ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE ENTITIES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP05T00644R000601780002-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
58
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 7, 2010
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 3, 1980
Content Type:
MISC
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Body:
GT/3 December 1980
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ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE ENTITIES
Collection Tasking Staff
* Exercised the transfer of the DCI's tasking resonsibilities to the
Secretary of Defense to be prepared should the President direct such
a transfer in time of crisis.
* Established the Collection Tasking Staff/National Intelligence Tasking
Center which centralized the intelligence requirements processes through
which prioritized guidance and tasking are levied on the Program
Managers.
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STAT
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NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20503
3 December 1980
STAT
NOTE FORT
STAT
The attached document is a brief
description of some of the accomptratil i sYunents
en.
Aim i -n i
of NFAC during the-Carter
.- 21
We only received you
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tens O
extension this is
request on 2 ecember. I hope
helpful,
STAT
1 STAT
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C S
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3 December 1980
NFAC Accomplishments
I. Organizational accomplishments:
A. The creation of the National Foreign Assessment Center in October 1977,
that brought together in one new organization: -
-- the intelligence production and support elements of the
Intelligence Directorate;
-- the national intelligence production capabilities of the
National Intelligence Officers; and
-- the scientific and weapons research and resources of the
Directorate of Science and Technology.
B. The establishment of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), to
function as a central Community body for the coordination and
collegial review of National Intelligence Estimates and the
creation of the Analytic Group to give the NIC an interagency
staff to draft NIEs and other interagency papers.
C. The consolidation of intelligence production resources devoted'to
military and non-military science and technology into the Office
of Scientific and Weapons Research.
I}.. The establishment of the Senior Review Panel:
-- to provide substantive review of major interagency and other
v finished intelligence publications;
-- to conduct independent reviews of Community performance on
key foreign policy issues;
-- to advise DD/NPA an substantive matters pertaining to finished
intelligence.
E. The creation of the Environment and Resource Analys- is Center that
pioneered efforts to manage interdisciplinary research, analyses,
and reporting; subsequent formation of other multidisciplinary teams
including the Cuba Analytic Center, the International Narcotics and
F. The establishment of the arms Control Intelligence Staff to provide
a central point for staff oversight of the intelligence aspects of
all arms control activities involving the U.S. Government.
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tions.
G. The appointment of a Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation
Intelligence to provide a focal point for Coir^nunity intelligence
resen*rch and *+rn~uction on problems relating to nuctL.Lar prolifera-
formulation of a systematic five-year plan to improve them.
Improvements in analytical capabilities:
A. The comprehensive assessment of analytical capabilities and the
B. The establishment of a Senior Intelligence Analyst Program that
allows Intelligence Officers to progress to GS-15 and SIS-1 rank
on the basis of superior analytic performance rather than managerial
responsibility,
geographic, and political intelligence in general and on such
specific topics as Soviet petroleum reservoirs, agricultural nro_
C.
or topical intelligence problems. i 2 5X1
E. The appointment of special NFAC recruiters to attract to theanalytic
corps, qualified women and other minority candidates and individuals
with skills that are critical mission and are currently in
short supply 25X1
D. The development of the Advanced Analyst Development Program to combine
domestic graduate training and TDY travel focusin" on priority/regional
F. The establishment of analytic and intelligence production process
courses; rp-ernnhasis nn the maintpnan7 of foreign language
skills.
of major countries or organizations (OPEC) on the global economy.
G. The use of econometric techniques to forecast the iroact of decisions
H The addition of substantial analytic resources to analysis of Third
World countries. Their ch other, and to the major
industrial nations.
and societal change.
1. The development of a prorramatic and systematic approach to examining
socio-cultural factors that affect prospects for political instability
111. Analytic production process accomplishments:
A. The increased experimentation with application of n,:-ii analytical
techniques and methodologies to better analy"e nilitarv, economic,
duction in foreign countries, and So.'iet defense sr.nciin;.
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B. The increased participation by the intelligence production office"
the tasking of collection capabilities, both hu:ian and technical.
C. The detielopr:ert, refinement, and testing of Prc'.}ect 5:11'E to update
and upgrade the current manual information Mandl in-; tiy,:tem. A massive
computerized system, the SAFE system will allow an;-lv-ars to read and
transfer daily intelligence traffic electronically, lutild private
analytical files, create bibliographic records, and ultimately draft,
review, and edit intelligence production via a CR1.
D. The initial develop-tent and periodic updating of the National Intel-
ligence Topics (Nils), which established, pursuant to E.O. 12036 of
January 1978, Community-wide requirements and priorities for national
foreign intelligence. The "current" topics inform intelligence
collectors and procedures of the nature of senior rK)licymakers'
needs for information and analysis over the current six-nine, month
time period. The "continuing" NITS wide collection, research, and
analysis over the longer term.
E. The establishment of a new approach to integrated production' planning
that is designed to promote more extensive and effective inter-
disciplinary research as well as more efficient use of analytic
resources. It makes use of interoffice teams to develop comprehensive
research programs on selected high priority foreign intelligence
topics.
F. An increase in the number and variety of topics NFAC publications
address, and an ever widening audience for the intelligence product.
G. The development of an enhanced warning capability; the appointment
of a National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the creation
of a warning network to include a Earning Working Group and ro-
cedures to direct the work of other NIOs in this area.
V
H. The increased use of tailored ADP-support to help analysts manipulate
large quantities of data quickly, perform analysis of it, and present
it effectively and efficiently.
I. The greater responsiveness of the intelligence production process to the
increased requirements of traditional customers.
IV. Substantive accoomplishments:
A. Increased production of integrated analyses that examine the political,
economic, military, geographic and sociological considerations of
complex issues (nuclear proliferation (Iuestions, prospects for
democracy, nationalist ntovements, potentials for war and peace)
SECRET
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B. Production directed increasingly toward current
Polic~?-lclibcrations,
both in Washington and abroad:
-- support for trade negotiations;
support for arms negotiations I.lBrR, SALT, \`alccar, 81 /i,-y,
ASAT) ;
RCS, CSCL?,
C. Increased and enhanced analytical cork that deals with specific
issues of international import (terrorism, narcotics, a:;es Of
outer space, arms transfers, technology transfers. ~ su of
in weather-impacted area, crop forecasts). P y
Even deeper investigation of the Soviet, East European and
economies, both in the aggregate and by sector. e
The addi;.__.. of substantial resources to the analysis of worldw'
energy supply and demand with emphasis on petrole.
The more rapid production of high
,,.,, , t
___ , . .
q
y maps
e
i
?.
go rat
ons and contingency force activities.
H. The development of an enhanced warmin
bi
g capa
lity to zlert
policymakers to developing crises and monitor events thereafter
(China-Vietna
-USSR
m
., Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Poland;.
I. r The integration of highly technical engineering analyses of weapons
with analyses of force doctrine and strategy, principally with
respect to the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. ('.L?ajor military
NIEs, intelligence analyses ins r licy deliberations and
arms control negotiating teams
)
.
J. The assessment of quantitative measures of force cfIectiveness of
the USSR, China, and Third World countries whose conflicts night
affect US intersts. (Arabs-Israel, Iraq-Iran, Sino-Soviet border.)
