LIBYA-CHAD: CULTURAL FACTORS BEHIND LIBYAN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

q Q p) 00 26Approved~'For Release 2007
National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
S5
b&P
ADP
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000200010001-7
Libya-Chad:
Cultural Factors Behind
Libyan Intervention in Africa
Secret
PA 81-10035
January 1981
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Libya-Chad:
Cultural Factors Behind
Libyan Intervention in Africal
Summary
ra edouins have long involved
themselves in the a airs o their A rican neighbors through religious
proselytization, economic exploitation, or political domination. These fac-
tors probably are more important than any strategic or economic consider-
ations in sustaining Qadhafi's determination to control Chad
Nomadic tribes of the Sahara, whether Arab or African, have little sense of
political identification with governments. Qadhafi is attempting with grow-
ing success to incorporate the existing cross-border tribal affiliations into his
Greater Sahara unity scheme. He is also making far-reaching territorial
claims based on precedents established by a now prohibited Libyan religious
order, the Sanusi, that controlled parts of Egypt, Sudan, Chad, and Niger in
the late 19th century. Such claims reinforce the fears of neighboring African
leaders about Libya's ultimate aims.
Continued involvement in the affairs of Libya's neighbors will nourish
Qadhafi's need for international attention and demonstrate his unwilling-
ness to accept the Libyan borders defined by the former colonial powers.
Involvement by France or the United States in efforts to counter the Libyan
presence in these states will only reinforce Qadhafi's determination to stay.
This memorandum was prepared by the Egypt-North Africa Branch, Near East South Asia
Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Office of Geographic and
Societal Research, the Office of Central Reference, the Directorate of Operations, and the
National Intelligence Officers for Near East and South Asia and for Africa. Research was
completed on 18 January 1981. Questions and comments are welcome and should be
directed to the Chief, Near East South Asia Division, OPA
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Libya-Chad:
Cultural Factors Behind
Libyan Intervention in Africa
Qadhafi's Bedouin A number of factors in the personal life of Mu'ammar Qadhafi have
Heritage contributed to
Qadhafi's father was a bedouin nomad who reportedly was a hero in the
1915 battle of Qasr bu hadi against colonial Italian forces. An only son,
Qadhafi enjoyed the unique privilege of being the first member of his tribe to
receive a formal education. Already imbued with the strong sense of
independence that is an integral part of the bedouin ethos, Qadhafi's
uniqueness-a Qadhadhafa, only son of a tribal hero, and only educated
member of his tribe-added a dimension to his developing
personality.
25
25
25
2;
According to bedouin culture, boundaries-whether of a tribe, clan, or
family-are considered only temporary definitions of areas of influence. If a
tribe's strength increases or decreases appreciably, tribal boundaries will
expand or contract accordingly. The underutilization of tribal power is
unheard of in bedouin culture, and Qadhafi's military exploits in neighbor-
ing countries-when viewed in a bedouin context-are attempts
Libyan national boundaries by using increased military strength.
The behavior of Qadhafi is neither psychotic nor random.
lAcceptance of the status quo is the antithesis of bedouin life. In this
perspective, Qadhafi's policies toward neighboring African sta
ligations of his bedouin heritage and can be expected to persist
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25
Reaction to Colonial Qadhafi's unwillingness to accept national borders as deterrents to his
Borders activities or ambitions is reinforced by the fact that Libya's state boundaries
were set by agreements between foreign colonial powers. They were imposed
without respect for tradition, tribal loyalties, or religious cults and were in
essence de jure demarcations with little validity or significance to the
peoples of the area. Remarkably straight lines separate Libya from Niger,
Chad, Sudan, and Egypt and demonstrate that indigenous factors were
swept aside when spheres of influence were delineated in 1925 and 1935 by
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Italy, France, and Great Britain. Qadhafi probably sees recognition of these
borders as acceding to the imposition of Western will on the Saharan people.
Tribal, religious, and legal claims give him ample reason, in his view, for
Libyan involvement in the affairs of other African nations
His first overt move to exert control outside Libya was in mid-1973. Since
then, Libyan troops have occupied the 27,000 square mile Aozou Strip along
Chad's northern border, which; according to old and incomplete French
surveys, may contain iron and low grade uranium ore. Libya's claim to the
area is based on traditional claims of an influential Libyan religious order,
the Sanusi, and on a 1935 draft treaty-never ratified by the French
Parliament. Under the treaty France agreed to cede the area to Italy, which
then controlled Libya, in return for territorial concessions elsewhere. The
recently proposed Libya-Chad union has substantiated African fears that
Qadhafi intends more than just the annexation of the border strip
The Sanusi Tradition In the middle of the 19th century, there arose in Cyrenaica a religious
revivalist movement, the Sanusi, that had a pervasive impact on the tribes of
the Sahara. A sect of Sunni Islam, the Sanusi order established a number of
zawayias (lodges) throughout much of Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Chad, and
Niger. These zawayias, which were colleges, monasteries, and markets, were
often built at watering places on trade and pilgrim routes. Travelers who
stopped there were subjected to Sanusi proselytizing. The propagation of the
movement was facilitated by its adaptation to the needs of tribal society,
which had not changed markedly in the centuries since the Arabs first
accepted Islam. The bedouin tribal system gave the order its political
foundations. The order, in turn, contributed an organization that gave some
coherence to a chaotic and undisciplined society 25
The Sanusi order flourished under 19th century Ottoman rule. The Turks,
who-were satisfied with a pledge of tribal loyalty and the payment of taxes,
encountered strong local opposition to their authority and showed little
interest in implementing Ottoman control over Fezzan and the interior of
Cyrenaica. In essence, the Sanusi order became a state within a state,
administering day-to-day local affairs and mediating intertribal disputes.
