TECHNOLOGY TRENDS COLLOQUIUM VOLUME I - RAPPORTEUR S REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000601600003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
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Secret
Technology Trends Colloquium
Volume I Rapporteur's Report
29 March - 1 April 1978
United States Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland
Secret
A Department of Defense Research and Engineering-
IA 100001-78
Intelligence Community Publication
June 1978
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TEC:-TNOLOGY TRENDS COLLOQUIUM
Volume I
Rapporteur's Report
29 March - 1 April 1978
United States Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland
JOINT DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING -
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PUBLICATION
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CONTENTS
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Keynote Remarks, Hon. William J. Perry, Under . . . . . 9
Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering
Technological Futures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Land Combat
Life Sciences
Naval Combat
Materials Physical Sciences
Energy Weapons Applications
Strategy and Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Overview
Non-Mutual Assured Destruction
Nuclear Proliferation World
NATO War
Information War
Small Unit Operations
Food/Water Crisis
Energy Related Scenarios
Resources and Uncertainties - USSR. . . . . . . . . . . 67
Soviet Resources
Soviet R&D Patterns
Resources and Uncertainties - US. . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Technology As An Equalizer
t
Design For Mobilization
Operations R&D
Innovation In The US
Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
STAT
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UNCLASSIFIED
This publication describes presentations and discussions
at a colloquium conducted over a four-day period by a mix of
technologists, systems designers and managers, intelligence
analysts, and operational military. The colloquium was part
of a joint Defense Research & Engineering - Intelligence
Community technology forecast to determine what technology
will be most significant for military weapon systems of the
United States and the USSR for the rest of this century.
Technology forecasts are normally strongest in their
statement of technical possibilities; and weakest in their
relevance to political-economic-structural-demographic-human
reactions and in their recognition of cross-impacts or
substitutions. The mix of technical disciplines, future
environment topics, and operational personnel was an inten-
tional attempt to overcome such shortcomings.
The year 2000, or twenty years hence, may sound like
the far future - a realm for wild thoughts. Unfortunately,
many people concerned with defense planning are awed by a
rigid ten-year acquisition cycle, and a ten- to thirty-year
life cycle for deployed systems. The future appears to be
known, and indeed no one would suggest that much of the
equipment now or soon to be deployed will not still be used
in the year 2000. In the past, however, major changes in
equipments have evolved within a decade (e.g., the ICBM) to
dramatically change war-fighting capability and significantly
the perception of military strength. Quoting Peter Drucker,
the proper rule is not, "whatever we do we'll do forever,"
but "whatever we do today will...be a candidate for abandon-
ment within a fairly short period of years." The possibilities
described in this publication should stimulate abandonment
of the "more of the same" viewpoint.
The impetus for this colloquium came from Admiral
Stansfield Turner. He engaged others in his idea and gave
emphasis to the mix of technical and operational people.
The colloquium benefited significantly from the co-sponsorship
and active participation of Dr. William J. Perry, Under
Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering; as well as
the guidance and active participation of the steering group
composed of Dr. John Deutch, Director of Energy Research,
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DOE; Dr. Stephen Lukasik, Senior Vice President of RAND
Corporation; and Dr. Frank Press, Presidential Science
Adviser. Ultimately, the fact of the colloquium and its
content rests on all the participants who generously gave
their knowledge and talents to the undertaking.
The text which follows is arranged by logical grouping
of materials from the colloquium exchange. Every effort was
made to give an accurate, though brief, account of main
points. Any errors or misrepresentations contained in this
report are unintentional and regretted. Individual papers
prepared for and given at the colloquium are contained in
the separate volume, and are commended to the reader as a
more thorough treatment of the individual topics.
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SUMMARY
The tasks laid before the colloquium were to identify
where important technologies are going and where the leverage
for military significance is in these technologies--for the
US and/or for the USSR. This was not a comparative assessment
of the United States and USSR. Technological possibilities
were treated as neutral--that is, capable of exploitation by
either nation, depending upon its institutions and purposes.
Forty technologies, systems, and conflict descriptions
were selected beforehand for their likely significance.
These formed the core of the materials presented--and thereby
the future prospects.
These results do suggest priorities. For DOD activities
their importance can be in the opportunities now seen to be
significant, in the possibilities which are not prematurely
foreclosed, and in the stimulation to think about a future
different than a simple extension of today. Their importance
for the intelligence community can be in the recognition of
where US designs may depend upon threat definition or target
signature variations, e.g., cruise missile defenses; in the
identification of future technologies which need to be
watched; in the understanding of the US (blue side) develop-
ment, acquisition and operational strengths and problems;
and in the recognition of research and development fields
where information or solutions found by other nations could
prove helpful in US developments.
