PAKISTAN: TOUGH CHOICES ON AFGHANISTAN

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200890001-1
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• Original Classification: S
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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
STAT
on Afghanistan
Pakistan: Tough Choices
An Intelligence Assessment
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review
completed.
Secret
NESA 82-10366
July 1982
Copy 2 3 'j
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Directorate of cret
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
Council and with the Directorate of Operations.
It was coordinated with the National Intelligence
Secret
NESA 82-10366
July 1982
Pakistan: Tough Choices
on Afghanistan
This assessment was prepared by
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis.
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Pakistan: Tough Choices
on Afghanistan
Key Judgments Pakistan supports the Afghan insurgents in order to prevent the Soviets
from controlling Afghanistan and using it as a base to threaten Baluchistan
and meddle in Pakistani politics. The support to the Afghan insurgents also
allows Islamabad to secure increased military and financial assistance from
the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, and Western Europe. Moscow
blames its failure to control Afghanistan in part on Pakistan's support for
the insurgents and has warned Islamabad that its policies could threaten
Pakistan's security. The Soviets retain options to increase their support for
opposition groups in Pakistan and to step up military pressure along the
border.
Some Pakistani officials have advocated a more flexible policy toward
Kabul and Moscow because they believe the Soviets will not withdraw
from Afghanistan and that continued opposition endangers Pakistan's
security:
? Pakistan cannot successfully defend against a major Soviet incursion.
? India is still Pakistan's principal security threat, and sustained tensions
along the Afghanistan border leave Islamabad vulnerable to coordinated
pressure from Moscow and New Delhi.
? Tensions between Pakistani citizens and the Afghan refugees in the
border regions are mounting because of ethnic, religious, and tribal
differences and the greatly increased burden on local resources.
? Foreign support could weaken if the European Community, the non-
aligned movement, and even the United States decide that reducing
tensions with Moscow is more important than continued confrontation
over Afghanistan.
Islamabad's participation in UN-sponsored indirect talks with Kabul is
intended to relieve the pressure from Moscow, to show sufficient diplo-
matic flexibility to preserve Pakistan's broad international support, and to
put the onus on the Soviets and Afghans for the failure of the discussions.
Islamabad would probably adopt a slightly more conciliatory policy if
intensified Soviet pressure threatened Pakistan's security or political
stability or if foreign security assistance-especially from the United
States-was perceived as inadequate for Pakistan's needs.
Information available as of 15 July 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
iii Secret
NESA 82-10366
July 1982
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The Pakistanis view US military assistance as the necessary underpinning
to their Afghanistan policy. They believe a strengthened military capability
made credible by the acquisition of modern weapons is essential to mitigate
Soviet pressure and to deter Soviet-and Indian-attacks on Pakistan.
The sale of advanced weapons is the yardstick by which Islamabad
measures US support for Pakistan's political and security interests. Failure
by the United States to meet Pakistan's perceived security needs would
confirm Islamabad's doubts about the reliability of the United States as an
ally and arms supplier and harm US .interests in the region:
? Such a development would strengthen those in Islamabad who are
arguing for an accommodation with Moscow and Kabul, which would
diminish the security of the insurgents' base and propaganda platform in
Pakistan.
? Saudi and Chinese confidence in US resolve to protect its interests and
allies in the region would be undermined.
? Moscow might be encouraged to intensify its pressure on Islamabad and
would question US willingness and capability to protect its interests
elsewhere in South Asia and the Middle East.
US willingness to provide modern arms to Pakistan would reinforce
Islamabad's policy of supporting the insurgency and would be well received
in Beijing and Riyadh. Extensive US arms supplies to Pakistan, however,
would also increase regional tensions:
? Relations between New Delhi and Islamabad would become more
strained, and the likelihood of an Indo-Pakistan war would increase until
Pakistan's defenses were strengthened with the delivery of most of the
US weapons in the mid-1980s.
? India would become more vocal in its opposition to US policies in the re-
gion and might give greater support to Soviet policies and seek additional
Soviet arms.
? Moscow would still not compromise on Afghanistan and might increase
its support for the political and subversive opposition to the Zia regime.
