RESURGENT ISLAMIC NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200170001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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~tE`F National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Resurgent Islamic Nationalism
in the Middle East
Secret'
PA 81-10123
March 1981
Copy 3 10
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Resurgent Islamic Nationalism
in the Middle East
Information available as of 12 March 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
The author of this assessment is
IJffice of Political Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and should be directed tort
This paper has been coordinated with the Office of
Geographic and Societal Research and the
Directorate of Operations, but the views and
perspective are essentially those of the authol
Secret
PA 81-10123
March 1981
2,
2
2
2
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Resurgent Islamic Nationalism
in the Middle Easi
Key Judgments In the last five years the link between religion and nationalism has been
growing stronger in the Islamic world. The consequences of this linkage are
destabilizing for the societies concerned and detrimental to the strategic and
economic interests of the United States
national Islamic unity
The turn to religion does not represent a unified Islamic resurgence, and a
replay of the Iranian revolution does not seem likely elsewhere. The Muslim
world is extraordinarily diverse, and expressions of Islamic sentiment are
equally diverse. In the various national contexts, religious symbols are being
used to help create a sense of national unity. Leaders in power draw on the
symbols of Islam to secure their legitimacy, and opposition groups draw on
them to organize dissent. Because Islam is being interpreted in terms of
distinct national experiences, religion itself is an unlikely basis for supra-
In nearly every country of the Third World, rapid modernization has created
widespread psychological and social displacement without providing a new
framework for personal, social, and political integration. In Islamic nations
religion exerts tremendous appeal as a constant that conveys a sense of
identity in a rapidly changing environment and promises a more just society
in the future. Given the pressures of modernization, Islam will remain a
potent political force, among the discontented and the left-behind in many
countries
The United States has long been heir to anti-Christian and anti-Western
feelings, which have been heightened by the new commitment to Islam. It is
associated in the popular mind with neocolonialism and the changes brought
by modernization and is viewed as a political and economic power capable of
great influence. The United States, therefore, has become identified as the
cause of frustrations arising from the modernization process and has come to
serve as the scapegoat for national ills.)
Fundamentalist leaders particularly resent the intrusion of US programs
and persons identified with changing their society's traditional value sys-
tems. The protests they articulate are sympathetically received by groups
caught in the process of social change. Even leaders who appreciate the need
for US support are likely to feel compelled to demonstrate the independence
of their policies before home constituencies, and anti-US rhetoric and
policies are likely to increase. Although these leaders will continue to take
advantage of the technology, protection, and opportunities for investment
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that the US offers, they will probably prefer a less visible, more restricted
relationship.
The root cause for the intense expressions of anti-US feelings is the dis-
satisfaction and humiliation the Muslim peoples are experiencing in their
collective lives. As the traditional social order breaks down, the answers
drawn from the past are insufficient for coping with the complexity of the
modern world; the structure provided by Islam cannot contain the anger and
frustration of the Muslim people uprooted from their traditional milieu.
The relationship between Islamic nationalism and modernizing forces is
dialectic. As the world presses in on a nation undergoing change, religious
sensibility tends to rise. The revolutionary impact of religious nationalism
will depend on the institutional arrangements effected by the leadership. To
the extent that the state manages to co-opt the institutions and personnel of
Islam or defuse their appeals in other ways, the revolutionary impact of
religion is reduced. Co-optation forces the opposition to adopt radical
Islamic slogans and actions that alienate the devout majority who are
comfortable with their traditional modes of religious practice
The patterns in this dialectic between religion and state are very different in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The relationship between state and religious
forces is institutionalized in Egypt and personalized in Saudi Arabia. In
Iran, where the Shah chose to attack rather than co-opt the national
religious establishment, it is revolutionized.
Nationalism in the Islamic world will persist and grow as modernization
proceeds. Regional rivalries will be sharpened as leaders compete for re-
ligious and national authenticity, often. for domestic political purposes. No
matter how helpful the US is to these societies in transition, the outlook is for
continuing hostility over the next few years--particularly if the US pursues
its policies in a highly visible way.
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Resurgent Islamic Nationalism
in the Middle Eas
The recent history of the Islamic world has been punc-
tuated by a number of dramatic political events fueled
by intense religious feeling. Islam is increasingly be-
coming linked to nationalism, and the resultant politi-
cal currents are taking a decidedly anti-US direction.
