THE IMPACT OF US FORCES IN KOREA

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
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January 15, 1951
Lieutenant Colonel W.M. Hanes of Richmond, Va., Commanding Officer, X
Corps Special Activities Group (right), and Major Tong Gullpai, Commanding
Officer of the Group's Special Attack Battalion, inspect an old Korean fort
near Mungkyong, Korea, which troops used in repelling an attack by
Communist-led North Korean guerrillas.
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THE
IMPACT
OF US FORCES IN KOREA
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THE
IMPACT
OF US FORCES IN KOREA
LEE SUK BOK
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
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National Defense University Press Publications
To increase general knowledge and inform discussion, NDU Press publishes books on subjects
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Each year, in this effort, the National Defense University, through the lnstitute for National
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partment of Defense,,any other US Government agency, or any agency of the Republic of Korea
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Photographs, including cover photograph, are official US Army or Air Force photographs,
courtesy of the Defense Audiovisual Agency, Washington, DC.
Proofread by William R. Mizelle under contract DAHC32-87-A-0014.
NDU Press publications are sold by the US Government Printing Office. For ordering infor-
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
First printing, f my 1987
Lee, Suk 13ok.
The impact of US forces in Korea.
Includes bibliographies.
1. United States-Armed Forces-Korea (South) 2. United States-Military relations-Korea
(South) 3. Korea (Soinh)-Military relations-United States. 4. Korea-Politics and government-
1945-1948. 5. Korean War, 1950-1953-Campaigns. 6. United States-Armed Forces-Social as-
pects-Korea(South) I. Title. IL Title: Impact ofU.S.forcesinKorea. 111. Title:lmpactof
United States forces in Korea.
UA26. K6L44 1987 355'0095195 87-7915.
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CONTENTS
Foreword .............................................. xi
Acknowledgments ...................................... xiii
I. The Historical Background .......................... 1
II. Independence (1945-1950) ......................... 7
The Establishment of the Constabulary ............ 10
The Foundation of the Republic of Korea and Army .. 17
The First US Forces' Withdrawal ................. 22
Military Training and Education .................. 24
US Military Assistance ........................... 27
III. The Korean War (1950-1953)
North Korea's Preparations for Attack ............ 35
Combat Power Comparison ...................... 38
Invasion ....................................... 39
Formation of UN Forces ......................... 43
The Second US Forces' Disembarkation ........... 43
IV. The Post-War Period .............................. 57
The Mutual Defense Treaty ...................... 57
The Second Withdrawal (1954-1955) ............. 59
The Third Withdrawal (1971) .................... 60
The Fourth Withdrawal (After 1977) .............. 64
The Incidents Related to North Korea ............ 68
The Pueblo Incident ........................... 68
The Shooting Down of the EC-121 .............. 68
A Savage Ax Attack ........................... 69
Change of Command ............................ 70
Combined Forces Command ................... 70
The Combined Field Army ..................... 71
UNC Deactivation Contemplated ................. 71
An Exceptional Unit .....................:....... 74
Behavior ....................................... 74
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V. The US Forces' Influence on Korean Society ......... 77
The Armed Forces in Korea Network ............. 77
The Dollar Economy ............................ 78
Korean Employment in US Agencies ............ 78
Post Exchanges ............................... 79
Local Procurement ............................ 79
Social Consequences of the War .................. 82
Mixed Blood ................................... 83
Transcultural Marriage .......................... 83
VI. The Future Role of the USFK ...................... 87
The Perspective for Withdrawal .................. 87
The Present Role of the USFK ................... 89
The Future Role ................................ 93
VII. Summing Up .................................... 95
The Author ........................................... 101
MAPS
The Korean Peninsula ................................ xvi
South Korea .......................................... 6
The Military Situation in Korea before 25 June 1950......36
Initial Developments of the Korean War, 25 June-
20 August 1950 ..................................... 46
TABLES
Comparison of North Korean and ROK Combat Power
on the Eve of the Korean War ........................ 40
Comparison of Earnings from Export and Military Supply ... 82
PHOTOGRAPHS
Men of the US 17th Infantry, the first American troops
in Korea, March toward Jensin, 8 September 1945...... 3
Korean Civil Affairs Representative Addressing Villagers,
9 November 1950 ................................... 9
Two US Soldiers Examine a Korean Religious
Statue, 12 March 1982 ............................... 73
A Social Worker, Employed by the Amerasian
Association, Talks to an Amerasian Girl, May 1980 ..... 81
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A Young Amerasian Girl Cries, May 1980 ............... 85
The US 25th Infantry Division is Placed under
ROK Army Command, 3 March 1983 ................. 91
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FOREWORD
When the National Defense University opened its senior colleges
to distinguished foreign military officers, Colonel Lee Suk Bok, Re-
public of Korea Army, was part of the inaugural class of NDU Inter-
national Fellows. During his year at NDU he produced this study-a
Korean perspective-of the impact of US forces on Korea and
Korean society since 1945.