K. The projection of likely changes in th
e comnoition f . v
forces a decade ahead, includboth qualitative changes and changes in
technical characteristics
)
.
L. The improved analysis of L'S and .U,;cd intelligence to monitor
coerpliance with
proposed and agreed terms of arms-1initing trc;ities.
rnr-r
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support for international issues negotiations
Middl
E
e
ast socio-cultural factors).
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M. The increasingly sophisticated exariination of the impact of the transfer
of critical technologies from the Lest to the USSR, tiie PRC, and other
countries.
N. The production of foreign conventional and strategic weapon assessments
that provide information for the direction and development of U.S.
weapons system.
0. The refined analysis of the physical and emotional health of unrld
leaders and political successors.
P. The improved analysis of foreign civil technology capabilities of a
variety of countries, especially the OECD, as they iUnpaet on the
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U.S. international economic position.
The assessment of developments in the life sciences that might imps
politically, economically or militarily on the U.S. or its allies.
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COLLECTION TASKING STAFF
1 December 1980
NOTE FOR THE DCI
TrF~ ..'-try
F
Acting D
SUBJECT: Report of Administration
REFERENCE: NFIB-2.1/40, 18 November 1980
Per your request (reference), attached
is a brief accomplishment statement for
the Collection Tasking Staff to be
included in your report to the President.
Attachment:
As Stated
INFORMATION
STAT
STAT
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executive Order 12036, January 1978, charged the DCI with responsibility
for the coordination and tasking of national foreign intelligence collection
activities, the production of intelligence, and approval of the National
Foreign Intelligence Program budget. Responsibility for implementing
the DCI's tasking authorities was vested in the Deputy to the DCI for
Collection Tasking/Director, National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC)2
13 he establishment of the Collection Tasking Staff/NITC centralized
the intelligence requirements processes through which prioritized guidance
and tasking are levied on the Program Managers. Such tasking is normally
developed with a Community consensus but utilizes the new DCI authority
when a consensus cannot be ac uired. In addition, in accordance with
Executive Order 12036, we have onducted.an exercise transfer of the
DCI's tasking responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense to prepare
ourselves should the President direct such a transfer in [a`' time of extreme
world crisis.
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- ---~??~ ~r~^ rr V U n U rV nhn I UUUL,
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF INTELLIGENCE
DATE:
MEMORANDUM FOR:
;
SO-1 a'Y "Oooo,4
d'k 4;zal~~
ROBERT D. ANDERSON, Major, USAF
Special Asst for External Affairs
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r
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SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
REPLY TO
ATTN OF- IN
SUBJECT: Report for the Administration (NFIB-2.1/40)
In accordance with your request, a report on Air Force Intelligence
accomplishments is attached.
JOHN B. MAR'S, Mcij Con, u S A."'
Asst Chief of S' c_J, I.'tta ro:::,c:e
2 Atch
1. AF Intelligence Accomplishments (S)
2. AF Intelligence Accomplishments (U)
l SGIB
LAS
When Atch 3s/f!!e ~viill$d aWlt
or not
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AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS
(Unclassified Version)
/Air Force Intelligence made several significant contributions to the Intelligence
Community over the past four years. The Foreign Technology Division, for example,
identified rapid improvements in Soviet weapons technology. 'Further, Air Force
z "
elements),.provided national decision makers with information vital to nuclear
treaty monitoring. [The Air Force has alsciimade a concerted effort to improve the
interface between operations and intelligence within the Air Force and the Depart-
s...;
ment of Defense Among other things, these initiatives have included"rgreatly
expanded support to electromagnetic combat and the development of a concept for
integrated application of near real-time, all source intelligence to directly
support air combat operations. ?In addition, the Air Force Intelligence Service
established a Soviet Awareness Program which has been presented to over 100,000
personnel at some 200 bases worldwide, to educate Air Force members to Soviet
military doctrine, strategy, force structure, and combat employment.
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Marine Corps
o Obtained observer status and participated in NFIB activities.
o Contributed to/innexeasgd National Foreign Intelligence Program/ pper4
'to--oper'a
BI~awe~-~ewe?}~s-~y-tqe-epea~ep-ei-qe-laEtsa~-6wy~te~e~e-P~eg+~ar~
o
~~GP3;-g4v4Hg-v4s}b 4ty-te
o E omproved tactical cryptologic capabilities.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380
INT:JJG:rap
3800
26 Nov 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Subj: Report for the Administration
Ref: (a) DCI Memo NFIB-2.1/40 dtd 18 Nov 1980
1. This memorandum provides the Marine Corps response to your
request forwarded by reference (a).
2. Obtaining observer status on the National Foreign Intelligence
Board, as recommended by the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and approved by the Director of Central Intelligence, was
the signal accomplishment for Marine Corps intelligence during
the past four years. Marine Corps participation in NFIB activi-
ties subsequently contributed to increased National Foreign Intelli-
gence Program support to operational commanders which, from the
perspective of this Headquarters, was the major accomplishment of
the Intelligence Community during the period. This increased
support has been manifested in various forms, several of which
are described below:
a. Increased availability and capability of national intelli-
gence systems to support operational commanders. The inclusion in
the NFIP decision process of Service impact statements on proposed
national intelligence systems, as directed by Congress, ensures
consideration of the intelligence requirements of operational
commanders.
b. Specific attention of the Intelligence Community Staff
to the needs of operational commanders, as reflected in the CY
1980 study on NFIP Support to Contingency Forces.
c. Participation of an Intelligence Community Staff member
in the annual development of the DoD Plan for Intelligence Support
to Operational Commanders.
d. Intelligence Community Staff support to Service TENCAP
(Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities) Programs.
e. Increased awareness of, and NFIP resources devoted to,
Third World intelligence gaps.
3. The Marine Corps obtained significant benefits from the
creation of the Tactical Cryptologic Program (TCP), which gave
necessary visibility to tactical resources and permitted them to
compete more effectively in the PPBS process. Further contri-
buting to improved tactical cryptologic capabilities was the in-
ternal NSA reorganization which created a Tactical Resource Man-
agement Structure. These actions, both of which will ultimately
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Subj: Report for the Administration (U)
improve cryptologic support to operational commanders, are
considered positive and significant accomplishments of the
Intelligence Community.
4. In summary, the Marine Corps commends the Intelligence
Community for significant accomplishments in improving national
intelligence support to operational commanders and expresses
sincere appreciation for your support for these initiatives and for
Marine Corps participation on the National Foreign Intelligence
Board.
C. D. DEAN
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Director of Intelligence
Copy to:
Director, DIA
Director, NSA
DNI
ACSI, DA
ACSI, USAF
DUSD (PR)
ASD(C3I)
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STAT
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I
S J
T OF THE NAVY
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
ON, D.C. 20350
Ser 009Z/S325
2 December 1980
SECRET (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (2))
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Subj:
Report for the Administration
Ref :
(a)
DCI memo, NFIB-2.1/40, subject as above, of
18 November 1980
Encl:
(1)
Naval Intelligence Highlights, 1976-1980 (Unclassified)
(2)
Naval Intelligence Highlights, 1976-1980 (Secret)
Enclosures (1) and (2) are forwarded in response to
reference (a) .