In Iran, the pro-Western, modernizing Shah was over-
turned by the most radical elements of the Shia clergy;
in Saudi Arabia, the Great Mosque at Mecca was
taken over by a fanatical Wahabist group repelled by
the programs of the royal family and its alleged per-
sonal corruption; in Pakistan, the US Embassy was
destroyed by students who believed the US was respon-
sible for the attack in Mecca. To understand better the
causes of these events, one must appreciate the impact
of modernization upon Islamic societies!
Islam: Diversity and Parochialization
There are over 720 million Muslims in the world.
Since its inception nearly 1,400 years ago, Islam has
expanded to include people of diverse and often con-
tradictory lifestyles ranging from primitive tribesmen
in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia to sophisticated mer-
chants in ancient trading cities and urbane bureau-
cratic and military elites in traditional metropolises.
Believers today live in countries as different as
Morocco in the west and Indonesia in the east)
From the time of Mohammed, Islam defined itself as a
unitary community (umma), making no distinction be-
tween church and state or religious and secular. Each
believer submitted to Allah and followed a pattern of
life that was distinctly Islamic, adhering to injunctions
derived from the example of the Prophet's life (hadith)
and, later, schools of law (sharia). Religious strictures
govern in precise ways the most intimate aspects of a
believer's family, social, and economic life-the seclu-
sion of women and the mandate to contribute a portion
of one's income to the community are two examples
from the Koran, Islam's holy book.
The source of the religion's rapid growth has been its
ability to impart a sense of shared belief in a universal
value system while at the same time accommodating
its tenets to local conditions and social practices. It has
been able to do this because of the strength of its
message-the promised victory of the Islamic faith
over all others and a heavenly reward for personal
piety-and because of the flexibility of those who
interpreted and enforced religious rules in different
societies
The men who interpreted and administered religious
law made it compatible with preexisting social mores.
As the religion was adjusted to fit different social
structures, Islam became associated in believers'
minds with loyalties to kinship groups, neighborhoods,
or guilds, but not to the state. On the Indian subconti-
nent, the caste structure inherited from Hindu culture
became part of Islamic social behavior; paganism in-
trudes on Muslim religious practice in Indonesia and
the Philippines. In Afghanistan, the hand school of
law was adjusted to the conditions of primitive tribes-
men, while in Saudi Arabia the strict hanbali school
men came to prevail. The easier sharia mode of inter-
pretation better suited the urban lifestyle of medieval
Cairo. Thus, great regional diversity emerged within
the reli ion into their ersonal and group identities.
The Islamic State: Weak Traditions of
Legitimacy and the Personalization of Rule
In contrast to Western governments, Islamic govern-
ments did not come to be regarded as legitimate, and
rule was highly personalized. Islam is divided into two
major sects, the Sunni and the Shia, and the teachings
of both reinforced the tendency toward personalized
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rule. The orthodox majority Sunni emphasized the
leader's personal, moral, and religious qualities as a
means to uphold justice. Sunnis came to accept as
leader anyone who was capable of preserving stability
so that the religion could be practiced. The Sunni view
lent itself to political passivity to preserve order and
stability, and Sunni religious leaders and institutions
have largely been co-opted by the state
The minority sect that became known as Shiism took a
stricter view. Shias looked to the leader of the commu-
nity as inheriting the special divine knowledge of the
Prophet; they found it in All, Mohammed's son-in-law,
and his sons. When the latter were killed in battle in
the eighth century, leadership of the religious commu-
nity passed to their descendants, who were regarded as
infallible guides or Imams. The Imams were Messiah-
like figures, and the largest group of Shia, called
Twelvers, believed that when the 12th Imam dis-
appeared, he went into hiding (occultation). They rec-
onciled themselves to waiting for him to reappear some
day to reestablish justice on earth. In the interim,
governments are needed to provide the order necessary
for Muslims to practice their faith, but all governments
are only quasi-legitimate. Since the 16th century,
when Shiism became the state religion, the Shia anti-
authority outlook has been dominant in Iran, the only
Muslim country where it became the official faith 25
Highly personalized rule in the Islamic world contin-
ues to this day. Leaders use Islam in divergent ways to
appeal to their followers and build popular support for
themselves and their policies. President Zia of Paki-
stan has launched a conservative Islamicization pro-
gram to legitimate his military regime. Colonel
Qadhafi, on the other hand, has chosen to take Libya
down a revolutionary Islamic path. Sadat of Egypt,
like leaders of many other Muslim states, displays his
personal religious devotion to gain popularity. In con-
trast, the late Shah was conspicuous for his attempt to
move Iran in a secular direction and thus opened the
way for Ayatollah Khomeini's religious revolution
The Impact of Modernization: The Dissolution
of Traditional Society
The political appeal of Islam has gained in recent years
because modernization has brought in its wake
psychological and social displacement on an ever-
widening scale while failing to offer adequate sub-
stitutes for the ethical guides people found in Islam for
obtaining equality and justice. Traditional groupings
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grams cannot keep pace with the constantly rising
and regional cohesion have tended to break down, and
people feel increasingly insecure as the traditional base
for their personal, social, and moral identities erodes.