Colonel Lee treats both the positive and negative effects, as he
sees them, of the American presence in his country. He applauds, for
example, the major US effort to train and reconstruct the Korean mil-
itary after World War II. But he also criticizes the American failure to
appreciate Korean antipathy toward the Japanese; the US forces, for
instance, retained many aspects of military organization left over
from Japanese colonial rule. He commends US successes in the
Korean War, such as the Inchon landing, but he questions certain US
decisions, such as the selection of an armistice negotiating site only 25
miles north of Seoul. In terms of regional strategy, Colonel Lee also
frankly points out pros and cons. He perceives that successive US
force reductions, for example, while raising fears about the US com-
mitment, nevertheless have spurred the Koreans on to greater self-re-
liance in defense. The net effect of US forces in Korea, he concludes,
has been positive because they have deterred war and maintained sta-
bility on the strategic Korean Peninsula.
For Americans in particular, Colonel Lee's analysis offers a better
understanding of the strategic issues and explains the wide-ranging
consequences of the US presence in his country. The National De-
fense University is pleased to publish this special insight into the his-
tory and culture of an important ally.
BRADLEY C. HOSMER
Lieutenant General, US Air Force
President, National Defense
University
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author deeply appreciates the generous interest in his
life and work as an International Fellow shown by Lieutenant
General Richard D. Lawrence, then President of the National
Defense University.
This book could not have been written without the enor-
mous support and assistance of Dr. Fred Kiley, Director of the
NDU Press, and Colonel Albert C. Waldack, Director of Inter-
national Fellows at the university.
A number of officers of the Republic of Korea Army in
Korea and in the United States greatly assisted the author with
their perspectives and their encouragement. Among those who
provided comments and suggestions were Brigadier General
Kim Jung Whan, formerly colonel, Combined Forces Com-
mand, ROK/US; Brigadier General Hur Wha Pyung (retired),
a scholar at the Heritage Foundation; Lieutenant Colonel
Whang Dong Joon; Research Fellow at NDU; Lieutenant Lee
Young Woo, Korean Defense College faculty; and two class-
mates at the Korean Military Academy (class of 1965), Colonel
Park Yong Ok, of the Korean Defense College faculty, and
Colonel Kim Dong Shin, Chief of the Foreign Policy Division of
the Ministry of National Defense.
The support and comments of Dr. John E. Endicott, Direc-
tor of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU; of Dr.
Joseph Goldberg, NDU; of Dr. Harley Moulton, the National
War College faculty; of Dr. Robert W. Beckstead, the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces faculty; and of many students of
both colleges at the National Defense University, are most
gratefully acknowledged. Particular thanks go to Dr. Dora
Alves of the Research and Publication Directorate, NDU, for
her assistance and organizational support throughout.
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THE
IMPACT
OF US FORCES IN KOREA
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The Korean Peninsula
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LEE, SUK BOK
the Asian balance of power. The security of Korea is linked
to the security of Japan, a key ally in the Pacific. Any alarm-
ing tremors in Korea will upset the Asian balance and have
repercussions in Western Europe and other points around
the world. The ROK is a critical key to western interests in
Asia, interests which encompass US-People's Republic of
China (PRC) rapprochement; improved Chinese-Japanese
relations; efforts to persuade Japan to assume a larger de-
fense role in the area; the growth of ASEAN as an influen-
tial economic cooperative; and countering the Soviet
buildup in the region. If the United States succeeds in
these interlinked policies, the waning of US influence in
East Asia following the Vietnam War will be halted and a
new balance favoring the interests of the Free World
achieved. Tl i~hth US Army and US Forces, Korea, are
a deterrent which is factor 'nto t is regiona an g o a
s rategy.