Future Possibilities
? Flexibility gains, and thereby the capability for
effective application of forces, appeared to the parti-
cipants as the most significant military outcome from a
number of these technologies. The explosion of data
processing applications possible through large-scale
integration, processing at the sensor, and cheapness is
foremost in impact. Applications to weapons and to
radar are of course expected of hardware designers.
Application to evolve geographically and functionally
distributed systems for target location, unit position
location, air defense, and so on will provide for
battlefield portrayal and the survivability of command
and control. Most significantly, application to
maintenance tasks, to multiple purpose maintenance
tools, and to equipments capable of field changes in
function will effect radical removal of logistical
constraints on force operations.
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A second source of flexibility gain is expected to be
the wide use of insensitive or "wooden" explosives and
propellants. These, used in smart and barrage weapons,
eliminate the handling, storage and fabrication con-
straints now necessitated by fear of fire or accidental
detonation. VTOL is a third source. VTOL aircraft
equal in range-payload capability to today's fixed-wing
aircraft can be available in the 1990s. A fourth
source is the design of battlefield surveillance and
weapons to explicitly gain the advantages of night and
bad weather operations. The millimeter wave radar for
these short-range applications is a likely consequence.
The last of the items identified with flexibility is
the integration of small team operations and equipments
in a manner analogous to the development of a tactical
aircraft. These teams for both main force and special
operations can thereby realize the protection, the
target kill, and the fire/force direction potential
from new weapons, sensors, computation and communications.
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New Needs and New Approaches
Technologies were the focus, but beyond identifying
what is technically possible is the question of how to make
it possible. The disparity between the US and the USSR in
fielding of new systems was very much the concern of the
participants. The issue is not whether US technology can
better fill a military need than can Soviet technology; but
whether we can reverse our difficulties of recent years in
choosing, designing, and producing systems which work, are
assimilated, and are of reasonable cost.
STAT
Real concern was expressed about the attention given by
the Soviets to continuous, including nuclear-biological-
chemical, warfare in their doctrine, their equipments, and
their training.
STAT
Continuous warfare was one of the forms of future
conflict discussed in the colloquium; force differences
responsive to a concept of non-mutual assured destruction,
to a world of nuclear proliferation, and to small unit type
actions were others discussed. Inadequate as these were in
covering the spectrum of future needs
STAT
Perhaps one of the more pervasive thoughts put forward
in the colloquium was that of information war. Strategic
intelligence is updated in bursts occurring in a matter of
months or years. In a relatively stable regime of technical
collection the capabilities of the collector tend to become
known, and thus culpable to deception. A carefully designed
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sequence of messages can cause reliance upon false input
data and decision logic e.g. a designer is vulnerable to
wrong or deceptive signature data. Furthermore, new vulnera-
bilities to tactical intelligence, and in actual engagements,
result from the explosive use of information to optimize
force and weapon allocation and control precision weapons.
The colloquium's focus was upon technologies for weapon
systems. Unintentionally, this appears to reflect the im-
plicit assumption that machines and technology determine the
outcome of wars. Those of this persuasion are impressed
with the destructive power of modern weapons and view military
personnel as rather unreliable machine-tenders whose func-
tion is to keep the equipment running. Fortunately, the
operational participants present forcefully challenged this
attitude much to the benefit of the colloquium's product.
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Dr. Perry gave the keynote charge to the colloquium.
He first drew attention to two aspects of the organization:
that it was a joint undertaking by two elements of the
government, Defense and the Intelligence Community and, more
significantly, that it represented a joining of forces
between the scientific and national security communities.
He noted that the latter communities had worked together in
earlier years--with pride--and expressed his hope that this
undertaking was a harkening of the better things to come.
He identified his two major themes for the colloquium:
first, that of major military competition and, second, what
science and technology has to do with that competition.
STAT
He noted that the competition is not only military, but
is economic and has to do with the quality of life and the
ability to maintain freedom of choice. In these other areas
we are winning the competition.
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He cited President Brezhnev on the significance of
science and technology in this competition. This he agreed
with, noting that we have very fundamental advantages in
this country in our industrial base and in our technological
base. The issue is how to most effectively exploit this
science and technology base--we must be extremely selective.
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Dr. Perry said we have made choices with our R&D dollars
in the past and that has led to the military capability we
have today.
STAT
The task he placed upon the colloquium was to identify
where the technology is going and to identify where the
leverage is in that technology and military systems.
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The colloquium was a 3-day snapshot of technology
futures and possible military applications. The results are
an input to a forecast, intended thereby to be a starting
point for the harder task of resource allocation.
Dr. Davis in her summary provided a chronological
listing of the technology presentations in terms of radical
changes, incremental changes, and no anticipated changes.
She noted the amazing and spontaneous consensus as to the
constituents of US technological infrastructure for the next
20 or so years.
