THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY: SEARCH FOR POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200490001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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tE~?E National 3ecrei.
Foreign
Assessment
Center
The Pakistan People's Party:
Search for Power
State Dept. review completed
Secret
PA 81-10382
September 1981
Copy 218
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center 25X1
The Pakistan Peo le's Part :
Search for Powe 25X1
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 8 September 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
25X1
The author of this assessment is of the
Office of Political Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, 25X1
Near East South Asia Division, OPA
25X1
This assessment was coordinated with the Office of
Economic Research, the Office of Scientific and
Weapons Research, the Directorate of Operations,
and the National Intelligence Officer for Near 25X1
East South Asia
Secret
PA 81-10382
September 1981
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KABULI
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f control
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LAMABAD
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Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
Indian
claim \
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Secret
Key Judgments
The Pakistan Peo le's Party:
Search for Power
Since last fall, however, Zia has shown no interest in such negotiations
regime by negotiating a political settlement with moderates in the PPP.
Deep divisions between PPP moderates and leftwingers have intensified
since the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner by pro-Bhutto terrorists last
March and are threatening the unity of the party. This situation gives
President Zia an opportunity to split the party and broaden the base of his
s
e
e
t
e ections are m prospect, an a pose ion o e par y `25X1
to a PPP victory if a national election were held today. But no such
riorc -
d
t
h 't' f th t i
1 d
The Pakistan People's Party-which ruled Pakistan from 1971 until it was
overthrown by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977-is the strongest opposition
political force in Pakistan. The broad constituency originally put together
by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1970 is basically intact and would probably lead
PPP moderates are ready to deal with Zia and want the government to hold
national elections on a nonparty basis. A civilian government with PPP 25X1
participation would have greater legitimacy than the present Martial Law
Administration and would not alter Pakistan's present foreign policy. PPP
moderates see the Soviets in Afghanistan as a long-term threat and support
Zia's efforts to strengthen Pakistan by expanding ties with the United
States. 25X1
United States and would effect an accommodation with the Soviets
The PPP's left wing hopes to scuttle any negotiations between Zia and the
moderates, but 'Bhutto's wife and daughter-who agree with the left on
this issue-may no longer have the strength to stop the moderates. The
PPP left believes it can take power through a revolutionary mass move-
ment. It hopes to orchestrate such a movement using discontented students,
interest groups, civil servants, and military officers. The more extremist
groups in the PPP and on its fringes-including the terrorist group Al-
Zulfikar-believe the interplay of regional tensions and instability inside
Pakistan will lead to outside intervention by the Soviets and possibly the
Indians and to the creation of a radical PPP regime in Islamabad.
25X1
A left PPP regime-whether put in power by a mass movement, by some
form of outside intervention, or through a combination of these-would
quickly reverse Islamabad's policies on Afghanistan and ties with the
Secret
PA 81-10382
September 1981
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Neither the PPP nor its factions has much chance, however, of dominating
the Government of Pakistan in the near term. Internal divisions, ineffective
leadership, and the government's ability to break up party initiatives have
kept the PPP from transforming its popular support into political power.
The party also lacks an issue around which to galvanize opposition to Zia
and faces a public that believes domestic conflict now would only benefit
Pakistan's enemies: the Soviets and the Indians. Moreover, the airliner
hijacking last March has hurt the PPP's popularity and undermined the
public standing of its top leaders: Bhutto's widow and his daughter.
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The Pakistan People's Party:
Search for Power
The Pakistan People's Party is the most powerful
opposition political force in Pakistan. The broad
constituency originally put together by the party's
founder, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, is basically intact, but
lacks a leader who can dominate it, invigorate it, and
direct its energies toward the recapture of power. The
party's populist program-"bread, clothing, and shel-
ter"-still holds the imagination of the rural and
urban poor, the groups that form the base of the
PPP's electoral strength
Bhutto-who was executed in 1979-is for many a
heroic and martyred leader who by his death absolved
the PPP of its sins. His crimes are of little concern to
rural folk, who are used to seeing their tribal and clan
leaders eliminate people who get in their way. They
still believe Bhutto understood them, spoke for them,
and made them feel for the first time a part of
Pakistan's polity. They acknowledge that the PPP
failed to live up to all its promises, but argue that
Bhutto made a start at social reform and gave urban
workers, rural tenants, and small farmers unprec-
edented leverage with the privileged groups that in the
past had controlled their lives. Much of the loyalty
they gave Bhutto has been transferred to his widow,
Nusrat, and his daughter, Benazir
The PPP would emerge the strongest party if an
election were held today. President Zia probably
postponed the election he promised in 1979 because
he feared the PPP would win. Its greatest strength,
however, is among the rural poor, who are too dis-
persed and powerless to exert pressure except at the
polls. The party lacks the organization necessary to
mount by itself a successful movement in the streets
against the Zia regime, although it is capable of
taking advantage of such a movement if started by
others. The PPP suffers from poor leadership, sharp
internal divisions, and the absence of an exploitable
issue. The martial law regime has consistently out-
maneuvered the PPP and spoiled its plans for agita-
tion by arrests and intimidation.
The hijacking of a Pakistani airliner to Kabul last
March and the murder of a Pakistani diplomat on
board by terrorists owing allegiance to "Bhuttoism"
and directed by Bhutto's oldest son, Mir Murtaza, has
clouded the long-term future of the party. The inci-
dent has severely damaged the political credibility of
the Bhutto family-the incontestable repository of the
Bhutto legacy and perhaps the sole force holding the
party's factions together. The widespread belief that
the Bhuttos are committed to the "politics of revenge"
and would deal with the country's enemies to gain
their ends could eliminate the Bhuttos as acceptable
national leaders for the foreseeable futur
25X1
Moderates in the PPP want the Bhutto women to step
down from the party leadership and leave Pakistan.
They are prepared-even at the risk of splitting the
party-to negotiate a political settlement with Zia
that would lead to a civilian government elected on a
nonparty basis. They argue that Zia needs to broaden
the base of his regime and gain legitimacy for it by
demonstrating public support. They see Pakistan's
future endangered by the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan and strongly support Zia's efforts to gain US
assistance. The moderates believe the party's left wing
and the Bhutto women-by insisting that Pakistan
accommodate to Soviet aims in Afghanistan-are
playing into the hands of the country's enemies who
seek permanent leverage over Pakistan. '
Search for Power
The PPP has always been more a coalition of factions,
interest groups, and patron-client networks than a
tightly organized political party. Its two major
wings-moderates and leftists-represent discrete so-
cial groups that have clashing views about the inter-
ests that should be served by a PPP government.