Secret iv
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Pakistan: Tough Choices
on Afghanistan
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Pakistan's Strategic Perceptions
Most diplomatic, political, and military observers
agree that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan has
increased Islamabad's sense of vulnerability and has
led it to reassess its security policy and foreign
relations. The Pakistanis, for the first time, face a
serious threat from the northwest in addition to the
longstanding threat from India to the east. Afghani-
stan was once regarded as a weak buffer state be-
tween the USSR and South Asia and no great threat
to Pakistan's security.
Islamabad believes a fundamental improvement
in its military capability is necessary to deter Soviet
and Indian aggression and has emphasized acquiring
modern weaponry-principally from the United
States-to build a convincing defense.
Pakistani assessments conclude that the Soviet move
into Afghanistan was part of a long-term strategy to
gain access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
They warn that Soviet pressure on Baluchistan and
meddling in Pakistani politics will inevitably follow
Soviet success in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis in their
assessments worry that by 1985 the Soviets will want
to launch a major attack on Pakistan with the aim of
seizing Baluchistan and simultaneously cutting the
strategic Korakoram highway to China in the north
and linking with Indian forces at the Indus River in
Pakistan's Support for the Insurgents
Islamabad's support for the Afghan insurgents, in our
view, is premised on the strategic imperative of
neutralizing the Soviet threat from Afghanistan while
strengthening Pakistan's defenses. Support for the
insurgency allows Islamabad more time to improve its
armed forces while simultaneously preventing the
Soviets from consolidating their hold on Afghanistan
and using it as a base to threaten and destabilize
Pakistan. Islamabad has secured increased military
and financial aid from the United States, China,
Saudi Arabia, and Western Europe-all of which
want to strengthen Pakistan to contain Soviet political
and military expansion in South Asia. Islamabad's
policy, however, risks greater Soviet pressure that.
could threaten Pakistan's security and stability before
Pakistan could finish improving its defenses~__25X1
Islamabad's support for the insurgents is crucial to
denying the Soviets control of Afghanistan. Pakista25X1
is a supply base and a sanctuary for the insurgents,
and Islamabad has allowed them to establish traini25X1
camps and receive foreign arms in the border regions.
The cross-border infiltration of men and weapons has
central Pakistan.
India's close relations with the USSR greatly increase
Pakistan's anxieties
sions between Pakistanis and various US officials
indicate Islamabad's worst nightmare is that the
USSR and India intend to dismember Pakistan into
ethnically based vassal states in Pashtunistan, Balu-
New Delhi are conspiring to weaken and neutralize
Pakistan so that its policies do not threaten their
interests. India's arms buildup, primarily with Soviet-
supplied weapons, is seen as preparing for an eventual
war to establish its hegemony over Pakistan. Discus-
Islamabad's fears that Moscow and
and effective insurgency could cause Moscow to re,25X1
sess its policy in Afghanistan and seek a political
accommodation acceptable to Islamabad, including
the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the establishment
of a genuinely nonaligned government in Kabul.
Pakistan's policy of giving sanctuary to over 2 million
Afghan refugees and its support for the insurgents has
broad public backing. Much of Pakistan's population
in the Western Tribal Areas is ethnically related to
25X1 chistan, Sind, and the Punjab.
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 Reinforcements from the Indian border would be
needed to deal with a major Soviet thrust from
Afghanistan, but in our judgment the Army's logistic
system could not support a major redeployment of
units across the country, even in the unlikely event
that a decision was made to reduce defenses along the
Indian border. There are only two major rail lines
between eastern and western Pakistan, and the roads
are in poor condition. The Pakistanis are not able to
move equipment quickly across country, and the
transportation system paralleling the Afghan border
is wholly inadequate for redeploying units.
Pakistan is unable to cope with Soviet and Afghan
airspace violations and could not maintain air superi-
ority or provide effective close air support in border
opposite Afghanistan.
Most of the improvements Pakistan has made in its
western defenses have been in strengthening the
lightly armed, paramilitary Frontier Corps, which is
responsible for border security and for maintaining
order in the Western Tribal Areas. The Frontier
Corps is commanded by Army officers and is orga-
nized into some 70 battalion-size "wings" of 750 men
each. Though it lacks heavy weapons and has only
limited mobility, attache reports indicate that the
Frontier Corps is highly motivated and intimately
familiar with the rugged terrain along much of the
border because its recruits are from the Tribal Areas.