S. SHAPIRO
Rear Admiral, U. S.ZNavy
Director of Naval Intelligence
3EORET
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NAVAL INTELLIGENCE H=e'FILIGHTS
1976-1980
An automated system (RANKIN) for rapid promulgation of
security guidance throughout the Department of the Navy has
been established which has permitted annual savings of $260K.
Administrative procedures for controlling and adjudicating
access to compartmented intelligence have been greatly improved,
and major progress made in Navy security education and manage-
ment programs.
Counterespionage operations by the Naval In?eStigatjve
Service and FBI resulted in: (1) the arrest, trial, and
conviction for espionage of two Soviet U.N. employees (ENGER
and CHERNYAYEV) and expulsion of a third Soviet; and (2) the
arrest, trial, and imprisonment of a USN enlisted man (MADSEN)
for espionage.
Major strides have occurred in providing intelligence
support, including data derived from national systems, to Navy
operating forces. Increased cooperation has also occurred with
other Service reconnaissance elements and foreign intelligence
services.
Major upgrades were made in Navy's automated intelligence
processing systems (NIPS) for tactical users in forward areas,
including future support for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.
Upgrades include improved hardware for imagery interpretation
and processing and communications systems for battle group
commanders in such areas as the Indian Occan. Navy's Integrated
Automated Intelligence Processing System (IAIPS) now under
development will offer major efficiencies in providing intelli-
gence support to all consumers, national and tactical.
To improve maritime intelligence, particularly in Third
World areas, a series of bilateral intelligence agreements with
selected foreign navies have been initiated, and others are being
aggressively pursued, which involve extensive data exchanges
and hardware support. Consequently, major gaps in intelligence
data bases are being reduced.
New procedures have been developed for providing all-source
indications and warning data to tactical forces as well as
national command authority. Unique data bases on worldwide
merchant and fishing fleets, including major improvements in
daily locational reporting and on arms deliveries to Third World
Enclosure (1) to CNO memo
ser 009Z/S325 of 2 Dec 1980
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nations, also have been developed. The significant potential
threat to USN forces posed by Third World nations supplied with
sophisticated weaponry has resulted in a new analytical and
production effort.
SUPPORT TO RDT&E
Specialized procedures developed within Naval Intelli-
gence for providing threat support to the weapon systems
planning and acquisition community have made major resource
savings available, in excess of $750M to Navy program managers
and sponsors, and have been recognized by award of an
Intelligence Community Meritorious Unit Citation to an
element of the Naval Intelligence Support Center.
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(2)
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SECRET
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS
1976-1980
(S) A series of Naval Investigative Service (NIS) counter-
espionage (CE) operations, designed to neutralize espionage
activities against the Department of the Navy have been highly
successful. In one case, with the cooperation of the Spanish
government, GRU Brigadier General SVESHNIKOV was expelled from
Spain with considerable adverse publicity. In April 1979, a
five-year, joint NIS-FBI operation resulted in the return to
the USSR of a Soviet intelligence officer and h family
Currently,
NIS has 59 active CE operations underway and 128 in the develop-
ment stage which have produced extensive data, shared with
other CE agencies, on Soviet, Polish, PRC, and Bloc military
intelligence priorities, activities, and methods.
(S) To identify the security vulnerability of U.S. ports
to visits by Bloc merchant and public vessels, a major port
survey effort was conducted of 120 areas, which resulted in
closure by the NSC of several ports to Bloc shipping. In a
related counterintelligence effort, during Operation COAST
WATCH conducted during November 1978 each Soviet merchantman
with Long Beach, California or New York City as first U.S.
port of call was boarded and searched by an augmented Coast
Guard team to identify its intelligence collection capabilities.
SUPPORT TO USN OPERATIONS
(S) An intense, concurrent RDT&E program funded through
the NFIP to improve submarine SIGINT capabilities (PRAIRIE
WAGON) succeeded in 1979 in the first operational deployment
of a significantly enhanced and sophisticated system aboard
US nuclear attack submarines. Additional systems are being
procured.
(S) Navy's worldwide, all-flag merchant and fishing fleet
tracking system now includes over 39K ships and has provided unique
intelligence, unavailable elsewhere, on types and quantities
of arms deliveries, Cuban troop deployment to Ethiopia, shipping
in the Persian Gulf, compliance with the U.S. grain embargo,
CLASSIFIED BY OP-009
REVIEW ON
SECRET
Enclosure (2) to CNO memo
ser 009Z/S325 of 2 Dec 1980
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and drug smuggling. Highly specialized and innovative
analytical efforts by Naval Intelligence elements have resulted
in major improvements in U.S. abilities to predict Soviet
ballistic missile submarine deployments, plus data on Soviet
naval readiness and military equipment deliveries to other
nations, merchant and special interest ship activities, and the
ability of the Soviet Navy to mount and sustain extended opera-
tions distant from Soviet territory. The latter ability has
proven critical during the current hostilities along the Persian
Gulf.
(S) Specialized threat intelligence support to Navy's weapon
system planning and acquisition community has made great strides
in recent years. Innovative procedures developed by the Naval
Intelligence Support Center have pioneered foreign maritime
threat projection efforts and made major contributions to ensuring
the long term effectiveness and survivability of USN systems. For
example, data developed on Soviet submarines resulted in re-
structuring of Navy's Propelled Ascending Mine Program, as well
as modification to the target acquisition and exploder systems
of the Mark 48 Torpedo. Similar information on Soviet naval
air defense systems resulted in modifications to the HARPOON
antiship cruise missile flight trajectory to enhance surviva-
bility. NISC's threat intelligence support has been credited
with saving the Navy more than $750 million.
(S) Additional critical scientific and technical intelli-
gence provided during the period to National, Defense, Departmental
and Fleet customers include: identification of the design and
operating characteristics of the world's first 40 knot, titanium
pressure hull submarine, the Soviet ALFA class; identification
of the capabilities of a Soviet underwater reconnaissance system
targeted against U.S. ASW surveillance systems; determination
of a significant reduction in tonal levels in the primary noise
source of the YANKEE class SSBN which effects U.S. ASW system
capabilities; and data on Soviet surface combatant construction
programs, including a possible nuclear-powered Soviet aircraft
carrier.
SECRET
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Dent DActft Army
As the r It of the Intelligenr,c~OrganizatioAf and Station,j4g Study,
many recommendations were approved and implemEiited with far-beaching gnificance.
Some of'the highlj hts are /
o Placed tactical intelligence units directly under the
authority of Army commanders instead of being attached to tactical
units from larger Military intelligence organizations.
o Established the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)
to provide command and control of intelligence units above the corps level.
o Organized the combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI)
battalions at the division level and *F groups at the corps level.
o Established the Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN)
Program, w' achiev i`rg and maintainer readiness of
Army tactical intelligence personnel and units.
o Implemented the Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program.
o Developed and implemented an automated security program w 47?
ensure/ that all sensitive defense information handled by automated
systems is protected.
o 44-eu4coordinated with FBI, CIA and Air Force in the debriefing
and processing of Cuban refugees,
o Contributed .s g ? y to the National/Tactical interface arena
through the Army's Tactical Exploitation of National Sapce Capabilities (TENCAP)
Program.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Report for the Administration
01 Ft;" 1980
1. This is in reply to your memorandum for NFIB Principals, dated 18
November 1980, subject as above.
