PAKISTAN: PROSPECTS FOR THE ZIA GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200070001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Assessment
Center
OJO
Pakistan:
Prospects for the
Zia Government
'PS
Secret
PA 81-10045
February 1981
Copy 114
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National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Pakistan:
Prospects for the
Zia Government
Information available as of 15 December 1980
has been used in the preparation of this report.
Research and Strategic Research.
This assessment was written by~ South-
west Asia Analytic Center, Near East-South Asia
Division, Office of Political Analysis, with con-
tributions from the Offices of Economic Research
and Strategic Research. It has been coordinated
with the National Intelligence Officer for Near
East-South Asia and with the Offices of Economic
Questions and comments are welcome and should be
directed to the Chief, Southwest Asia Analytic
Center, Near East-South Asia Division, OPA,
Secret
PA 81-10045
February 1981
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Na- and boundary representation
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Pakistan:
Prospects for the
Zia Government
Key Judgments President Zia has strengthened his authority over the Army and is taking
steps to consolidate his control over the bureaucracy. His regime has
benefited from the general improvement of the economy during his rule, and
he has been careful to keep martial law from becoming too repressive.
Although Zia has handled potentially inflammable domestic tensions with
skill, he does not have widespread popular support. He has been unable
either to attract credible political leaders into his government or to establish
the legitimacy of his regime in the eyes of most Pakistanis. His regime is
vulnerable to mass civil discontent, and such an eventuality cannot be
entirely ruled out.
As Chief Martial Law Administrator, Zia rules Pakistan through the Army,
but day-to-day decisions are made by Zia in consultation with a small group
of military and civilian advisers. Zia needs the Army's concurrence for
major policy decisions. It is unlikely the Army would remove him unless
there was a serious breakdown in public order.
The Army is a cohesive force and appears to recognize the dangers to its
unity and discipline posed by prolonged military rule. But it is reluctant to
return the government to civilian control. It lacks confidence in party
politicians and believes the Pakistan People's Party would damage Paki-
stan's fundamental interests by moving against the Army and acquiescing in
Soviet aims in Afghanistan.
The opposition, though normally fragmented, has recently joined to demand
Zia's resignation, an end to martial law, and elections within three months.
Lacking a powerful leader and a "gut" issue, however, and restrained by the
Soviet threat in Afghanistan, the opposition is hamstrung by its divisions
and cannot by itself mount a major challenge to Zia.
The Pakistan People's Party of the late Prime Minister Bhutto is the most
popular political force in the country, but it is divided between radicals and
moderates and lacks effective leadership. Even if it succeeded in taking
power, it would probably soon be split by factional struggles.
Foreign threats dominate the political landscape in Pakistan. The military
leaders fear that Pakistan will be the next victim of a Soviet drive to gain
strategic access to South Asia and the Persian Gulf if Moscow consolidates
its hold on Afghanistan. Even short of a fullscale Soviet attack, they fear
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potential Soviet subversion among Pakistan's restless border tribes and
worry that major border incursions would raise serious questions in Pakistan
about the government's ability to govern and defend the country. Most
Pakistanis deeply distrust India and suspect that Moscow and New Delhi
are collaborating to put pressure on Islamabad.
These threats, the military believes, can be offset by a stronger security
relationship with the United States. Islamabad's best hope is for an ironclad
US commitment against all comers, Indian as well as Soviet, guaranteed
access to modern weapons, and some joint military planning with US Indian
Ocean forces. Pakistan is reassessing its foreign policy and probably will
seek stronger ties with the United States. Some influential circles, however,
argue that the United States is unreliable and advocate continued nonalign-
ment, dependence on moderate Arab countries, friendship with Iran, and a
degree of accommodation with the USSR.
Zia, who believes the Afghan insurgency can go on indefinitely if properly
supported, will continue to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
Islamabad may have to reconsider its Afghanistan policy, however, if it
perceives a decisive shift in domestic public opinion on the issue, or if it fails
to receive support and security guarantees from the United States that it
considers adequate. The roughly 1.5 million Afghan refugees are an addi-
tional pressure on Islamabad. Pakistan might discontinue diplomatic efforts
to obtain Soviet withdrawal and, if severely pressed, could agree to a long-
term Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
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Pakistan:
Prospects for the
Zia Government
The most significant achievement of the Zia ul-Haq
regime since it came to power in July 1977 has been its
ability to survive serious challenges and achieve a
degree of consolidation unexpected by most observers.
In the three years since he overthrew Prime Minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Zia has managed to bolster his
position in the Army, revive a stagnant economy, de-
fuse potentially explosive domestic political unrest
caused by the execution of Bhutto and growing sectar-
ian tensions, and achieve a measure of international
attention as a spokesman for the Islamic world.F_
Major problems remain. The Zia government has been
unable to win more than grudging tolerance from most
Pakistanis, and political party leaders continue to press
for elections and a return to party rule. Bhutto's Paki-
stan People's Party is still widely popular and would
probably win control of the National Assembly if an
election were held. But the military leaders, quite apart
from fearing retribution for the execution of Bhutto,
will not willingly allow a party to return to power that
they believe would accommodate to Soviet aims in
Afghanistan and would attempt to undermine the
political and economic power of the armed forces at
home. Abroad, Pakistan's chronic insecurity, histori-
cally aroused by India, has been enhanced by the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Zia has so far dealt skillfully with these problems. On
the domestic front he has engaged the party politicians
in a dialogue on a return to party rule, thus emphasiz-
ing their divisions and competing interests. Interna-
tionally, Zia has been able-publicly at least-to keep
his distance from the United States and cover Paki-
stan's aims with the protective camouflage of Islamic
brotherhood and nonalignment. With India, Zia has
kept channels open to Prime Minister Gandhi and has
not allowed the two countries' historically hostile rela-
tionship to deteriorate further. On Afghanistan he has
managed a delicate balancing act, aiding the insur-
gents while offering to negotiate with the Soviet Union
through a united front of Muslim states.
Background
Despite Zia's evident ability to survive and the appar-
ent crystallizing of his regime, Pakistan's long-term
survival arouses serious doubts. It is the only post-
colonial state to suffer permanent dismemberment- 25X1
the breaking off of East Pakistan in 1971-and strong
regional undercurrents flow in what remains of Paki-
stan. It is not inconceivable that a combination of
internal and external pressures will once again subject
Pakistan to enormous political stress, perhaps this time
leading to total disintegration. Although this prospect
is neither immediate nor inevitable, Pakistan's prob-
lems are fundamental and will require imaginative
leadership and luck if they are to be overcome-two
qualities not found in abundance during Pakistan's
short history
Perhaps most basic to Pakistan's difficulties has been
its failure to achieve either true nationhood or a viable
political order. The country's history has shown that a
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common adherence to Islam is not enough to replace
regional and cultural loyalties with a broader and more
compelling nationalism. The elites that envisioned and
founded Pakistan were narrowly based, both socially
and regionally. Many groups either were incorporated
into Pakistan without their consent or, having joined in
a spate of religious enthusiasm, found themselves
underrepresented in the increasingly dominant institu-
tions of the state-the higher bureaucracy and the
Army, both of which were almost exclusively staffed
by Punjabis, Pathans, and refugee notables from India.
Regional and social groups that did not have access to
the institutions of real power sought to strengthen the
national legislature as a center of opposition to execu-
tive government and saw the reluctance of the Army
and civil service to accept legislative dominance as
proof of Punjabi-Pathan aims to run the state in their
own interest
The failure to solve this fundamental problem early in
Pakistan's history left the country without a true na-
tional consensus and without an acceptance of those
basic rules of political order which govern participa-
tion, enable competing claims to be compromised, and
allow governments to be made and unmade according
to clear and accepted procedures. In these cir-
cumstances, competing parties and electoral politics
have tended to aggravate rather than efface social and
regional divisions, thus confounding national integra-
tion and leading to recurrent constitutional break-
down.
In general, politics in Pakistan have fluctuated be-
tween two competing and mutually hostile patterns.
The first of these is party government and is exempli-
fied in the periods of rule by the Muslim League of
Pakistan's founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah and later
that of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto. Both Bhutto and Jinnah were secular
nationalists who had profound faith in the law and
constitutional processes that the political elite and
educated classes had inherited from the British. Both
men were able to arouse deep popular support for
radical reform and to establish their popular mandates
by linking together a large number of social and in-
terest groups in a broader party identity.
But parliamentary rule has not worked well in Paki-
stan. National elections were held in 1970 and 1977,
but on both occasions agitation by the losing parties led
to major civil instability. Parliamentarism has been
further eroded in Pakistan because ruling regimes-
including civilian governments-have not allowed op-
position groups to organize and function unhindered.