Debate within the party is intense because the inter-
ests of powerful party constituencies will be affected
by the way in which the PPP returns to power. A
' Appendix A discusses the background and development of the
PPP. 25X1
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Sindhi landlords
Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi;
Makhdum of Hala
strong
Karachi-Larkana group
Mumtaz Ali Bhutto; Ab-
dul Hafiz Pirzada
moderate
Punjab centrists
Malik Meraj Khalid;
Sheikh Rafig Ahmad;
Anwar Aziz Chaudhry
moderate
Punjab landlords
Ghulam Mustapha Khar;
Hamid Raza Gilani;
Anwar Ali Noon
declining
moderate
Nonpoliticians
Gen. (Rtd) Tikka Khan;
Aziz Abroad; Major
Gen. (Ret.) N. Babar
weak
People's Progressive Party
Maulana Kausar Niazi
weak
Pakistan Musawat Party
Haneef Ramay
weak
Leftist/Extremist Groups
Punjab leftwing group
Sheikh Rashid;
Ghulam Hussain
strong
Pakistan Student's
Federation
?
moderate
AI-Zulfikar
Murtaza Bhutto
weak
Pakistan Liberation
Movement
Brig. (Ret.) Usman
Khalid; Lt. Col. Ilyas
Shamim
weak
Mainline landlord group in Sind and strongest landlord group in
the PPP. Base is mostly in Sind interior east of the Indus. Has
strong relations with other elite groups both inside and outside
the PPP.
Represents landlords west of the Indus and has support among
Karachi professional groups. Both leaders have poor personal
relations with the Bhutto women. Mumtaz is Zulfikar's cousin.
Represents urban professionals and interest groups. Not a very
cohesive faction and includes some leftist elements. Opposes US
tie.
Khar is in exile in London, and many formerly pro-PPP landlords
in Punjab have left the party. Group is sensitive to whichever
direction political winds are blowing and always attempts to join
the winner.
Has support among urban professional and student groups. PPP
influence probably has been growing in Frontier Province,
although most tribes follow traditional-and conservative-
leaders.
Former military and civil officers that support the party. Have
little popular following or personal support in the PPP. Most
important function is to serve as channel of communication to
potentially dissident army officers and civil servants.
Founded-possibly with Zia's initial encouragement-by PPP
leaders to attract government support and gain a role in the
cabinet. Rejected by both Zia and PPP leadership, group has
little strength.
The old "Islamic Socialism" group of the PPP. Ramay, a PPP
Chief Minister of Punjab, broke with Bhutto in 1975. Has some
localized support in and around Lahore.
Substantial support in Punjab heartland and rich agricultural
districts among rural tenants, small farmers, students, and
workers. Rashid has Begum Bhutto's confidence as the only
major Punjabi leader to consistently remain loyal to Bhutto.
PSF gained a string of student election victories in Sind, the
NWFP, and parts of Punjab during the winter of 1980-81, often
defeating entrenched Islamic student groups. Has moderates as
well as leftists, but latter tend to dominate at present.
Terrorist underground loyal to memory of former Prime 25X1
Headquartered in London and financed by Libya, group,
represents pro-PPP exiles and expatriates.
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PPP Factions and Related Groups (continued)
National Liberation Front
Mairaj Mohammed
Khan
moderate
Jiya Sind Student's Front
?
weak but
growing
National Progressive Party
Azaz Nasir; Afrasiab
Khattak
weak
Kisan Mazdoor Party
(Peasants-Workers)
Afzal Bangash; Major
Ishaq
weak
Awami Jamhoori Party
(People's Democratic)
Khurshid Hasan Meer;
Taj Khan Langah
weak
Strong support in Karachi labor and student circles. Mairaj fell
out with Bhutto in 1973, but since 1979 he has become a trusted
adviser to Begum Bhutto.
Sindhi separatists-mostly students-who support Bhutto and
blame Punjab for his death. Anti-Punjab sentiment has been
growing in Sind.
The orthodox core of the old pro-Soviet Communist Party of
Pakistan.
Formerly a pro-China party, but is now shifting to a pro-Moscc25X1
stand. Bangash is in Kabul. KMP has support in parts of the
N W FP and currently is aligned with the PPP and is a member
the MRD. 25X1
Ex-PPP left socialists, the group has some support in Punjab.
AJP probably has some links with Al-Zulfikar, but is rejected as
a PPP ally by Nusrat Bhutto, who believes it betrayed her
husband.
peaceful transition-through elections or a deal with
Zia-would give established interests command of a
PPP government, but a violent transition would mark-
edly strengthen the left, which thrives on confronta-
25X1 tional politics.
The debate over the best route to power marks both
conflicts over domestic policy and arguments about
foreign policy. The distinctions between PPP groups
and the strategies they promote are the key to under-
standing the dynamics of the PPP.
The Moderates
The moderates would prefer to negotiate with the Zia
regime for a share in power and a promise of future
elections. If caught between pressures from below and
an intractable regime, however, the moderates could
support a mass movement strategy. They would first
look for a credible guarantee from the Army that Zia
would be quickly removed if serious unrest broke out
and that the next general would agree to their de-
25X1 man4
The moderates are uncomfortable with Nusrat Bhut-
to's refusal to bargain with the regime, have estab-
lished interests to protect, and are eager for the
benefits of cooperation with the government. They
agree that the Bhutto land and industrial reforms
went too far and support more cautious social policies.
They are deeply disturbed by the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the weakness of their own country.
They support a strengthened relationship with the
United States and welcome the provision of sophisti-
cated weapons. 25X1
But the moderates believe Zia is dangerously isolated
inside Pakistan and seek US help in convincing the
regime to broaden its political base. They want Zia to
include moderates from the PPP and other centrist
parties in his cabinet, end martial law, schedule
elections, and restore judicial independence. They
believe that external threats make open confrontation
with the government both dangerous and unpatriotic.
They warn that a mass movement would only benefit
the political extremes in the country and fear they
could be swept away along with Zia.
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25X1
The moderates are not a monolithic group, but a
collection of factions and interest groups. A fairly
strong figure-such as Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi, a
former Federal Minister under Bhutto-could, how-
ever, unite PPP moderates behind a deal with Zia for
an orderly transition to elective government. Among
the concessions the moderates would require would be
the appointment of an interim prime minister with the
authority to select his own cabinet and appoint the
provincial chief ministers. The Zia regime sounded
out Jatoi along these lines in August 1980, but a deal
failed because of opposition from both military hard-
liners and PPP Chairman Nusrat Bhutto.