Industrialization plans, land reforms, and the setting
up of new universities require that people leave kin
groups behind for new places to earn a living-that
they learn new work habits and skills, enter new kinds
of relationships, and direct their children into new
kinds of education. The new competitive environment
that modernization creates does not, in Islamic minds,
meet the standards of justice, equality, and austerity
imparted by their religion. These changes have re-
to impersonal and threatening ones on a much larger
scale; in response, many have attempted to reassemble
elements from the past in new settings
urban population. The number of students in Egyptian
universities has tripled since 1967 to over 400,000
In Iran, Reza Shah began the process of modernization
in the 1930s; his son accelerated the pace in the 1960s
and 1970s. From 1964 to 1974, Iran's 11.3-percent
annual growth in gross domestic product was one of the
highest in the world; the economy was overheated even
before the large infusions of oil wealth that followed
the price jump in 1973. Spurred on by the land reform
program and new employment opportunities, there
were large migrations from the countryside to urban
areas to take advantage of new employment opportu-
nities. Large universities were established throughout
the 1960s and 1970s, and many students studied
abroad
The Saudi dynasty started its modernization program
in the mid-1960s in a less developed context, but the
program probably is the largest of all in scope. Since
1973, government investments in industrial develop-
ment, social welfare, and educational programs have
grown by $40 billion. About 40 percent of the popula-
tion resides in cities, and the number of students in the
school system has increased more than threefold since
1964
As modernization proceeds and populations are pushed
from a smaller world to a larger one, they find their
primary sources of identity in family, kin groups, and
localities being attenuated. The promised economic
and social rewards of change are often less than
expected-individual men or families are frequently
alone in large cities without social support, keenly
aware of their relative physical and financial depriva-
tion. At the same time, the old elites they once admired
for preserving traditional values are being displaced or
changed by persons with newer ways whose behavior
they do not respect. Their sense of isolation is also
intensified in many countries by the presence of large
numbers of foreign workers with alien habits. In this
situation, Islam is for many the one element of their
traditional identity that is continuous with the past. It
provides them with a sense of psychological and social
authenticity. It also provides them with firm moral
standards by which to measure the quality of their new
The extent of change can be seen in the rates of
urbanization, industrialization, and expansion of secu-
lar educational facilities over the last 20 years. The
process has been under way the longest in Egypt, where
modernization was initiated by reforming monarchs in
the 19th century. Cities have been large and crowded
for a long time, and rates of migration from the
countryside are high. Old housing, deteriorating trans-
portation facilities, and inadequate social welfare pro-
lives
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Iranians at the university of Tehran in what has become a weekl
ritual of Friday prayers and speeches
Moreover, as modernization has removed people
within a country from their immediate environment-
either by means of migration or by exposure to a larger
world through improved communications-they have
become more aware of the differences among them-
selves. In many countries, regional and/or ethnic ele-
ments have been incorporated into their religious
identities, and dormant animosities and rivalries have
reappeared, making it harder for governments to sat-
isfy competing segments of their populations. A new-
found sense of Islamic distinctiveness is felt in both
majority and minority groupings, and has further frag-
mented societies. The Shias in Pakistan feel less secure
in a state trying to impose Sunni systems of taxation.
Sunni Baluchis strain under the rule of Shia Persians
in Iran, while fellow tribesmen strain under the rule of
the Sunni Punjabi elite in Pakistan. A younger genera-
tion of Shias in Saudi Arabia, who provide much of the
manpower in the oilfields, resent their status as a
despised minority. These minority groups and others
like them are open to a kind of counternationalism
based on both their ethnic and religious identities.
