MOROCCO: KING HUSSAN S DOMESTIC SITUATION

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National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Morocco: King Hassan's
Domestic Situation
State Dept. review completed
Secret
PA 81-10067
February 1981Copy 116
STAT
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Domestic Situation
Morocco: King Hassan's
Research for this report was completed
on 23 January 1981.
OPA
The author of this paper isl Near East
South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be
directed to the Chief, Near East South Asia Division,
This report was coordinated with the Office of Strate-
gic Research, the Office of Economic Research, the
ligence Officer for Near East and South Asia.
Directorate of Operations, and the National Intel-
Secret
PA 81-10067
February 1981
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Morocco: King Hassan's
Domestic Situation F_
Key Judgments Morocco's King Hassan is in the strongest domestic political position he has
enjoyed in several years. Over the past year he has solidified his hold by
skillfully pitting competing factions and interest groups against each other
and by demonstrating greater responsiveness to the discontcnt of potential
opponents and the needs of the Moroccan military. Conciliatory moves last
summer undercut the criticisms of his civilian detractors-even of the
socialists, Morocco's only credible political opposition-who were attracting
growing popular support, and there is widespread disarray in the ranks.
25X1
There are signs, however, that this calm is fragile. The government's
parliamentary coalition is rent with dissension, and Hassan is under pressure
to call for new elections this summer. Labor and student activists are said to
be considering renewed protests as economic hardships continue, although
they have not yet acquired the legitimacy and support necessary to challenge
the King effectively. Such ups and downs are cyclical; during the course of
his reign, Hassan has faced stiff challenges from his civilian opposition and
withstood two coup attempts by the military. 25X1
The war in Western Sahara, which the general public and even traditional
royal supporters blame for Morocco's economic difficulties, is the most
dangerous near-term threat to the country's stability. The political climate is
more favorable for a compromise settlement now than it has been in several
years. But Hassan will have to proceed artfully if he is to secure public
acceptance of significant concessions by Morocco. 25X1
Devotion to the throne is gradually giving way to irreverence or indifference
as the impact of modernization and education spreads, especially among the
youth. Over the long term, the, King will face substantial pressure for
political liberalization. Fledgling democratic institutions-the development
of which Hassan has generated and tolerated-will demand more vigorously
that a transition be made from a divine-right monarchy to a constitutional
one. 25X1
This process will not be smooth. The King or his successor will almost
certainly resist fundamental changes. Nevertheless, widespread calls for the
abolition of the throne are not likely in the near term. Most politically aware
Moroccans seem to fear discarding this symbol of their country's legitimacy
and continuity. 25X1
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The attitude of the military, the only force capable of unseating the King,
will be critical. At the moment, morale in the Moroccan military is quite
high, and the Army is generally apolitical. Unlike the military segments of
most other North African countries, Morocco's military seems unlikely to
seek a permanent role in politics. Although the armed forces probably would
step in as a last resort in an unmanageable situation, they probably would
prefer the quick restoration of a civilian regime.
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Morocco: King Hassan's
Domestic Situation
King Mohammed V, father of Hassan II, began in
1958 what has come to be known as Morocco's "demo-
cratic experiment." He issued a series of proclamations
in that year announcing his intention to establish a
constitutional monarchy and to create democratic in-
stitutions. Mohammed died in 1961 before completing
his project, but shortly after his death Hassan re-
affirmed his father's commitment and personally took
charge of drafting Morocco's first constitution, which
was approved in a popular referendum in December
25X1 1962.
Since that time, Morocco has had two more constitu-
tions, punctuated by a "state of exception" from 1965
to 1970-when Hassan dissolved the heavily
factionalized and hamstrung legislature and ruled by
decree-and by a five-year period following the
promulgation of a new constitution in 1972 during
which no legislature sat. The King's manipulation of
the country's political system and his skill at balancing
competing factions and exploiting their differences
have prevented the formation of political institutions
with enough power and credibility to restrict Hassan's
ability to make all major decisions. Hassan's tactics
have helped him to put down frequent stiff challenges
from his domestic opponents and to weather two coup
attempts by the military
Morocco has developed a free press-although it
circumspectly exercises much self-censorship-and a
parliament in which issues are subject to lively debate.