In the aftermath of the PIA hijacking last March by
pro-Bhutto terrorists, the PPP moderates are again
indicating an interest in a deal with Zia. They believe
the involvement of Bhutto's sons with the hijackers
precludes Bhutto family members from future nation-
al leadership. They want the Bhutto women to step
down from their party positions and would be relieved
if Zia released the women from jail and sent them out
of the country. With the Bhutto women out of the
way, the moderates believe they could then reach an
understanding with Zia
The Leftists
The leftists in the party favor confrontation with the
Zia regime. They believe an increasing cycle of
violence and repression will undermine the regime and
consolidate the opposition. They look forward to the
coalescing of a broad opposition movement that can
overthrow Zia, much as President Ayub Khan was
toppled by the PPP and its allies in 1969. The more
committed leftists, however, insist that this time the
movement should go beyond a change of government
to destroy the postcolonial establishment-the Army
and civil service-and create a revolutionary army to
protect the movement's gains. Leftist influence has
been on the rise in the PPP-particularly since the
execution of Bhutto and the postponement of the 1979
elections-as more party activists have become con-
vinced that Zia can be toppled only through violent
confrontation.
The Bhutto women are somewhat responsive to leftist
advice. Nusrat moved the party to the left in 1978 and
1979 because she believed that only the left could save
her husband. More recently, Nusrat and her daughter
have said that other left parties will drain away PPP
supporters and activists if the party appears too
passive. Like the leftists, they believe Pakistan cannot
defend itself against the Soviets or Indians. They hold
that the country would be better served by scaling
down its military establishment, accommodating with
its neighbors, and using its resources for economic
development 25X1
The two leftists who have the most influence with
Nusrat Bhutto are Sheikh Mohammed Rashid, a
leader of the Punjab PPP left wing, and Mairaj
Mohammed Khan, a Karachi-based leader with a
following in labor and student circles.
Both leaders say they are "independent Marxists,"
though Rashid has the stronger claim to this status.
Leader of the; Punjab PPP left wing since the begin-
ning, Rashid has Nusrat Bhutto's confidence as the
only prominent left leader to remain consistently loyal
to Bhutto. He probably has indirect links to the Al-
Zulfikar group through Punjabi radicals formerly
associated with his faction, but his real source of
strength is the Punjab PPP organization, with its roots
among rural tenants, urban workers, professionals,
and students. Sheikh Rashid has long regarded him-
self as a peasant leader and admires Asian brands of
Communism. He opposes the United States, but also
has eschewed overtures by Soviet diplomats and their
representatives
After a notable career as a radical student activist,
Mairaj rose to prominence during the early PPP
years. Bhutto once singled him out-along with Ghu-
lam Mustapha Khar-as his political heir. Mairaj left
the PPP in 1973 after Bhutto had ruthlessly put down
labor unrest in Karachi and was jailed a year later for
leading a union demonstration. After the fall of
Bhutto, he organized the National Liberation Front
and patched up his differences with the Bhutto fam-
ily. In mid-1979 he organized a "working alliance"
between the PPP, his own NLF, the Kisan-Mazdoor
(Worker-Peasant) Party, and the National Progressive
Party-the overt manifestation of the underground
Communist Party of Pakistan. At the time, encour-
aged by Soviet diplomats, these small leftist parties
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with daughter Benazir.
wanted to take advantage of the steadily growing
preelection popularity of the PPP. They have re-
mained associated with the PPP since the postpone-
ment of the elections and have been urging the party
25X1 to take to the streets against the Zia regime
The Party Leadership
Both major groupings are represented in the party
leadership, but the balance is held by the Bhutto
women. Although party decisionmaking is collegial,
Nusrat and Benazir have the last word. No other
party leader has their countrywide electoral appeal or
so commands the loyalty of the party faithful. Thus
far they have been able to veto any effort to negotiate
25X1 with the Martial Law Administration
The Bhuttos tend to agree with the moderates on
domestic policy and say they would follow more
conservative social policies than the late Prime Minis-
ter. On foreign policy, however, they side with party
leftists and argue that Pakistan must find an accom-
modation both with Moscow and New Delhi. Like the
left, they believe the political power of the Army must
be broken. They want the Army scaled down to the
point where it offers no threat to its neighbors and
absorbs fewer national resources
Some PPP leaders have not been satisfied with the
leadership of the Bhutto women.
25X6
25X6
Benazir shows flashes of her father's 25X6
has shown a capacity to learn from mistakes.
factors beyond the control of the party leadership.
Both women have shown dedication and courage
Although neither has grown to
dominate the political scene like Bhutto in his heyday, 25X6
either or both could be catapulted into a position of
national leadership if the political tide turns against
Zia. 25X1
Toward Confrontation: Growth of the PPP Left
The influence of the left wing has been growing in the
PPP since the elections were postponed in October
1979. The party leadership was initially reluctant to
pursue an openly confrontational policy inside Paki-
stan but reportedly endorsed the anti-Zia activities of
PPP exiles in the UK, the Middle East, and Afghani-
stan. This included the activities of the Bhutto sons-
Murtaza and Shahnawaz-who moved the headquar-
ters of their group-the People's Liberation Armv
(PLA)-to Kabul in mid-1980.2 25X1
The moderates had initially gone along with the
endorsement of exile activities-probably because
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they believed they could use any significant results to
gain leverage with Zia. After the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979, however, the moder-
ates became concerned that the Bhutto sons would
come under Soviet influence. They were also alarmed
that Afghan, Libyan, and Syrian patronage of the
PLO would enable it to exceed its limited mandate
and attempt a violent confrontation with the martial
law authorities. They were strongly critical of PPP
exiles who went to New Delhi seeking support, and
they objected to Nusrat's announcement in May 1980
that a PPP government would recognize the Babrak
regime in Kabul and would stop Afghan insurgents
from using Pakistani territory. Some moderates be-
lieve Nusrat and the PPP left wing would welcome
Soviet-aided instability in Pakistan because the coun-
try would then have to turn to them as the only
alternative to a Soviet puppet regime in Islamabad
Under pressure from PPP moderates, and aware that
25X1 her public support for Babrak had been widely criti-
I cized in Pakistan, Nusrat backed away from her
statement but continued to ar ue
that Pakistan would eventually have to accommodate
its policies to the Soviet role in Afghanistan. She also
let it be known she did not approve of her sons'
activities and sent messages urging them to leave
Kabul.
Although links between leftwing leaders and PPP
exiles probably exist, the main leftist leaders recog-
nize that if the Zia regime is to be overthrown, it will
have to be from within Pakistan. Encouraged by
sweeping victories by PPP student groups in univer-
sity elections throughout Pakistan in late 1980, the
left wing won Nusrat Bhutto's approval to broaden
the party's support among leftist activists in the
National Liberation Front and Kisan Mazdoor Party
and among strongly disaffected interest groups like
lawyers, journalists, students, and industrial workers.
The effort-headed by Sheikh Rashid-sought to
trigger a violent response by the martial law regime
by using these groups to take control of the streets.
Government repression, they believed, would help
unify the opposition. The PPP would stay in the
background, protect its activists from arrest, and wait
for the tide of public opinion before emerging to lead
the opposition movement.