The Appeal of Islam. and the Rise of Religious
Nationalism
The Strength of the Religious Appeal
Although modernization has uprooted people from
their traditional milieu, it has not provided a new
framework for personal, social, and political national
integration and often stands in contrast to the ethical
values associated with a community life enshrined in
religion. In that void, Islam exerts tremendous appeal
because it offers an enduring element of identity in a
rapidly changing environment. The religious appeal
has grown even stronger in recent years because of the
new respect accorded the conservative, oil-rich Muslim
states and their growing influence in world affairs. The
apparent failure of the radical socialist leaders of an
earlier generation, like Nasir, to fulfill their promises
has further stimulated religious interest. The
revolutionary impact of Islam, however, varies from
country to country as it mingles with distinctive na-
tional heritages and institutional arrangements.
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The religious appeal draws its strength from two basic
sources. The first is Islam's persisting intimate associ-
ation with personal and social roots of identity based in
family, kinship, and regional affiliations; the second is
the promise of equality and justice if one participates
devoutly in a Muslim community. The tensions in
Islamic societies as in other societies experiencing
change will continue-even grow-because mod-
ernization with its consequent dissolution of traditional
modes of identity and justice will go on. The state, the
only other all-inclusive institution in Muslim societies,
has not been able to draw populaces in countries ready
to be mobilized into a new kind of national and ethical
integration.
The attraction of Islam is so strong that both modernist
reformers and religious fundamentalists are drawn to
it. The reformers try to adapt their religion to the
contemporary world by restoring society to a core of
religious belief they think is essentially Islamic, al-
though they differ among themselves about specifics.
Their outlook tends to be utopian, and like President
Bani-Sadr of Iran, they often borrow programs from
modern socialist theory
In contrast, the fundamentalists-who are equally
utopian-tend to be backward looking. They would
like, for example, to replace Western legal codes with
the sharia, reformulate economic laws to eliminate
interest, reform educational systems to meet religious
standards of learning, and restrict women's role in the
workplace. Although these prescriptions are the prod-
uct of a pretechnical age and do not provide solutions
for the technological and scientific problems presented
by the modern world in which Muslim nations must
participate, they are extraordinarily powerful because
they accord with time-honored Islamic notions of faith
and justice
In most countries, the people who rally to the Islamic
banner often lack the skills necessary for coping with
the increasingly complex contemporary world. Many
have old-fashioned religious training, which does not
prepare them to manage societies characterized by
large-scale organizations and large technological in-
stallations like the oil facilities on which many Muslim
nations depend.)
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While Khomeini and his followers, to give an extreme
example, resisted the changes caused in Iranian life by
technical growth, they have little understanding of
what technology is or its impact upon social organiza-
tion. Furthermore, the contemporary world relent-
lessly imposes itself-as the clerical leadership in Iran
discovered when it tried to purchase and maintain
sophisticated weaponry needed by armies that are no
longer imperial legions or tribal levies
The people who support an extreme Wahabist state in
Saudi Arabia come out of similar backgrounds-albeit
with a different ideology and a different attitude to-
ward authority. An older generation of important
princes shares with this group a religious and political
approach learned from tribal rather than technical
experience. It is an open question whether they can
cope with the consequences of the development pro-
grams they have initiated.
Islam bridges the void created by social change, but it
does not supply a new integration. This is exemplified
by Pakistan, where President Zia proceeds with a
conservative Islamicization policy that has not suc-
ceeded in lending more unity to the nation; by Libya,
where a radical Islamicization policy is sustained only
by severe repression and oil money; and by Iran, where
the constituency for a radical Shia state that formed
during the height of the revolution is beginning to fall
apart
State Institutions and Religious Forces
The destabilizing impact of Islamic nationalism on
established governments is extraordinarily diverse in
both degree and kind. Local traditions, social struc-
tures, and outlooks impart quite different forms to
religious-political movements. The degree to which
revived Islamic sentiment poses a threat to the stability
of a regime depends, however, on the relationship of
the government to religion and the clergy. Where the
regime challenges the religious hierarchy, as in Iran,
the threat is extreme. Where the state has long domi-
nated the religious establishment, as in Egypt, the
threat to stability is lesser. When, as in Saudi Arabia,
there is an intimate relationship, the state is in a strong
position to deal with threats from religious forces.