2. A summary of unclassified major Army intelligence accomplishments
during the 1977 through present period of President Carter's administra-
tion are described below. This summary is not all inclusive and in-
cludes only those accomplishments which may be discussed at the unclassi-
fied level and are deemed of such significance that they merit mention
at the national level.
\.. In. 1974 the Army began a broad study of its intelligence
activities known as the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study
(IOSS). Many of its recommendations were approved in 1976 with imple-
mentation in 1976, 1977, and continuing through 1983. These were of
far-reaching significance. Some of the highlights are:
(1) 'Placing tactical intelligence units directly under the
authority of Army commanders instead of being attached to tactical
units from larger Military Intelligence (MI) organizations.
(2) Establishment of the US Army Intelligence and Security
Command (INSCOM) on 1 January 1977 to provide command and control of
intelligence units above the corps level.
(3) Organization of combat electronic warfare intelligence
(CEWI) battalions at the division level and CEWI groups at the corps
level.
b. As mentioned above, one of the more far-reaching results of
the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study was the development
of fully integrated combat electronic warfare and intelligence battalions
and groups to support divisions and corps. The first such unit, the
522d Military Intelligence Battalion (Division) was organized and, tested
at Fort Hood, Texas. The concept has proved to be valid and is being
Regraded U4LILASSIFIES
when s::r>z:zd from
alsssilled laslasares
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
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I OF
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTAN CHIER S L -
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310 L.
DEPARI'`M "~ bl .'Ti E ARMY
TAFF PO= INTELLIGENCE
. _^T "
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DAMI-RMB-M
SUBJECT: Report for the Administration
f' 1?! 1999
implemented Army wide. The new consolidated units are more responsive
to field commanders, easier to command and control, and able to provide
concentrated collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence
by having access to other defense and civilian intelligence sources.
c. Army accomplishments during the period were also highlighted
by major innovations in the field of intelligence training. In 1979 the
Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) Program was estab-
lished with the objective of achieving and maintaining readiness of
Army tactical intelligence personnel and units. REDTRAIN is the appli-
cation of all operational and training techniques necessary to preclude
the erosion of highly technical and perishable skills gained during
institutional or other training. As initially conceived and implemented,
REDTRAIN was concerned with tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) but
has been revised to include the other intelligence disciplines, Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). REDTRAIN has
had a favorable impact not only on skills development and maintenance
but also on job satisfaction and soldier retention.
d. Additionally, in late 1976 the Chief of Staff, US Army, approved
the establishment of the Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program. Implementation
of OPFOR began in 1977 and continues as one of the significant accomplish-
ments of the past four years. It is an Army-wide training program which
focuses peacetime preparedness training on the tactical vulnerabilities
of potential adversaries mainly at the division level and below. OPFOR
is designed to provide commanders with a training mechanism for empha-
sizing the competition inherent in battle through use of a realistic and
credible opposing force, using the doctrine, tactics, and weapons systems
of actual potential adversaries.
e. Organization and training were not the only areas of Army accom-
plishment. In an ever increasing world of automation, Army intelligence
insured that automated support, and automation security procedures were
available Army wide. The Army System for Standard Intelligence Support
Terminals (ASSIST) was actually inaugurated in 1973 to modernize and
improve intelligence data handling systems (IDHS). This involved the
standardization of both computer hard- and software, internetting com-
puters, providing access to national intelligence data bases, and achie-
ving compatibility between Army and DOD computerized command and control
systems. These improvements were to be made over several years. However,
a major milestone was attained in FY 1978 when system software was in-
stalled at Army and Army-supported IDHS sites worldwide. This action
provided the US Army, Europe (USAREUR), and the US Air Forces in Europe
(USAFE) intelligence analysts common software for exchanging data,
analyst-to-analyst communications, and full time access to the central
host computers at Headquarters, US European Command (EUCOM). In FY 1.979-
80 linkage with the computer systems of the Defense Intelligence Agency
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v t. ?i L c 13J~1
DAMI-RMB-M
SUBJECT: Report for the Administration
(DIA) was achieved. The enhancement of the Army's intelligence data
handling capabilities through ASSIST represents a significant accom-
plishment of great value to the Army, the Department of Defense, and
the national interest.
f. On the security side of automation, a formal Army automation
security program was developed and approved for Army wide implementation
in 1977. This program is intended to ensure that all sensitive defense
information handled by automated systems is protected against espionage,
sabotage, fraud, misappropriation, misuse, or inadvertent or deliberate
compromise.
g. Finally, Army analysts also contributed to national level sub-
stantive intelligence issues which had direct effects on the national
foreign intelligence policymaking process and decisions that were pro-
mulgated at the highest levels. Two cases in point were Army intelli-
gence analytical efforts which uncovered major changes in North Korean
troop levels and dispositions and Army research and analysis which, along
with other intelligence community inputs identified and clarified the
purpose of Soviet combat forces in Cuba. These were only two of the many
national level contributions of Army intelligence production; however,
they serve here to show that Army's intelligence efforts during the
period were oriented equally at support for the soldier in the field and
aid to the decision and policymakers of the nation. Army intelligence
accomplishments for 1977-1980 were many. What has been described above
and in the inclosure only serves to show that the period was marked by
national level successes by Army intelligence.
FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:
1 Incl SIDNEY T. WEINSTEIN
Classified Edition Colonel, GS
Executive
Copies Furnished:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy Review
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F-+1 X-r-'-Yr-
MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE (U)
(Classified Version)
(U) A summary of major accomplishments (classified) of Army Intelligence.
during President Carter's administration is provided below. The items high-
lighted in this report are those considered to be of national level interest.
and by no means represent the sum of accomplishments significant to the Army.
a. (S) During the past four years, the Army's vigorous Tactical Exploitation
of National Space Capabilities (TENCAP) Program has made a significant contri-
bution in the National/Tactical interface arena. The ultimate objective of
TENCAP is to exploit the tactical potential of pertinent current and future
assets of our national space programs. To that end, the Army has expeditiously
fielded interface equipment and demonstrated the utility and effectiveness of
this exploitation through exercises and JCS sanctioned special projects such
as GRAVITY SCORE and POST OAKS I & II. (Classified by: DAMI-IS, HODA.
Declassify 25 Nov 86).
b. (S/NOFORN) The Carter Administration's decision to accept Cuban boat
refugees in the Spring of 1980 facilitated US intelligence collection efforts
on Cuba. Refugees were debriefed to provide, among other things, order of
battle on Cuban forces, the Soviet presence in Cuba, and related military infor-
mation. The debriefings were a closely coordinated effort between the FBI, CIA,
Army and Air Force teams assigned to the five Cuban refugee processing centers.