It is doubtful Nusrat would have endorsed the leftist
plan without acquiescence of the moderates. Frus-
trated by failure of their approaches to Zia, the
moderates probably agreed because they feared the
loss of influence with the party activists and believed
the military would have to turn to them if the leftist
effort appeared to be succeeding. Both major groups
in the party agreed it was essential to isolate Zia from
other political parties to prevent the movement from
being undercut by a restoration of the anti-Bhutto
alliance. Convinced the PPP could dominate any
opposition coalition, they urged the Bhutto women to
put aside their demands that the other parties apolo-
gize for their roles in the overthrow of Bhutto and .
agree to restore the precoup status quo
The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
Protracted negotiations between various political par-
ties resulted in the formation of the nine-party Move-
ment for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) on
6 February 1981. Composed of centrist and leftist
parties-but clearly dominated by the PPP-the
MRD called for the immediate end of martial law, the
resignation o1' Zia, and elections within three months.'
Encouraged by the emergence of an opposition front
and by protests and strikes by lawyers and doctors,
PPP student groups-which had maintained a cam-
paign of low-level unrest since the previous fall-
moved to defy the government openly. On 10 Febru-
ary 1981 students in Multan protesting an increase in
bus fares and the new Universities Ordinance clashed
with police. Student protests quickly spread to the
country's major cities-Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi,
Hyderabad, Faisalabad, Quetta, Peshawar-and to
' Parties signing the MRD joint declaration were: the PPP, the
Pakistan Democratic Party, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-i-Islam, the Muslim League (Khairuddin Group), the NLF,
the National Democratic Party, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Muslim Conference, and the Pakistan Kisan Mazdoor Party. The
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many district and industrial towns. The most violent
incident occurred on 21 February in Peshawar when
students raided the university armory and fought
25X1 pitched battles in the streets with police.
25X1
25X1
The February student movement was the most serious
challenge Zia has faced. Its rapid spread revealed
serious discontent in all four of the country's prov-
inces. Nervous civil servants began to make quiet
The movement failed to gain support from crucial
social groups-the clergy, the bazaaris, industrial
workers, and the urban lower middle class-although
these groups might have joined had the movement
gained stronger momentum. The government, how-
ever, was able to break up the movement by exercising
restraint with violent protesters, closing campuses,
dispersing students, detaining party leaders in their
rural villages, and jailing party activists. The MRD
sought to identify itself with the students, but found it
was not prepared to lead a movement. Party organiza-
tions were weak and lacked lower echelon leaders
capable of taking over when the top leaders were
detained.
The PIA Hijacking
The hijacking of a Pakistani airliner to Kabul and
Damascus on 2 March was a serious blow to the
already faltering movement. Perpetrated by members
of Murtaza Bhutto's Kabul-based Pakistan Liber-
ation Army-now renamed Al-Zulfikar-the drawn-
out incident and killing of a Pakistani diplomat on
board the aircraft shocked public opinion in Pakistan.
The connection between the Bhutto sons and the
hijackers reminded Pakistanis that things had not
been so rosy under the Bhutto re ime
Support for the hijackers by the Kabul
regime-inevitably acting with the knowledge of its
Soviet advisers-while the plane was in Kabul
refocused Pakistani fears of the Soviet threat
Al-Zulfikar's terrorism and its perceived Soviet links
suggested to many that the Bhuttos were consumed by
the "politics of revenge," that they viewed Pakistan as
their own feudal preserve, and that they had no wider
political program for the country. These perceptions
severely damaged the public standing of the Bhutto
family and-temporarily at least-diminished the
authority of the Bhutto women and the left wing
within the party's councils 25X1
Charges by other opposition parties that the PPP left
wing was in league with Al-Zulfikar and the PPP was
using the MRD for its own ends nearly wrecked the
opposition alliance. MRD leaders noted that Nusrat
Bhutto had not seen fit to condemn the hijacking and
murder and demanded the PPP issue a statement
denying any involvement in the incident. PPP moder-
ates belatedly issued a tepid condemnation-it
blamed the government for creating conditions that
lead to such incidents-in an effort to limit the
damage to the PPP's standing with the public and
within the MRD. The faltering MRD canceled dem-
onstrations it had scheduled for Pakistan Day on
23 March. Apart from several meetings to remind Zia
and the public of its continued existence, the MRD
has been quiescent.
The incident-and President Zia's handling of it-
markedly strengthened public backing for Zia and
consolidated his position in the Army. Officers who
had been wavering in their support pulled strongly
behind Zia as the country's only political alternative.
His position restored, Zia moved strongly against the
opposition, jailing its leaders-including the Bhutto
women-and expanding the authority of the Martial
Law Administration by ending the historic independ-
ence of the judiciary. 25X1
External Support for the Party
A socialist party, the PPP has always looked to the
nonaligned and radical Muslim blocs for support and
has identified with the "Nasserite" tradition in the
Islamic world. Under Bhutto the party adopted a 25X6
decidedly pro-China stand and promoted the loosen-
ing of ties to the United States. In recent years,
however, Beijing's strong support for Zia has disillu-
sioned the party's leftwing activists and led to the
emergence of a pro-Moscow lobby in the party.
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The Soviets unquestionably preferred Prime Minister
Bhutto to his predecessors, but they showed no inter-
est est in supporting the PPP against its domestic oppo-
Pakistani publications through journalistic contacts,
Since the invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow probably
has come to regard a PPP victory over Zia as its best
hope for a reversal of Pakistan's policy on Afghani-
stan. Soviet propaganda and covert activities in Paki-
stan probably are directed at strengthening the PPP
and consolidating the PPP-dominated Movement for
the Restoration of Democracy. Islamabad is mindful
of the threat and has attempted to neutralize it by
banning Soviet propaganda publications, limiting dip-
lomatic travel, and ordering a reduction in the num-
ber of Soviet diplomats in the country. Nevertheless,
Soviet propaganda continues to find its way into
rassed by international criticism of their actions
during the hijacking. Moreover, the incident only
strengthened Zia and severely set back the growing
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PPP attitudes toward the US continue to suffer from
former Prime Minister Bhutto's accusations of US
complicity in his overthrow. These charges are widely
believed by PPP activists, who also hold the US
responsible for using its assistance to strengthen Zia.
Although the Bhutto women have sought to assure
US diplomats that they do not blame the United
States for Bhutto's fate, they harbor deep suspicions
of US actions and motives, past and present. Like the
moderates in the party, they want US help in pressing
Zia to hold elections. Unlike the moderates, however,
they do not want closer US-Pakistan ties. This, they
believe, would make it impossible for Pakistan to
reach any understanding with the Soviets and Indians.