Iran: Antagonism
The conditions that led to massive upheaval in Iran
grew out of a set of circumstances peculiar to that
country.' The two Pahlavi Shahs decided to take on the
Shia hierarchy. Reza. Shah's original plan was to re-
construct Iran on the model of Ataturk's Turkey,
where religion had been formally disestablished. The
son followed in the father's footsteps. The two Shahs
attempted to win popular loyalty by emphasizing pre-
Islamic themes and symbols from the imperial tra-
ditions of ancient Persia and deemphasized religion as
the basis of national unity. They distrusted the clergy
and divested the Shia hierarchy of many functions and
sources of income. Over the years, the clergy lost its
monopoly on educational and judicial functions, as
well as some of its lands, and was subject at times to
brutal repressioni
But, the Shia clergy retained a degree of independence.
Islamic leaders continued to receive loyalty and funds
from their followers; they remained oppositional and
well-organized. At best, the Shah gained a kind of
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passive cooperation from some leading religious fig-
ures. The promises held out by the religious establish-
ment became more appealing as Pahlavi rule became
more oppressive. The Shah permitted no expression of
opposition, religious or secular. The educated and pro-
fessional classes increasingly turned toward religion in
the 1970s. Although the spiritual motives behind this
new religiosity were probably sincere, demonstrations
of piety were also acts of political protest in a society
that permitted no other. The clergy and traditional
businessmen constituted the alliance against the Shah.
The clergy, particularly its younger elements, felt
acutely dispossessed as the means for personal
advancement increasingly shifted to the secular educa-
tional system. Traditional businesses of the bazaar
were being outdistanced by the large-scale economy
instituted by the state. The still oppositional, indepen-
dent religious leadership was the only vehicle of protest
left to the Iranian people
network of government-run religious centers of learn-
ing. The Grand Mufti of Egypt, another government
appointee, is the country's highest authority on Islamic
law and heads the state-run network of religious
courts. The Ministry of Wafd and Azhar Affairs
oversees the majority of mosques and religious endow-
ments in the country and regularly suggests the weekly
sermon topics. Thus, the Egyptian governing structure
is part of the fabric of the nation's religious life.
Revolutionary leaders have rarel emerged from of-
ficial Islamic organizations.
Further, unlike Iran, the political environment in
Egypt was relatively open during the first half of the
20th century, allowing those who wanted alternative
political forms some opportunity to organize
The oldest revolutionary Islamic party, the Muslim
Brotherhood, was formed in 1928. Its founder, Shaykh
Hassan al Banna, was a provincial schoolteacher in
Ismailia who called for a purge of Western influences
by instituting the sharia as the Egyptian legal system,
conducting economic life on the basis of the Koran, and
In these circumstances, Ayatollah Khomeini's unyield-
ing opposition to the Shah, his steadfast adherence to
his beliefs, and his purity as an ayatollah gained him a
large following. His network of religious aides in the
urban mosques, bazaars, and crowded residential
quarters of the cities could be counted on to rally large
crowds. As the Shah seemed to grow weaker during
1978, the demands of Khomeini's supporters escalated.
Others joined the anti-Shah movement as a release
from political oppression, and a new authority
figure-replete with the symbols of the ultimate
authority of the Imam-displaced the Shah. Khomeini
is attempting to build an Islamic state, dominated
almost completely by the clergy, for the first time in
Iranian history.
Egypt: Co-optation
In contrast, the clergy in Egypt has, at least since
Ottoman times, been dominated by the massive state
bureaucracy of which it is a part. Egyptian political
leadership can rely on the relatively passive outlook
toward the state associated with the Sunni clerical
tradition. Some of the most prestigious institutions in
the Islamic world are part of the ruling structure, and
the government has obtained some of its legitimacy
through its penetration of national religious life. Al
Azhar, the greatest center of Sunni learning for cen-
turies, is a state institution, and its head is an official
appointee. Al Azhar stands at the apex of a national
returning women to the home. Al Banna drew his
support from those in the middle and lower middle
classes who felt personally buffeted by change and
received few material rewards. In the Brotherhood,
members found a cohesiveness in cells-significantly
called "families"-and recreated older familiar
lifestyles by submitting to a paternal-like authority
and abjuring non-Muslim pastimes like gambling,
drinking, and dancing
The organization grew rapidly, developed a terrorist
wing, and its secret, hierarchical structure enabled it to
survive massive government onslaughts from the Wafd
in 1948 and Nasir in the 1950s and 1960s. In the early
1970s, the leadership achieved a tacit understanding
with the Sadat government. Though not legally sanc-
tioned and unable to acquire the participation of major
elements of the clergy who are integrated in the state
bureaucracy, the Brotherhood is permitted to function
openly in exchange for restrainin its criticism.
