INDIA AND PAKISTAN: RISING TENSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200320001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
India and Pakistan:
Rising Tensions
0041280002003 0001-3
ecret
Secret
PA 81-/0207
June 1981
Copy
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Summary
Rising Tensions
The historically turbulent relationship between India and Pakistan is more
uncertain than at any time since the last Indo-Pakistani war in 1971. The
deterioration in relations is a direct consequence of the Soviet move into
Afghanistan. Indian Prime Minister Gandhi is strongly opposed to Pakistani
President Zia's efforts to aid Afghan resistance forces, rearm Pakistan with
advanced US military equipment, and acquire nuclear weapons.
Gandhi wants to keep US support for Pakistan at a minimum in order to
assure Pakistan's status as a militarily weak buffer state unable to challenge
India's regional preeminence. Her approach toward Pakistan combines
veiled threats with conciliatory gestures. She has launched a worldwide
lobbying effort to build pressure against the proposed US-Pakistani assist-
ancepackage and make US Congressional approval more difficult to secure.
Prime Minister Gandhi will not shrink from punitive action if her concerns
about Pakistan deepen significantly. Military measures could include a
limited incursion to "teach Pakistan a lesson" or more specific efforts to
damage Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
Pakistan is trying to quell India's stated fears of a Pakistani threat. Both
sides are receptive to revitalizing the diplomatic dialogue, but each side
continues to regard the other as a belligerent waiting for the right opportu-
nity to attack.
Moscow is waging an intense propaganda campaign to dissuade Pakistan
from supporting the Afghan resistance movement and reinforce the Indian
perception that continued close ties with the USSR are vital to India's
security.
This paper was prepared by0of the Near East-South Asia Divisi~~ce oJ'
Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the OJfces of Strategic Research, Scient~c and
Weapons Research, the Directorate oj'Operations, and the National Intelligence O1fcerfor
Near East and South Asia. Irt1ormation available as oJ'27 May 1981 was used in its
preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and ma be addressed to the Chief; Near
East-South Asia Division, OPA 25X1
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Rising 'd'ension
Troubled Relations The deterioration of Indo-Pakistani relations is a direct consequence of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The Soviet move radi-
cally altered the strategic environment in South Asia and undermined
painstaking efforts of the last decade to build confidence and trust between
India and Pakistan after the 1971 war over Bangladesh.
With that decisive Indian victory, Prime Minister Gandhi believed India
had finally achieved regional primacy and forced Pakistan to accept second-
rankstatus in the region. The revival of superpower interest and involvement
in the Indian Ocean~Persian Gulf area since the invasion of Afghanistan,
however, threatens India's power aspirations and has revived the high level
of mutual suspicion that has characterized Indo-Pakistani relations during
most of the postindependence era. 25X1
Zia's efforts to emphasize Islamic fundamentalism dismay the Hindus, who
dominate India and tend to view the Muslims as impulsive and prone to
violence. New Delhi believes Pakistan's refurbished Islamic credentials will
give it access to Arab modern weapons inventories and generous financial
aid from Saudi Arabia and others to buy sophisticated arms
25X1
New Delhi also has traditionally distrusted military rule. General Zia's
suppression of political dissent and his narrow base of public support lead the
Indians to see him as more dangerous than his civilian predecessors. Indian
defense planners believe they must prepare for unprovoked Pakistani mili-
tary actions, including a campaign to seize parts of Indian-held Kashmir.