Since December 1979 Pakistan has added over 15,000
men in 20 new wings to the Frontier Corps,
and has reinforces
border units with Army battalions at the major border
crossings. We believe the expansion of the Frontier
Corps may have been as much to help control the
large number of Afghan refugees as to strengthen
border security.
Soviet Pressure on Pakistan
It is clear from their private and public statements
that the Soviets put part of the blame for their failure
to control Afghanistan on Pakistan's support for the
insurgents and are using a combination of pressure
and blandishments to try to change Islamabad's poli-
cy. Moscow has frequently warned Islamabad to end
its support for the insurgents and negotiate a solution
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the Afghans and would support their Afghan brethren
in their fight against the Soviets even if Islamabad did
not. Some of the domestic groups that most strongly
back President Zia's government have traditional
political ties with several of the Peshawar-based insur-
gent groups.
25X1
Pakistan's Military Capabilities
Islamabad has made only modest improvements in its
military capability along the Afghan border since the
Soviet intervention in December 1979.
clashes. The Pakistan Air Force is equipped largely
with aging and obsolescent Chinese-built aircraft.
Islamabad has not deployed any of its more modern
French Mirage fighters to react to airspace violations
in the west.
Pakistan has improved its air defenses in the west by
establishing a new air defense sector between Pesha-
war and Quetta and by installing new warning and
surveillance radars along the Afghan border. The
ability of the Pakistanis to coordinate air defenses,
however, is greatly circumscribed by aging equipment 25X1
and command and control difficulties. None of Paki-
stan's six surface-to-air missile batteries protect the
two major airfields or any other military facility
No major units have been moved
from the Indian border since the Soviet intervention,
and Pakistan's plans to increase forces opposite Af-
ghanistan depend on sizable arms purchases from
25X1 abroad
We believe Pakistan could defend against limited
Afghan or Soviet border incursions, but it could not
withstand large Soviet operations.
Equipped with little armor, few armored vehicles an
helicopters, and many outdated weapons, the Army
lacks the mobility and firepower to engage large
25X1 Soviet formations in maneuver warfare.
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to the Afghanistan problem with the Kabul govern-
ment. The Soviets insist, both publicly and privately,
that an end to foreign support for the insurgents must
come before any withdrawal of their forces and that,
in any case, the subject of Soviet forces is a matter
exclusively for Moscow and Kabul
Political Pressure. In our view, Moscow believes that
Islamabad's policy on Afghanistan is personally
linked to President Zia,
Nusrat Bhutto, chairman of the PPP
and widow of populist Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, has pleased Moscow by saying she would
recognize the Kabul government, stop insurgent infil-
tration from Pakistan, and send the Afghan refugees
home if she gained power.
the Soviets have long maintained contact with Paki-
stani Baluch and Pushtun separatist groups and might
try to use them to gain leverage over Pakistan's
policies. In our view these groups, unlike the PPP, are
too weak to threaten the survival of the Zia regime,
but they are capable of costly acts of subversion and
can exploit traditional tribal rivalries along the Paki-
stan-Afghanistan border. We believe Moscow is
aware that its support for the separatist groups would
be opposed just as strongly by a PPP-led government
Soviet intervention in Pakistan's domestic affairs by
supporting opposition political groups or ethnic sepa-
ratist elements in their activities against the Zia
regime has little prospect for immediate success, in
our view. Moscow's subversion-especially if it is not
well concealed-promotes still closer ties between
Pakistan and the United States. The Soviets generally
have focused on trying to change Pakistan's policy by
a combination of political and military pressure and
offering economic aid and an easing of tensions. We
believe the Soviets hope at least to encourage debate
among Zia's advisers about the wisdom of Pakistan's
Afghanistan policy. 25X1
Military Pressure. The Soviets have warned Islam-
abad on many occasions that continuing to support
the insurgents, and strengthening security relations
with the US, would threaten Pakistan's own security.