They provided significant reporting of a first-time, unique nature which had a
substantial impact on activities of the DOD Cuban Task Force. (Classified by:
DIAM 58-11. Review on: 25 Nov 2000. Reason 2.301e(3))
: '' 1.2
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FDREIGN NATIONALS
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Department of Justice
I
o Achi?ev-ed .uccess in espionage prosecutions of Dedeyan, Moore, Boyce-Lee,
Kampil es acrd Truong-Humphrey) 4-n-a?dd--teen, Rogal sky, Enger-Chernayayev and
Barnett.
< 44
o Aehi?ev,ed success civil actions in the Snepp, Stockwell and Agee cases.
o Established the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, centralizing
the Department's intelligence-related functions.
o Participated in extensive discussions between and representatives
of the Executive and Legislative Branches concerning the proposed legislative
charter for the intelligence community.
o Implemented the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
o Provided recommendations to the Attorney General of counterintelligence
cases requested by the FBI'."
o Reviewed and approved,'modified or disapproved FBI foreign counterintelligence
activities for which the Attorney General has delegated approval authority
to the Office of Intelligence and Policy Review.
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U.>. Department of Justice
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
DEC 02 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
Central Intelligence Agency
Re: Summary of Major Accomplishments
1976 - 80
This is in response to your November 18 request for a
summary of major accomplishments of the Department of Justice
as a member of NFIB during this Administration. Because of
the nature of the Department's role in the intelligence area
and the fact that the substantive aspects of that role are
likely to be reported by the intelligence agencies involved,
we are submitting only an unclassified version. Please advise
us if additional information is necessary or desirable.-.
Kennet III
C unsel for meBgence Policy
Office of Intel ge Policy & Review
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SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RELATING TO U.S.
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The Attorney General and the Department of Justice have
become full, recognized participants in the U.S. intelligence
and national security affairs area during the past several
years, largely as a result of the development and implementation
of Executive Order 12036, entitled "United States Intelligence
Activities" and authorizing the conduct of those activities, and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and other statutes
affecting the Intelligence Community. Under Executive Order
12036, the Attorney General is a member of the National Security
Council's Policy. Review and Special Coordination Committees and
the Department is represented on the National Foreign Intelligence
Board.
Attorneys from the Department played substantial roles in
the drafting of Executive Order 12036 and the PRM/NSC-11 studies
that preceded that Order. Department representatives were also
called upon to contribute heavily to the development of Executive
Order 12065, entitled "National Security Information" and governing
the handling and processing of classified information, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, authorizing electronic
surveillance for intelligence purposes in the U.S., and the
consideration and negotiations concerning the proposed National
Intelligence charter legislation.
The latter effort, involving representatives of the
intelligence agencies as well as the White House and the Justice
Department, culminated in the Intelligence Authorization Act of
1980. Provisions of that Act amended the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
so as to narrow the required reporting of covert action findings
to only two committees of Congress instead of eight and to pre-
serve the. existing balance between the Executive and the Congress
in the area of Congressional oversight and access to intelligence
information. In addition, the Department was primarily responsi-
ble for the enactment of new legislation to protect the Government
and national security information from "Greymail a term that
was apparently first coined by former CIA Deputy General Counsel
John Morrison - whereby defendants in criminal proceedings would
use the threat of disclosure of classified materials to evade
prosecution.
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Representatives of the Department also were called upon
to provide views and added support to proposed legislation
that would provide criminal penalties for enterprises intended
to expose the identities of U.S. intelligence officers operating
undercover. The Department also helped develop and t
significant amendments to the Freedom
would serve to alleviate the burdens imposed on the intelligence
agencies by that statute.
Although the underlying circumstances were unfortunate, , with it should also be noted that thrsoalnumbereof cases
the assistance of the various general counsels, of extreme significance to the Intelligence Community during the
past four years. Among the successful espionage, prosecutions
were the Dedeyan, Moore, Boyce-Lee, Kampiles and Truong-.Humphrey
Government were
cases. Additional successes forthe
in the Rogalsky, Enger Cherny y ,
The Department also achieved success in civil actions affecting
and preserving the integrity of intelligence pre-publication
review agreements in the Snep , Stockwell and Agee cases, and
defended the agencies' interests in a host of other civil actions
and FOIA cases.
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND REVIEW
It became increasingly apparent in early 1979 that, while
the involvement of the Attorney General and the Department in
intelligence activities and national security affairs was growing,
no organization with the Department was well suited in terms of
expertise, experience, continuity and function to assist the
Attorney General in performing the broad range of responsibilities
and functions that were spread at that time between personnel in
the Attorney General's Office, the Office of Legal Counsel and, to
a lesser degree, the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the Department.
After considering a variety of options, it was determined that a
new component was required, headed by a senior official reporting
directly to the Attorney General and staffed with attorneys devoted
entirely to the study and resolution of the legal and policy issues
that arise in this area. Accordingly, Attorney General Bell, in
April 1979, appointed the first Counsel for Intelligence Policy
and directed the establishment of the Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review. In the interim, many of the functions that
were to be assigned to the new Office began to be performed by
personnel in the Office of Legal Counsel and the Investigation
Review Unit which had been engaged in the review of certain
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intelligence activities for the previous several years.
In February 1980 Attorney General Civiletti signed a
DOJ Order establishing the new Office, consisting of ten
attorney and four secretarial positions and absorbing the
Investigation Review Unit. In addition, the centralization
of the Department's intelligence-related functions continued.
Personnel were recruited during 1980 and the Office reached
full strength for the first time in November 1980.
The Office serves as the principal legal adviser on
intelligence matters to the Attorney General, Deputy and
Associate Attorneys General, other Departmental components and
other agencies in the Executive Branch concerning the development,
interpretation and application of statutes, Executive Orders,
regulations, procedures and other directives and guidelines
relating to U.S. intelligence activities. The Office also
represents the Attorney General on the National Foreign
Intelligence Board.
During the past year, the Counsel and other members of the
Office represented the Attorney General and the Department on a
large number of other boards, committees, subcommittees and
working groups dealing with various types and facets of issues
relating to intelligence activities, including the Interagency
Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Affairs, the DCI Committee
on Exchanges, the NSC Ad Hoc Technology Transfer Group, the
Intelligence Charter Legislation Working Group and the NSC/SCC
Counterintelligence Working.Group.
Executive Order 12036 requires that the intelligence agencies
promulgate, and the Attorney General approve, over thirty separate
procedures and guidelines to regulate various intelligence-related
activities of the FBI, NSA, CIA, DoD and Treasury. In 1980, the
last of these procedures was promulgated and approved, and a
lengthy process of review, reevaluation and revision of the
majority of these procedures and guidelines was initiated and
will be substantially completed by the end of 1980.
The Office participated in. extensive discussions between
and among representatives of the Executive and Legislative
Branches concerning the nature and content of a proposed legis-
lative charter for the intelligence community. This participation
included interpretation, coordination, drafting and analysis of
existing and proposed policy and statutory standards. Additional
efforts were made by the Office in connection with the development
of DOJ positions regarding amendments proposed to the Freedom of
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Information Act by the intelligence agencies and the proposed
enactment of a new criminal statute to bar the revelation of
undercover U.S. intelligence officials.