Evidence of Indian backing for the PPP is harder to
uncover. Prime Minister Gandhi would undoubtedly
prefer to deal with a PPP government in Islamabad,
but realizes that overt Indian support would be coun-
has forbidden transit through its territory to the
hijackers but has become more open about allowing
Murtaza Bhutto to stop off in India on his way to and
from Kabul. For his part, Murtaza recently expressed
his group's "great respect for Indira Gandhi, who has
taken up the matter of the people of Pakistan."
25X1
Prospects
The PPP is a party in crisis. The PIA hijacking by
pro-Bhutto terrorists and the association between
Bhutto family members and Pakistan's enemies have
severely damaged the credibility of the party inside
Pakistan and make less possible its accession to power
by mass movement politics in the near term.
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Internal stresses in the party are bound to intensify as
the major factional groupings polarize around basical-
ly conflicting demands. The leaders of the moderate
landlord wing will step up their pressure for a deal
with Zia to return the country to some form of civilian
rule. They have lost confidence in the leadership of
the Bhutto women but have been reluctant to ap-
proach the government as long as the Bhutto women
remain in prison. Now that Nusrat Bhutto has been
released, however, the moderates will probably insist
on her agreement to negotiations with the Zia regime
or face a major split in the PPP. One prominent
leader-Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, a Federal Minister
throughout the Bhutto years and the PPP's top parlia-
mentarian-has already begun to act independently
of the Bhutto women in an attempt to pull together an
all-party coalition of moderates from the minority
provinces.
The mainline PPP left wing will find itself under
increasing pressure from pro-Soviet activists, Al-Zul-
fikar extremists, and Sindhi separatists to support
covert activities and terrorist operations. These group-
ings already regard the moderates as betrayers of
Bhutto and his legacy and will feel less restrained in
attacking them if they break with the Bhutto women.
The February student movement-particularly its
rapid spread-was sufficiently successful that the left
wing will be looking for ways to restart it this fall and
winter.
The Bhutto women will be hard pressed to maintain
party unity in the face of these pressures. They could
attempt to avoid making decisions, hoping both to
hold off a party crisis and convince the government
they intend to lie low. They might also find it
convenient to travel or live abroad for awhile-if
Islamabad permitted their departure. In the recent
conviction in absentia of Murtaza Bhutto for treason,
the government now has a powerful legal tool to use
against the Bhutto women. It could confiscate the
Bhutto residences in Karachi and Larkana and a
substantial portion of the family's agricultural land-
all inherited by Murtaza. These actions would make
life much more uncomfortable for the women.
To an important degree the direction the PPP takes
will be determined by Zia's willingness to negotiate
with the PPP moderates. The latter want Zia to
declare that all future political activity in Pakistan
will be on a nonparty basis. This would enable them to
function independently of the PPP and seek a share in
power based on their local strength. In such a format,
the moderates are prepared to help form a new
national coalition. They do not trust Zia, who has
gone back on his promises in the past, and would
require that Zia demonstrate his good intentions by
withdrawing martial law, restoring judicial independ-
ence, and setting a date for nonparty elections.
If Zia spurns the moderates, the party probably will
maintain a facade of unity. The moderates will come
under increasing pressure to actively oppose the MLA
or suffer an erosion of their support. They will
attempt to avoid a confrontation while Zia is strong,
but will back a movement if Zia-through an eco-
nomic downturn or some miscalculation-becomes
politically vulnerable. Their hope will be to negotiate
a share in power, and their participation in mass
movement politics will be a means of gaining leverage
with Zia or whoever would replace him. Their fear,
however, is that a mass movement would quickly go
beyond their control and force the MLA to negotiate
with more radical elements, thus excluding them from
a political settlement.
It is unlikely the Pakistan People's Party will come to
power by any means other than negotiation in the
near term, although a successful PPP movement
cannot be entirely ruled out. Some party leaders may
still look for a coup by anti-Zia officers in the military
or hope that some unforeseen event will remove Zia
and open the way for a political settlement. Party
radicals hope that the Soviets and Indians will seri-
ously destabilize Pakistan-or perhaps move against
it militarily--in which case the country would turn to
the PPP as its best hope. In these circumstances,
however, the PPP would have little legitimacy and
probably could not maintain itself in power without
outside support.
25X1
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Should the PPP succeed in regaining a role in govern-
ment, the circumstances through which the party
comes to power will largely determine which faction
dominates the new government and what foreign
policy options that new government chooses to exer-
cise. An indirect PPP accession through a negotiated
settlement with the military would not appreciably
affect the country's foreign policy. PPP moderates,
who would probably dominate a civilian cabinet under
Zia, favor US support for Pakistan. A PPP govern-
ment in which the party's left wing was dominant,
however, would work out accommodations with Mos-
cow and New Delhi. It would also attempt to curb the
Afghan insurgents' use of Pakistani territory and
would reverse the trend toward closer US-Pakistan
relations. Such a government, if threatened by mas-
sive opposition, might also seek outside support in 25X1
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Appendix A
PPP: Origins and Development
Founded in November 1967, the Pakistan People's
Party was from the beginning a party of personal
loyalty to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Scion of a wealthy
landed family of Sind Province, Bhutto had already
earned an international reputation for brilliance and
showmanship as Pakistan's Foreign Minister when he
broke with President Ayub Khan over the latter's
decision to negotiate an end to the 1965 war with
India. His move into opposition and his combining of
intense nationalism with demands for the radical
reform of Pakistani society tapped powerful undercur-
rents in Pakistan and quickly brought Bhutto support
from a wide range of social groups excluded from
Ayub's bureaucratic, centralized political system
The Anti-Ayub Movement
Bhutto and the PPP played the central role in the
anti-Ayub movement begun by pro-Bhutto students at
Rawalpindi in November 1968. This movement gath-
ered momentum in all parts of the country over a five-
month period and amounted to a mass uprising
against the Ayub regime. Although the movement
was substantially broader than the PPP, Bhutto domi-
nated it and kept it focused on the removal of Ayub-
in contrast to other politicians who attempted to call
off the agitation and negotiate. The anti-Ayub move-
ment ended only when the Army under General
Yahya Khan stepped in and forced Ayub to retire,
abrogated his constitution, and promised early
elections)
Internal Party Groups
The most influential groups within the PPP during
this period were secular leftist groups that had their
roots in radical student, worker, peasant, and profes-
sional organizations. Strongly ideological, they re-
sponded to Bhutto's socialist critique of Pakistani
society, his authorship of Pakistan's China connec-
tion, and his demand that Pakistan pull out of its
alliances with the West. Although he was never
completely comfortable with the committed leftists in
the PPP, Bhutto appreciated their organizing skills,
their willingness to confront the regime, and their
capacity to keep the movement going while he was in
prison. Adept at operating in an agitational environ-
ment, the party's left wing gained control of most of
the early party organizations, including the important
Punjab Provincial Organizing Committee.