The Indians worry that if Zia's hold over Pakistan is in jeopardy, he will tr
to regain domestic political support by creating trouble with Ind
Pakistani Concerns For Pakistan, the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan posed a grave new threat
to its survival. The Pakistanis view Gandhi's refusal to condemn the Soviet
invasion as evidence for her unequivocal commitment to the USSR as the
' cornerstone of Indian foreign policy. Pakistan fears that Moscow and New
Delhi may eventually consider joint intervention in Pakistan aimed at
dividing it up or establishing a pliable government in Islamabad 5)(1
Most Pakistanis do not believe Gandhi's categorical assurances that India
has no designs on Pakistan. They are convinced that India will eventually try
to conquer all of Pakistan, undoing the partition settlement that accom-
panied the two countries' independence in 1947. They point out that India's
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military intervention in 1971 permitted the severance of Pakistan's eastern
wing containing half the population of Pakistan
25
The Impact of Gandhi and Zia disagree in their overall assessment of Soviet policy toward
Afghanistan the region, and although Gandhi is disturbed by the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, she believes that Afghanistan falls within Moscow's sphere of
influence. She contends that Soviet intervention must be accepted as a fait
accompli that will be sustained on M~~scow's terms, and that the sooner the
Soviets consolidate their control, the sooner they will substantially reduce
their military presence. Gandhi rejects allegations that the Soviet takeover is
part of a drive toward the Persian Gulf and denies the existence of a Soviet
security threat to Pakistan 25X1
If Pakistan continues to support the E~fghan insurgents, New Delhi believes
the USSR, at a minimum, may try to undermine President Zia's govern-
ment and replace it with apro-Soviet regime. Gandhi also fears that the
Soviets and their Afghan puppets may move against rebel sanctuaries on
Pakistani soil and that the situation would then quickly deteriorate. New
Delhi mi ht be forced to acce t or even articipate in a Soviet takeover of
Pakistan. 25X1
The Military Question India argues that Pakistan would be Finable to repel a Soviet invasion even if
Zia obtains the equipment he seeks. Ivew Delhi reluctantly accepts Paki-
stan's desire to modernize its armed fi~rces, but India sees no justification for
large-scale acquisition of so histicate;d arms articularl F-16 combat
fighters and M-60 tanks 25X1
The Indians believe they have a reasonable chance of undermining the
proposed five-year US-Pakistani eco~lomic and military agreement. Their
goal is to limit the $2.5 billion package by marshaling opposition abroad and
in the US Congress. Indian diplomats in Washington and Western Europe
are arguing vigorously that substantial US arms would have the undesirable
effect of prolonging Zia's dictatorial rule, indefinitely postponing the return
to power of an elected civilian government, and heightening the risk that
Pakistan will initiate hostilities with [ndia or the Soviets in Afghanista~a
The Indians charge that Washington. is seeking a Third World proxy to
confront the USSR. They accuse the United States of not wanting a political
settlement in Afghanistan, preferring; to keep Soviet troops tied down there
indefinitely. For Pakistan, US weapons are the reward for sustainin a
dangerous anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan. 25 1
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regardless of any new aircraft the Pakistanis might acquire. 25X1
military challenges, India could defeat Pakistan in a conventional war
This redeployment and strengthening of Indian forces along the iron ier is a
forceful reminder to Pakistan of its military inferiority vis-a-vis India. The
Pakistani Army is less than half the size of India's. Pakistan is also
handicapped because its border poses few impediments to an Indian inva-
sion. Pakistan's lines of communication and its industrial and population
centers are within easy striking range from India. If not diverted by other
be able to support its Air Force more effectively than in previous wars
Military Reminders New Delhi is stationing newly acquired Soviet and Western military equip-
ment at Indian bases on the frontier facing Pakistan. The Indians are also
improving their airfields in the area. In a conflict with Pakistan, India will
Indian military planners believe they must be alert to the possibility of the
Chinese engaging Indian troops in the Himalayas, giving India a war on two
fronts. The Pakistanis might grab territory in Kashmir, and an early
international call for acease-fire might leave Pakistani soldiers on Indian
soil 25X1
The Nuclear Race Efforts to develop nuclear weapons have added a dangerous new factor to
Indo-Pakistani tension
We believe a test is unlikee~~ore
1982. 25X1
Gandhi states publicly that India will respond in an "appropriate manner"
to a Pakistani nuclear test. The ominous implications of her repeated
warnings have not been overlooked by the Pakistanis. They suspect India
may publicly adopt a nuclear weapons program, dropping its longstanding
commitment to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.' Prominent
Indians are advocatin a wea ons program if Pakistan explodes a nuclear
device.
25X1
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Deployment of Pakistani and Indian Forces
90
PAKISTANI INDIAN
~ Armored division
Infantry division
Mountain division
/~ ~j Fighter base
Bomber base
Bengal
LACCADNE
ISLANDS
(irvo~A)
Kilometers gp
Aiv~JAMAN
ISLANDS
(INDIA)
Boundary representation is
not necessarily &j~~pTj~(a>)ve.
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The Soviet Role The USSR, since its invasion of Afgh