During the past year, the Office has rendered numerous
formal and informal opinions for various Executive branch officials
and has provided the Attorney General and other senior Justice
officials with a large number of policy papers and recommendations.
The Office has been involved in several initiatives to increase
the coordination and flow of information between and among the
intelligence agencies and other agencies of the Federal Government.
The Office has provided legal and policy advice on various
intelligence-related matters, including issues and options, during
the past year to the Attorney General, the Special Coordination
Committee of the NSC, the State Department, the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Commerce Department,
the FBI, the NSA, the CIA, the DoD, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the-Office of the DCI, the Treasury
Department, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and various
components in the Justice Department.
In the area of intelligence operations the Office's
accomplishments primarily involve implementation of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Due to the time required
for members of the court to be appointed, and to make the
administrative arrangements to support the Court, implementation
of the Act did not occur until May, 1979. During the 1978-79
transition period the Office created an entirely new series of
forms for applications under the Act, as well as special procedures
to minimize electronic surveillance, and associated legal papers.
New administrative procedures were developed by which applications
for electronic surveillance could be considered by the Attorney
General to obtain his authorization for filing. Security procedures
issued by the Attorney General and the Director of Central
Intelligence to protect Court orders for electronic surveillance
were prepared for issuance to communication common carriers.
Office attorneys also participated in the drafting of security
procedures for the Court which were promulgated by the Chief
Justice of the United.States. The Office is now part of the
inter-departmental task force drafting procedures for the protection
of classified information in the custody of federal courts pursuant
to the Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980.
In a few instances, the Office brought applications to the
Court for the exercise of its inherent authority to approve
physical searches for intelligence purposes. A legal memorandum
also was developed by the Office for the Director of the FBI
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explaining the legal basis for this exercise of jurisdiction.
This memorandum has been the subject of some discussion between
the Department, the Congress, and the FISA Court.
A substantial number of FBI requests to conduct undercover
activities in counterintelligence cases were reviewed as required
by the Department of Justice Appropriation Acts for FY 79 and FY 80.
Recommendations for Attorney General approval of these operations
were developed by OIP&R in appropriate cases. In addition, a
substantial number of other counterintelligence activities were
considered by the Office and appropriate recommendations furnished
to the Attorney. General. The Office also reviewed, and approved,
modified, or disapproved a substantial number of FBI foreign
counterintelligence activities for which the Attorney General
has delegated approval authority to OIP&R.
Finally, as part of its oversight responsibilities, OIPR
attorneys conducted field evaluations in 1979 and 1980 for the
Attorney General concerning implementation of the minimization
procedures governing electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence cases. This study involved trips to field
facilities, interviews of operational personnel and review of
surveillance logs. In addition, the Office participated in a
1979 study by the Deputy Attorney General regarding the guidelines
for Drug Enforcement Administration domestic investigations. The
study involved visits to some 10 major DEA field offices and
interviews and file reviews pertinent to guidelines compliance.
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Department of Energy
* Developed intelligence assessments which furthered national non-
proliferation goals of delaying acquisition by Pakistan of weapons-
usable nuclear materials.
* Directed Taiwan's nuclear research into areas not useful in potential
weapon work.
* Altered the direction of South Korea's spent fuel reprocessing plant
acquisition.
* Slowed the pace of the Iraqi nuclear program.
* Secured assurances from South Africa as to the peaceful nature of its
nuclear program.
* Improved the US capability to characterize foreign nuclear tests and
weapons, including new calculationa-- methodologies which provide more
precise estimation of underground nuclear test yields, advanced nuclear
event detection technology and hardware which will accomplish worldwide
coverage and assessments of Soviet nuclear weapon design which permit a
greater precision in operational yield estimates.
* Established an International Energy Technology Assessment Program.
* Developed a current intelligence capability, including the establishment
of a 24-hour Watch Office, to monitor and evaluate fast-breaking international
energy.delopments having a significant impact upon national or Department
energy policies.
* Established an independent political/economianalytical capability which
provided intelligence assessments of the impact of the Iran-Iraq,War and
OPEC's long-term strategy on national energy and security policy and which
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Department of Energy, continued:
identified alternative approaches,-too dealing with oil supply disruptions.
* Formal=i~z=edtan-a:nnovatLVe__a.gp.roa_c.h o protectkli~o sensitive DOE facilities
and classified technologies_',;y fe-stablishing an Operations Security Program.
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Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20585 December 1, 1980
prc r.o
Admiral Stansfield Turner (Retired)
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Admiral Turner. Enclosed for your use in preparing the Summary for the
President of the major accomplishments of the Intelligence
Community during this Administration is an unclassified
and classified statement of the major achievements of
the Department of Energy Foreign Intelligence Program.
I am confident: that your Summary will reflect proper
credit on,the many significant contributions of the
Intelligence Community to increased National security.
I an proud that the Department of Energy could play a
.part in some of these accomplishments, and I look forward
to reading your. Summary.
M. H. 'Iredell
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
In ernational Intelligence Pkaly ;.s
Seni r Intelligence Officer
Enclosures
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Department of Energy .Intelligence Community Accomplishments
Since its establishment in 1977, thle Department of Energy (DOE)
has responded to the increasingly important energy crisis by
expanding the foreign intelligence program of its predecessor,
the Energy Research and Development Administration, to include
a current intelligence capability and the ability to assess
foreign political and economic deve opments related to energy
security. At the same time, DOE ha continued the on-goin
program of assessing foreign energy; technologies, especially
those related to the development of-a nuclear weapons capability;
and providing space-based nuclear event detection sensors. (U)
Specific accomplishments of the Department of Energy Foreign
Intelligence Program during this Administration include:
-n Intelligence assessments which furthered National
non-proliferation goals of delaying acquisition by
Pakis .~n of. weapons-us able nuclear materials,,,
di.rectn Taiwan's wan's nuc ear research i to areas not
useful in potential weapon work; altexng] the direction
of South 1'orea's spent fuel reprocessing plant acquisi-
tion' s i.~~ ~i npJ the pace of the Iraqi nuclear program;
and securnp] assurances from South Africa as to the
peaceful, nature of its nuclear program. (Cl
Improvements i.nj the U.S. capability to characterize
foreign nuclear tests and weapons, including new
calculational methodologies which provide more precise
estimation of underground nuclear test yields,
advanced nuclear event detection technology and hardware
which will accomplish worldwide coverage, and assess-
ments of Soviet nuclear weapon design which permit a
greater precision in operational yield estimates. (C)
- Establishrient of~ an International Energy Technology
Assessment Program, which offers potential cost savings
for the Department by providing information that would
reveal new approaches to technical problems and by
allowing DOE to avoid experimental approaches that have
failed in foreign countries, and which provides intelli-
gence support for the negotiation and implementation
of international agreements for cooperation. (U)
- Development? off a current intelligence capability, fncludin::,;
the establishment of a 24-hour Watch Office, to monitor
and evaluate fast-breaking international energy develop-
ments which would hav 'a significant impact upon epart-.