Another problem has been that weak party or-
ganizations have been unable to resist fracturing in the
struggle for pelf and patronage. Once in power, neither
Jinnah nor Bhutto was able to make party government
work, and both soon realized that they had to co-opt
and control the instruments of executive government.
For Bhutto, especially, this meant a growing depend-
ence on groups-particularly the landlords and the
bureaucracy--that he had initially denounced and dis-
placed and whose interests he had severely damaged in
his reforms.
Thus, parliamentary government has tended to decay
into executive government under the Army, the second
and so far dominant pattern of politics in Pakistan. The
tradition of executive government rests on the strong-
est and most developed institutions inherited from the
British Empire-the Army and the civil service. The
British drew on the executive-based Mughal imperial
system, including its tradition of mediative kingship.
Mediation, not mobilization, is the customary mode of
day-to-day politics in Muslim South Asia. At the lo-
cal-as well as the national-level, leadership is ex-
ercised through mediation within and between tribes,
lineage brotherhoods, patron-client networks, and re-
ligious orders.
Executive government in Pakistan, particularly under
its military leaders, Gen. Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan,
Yahya Khan, and Zia ul-Haq, has been a "brokered
system" in which the leader is a mediator who balances
contending elites. The stability of this system has
depended on a stalemate between many opposing fac-
tions and has been directly threatened when the emer-
gence of a dominant political party led by a char-
ismatic figure has upset the balance. It has also been
threatened-as Ayub Khan learned-by a failure of
"mediatorship," which can happen if the leader at-
tempts to build up a personal base of power or if he uses
his position for personal or family benefit
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The conflict between the legislative and executive prin-
ciples of government and the deeper struggle between
opposed and powerful social groups, which has pre-
vented the development of a national consensus, also
cast a shadow over Pakistan's external affairs. With its
internal divisions, Pakistan has never felt sure of its
place in the world, especially because it has always
believed that India is finally-and implacably-op-
posed to its existence. Pakistan has, therefore, consist-
ently sought to involve a protecting power on its side in
the subcontinent to provide it with the means to defend
itself and allow it time to strengthen its polity. But
while these "alliances," first with the United States
and later with China, brought Pakistan important
military and economic aid, they did not provide lasting
security or enable Pakistan to maintain its territorial
integrity during the East Pakistan crisis. The emer-
gence of Bangladesh showed that Pakistan's fun-
damental weakness in foreign affairs was its domestic
politics. The inability to manage the domestic pro-
cesses of national integration has meant a reduced
The Zia Regime:
Problem of Legitimacy
The Zia regime began on 5 July 1977, when Army
Chief of Staff Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq toppled
the government of Prime Minister Bhutto. The blood-
less coup brought to an end a violent three-month-long
campaign, led essentially by the urban middle class, to
declare the 1977 elections invalid because of alleged
rigging by Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party.
capacity to resist outside penetration
This remains the case today, for ethnic and linguistic
consciousness-particularly in Baluchistan and
Sind-continue to foster separatist tendencies. This
comes at a time when the international environment
has grown more threatening for Pakistan. India, the
historic enemy across a lowland border, continues to
build up its military power and refuses to discuss the
disputed state of Kashmir. In the north, the Pakistanis
believe that the Soviet Union has made perhaps a
decisive move in the "great game," sending its forces
along ancient invasion routes across the Hindu Kush
Mountains and turning the Durand Line into what
Pakistan now calls a de facto Soviet border. Pakistan
finds itself caught between two stronger powers, both
of which can exploit minority separatism inside Paki-
stan. The memory of Indo-Soviet sponsorship of Ban-
gladesh is painfully fresh, and Pakistan's leaders be-
lieve that such a collaboration might resume to
neutralize Pakistan and turn it into a weak buffer
between India and the Soviet Union. The Army is
acutely aware that a Pakistan transformed into a weak
buffer would lead to the virtual demilitarization of the
central government; it believes this would fatally
weaken the one institution capable of holding the coun-
try together.
Initially General Zia promised early elections and a
return to civilian rule. Pressures from anti-Bhutto
constituencies in the Army, bureaucracy, and middle
class, however, as well as discoveries by Army inves-
tigators of extensive wrongdoing by Bhutto and his
cohorts, led Zia away from his policy of moderating
political developments to one of attempting to domi-
nate the political process and effect major social and
economic reforms. To succeed in these goals Zia had to
neutralize Bhutto and the PPP. The means at hand
were charges of conspiracy to commit murder which
the government placed against Bhutto and four 25X1
confederates. Zia proceeded with the trial of Bhutto
and eventually approved his execution after Bhutto's
appeal to the Supreme Court was turned down. 77
Despite evidence of Bhutto's guilt, many Pakistanis
believe that Bhutto was either framed or tried unfairly.
The fact that the four judges who voted to uphold the
death sentence were all Punjabis, while the three who
voted to acquit were not, greatly exacerbated the sense
of grievance against Punjabi domination in Bhutto's
home province of Sind. The execution, along with
consistent efforts to weaken and harass the PPP, have
made Bhutto a martyr and helped revive the broad
popularity of his party.
The constitutionality of Zia's assumption of power and
his position as Chief Martial Law Administrator were
upheld by the Supreme Court on the basis of the
"doctrine of necessity." The court, however, has placed
some restraints on the scope of the military govern-
ment. It affirmed the right of superior civilian courts to
review actions of the martial law authorities, and it
appeared to make its acquiescence to martial law
contingent upon Zia's implementing his promise of
early elections and return to civil government under
the 1973 constitution
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President Zia has clearly gone beyond these limitations
since the court's decision in 1978. He has twice post-
poned elections-the second time indefinitely-and in
May 1980 he amended the constitution to make mili-
tary, courts superior to all civilian courts. Efforts to test
the constitutionality of these actions, including a court
action by the chief of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal party,
Asghar Khan, have been entangled in Zia's policy of
frequently transferring judges to prevent any bench
from completing this kind of political case. It is un-
likely that any court will adjudicate such political
claims as long as Zia's grip on power remains firm.
Nonetheless, the charge that the Chief Martial Law
Administrator has gone beyond the bounds of constitu-
tionality could haunt the regime in a future period of
instability.
The Zia regime has not been able to establish its
legitimacy in the eyes of most educated Pakistanis, but
it has achieved a measure of tolerance. Open opposi-
tion has been poorly organized, low-key, sporadic, and
usually confined to single-interest groups like lawyers,
Shias, and students. There are a number of possible
reasons for this:
? The enforcement of martial law has been firm
enough to control the politicians, but not repressive
enough to stimulate a violent reaction.
? Opposition parties are divided and demoralized and
can offer no contender who has broad enough sup-
port to challenge Zia's rule.
? There is not at the moment a "gut" issue around
which people can be mobilized. The regime has been
able to impose a degree of economic discipline un-
known since the Ayub period. The economy has
grown at better than 6 percent per year, and inflation
has been held to tolerable levels.
? Zia retains the respect, if not the love, of most of his
countrymen. He has performed shrewdly as a medi-
ator, a position that requires a reputation for piety
and evenhandedness rather than the "charismatic"
qualities of the political party leader.
? Some observers have noted a growing sense of politi-
cal maturity in Pakistan, a country that, within less
than a decade, has been through two countrywide
mass movements and a civil war that spilled across
national frontiers. Pakistanis have a more realistic
appreciation of how much economic damage mass
movements can do.
? Because Pakistan faces not only its traditional enemy
India, but also the Soviets in Afghanistan and the
difficult dilemmas of the Iran-Iraq conflict, most Paki-
stanis do not see this as a propitious time to challenge
or change the national leadership.
Nonetheless, virtually all Pakistanis consider the mar-
tial law regime to be temporary and support a return to
popularly elected civilian government. Support for Zia
rests, in a certain degree, on the public's perception
that the regime is moving-however slowly-toward
some form of civilian rule. Should his domestic oppo-
nents perceive that Zia is losing his hold, opposition to
his regime could coalesce rapidly, forcing him either to
crack down hard or make major political concessions.
Regime Poweir Relationships
Zia came to power in Pakistan as the weakest in the
intermittent line of Pakistani military rulers. Origi-
nally appointed by Bhutto, who wanted an undistin-
guished soldier without political ambition to head the
Army, Zia emerged as leader of the coup more by
virtue of his position than from a personal desire for
influence with. other coupmakers was weak, and early
evidence of poor planning and internal disagreements
initially undermined confidence that his leadership
would last.