Foreign Minister Gromyko said publicly in February
1980 that Pakistan risked its independence by aiding
the insurgents. US diplomats in Pakistan were told
that Islamabad's Ambassador in Moscow was bluntly
warned by a ranking Soviet official in the Foreign
Ministry in June 1981 that Pakistan's policy would25X1
eventually lead to war with Afghanistan in which
Moscow would support Kabul.
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The Soviets have not systematically attacked targets
in Pakistani territory, but reconnaissance flights along
the border are routinely flown by Soviet and Afghan
aircraft and there are frequent airspace violations and
occasional bombing and strafing attacks across the 25X1
border.
Until last fall we believed few of the violations were
deliberate and that many occurred because the border
is ill-defined. Some of the border violations last fall-
which involved aerial mining and bombing and straf-
ing incidents-seemed deliberate, however, and ap-
peared aimed at intensifying pressure on Islamabad to
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come to terms with the Soviet-dominated government
in Kabul. No serious border violations have occurred
25X1 since then.
Pakistan tensions to prevent Pakistan from strength-
ening its defenses in the west and to force the
Pakistanis to reduce tensions with Afghanistan in
order to concentrate on the Indian threat. They also
believe that the Soviets have discouraged New Delhi
from serious negotiations on Zia's proposal for a
nonaggression pact between India and Pakistan and
have reinforced New Delhi's belief that Islamabad's
purchases of modern US arms reveal an intention to
We do not believe New Delhi would be willing to
increase pressure on Pakistan to serve Soviet interests
Prime Minister Gandhi has not openly
opposed Soviet policy on Afghanistan
she is
concerned that the conflict is threatening India's
policy and security interests by contributing to the US
decision to sell modern weapons to Pakistan. New
Delhi's position on Afghanistan in our view also
reflects its belief that Moscow will not accept any
government in Kabul that threatens its interests-
even if this requires a Soviet military involvement of
many years
Worrying About the Future
Pakistani officials believe the Soviets will become
more aggressive in trying to press Islamabad to
recognize the Kabul. government and end its support
for the insurgents.
Islamabad the Soviets to conduct an
increasing number of cross-border artillery and air-
strikes against the refugee camps and isolated border
outposts.
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Although the Soviets have been unable to close the
porous frontier by using combat patrols and mining
border trails and have also been unsuccessful in
intimidating Islamabad politically, they could in-
crease military pressure on Pakistan with more fre-
quent and severe airstrikes and artillery fire across the
border or with quick, airmobile assault raids against
insurgent bases in Pakistan's border regions. We
believe the Soviets would probably try to control the
escalation by limiting their attacks to insurgent bases
and supply lines, not striking deeply into Pakistan,
and trying to avoid clashes with the Pakistan Army
that could trigger a larger conflict and provoke sharp
Cross-border operations, in our view, would disrupt
the stability and security of insurgent supply lines and
staging areas in Pakistan and increase pressure on
Islamabad to end its support for the insurgents, but
they would not stop insurgent infiltration into Af-
ghanistan. The failure of such operations to apprecia-
bly dampen the insurgency might convince frustrated
Soviet military planners that larger cross-border oper-
ations were necessary, perhaps including the seizure
of Pakistani territory. We believe Soviet policymakers
would weigh the dubious military benefits of such
escalation against the risk that gross violations of
Pakistan's territory would provoke greater US politi-
cal and military involvement in South Asia
25X1 e ieves that the Soviets want to increase Indo-
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An escalation of Soviet and Afghan military pressure
along the border would present Islamabad with hard
choices on how and where to respond, especially if the
Soviets began a concerted effort to attack insurgent
base camps in Pakistan on a regular basis. In our
view, failure to defend Pakistani territory would have
severe political consequences for any government in
Islamabad. It would undermine public confidence in
the government, erode Army support for Zia, and
endanger his regime. A serious military defeat, how-
ever, could have equally severe consequences, particu-
larly if it resulted in territorial losses. A forward
defense of resisting Soviet attacks in the border
regions might deter further attacks, but it could also
provoke an unwanted escalation of force against
which Pakistan could not defend. A defense-in-depth
strategy would allow the Soviets to operate in the
border regions with virtual impunity and could em-
bolden them to apply greater military pressure on
25X1 both the insurgents and Islamabad.
