LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200630001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 11, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Rel
MtMORAM FOR:
Executive Secretary
THROUGH: NFAC Action Officer
FROM: Helene L. Boatner.
Director, Near East/South Asia Analysis
Attached is our memo titled IlLehanpqp idential
Election" which was prepared byl of our
Arab-Israel Division in respons e revues from
Allen Lenz of the National Security Count
He ene L. Boatner
FORM 1 USE PREVIOUS ""j
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
11 December 1981
LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Summary
The emerging Lebanese presidentia-:Z campaign, aimed
at the election scheduled for next summer, is already
boiling down to a contest between the Christian Lebanese
Front, Zed by Bashir Jumayyil,_,.? yid the Syrians. The
Front does not have sufficient support in the Lebanese
parliament to elect its own candidate, but it could
probably muster the votes to block a Syrian-backed candi-
date from achievin the broad majority Damascus will be
seeking.
Raymond Edde and former President Sulayman Franjiyah
are the two most frequently mentioned possible candidates,
although most factions have refused to tip their hand so
early in the campaign. Edde is popular in Lebanon and
has ties with the Muslim community, but his relations
with Syria have been strained in the past and he is dis-
trusted by hardline Christians. Franjiyah, widely viewed
as a Syrian stalking horse, is anathema to the Phalange-
dominated Lebanese Front, and his election would almost
certainly lead to new Syrian-Phalange hostilities.
This memorandum was prepared by of the Arab- 25X1
Israeli Division of the Office of Near as South Asia Analysis
at the request of the National Security Council Staff. It was
coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Near East
and South Asia, the Office of Central Reference, and the
Directorate for Operations. The information cutoff date is
11 December 1981. Questions and comments are welcome be addressed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division 25X1
NESA M#81-10079
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The Legal Framework
The Lebanese constitution stipulates that the President must
be elected by two-thirds of the 99 members of Parliament on the
first ballot or by a simple majority on subsequent ballots.*
Parliamentary elections have not been held since 1972, and seven
of the 99 deputies elected that year have since died. It appears
that unless the constitution is amended to reflect a voting pool
of 92 deputies, a winner would still require 66 votes on the
first ballot or 50 thereafter. This could work to the advantanp
of a small bloc seeking to prevent a candidate's .1 1 25X1
Holding the election does not require a specific quorum.
Only the number of deputies to elect a candidate--66 on the first
ballot and 50 thereafter--need be present. President Sarkis was
elected in 1976 with the support of 69 of the 71 deputies in
attendance; his Muslim and leftist opponents, knowing they larkprl
the votes to block his election, boycotted the balloting. 25X1
A constitutional amendment was passed in 1976 to allow the
election that year to be held three months before the time
stipulated by the constitution, largely because the Syrians hoped
the prompt replacement of then PresiAtnt Sulayman Franjiyah would
end the civil war. Many deputies were cowed into backing Elias
Sarkis, who had both Syrian and hardline Christian support
against Raymond Edde. Leftist leader Kamal Junblat, who
supported Edde, tried several times to postpone the election. He
finally resorted to ordering his militiamen to stoke up the
fighting and detain deputies in an unsuccessful
a quorum of 66 from meeting to elect Sarkis. 25X1
The 1982 Election
Because of the unsettled security situation and the
continuing Syrian role in Lebanon, the impending election is
likely to resemble the campaign of 1976. If the Syrians--through
their Lebanese Muslim and a few Christian allies--decide to press
for the election of a strongly pro-Syrian candidate, they are
likely to be opposed actively only by deputies representing the
Christian Lebanese Front and a few allied with it. -
The Front could attempt to block the election by preventing
a sufficient number of pro-Syrian deputies from assembling in the
hope that this would force Syria td--accept a compromise candidate
or lead to a crisis that would prompt outside intervention on the
Front's behalf.
*Under the unwritten National Covenant of 1943, the President
must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister
and the Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim. 25X1
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-- Such a strategy would almost certainly require kidnapings,
killings, and other forms of intimidation and violence.
-- If the election were not held and President Sarkis's term
expired in September 1982, a so-called "constitutional
vacuum" would be created and the cabinet would have to
assume executive responsibilities until an election could
be held.
-- Many Lebanese politicians and observers fear that such a
development could be fatal to the presidency as the symbol
of Lebanese unity.