The coherence that the order gave to the tribal structure led to the develop-
ment of the Sanusi as the first indigenous national symbol of the tribes of
North Central Sahara. F777777 1 25
The southern expansion of the Sanusi order was halted by advancing French
forces in the Sahara and Central Sudan. The struggle with the French
brought the tribes together and strengthened their ties with the order in the
face of a common enemy. The French eventually won out and Sanusi
influence receded from Central Africa at the end of the 19th century, but
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the Sanusi remained strong in Cyrenaica. The ascetic demands of the
puritanical religious reform movement, however, still influence the religious
pretensions of Qadhafi's foreign policy in Central Africa; his claims to parts
of Niger, Chad, Sudan, and Egypt are based on the area of Sanusi influence
prior to the French intervention
The Sanusi constituted the major resistance to the Italian colonization of
Libya during the 20th century. Zawayias developed into national resistance
centers for the Saharan troops, providing support, financial assistance, and a
communications network between the various tribes. The limited political
cohesion that developed among the nomads was recognized by the colonial
powers when King Idris I a Sanusi amir, was selected to govern independent
Libya in 1951
The Sanusi order is now officially prohibited in Libya as Qadhafi is
unwilling to tolerate the formal existence of public organizations independ-
ent of the government. Although the ban effectively stifles the order's
political expression, it is probably not designed to destroy an Islamic
movement that has dictated every aspect of the lives of Libyan bedouins for
over 100 years.
Qadhafi, although not a Sanusi, probably considers himself heir to the
Sanusi tradition. By virtue of his propagation of Islam, intervention in the
affairs of Libya's southern neighbors, and his ascetic religious behavior,
Qadhafi has assumed a position of leadership in an indigenous religious
reform movement that claims a historic spiritual and political heritage in no
less than five African states. Even the national people's congresses outlined
in Qadhafi's Green Book bear a marked resemblance to the nascent political
structure of Sanusi zawayias of the late 19th century
Border Tribes Until independence in 1951, Libya was essentially an assemblage of tribes,
regions, and cities loosely connected under a succession of colonial empires.
The numerous nomadic tribes of the Libyan Sahara never fully acquiesced
to foreign domination. At the same time they were unable to unite for more
than brief periods in the face of a common enemy. Traditional tribal
identification and rivalries and the strong sense of independence inherent in
the tribal ethos have perpetuated the fractious nature of Libyan society even
though many nomadic tribesmen have adopted a sedentary existence in
urban areas. Numerous tribes have publicly pledged their support for the
Qadhafi regime, but the extent and durability of that support are question-
able. When bodies of Libyan soldiers killed in Chad arrived in Benghazi late
last year, Libyan tribes held large rallies at which they demanded that
adhafi's tribe-the Qadhadhafa-pay the price for the blood of their sons.
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Libya's tribal makeup has implications that involve Qadhafi in adventures
far beyond Libya's borders. Chad's problems are in large measure a struggle
between tribal factions in which Qadhafi has chosen sides. Libyan troops
move in and out of Algeria-despite protests from Algiers-protecting
nomadic lands: Other tribes move back and forth between Libya and
Egypt-raising fears by each that the other is exploiting the bedouin for
subversive purposes
The Toubou. The border areas of Libya, Niger, and Chad are inhabited
primarily by the Toubou nomadic tribes. In the local language a Toubou
means "a man from Tibesti" (a mountain region on the Libya-Chad
border), either an inhabitant of that region or one believed to have lived
there at one time. The Toubou, who are nominally Sanusi but retain many of
their earlier religious beliefs and practices, are nomadic or seminomadic and
freely cross the borders during the dry season.