The country also has a variety of political parties, labor
unions, and other interest groups that are vocal and
often troublesome. In early 1980, for example, grum-
bling about Morocco's growing economic and social
problems was increasing, and Hassan faced the pros-
pect of unrest from trade unionists, students, and
Islamic fundamentalists. Arrests and preventive deten-
tion of the leading activists, while they cowed organiz-
ers and prevented incidents, tended only to build popu-
lar resentment and to give Hassan's opponents-
especially the Socialists Union of Popular Forces-
new weapons with which to attack him.
Hassan's Handling of Key Issues
Last summer, in response to growing political dis-
content, the King made a number of unexpected moves
that neutralized criticism from his political opponents.
In July and August, Hassan pardoned a number of
political activists-some had been in jail for many
years-whose cases had become a major cause for
Moroccan and European human rights groups. The
releases included virtually all of Hassan's important
socialist opponents. 25X1
At the same time, Hassan amnestied many opposi-
tionists in exile and encouraged them to return home.
He reinstated with back pay a number of labor activ-
ists who had lost their jobs during strikes in the spring
of 1979. The King also announced a series of economic
measures intended to benefit low-income citizens, such
as rent reductions and special tax measures.) -25X1
These actions have for the moment fragmented
Hassan's opposition and helped to foster the image of
an active monarch concerned with the public welfare.
As a result, the King appears better off politically than
he has for the past few years.F7 25X1
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150
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Gilbraltar (U.K.)
Algeria
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This calm, however, is fragile. Still unfulfilled are
Hassan's promises to resolve Morocco's serious and
growing economic problems, and his trade union and
socialist critics intend to exploit this failure to rebuild
,25X1 their su rt.
25X1
Western Sahara. The most serious immediate problem
for the King is the conflict in Western Sahara, with
which his fortunes are inextricably linked. In the past,
Hassan has used the call of "regaining" the Sahara as
a diversion from serious domestic problems and as a
way to rally popular support. This tactic is less and less
successful; both the elite and the masses link Moroc-
co's economic problems with expenses for the war. The
military's improved standing and successes on the bat-
tlefield this year, however, have extensively reduced
pressure on the King to consider a compromise settle-
ment. Some military leaders-and perhaps the King-
are said to believe that Morocco can stabilize the
25X1 situation and go on to "win" the war
There are, nonetheless, important motivations for the
King to end the conflict. These include Morocco's
deteriorating international diplomatic position and the
increasing impact of the country's serious economic
problems on the general population. Algeria also seems
more interested in trying to resolve the problem and is
reportedly putting pressure on the Polisario to mod-
erate its demands. Finally, the political climate is
likely to worsen in the next few months.
If Hassan chooses to pursue compromise, he will need
to do so artfully. The country's political parties are
trying to position themselves to profit from any settle-
ment that may emerge. Their leaderships-expecting
to capitalize on the popular aversion to a com-
promise-are likely to be more intransigent on the
issue than the King will be.
Since last summer, many observers had been predict-
ing that the King would form a "government of na-
tional unity" including all political elements and led by
royal counselor and former Prime Minister Guedira.
Guedira is the most dovish of Morocco's senior politi-
cal figures. He is Hassan's confidant on the Sahara
question and is rumored to be handling secret contacts
with the Algerians. A national unity government is
now less frequently discussed. Some observers specu-
late that the politicians would not accept Guedira's
leadership, while others suggest that the socialists have
made demands that Hassan would not meeti25X1
The country's political parties have almost unani-
mously either criticized Hassan for Morocco's reported
talks with Algeria or expressed strong reservations
about the outcome of the talks. Should the palace
announce a surprise compromise settlement soon, a
political crisis could ensue because a settlement would
lack broad political support. 25X1
For this reason, Hassan may try a cabinet shuffle and
new elections in the summer to legitimize whatever he
may be working out with the Algerians or through
OAU and UN mediation. Because the political scene is
fragmented, however, it may take many more months
of maneuvering for the King to achieve even a fragile
consensus. 25X1
Economic Problems. Morocco's economic difficulties
and the popular perception that they are attributable
to the war may encourage Hassan to believe that he
cannot await the formation of this consensus. In
strictly economic terms, linking Morocco's economic
problems and the costs of the war probably is not
justified. Massive economic assistance from oil-rich
states-primarily Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent,
Iraq-and budgetary subsidies to hold down the prices
of consumer goods have shielded the public from the
worst effects of the cost of the conflict, now estimated
to be between $400 million and $800 million per year.