Since Sadat began to permit more open politics in the
early 1970s, Islamic Societies have gained popularity
among students at Egypt's 13 universities and have
won control of most student unions. Like members of
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the Brotherhood two generations ago, the majority of
society supporters comes from lower and middle class
backgrounds; they or their parents often are under
financial strain. Because the depressed Egyptian
economy holds little promise of material reward, edu-
cation hardly seems worth the sacrifice. Further, many
are without the immediate support of families or old
friends at the universities. In contrast to the seemingly
empty political structures sanctioned by the govern-
ment, the Islamic Societies offer the appeal of
independence and authenticity by espousing a coherent
world view similar to the Brotherhood's: friendship and
group support through attendance at prayers, discus-
sion groups, and religious camps, all promoting a sense
of personal purpose and communal identity. The struc-
tural organization of the societies, their leadership, and
relations to the Brotherhood and radical fringe groups
are obscure
The desire for Islamic reform appears strongest among
the brightest students, the most achievement oriented,
and those in the most rigorous professional faculties.
Leaders of Islamic Societies and terrorist fringe groups
are often aspiring doctors, lawyers, engineers, and
scientists. Although they vociferously criticize Sadat's
policies, they have not attacked him on religious
grounds-most Egyptians believe he is a sincerely
religious man. Some society leaders tend to be prag-
matic and are willing at times to cooperate with the
government. The terrorist fringe groups do not seem to
have much of a following.
As today's students and recent graduates come to
assume important positions in national institutions,
they could shift the state in a more avowedly religious
direction. Although there is economic discontent, the
possibility of a religious upheaval like Iran's seems
remote because the religious hierarchy is an integral
part of the state structure, and the majority of the
people a ear content with their religious lives.
Saudi Arabia: Symbiosis
In Saudi Arabia, the relationship between the govern-
ment and religious establishment goes beyond co-
optation to an interdependence approaching symbiosis.
The families of al Saud and al Shaykh, the descendents
of the 18th century founder of Wahabism, have risen
to power together. The al Sauds base their legitimacy
on their role as defenders of the faith and protectors of
the holy sites; in exchange the al Shaykhs, who head
the clergy, have given the royal family their religious
backing. Both need each other, and, while the royal
family has proceeded with modernization, the govern-
ment has always been careful to appease the religious
hierarchy by letting it enforce the fundamental tenets
of Wahabism strictly. To give but a few examples: the
sharia is still the only basis of law in the kingdom;
businesses must close at prayer time; women must
remain veiled in public and are not permitted to work
in offices
Little is known about the organization of the clergy in
Saudi Arabia-individuals apparently do not have
large independent followings as the Shia ayatollahs-
or precisely among what sectors of society clerics have
great sway. The government has increasingly assumed
the clergy's responsibilities through the expansion of
the educational system, the spread of technology, and
involvement :in the hadj (annual pilgrimage of believers
to Mecca and Medina). But the royal family continues
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Social change: Women waiting for shops to open
after prayer time in Saudi Arabia
to appoint members of the clergy, especially members
of the prestigious al Shaykh family, to key ministries.
The clergy acts as a constant lobby to perpetuate the
austere practices of Wahabism and probably speaks
for those who have been discomfited by or have not
benefited from the kingdom's new wealth.)
Continued Instability
The relationship between Islamic nationalism and
modernizing forces is dialectic. As the world presses in
on a nation undergoing change, religious sensibility
rises. As the proponents of religious revival fail to cope
with the new force, the religious sensibility becomes
less obviously political-as it will in Iran over the
longer term-until the external world again impinges.