In the past year, however, Zia has been able to consoli-
date more power in his own hands and has emerged as
the dominant figure in the government. In March a
number of officers, including a retired major general,
were arrested on charges of plotting a coup against
Zia. Faced with unrest in the Army and continued
disunity at the top levels of the regime, Zia moved to
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solidify his position while dispersing the power of his
military colleagues. He retained three of them as
provincial governors, but transferred their troop com-
mands to a group of freshly promoted lieutenant gen-
erals.
Only Lt. Gen. Rahimuddin Khan, who is related by
marriage to Zia, was allowed to retain both his posi-
tions as governor of Baluchistan and commander of the
Army's Second Corps. Others who had clashed with
Zia were reassigned to high-but relatively power-
less-staff positions. The subsequent resignations of
Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali Chishti and Ghulam Hassan Khan,
and the appointment of Lt. Gen. Mohammad Iqbal
Khan to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
indicated that Zia had gained the upper hand in the
reorganization of the regime's top echelon.
Zia ul-Haq: An Emerging Leader
Once diffident and dependent on his military peers,
Zia has matured into a tough, self-confident leader
who is clearly in charge and who intends to impose a
more Islamic way of life on his countrymen. His ability
to manipulate politicians, to settle potentially inflam-
mable tensions between Sunnis and Shias, and to gain
world recognition as a Muslim spokesman and a coura-
geous opponent of Soviet aims in Afghanistan bring
into focus a man who is somewhat more complex and
much more politically skilled than was earlier as-
sumed. He is careful not to take positions from which
he must back down, and he is adept at compromising
and accommodating diverse and opposed demands.
Yet he neither shrinks from making difficult decisions
nor vacillates once he has made them.
As no other leader in his country's short history, Zia
has promoted the Islamic basis of Pakistani national-
ism, a predisposition that springs from his genuine
religious devotion. He accepts the principle, most often
enunciated by the fundamentalist Jama'at-i-Islami
party, that Islam is a "complete code of life" which
guides Muslims in all realms of human activity-
political and economic, as well as moral and social.
Zia's piety and his respect for the egalitarian and social
goals of Islam probably give him substantial support
among the urban lower middle class, which is obscured
by the bitter criticism directed at Zia and Islamization
by the more Westernized groups he has displaced.
President Zia is not a "Mahdist" (messianic) figure,
nor one who sees himself as divinely ordained to
achieve a religious mission. An element of pragmatism
marks his religious views. Although he approaches
matters of religious interpretation conservatively, he 25X1
accepts the doctrine of ijtihad, which allows Muslims
to apply the basic injunctions of Islam in light of
changing circumstances. His pursuit of Islamization
stems, at least in part, from his belief that only Islam
can ultimately provide Pakistan with a national iden-
tity and ethos. Although Zia seems to be feeling his
way rather than operating from a detailed blueprint, it
is clear that he sees Islamic reform as a way of infusing
his countrymen with a sense of order and discipline and
a means of remodeling social institutions badly eroded
during the perfervid Bhutto years. 25X1
Zia occasionally reads more into events than facts
warrant, but he is a clear-eyed realist on most matters.
He is aware that a long political involvement might
erode the cohesion and professionalism of the armed
forces and agrees that the country must eventually
return to civilian rule. At the moment, however, when
Pakistan is threatened as never before, he is more
concerned that inept or irresponsible politicians would
lead the country to disaster or that an election cam-
paign could arouse uncontainable sectional, sectarian,
or class passions. Hence, he has refused to become
pinned down to a schedule for civilianization and seems
disposed to delay any move toward elections pending
further "reforms" and a less dangerous international
environment.
Zia has avoided becoming isolated as a leader and is
aware that strong opposition to him exists. Debate and
criticism are relatively open at the top levels of the
regime and in the Army, and Zia has been careful to
maintain contact with old friends and outsiders, some
of whom are sharp critics of his handling of events. In
addition, the President travels frequently to keep in
touch with a wide variety of Pakistanis throughout the
nation. He is candid about the fact that his authority
springs from his position as Chief of the Army Staff
and recognizes that any effort to build up a personal or
party following outside the Army would probably
bring pressure from within the Army for his resigna-
tion as Army Chief.
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Decisionmaking Groups
Pakistan is governed by a Martial Law Administration
that superimposes Army and other ad hoc lines of
authority over regular government and bureaucratic
structures. Zia runs the MLA and government min-
istries through his position as Chief of the Army Staff.
The decisionmaking process, particularly on national
security matters, is closed, highly centralized, and
restricted to a small group of military colleagues and
civilian advisers. No formal body with clear executive
responsibilities can be singled out, and Zia appears to
select his advisers on any given issue on the basis of
personal trust rather than function. Some matters Zia
appears to handle alone. One of these is Islamization,
which is very much his own effort. Another is the
extremely sensitive matter of nuclear development. Zia
appears to make the key decisions on technical nuclear
matters in consultation with his nuclear advisers, most
prominently Munir Ahmad Khan, chairman of the
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. More general
aspects of nuclear policy, however, are more widely
discussed in the top echelons of the Army and regime.
Two fairly discrete decisionmaking groups can be dis-
cerned around Zia. The first is a core group of close
advisers that figures in the day-to-day running of the
government. Most important are two lieutenant gen-
erals whose influence has mounted as Zia's fellow
coupmakers have resigned or suffered a diminution of
influence. Akhtar Abdul Rehman Khan, an artillery
officer, is a senior lieutenant general who heads the
interservices intelligence functions of the government,
including aid to the Afghan insurgents, domestic
political intelligence, and intelligence on attitudes and
opinion in the armed forces. His effectiveness is essen-
tial if the regime is to control domestic opposition, and
his loyalty to Zia is crucial if the latter is to avoid
falling victim to a possible coup from within the Army.
Khalid Mahmud Arif, the most junior of the lieutenant
generals, serves as Chief of Staff to the President. Like
Zia a Punjabi and an armored corps officer, Arif is
personally close to Zia and appears to have replaced
General Chishti as head of the regime's political com-
mittee. He has gained stature as a policy spokesman on
sensitive issues like the border situation, refugees, and
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and has developed
a good personal relationship with Foreign Minister
Agha Shahi. As Zia's main contact with the poli-
ticians, he had a major role in settling the difficult
Shia-government dispute over the payment of Islamic
wealth taxes. He is probably privy to the most sensitive
national security and nuclear policy discussions.
Two civilians are also close to Zia. Ghulam Ishaq
Khan holds, among other portfolios, the Finance Min-
istry and is regarded as a policymaker and administra-
tor of outstanding ability. He enjoys major influence
on domestic affairs and has been involved with nuclear
issues since the Bhutto years. The fact that he is a
career civil se:rvant gives him great stature with the
bureaucracy, the "steel frame" that extends down to
the village level and without which Pakistan could not
be governed. The Finance Ministry traditionally has
been the most powerful Cabinet post in Pakistan, and
Ishaq has been described as a de facto Prime Minister
under Zia.
Foreign Minister Agha Shahi, a career Foreign Serv-
ice officer and diplomatic notable since the Yahya
regime, is a close adviser to Zia by virtue of his foreign
affairs expertise and grasp of the workings of the
diplomatic machinery. A master of diplomatic maneu-
ver and nuance, Shahi has starred brilliantly in the
Islamic Conference and in promoting Zia as a spokes-
man for the Islamic world. His influence is limited,
however, largely because he is not completely trusted
by the military leaders, who dislike his diplomatic
dissimulation and believe Shahi has sometimes
stretched his instructions to the limit. Additionally,
Shahi-a Shia-does not deal with Saudi Arabia on
bilateral matters and is kept on the periphery of foreign
policy questions dealing directly with national security
and nuclear development. Policies closely identified
with him, however, such as nonalignment, close rela-
tions with Iran, rejection of US military aid, and a
dependence on moderate Arab states, have recently
come under attack inside the government, and it is
possible that Shahi would not retain his ministry if
Pakistan became more closely aligned to the United
States)
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 Organization of Zia Regime
Joint military Committe
Chairman
Gen, Mohammed.Zia-d1.-Haq
Gen., Mohammed lqbal Khan.
Gen.`Sawar Khan
Air Chief Marshall M. A Shamir
Adrim. Kararnat Rehman. Niazi
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President
Gen. Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq
Chief of Staff to the President
LTG Khalid Mahmud Arif a
Finance Ghulam Ishaq Khana
Foreign Affairs Agha Shahia
Agriculture RAdm. Mohammed Fazil Janjua
Housing Air Marshall Inamul Haq Khan
Information MG (Rtd.) Shahid Hamid
Interior Mahmud A. Haroon
Law Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada
Industries LTG (Rtd.) Ghulam Hassan Khan
Exports Hamid Habib
Social Welfare Mahmud All
Martial Law Administration
Chief
Gen. Mohammed Zia-uf-Haq
Provincial Martial Law Authorities
.Punjab. LTG Ghulam Jilani Khan
Baluchistan: LTG Rahimuddin Khan
Sind LTG Sadi-ur-Rashid Abbas:
NWFP LTG Fazle Haq
Defense Mir~Au Ahmad Talpur
Joint Chiefs of Staff: Committee
Chairman x f, a
h
`Gen ,Mohammed,flgbal Khan ?