ment r,i~ational energy policies and to provide direct
intelligence support to DOE Secretarial Officers]. (U)
~,i i .(l ? Sll'Y X2-1..8f,%
q~aworer
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'- P F
Es,tnbl.i.st ent' of an independent Political /economic
anal.yricc capability, which provided intelligence
assessments of the impact of the Iran-lr.:(q War
and OPEC's long-term strategy on national energy
and security policy and which identified alternative
approaches to dealing with oil supply disruptions. (U)
Fo.rma.lifaLion of an innovative approach to protecting
sensitive DOE f.cilities ani classified technologies
by the estabiishment of an Operations Security Program,
which cont.r.ol.s or eliminate' vulnerabilities through
the use of counterintellige ce, computer security
and technical measures. 1'
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Department of Ene IuLe ligence Community Accomplishments
I
Since its establishment in 1977, the a;Department of Energy (DOE)
has responded to the increasingly important energy crisis by
expanding the foreign intelligence praogram of its predecessor,
the Energy Research and Development Administration, to include
a current intelligence capability and the ability to assess
foreign political and economic developments related to energy
security. At the same time, DOE has continued the ca-going
program of ,a ssessinfg foreign energy gechnologi_es, especially
those related to the development of nuclear weapons capability,
and providing space-based nuclear ev~nt detection sensors.
Specific accomplishments of the Department of Energy Foreign
Intelligence t'ro,g.ram during this Admi{nistr.ation include
Intelligence assessments which furthered National
non-proliferation. goals of delaying foreign
acquisition and reprocessing capabilities of
weapons-a.iseable nuclear materials, and directing
nuclear research into areas not useful in potential
weapon work.
- Improvements in the U.S. capability to detect and
characterize foreign nuclear events and to estimate
weapon yield.
- Establishment of an International Energy 'technology
Assessment Program, which offers potential cost
savings for the Department by providing information
that would reveal. new approaches to technical problems
and by allowing DOE to avoid experimental approaches
that have failed in foreign countries, and ti?hich
provides intelligence support for the negotiation and
implementation of international agreements for
cooperation.
Development: of a current intelligence can_ ability,
including the establishment of a 24--hour- Watch Office,
to monitor and evaluate fast-breaking international
energy developments which would have a significant
impact upon Denartment of National enemy policies,
and to provide direct intelligence support to IOr
Secretarial. Officers.
Establishment of an independent political/economic
analytical capability, which provided intelligence
assessments of the impact of the Iran-Iraq `'ar and
OPEC's long-term strategy on national energy and
security policy and which ifdentified alternative
approaches to dealing with oil supply disruptions.
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- Formnli z,iti on of an innovative approach to protecting
sensitive DOE facilities and classified technologies
by the estai.).Lishment of an Operations Security Program,
which control s or eliminates vulnerabilities through
the use of counterintellip_ence, computer security
and technical measures.
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I e o
Department of State
Central and Latin America
o Produced detailed historical narrative of the Panama Canal Treaty
negotiations for use by policymakers in responding to Senate requests.
o C1e6ely Followed the evolution of the dispute between Argentina and
Chile over sovereignty in the Beagle Channel.and provided background
and analyses needed by policymakers.
o Formulated tasking requirements which produced information
needed to confirm the presence of troops in Cuba.
o Provided detailed political-military service to State Department
principals on the Nicaraguan civil war and a policy review paper
assessing the various international roles in the Nicaraguan crises.
Near East and South Asia
o Devoted-con,sicder~a.//b~~l=e=atten?tl-6t!-from-e'arl y 197?8-an-to=the-
~I_r=a?n=situati.o,n-andLnf"aintained a major effort to analyze events
and discern trends during the Iranian revolution.
e --Cl-esel-y-apd-aeeHa
o Monitored events preceding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
o Provided essential intelligence back-up to the Camp David talks.
East Asia
o Analyzed reports of the political, economic and social changes
in China and their implications for US-PRC relations.
o Delineated Japan's constitutional and political problems.
o Assessed events in North and South Korea following the
assassination of President Park and accession to power of President Chun.
Provided analyses on The Sino-Vietnamese conflict; Hanoi's strategy
toward Kampuchea and Loas; the Indochinese refugees; and the political
problems and tensions in Thailand and the Phillipines.
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Africa
o Provided in-depth analytical support on problems in:
-- Rhodesia. Analyzed negotiating strategies, military and political
situation on the ground, the role of various external parties, and
prospects for negotiations;
-- South Africa. Pretoria's regional role, the government's intentions
with respect to the separate development policy and nuclear policy;
-- The Horn of Africa. The military situation in the Ogaden and Eritrea,
the Soviet-Cuban presence, the outlook for Ethiopian-Somali relations,
s and the implications for regional issues. (S)
Political-Military Issues
o Shared intelligence with other nuclear suppliers of the need to
limit the export of sensitive nuclear technology and facilities
through aggressive use of intelligence information on the nuclear weapons
intentions of various threshbold proliferation states. (S)
o Assessed warning situation relative to the initiation of hostilities
in Europe by the Warsaw Pact, as reflected in NIE 4-1-78. (S)
o Tightened focus on world'arms trade,
o Recognized and surfaced as a policy issue the Soviet backed use
of chemical warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. (S)
o Increased capability for monitoring and interpreting fo a build-up
in advance, e.g., the Sino-Vietnamese border in 1978 and early 1979. (S)
Economic Issues
o Improved expertise in energy field, resulting in continuing analyses
and forecasts of high quality.
o Improved econometric capabilities, with particular attention given to
effects of oil price changes.
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SECRET
,acember 2, 1980
MEMORANDUM
Subject: Report for the Administration: INR Contribution 's
CI
Listed below are items that could
accomplishments nduthe ring
summary for the White House of ma
this Administration's term of office:
Central and Latin America
Panama Canal Treat . In the midst of efforts to secure
y INR produced a detailed
ratification of the treaties in 1977, negotiations for use by
narrative of the history of to Senatetrequests: (U)
policymakers in responding t INR closely followed
Beagle Channel. In the fall of 1978,
the evolution of the disputhanneleenWhenethencrisisCreachedesovereignty in the Beagle C rovided the background and
near-war proportions in 1978, INR P in working
analyses the policymakers needed and participated
ing two option
group discussions of policy alternatives,
of having the Vatican mediate the dispute. (C)
Cuba. During the latter part of 1978, INR noted nuiber-
z
of anomalies in Cuba, especially in the militagyir ea. which
ing incomplete data, INR formulated tasking explain t eventually produced the information
thetpresence of t~oops
the anomalies and, in
in Cuba (C)
Nicaragua. During the height of the jcaragUan civil war
in 1979, INR provided a detailed political-military briefing
service to State Department principals. After victory, ared a policy review paper that assessed the
various internaCjonal actors in the Nicaraguan
roared
les of thINR e he prep
crises from 1978 forward.
