LEBANON: THE LEBANESE FORCES MILITIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000201120001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Dept. review completed
Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 November 1982
Lebanon: The Lebanese Forces Militia
Summary
The Phalange-dominated Lebanese Forces militia
represents the most serious domestic threat to the authority
of Lebanese President Amin Jumayyil. It is the strongest
indigenous military group in Lebanon, and under the
leadership of its former commander, Bashir Jumayyil, it had
become a major political-force in its own right. One of
Amin's most difficult tasks will be to subordinate the
militia to the authority of the central government.
Bashir's assassination last September ushered in a
period of uncertainty for the Lebanese Forces. The militia
leaders viewed Bashir's election to the presidency as the
guarantee of their own legitimacy and preeminent role in
Lebanese politics. These leaders now are attempting to
redefine that role under radically different circumstances.
Never well disposed toward Amin, the militia leaders
initially seemed prepared to challenge his authority if he
deviated from Bashir's policies. In recent weeks, however,
the adversarial relationship between Amin and the Lebanese
Forces seems to be moderating. Militia leaders are beginning
to gain confidence that Amin is willing to compromise on
issues they regard as vital to their interests. They also
lack a viable alternative to Amin's leadership and recognize
that he has secured US support that is necessary to restore
Lebanon's national sovereignty.
This memorandum was prepared by jof the Levant 25X1
Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office o Near gas outh A
Analysis, at the request of Ambassador Habib.
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Amin and the militia leaders are still engaging in
political maneuvering with one another, and numerous issues,
particularly the future role of the Lebanese Forces, could
upset the still evolving relationship and lead to a
showdown. Unless clan and factional interests agree on a
compromise, Lebanon's future--like its past--is likely to
remain one of ongoing conflict and violence.
The Lebanese Forces is a coalition of Maronite Christian
militias formed in August 1976 during the Lebanese civil war.
Initially it included virtually all of the militias of the
Maronite political parties, but after 1978, the Syrian-backed
Zgharta Front, associated with former President Sulayman
Franjiyah, withdrew because of the anti-Syrian attitudes of the
other Maronite groups. Today the Lebanese Forces is made up of
the Phalange, the National Liberal Party of Camille Shamun, and
two extremist splinter groups--the Tanzim and the Guardians of
the Cedars.
The Lebanese Forces is totally dominated by the Phalange
militia. The Phalange fielded the largest Christian militia
during the civil war and was the first of the Maronite military
forces to clash with the Palestinians, whom the Phalange blame
for plunging the counry into civil war.
Bashir Jumayyil, then commander of the Phalange militia,
soon became the head of the Lebanese Forces, but he did not have
direct command over the other militias within the organization.
He remedied this situation in July 1980 by launching a brutal
attack on the rival Shamunist militia, forcing its total
submission to his authority. A short time later, the minor
Christian militias also surrendered their forces to Bashir.
Since that time, the term Lebanese Forces has become vi y
synonymous with the Phalange militia.
The philosophy of the militias reflects the political
ideology of the Maronite parties. Their aim is to maintain an
independent Lebanon under Maronite hegemony and thus ensure that
Lebanon will never be dominated by Muslims or absorbed into the
Arab world.
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br L ti:'r
Structure of the Lebanese Forces
We estimate the Lebanese Forces have a standing army of
approximately 3,000 men, supplemented by an estimated 9,000
trained reservists. The Phalange claims that its total military
strength, including its militias and irregulars, is as high as
40,000. In theory, the actions of the Lebanese Forces are
governed by a command council which implements policies handed
down by the the Lebanese Front the 'Political of the
unified Maronite parties.
Under Bashir's leadership, however, the Phalange militia
grew into a powerful and disciplined military force that
eventually superceded the authority of the political wing of th&
party. Bashir seldom consulted political leaders concerning the
activities of the Lebanese Forces, and he frequently ignored the
advice of the politicians when it was offered. Bashir
transformed the Lebanese Forces into an independent vehicle for
political change that eventually rivaled the traditional
political wing of the party, led by his father, Pierre.
New Circumstances
According to US Embassy reports, the Lebanese Forces has
lost some of its special identity and cohesion since Bashir's
assassination. Militia leaders want to maintain their
organization as a unique military force, but without Bashir's
dynamic leadership they appear to be drifting back under the
control of the party politicians.
Pierre Jumayyil, whose influence over the party's military
wing was eclipsed during the period of Bashir's ascendency, has
again emerged as the most important influence on the Lebanese
Forces. Fadi Frem, Bashir's politically inexperienced successor
as Lebanese Forces commander, has not been able to continue
Bashir's practice of acting without reference to the Phalan
Party.