R
hi III
Province Governors .
Punjab -LTG. Ghulam Jilani Khan
Baluchistan:- LTG,Rahimuddin Khan
Sind: LTG Sadi-ur-Rashid Abbasi.
NWFP: LTG Fazle Haq
Local. Bodies
Army
Inter Services% ntellligence Directorat'
LTG Akhta Abdul r2ah iian Kha
;Chief of the; Army ;Staff
Geri Mohammed Zia ul.Haq
vice Chief=of the Army Staff
Gen Sawar=Khan i
IColps LTG Elaz Azim
II Corps LTG,Rahimuddm Khan
XI Corps.. LTG Ch Abdul Maiid Khan::
Navy
Chief o the Nava
Admiral Kara tt .
aMembers of Zia's "Inner Cabinet" 25X1
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On major decisions, such as the one taken in October
1979 to postpone national elections, Zia turns to a
somewhat larger circle to help make policy. Today this
would include the Army high command, the provincial
governors, and the corps commanders. Three generals
stand out in this group as most important: Mohammad
Iqbal Khan, chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Com-
mittee; Sawar Khan, vice chief of the Army Staff; and
Rahimuddin Khan, governor of Baluchistan and Sec-
ond Corps commander. Frequently Zia calls on close
associates in this circle to assist him on sensitive na-
tional security issues. For example, Zia and a coterie of
generals, including Iqbal, have dominated the dialogue
with Saudi Arabia on aid and the stationing of two
Pakistani armored brigades. Since the departure of
Generals Chishti and Ghulam Hassan Khan, who of-
ten sided with him against Zia, Iqbal has dealt less
with political and more with purely military affairs.
Rahimuddin remains a close confidant of Zia and was
included along with Akhtar and Arif in the President's
entourage during his visit to the United States and
Western Europe late last year. There are some who
believe Zia is grooming Rahimuddin to be his succes-
sor.
Made up of military officers and senior civil servants
who have similar social backgrounds, values, and a
common stake in preserving the status quo, the leader-
ship in the Zia regime is remarkably homogeneous. As
a group it appears to have had little previous foreign
affairs experience, although Zia and Generals Akhtar
and Arif have proven to be quick learners. Punjabis
tend to dominate this ruling group more than in past
military governments, while it seems clear that the
elite, Westernized values of earlier postpartition gen-
erations are giving way to more middle class and
parochial attitudes. The most fascinating aspect of this
group is their inbred quality and self-protective nature.
This tends to contain the vigorous ambition of some
and enables the leadership to perpetuate itself and
protect its group integrity from real or imagined incur-
sions by outsiders.
The Army
General Zia's position depends ultimately-as he has
admitted-on the "support which I get from my own
constituency, which is the military." Together, the
Army high command and corps commanders could
overrule Zia or, in extraordinary circumstances, force
his retirement from the Army or the presidency. Coup
plotting against military rulers is not unknown in Paki-
stan's history, but command discipline has remained
firm and no such conspiracy has gone beyond the
preliminary stages before being discovered. It is worth
noting, however, that twice military presidents-Ayub
Khan in 1969 and Yahya Khan in 1971-have re-
signed from office when it became clear that they had
lost the support of the Army.
Only a situation such as happened in the Bangladesh
crisis of 1971 or a series of incidents that threatened
widespread civil disturbances or serious discrediting of
the Army would overcome the Army's enormous reluc-
tance to risk disunity by replacing its chief. The Soviets
have threatened actions that would discredit the
Army's ability to defend the country. A major Soviet-
Afghan incursion, however, would not only be strongly
opposed, but would most likely unite the country be-
hind the government
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The more realistic threat to Zia is that of mass civil
disobedience or a prolonged breakdown in public order
possibly occasioned by Sunni-Shia disturbances, stu- 25X1
dent riots, or clashes between Afghan refugees and
Pakistanis. The threat of civil disobedience points to
the inherent weakness of any martial law
administrtion. The US Embassy in Islamabad holds
that "to be credible and effective, martial law must be
enforced; but if enforcement means severe repression
and the use of force against ordinary citizens, the
reliability of the Army cannot be guaranteed." The
Army would not long prop up an unpopular ruler
against an enraged and mobilized citizenry, particu-
larly in Punjab. It woudl quickly move to protect its
interests by replacing Zia with another general who
would either seek to maintain the military regime or
negotiate an acceptable political settlement with the
party leaders.
Zia does not enjoy the great respect in the Army
accorded his most illustrious predecessor, President 25X1
and Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. Wide-
spread criticism of his rule is reported among junior
officers, some of whom have charged that Zia cares
more for his own interests than the Army's; others
worry that the Afghan refugees will become a perma-
nent security problem for Pakistan, much like the
Palestinians in Lebanon and Jordan.
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Some middle-ranking officers believe that
Islamization may be going too far, and several senior
officers are reported irritated with General Akhtar-
and by implication Zia-for prying into personal
drinking habits.
This
kind of irritation is not important by itself, but it could
assume more importance if the generals become dissat-
isfied with Zia on more substantive issues.
Zia well understands the internal politics of the Army
and has made himself chief spokesman of the broad
middle ground on substantive policy issues. Dissent on
policy exists, but so far has been confined to small
groups of senior officers or to junior officers. On for-
eign policy, for example, a few have argued for an
accommodation with the Soviet Union on Afghanistan,
while others want an aggressive forward policy, includ-
ing the use of Pakistani troops inside Afghanistan in
support of the Islamic insurgents. Most officers, how-
ever, support Zia's policy of keeping lines open to the
Soviets while demanding Soviet withdrawal, refusing
to recognize the Karmal regime, aiding the Afghan
insurgents, and reacting with force to Soviet-Afghan
incursions,
move toward civilianization, his requirement that the
next election be nonpartisan, and his search for an
institutional mechanism that will give the Army a
long-term veto over major foreign and domestic
policymaking by future civilian cabinets.
Domestic Politics
The Zia regime has yet to give Pakistan a clearer
political, economic, or institutional shape.
Islamization-the effort to restructure public institu- 25X1
tions according to Islamic models-is being imple-
mented cautiously and has begun to affect the legal
system, banking, taxation, and education. A few in-
terest groups feel threatened-lawyers, women, col-
lege teachers, and some students-and have begun to
demonstrate against the Martial Law Administration,
though a lack of coordination, divergent interests, and
the absence of strong popular support have prevented
these protests from developing into a countrywide
movement. In time, the cumulative effect of
Islamization might be more profound and unsettling,
particularly if Zia attempts to replace parliamentary
government with executive-dominated "Islamic"
appointive advisory councils (Majlis-i-Shura) as a
way of strengthening the central government. One
cannot rule out a future coalescing of "anti-
Islamization" interest groups and sectional political
parties in a broad front that would accuse Zia of
misusing Islam to maintain the power of the Army and
privileged business, landlord, and bureaucratic elites.
Much ambivalence exists in the Army about its in-
volvement in politics. Most officers would prefer a
return to civilian leadership, though the difficulties of
implementing this task are clearly recognized. On the
one hand, there are the concerns about an erosion of
professional standards and cohesion in the Army,
and-since the East Pakistan debacle-few officers
have any illusions about the Army's capacity as gov-
ernor and reformer. On the other hand, most senior
officers stress the importance of legitimate and effec-
tive political leadership as a prerequisite for civilian
control and argue that elections that inflame sectional,
sectarian, or class passions are too threatening to the
country's integrity. There is also acute concern that
"incompetent" politicians will divert resources from
the armed forces, thus weakening the only defense
against external threats and the primary force holding
the state together. Most officers support Zia's glacial
Zia's relations with political groups have changed since
the execution of Bhutto. Initially, Zia was perceived as
a temporary ruler-one who would clean the corrupt
and criminal elements out of government and hand it
back to the politicians through a fair election. As a
caretaker ruler, Zia was de facto head of the anti-
Bhutto coalition in Pakistan, an amalgam of power
blocs-the judiciary, civil service, big business, big
landlords, and clergy-that had been damaged or
threatened by Bhutto and his authoritarian populism.