Human Since Latin America disagreements be often
scrutiny under the human rights policy,
have emerged over the degree f .humindright compliance in
specific countries. INR has fulfil the role of iased
analyst, providing information, analyses and evaluations. (C
Political-Military Issues
--One of the major successes of the Carter niutrati ininlli-
the intelligence field has been the aggressive ence information on the nucler weapons sintentions of various
rs of the need to
threshhold shhold proliferation states. shared to convince other nuclear supplieintellence has been
and facilities.
limit the export of sensitive nuclear technology
(S)
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SECRET
--A more realistic assessment of the warning situation rela-
tive to the initiation of hostilities in Europe by the
Warsaw Pact is another important accomplishment during the
past four years. This is reflected in NIE 4-1-78, which
moves away from the minimum-warning, standing-start appre-
ciation to a more balanced recognition of what the USSR
would have to do to prepare for an initiation of hostilities
and of the political conditions that. would precede such an
event. (S)
--A tighter focusing of the intelligence community on the
world arms trade, including efforts to develop realistic
measures of comparison between major producers, is another
important contribution of the Community. (C)
--The Community has done a good job in recognizing and
surfacing as a policy issue the Soviet-backed use of
chemical warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. (S)
--Finally, the capability for monitoring and interpreting
force build-up in advance of the use of such forces, e.g.,
the Sino-Vietnamese border in 1978 and early 1979, has
been increased. (S)
Near East and South Asia
--The Intelligence Community devoted considerable attention
from early 1978 on to the chaotic situation in Iran and
maintained a major effort to analyze events and discern
trends during the Iranian revolution. (U)
--The events that preceded the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in December 1979 were closely and acccurately monitored
by the Intelligence Community. (U)
--The Community, especially INR and OGCR, provided essential
intelligence back-up to the Camp David talks. (U)
--INR devoted particular effort to analyzing reports that
broadened US understanding of the political, economic, and
social changes that have occurred in China and their implica-
tions for US-PRC relations. (U)
--It also delineated Japan's constitutional and political
problems with a more active foreign policy and,increased
defense spending.
--INR played a useful role in assessing events in North
and South Korea following the assassination of President
Park and the accession to power of, President Chun.-.(U)
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SECRETT
Other notable INR analytical efforts included analyses
on: the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, particularly relating to
Chinese intentions in invading Vietnam; Hanoi's strategy
toward Kampuchea and Laos; the plight. of the Indochinese refu-
gees, and the politics of humanitarian relief; and the political
problems and tensions which have arisen in Thailand and the
Philippines. (U)
Africa
INR has been heavily tasked over the last four years to
provide in-depth analytical support to policymakers on African
issues. INR's efforts have focused on several thorny problems,
including:
--Rhodesia, where INR analyzed negotiating strategies, the
military and political situation on the ground, the role
of the various external parties, and the prospects for
the negotiations;
--South Africa, where INR gave special attention to Pre-
toria's regional role, the government's intentions with
respect to the separate development policy,'and nuclear
policy;
--The Horn of Africa, where INR has devoted special attention
to the military situation in the Ogaden and Eritrea, the
Soviet-Cuban presence, the outlook for Ethiopian-Somali
relations, and the implications for regional issues. (S)
Economic Issues
--INR, during the last four years, has acted to ensure its
ability to respond to the needs of the policymakers for current
analyses. Early in this period, INR moved to improve its
expertise in the energy field. The result has been a con-
tinuing flow of analyses and forecasts of high quality that
were of considerable use to policymakers. Indeed, INR probably
now has the best continuity of energy expertise in the Depart-
ment. (U)
--Over the same period, INR has improved its econometric capa-
bilities, making extensive use of the global Link model and
other econometric systems for simulations of economic con-
tingencies. Particular attention has been given to studies
on the effects of oil price changes. Work done in INR's
econometric unit, and the facilities which it has made
available, have been recognized throughout the Government.
U)
dir6'ction. (/V)
--INR ha also seen the need for greater attention to th~j
long- erm impl rations of rrent econc~ is trends aridThas
atte pted to ocus some 9;f its limiter esources in) is
SECRET
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
o Improved the production and dissemination of foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, and counterintelligence studies and reports.
o Developed a computerized Intelligence Information System (IIS)
insuring retrieval of necessary research. data.
o Coordinated with US Dept of State a system of arbitration on
visa issuance.
o Initiated a field office wide Development of Counterintelligence
Awareness Program (DECA) designed to develop information concerning
hostile intelligence services targeting of classified industrial
products.
o Coordinated with the Dept of Justice and the Export Control Community
in the improvement of export control enforcement.
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
Date: December 1, 1980
To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
From: \ William H. Webster, Director
Subject: REPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
Reference is made to your letter of November 18,
1980, requesting significant FBI accomplishments during this
Administration's term of office.
During this period, the FBI, recognizing the
need to upgrade its research and analysis capability, has
taken significant steps to improve the production and
dissemination of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence,
and counterintelligence studies and reports. In addition
to the employment of professional Intelligence Research
Specialists (IRSs), the FBI developed a computerized
Intelligence Information System (IIS) insuring retrieval
of necessary research data. These steps have enhanced the
FBI's counterintelligence analytical capability. As a
further step, the FBI has recently established a positive
intelligence production element to provide other U.S.
Government agencies positive foreign intelligence collected
as a by-product of our counterintelligence activities.
Before and during this period, disagreement
between the FBI and the U.S. Department of State (USDS) on
the question of visa denial based on association with a
hostile intelligence service existed and, at times, seemed
inherent to the work of each agency. A system for arbitrating
disagreement between the FBI and USDS on visa issuance was
initiated by the U.S. Department of Justice, and developed
by USDS and the FBI over several months during the Fall
of 1978. The system of arbitration established by this
committee and its operation during the past year is
satisfactory from the FBI standpoint.
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Director
Central Intelligence Agency
in deciding whether to interpose an objection to
issuance of a visa to a visitor, the Intelligence Division
(INTD) of the FBI weighs the available information concerning
the applicant against the requirements of paragraphs 27 and
29 (8 USC 1182). If the available information indicates
that the applicant presents a serious threat as described
in paragraphs 27 or 29, then an objection to issuance will
be raised.
At the request of the National Security Council (NSC)
the INTD has worked quite closely with the Department of
Justice and the Export Control Community examining ways to
improve export control enforcement. The FBI actively
participated in an ad hoc interdepartment working group
which reported its findings to the NSC ad hoc Technology
Transfer Group on means to improve compliance with
export control laws. These efforts over the past two
years have led to improved coordination among agencies
involved in this area.
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UNCLA SIFIEED
DCIf RM-80-0074
8 December 1980
NOTE FOR:
FROM;
pecia 8ss1s an to the DCI
Executive Officer, RMS
SUBJECT: Report for the Administration
1.. Following is the information we spoke about for inclusion in
Admiral Turner's submission to th.e President.
Using zero-based budgeting, the DCI in this Administration
was able for the first time to submit a consolidated National
Foreign Intelligence Program and Budget which expressed
Intelligence Community needs in priority order. By introducing
a sense of priority to the process, ZBB helped the DCI to
manage more effectively a decentralized budget process. Here-
tofore, the intelligence budget had contained only program
totals and explanations of selected issues. The new method
not only makes it possible for the DCI to produce a more
rational, more coherent, and more efficient program and budget
for the Intelligence Community, but it also makes it possible
to defend more effectively the intelligence budget that the
President proposes to the Congress.
2. George, please call if I can provide any additional information.
UNCLASSIFIED
STAT
STAT
STAT
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