Alternatively, the Front could allow the election to take
place and try to block the Syrian candidate on the first
ballot.
-- The Syrians would prefer to win on the first ballot with a
two-thirds majority because they could then claim that the
new President represented all but the most hardline
Christian elements.
-- Damascus took.this tack in 1.976 when it lined up backing
for Sarkis from depu 1 confessional
groups and regions.
We believe Jumayyil could count on enough deputies (27) to
block a Syrian candidate on the first ballot, but he probably
could not prevent a Syrian victory on a subsequent ballot if
Damascus settled for Preside ed by less than a two-
thirds majority.
At this point Syria's strategy is unclear. The Syrians are
opposed to the election of a hardline Christian, but we have
little information on whether they plan to back a strongly pro-
Syrian nominee or are looking for a compromise candidate. There
are signs that they believe they cannot marshal enough votes to
win on the first ballot. If this is the case, they may choose to
promote a strongly pro-Syrian candidate in the early stages of
the campaign with an eye toward "compromising" on a candidate who
still meets most of their requirements and can be elected on the
first ballot.
On the other hand, indications--that the Syrians believe they
cannot muster the votes to win on the first ballot may simply be
tactical maneuverings designed to frighten their potential allies
in Lebanon into a political coalition against the Lebanese
Front. Combined with warnings about Phalangist machinations
these tactics might also help keep pressure on potentially
wayward deputies in the event of a first ballot setback
Damascus already appears to be trying to build a coalition 25X1
consisting of Franjiyah, former Prime Minister Rashid Karami, and
the leftist National Movement to serve as the vehicle fo
confronting Jumayyil's Lebanese Front over the election.
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Raymond Edde
When asked recently about the strong public support in a
poll last year for the possible candidacy of Raymond Edde, former
Prime Minister and leading Sunni politician Saeb Salam said, "I
think if you conduct the same poll again now, you-will find the
result still stands, but that is the opinion of the public and it
is not the public that elects the President in Lebanon."
Although blunt, his statement highlights the relatively limited
role public opinion plays in Lebanon's presidential elections.
Previous Presidents have usually been elected largely as a result
of political deals among the country's political parties, clans,
and confessional groups. Moreover, the traditionally weak
electoral link between parliament and the voting public has grown
even more tenuous with the postponement of quadrennial elections
since 1972. The civil war has caused such major shifts in some
constituencies that several deputies could not possibl be
reelected in the districts they currently represent. 25X1
Raymond Edde, whose moderate Maronite Nation Bloc has three
seats in parliament, apparently retains the backing of at least
some of the leaders of the factions that backed him as the
candidate of moderate. Christians and.the Muslim left during the
campaign of 1976. Druze chieftain and Muslim leftist National
Movement leader Walid Junblat has already endorsed Edde, as has
Saeb Salam. Nabih Barri, head of the largest faction of the Shia
Amal Movement, has offered cautious support. 25X1
Edde has been unpopular with the Syrians, whom he criticized
heavily for their role in the civil war 1975-76 in. There are,
however, signs that Edde recently exchanged
political feelers.
Edde and his National Bloc were at one time allied with
Camille Shamun and Pierre Jumayyil, whose factions now constitute
the bulk of the Lebanese Front. He broke with them during the
parliamentary election in 1972 when, with his eye on the
presidency in 1976, he began moving toward the political
center. This, combined with hardline Maronite suspicions that he
was too sympathetic to the Muslim side during the civil, war,
earned him the enmity of many hardline Maronites, including
Bashir Jumayyil. They remain suspicious that his presidential
ambitions will prompt him to concede too much to Damascus.
Following the elections in 1976 Edde-, who now lives in Paris, was
the target of two attempts on his life one f which believed
to have been perpetrated by the Phalange. 25X1
Sulayman Franjiyah
Former President Sulayman Franjiyah has been widely viewed
as one of Syria's leading candidates for the presidency since his
break with the Lebanese Front in early 1978. Franjiyah has
little popularity either with Muslims, who remember his stubborn
defense of Maronite supremacy during the civil war, or
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Christians, with whom he has never achieved much of a following
outside his fiefdom in northern Lebanon. A dark horse candidate
in 1970, he was elected only after the two main candidates
dropped out of the race at the last moment and then only b one
vote on the third ballot, 25X6
1 -1 Although the early years of his 25X6
presidency were marked by a welcome effort to ensure that the
parliamentary election in 1972 was conducted fairly, his regime
i s 1 for the country's rapid slide into civil
war.