Politicians, grouped in the Pakistan National Alliance,
who represented the interests of these groups, joined
Zia's government in late 1978 and stayed long enough
to share-at least in the public mind-some of the
responsibility for the execution of Bhutto.
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The death of Bhutto and the expectation that his
Pakistan People's Party (PPP) would begin to frag-
ment brought renewed pressures from anti-Bhutto
politicians for a return to civilian government. The
military initially agreed, but changed its mind when
the local elections in September 1979 showed the PPP
still capable of winning elections at the provincial and
national levels. The military decided to postpone the
national and provincial elections indefinitely and
strengthened martial law by banning political parties
and stiffening press censorship. The perception of Zia
as a "caretaker" ruler gave way to one of Zia as a
reformer who had a mission to Islamize society, who
had come to enjoy the exercise of power, and who was
not especially anxious to depart. For the traditional
power blocs and the middle class, these developments
and the regime's decision to curb the authority of the
civilian courts were evidence that Zia's rule was begin-
ning to threaten some of the nation's basic political
institutions, including the 1973 constitution and the
traditionally independent judiciary.
The result has been a weakening of Zia's political base
in the past year. The Sunni clergy remain, by and
large, strong supporters. Zia has been able to ensure
that the "governmentalization" of Islamic wealth
taxes enhances rather than erodes the customary social
power of the clergy. Additionally, the clergy has
gained substantially in stature and income by the
establishment of the courts of religious law and the
Board of Ulema (religious scholar-jurists), a body that
Zia promised to treat as his Majlis-i-Shura (advisory
council) until a more representative body can be
formed. Clerical support is an important element in
Zia's ability to maintain order because the religious
leaders have major political influence with the urban
lower middle class, which has provided much of the
support for mass movements in the past.
Zia needs to keep up relations with the clergy to
protect his right flank. The example of religious revolu-
tion in Iran has inspired many Pakistanis, Sunni as
well as Shia. Unlike Iran, however, Pakistan lacks a
unified religious establishment. Many local heterodox
sects of saints and shrines define a parochial religious
consciousness for most rural folk, and the more ortho-
dox Islam of the cities is not only divided into the major
branches of Islam-Sunni, Shia, and Ismaili-but the
Sunni majority is itself split into a variety of historical
and legal schools. This makes it unlikely that a purely
religious figure will emerge to lead an Islamic revolu-
tion in Pakistan.
Nonetheless, there are real dangers for Zia in the rise
of a more militant Islam. His program of Islamization
has politicized religious divisions between Sunnis and
Shias. The handling of the recent government-Shia
dispute over the payment of religious wealth taxes
required great political surefootedness. It is all but
certain that pressing ahead with Islamization will raise
other contentious issues, any one of which could set off
serious sectarian disturbances.
Some elements on the right believe Zia is proceeding
too slowly with Islamization. Some student groups,
including the one that planned the attack on the US
Embassy in Islamabad a year ago, are prepared to
press the government in the streets. Clerics, who often
control such groups from behind the scenes, are not
united by a desire to unseat Zia and can be expected to
contain most student excesses. On the other hand, the
emergence of Muslim radical fringe groups, answer-
able only to themselves and bent on destroying the
Army, is a real possibility.
Other groups in the old anti-Bhutto coalition-land-
lords, big businessmen, and the urban middle class-
have put distance between themselves and Zia, but
have not broken with him. Some of Zia's policies-
denationalization of industry and probusiness labor
policies-are welcomed. It is worth noting that all the
elements of the anti-Bhutto coalition share with the
military an inordinate concern for political order and a
bias against mass political activity. All fear the con-
sequences of ;politically conscious worker and peasant
classes that know they can translate their numbers into
political power if another Bhutto emerges. The tra-
ditional power blocs want political power to protect
their interests, but would rather negotiate a deal for
elections with Zia and avoid the streets, fearful that a
mass movement would soon be captured by the left.
Only if a tide of public opinion began to run strongly
against Zia would these groups join in active opposi-
tion, and even then they would keep their channels to
Zia open.
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So far Zia has not felt sufficiently pressed by opposi-
tion elements to reach a political settlement with any
political groups. The left has been badly battered by
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Traditional leftist
strongholds, like the sectional parties among the
Pakhtuns and Baluch, have been substantially weak-
ened, and the pro-Moscow left in Punjab and Sind is
confused and defensive. Sporadic demonstrations by
single issue groups such as lawyers, Shias, and students
have occurred in recent months, but Zia has acted
skillfully through a combination of firmness and flexi-
bility to dampen any antiregime momentum that
might have been building. His sporadic talks with
selected political leaders about civilianizing the gov-
ernment appear to be tactical maneuvers designed to
protect his rule by dividing the opposition and deflect-
ing political debate into a contest for power and pa-
tronage.
Before his trip to the United States and Western
Europe in late 1980, and while he was settling poten-
tially explosive government-Shia tensions, Zia re-
opened a dialogue with political leaders. Negotiations
appear to have gone the farthest with Ghulam
Mustapha Jatoi, a prominent Sindhi landlord and
leader of the moderate wing of the Pakistan People's
Though pressed by many
PPP moderates to conclude the deal, Jatoi vacillated,
having failed to get the agreement of Bhutto's widow
and political heir, and Zia left the country without
making the expected announcement about a new civil-
ian cabinet.
Zia has not renewed his contacts with Jatoi. The
President returned from abroad apparently convinced
that he had finally attained such an overwhelmingly
popular position that no political party could shake his
resolve to mold the country's system of government as
he saw fit. There is some indication, however, that a
majority of the Military Council and governors op-
posed Zia's plan for civilianization and either wanted
to maintain the status quo or insisted that the poli-
ticians relinquish their party ties before being ap-
pointed to the cabinet. Zia has reverted to suggestions
that the new Islamic political system could be built up
from the local bodies. He has promised to appoint both
a federal advisory council and a federal cabinet to be
staffed by community notables respected for their
accomplishments, honesty, and piety, but has said that
elections under the present circumstances would be
"suicidal." He has agreed, however, that a referendum
on Islamization might "prove useful" to show that his
policies have broad support.
Zia must be careful not to overestimate his support or
underestimate that of his opponents. The failure of his
talks with Jatoi is only the latest in a series of failures
by Zia to keep promises made to politicians, and the
President is rapidly losing credibility as a forthright 25X1
negotiator. Additionally, there are indications that the
PPP has begun to shake off its lethargy and may be
preparing to raise the level of oppositional activity in
the country.
The Pakistan People's Party
The PPP is potentially the most influential political
force in Pakistan and would most likely win any na-
tional election held today. Its chief rival, the Pakistan 25X1
National Alliance, which led the movement to unseat
Bhutto in 1977, has rapidly declined in popularity and
unity and has not found a leader to replace the recently
deceased Maulana Mufti Mahmood. Bhutto's cha-
risma and populist program have proven far more
enduring in memory than has his ruthlessness. His
execution has made him a martyr for the party faith-
ful, and his tomb has become a shrine for the rural
peasantry of Sind. The PPP, known as the "poor peo-
ple's party" throughout Pakistan, retains the loyalty of
many of those who voted for it in 1970. Although the
party has never developed an effective organization, 25X1
key elements of the social coalition put together by
Bhutto are substantially intact. It remains to be seen,
however, if the party will produce a leadership capable
of effectively exploiting its latent strength
Hounded by the martial law authorities and divided by
conflicting counsels, the PPP has had great difficulty
maintaining its unity and adopting an effective, coher-
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Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto,
wife and daughter of the late
ent strategy. Nusrat Bhutto-Bhutto's widow and tit-
ular head of the party-has only recently begun to
emerge from long months of mourning and detention
and seems to lack the executive ability and brilliant
tactical skill of her husband. Benazir, Bhutto's oldest
child, has shown flashes of her father's ability, but has
not demonstrated the maturity and vision needed for
sustained political leadership. The Bhutto women have
had difficulty in controlling the restless ambitions of
some in the PPP leadership and have done nothing to
revitalize the party or restore its morale. The party
generally finds itself on the defensive, reacting to Zia's
maneuvers-such as the Zia-Jatoi talks, which almost
split the party-rather than setting the pace of politics
in Pakistan
For more than a year after Bhutto's execution,
Nusrat-perhaps understandably-remained bent on
retribution and unshakably determined not to deal
with Zia or cooperate with any party or leader who
might have had a hand in her husband's death. Earlier
this fall, Benazir's prescription for the country's politi-
cal condition was that "either the people rise or the
Army should act in a revolutionary manner." Efforts
in the past year to seek support in India and Afghani-
stan cast no credit on the party and suggest that some
Her announcement in
April-which was widely unpopular in Pakistan-that
she would be willing to talk with the Karmal regime
and send the Afghan refugees home was seen as a
signal to the Soviets that she would be more accom-
modating to their aims in Afghanistan. About the
same time, the PPP high command agreed to sanction
an effort by the Bhutto sons-Murtaza Ali and
Shahnawaz--to set up an anti-Zia movement in Ka-
bul.