But the drain of the Sahara war, in addition to other
defense expenditures-over half the Army is fighting
in the south, and defense needs diverted at least 40
percent of the national budget last year-aggravates
other problems. 25X1
Senior bureaucrats and parliamentarians are increas-
ingly concerned about Morocco's economic future.
They lament that public expenditures for the country's
great social and economic needs lag far behind the
country's population growth. The commercial elite,
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25X1
formerly staunch supporters of the King, are complain-
ing more frequently that government restrictions and
inefficiency hamper their ability to do business.
Articulate middle class elements, who have themselves
suffered only modestly because of the economy's prob-
lems, are finding more in common with the masses of
Morocco's poor who attribute price increases to "the
war.'
Although Morocco's economy has considerable poten-
tial over the long term, mostly because of mineral
wealth, during the next few years it will face serious
imbalances over which the government will be able to
exert little control. Morocco has just suffered through
three years of an austerity budget (1978-80), which
the government instituted when the bottom fell out of
the economic boom in 1976 as phosphate prices
plunged. The austerity program sharply slowed real
economic growth, which fell from 7 to 3 percent per
year in 1978 and 1979. It caused particular problems
and hurt consumer interests in economic sectors like
construction, public works, automobiles, and light
manufacturing. The government severely cut back im-
ports of foreign goods and nearly cut in half its invest-
control program has not slowed the increase in con-
sumer prices, and inflation this year will probably be
between 15 and 20 percent. Real economic growth will
be about 3 percent, and revenues will not be sufficient
to fund a number of promised social programs. Un-
fulfilled promises to students are already beginning to
cause ripples, for example, and grumbling is likely to
spread to other sectors as aggressive labor unions-
especially the socialists-seek to exploit popular dis-
ment in the public sector
These policies temporarily reduced trade and budget
deficits in 1978, but they heightened social pressures.
The government said last year's inflation rate was 9
percent, but we estimate actual inflation at more than
15 percent. Cost-of-living and salary increases in any
case have not kept pace. Unemployment has reached
an unprecedented high-possibly 20 percent in major
industrial areas-and may even be higher in urban
areas like Casablanca. Many consumer goods are in
short supply as a result of government restrictions on
imports, and prices of import substitutes have been
driven up. Morocco, like other energy-poor Third
World countries, is greatly affected by soaring fuel
prices, although the Saudis and the Iraqis have assured
'25X1 its supplies for 1981
The government has been able to do little to address
the social pressures that have led to labor dissatisfac-
tion. It announced increased allocations for education,
public health, and other social welfare projects, but
real spending in these areas declined in 1980 and will
probably drop again in 1981. The government's price
Morocco has recently concluded an agreement with
the International Monetary Fund that the government
hopes will help to solve some of its serious economic
problems over the next three years. The Fund, how-
ever, is requiring Morocco to meet certain economic
targets. These goals will require even more sacrifices
by the public over the next year, because the regime is
obliged to cut subsidies to consumers and to limit
government spending. 25X1
Pressures for Political Reform. The economic difficul-
ties of the past three years have only heightened glar-
ing social inequalities between the elite and the work-
ing classes, and Hassan has done very little to narrow
these disparities by either chastizing the most fla-
grantly corrupt or moderating his own style. Devotion
to the King is increasingly giving way to irreverence or
to indifference, especially among the youth. Emotional
issues, such as "regaining" the Sahara, no longer seem
to rally popular sympathies the way they once did. The
public, even the privileged classes who traditionally
have strongly supported Hassan, is beginning to judge
the King by his ability to get economic results. This
promises to be an area where Hassan will be found
wanting, even though it is questionable whether any-
one could do a much better job 25X1
Hassan's civilian opponents, both active and potential,
are poorly organized. They lack the power to enforce
their wishes on the monarchy, although they could
doubtless create popular disturbances that the regime
would find difficult to contain. There is likely to be
growing pressure, however, both from the government
bureaucracy and from the public, for greater popular
participation in running the country and for a general
political liberalization. It is uncertain how fast this
pressure will build, but some groups like the socialists
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25X6
25X6
25X6
King Hassan with his sons L___vhorotrom Sig= C
25X1
are already calling for movement toward a constitu-
tional monarchy. If Hassan were to die or be removed
from the political scene, these pressures would prob-
ably mount much more quickly.