All rIie al3ove defines cogently the role of the USFK. In ad-
dition, the ROK for its part views the role of the USFK as:
? maintaining the balance of power among the big powers in
Northeast Asia in order to check Soviet expansionism in
the Asia/Pacific region, and to protect Japan from contain-
ment by the USSR and the PRC;
? deterring war in the Korean peninsula, preventing North
Korean adventurism, and suppressing any excessive ROK
military actions against North Korea; , ,
? protecting the US political and economic interests in the
Northeast Asia region;
? demonstrating symbolic determination to defend the Asia
and Pacific area;
? contributing to the security of Western interests by dis-
persing the Soviet military power in Northeast Asia, and
maintaining the security of Northeast Asia; and
? contributing to the development of the ROK by assisting
the development of the ROK economy, by developing the
military skill of the ROK Armed Forces, and by stabilizing
South Korean society.
However, the USFK, in the eyes of Koreans, has had
effects that are partly adverse. The presence of the USFK
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THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE USFK
_prov_okes_improved military power in North Korea and tempts
the N~orth_ Ko.r-ea-ns-to-r-esor-t to-nuclear.armament, and the
USFK slows the development of self-reliant defense policy and
military strategy. in the ROK. The USFK causes an unbalanced
military power structure within the ROK armed forces. The So-
viet and PRC have been forced to support North Korea as a
counterweight to the presence of the USFK. The presence of
the USFK is used by the United States as leverage to intervene
in the ROK's internal affairs. Finally, the US forces cause some
cultural friction in Korean society.
The Future Role
The role of the USFK is unlikely to change greatly in the
future. The USFK should assist the ROK to play a bigger role
in the defense of the Korean peninsula. Were the ROK's power
equivalent to North Korea's, the United States could concen-
trate its power on checking the Soviets. This is the short cut and
the best way to ease the tension in the Korean peninsula and to
bring the North Koreans to a frame of mind ready for political
negotiation.
1. William M. Carpenter, The Maintenance of US Forces in Korea, SRI
International (Arlington, VA.: Strategic Studies Center, June 1975),
pp. 14-15. This executive summary was prepared for the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations and Planning, Department of the Army.
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VII. SUMMING UP
orea, as one of the most strategic confluences in the world,
has a special relevance to the global balance of power. It is
the only place where the direct interests of four major world
powers interact. Korea is geographically critical in the Far East,
being a peninsula where the conflicting interests of several ma-
jor powers have met for centuries. The peninsula has been
thought of by the Japanese as "a dagger pointed at the heart of
Japan." With equal logic it has been seen as "a hammer ready
to strike at the head of China." For the Soviet Union, Korea
commands the port of Vladivostok.
When US forces disembarked in Korea in 1945, neither
the US government nor the US forces knew much about the
strategic importance of the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless,
the US government provided no detailed, clear direction to the
USFK, whose members did their best to carry out their mission
of disarming the Japanese and preserving law and order until
Korea could take over. However, the lack of understanding of
the history, culture, and way of thinking of Koreans, and, par-
ticularly, Korean sentiments against the Japanese, delayed the
planned political process while repeated trial and error ensued.
With no understanding of the peculiarities of Korea, from the
beginning of the occupation to the first withdrawal of the US
forces, the US military government was simply attempting to
implant American ideals and democratic principles.
Chaos came, with continual demonstrations. Within two
months of the arrival of the US military government there. were
as many as 250 groups formed by political parties and military
factions. Such was the emergence of democracy in the new
Korea under the control of US military government.