The cycle is not likely to be broken until political
leaders can create a new sense of integration, drawing
upon other facets of their national traditions
I I
In Egypt, Sadat does not seem capable of doing this. If
discontent should take the form of mass violence as it
did in 1977 and continue for a prolonged period, Sadat
could find himself losing his middle class support as the
Shah did when he turned troops loose upon the student
population. Furthermore, should the Egyptian econo-
my continue to deteriorate and the government have to
rely frequently on force to put down large-scale rioting,
there is a possibility-as happened in Pakistan-that
the military leadership might take over the government
to restore domestic peace. Once in power, the austere
and patriotic outlook of the military would probably fit
in with a national religious ideology provided by
Islamic Society leaders. There has been reporting in-
dicating that some officers may already be members of
the Brotherhood. The established clergy, already 25
dominated by the state, would be passive but warm
supporters of such a regime 25
The commanding princes of Saudi Arabia are caught
in the dilemma of trying to reconcile their traditional
society with modernization. They are perhaps not
aware of the consequences of their reforms. Because
their background and education are largely traditional,
they tend to respond to political problems in familiar
tribal ways, keeping at bay the influence of princes and
commoners with modern education and less traditional
styles. No less Islamic than their more old-fashioned
countrymen, the latter groups are kept in positions of
dependence and are not the final authorities in their
own spheres of technical competence. The resentment
this engenders is often reinforced by their experience of
working alongside foreigners of similar technical com-
petence who can exercise such authority. Perhaps in
The constituency representing the extreme religious
view in Saudi Arabia may be similar to that in Iran. Its
sources lie with tribes that were neglected by the royal
family, religious students who perceive themselves to
have no future as secular education gains in impor-
tance, and small traders of the old middle class who
have not gained as much as they would like from the oil
boom. But the circumstances are different. The Saudi
nation is a religious state, more socially cohesive than
Iran was under the Shah, and dissidence from tra-
ditional quarters does not appear widespread. Unlike
its Iranian counterpart, the Saudi religious leadership
is a part of the royal establishment, and to provoke
Islamic dissidence would raise the danger of undermin-
ing its own position. As long as the government takes
account of their view, the higher echelons of the clergy
are not likely to raise the call for religious revolution.
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members of the new technocratic elite.)
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alliance with some reformist younger princes, they
may begin to lobby for more autonomy and more
rational styles of decisionmaking for which the seniors
of the royal family will be unprepared
the official level, the Islamic Conference has existed
since 1969, but it is not so much a vehicle for Muslim
unity as a forum for the expression of competing
national policies based on different strategic interests.
Of the opposition groups, the Muslim Brotherhood is
the most widespread, but there is little solid evidence
that the various Brotherhood chapters follow the dic-
tates of a centralized international executive body,
particularly regarding domestic political matters, and
the national chapters are themselves very different.
The emissaries sent from revolutionary Iran to the
Gulf and Saudi Arabia for propaganda and organiza-
tional work do not seem to have been particularly
effective.
Absence of Islamic Unity
Despite heightened religious sensibilities, Islamic na-
tions will not be able to act in a unified fashion on
contentious issues. Because of the diversity of national
interest and traditions, religious revival will not lead to
a united Islamic resurgence. The efforts to form feder-
ations of states and Islamic opposition groups have
been frustrated by the variety of national legacies. At
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The US and the Muslim World
Islam has always had difficulty coping with the Chris-
tian world as the carrier of modernity. Islam is a
militant faith and offers its adherents the reward of
conquering the world as the community of believers
moves through history. Nonbelievers are relegated to
positions of inferiority. Christianity has been perceived
as an enemy since the time of the Crusades, and this
attitude was reinforced when Christian nations began
to conquer Islamic people. With the imposition of
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colonial rule in the Islamic heartland in the 19th and
20th centuries, there were recurrent revivals of re-
ligious feeling as Muslims both protested their depend-
ence and asserted their religious and national identi-
ties
Although the US did not participate in this contest, it
is heir to the anti-Christian, anticolonial xenophobia in
many Islamic cultures. It is associated in the popular
mind with the changes brought by modernization and
is viewed as a political and economic power capable of
great influence. It has, therefore, become identified as
the cause of the frustrations growing out of moderniza-
tion and has come to serve as a scapegoat for national
ills.
Most Muslims, leaders as well as the populace, view
the US ambivalently. Some admire it for its tech-
nological and military achievements, but these accom-
plishments remind some Muslims of the inferiority of
their country's standing in the contemporary world,
despite the promises of their religion. Others regard
the US as a corrupting influence for being associated
with the changes connected with modernity and for
supporting leaders who are not popularly respected.