STAT
She identified some technologies which need watching
because too little attention has been directed to them,
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Dr. Lukasik said the approach in the systems discussions
had been to focus upon a set of systems that would reasonably
span the future needs and relevant technologies--space
systems, battlefield systems, etc. He related systems and
technologies by a listing of technologies which had come up
in the systems discussions. These include some overlaps
with the lists of Dr. Davis, but also some differences. F__1
STAT
He drew attention at one topic from the systems discus-
sion; namely, the one addressed by Dr. Rona entitled informa-
tion systems (or information war). The future attainment of
higher and higher levels of precision in surveillance,
weapon use, and force allocation carries with it the greater
vulnerability to deception prior to conflict or actual con-
fusion and destruction during conflict by targeted actions
against command-and-control links. This topic needs constant
attention, not the afterthought customarily given counter-
measures.
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Many of these technologies offer new or enhanced military
capabilities which will i --
change in future forces.
STAT
~ The extent to
which such changes are foreseen, and actually occur, in US
forces depends in part upon the stimulation generated by the
materials of this colloquium.
The last decades saw the development and use of the
programmable electronic computer, then the transistor, and
now the present day silicon chip with its large-scale inte-
grated (LSI) circuits. The cost per function has dropped
dramatically so that inexpensive hand calculators and
related microprocessors and minicomputers are now widely
used commercially. Further integration is part of the
future; but, more significantly, with low-cost processing
many new tasks will be undertaken that today are uneconomical
or not thought of. Large amounts of energy and force can be
controlled in a manner similar to the way the brain directs
the action of the muscles. This technology was thus seen by
those at the colloquium as key, whether the application was
toward separation of signals from clutter, guidance of
missiles, distributed systems operations, or tools for
maintenance and logistics operations in support of combat
teams.
Dr. Dertouzos described the magnitude of expected
hardware changes in memories and processors. By the late
1980s a million-bit chip memory will provide the equivalent
of today's $100,000 computer for a few hundred dollars--
purchasable for the homeowner or soldier. Similarly, by the
late 1980s we will have available logic processors of 1
million to 5 million instructions per second (MIPS) at
today's prices ($50 to $100). The significance by today's
standards is that microprocessors will permeate instrumentation
and control functions, individual use of computers will have
a substantial qualitative impact on the individual's access
to services and overall performance, and geographically
distributed computer-communications systems will become the
rule.
Radically new technologies may further increase memories
in capacity and reduce costs. Single processor machines may
be extended to 200 to 300 MIPS. However, these and even
larger processing rates are more likely to be achieved by
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multi-processors. He saw little advancement in input/output
devices with continued reliance on the cathode ray tube,
printer devices, and the keyboard. He noted that researchers
are still struggling to construct programs that can comprehend
spoken English. The significant exception will be that of
the direct sensor computer interface.
The central processing units with large memories of
today are a natural consequence of the considerably higher
cost of logic switching or computation in contrast with that
of memory storage. Now storing and logic costs are compar-
able, and we have the microprocessor. Mr. Joseph addressed
microprocessors futures. He emphasized the rapidity of
change. Until the late 1960s a new maxicomputer generation
was developed about every six years, but since 1971 a new
microprocessor generation has occurred every two years--
small enough now and at sufficiently low cost to be inte-
grated into common objects to give them intelligence. The
integration will advance faster because interconnections are
costly in power, maintenance, reliability, etc. Whereas the
penalty for a signal now leaving the chip versus staying on
the chip requires a hundred times more power, in a few years
the number of circuits on a chip will increase by more than
10 times, and the power penalty will be a thousand to one--
dictating designs where few signals leave the chip/wafer.
Initially microprocessor hardware will be incorporated into
computers and other machines, but he believes that, by 1980,
entire systems will be integrated onto semiconductor wafers.
Dr. Dertouzos said these developments in processing
hardware, the direct interface of sensors and actuators with
processors, and the sizable improvement expected in bandwidth
cost (glass fibers) bear directly on the instrumentation and
control applications--and will bring about new levels of
performance for individual equipment. New designs in such
things as ships, airplanes, vehicles, buildings will come
about by at least replacing heavy multiwire bundles with few
glass fibers that link packet-oriented processing hardware.
Mr. Joseph added possibilities for dispersed operations
that could be of significant security interest. A machine-
like, nongeographically targetable, microminiaturized factory
will produce end products. A mobile unit will have the
versatility for complete maintenance of military equipments.
Information transfers will substitute for the transfer of
people and things, including where adaptation thereby of an
appliance (tool) at a remote location performs a different
function.
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He foresees the ability to im e micro-
processor-like logic at the interface of complex systems,
thereby allowing such systems to be used by the uninitiated
and untrained, to aid immeasurably in closing the gap.