but the most cosmetic trimming of his royal privileges
and divine-right status, and we assume that the Crown
Prince would do the same. It is far from certain,
however, that there would be widespread calls for
abolition of the monarchy. Although Hassan is not well
liked, many politically aware Moroccans probably fear
that dispensing with the throne altogether would de-
prive the country of its political "glue."
Attitudes of the Military. In this situation, the attitude
of the military is critical. The armed forces are the only
group powerful. enough to unseat Hassan, and they
would probably step in if things became unmanage-
able. Many officers chafe under Hassan's strict control
and personal supervision of the armed forces, and most
would presumably welcome greater independence.
some younger Moroccan of-
ficers are more "republican" in their outlook than their
older counterparts, but we are uncertain whether these
officers would approve the abolition of the monarchy
or wish a permanent role for the military in Moroccan
Factionalism is especially troublesome within the large
and amorphous National Assembly of Independents
(RNI), the r alace-controlled front group that controls
53 percent of the seats in parliament and most major
government ministries. The party is headed by the
King's brother-in-law Ahmed Osman, who resigned as
Prime Minister in 1979 to take over leadership of the
Independents at Hassan's request. Osman has tried to
bring together a diverse group of conservative and
liberal deputies, some of whom reportedly even favor a
socialist government. These ideological contradictions,
coupled with Osman's lackluster leadership and the
politics.
Morale in the military has improved markedly over the
past nine or :10 months, however, largely as a result of
successes against the Polisario Front guerrillas
there is appears to center in the middle and lower
officer corps., but it now seems minor and unfocused.
Efforts by some political parties to establish links with
the military have, moreover, been ineffectual, and it is
doubtful. that these groups could find common cause
anytime soon on any except the most serious issues, like
an unfavorable Sahara settlement
To retain the support of the military, especially its
younger and more independent officers, Hassan must
continually demonstrate his awareness of and sensitiv-
ity to its needs. The King, seeming to recognize this,
has authorized a number of reforms over the past year
that decentralize authority and reward initiative. For
the moment, these tactics seem to have worked in
building rapport badly damaged by years of unproduc-
tive fighting in the Sahara by a military hamstrung by
royal dictates. Military morale is at its highest point in
over a decade, and the challenge to the King will be to
prevent a slump as frustrations recur in the Sahara and
with the economy
25X1
25X1
25X1
Politics of the Governing Coalition
Morocco's parliamentary system appears headed to-
ward paralysis again because of disputes within the
leaderships of the parties in the governing coalition.
This will complicate Hassan's handling of the sensitive
Sahara question and will prove difficult to resolve.
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Istiglal 51
USFP 15
Distribution of
Seats in the Moroccan Chamber of Representatives
MP 44
Rassemblement National des Independents Ahmed Osman Loose grouping of deputies who are 141
(National Assembly of Independents- RNI) supported by and subject to govern-
ment control.
Mouvement Populaire
(Popular Movement-MP)
Mahjoubi Aherdan Rural-based party of Moroccan Ber- 44
bers; subsidized and strongly influenced
by the monarchy.
Istiglal (Independence) Party Mohamed Boucetta Oldest and largest conservative political 51
party in Morocco; led Moroccan inde-
pendence movement; strong nationalist
irredentist outlook; supports constitu-
tional monarchy, Arabization; is the
most vociferous defender of Morocco's
annexation of Western Sahara.
Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires Abderrahim Bouadib Only militant political party of the left; 15
(Socialist Union of Popular Forces-USFP) strong proponent of political and
economic reform that would substan-
tially reduce King Hassan's autocratic
powers.