The pursuit of idealism led to some fatal mistakes in the
process of establishing a ROK government and army. The first
mistake was not utilizing the provisional Government of Korea
in Exile for the better administration of Korean society, law,
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LEE, S UK BOK
and order. The provisional government would have been use-
ful for the better outcome of a US-USSR joint commission to
unify the Koreas. With the use of the provisional government,
trusteeship might not have been necessary. The exclusion of
the Government of Korea in Exile later diminished the cred-
ibility and legitimacy of the new ROK government.
Second, the exclusion of the Korean Restoration Army of-
ficers from the new ROK officer corps was an error. The exclu-
sion of the former resistance army officers and the preference
for young ex Japanese officers sundered the long military tra-
dition of Korea and caused the lack of legitimacy and leader-
ship in the Korean Army for some considerable time.
~ Third, allowing communists into the South Korean con-
stabulary made the barracks an ideological battle ground and
caused the Communist revolts within the constabulary. This
was, in a sense, a provocation for the war because the North
Koreans overestimated the effect of the communist revolts in
the South.
Finally, the first withdrawal of the USFK without sufficient
strengthening of the ROK armed forces brought about the
Korean War. This was a result of the US forces' ignorance of
the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula-a fact which
was highly appreciated by the USSR and the PRC.
However, the efforts of the Military Advisory Group in
Korea (KMAG), devoted to activating and training the ROK
Army soldiers and units, should always be appreciated by
Koreans. The creative work of these men from 1945 to 1948 in
activating the Constabulary merits high praise. During this time
the US government continued to postpone the decision for the
recommendation of the 45,000-man Korean national defense
force. Local observation in the field of USFK personnel showed
them what needed to be done, whereas the higher echelons of
the government merely procrastinated.
As for the Korean War, two questions still perplex Korean
analysts. One is, "Why didn't the UN forces stop at the line of
the Chong Chon River and Ham Heung, which is one of the
narrowest necks on the Korean peninsula and was the site of
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the defeat of two million Chinese invaders 1500 years ago?" If
the UN forces had stopped at this line, history would have been
changed. The other question is, "Why did the UN command
accept Kaesong or Panmunjon as the place for armistice nego-
tiations when it is only 25 miles north of Seoul and below the
38th parallel?" This decision gave very limited choices to the
ROK, whose forces were necessarily concentrated around
Seoul.
During the long struggle, two occasions greatly encour-
aged South Koreans. One was the Inchon landing operation,
which was a typical example of General MacArthur's greatness,
and scarcely to be outclassed anywhere in military history.
Again, the Changjin Reservoir retreat operation was conducted
splendidly by the US 1st Marine Division and is another out-
standing example of military action. Even though it was a re-
treat, not a victorious offensive operation, it is reviewed by all
Korean armed force units every winter to remind them of the
strong spiritual element in combat power.
After the Korean War, the ROK relied too much upon the
USFK until the third withdrawal of the USFK in 1971, which
left only one US division as a ground force. Ironically, the pres-
ence of the USFK itself caused negligence in the fostering of
the ROK armed forces. The disappointing US withdrawal gave
the ROK government and soldiers a chance to realize the im-
portance of self-reliance. The ROK government was stimulated
to promote self-reliance in the field of defense industries, tac-
tics, and defense policy with experience of the Vietnam War be-
hind them. Though the ROK has exerted every effort to
improve its miltiary strength with US assistance, it will still take
time to catch up with the North Koreans' buildup. Carter's
withdrawal policy forced the ROK to make a drastic improve-
ment in its armed forces, but a big gap still existed and the con-
tinual presence of USFK is still needed today.
Hopefully, in the early 1990s, the ROK will be capable of
defending itself. North Korea may fear to lose the last chance
to unify the Korean peninsula forever by force. When the ROK
is equivalent in combat power with North Korea, possibly even
before the turn of the century, new arrangements between the
ROK Armed Forces and the UN Command, CFC, and USFK
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LEE, SUK BOK
will be in order. Regarding the presence of the USFK, the long- c
range plan should be prepared by bilateral agreement now to
avoid inconsistent USFK policies such as are to be seen when-
ever anew US administration comes to power. ;
The US forces in Korea had the greatest impact on Korean
society, greater than any other foreign presence in her history.