Similarly, he saw the significance of the microprocessor
future for the military as offering the elimination of tech-
nological obsolescence for defense systems. These can be
designed for continued/constant piecemeal updating, which
will permit systems, vehicles, missiles, and so on to be
readily adapted to a changed threat or a different physical
environment. This means saving in major system buys, savings
of energy, and savings of materials.
Technology can be the driver for individual equipments.
Dr. Dertouzos noted by contrast that while the technology
will make distributed systems possible, the principal force
behind distributed systems is simply the natural geographical
distribution of the collectors and users. The extent to
which these systems become widespread depends critically
upon the evolution of languages and operating systems designs.
The most dominant application is likely to be clerical and
logistic support automation, that is, the mail and message
systems, text editing and preparation, maintenance of records,
and clerical functions. Other applications include military
intelligence, where inputs can be linked to an informational
structure and retrieved inferentially and associatively
rather than by key words; commands and assessment of forces
issued over widespread formations; and stationery and mobile
radars netted.
Dr. Hart joined in to carry the possibilities offered
by greatly expanded memories and processor capabilities to
even more difficult tasks. He contrasted conventional
computer programs with the work in Artificial Intelligence
(AI). Conventional programs ordinarily perform an inflexible
operation upon a rigid set of inputs. Clearly, this speed
and processing power ought to be more responsive to variability
in inputs and unanticipated queries. AI achieves this in
part by incorporation within the system of a substantial
body of knowledge about the problem. For example, a system
for analyzing aerial photographs can contain more than the
visual appearance of trucks; it can contain relations
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between trucks and roads, rivers, and bridges and relations
between buildings and roads and so forth. The AI program
can thereby interpret and analyze inputs such as photographic
imagery, generate and execute a routine to answer the query,
and measure the output against a desired goal.
Within the past few years, AI systems have demonstrated
experimentally that they can provide consultation services
to physicians on problems of medical diagnosis; determine
the structure of large organic molecules from their mass
spectra; analyze aerial imagery to monitor ship movements;
deduce, from the content of data bases, the answers to
questions posed in ordinary ungrammatical English; interpret
continuous human speech about restricted domains of discourse;
and control robotic vehicles and manipulators on the basis
of video and other sensory input. He cited possible future
military applications: the direction of multisensors on EW
surveillance platform by verification of anticipated emitter
presence or recognition of gaps in the current electronic
order of battle; the monitoring of a stream of logistics
data to determine critical exceptions to the execution of a
plan; the interrogation, in ordinary English, of a set of
distributed computerized data bases to form an assessment of
assets or to test the feasibility of a contingency plan.
Dr. Hart saw the growth of AI to depend upon the acquisi-
tion, representation and use of knowledge. The discussion
suggested an example. The enormous gain in oceans knowledge
projected by Dr. Wunsch, as exploited incrementally by Al
programs could accelerate knowledge of the oceans and also
be applied to ocean surveillance, surface vehicle weather
avoidance, and sensor designs. He saw the exploitation of
multiprocessors as a further source of AI growth. Designs
involving hundreds of general purpose processors or millions
of simple logic units can provide the large amounts of
computation Al systems typically require. Dr. Dertouzos
noted that multiprocessor systems will be needed to achieve
processing rates of 1,000 MIPS and up for tasks like weather
forecasting, partial differential equation operations, and
speech processing. Unfortunately little development of
multiprocessor organization is under way.
Discussion brought out an issue concerning the growth
of microprocessor systems, distributed systems and multi-
processor systems: namely, the absence of software, the
difficulties and high cost of programming, and the availability
of programmers. Dr. Dertouzos suggested the solutions
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probably will utilize natural-language filters that precede
other programs, and larger amounts of structured knowledge
with relatively few processing rules. Mr. Joseph carried
this point about programming cost a step further suggesting
the future approach would be counterintuitive. Today the
design of future systems must be software compatible with
old systems, since it costs about $50 to develop a single
line of new code. But we overlook the life cycle cost to
maintain that line, which involves thousands of dollars
because the past programs are in low-level languages. In
the future we should throw away the old program and redo in
a higher level language--replaceable dedicated computers on
a chip will further this direction by casting software into
hardware.
This means it will be cheaper to buy a new chip in
order to replace the program. There were questions whether
the military could constitute a significant enough market to
make this approach economical. Mr. Joseph stated his belief
that the costs will indeed be cheap enough to meet the
special purpose needs of the military.
STAT
Computers and data processing naturally brought the
discussion to command and control as a topic. The new
technology facilitates local processing. Dr. Rona emphasized
how the analogous biological functions work well independently--
decoupled. Decentralization offers the benefit of local
tasks well done and reduces the vulnerability to counter-
measures by the enemy. Dr. Davis also emphasized in her
summary remarks the group's view of strong need for decentral-
izations.