The activities of the Bhutto sons-which must have at
least the acquiescence of Soviet and Afghan authori-
ties-are a potential embarrassment to the PPP.
Murtaza and his entourage-a collection of political
exiles and former Army officers loyal to Bhutto-
reportedly have organized a guerrilla force called the
People's Liberation Army and may be receiving ma-
terial aid from Syria and Libya. Murtaza Bhutto
claims that the PLA operates from Pakistani tribal
territory and has conducted successful sabotage oper-
ations against Army, paramilitary, and communica-
tions targets. Moderates in the PPP believe the Bhutto
brothers have gone beyond the intent of their mission
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There are indications that the PPP is considering a
more active opposition to Zia. Nusrat Bhutto has re-
laxed restrictions on PPP contracts with other opposi-
tion parties and softened her condition for PPP partici-
pation in a broad opposition alliance. The parties are
negotiating a set of principles to guide a united strug-
gle for the restoration of partlamentary governmentF
Although a credible opposition front has not yet for-
mally announced itself, representatives of all major
political groups, including the PPP, met in late
November at a Lahore mosque to make the following
demands: complete restoration of the 1973 constitu-
tion; the immediate setting of a date for parliamentary
elections; the lifting of the ban on political parties; the
ending of martial law; and the establishment of an all-
party national government to deal with threats from
India and the Soviets
At the same time the party's left wing-led by Sheikh
Rashid, a Punjabi lawyer with contacts among peasant
organizations, and Mairaj Mohammad Khan, a Ka-
rachi labor leader with strong links to radical student
and Baluch groups-has received the party high com-
mand's permission to broaden its contacts with labor,
student, lawyers', and women's organizations. The
PPP left plans to press such groups into clashes with
the government, hoping to force the martial law
authorities either to concede the streets-after which
the PPP left can emerge in its own right-or to engage
in violent actions that they believe will unify the op-
position and strengthen the role of the left. The PPP
moderates probably have agreed to the plan because
they believe that increasing pressure from below will
force Zia into meaningful negotiations with them
The decision to form an opposition united front prob-
ably reflects a multiplicity of converging hopes and
fears on the part of the opposition. There is, on the one
hand, the sense of weakness and exposure felt by most
opposition leaders and parties and the worry that Zia
and the generals will-like Ayub Khan in 1959-use a
referendum to bring in a centralized system of govern-
ment in which they will have no place. Regional parties
are concerned that Zia's call for establishing local
bodies in the tribal areas of Baluchistan and the North-
west Frontier Province means a strengthening of the
center's policy of dealing directly with tribes at the
local level. On the other hand, there is comfort in
numbers and a hope that a united opposition will force
the regime to negotiate with them or, failing that, that
a referendum on Islamization will provide an opportu- 25X1
nity to organize a countrywide boycott as a vote of no
25X1
confidence in the Zia regime 7!X1
By itself, the emergence of an opposition alliance is not
especially ominous for the Zia regime. The diverse
interests and competing personalities among the op-
position groups offer many opportunities for a shrewd
ruler to divide and rule. The development is one that
cannot be ignored, however, particularly given the
participation of the PPP. At the moment Zia rules
through a negative consensus and could in a variety of
situations-economic downturn, sectarian disturb-
ances, costly Soviet-Afghan incursions-lose the
political initiative to the opposition. At the very least, 25X1
this development means that Zia will have to find a
way to revive the flagging support of those grow s that
originally supported the coup against Bhutto. I 25X1
The Economy
Zia's political foothold has been strengthened by a
turnaround in the economy. Good crops, strong export
growth, and several key economic policy reforms en-
abled the economy to grow 6 percent in the fiscal year
ending 30 June 1980 for the third consecutive year-a
marked recovery from the stagnant years of the mid-
1970s. At the same time Zia has used heightened
Western concern about Pakistan's security to line up
sufficient external financing to cover his country's
chronic foreign payments gap.
Pakistan's balance-of-payments problem is much im-
proved since the fall of 1979 when Islamabad threat-
ened to default on its debts. Since last June Islamabad
has been able to gain economic aid and balance-of-
payments financing that could amount to as much as
$2.5 billion. This would include a record three-year
$1.7 billion International Monetary Fund credit and
aid from the Persian Gulf states-mainly Saudi
Arabia-that could total $1-1.5 billion.
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The domestic economy showed encouraging resilience
last year as manufacturing rebounded for the first time
since Zia took power. More importantly, a favorable
year in agriculture yielded a record 15-million-ton
production of foodgrains-largely wheat and rice. Cot-
ton production also recovered because of high world
prices and favorable weather. Commodity exports, led
mainly by rice, cotton, and textiles, increased to a
record $2.4 billion. Remittances from Pakistani work-
ers employed abroad continued to grow reaching $1.8
billion in the fiscal year ending 30 June 1980.
The thrust of Zia's economic policy since taking power
has been to undo the damage of Bhutto's programs,
which emphasized nationalization of key industries
and an expanded role of the public sector. One of Zia's
first moves in 1977, for example, was to denationalize
small-scale agricultural and industrial processing
facilities. Since then, amendments to the constitution
providing safeguards to private industry against ar-
bitrary state takeover, widening the scope of industries
open to the private sector, and new investment incen-
tives, have been introduced to improve the investment
climate. In agriculture, Islamabad has stepped up its
price support and grain procurement programs._1
Despite the progress in recent years, the economy still
faces many intractable problems. Rapid population
growth, widespread rural and urban poverty, financial
constraints limiting needed infrastructure expend-
itures, and high dependence on oil imports are all
factors restraining sustained economic growth. Private
foreign and domestic investment remains at low levels
of past years, and business confidence is being further
eroded by the Soviet threat from Afghanistan and
concerns about Pakistan's internal stability. In addi-
tion, under performance conditions required by the
IMF, Zia has agreed to narrow Pakistan's annual
budget deficit and gradually reduce the government's
massive subsidy program on sensitive items such as
wheat and fertilizer. The effect of these moves on price
levels, particularly in urban areas, could be politically
damaging and will test Zia's mettle to carry out needed
economic reforms despite possible political reper-
cussions.
Not the least of the problems confronting the Zia
government is rising expectations. While Pakistan re-
mains one of the world's poorest countries, if newly
generated wealth does not filter down or if Pakistan
runs into serious economic difficulties, social tensions
would escalate rapidly-as happened during the later
Ayub years. One safety valve in the 1970s has been the
boom in the :Persian Gulf which provided alternative
employment opportunities to Pakistanis of all walks of
life. The slowing growth of the market for Pakistani
labor and professional skills, and the possible adverse
effect on the return flow of remittances would com-
pound the economic problems Zia must deal with in
the next few years
Pakistan's Military Capabilities
One of Zia's primary concerns is the state of Pakistan's
armed forces, which are far from adequate for the
country's security needs. Its armed forces are well-
trained and number some 450,000 men, but its weapon
systems are mostly outdated and are inferior to those of
India in both quantity and quality. As a defensive
force, the Pakistani Army could hold out against the
Indians for no more than a few weeks. Pakistan's
ground forces, less than half the size of India's, have
little flexibility to defend in depth or redeploy reserves.
Even if Pakistani forces were to assume the military
initiative, their logistic system would be hard pressed
to support prolonged operations on foreign soil. Short-
ages of modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
self-propelled artillery, coupled with difficulties in
maintaining aging equipment, would restrict Paki-
stan's mobility and firepower.