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We believe that so long as Soviet and Afghan air-
strikes or border incursions are small and limited to
attacks on insurgent targets in the border area,
Islamabad probably would not risk defending the
insurgents. The Pakistanis could inflict serious losses
on small Soviet or Afghan forces operating in the
border region in chance encounters or if there were
time enough to use their better knowledge of the
terrain to set up ambushes, but it is clear
Is ama a
fears such clashes would provoke a large Soviet
response. We do not believe that small border skir-
mishes involving mostly Frontier Corps units would be
seen by Islamabad as a major provocation that would
cause the Soviets to escalate, and Pakistani border
posts would be expected to fire on attacking aircraft
and ground forces as in the past. We expect the
Pakistanis will keep Army units deployed in defensive
positions away from the border to guard against deep
incursions. These units could be more easily rein-
forced with additional manpower, artillery, and air
25X1 defense weapons.
Pakistan's Policy Debates
Most Pakistani officials do not believe the Soviets will
withdraw from Afghanistan, and some influential
policymakers and a significant number of middle-level
Army officers believe that Islamabad should seek an
accommodation with Moscow to reduce political and
many Paki-25X1
stanis believe that a reduction in tensions with the
Soviets is needed to allow Islamabad to better cope
with the more serious threat to Pakistan's security-
India. President Zia told a US Congressional delega-
tion to Islamabad last January that many Indian
officials have not reconciled themselves to Pakicthn'c
existence-a belief shared by many PakistarUn25X1
Pakistani25X1
officers are concerned that Islamabad's new emphasis
on Afghanistan allows India to increase the pressure
on Pakistan as well as allowing Moscow and New
Delhi to threaten Islamabad implicitly with a two-
front war. A more conciliatory policy toward Afghan-
istan, based on the prevalent view that Moscow will
not withdraw its forces, could induce the Soviets to
press New Delhi to ease tensions with Pakistan and
would enable Islamabad to concentrate on improving
its defenses against Indi 25X1
Some Pakistani officials, concerned that the 2 million
Afghan refugees in the border region are straining
local economic resources and exacerbating ethnic and
religious tensions, are also urging a more flexible
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policy, Pakistan's popu-
lation in the North-West Frontier Province and in
Baluchistan has accepted the Afghan refugees with
tolerance and support, but some disturbances have
occurred between the refugees and the local popula-
25X1 tion in the Kurram Agency in the North-West Fron-
The large number of refugees al
within NATO, might reach agreement with Moscow
that leaves Pakistan without any superpower support
in its backing of the insurgents.
the Pakistanis still harbor persistent doubts
about US reliability as an ally and especially as an
arms supplier-a legacy of the US arms embargoes in
25X1
25X1
25X1
the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971. We believe
that US inability to assure promised delivery to
Pakistan of some sophisticated weapons-which are
protected by US national disclosure policy-and the
prospect of annual congressional review of the foreign
military sales program both reinforce Islamabad's
concern that the US arms supply relationship would
not endure. US 25X1
unwillingness to commit itself to Pakistan's security
beyond the assurances contained in the 1959 Execu-
tive Agreement also causes some Pakistanis to ques-
tion Islamabad's policy of relying on US backing 25X1
is beginning to compete with the local population for
employment, food, water, and fuel, thus straining
available resources in the border regionsi
Islamabad could, in our view, try to mitigate tensions
between the refugees and the local population by
tightening regulations on the refugees to minimize the
insurgents' freedom of movement and permitting only
UN-administered refugee camps-and no insurgent
camps-to function on Pakistani territory.
the governor of Baluchi-
25X1 Stan Province plans to move many of the refugees
away from the border to minimize both the prospect
of local disturbances and the likelihood of Soviet
strikes across the border. Many Pakistanis living in
the border region believe that there would be no
25X1 Soviet threat from Afghanistan if it were not for the
refugees, The US
Embassy reports that the governor of the North-West
Frontier Province was warned by the Soviet Ambassa-
dor in Islamabad that border tensions would remain
high so long as Islamabad continued to allow the
insurgents to operate from Pakistani territory.
Pakistani officials also worry that the longer the
Soviets occupy Afghanistan, the more readily the
occupation will be accepted by other nations-partic-
ularly in the European Community and in the non-
aligned movement-which are more intent on reduc-
ing tensions with Moscow than adhering to a position
of principle that aggravates international tensions.