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The ever present concern over the adequacy of NATO air
defenses was the subject of much discussion, but no concensus;
except to affirm that short-range systems will be key.
The importance of continuous warfare and nuclear,
biological and chemical (NBC) warfare was recognized as
pervasive if real preparations were undertaken. Some
technologies for night vision, for forward repair, and for
protection were cited but no participant suggested that the
magnitude of change was even understood.
The infyonics concept for integral development of small
units, their equipment, and their support excited most
participants as an approach likely to maximize the exploitat-
ion of new technology and thereby gain real leverage for US
land forces. Other than the new technologies two ideas were
central. First, that the small unit be developed in an
analogous fashion as that of a tactical aircraft instead of
the current practice of appending gadgets onto men in the
unit. Second, that the mission for these units be "engage
and defeat," not "close with and destroy the enemy by fire
and maneuver" as currently written. Defeat-not-destroy
better recognizes the operational concepts within which a
unit can best employ the new technologies--and the support
available to it--while also recognizing "close with and
destroy" is an unlikely task for a small unit facing a tank
or armed helicopter. General Gray cited the Marine Sting
Ray concept, and the ARPA Small Independent Action Force
(SIAF) as past examples of such emphases--but without the
advantages of the sensor, weapons, and processing technolo-
gies soon to be available. Several emphasized that however
appropriate the development of small units was for low-level
conflict, it was equally essential to large-force operations
of the future.
General Dickinson along with General Gray and others
cited what they saw as the tremendous potential from the new
technologies for logistics. Force projection and sustained
operations are dragged down or made possible by logistic
support
New technologies] are: weapons
which will hit what they are aimed at, t e miniaturization
of equipment, the processing available to anticipate and
speed up response, field reprogrammable tools and equipments,
and the insensitive explosives. Dr. Bement's projection of
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battlefield "cloning" of repair parts for existing or captured
equipments added to the excitement for vast improvement in
logistics and maintenance. The radical change in maintenance
and logistics was seen as most significant because of the
freedom thereby created for combat unit operations.
Life Sciences
Dr. Doty described the life sciences as in a state of
vigorous growth and likely to remain so throughout the
remainder of this century. He noted there have been 5,000
PhDs per year in the life sciences over the past half dozen
years in comparison with declining numbers in the physical
sciences and engineering (3400 and 2400 respectively in
1976). Thus while he could find no consensus on what dis-
coveries will be made 15 to 20 years hence, he emphasized
that the field is alive with the potential of discovery and
utility.
General Augerson characterized the US man in combat.
The soldier is no longer from the small town or farm who is
comfortable out of doors. But rather, few will have worked
with cars, fixed radios or fired a weapon as youth. For
many, all impressive technology is imported (such as Japanese
electronics) and domestic goods are subject to recall.
Typically, equipments are undersupported, and supply austere
in the extreme. If the war is in Central Europe there will
be concern about dependents, if elsewhere, a national consensus
may be lacking. Tactical dispersal, isolation in-fighting
vehicles, and disrupted communications put serious barriers
between the soldier and the supporting group with which he
identifies. The equipment imposes acoustical, acceleration,
thermal and toxic stresses close to tolerance limits.
Intense, sustained around-the-clock combat in fluid and
confusing circumstances can be expected. With no sleep
people become ineffective in about three days, units and
command sooner. Sustained military performance is possible
with three hours of sleep per day.
Regarding lethal, toxic or disabling chemicals and
drugs Dr. Doty doubted lethal agents would become any more
lethal than present nerve gases. Nonlethal toxic or disabling
agents are somewhat different. Nevertheless for them as
well as the lethal agents he said the problems are not with
the deficiency of the chemical, but with the delivery system.
The uncertainty is in the domain which they will affect, and
the duration of their concentration (or lethality). Similarly,
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General Augerson summed his remarks by noting the
adaptability of people to chemical weapons in World War I,
and indeed the ability to continue WWII operations in the
presence of high casualty densities, suggests that we could
be capable of prevailing if such weapons are used. Today
the difficulty of detecting chemical, biological agents or
radiation without special equipment is a major psychological
problem affecting the way troops feel about such threats.
Defensive, or offensive, developments will be a waste of
money if attention is not paid to training, discipline,
indoctrination and practice on the part of military personnel
and commanders so that NBC operations are drilled to where
they are automatic and assimilated fully into military
operations.
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UNCLASSIFIED
Dr. Doty addressed the topic of genetic engineering.
He saw genetic engineering in this century limited to ex-
ploiting the transfer of genes from higher organisms into
bacteria and viruses in order to manufacture important
products of the higher organisms, rather than the introduc-
tion of genes from one higher organism into the stem cells
of another. The latter, schemes of significantly changing
humans, seems a very long way off. He pointed out that the
combatants for this century are born or will be within the
next five years.