The language of the Toubou, although distinctly Saharan, resembles the
language of Niger and is composed of two main dialects that are mutually
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comprehensible. Tedaga is spoken by the Teda subgroup, which inhabits the
areas of southern Libya, northern Chad, and northeastern Niger. Dazaga is
the language of the Daza subgroup, which is located in central Chad and
eastern Niger. The Teda nomads formerly derived most of their revenue
from a combination of caravan trade, protection fees extracted from the
caravans of others, and caravan raiding. The vicissitudes of time, including
the replacement of camels by trucks, have forced the Teda to survive by
breeding camels and cultivating date palms. The Daza, being more sed-
entary than their northern neighbors, raise horses, donkeys, sheep, goats,
and cattle
The political organization of the border Toubou, the Teda, seems to be
elastic and the position of the various clans within it very unstable. The
principle of freedom raised almost to the level of anarchy is so deeply rooted
that many families refuse to acknowledge anyone as their chief.
Chieftainship in the Tibesti region appears at the level of subtribe, which is a
unit made up of-clans and factions held together by ties of kinship and
geopolitical considerations. But these chiefs exert little influence on the
actions of clans other than the settlement of minor tribal disputes.
The recent hostilities in Chad have distinct tribal dimensions. President
Goukouni Weddeye, who received military assistance from Qadhafi, is a
Teda Toubou, while his rival, former Minister of Defense Hissein Habre is
from the Anakassa group of the Daza Toubou.Z Because of the ephemeral
nature of Toubou tribal allegiances, one leader-such as Goukouni-may
be able to impose himself over several tribes in time of stress or victory. But
such tenure is unsure, as evidenced by the defection of the Daza-Anakassa
under Habre.1
Qadhafi's involvement in the affairs of border tribal groups is in keeping
with the historic attitude of the Arab bedouins toward the Toubou. Arabs
have for centuries sought to dominate them. 'Toubous, in return, have a deep
distrust of their northern neighbors. Although Goukouni may have agreed to
a political accommodation with Qadhafi, the majority of Toubou tribes-
men-both Teda and Daza-no doubt oppose protracted Libyan involve-
ment in Toubou affairs. If Qadhafi is planning on using Chad for an
offensive against neighborin states, therefore, he will have to act before
Toubou resistance develops]
The Tuareg. A few thousand Tuareg nomads live scattered in the southwest-
ern Libyan desert and claim close relationship with the larger Tuareg
populations of Algeria, Niger, Mauritania, and Mali. Politically, the Tuareg
2 Goukouni's father was,the last derdi-a French-appointed tribal leader who served as
administrative intermediary between the colonial government and the Toubou tribesmen-
but Goukouni would not be heir to that position, which traditionally was rotated among three
noble families of the Teda.
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nation is divided into confederations consisting of various tribes, which are
divided into clans and further broken down into factions. Socially, the
nomadic population is divided into three main classes: the Tuareg "nobles,"
"vassals," and Negro slaves. The Tuareg have a rigidly formalized division
of labor and firm authority based on established rank. Although not Sanusis,
the Tuareg adhere to a form of Sunni Islam that incorporates nonorthodox
magical elements and therefore identify with other Muslim nomadic tribes.
The Tuareg, like the Toubou, have a strong sense of independence and little
feeling of political identification with governments. Both the Libyans and
the Algerians have vied for the allegiance of the Tuareg nomads in their
attempts to establish control in the Sahel. The Libyan Tuareg regularly
cross into Algeria during seasonal migrations. Libyan troops have even
accompanied Tuareg nomads to water wells 80 kilometers inside Algeria
between the Libyan border town of Ghat and the Niger border. Resulting
Algerian demarches to Tripoli have gone lar ly unheeded, and Lib an
troops continue to cross the border.
Although there are fewer Tuareg in Libya than in several other African
states, Qadhafi has exploited the case of the Tuaregs to reaffirm the
commonality of Saharan Africa. As a pretext for his pan-African ambitions,
Qadhafi claims a common heritage with African nations that do not share a
common border with Libya. Since the Tuareg inhabit such a large area of
the western Sahara, Qadhafi has alarmed even distant African nations with
his aggressive policies and calls for Saharan unity.
The Saadi. The Saadi bedouins originally were unique to Libya. Most of the
Saadi tribes, however, were driven from Cyrenaica into Egypt during the
19th century by the Turkish pasha of Tripoli. After years of resistance to
Egyptian authority, many of the tribes were forced to give up their nomadic
lifestyle for a sedentary existence, some settling as far east as the Nile delta.
There are reportedly more than 1 million descendants of Saadi tribesmen in
Egypt, with as man as 100,000 maintainin close ties with their Cyrena-
ican cousins.
Some of the Saadi tribes, notably the Awlad Ali, have maintained relatively
strong tribal cohesion and roam freely across the Libyan border to areas
inhabited by smaller Libyan branches of the tribe. The Awlad Ali and a few
other Saadi tribes with Cyrenaican origins have clung to nomadic traditions
and probably have little affinity with either the Libyan or Egyptian Govern-
ments. The Saadi have historically felt a strong sense of independence
marked by longstanding antipathy for Egyptians and more recent antago-
nism toward the Qadhafi regime. Egypt and Libya are each concerned that
these negative sentiments of the Saadi will be exploited by the other, thus
straining further an already difficult border situation
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