The approach of elections in 1970 aggravated the 25X1
basic factional conflict in the PPP between its left
wing and the more moderate groupings around
Bhutto. The left-led by Mairaj Mohammed Khan-
argued that conditions were ripe for a revolution in
Pakistan and that the PPP's popularity resulted from
its program for land reform and the nationalization of
industry. The party, he urged, should forgo the elec-
tions and take power through a revolutionary worker-
peasant movement. The left pressed Bhutto to base
the party organization on disciplined activists and
refuse membership to all who were not ideologically
acceptable. They particularly distrusted the wealthy
landlords around Bhutto and believed they would use
their wealth- to buy party election nominations, take
control of the party organization, and subvert the
party's reform program. 25X1
The moderates-a diverse collection of Islamic
socialists, landlords, interest group leaders, political
professionals, and Bhutto cronies-argued that the
Army would crush any quixotic attempt at revolution
and that the only way the PPP could come to power
was through elections. The PPP was, they insisted, not
a "class party" but a "mass party," open to all who
accepted the party manifesto regardless of social
background. They believed that Bhutto was the real
reason for the PPP's popularity and that electoral
support could best be mobilized through tours by
Bhutto and by the wholesale incorporation into the
party organization of rural notables, interest groups,
and patron-client networks. In their view, the party
needed the wealth and local influence of the landlords
in order to win in the countryside-the key to any
election victory in Pakistan. 25X1
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Bhutto's Approach
Bhutto sided with the moderates. He agreed the anti-
Ayub movement was a mass popular awakening, but
perceived that most Pakistanis' aspirations were na-
tionalist, participatory, and economic, not revolution-
ary. He believed that he-like a Nasser or Ataturk-
could dominate Pakistan through the force of his
personality. This could be achieved by forging a
permanent personal link with the masses through a
skillful manipulation of nationalist symbols and
Islamic socialist ideology. Once he had demonstrated
his unchallenged position as leader of an aroused,
politicized populace, Bhutto would have the leverage
he needed to counter elite opposition and bargain for a
share in power.
The immediate object was to win the elections by
making the PPP, in effect, a broad electoral coalition.
A tightly organized ideological party would only
create tensions between disparate internal groups and
force Bhutto to adopt uncompromising stands on
major policy issues, thereby restricting the flexibility
he needed to orchestrate his grand coalition. In order
to gain maximum support, Bhutto enlisted anybody
who pledged loyalty to him and who paid lipservice to
the PPP manifesto. The PPP thus attracted diverse
groups, including rural tenants, peasants, industrial
workers, rural-to-urban migrants, urban profession-
als, wealthy landlords, and several industrialists-all
competing for Bhutto's favor and all adroitly manipu-
lated by one of the most skillful political tacticians of
his day
The 1970 Elections
The PPP won a clear majority of the West Pakistan
National Assembly seats in the 1970 elections and
captured control of the provincial assemblies of Sind
and Punjab. Landlord support was crucial to the PPP
victory in Sind, but in Punjab-the country's politi-
cally dominant province-economic aspirations clear-
ly overrode old parochial loyalties.
Bolstered by the unexpected extent of his victory,
Bhutto used his clout to block the assumption of
power by the Awami League-it had swept the more
populous East Pakistan-and lobby for a share in
power for himself. Although his machinations helped
to set off the East Pakistan crisis, Bhutto sidestepped
his share of responsibility for the debacle that ended
with Pakistan's defeat by India and the emergence of
Bangladesh. After the fall of Dacca, the PPP re-
mained the only political alternative in Pakistan to the
totally discredited military regime, and Bhutto be-
came President and Chief Martial Law Administrator
of what was left of the country in late December
1971.
The PPP in Power
Bhutto's rule began well. He pulled the defeated
country together, ushered in a period of reform,
negotiated an honorable peace with India, and pro-
vided Pakistan with a constitution (1973) based on a
broad consensus. After these high points, however, his
rule began to go sour. His efforts to monopolize all the
country's po]itical and economic resources and build
up his personality cult as the savior of Pakistan
increasingly aroused the opposition of key power
groups in the army, bureaucracy, and urban middle
class. These groups also had deep misgivings about
the disintegration of public morality and institutions,
chronic economic mismanagement, and the alienation
of tribal minorities under Bhutto. Rapid inflation and
the growing penetration of the bureaucracy into the
countryside and into district level party organizations
began to erode Bhutto's popularity among his most
committed supporters.
later hang.
The assumption of power did not fundamentally
change Bhutto's approach to the Pakistan People's
Party, although it gave him the means, through the
vast spoils system he now operated, to reinforce his
personal control. Bhutto's manipulation and his harsh
treatment of the opposition disillusioned many of
those who had helped him found the PPP. Aware that
Bhutto would only minimally fulfill the PPP's mani-
festo, most of the party's committed leftists broke
with Bhutto shortly after he took power. More moder-
ate groups also became disenchanted. A few of
them-mostly urban professionals-served in federal
or provincial cabinets, but eventually lost their places
to landlords and newcomers in the party. Those who
went into opposition usually ended up in prison or in
concentration camps. Bhutto's effort to eliminate one
early supporter led to the killing for which he would
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Never a strong organization, the PPP was unable to
cope either with the vast numbers of new members or
the emergence of intense factional and parochial
conflicts engendered by the competition for patron-
age. As party structures broke down, Bhutto increas-
ingly relied on the landlords and the bureaucracy to
operate the party, in effect depending on social groups
that had little intrinsic love for the PPP and no
permanent loyalty to Bhutto
The Prime Minister' used the landlords and bureauc-
racy to ensure and enlarge his party's election victory
in March 1977, although he could have had a lesser,
but credible, victory through fair means. Without an
effective party organization, however, Bhutto lacked
the means to counter the urban riots set off by the
Islamic parties and the widely believed charges that
Bhutto had rigged the elections. The unprecedented
intensity of the violence and the need to rely on the
Army to quell the disturbances solidified an anti-
Bhutto alliance among the Army, the Islamic parties,
the industrialists, and the urban middle class and set
the stage for the coup of 5 July 1977.
Bhutto's Last Days
Led by the Army Chief of Staff, General Zia-ul-Haq,
the coup was greeted with widespread relief in Paki-
stan. Despite the high drama of his long trial, sen-
tence of death, and judicial appeal, Bhutto's passing
from the scene was surprisingly quiet. He had, by his
own actions, given too many key groups, including
some in the PPP, a stake in his final removal. The left,
both inside and outside the party, probably could have
mounted an agitation, but preferred to wait and
benefit from Bhutto's death rather than risk its
activists in an open clash with the Zia regime. The
PPP moderates depended too much on the bureaucra-
cy for the security of their economic interests and
suggested Bhutto look to the courts for justice. Bhutto
in jail was unable to exert the magnetic personal
leadership on which the party had come to depend.