Dr. Doty said the apparent mismatch between the onrush
of the life sciences and the modest impact in matters relating
to national security was cause for question. There is no
counterpart in the life sciences to the R&D community in the
physical sciences constantly innovating and applying new
developments or discoveries--except in limited areas such as
the pharmaceutical industry. He thought the question serious
enough to be examined in a deeper manner than this brief
forecast permitted.
Naval Combat
Surface ships and submarines are presented in that
order in this section. Not large ships, but rather smaller
advanced surface vehicles were the subject. New possibili-
ties for undersea vehicles for combat and as work vehicles
were presented and discussed, as well as new ideas for sub-
marine operations.
Mr. Mantle presented candidates for advanced naval surface
vehicles for the year 2000. These were hydrofoils, air
cushion vehicles (ACVs), surface effect ships (SESs), small
waterplane-area twin-hulled (SWATH) ships, planing craft and
wing-in-ground effect (WIG) vehicles. Normally these are
sized in the 1,000-3,000-ton class, with the SES and SWATH
also considered as possible aircraft carriers. Several of
these offer revolutionary performance features such as calm
water speeds up to 100 knots (three times today's displacement
ships), seakeeping features that would virtually eliminate
seasickness, and impressive maneuverability. For example,
the 40- to 70-knot speed of the hydrofoil, ACVs and SESs
offer the opportunity of an ASW vehicle to sprint/listen
ahead of a convoy. The SWATH has the sea-keeping character-
istics of much larger ships and thus could serve as a mini-
carrier since two or three could be constructed for the cost
of one large carrier. However, the small high speed vehicles
cost the same as large medium speed displacement ships
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(3,000-ton displacement, 80-knot high speed ship costs as
much as a 10,000 ton 35 knot displacement ship) and thus new
roles rather than competing roles need to be explored for
such high speed platforms.
Speed, seakeeping, size and cost are the major consid-
erations. Technological opportunities exist to extend
capabilities or overcome some of the recognized shortcomings,
for example a variablegeometry foil can add a 70-knot dash
capability to a 50-knot cruise hydrofoil at no loss in
seakeeping capability, supercritical hull designs can eliminate
pounding at the bow for planing craft, and slim designs can
give the SES an ability to operate at low speeds similar to
that it possesses at high speeds.
He said introduction of these vehicles into the fleet
is unlikely to be the result of a technological achievement,
but rather the result of experimentation with smaller and
slower versions of these vehicles. Fleet use of ACV and SES
at 2,000 to 10,000 tons, but 40 to 70 knots in lieu of 100
knots, and hydrofoils at 200 to 2,500 tons and 50 to 70
knots would provide the opportunity to test the concepts and
develop military applications. Other navies operate these
type vehicles in numbers greater than the conventional US
Navy fleet today. The Soviets have a large amphibious force
of ACVs together with over 800 hydrofoils combined in Soviet
Navy and civilian operations. Similar experience, rather
than any specific technical development, is likely to develop
a military role for these vehicles.
General Gray drew attention to the advantages these
high-speed platforms could have for a mobile force to land
1,000 miles away, overnight, in weather of our choice.
Support could be provided by platform use for VTOL, surveil-
lance, and communications. Used for a precursor force or
time-limited operation, these vehicles could offer unique
advantages.
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and development is on highly reliable optical sources beyond
one-micron wavelengths. From this, low-loss optical communi-
cation systems are likely in the 1980s with concomitant
development toward optical integrated circuits. He believes
the move from discretes to integrated optics will not take
as long as it did from the transistor to integrated electronic
circuits.
Basically he described preparation activities as having
become more sophisticated. Molecular beam epitaxy (MBE)
allows the preparation of almost monoatomic layers of programmed
composition. Thus the possibilities for nonequilibrium
structures and materials previously unobtainable are manifest.
The detectors for the space and tactical surveillance described
by Mr. Justice are one obviously important application.
Dr. Bement addressed the matter of other materials, but
first noted that optical sensors and diphasic composite
materials offer, as undersea acoustic sensors, the potential
of order-of-magnitude improvements in acoustic response and
greatly extended depths of application. Even such currently
available materials as fiber optic hydrophones can provide
sensitivities far greater than required for underwater use.
note that for
electrical machinery the system for collection of current
dominates the geometry and size of new equipments. He cited
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UNCLASSIFIED
developments of monolithic brush collectors for high power
density electrical machinery, which will allow conventionally
cooled machines to match superconducting machines in size
and weight. He cited materials impact upon design. simplifi-
cation, or changes not easily seen, such as the increase in
wear-life of splines to the point where they never need to
be replaced in ship or submarine.