Islamabad is
especially concerned that the United States, perhaps
acting to assuage domestic and foreign concern about
its Soviet policies and to minimize policy differences
against the Soviets.
many Pakistani officials suspect US support 25X1
for Pakistan its only a temporary expedient to oppose
the Soviets and that an improvement in US-Soviet
relations would leave Pakistan alone to confront the
Soviets, and their Indian allies, in South AUN~
At the same time, Islamabad has failed to secure a
much-hoped-for commitment from Beijing to defend
Pakistan, despite China's strong support.
United States provide a firm commitment to defend
Pakistan and has implied that Chinese troops would
deploy to Pakistan only after US troops had arrived.
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Pakistan's Diplomatic Strategy
Despite these misgivings, Pakistan has been resolute
in maintaining its conditions for an Afghan settle-
ment, which have been endorsed by both the UN
General Assembly and the Islamic Conference and
which have the support of Islamabad's principal allies.
Islamabad's substantive proposals, given both publicly
and privately to various audiences, call for the imme-
diate withdrawal of Soviet forces, the creation of the
political conditions necessary for the return of the
Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, self-determina-
tion for the Afghan people, and nonalignment for
Afghanistan. Islamabad does not recognize the Kabul
government and insists that negotiations only include
representatives of the Afghan Communist Party-not
the government-in addition to the governments of
Pakistan and Iran and representatives from the insur-
gent groups
Islamabad, because it is uncertain about the depth of
foreign backing and feels vulnerable to Soviet pres-
sure, has nevertheless maintained diplomatic channels
to Moscow and has been careful not to close policy
options. Pakistan and the USSR exchange high-level
delegations to discuss Afghanistan, although they
have made no progress in resolving their differences.
It is clear that the Pakistanis have not compromised
their position on Afghanistan despite Soviet threats
and offers of economic and even military aid and hints
that Kabul would recognize the Durand Line as
Afghanistan's border with Pakistan. In our view,
Islamabad's hints that it might some day seek an
accommodation with Moscow and Kabul and perhaps
recognize a different government in Afghanistan rep-
resent not only genuine consideration of policy alter-
natives, but-also subtle efforts to elicit more foreign
support. The Pakistanis have told their allies that
their support for the insurgents requires assurances of
foreign backing for Islamabad, especially in military
25X1 aid.
We do not believe Islamabad's involvement in the
UN-sponsored indirect talks with Afghanistan at
Geneva last month means that Pakistan has softened
its conditions; instead it was intended to show diplo-
matic flexibility and to increase political pressure on
Moscow. Pakistani officials have made clear to the
United States that Islamabad believes the talks,
which were held through a UN intermediary, were
necessary to relieve the pressure from Moscow and to
preserve the strong diplomatic support it has received
from the UN, the Islamic Conference, the nonaligned
movement, and the European Community. Even
though the format was designed to avoid prejudicing
Islamabad's nonrecognition of the Soviet-backed gov-
ernment, the Pakistanis risked conferring a modicum
of respectability on the Kabul government. They
hoped that adherence to their widely backed condi-
tions for an acceptable Afghan settlement and Iran's
willingness to be kept informed on the progress of the
talks would deflect criticism of Pakistan and preclude
early movement to direct talks between the govern-
ments. The UN intermediary claimed small progress
was made when the Afghans agreed to discuss the
withdrawal of Soviet troops and return of the refu-
gees, but the talks do not seem to have brought a
political solution to the Afghanistan problem any
closer. 25X1
If Islamabad believed that intensified Soviet pressure
threatened either Pakistan's security or political sta-
bility, we expect Pakistan would attempt to modify its
Afghanistan policy without seeming to abandon its
support for the insurgency. Pakistan could restrict
insurgent activities in the border region but still claim
it supported the political objectives of the Afghan
insurgents. Islamabad could discreetly begin diplo-
matic contacts with the Kabul government at UN-
sponsored proximity talks but still publicly insist its
conditions for a political settlement had not changed.