This was and is demonstrated most dramatically by the
vituperative anti-American rhetoric that prevails in
Iran today. The Saudi royal family is the object of
muted criticism of the same kind because of the pres-
ence of so many Americans in their midst
The negative attitudes inspired by culture are re-
inforced by US global strategies. Although Islamic
populations take pride in the independence from the
US of the oil-rich Muslim states, people in those na-
tions fear that US military might could be turned
against them. The presence of a US fleet in the Indian
Ocean is a double-edged sword, as threatening as it is
reassuring. The continued US support for Israel-a
constant reminder of Muslim military defeat and
Western imperialism-also resonates negatively
through Islamic lands. The Saudis and other Gulf state
leaders are bothered by Washington's seeming unwill-
ingness to resolve the issues of the status of Jerusalem
and the Palestinians, while Sadat's participation in the
Camp David process makes him vulnerable to the anti-
Zionist criticisms of the Muslim Brotherhood and
Islamic Societies.
f Armed mullahs parade in front of Khomeini'
"mobilization "against.American aggression
Although such events as Soviet aggression in the Mid-
dle East or a sudden shift in the local balance of power
could make Muslim regimes more responsive to US
initiatives, leaders of Muslim states will find it increas-
ingly difficult to identify openly with US interests.
Among both elite groups and masses, Islam has a
tremendous latent attractiveness, and that appeal
grows more powerful as traditional societies experience
the strains of modernization. Most leaders are aware of
this.
One challenge for the US will be to distinguish be-
tween the rhetoric designed for internal consumption
and a leader's personal willingness to enter into a
relationship with the US for certain purposes. Because
25
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of their internal situations, it will be far more difficult
for the heads of Muslim states to make total commit-
ments to the US. This will put a premium on US
selectivity in broachin issues that require their
cooperation
Over the longer haul, there will be no totally reliable
allies in the Islamic world for the United States. Gov-
ernments are highly personalized, like those in other
Third World countries, and policies tend to emerge
from the perceptions of a leader or a group of leaders
rather than from a firm foundation in a nation's in-
stitutional life. Leaders can make sudden turnabouts,
and governments can change just as suddenly. It is
difficult to predict precisely when governments will
change in Muslim countries because politics are
largely the affair of a closed elite with few universally
recognized mechanisms for succession. Leaders op-
erate from positions of relative domestic weakness.
Each must depend on the support of key elite groups
who help keep the masses in check. If Islamic feelings
are strong, leaders will play on them and rouse them
even more.
The US is also likely to face growing Soviet involve-
ment in Muslim politics in the 1980s. Renewed re-
ligious feeling presents problems for Moscow. Islamic
feelings against Communism as a doctrine are high.
But Moscow has tried to take advantage of unstable
situations in the Islamic world and will do so again.
Some disaffected youths of middle class background
find great psychological comfort and a sense of impor-
tance in covert organizations and the direction pro-
vided by ideology. Military and bureaucratic elites
often are drawn to a socialism short of Marxism be-
cause of the doctrine's austerity and egalitarianism.
Although Communism is rejected by most Islamic
leaders because of the doctrine's avowed atheism, the
anti-US themes of Soviet propaganda find a sym-
pathetic response in the Muslim world. Revived re-
ligious feeling presents problems for the Soviet leader-
ship in the Middle East, but Moscow could probably
live with Islamic leftism in an oil-rich state. There is
some possibility of this occurring in Iran, where radical
youth in possession of arms, an Islamic left-leaning
intelligentsia, and a disaffected officer corps are al-
ready in place.
There will be efforts to effect transnational alliances
because of the globalism inherent in both the Islamic
and Arab identities. Nevertheless, the Muslim world
will remain fragmented and may become even more
fragmented as a consequence of heightened religious
awareness. The symbols and rhetoric of each state's
Islamic revival have distinctive national colorations
and magnif the o ulations' sense of difference
one another
As the forces of modernization put traditional Islamic
societies under increasing strain, the United States will
inevitably be blamed. But the root cause for the intense
expressions of hostility and dramatic political actions is
the dissatisfaction and humiliation the Muslim peoples
are experiencing in their collective lives. No matter
how helpful the United States is to these societies in
transition, the outlook is for continuing hostility over
the next few years.
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