The presence of large numbers of Soviet combat troops
in Afghanistan and the Afghan insurgents' use of
Pakistani territory as a safe haven have increased the
likelihood of confrontation along Pakistan's western
border. Although Pakistani forces there are relatively
small in number and lightly armed, they enjoy one
major advantage. Rugged terrain along the northern
two-thirds of the western frontier from where most
insurgent groups operate against Soviet-Afghan forces
would dictate that any major ground force (more than
a battalion or so) use the roads through a few key
passes. Pakistani ground defenses, which have been
improved since last summer, could make the cost of
such an incursion exceedingly high. Battalion-sized or
smaller raids by infantry or air assault units, however,
might be conducted for limited objectives without
encountering Pakistani strongpoints. Pakistan's lightly
armed paramilitary forces, augmented by some regu-
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lar Army troops, however, appear adequate to counter difficult in the past and would only partially offset the
the kind of small Soviet-Afghan incursions that have imbalance.
occurred so far
The capabilities of Pakistan's other services also are
limited. Because its air defense system relies prin-
cipally on older model Mirages and MIG-19s, Paki-
stan would have difficulty defending its airspace from
a major air attack by India or the USSR. Pakistan's
few Crotale short-range surface-to-air missiles have
been deployed at several major air bases, leaving the
urban areas with no missile defenses. Air Force ca-
pabilities also are restricted, more by the quality of
equipment than the quality of personnel. Most of Paki-
stan's aircraft are MIG-19s, which compare unfavor-
ably with India's MIG-21 bis, Jaguar, and recently
acquired MIG-23 aircraft. The Navy is small, and its
major surface combatants-mainly of World War II
vintage-are in poor condition and require consider-
able maintenance. On the other hand, Pakistan's sub-
marine force is on a par with India's.
Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979,
the Pakistanis, who have always been suspicious of
India and its close ties with the USSR, have become
more concerned over what they perceive as Soviet
encirclement. During 1980, two developments in-
creased Pakistani apprehensions. The first was the
signing of the Indo-Soviet arms agreement-the larg-
est such contract ever concluded by India-whereby
the Indian armed forces are to acquire large numbers
of relatively modern weapons. The second development
was President Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi in Decem-
ber to further cement Indo-Soviet relations and offer
India additional arms.
As India strengthens its military during the 1980s,
Pakistan will undoubtedly step up its efforts to acquire
more modern arms, but its options are limited. China,
which is Pakistan's principal arms supplier, cannot
provide weapons as advanced as those of the USSR.
Moreover, no Western nation seems willing to provide
the variety of weapons on terms comparable to those
that the Soviets are giving India. Even if such equip-
ment and terms were available, Pakistan could not
match Indian purchases weapon for weapon because of
its smaller economy and limited foreign exchange
holdings. Finally, financing arms purchases through
loans from Arab oil-producing states has often proven
With dismal prospects for redressing the current mili-
tary imbalance, Pakistan may intensify its efforts to
develop nuclear weapons. Such actions, however,
would probably cause India to resume its nuclear
weapons development program and would produce fur-
ther instability in South Asia.
Foreign Relations
One of the reasons for Zia's ability to hang on has been
the overriding primacy of foreign problems and the
dampening effect this has had on the domestic opposi-
tion. External threats have never been so complex or
ominous as they are today as Pakistan searches for a
way to maintain its national security in a regional
environment dangerously destabilized by the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan now believes it must
look two ways at once-northwest to a superpower
bent on subjugating the traditional buffer state be-
tween Central and South Asia, and southeast to India,
a historic enemy that Pakistan believes is implacably
hostile to its existence and under Prime Minister Gan-
dhi, a virtual ally of the Soviet Union.
Deeply distrustful of India, Pakistan has consistently
believed it needs a relationship with a protecting power
that will provide it with security guarantees and ad-
vanced weaponry. Since the effective collapse of the
US-Pakistan alliance in 1965, when the United States
cut off aid during the Indo-Pakistani war, China has
played this role, giving Pakistan some of its best weap-
ons and balancing off India. Under Prime Minister
Bhutto, Pakistan maintained the relationship with
Beijing, but also sought to strengthen its financial and
security interests in the Muslim world while assuming
some of the protective camouflage of nonalignment.
Finally, it set about developing a nuclear weapons
capability-the ultimate guarantor of its security
against a nuclear-capable India-and could have suffi-
cient fissile material for a nuclear explosive device by
late 1981. These are policies that Zia has continued.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the
Shah in Iran have completely altered Pakistan's strate-
gic situation and highlighted the inadequacy of these
policies. The most gloomy prospect now, in the Paki-
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stani view, is Soviet-Indian collaboration to neutralize
Pakistan-perhaps by a combination of external mili-
tary pressure and meddling in Pakistan's potentially
unstable domestic politics. Although there is a measure
of paranoia in these fears, there is also some justifica-
tion. Soviet pressure on Pakistan-manifested in diplo-
matic demarches, private contacts, and occasional
crossborder military activity from Afghanistan-has
been intense. In these circumstances the Pakistanis
cannot be faulted for saying they expect a major
Soviet-Afghan strike across the border at some point in
the near future.
The Soviets have also been active, in varying degrees,
in Pakistan's internal problems. This has included
planting propaganda in vernacular newspapers, financ-
ing small Baluch and Sindhi separatist groups, and
attempting to stir tensions between Afghan refugees
and local populations.
there have been
many rumors-none con irme -of arms aid to
Baluch insurgents. Finally, there are indications that
the Soviets have planted misinformation on both sides
of the India-Pakistan border about military buildups in
Kashmir, clearly hoping to deflect Pakistan from its
attention to Afghanistan.
Pakistan's relations with India have neve been warm
and have to be measured in degrees of greater or lesser
antipathy. Relations improved to a tolerable level dur-
ing the Janata period in India, but have declined since
Prime Minister Gandhi was returned to power in early
1980 and the vexatious issues of communalism and
Kashmir received new attention last fall. Pakistanis
bitterly remember Gandhi's sponsorship of Bangladesh
and believe she intends to complete the process of
India's rise to regional dominance begun with the
partition of Pakistan a decade ago. Even though Paki-
stanis are sharply critical of India's inability to see the
threat posed by the Soviets in Afghanistan, their abid-
ing distrust of India prevents them from moving a
significant portion of the Army away from the Indian
to the Afghanistan border. While it is highly unlikely
that India would agree to act militarily against Paki-
stan in concert with the Soviets, Indo-Pakistani rela-
tions are inherently volatile, and Pakistan's pre-
monitions of Soviet-Indian collaboration-possibly in
a political form-have only reinforced its siege mental-
ity.
In contrast to Pakistan's suspicions of India and the
Soviet Union, its relations with Iran traditionally have
been close. The two non-Arab Muslim states share
many cultural similarities and-along with Turkey-
strong security interests. They also have in common
the need to control the restless Baluch tribes, whose
extensive homeland is bisected by the Pakistan-Iran
border. Relations between the two states flowered
under the Shah, but have declined steadily since his
fall-despite Zia's prompt endorsement of the Islamic
revolution. Pakistan has been angered by the efforts of
Iranian diplomats to further inflame unrest among
Pakistan's Shia minority and by open calls in the
Tehran media for the overthrow of the Zia regime.
Pakistani leaders, including Foreign Minister Shahi,
believe the Soviets are using leftists in Iran to drive a
wedge between the former allies. They are deeply
worried that the Soviets will fill, either directly or by
proxy, any vacuum left if Iran disintegrates. They have
given Iran some material aid in its war with Iraq, but
are prevented from doing more by these fears as well as
by their growing dependence on Arab opponents of
Iran like Saudi Arabia.
The deterioration of Pakistan's regional security situa-
tion has set off a continuing debate on foreign policy
indside the Pakistani establishment and generated a
new interest in restoring the US-Pakistan relationship.
Many top military officers have asserted that the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has created parallel
Pakistan-US interests in the Persian Gulf area. They
argue that only the United States has the means to
defend Pakistan against Soviet military pressure and
believe that the United States would, in the end, be
forced to respond to major Soviet attack on Pakistan.
Some senior officers (including Zia) who remember
the halcyon (lays of the 1950s believe Pakistan must be
prepared to defend the "backdoor" to the Gulf and
allow the United States access to its ports and terri-
tories. In return, however, they require that the United
States enter into an ironclad security agreement and
provide enough advanced weaponry to make clear that
Washington will stand behind Pakistan whether the
threat arises from the Soviets or the Indians; and many
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of them question whether the United States has the
ability or the will to make such commitments, particu-
larly in the absence of a Soviet attack
Other voices-some in the military, but especially in
the Foreign Ministry and among the intelligentsia-
argue that the United States has consistently proven an
unreliable ally and as a declining power has neither the
will nor the capability to stand up to the Soviets in the
region. They do not believe that the United States will
ever provide the kind of assurances fundamental to a
close security relationship. This group has argued that
the Afghan insurgency will gradually lose steam and
that the United States will lose interest in Afghanistan,
leaving Pakistan holding the bag. Included in that bag
will be well over a million Pakhtun refugees and insur-
gents, who, if defeated in Afghanistan, may join with
Pakistani frontiersmen to agitate for a Pakhtunistan
inside Pakistan. This group concludes that Pakistan
should keep its lines open to the Soviets with a view to
reaching an eventual accommodation
This debate continues in Pakistan, but Zia, who makes
the final decisions on foreign policy, is determined to
reject Soviet aims in Afghanistan and to continue
aiding the Muslim insurgents. He is intent on standing
up to punitive incursions by Soviet and Afghan forces
into Pakistan, but has agreed that bilateral channels to
Moscow must remain open and that Pakistan should
probe for any give in the Soviet position on a political
solution for Afghanistan. Moreover, Zia has also
permitted Foreign Minister Agha Shahi some room to
maneuver in the Islamic Conference and in the United
Nations, where Pakistan's diplomatic efforts consist-
ently have been directed at bringing the Afghans and
Soviets to the bargaining table. No ground is being
given, however, on the demands of the Islamic Con-
ference that the Babrak regime not be recognized and
that the Soviets agree to withdraw from Afghanistan
as a condition for a solution.