Urged on by the Bhutto women, some Bhutto loyalists
attempted to agitate for his life, but these efforts were
tenuous, ill led, and quickly contained by the authori-
ties. Bhutto's execution on 4 April 1979 caused little
more than a ripple of protest, largely confined to
Upper Sind, his home area
The PPP After Bhutto
The Pakistan People's Party emerged from Bhutto's
death somewhat strengthened. The outpouring of
sympathy for the Bhutto women enabled them to
claim unopposed the leadership of the party, thus
forestalling a conflict with some party leaders who
were opposed to a family succession.' But a more
important reason for the PPP's renewed vitality was
Zia's announcement that national elections would be
held in October 1979. 25X1
The prospect of elections produced bitter intraparty
haggling over the disposition of election nominations.
The leftists and party activists argued that those who
had suffered under the Martial Law Administration
should receive nominations in preference to the
moderates who, they charged, had done nothing to
save Bhutto. The Bhutto women, however, quieted
these disputes. They recognized the influence that the
moderates could exert at the polls and realized that if
the PPP became too obviously a party of the left, it
would antagonize the Army and the basically conserv-
ative populations of Punjab and the North-West
Frontier Province. 25X1
Having contained its internal conflicts, the PPP
turned to activating those groups whose political
loyalties had been shaped by Bhutto during the anti-
Ayub movement. It also sought to rebuild the broad
electoral coalition that had been so successful in 1970.
The party benefited from the unpopularity both of the
Martial Law Administration and of the shaky center-
right coalition-the Pakistan National Alliance-that
had held cabinet positions under Zia. The PPP made
effective use of its experience as an electoral party
and the perception among many politicians and inter-
est groups that Bhutto's party would again come out
on top. 25X1
' Begum Nusrat Bhutto, the former Prime Minister's widow, was
made Party Chairman by the Central Committee. Benazir, Bhut-
to's daughter and first offspring, was next in line, followed by Mir
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The evident coalescing of the broad PPP constituency
worried the generals who-too optimistically-had
believed the PPP would fall apart without Bhutto. Zia
passed complicated election rules clearly aimed at
excluding the PPP from the polls. The PPP short
circuited the rules by running its candidates as inde-
pendent awam dost ("people's friends") candidates.
The party's "independents" did well enough in the
local bodies polls in September 1979 to convince the
government that the PPP would emerge as the largest
party in an elected National Assembly and might
even win a comfortable majority. Citing the danger of
elections to the country's security, President Zia
postponed the polls indefinitely and expanded the
authority of his Martial Law Administration.
The strong opposition aroused by the postponement
had little chance to express itself before the stakes of
Pakistani politics were fundamentally altered by the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
The advent of a hostile superpower on Pakistan's
restless and lightly defended western border, Soviet
efforts to crush the Afghan insurgents, and deep
Pakistani suspicions about future Indo-Soviet collabo-
ration enabled Zia to consolidate his position as
President and solidified his sometimes uncertain sup-
port in the Army. Facing major threats on both its
long land borders, few Pakistanis believed the time
was appropriate to pursue internal conflicts. This
perception, as well as Zia's success in turning the
economy around and his ability to deny the opposition
an issue to rally around, has made the recent political
environment particularly unyielding for the PPP.
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Appendix B
Al-Zulfikar: Terrorism Comes to Pakistan
Al-Zulfikar, which achieved worldwide publicity by
its hijacking of a Pakistani airliner last March, is a
self-proclaimed "national liberation movement." It is
inspired by the memory of former Prime Minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and dedicated to the overthrow of
the Zia regime through violence. It has promised
additional attacks on Pakistani Government installa-
tions, property, and personnel. Shahnawaz Bhutto,
Bhutto's second son and chief of operations for Al-
Zulfikar, reportedly has promised a major strike
against the Zia government in January 1982.
Al-Zulfikar suffers from disorganization, internal dis-
sension, and identification with powers hostile to
Pakistan. It is not likely to become a credible military
threat to the Zia regime, but has the capacity to
embarrass Islamabad with occasional dramatic
incidents or to mount a low-level campaign of terror.
If Al-Zulfikar succeeded to the point that public and
Army confidence was undermined, Zia would prob-
ably be replaced by a tougher general rather than the
Pakistan People's Party, which is led by Bhutto's
widow Nusrat and to which Al-Zulfikar owes alle-
25X1 giance, if not accountability.
25X1
A decline in public order in Pakistan would play into
the hands of the Soviets, who permit Al-Zulfikar to
operate from Afghanistan and who seek ways to press
Islamabad to acquiesce in Moscow's aims in Afghani-
stan. Thus far, however, Al-Zulfikar's actions have
strengthened rather than weakened Zia
Origins
Al-Zulfikar was originally the designation for the
military wing of the Pakistan Liberation Army, an
organization founded by Mir Murtaza Bhutto-the
former Prime Minister's oldest son-shortly after his
father's execution on 4 April 1979.' At the time of the
hijacking, however, the PLA announced it had
changed its name to Al-Zulfikar. Murtaza has subse-
quently identified himself as secretary general of Al-
Zulfikar in public interviews. 25X1
The PLA/Al-Zulfikar emerged from the community
of Pakistani political exiles in the United Kingdom
and elsewhere created in the aftermath of the Bhutto
regime. It was preceded by the Pakistan Liberation
Movement, an organization founded in September
1979 by Brigadier Usman Khalid, a deserter from the
Pakistan Army. Khalid identified himself as a Bhutto
supporter, gained Libyan financial backing for his
magazine Inqilab (Revolution), and sought to recruit a
guerrilla army from the Pakistani expatriate commu-
nity in the UK. He allied himself with Ghulam
Mustapha Khar, a governor of Punjab Province under
Bhutto, and appears to have cooperated with Mur-
taza. It is unclear, however, whether the PLM is an
umbrella organization of which the PLA/Al-Zulfikar
is a part, or is another exile faction with loose ties to
the Pakistan People's Party. 25X1
In September 1980 Murtaza Bhutto used Inqilab to
surface his own organization. In an interview head-
lined "Bhutto's Son Forms Guerrilla Army," he intro-
duced himself as secretary general of the Pakistan
Liberation Army. He asserted that his group had the
ability to eliminate top Pakistani officials and claimed
to have advanced weapons, including antiaircraft
missiles. He specifically warned Pakistanis not to
travel on the government-owned Pakistan Internation-
6 AI-Zulfikar, or "Children of Zulfikar," obviously adopts the first
name of the former Prime Minister, but there is additional symbolic
significance in the name. Zulfikar was a celebrated sword captured
by the Prophet Muhammad in one of his early battles and
symbolizes Islamic militance and justice. The PPP adopted the
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The founding of the PLA marked a decisive step for
Murtaza into international terrorism. Twenty-two
when his father was executed, Murtaza only at the
last minute gave up the life of playboy-student to
mount an effort among world leaders to save his
father's life. Deeply shaken and embittered by the
execution, Murtaza and his brother Shahnawaz
vowed to avenge their father's death.