Dr. Kear gave an overview of developments, old and new,
in laser materials processing technology. Laser welding
already has many applications. The welding of ring frames
to hull sections alone shows the possibility of reduction of
over 60,000 man-hours and thus $1 million per submarine.
Laserglazing (surface melting followed by rapid solidi-
fication) is a relatively new technology with many possibilities.
Bulk structures such as discs and drum rotors can be built
up incrementally by laserglazing one thin layer on another.
This gains a completely homogeneous, flaw-free structural
part, is natural for computer control and near-net shape
bodies, and can be combined with thermo-mechanical treatment
to give material microstructures otherwise unattainable.
In-situ surface treatment to attain high temperature-
corrosion resistance as well as shock hardening to improve
fatigue properties are other examples. Dr. Bement added
that laser treatment of aluminum can gain 30 to 40 percent
in strength and 100?C in temperature use--so it is almost a
new metal. Ultimately, Dr. Keay believes pulse annealing,
ion-implantation, and laserglazing will develop into an
integrated new technology for the surface treatment of
materials with a wide range of structural and electronic
applications.
Discussion brought out the possibilities for field use
of laser welding (already used for pipelines) and laserglazing
surface treatment. These were seen to be of great potential
for field maintenance. Dr. Bement added further to field
possibilities. He described the possibilities for in-field
"cloning" from polymers or steel of replacement parts for
existing or captured equipments. Three dimensional photography
with autodigitalization would control casting of parts for
automatic weapons, aircraft/missile or orthopedic needs. He
noted this application might be put to intelligence purposes
since similar photos of enemy equipment could be put onto
digital tape for later reproduction.
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Dr. Anderson stated geophysics is central to a few
specialized military problems, such as missile guidance
(gravity field) and weapons testing monitoring (seismology),
but is also involved in such general problems as weather
forecasting and control and submarine navigation, detection,
and evasion. He emphasized the advances expected in geodetic
instrumentation and technology including the multiple satellite
sources. The results will show in missile accuracies, pre-
cision updating of ship and aircraft inertial systems, and
so on. He believes DOD geodetic self-reliance can be expected
to increase and argued for more interaction with others to
pass on the gains in knowledge.
Separately, he identified a number of related develop-
ments of importance to national security but perhaps only
indirectly to military capabilities. The direct detection
of hydrocarbon resources by shear wave techniques should be
industrial practice during the 1980s; and thereby the possi-
bilities for the cheap discovery and early exploitation of
these resources. The routine prediction of major earthquakes
will make possible either disaster preparation or, the
opportunity for covertly testing nuclear weapons. Routine
six- to 10-day weather forecasts will be as good as today's
two- to three-day forecasts; and along with a more basic
understanding of weather modification, may come the tech-
nology to increase precipitation. Lastly, he noted materials
are now being fabricated at one to 10 megabar pressures,
which opens the possibilities that these new materials will
possess unique physical and electrical properties.
Dr. Wunsch cited two major areas where ocean science
relates to national security: the knowledge of the fluid
ocean on the acoustic and operational environment of the
Navy, and knowledge of the relationship between the ocean
and possible climatic changes. He emphasized the extent to
which we are now ignorant of the ocean as compared to the
atmosphere. Now, a very few observations and a rudimentary
knowledge of physics form our knowledge, but in 20 years he
expects a reporting network much like now exists for the
atmosphere and a real understanding of ocean weather and
climates. Acoustic sounding, satellites, and advances in
computer techniques will make this possible.
He predicted that in 20 years we
will
have the capability
for large-scale global monitoring of
ocean
weather systems
with a forecast ability equivalent to
what
is available
today for the atmosphere. This will
have
an enormous
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impact on vessel routing, ASW (acoustic propagation and
tracking) capabilities, tactics, and upon weather-climate
forecasts. We will also have greater understanding of the
role of ocean circulation in climate change. It is now
believed the ocean carries as much heat poleward from the
equator as does the atmosphere, but where and by what mechanism?
Clearly with this magnitude, the ocean plays a major role in
regional and global climate flux. The understanding may
enable the forecast of major changes far enough in advance
to alleviate catastrophic outcomes.
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advances in fiber optics and laser technologies For ignition
systems. However, the potential for more than evolutionary
change he identified with the electromagnetic gun. The
concept would employ a projectile with a magnetic coil
propelled out a tube by a linear electric motor. A proto-
type exists. The "Mass Driver" was constructed by an instruc-
tor and students at MIT to demonstrate outer space transport,
but has about one-tenth the energy of a small mortar. The
technology exists to undertake a moderately scaled gun
version.
He cited the potential advantages of an electromagnetic
gun. Some of these are precise control of projectile energy;
elimination of gun tube wear, flash, smoke, etc.; rapid
fire; ease of supply; and no propellant charge, no propellant
surveillance, etc. The propulsion could be provided entirely
electromagnetically or in a hybrid system where some electro-
magnetic energy is used as an adjustment--with different
degrees of these advantages gained.