The Pakistanis recently thought their policies had been
vindicated and initially interpreted the New Year's
Day offer by Soviet Ambassador Smirnov as a major
"procedural breakthrough" because the Soviets
seemed to be agreeing to talk under the aegis of the
UN Secretary General and to have the Kabul regime
present as representatives only of their party and not
the Afghan Government. Zia believed the Soviets were
feeling isolated and needed to show flexibility on
Afghanistan in order to dampen criticism at the 25X1
Islamic summit and the nonaligned meeting and al-
lowed Shahi to request the UN Secretary General to
appoint a special representative as a first step toward
negotiations.
The eagerness of the Pakistani response suggests that
the heavy diplomatic and propaganda pressure from
Moscow has made Islamabad more receptive to signs
of Soviet flexibility. Zia also may have been influenced
by the impact on Pakistani public opinion of Brezh-
nev's visit to New Delhi in December. The visit-and
reports of accelerated Soviet-Indian military
cooperation-received major coverage in the Pakistan
press and appears to have spurred opposition demands
that the Army relinquish its political responsibilities
and concentrate on its primary duty of national de-
fense. Implicit in these demands is the suggestion that
Pakistan cannot oppose both India and the Soviet 25X1
Union and that the Army can get out of politics and
face the "real enemy" if it comes to terms with Mos-
cow. While there is no evidence of a decisive shift in
public opinion on Afghanistan, the regime may be
feeling under increased pressure at home. Zia's recent
announcement that he will soon appoint a Federal
Advisory Council may be another manifestation of
domestic political pressure
Pakistan will take a firm line on Soviet troop with-
drawal if talks-now stalled-ever take place. Islam-
abad is not prepared to begin negotiations based on
Moscow's latest preconditions, which imply Pakistani
recognition of the Babrak government. The senior mili-
tary officers around Zia acquiesced in the decision to
permit Shahi to hold an exploratory dialogue with
Moscow-probably because they saw this as a way of
relieving pressure on Pakistan-but it is highly doubt-
ful that Zia and the generals would allow Shahi to 25X1
make substantive concessions. They are skeptical that
the Soviets want real negotiations and they do not
believe the Soviets are ready to withdraw their troops
from Afghanistan.
An important calculation in the Zia regime's response
to the recent Soviet ploy is its desire to demonstrate to
the new US administration the pressure it is under and
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indicate the directions it will have to take if substantial
military support from the West is not forthcoming. Zia
has been disappointed by the US response to Pakistan's
security needs since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and hopes that the new US administration will respond
more positively. Although the Pakistanis probably
have not focused on the precise nature of a new se-
curity relationship with the United States, they do not
want a return to the limited alliance of the 1950s,
which made Pakistan openly dependent on the United
States and appeared to meet the West's needs more
than Pakistan's. Any new treaty relationship not only
would have to guarantee Pakistan's territorial integrity
against both Soviet and Indian designs, but also be a
more equal partnership. Pakistan would promise to
hold the line against the Soviets-both militarily and
politically-and may eventually offer the United
States a variety of joint facilities on its territory in
return for uninterrupted access to advanced weapons
and aid in achieving greater defense self-sufficiency.
Pakistan would press the United States to affirm that
it would not abandon Pakistan or cut off military
supplies in any future India-Pakistan confrontation.
Anything less than this would be difficult to sell
domestically. Islamabad might accept less than explic-
it security guarantees-allowing it to keep its non-
aligned and Islamic credentials-provided advanced
weapons were made available both directly and
through the Saudis, who have promised major funding
for Pakistan's arms purchases in return for Pakistani
troop assistance in Saudi Arabia's defense.. Pakistan
would regard this as a "second-best" deal, but might
find this kind of format more acceptable if it perceives
major domestic opposition to a direct Pakistan-US
alliance.
Prospects
Pakistan under Zia will continue to concentrate on
foreign threats to its suability, while at home Zia's
willingness to deal seriously with party leaders will
probably depend on how much pressure the latter are
able to apply
Evidence that the opposition-including the PPP-is
pulling together makes the emergence of a broader
opposition more likely, though party leaders still face
difficulties. On the right, religious enthusiasm aroused
by the "Islamic revolution" in Iran ahs begun to wear
thin as Pakistanis perceive some of the consequences of
rule by mullahs. At the other end of the political
spectrum, as long as the economy continues to gain
strength and teh regime handles street demonstrations
with moderation, the left-already burdened by the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan-will have difficulty
finding a "gut" issue around which to mobilize a
broadly based opposition. The moderates will con-
stantly test the wind. They will marshal whatever
pressure they can to bring Zia into talks if he remains
strong, but will attempt to ride a mass movement to
power if he seems weak. It remains to be seen whether
any of the opposition leaders are capable of pulling
together all the numerous undercurrents in Pakistan
and channeling them in one direction against the re-
gime
Zia and the generals are interested in broadening the
base of the regime, but not at the cost of the kind of
concessions demanded by the more credible party lead-
ers. The military leaders will try to avoid holding
parliamentary elections, largely because they fear a
PPP victory. The longer the military avoids elections
and holds on to power, however, the greater the dis-
affection with its domination is likely to be and the
stronger the appeal of the PPP. A referendum on
Islamization may provide Zia with a way to give his
regime a badly needed popular mandate, but it could
also boomerang if the opposition succeeded in making
Zia-not Islam-the issue and turning the exercise
into a vote of no confidence. Thus far, the referendum
is only a diffuse idea and not a promise, and in any case
Zia would not hesitate to cancel any promised election
if its seemed to be going against him
The Army would like to get out of day-to-day politics
once the threats seem more manageable, but has not
yet found an acceptable mechanism for relinquishing
political authority. Zia does not have a detailed blue-
print for reforming Pakistan and restructuring its
political institutions, and it seems likely that he will
continue his cautious search for workable solutions
under the broader rubric of "Islamization." Having
failed to start anything more promising, Zia may seize
on the elected local bodies to build a superstructure of
nonpartisan and indirectly elected bodies.
Alternatively, he may try to undercut the parties-
which he regards as an un-Islamic form of political
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expression-by appointing respected citizens to advi-
sory councils at the provincial and national levels. It is
doubtful that any of these efforts will weaken the
major parties, and at some point Zia will have to deal
with them. The PPP, some observers point out, is
poorly organized and badly split, and a dose of political
power might be just the thing to finish it off. Such a
Machiavellian scenario would be a last resort for Zia,
but it is not inconceivable that he would negotiate with
the PPP leadership if he felt badly pressed
Although Zia's position has been relatively secure, he
must be careful, however, not to lose touch with opin-
ion in Pakistan or allow a sense of drift to take hold.
His rule has yet to be seriously tested in the streets.
Any serious outbreak of civil disorder, particularly if
brought about by an opposition political movement,
could mean Zia's replacement by a general who-like
Yahya Khan in 1969-would agree to hold elections
and return the country to parliamentary rule. This
would probably bring about the accession of a PPP
government that would substantially improve relations
with Kabul and Moscow.
As long as Zia remains in power and as long as the
Afghan insurgency remains active, however, Paki-
stan's policies toward Afghanistan and the Soviet
Union are unlikely to change. Given the present level
of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan can contain
Soviet-Afghan ground incursions with the forces it now
maintains along its border with Afghanistan. The like-
lihood of air incursions, against which Pakistan's
defenses are much weaker, are a continuing concern.
The Pakistanis recognize that only the United States
has the ability to match Soviet air power in the region.
For this reason, as well as for broader strategic calcula-
tions and pro-Western sympathies in the military,
Pakistan is likely to approach the new US administra-
tion about significantly strengthening Pakistan-US
ties. If the Pakistanis find the United States unwilling
to pay the stiff price they are asking, and if they find
Soviet-and possibly Indian-pressure increasing
while the Afghan insurgency subsides, then they will
almost certainly find a way to acquiesce in the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan.
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