Miscellaneous Various Several minor political parties, mostly 13
palace oriented, will be unable to exer-
cise significant influence, but their pres-
ence serves Hassan's interest in creat-
ing the appearance of a broad-based
government. Morocco's small pro-
Soviet Communist party-Party of
Progress and Socialism-is tame, holds
only one seat, but does have a signifi-
cant following in youth and intellectual 25X1
circles.
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family and ethnic animosities always present in Mo-
rocco, have for the past year caused strains within the
party. Two main factions have developed. The largest
supports Osman himself. A more militant group, rep-
resenting about one-third of the Independent deputies,
is headed by Labor Minister el-Jadidi~
The other major party in the ruling coalition is the
Istiqlal, headed by Foreign Minister Boucetta and
controlling about 19 percent of the seats in the legisla-
ture. It is the country's oldest and largest conservative
party and led the fight for Morocco's independence.
The strongly traditionalist Istiqlal, however, has grown
out of touch with most Moroccans-especially since
the party's decision to participate in the government,
where it holds the sensitive and difficult portfolios for
education and foreign affairs. Its lackluster perform-
ance-it has been unable to gain government approval
for any of the reforms it advocates-and its unpopular
policies are reported to have attenuated its influence
greatly
Istiqlal is said to be maneuvering to take advantage of
the factionalism among the Independents. Istiqlal it-
self is factionalized, however, and the rifts have wid-
The third party in the governing coalition, the Popular
Movement (MP), holds about 17 percent of the seats in
parliament. It is an almost exclusively rural-based
organization of Moroccan Berbers, subsidized and
strongly influenced by the government and royalist in
its outlook. The party thus does not have nationwide
appeal, but the predominance of Berbers in the Army
and Interior Ministry and their restive and rebellious
nature give the Popular Movement greater influence
than its numbers suggest.
There have long been rumblings of dissent within the
group-mostly as a result of regional and generational
conflicts and of personal antagonisms toward its lead-
er, Communications Minister Aherdan, who runs the
party largely as a one-man show. In the fall of 1979,
the dispute broke out in the open when four dissident
members issued a long manifesto highly critical of
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Aherdan, complaining that the party had no organiza-
tion and no ideology other than its emphasis on Berber
culture. The dissidents were expelled from the party;
this silenced the criticism but did not move Aherdan to
open party decisionmaking or wider participation.
Reports of dissatisfaction within the party have re-
cently cropped up once more, and some political
observers have told US diplomats that long-simmering
rivalries may soon boil over.
discontented Transportation Minister Naceur has re-
ceived the King's blessing to challenge Aherdan or to
form a separate party. This seems unlikely, however,
because of Aherdan's proven loyalty and his strong
following. But it would be typical for Hassan to play
off such leaders against each other.
The Left Opposition
The disarray in the governing coalition has worked to
the advantage of the King's militant opponents on the
left. These opponents are capitalizing on Morocco's
growing economic and social problems to attract
supporters away from progovernment, conservative,
and traditional groups.
The Socialists. The Socialist Union of Popular Forces
(USFP) has grown rapidly since its formation in 1974,
and its good organization and active program have
made it Morocco's only credible opposition party. It is
a strong proponent of a substantial reduction in the
King's autocratic powers, and it has gained credibility
as a result of its refusal to participate in the cabinet.
The party controls less than 6 percent of the seats in
parliament, but this does not represent its true popular
following. The authorities widely and blatantly rigged
elections to the disadvantage of the socialists. It is hard
to estimate the extent of the party's popular support,
but socialist leaders boast they could win a parliamen-
tary majority if free elections were held. Their claim
could prove true in urban areas, especially in the
sprawling and overcrowded commercial center of
Casablanca, but the party probably has only a small
following in most of the still traditional countryside.
Hassan has tolerated the socialists since their party
agreed to participate in parliament, but authorities
clearly regard it as the most menacing opposition ele-
ment. Until recently the government has subjected the
party to an active harassment campaign, arresting its
leaders and intimidating the rank and file. These tac-
tics worked largely to galvanize the party, however,
and are at least in part responsible for the regime's
decision to attempt to conciliate the socialists.