Sensitive to US, Chinese, and Saudi concerns, Paki-
stan, in our view, would probably not dramatically
change its policy but gradually shift toward concilia-
tion instead of confrontation. Such a shift could
emphasize supporting a UN-brokered solution-
which would have implicit international backing-
that could include the refugees returning to Afghani-
stan, Afghan opposition groups negotiating with, and
perhaps joining, a Soviet-backed government in Ka-
bul, and Soviet troops being withdrawn by bilateral
agreement with a more broadly based Kabul govern-
ment as Pakistan ended foreign support for the insur-
gents. 25X1
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Implications for US Policy
Islamabad has played the key role in supporting the
insurgents and in focusing international attention on
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and any move-
ment by Pakistan toward political accommodation
with Moscow and Kabul would be a severe blow to
US policy in South Asia. Pakistan's willingness to
negotiate with a Soviet-backed government in Kabul
would give that government a legitimacy it could not
otherwise attain. Because achieving the political and
military goals of the Afghan insurgency depends on
Pakistan's support, Islamabad's implied acceptance of
the Soviet fait accompli in Afghanistan would be a
major setback for the insurgents and erode the inter-
national consensus against the Soviet intervention
there. The insurgents would be denied a secure sanc-
tuary and supply base in Pakistan, and the activities
of Afghan political exiles there could be greatly
US policy toward Pakistan will be the key determi-
nant in the direction of Islamabad's Afghanistan
policy because of the Pakistani belief that US support
is crucial to resisting Soviet pressure. It is clear from
Pakistani officers and government officials that the
sale of advanced weapons is the yardstick by which
Islamabad measures US support for Pakistan's politi-
cal and security interests. In our view, US willingness
to meet Pakistan's perceived security requirements
would reinforce Zia's policy of supporting the insur-
gents. A perception of inadequate US support for
Pakistan's security interests, however, would strength-
en arguments in Islamabad for a more conciliatory
policy toward Afghanistan.
A stronger US commitment to Pakistan's security to
encourage Islamabad's firm opposition to the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan would almost certainly
further sour US relations with India and further
strain relations between New Delhi and Islamabad,
particularly if it involved more military sales. It is
clea
that the Indians view the US-Pakistan security rela-
tionship as both threatening their political and mili-
tary predominance and inviting increased superpower
competition in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
More US support for Pakistan might cause India to
heighten military tensions on Pakistan's eastern bor-
der and would increase the likelihood of an Indo-
Pakistan war within the next few years. India dis-
trusts Islamabad's intentions and may believe a
preventive war would be necessary before US arms
sales could greatly improve Pakistan's military capa-
bilities in the mid-1980s. India might also strengthen
its relations with the USSR and give more support to
Soviet policy in Afghanistan
US policy in the event of intensified Soviet pressure
on Pakistan would likewise be subject to close analysis
by regional powers in the Middle East-notably
Saudi Arabia.. The Saudis have close security rela-
tions with Pakistan and would welcome increased US
support for Islamabad. We believe a stronger US
commitment to Pakistan's security would reassure
Riyadh of the US resolve to protect Saudi security
interests in the Persian Gulf region. The Saudis were
disconcerted about the US failure to support as
important an ally as the Shah of Iran, and a similar
failure to support Pakistan would shake their confi-
dence in the credibility of US commitments. Even so,
we expect Riyadh would continue its close relations
with the United States because of its dependence on
the United States for arms and its fears about Iranian
intentions in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia might,
however, put further distance between itself and US
policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as US
efforts to build regional support for the use of the
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in the Persian
Gulf.
Soviet policy in Afghanistan would also be affected by
the US response to intensified pressure on Pakistan.
In our view, if Moscow believed there was no strong
US commitment to Pakistan's security, the Soviets
would probably conclude that they could conduct
deeper incursions into Pakistan without much risk of a
strong US response. They might also question US
willingness and capability to protect its interests
elsewhere in South Asia and the Middle East. On the
other hand, increased military assistance to Pakistan
and a reaffirmation of the 1959 US-Pakistan Execu-
tive Agreement might lead the Soviets to refrain from
deep incursions and possibly reduce tensions along the
border, although it would not cause them to compro-
mise on Afghanistan. But a stronger US commitment
to Pakistan's security would encourage increased So-
viet support for subversive and political opponents of
President Zia's regime
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