By December
1979 Raja Anwar, deputy chief of the PLA and head
of its political section, had taken up residence in
Kabul.' Murtaza shifted his headquarters there about
six months later.
Operations
The PLA claims to have carried out well over 50
successful operations-bombings, train derailings, at-
tacks on army and paramilitary units, and assassina-
tions. Although these claims are much exaggerated,
the Pakistanis admit that some bombings and derail-
ings can be traced to PLA activists. Some of its efforts
betray a lack of training and experience, but the
group should not be underestimated. As the hijacking
demonstrated, at least some of its members are
capable terrorists
' Regarded as a brilliant intellectual, Raja Anwar led the Rawal-
pindi student movement of November 1968-the movement that
brought down Ayub and paved the way for Bhutto's rise. Anwar
later served as Prime Minister Bhutto's adviser on student affairs.
Exile Factionalism
The PLA has not been free of internal stresses
brought about by the differing aims and conflicting
ambitions of its members. Loosely organized into two
independent wings--military (Al-Zulfikar) and politi-
cal-supported by a financial group, the PLA already
has experienced severe factionalism. The financial
and political chiefs-both older and more experienced
leaders-were recently thrown out of the PLA. Raja
Anwar, the political chief, was accused of being a
Pakistani spy by the PLA's radical allies in the Kisan-
Mazdoor (Peasants-Workers) Party (KMP). Anwar
was condemned to death by Murtaza and reportedly
executed in the Kabul jail about 31 March.
Murtaza probably has sided with the military-and
more extremist-wing which now appears to have
taken over the rest of the PLA. Tensions doubtless
remain both within Al-Zulfikar and between Al-
Zulfikar and its allies in the Pashtunistan Movement,
KMP, and National Progressive Party. Murtaza's
highly personalized. leadership, his lack of genuine
ideological commitment, and his obsession with the
destruction of the Zia regime probably conflict with
the organizational and ideological aims of more com-
mitted radicals around him. Apart from a core group
loyal only to the Bhutto name and family, Murtaza
can count on little long-term support from other
political exiles in Kabul, whose purposes-beyond the
fall of Zia-are very different from his own.
the revolution
Connections 'With the PPP
Al-Zulfikar does not operate at the direction or with
the explicit sanction of the PPP leadership. Murtaza's
decision to accept Afghan assistance and wage guer-
rilla war from Kabul is officially rejected by the PPP
leadership. The party's conservative landlord wing is
opposed to Murtaza, believing that he has come under
Soviet influence and that neither they nor the PPP
can benefit from even the remotest connection with
Soviet interests. The PPP landlords also know Al-
Zulfikar puts part of the blame for Bhutto's fate on
them. They are charged with collusion by deliberate
inaction in the execution of the PPP leader. Al-
Zulfikar has singled them out for elimination after
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Secret
The PPP, however, is a loosely organized agglomer-
ation of factions and interest groups, some of which
operate outside the directives of the central party
leadership. Al-Zulfikar has ties to some of these
groups, principally the radical left wing of the party
and its student organizations. These are groups that
believe Al-Zulfikar operations can contribute to de-
stabilizing the Zia regime and whose leaders know Al-
Zulfikar understands its role and does not need
25X1 direction.
Like Al-Zulfikar, these groups reject elections, prefer-
ring to take power in the streets, and would welcome
Soviet protection if they succeeded. At this time,
however, they constitute a small minority within the
PPP, capable of little more than disruptive street
activity and actions to support and protect Al-Zulfi-
kar activists. Their numbers could grow if the Zia
regime fails to provide broader channels for political
expression.
to power.
The relationship between the Bhutto brothers and
their mother Nusrat Bhutto-who has replaced her
late husband as PPP chairman-and their sister
Benazir is probably more complex. The women have
said they oppose Murtaza's activities and support
mass movement politics leading to elections as a route
Government investigators have been
unable to find any evidence that the Bhutto women
had foreknowledge of the hijacking! Nevertheless,
ties of blood and kinship are strong in Pakistan, and
even some in the PPP leadership believe Nusrat is, at
best, ambivalent about her son's activities. These
leaders believe that she would tacitly welcome the
disruption that AI-Zulfikar and a mass movement
might bring and that she believes the country would
then turn to her as the only alternative to a Soviet-
sponsored regime.
Links to Foreign Powers
Al-Zulfikar would not be a credible terrorist organi-
zation without the support it receives from foreign
sources.
The Soviets value
Al-Zulfikar as a means of gaining leverage with
Islamabad, but have begun to doubt its leadership and
capabilities. Moscow and Kabul were embarrassed by
international criticism of their actions during the
hijacking. They realize the incident only strengthened
Zia and severely damaged the PPP-based MRD.
They may also believe the Bhutto brothers are too
distracted by their colorful lifestyles to be effective
leaders. Moreover, they must certainly know that Al-
Zulfikar's much-touted base camp in Pakistani tribal
territory was recently destroyed by the Pakistan
Army. The Soviets want AI-Zulfikar to adopt a lower
profile in Kabul and are probably insisting on greater
control over its operations as a price for allowing it to
operate from Kabul.
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Outlook 25X1
Al-Zulfikar has so far had only limited success as a
terrorist organization, and its actions have tended to
strengthen rather than destabilize the Zia regime.
The hijacking, while successful in its immediate pur-
poses, has had profoundly negative consequences for
the PPP inside Pakistan. The incident-particularly
public revulsion at the killing of a Pakistani diplo-
mat-wrecked the growing political movement
against Zia led by the PPP and several lesser parties.
It enabled him to strike hard at the PPP and gives
him the opportunity to split the party and deal with its
more moderate leaders to establish a more credible
regime in Islamabad 25X1
' Nusrat reportedly did predict to a kinswoman the killing of Tariq
Rahim the day after the hijacking and three days before the
Pakistani diplomat was shot on board the aircraft. Rahim had been
Bhutto's military secretary during the period of the 1977 coup. He
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Al-Zulfikar could mount a lower level campaign of
violence against widely scattered tarvets~
Thus far the organiza-
tion has been ineffective in its terror campaign, but
this could change with experience and better leader-
ship.
The emergence of Al-Zulfikar is a warning that Zia
needs to expand the base of his regime and provide
broader channels for political expression. In the long-
er term, the advent of the group changes the terms of
politics in Pakistan-a country heretofore largely free
of organized terror if not of other forms of political
violence. Although Al-Zulfikar has not put together a
group that attracts deep emotional support in Paki-
stan, other terrorist groups could emerge that might
more effectively represent the frustrations of Paki-
stan's vast and growing body of youth.'
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