25X1
Hassan's moves last summer to meet almost every
significant demand of his socialist opponents have
reportedly undercut the party's arguments. The King's
actions have also spawned a divisive debate within the
party. The more moderate leaders are said to have been
placated by the King and to be afraid of jeopardizing
their gains by pushing the government much further,
anticipating a new crackdown. These leaders are said
to find it hard to retain control over the party's more
activist younger members. The militants decry the
failure to capitalize on Morocco's worsening economic
situation; the party's continued participation in par-
liament, which serves to legitimize Hassan's domi-
nance; and the socialists' past informal cooperation
with the palace. The return of prominent exiles like
Abderrahman Youssoufi, pardoned by Hassan last
summer, has probably strengthened the hand of the
radicals. 25X1
The King is fueling this debate by continuing to dangle
the offer of important cabinet posts for the socialists
and to suggest that he will not postpone parliamentary
elections from 1981 to 1983, as a constitutional
amendment approved last summer permits. Hassan is
said to be ready to offer the socialists three or four
portfolios, including the important Agriculture and
Education Ministries, and to give parliament greater
responsibility in overseeing day-to-day affairs. This
formula seems to fit the socialists' general conditions
for joining the government-that parliament get more
power and elections be held in 1981. But it apparently
still lacks specific guarantees for the observance of civil
rights, the unconditional holding of elections in June,
and real budgetary powers for parliament. Socialist
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participation in the government would go a long way
toward forming the national consensus that most
observers believe is necessary before Morocco can be-
gin serious negotiations to settle the Sahara conflict.
In the meantime, the debate in socialist circles is likely
to continue, and it is uncertain who will prevail. Al-
though the King hopes that the feuding will not get out
of hand and endanger the relative calm at home, party
First Secretary Bouabid announced in mid-December
that the party would withdraw from parliament in
June 1981, whether or not elections are held.)
Labor. In late 1978 the socialists organized the Demo-
cratic Confederation of Workers (CDT). It moved
aggressively and soon was almost as large as Morocco's
tamer, long-established 150,000-member Union of
Moroccan Workers (UMT). The UMT is nominally
independent but actually supported by the regime. The
socialist union's militant social program advocates,
among other things, an immediate 70-percent salary
increase and minimum housing guarantees. The
CDT's critics argue that it is actually seeking to topple
the regime by advocating nationwide strikes and press-
ing extreme demands in the face of Morocco's severe
economic difficulties.
Before long, however, the union was having trouble
attracting new members and coordinating its strike
efforts. This happened primarily because of the re-
gime's forceful reaction to the socialist-sponsored
strike of teachers and public health workers in April
1979. The government summarily dismissed up to
1,000 union employees from their jobs, the union's
membership declined, and it lost much credibility
when it became financially unable to continue support
payments to the members
Today the CDT is in difficult financial straits. It had to
cancel several planned strikes in 1980 because the
members feared a lack of union financial support if the
government once again cracked down. The union's
credibility problem persists, and the King's concessions
to the socialist opposition last summer appear to have
defused significant protest activity for the next several
Militants within the union, especially in key sectors
such as mining, fault their leaders for being overly
cautious. The leadership has become reluctant to press
the government too far for fear of provoking a rep-
etition of 1979's problems and wants to rebuild its
image slowly. The ensuing tension reportedly led to an
increase in wildcat strikes last year. The militants may
eventually force the union's leadership to be more
activist and to put greater distance between the union
and the sociallist party, which continues to counsel
moderation
The union will probably concentrate its efforts for the
next few months on low-key recruitment, sensitizing
the public to Morocco's deteriorating economic situa-
tion in an effort to present itself as an acceptable
alternative to the larger, "nonpartisan" union. These
efforts are meeting with some success. Last December
the UMT attempted to organize a strike of railroad
workers, formerly a UMT preserve; the socialists
successfully urged their members to boycott the strike.
The government agreed at the last minute to a gen-
erous settlement with the UMT in an effort, according
to socialist leaders, to detract from the socialists' im-
age.
The regime considers the socialist union a major threat
to domestic stability. The union continues to be sup-
ported by teachers, phosphate workers, and laborers in
several state factories, as well as by workers in other
important government activities such as communica-
tions. An Interior Ministry report last summer is said
to have concluded that the socialists' were the only
trade unions that would be able to mobilize workers in
a general strike during an economic crisis. The CDT is
likely to profit from the country's worsening economic
circumstances by gaining new members, but it will
always be vulnerable to a government crackdown until
it overcomes its financial and organizational problems.
