SOUTHERN AFRICA/DCI NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000601650001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 24, 1980
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2009/05/27: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601650001-6
Approved For Release 2009/05/27: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601650001-6
 Approved For Release 2009/05/27: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601650001-6
SOUTHERN AFRICA
1. Rhodesian election a milestone
Sense relief have behind us
DCI Notes
Real implications for U.S.
1. Rhod elec reinforces desire of black states not to
allow last vestige of white domination in
Southern Africa
Bound to be important psychological impact
After years of armed struggle won at ballot box -
But also not just black-white vote - intra black,
intra tribal selection bound instill sense
confidence, maturity
2. U.S. under more pressure than ever to support this
3. Issue will be whether those pressures build rapidly or
whether pragmatic considerations prevail.
Mugabe's dilemma
Probably very little to do w/his professed Marxism
Dependence on So. Africa
Transport
Subsidy
To degree needs to produce quick results
"Peace dividend" will need So. Af. coop -
much more diff w/o So. Af. help or at least
acquiesence.
But - radical wing, ANC and other So. Af. guerilla(?) groups will
be pushing to take activist role vs. So. Af.
Fortunately Frontline states likely be more passive
(Why?)
Also So. Af. playing Mugabe with "hands off - wait and see" attitude.
S E C R E -T
Approved For Release 2009/05/27: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601650001-6
 Approved For Release 2009/05/27: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601650001-6
U K t I
South African strategy based on notion of constellation of
Southern African states to be formed by persuasion and economic
pressure countered by Black state constellation
Too early measure impact on internal So. Af. situation
But - Bound to heighten sensitivities of Black pop.
So. African response so far has been to initiate
"reforms"
Minor internal reforms and "national conference
on future of South Africa" called by Botha
will not be likely to convince blacks of
South African government's good intentions
-Nature of reforms:
-Botha wants to remove most irritating aspects of
legalized radical discrimination and give urban
blacks more control over their own affairs and a
greater economic stake in the white areas
-He hopes to consolidate some of the more "fragmented
"black homelands" into more viable entities
-He intends to give coloreds--those persons of mixed
blood--and Asians a political role in the white areas
in which they live-
-He envisions a form of common South African citizenship
for all races
-The government recently granted black trade unions the
right to organize and has removed an anachronistic law
that kept blacks from becoming skilled workers
-The blacks do not see these reforms as a big deal. They want
ultimately the whole pie of one man-one vote
-A possible effect of even these reforms may be to lead to a
split in the Nationalist Party which, depending on how it
goes, may either help or hurt Botha's plans. If he is able
to move the moderates with him, this could result in isolating
the extreme right of the Nationalist Party and, ultimately,
the formation of another party.
The South Africans appear to believe that the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan may have tipped the scales of Western reaction in
South Africa's favor. They hope that the West may see the need
for greater reliance on South African minerals and on South Africa's
stratetic position. Consequently, they envision a softening of
Western opposition to South Africa's internal policies.
2
S E C R E T"
Approved For Release 2009/05/27: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601650001-6
 Approved For Release 2009/05/27: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601650001-6
) C U h t I
Soviet reaction also figures in equation
a. Surprised at Mugabe victory; difficult time changing gears
b. Congratulations only to PF and on coalition
c. Will seek opportunities for influence in Zimbabwe and to do so
will make overtures to Mozambique, Tanzania and count on better
organized ZAPU for long run. Will work on ZANU elements.
d. Evidence of Soviet-activity to convince Mugabe of their support
(e.g., visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister this week to
Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania, with efforts to get
into Rhodesia)
Approved For Release 2009/05/27: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601650001-6