If the Syrians decide to take a hard line on the election,
Franjiyah could be their candidate. He has already indicated a
willingness to establish the kind of close, formal ties Damascus
wants from the next President and is strongly motivated by a
desire to use the presidency to exact revenge upon the Jumayyils,
who he claims were responsible for the murder of his son. If, on
the other hand, the Syrians decide on another candidate but are
reluctant to tip their hand too soon, they may propose Franjiyah
with an eye to abandoning him later as a "conciliatory" gesture
aimed at attracting the u ronites and
isolating the Phalange.
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The Lebanese Parliament
Total number of seats 99
Number of living deputies 92
Number of votes needed to win
on first ballot 66
Number of votes needed to win
on subsequent ballots 50
Likely Lineup
Pro-Syrian
23
Probable Syrian allies
20
Possible Syrian allies
14
Possible Lebanese Front allies
8
Probable Lebanese Front allies
12
Lebanese Front
15
Information on the political leanings of the--92
deputies is in many cases very sketchy, and changes
in the above evaluation are likely as more infor-
mation is obtained.
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The Main Lebanese Political Groups in 1981
Independent Muslims
? Al Amal
Imam Musa al-Sadr missing since September 1978 and,
Nabih Barri; Shia
? Islamic Coalition
Sa'ib Salam and Rashid Karami; Sunni
? Islamic Grouping
Sahfiq Wazzan; Sunni
? Democratic Socialist Party
Kamal al-Assad; Shia
"National Movement"
(Primarily Muslim Left)
? Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)
Walid Junblat; Druze
? Independent Nasirite Movement (Murabitun)
Ibrahim Qulaylat; Beirut Sunni
? Communist Action Organization
Muhsin Ibrahim; extreme left Shia
? Communist Party of Lebanon
Nicola Shawi and George Hawi; pro-USSR Greek Orthodox Christian
? Baath Party-Iraqi Wing
Abd al-Majid Rafai; Sunni
? Nasirite Corrective Movement
Isamal-Arab; extreme left Sunni
? Syrian Social Nationalist Party (PPS or SSNP)
Inam Raad; left Greek Orthodox Christian
? Popular Nasserist Organization
Mustafa Sa'ad; Sunni
Baath Party-Syrian Wing
Assam Qansu; Sunni, pro Syrian
Arab Socialist Union
Abd al-Rahim Murad; Sunni
National Front
(Pro-Syrian Left)
? Nasirite Organization
(Union of Working Peoples Forces) Kamal Shatila; Sunni
? National Confrontation Front
Talal Marhabi and All 'Id; Tripoli-based Alawites
Moderate Christians
? Independent Parliamentary Bloc
Sim'an al-Duwayhi and Butrus Harb; Maronite
Pro-Syrian Christians
Zgharta Front
Sulayman Franjiyah; Conservative northern Maronite
"Lebanese Front"
(Primarily Christian Right)
? Phalange Party (Kataib)
Pierre Jumayyil and Bashir Jumayyil.(Lebanon Front Militia Commander);
Maronite and Greek Catholic
? National Liberal Party
Camille Shamun (President of Lebanese Front); Maronite
? Kaslik Front
(Order of Maronite Monks) Bulus Na'man; Maronite Clergy,
extreme right
? Guardians of the Cedars
Etienne Saqr AKA Abu Arz; extremist Maronite
? Al Tanzim
George Adnan; extremist Maronite
Independent Christian Right
? Maronite League
Shakir Abu Sulayman; Maronite
National Bloc
Raymond Edde; Maronite, anti-Syrian
Free Lebanon Movement
Major Sa'ad Haddad; Maronite/Shia, pro-Israeli
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SUBJECT: Lebanese Presidential Election
DCI
DDCI
D/DCI-DDCI/ES
Executive Registry
D/NFAC
DD/NFAC, Executive Secretary
NFAC Registry
OCO/IM/CB
DDO/NE
C/NE/ARN
D/OCR
OCR/NE/NENA
NIO/NESA
D/NESA
NESA/PS
NESA/AI/D
NESA/AI/I
NFAC NE A AI I
(11Dec81) 25X1