Students. The education sector in Morocco is probably
the most disaffected element in society. Teachers are
becoming more militant, and students as a group are
more vocal than the population at large. The National
Union of Moroccan Students (UNEM) has been the
months
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Secret
major student group since its formation in 1956, and it
has developed into a highly politicized organization.
The regime is especially concerned about student radi-
calism because over half the population is under 25,
and security authorities regard the student union and
the socialist party's youth wing as the two most dan-
gerous political organizations.
Originally affiliated with the conservative Istiqlal
party, the student union severed this association in
1959. Its members gravitated to the socialist party
before the government clamped severe restrictions on
the union in the 1960s because discontent over social
and educational issues became widespread. The gov-
ernment finally banned it in 1973 and legalized it
again only in 1978.
Student members chose a new national leadership in
August 1979 at an organizational congress. Only one
radical was elected to the student union's national
council, and only a handful of radicals were elected to
its administrative committee. Far-left militants
charged that the government and the socialist political
party manipulated the elections to install a moderate
leadership.
25X1
The Communists. Morocco's Party of Progress and
During elections in January 1980, however, an ex- Socialism (PPS), the country's tiny Communist party,
treme leftist group-some of whose members belong to is closely watched by the government. Tolerated
semiclandestine Marxist organizations-gained con- mostly because its membership is small-a total of
trol of student councils at Morocco's three largest 1,500 to 4,000 with only 825 active cell members-the
universities. Their victory apparently came as a con-
sequence of the failure of the student leadership to
redress academic and material grievances, not as a
result of political issues. Consequently, the union felt
itself under greater pressure and became more activist.
It sponsored more strikes, to which the government
reacted by arresting a number of extremist leaders and
trying some of them. Tension subsided by spring, how-
ever, when the regime released or gave lenient sen-
tences to most of the activists.
At a conference on education organized by the King
last August, the government promised to maintain a
dialogue with students and to act on their principal
complaints. These include increasing academic sti-
pends, opening new dormitories, reviewing admissions
policies, and reducing classroom overcrowding. This
bought the regime time, but in recent weeks student
strike activity in Rabat and Casablanca has begun to
pick up somewhat. Activists, disillusioned by the fail-
ure of the government to follow through on promises
made last summer, have been pressing for "warning"
and "wildcat" strikes. More moderate union leaders at
first refused to endorse the effort but later agreed-
presumably fearing that they would otherwise lose
influence to the radicals 25X1
Strike activity has thus far been largely peaceful and
orderly. The union's executive committee was said to
be planning more strenuous strikes if the government
did not respond by early this year. The government has
remained silent, and more frequent campus confronta-
tions are likely. Student extremists are doubtless look-
ing forward to campus elections scheduled for this
month or next, and the activists seem to stand a good
chance of ousting a number of socialist party members.
This would further heighten tensions with the regime
and undermine Hassan's efforts to forge a national 25X1
consensus, and it would weaken the already shaky links
between the socialist party and the student union.)
party has gained few adherents except among youth
and intellectuals in a few cities. Secretary General Ali
Yata, who first formed a Moroccan Communist party
in the 1940s, holds the group's only seat in parliament.
25X1
The Communists have a militant social program on
domestic issues and support the Soviet Union on every
international issue except Western Sahara and other
Maghreb matters. Only a very small portion of the
party's operations are funded by local contributions;
the rest is a direct subsidy from the USSR for Moroc-
cans studying in or traveling to the USSR and in
support of the party's daily newspaper.
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Despite the dedication and commitment of its few
followers and its militant social programs, the party is
unlikely to attract much of a following as long as it is
led by Ali Yata. Many of the country's radical youth
consider him a sellout to the government because of his
decision to operate legally and to participate in par-
liament. These young radicals belong instead to
semiclandestine Marxist-Leninist groups like the
"23 March" and "Ala al-Amam" groups, which are
seeking to gain control of the student union.
The Communists' efforts to establish working relation-
ships with other Moroccan groups-especially with the
socialist political party and its labor union-have
proved fruitless. There seems little likelihood of estab-
lishing such cooperation soon
25X1
25X1
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