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Amin and the Lebanese Forces
After Amin's election, the militia leaders moved ckly to
protect their interests. Amin has 25X1
acquiesced to several of eir demands, including the appointment
of many of Bashir's close advisers to positions of importance.
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While the President may still to some extent fear the militia, we
believe he is demonstrating political skill by taking advantage
of his father's influence with the militia, initially to reach a
modus vivendi and eventually to coopt its leaders.
During the past month, for example, Amin has made an effort
to gain the support of key militia figures, including appointees
who were forced upon him by the militia.
Amin has made special efforts to win over Zahi Bustani,
formerly a close adviser to-Bashir. Amin is expected to name
Bustani as Director of the Lebanese Surete Generale. We doubt
that Bustani will support Jumayyil, however, on, policies that
adversely affect the interests of the Lebanese Forces.
The gradual restoration of party influence over the militia
has improved relations hetwPPn Amin and the militia leaders.
the militiamen still do not like
Amin, who they believe represents the corrupt politics of the
older generation. They nevertheless have a basic identity of
.interests--the removal of Syrian, PLO, and Israeli forces from
Lebanon and the restoration of national sovereignty and
territorial integrity. We believe that the militia leaders,
however disgruntled, see no immediate alternative to Amin. They
also realize Amin has the US backing necessary to achieve their
ultimate objectives.
The Israeli Connection
The close contact and cooperation between Israel and the
Lebanese Forces over the past seven years has welded a very tight
relationship, the depths of which may never be known. We judge
that the militia leaders will remain indebted to the Israelis for
having come to their aid at a time when they were on the very
brink of being exterminated by the Palestinians and their leftist
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Sr;C:kU T
The major contentious issue conti
treaty.
In a conversation
witn us o icia s earlier this week, a militia official claimed
that the Lebanese Forces has informed the Israelis that it has
decided to back Amin and would no longer countenance Israeli
meddling in internal political affairs.
their room for political maneuvering has been blocked by US
involvement in Lebanon, and particularly US support for Amin.
Nonetheless, these militia leaders probably view the Israelis as
their ultimate trump card should their interests be y
the Lebanese central government.
Outlook
The resurgence of party control over the militia has reduced
the threat posed by the militia for the near term, but it has not
been eliminated. The loyalty of the militia hierarchy to
Phalange party founder Pierre Jumayyil--and the lack of alternate
leadership--may be strong enough to keep the militia from
challenging Amin.
Amin and the militia are still in a stage of tactical
maneuvering with one another. While a shift in the power balance
in favor of the President apparently is underway, it is by no
means complete. Major differences could still undermine their
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militants apparently believe
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new found accord. The nature of Lebanese-Israeli relations,
particularly the issue of a peace treaty, and the future of the
Lebanese Forces could lead to a showdown.
The key to Amin's winning the continuing cooperation--if not
loyalty--of the militia will be his ability to preserve the
Lebanese Forces in some form, without compromising the status of
the regular Army or offending Lebanon's Muslim maiority.
Ultimately, these compromises may be rejected by Muslims or
by the Army, which is seeking-to rebuild and reassert its
authority throughout the country. Even if accepted, the
proposals now under consideration may provide only near term
solutions in the absence of a strong sense of national identity
that outweighs clan and factional loyalties. Without this
identity, Lebanon's future, like its past, is likely to be one of
ongoing political and communal conflict.
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Name
Position Party
Fadi Frem Commander of The Lebanese Forces and Phalange
President of The Lebanese Forces
Command Council
Phalange
Phalange
Tanzim
Tanzim
Eli Aswad Deputy Commander of The Lebanese Forces National Liberal
Party
Na'um Farah
Fuad Rukuz
Georges Adwan
Fawzi Mahfuz AKA
Abu Roy
Etiene Saqr AKA
Abu Arz
Guardians of The
Cedars
National Liberal
Party
* The Tanzim split into two factions in 1977. Adwan and Tawil represent
one faction, while the other, represented by Abu Roy, is closely associated
with the Phalange.
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THE LEBANESE FORCES HEADQUARTERS STAFF ORGANIZATION
Position
Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff
Chief of Administrative Affairs
Phalange
Phalange
National Liberal
Party -
Chief of Military Intelligence
Namit Allah
Chief of Operations
Thai
Raj a
Chief of Logistics
Independent
Murakadi
Fadi Hayak
Chief of Psychological Operations
Tanzim
Na'um Farah
Chief of External Relations Department
Phalange
Elie Hubayka
Director of The Lebanese Forces
Phalange
Intelligence Department
Director of The Lebanese Forces
Phalange
Police Department
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