Even the Japanese had less influence on Korea in their 35 years
of colonial rule than the US forces, who were never autocratic,
did. The USFK brought a new wind, "American style." The
new wind created a whirlwind of democracy in the political and
social systems. The modernizing trends clashed with intolerant
customs and primitive industries. South Korea's whole culture
and lifestyle were Westernized. As a result, some old Korean
standards of good morality and customs are dying away, unfor-
tunately. American cowboy movies, broadcasting, Christian
churches, pop music, relief material, PX goods, books, maga-
zines, soldiers' attitudes, transcultural marriages-all were sud-
denly introduced into Korean society. Besides, those Koreans
who could work for the US military government emerged from
obscurity: the men who had studied in the United States during
the days of Japanese colonial rule were picked up rather than
pure independent activists. This was another circumstance that
affected Korean society and Korean values a great deal. Similar
favoritism exists today, to some degree. However, as a result of
the American forces staying in Korea, many job opportunities
opened up, helping the very poor ROK economy. The US local
procurement policy helped the fragile government economy in
another way during the early postwar years.
The US forces in Korea have deterred another war in the
Korean peninsula and have clearly enhanced stability in North-
east Asia. The danger in the Korean peninsula is not simply
that in the near future North Korea might launch a massive
military attack against the South, either on its own initiative or ~
at outside instigation. The real danger is that the Soviet Union
will never be content with the preservation of rough equi- '
librium between the Communist sphere of influence and the ~
Western sphere. The Korean peninsula provides a decisive
flank that obstructs the Soviet Union's designs to encircle the
PRC and Japan. As the ROK Armed Forces progressively gain
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SUMMING UP
the capability for self-defense against North Korea, US forces
in Korea can begin to concentrate their efforts on checking So-
viet expansionism-starting in the 1990s, with any luck.
ENDNOTE
1. See V. Zaicivok, Geography of Korea, tr. Albert Perry (New York: In-
ternational Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952) for details
of the strategic location of the Korean peninsula.
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 l l I I J I I I I I I I i I ,. III I.
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THE AUTHOR
Colonel Lee Suk Bok is a South Korean officer specializing in
Field Artillery and Operations. Colonel Lee received a BS from
the Korean Military Academy, and is a graduate of the Army
Staff College in Korea. He has attended several basic and ad-
vanced officer courses in field artillery in both the United
States and South Korea. Colonel Lee has had teaching experi-
ence as the Chief Instructor at the Air Defense School in Korea
and was the division artillery commander of the 20th Mecha-
nized Infantry Division before accepting an invitation to attend
the National Defense University as an International Fellow.
Colonel Lee also contributed a chapter to International Essays 1
(National Defense University Press, 1986).
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THE IMPACT
OF US FORCES IN KOREA
Composed with text and display lines in Baskerville.
Title and half-title pages in Andover
Cover art prepared by Kathryn Halbach
Special Credits
Colonel Albert C. Waldack,
Director of International Fellows,
Institute for Higher Defense Studies,
National Defense University
Editorial Readers:
Dr. John E. Endicott,
National Defense University
Dr. Joseph Goldberg,
National Defense University
NDU Press Editor: Dr. Dora Alves
Editorial Clerk: Carol A. Valentine
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I IIIIIII
II II
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THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Lieutenant General Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF
I'retiident
THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC S"TUDIES
Dr. John E. Endicott
Director
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Dr. Frederick Kiley, Director
Colonel Robert Kvederas, USA
fl~sncietc DireiMr
Dr: Joseph E. Goldberg
Profe+sor of Ke~e~rri h
Major Donald Anderson, USAF
Ueputy Director ~or Production
George C. Maerz, Senior Editor
Dr. Dora Alves, Writer-Editor Janis Bren Hietala, Writer-Editor
Thomas Gill, Writer-Editor . Edward H. Seneff II, Writer-Editor
L. J. Conk, Production Supervisor
Pat Williams, Lend Editorial Clerk Carol A. Valentine, Fditorial Clerk
Dorothy M. Mack, Editorial Clerk
Lieutenant Monica M. Cain, USN
Deputy Director (or Administration
Miles Brewster, O~/ire Manager Yvette Hemphill, O(~ire Assistant
Rhonda Hawkins, O(~ire Assistant
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