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STRATEGY AND TECHNOLOGY
The form future conflict may take is naturally an
important consideration in determining which technologies
are militarily significant. Military requirements and
planning are frequently labeled as "refighting the last
war." Thus conflict considerations were introduced on the
basis of their plausibility without regard to compliance
with mainstream forces planning.
Even then, Dr. Stevens noted that too much of past
analysis has been constrained by overattention.to plausi-
bility. In response, he suggested that the unknowns of the
future, such as those sampled in these discussions, argue
for broad capabilities in US forces.
Ideally, these sessions would have characterized the
environment to be faced. Instead the materials discussed
and recorded represent pieces for consideration, not a full
treatment. However incomplete, they do reflect significant
views of prime considerations for future needs. A few
examples were offered of how technical priorities might be
altered, but much fuller treatment is obviously required.
Mr. Kahn in his overview of strategy and technology
stated that the level of strategic debate in the US today is
at least an order of magnitude lower than 15 years ago. He
particularly noted US focus on strategic forces as if they
were only to respond to an out-of-the-blue attack upon the
US. Similarly, we think about NATO forces as if the Warsaw
Pact were expected at any day to grab Europe. He argued
that most people consider these the least likely, and they
are correct; but our planning and force choices have yet to
catch up.
He expressed no doubt that the USSR would like to
control the world, but stressed that while the Soviets may
believe it necessary to push history in their direction they
are unlikely to rush it. He saw the Soviets' emphasis on
strength as very basic. First, if a crisis does occur and
they are strong, the other side will back down. Second, if
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they overextend and get into trouble, their large superior-
ity will rescue them. And third, Finlandization of Europe
is possible through recognition of Soviet superiority.
These indeed are cause for us to be concerned over their
strength; but we need fresh views in our response, especially
as we view the future.
He argued that war, if it is to come about will not be
calculated, nor out of the blue, but rather from a period of
tension, with accidents leading to escalation. He cited two
critical considerations for examination of strategic forces;
namely, what is our goal at the end of the war and what is
the importance of evacuation.
He thought for conventional war the most important
consideration was the recognition that a buildup of tensions,
perhaps even "phony war," would precede major hostilities;
and thus a period for mobilization would exist. His second
point about conventional war was the need to look at our
best systems differently--one side forgets something, the
winner does not; all fortresses are invulnerable before the
attack, only some are found to be so after the attack.
Dr. Rechtin summarized the sober view toward NATO
warfare taken away by most. He said many past questions and
dilemmas about Soviet directions had been clarified. The
Soviets appear more predictable than we had thought.
The Soviets are thinking about World War II techno-
logically extended; that is, continuous-nuclear-biological-
chemical warfare. This is what they are set up to do. The
message has yet to be passed to US technologists and systems
designers, but it seems clear that we must responsibly
design to meet this threat.
Non-Mutual Assured Destruction
Dr. Durbin said the contingency of massive Soviet
attack out of the blue against the US, followed by immediate
and massive US retaliation has been the cornerstone of US
planning for almost three decades. Deterrence is attributed
to this posture of mutual assured destruction (MAD) or
balance of terror, as both populations are thereby held
hostage. Each offense must be overwhelming and the defense
emasculated. This situation may in fact be the correct one
for force sizing and decisions on alert posture; but it is
not the only situation possible and in fact is not even the
most plausible.
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Limited selective or controlled use of central strategic
nuclear weapons has been publicly discussed in the United
States since 1974. Yet it is unlikely that either the US or
the USSR can obtain any meaningful unilateral advantage
through limited use of nuclear weapons against homelands.
Use of these weapons in a local theater, especially on the
Soviet periphery, is likely to be met in-kind in the theater.
Either situation is likely to result in the rapid search for
de-escalation and termination, with concurrent concern for
alert and monitoring.
The threat to use tactical nuclear forces to back up
inadequate conventional forces in Europe has been the basis
of the NATO posture for the same three decades. The rela-
tionship of these forces to those of the strategic forces
has never been explicit even before the current concerns
over the SS-20, cruise missiles and Backfire Bomber. Further-
more, how does the survivability of these theater forces,
their mix, and their use after a massive exchange relate to
the MAD concept?
Lastly, what is the outcome of a massive nuclear war
likely to be? An examination of the capability for a Soviet
first-strike counterforce shows it to be formidable, although
not likely decisive. Examination of survivability and re-
covery of population, industry, and the economy presents
numerous unknowns, but certainly indicates survival of and
recovery from massive nuclear war to be realistic. The
civil defense, hardening, and defensive measures for Soviet
forces indicates they hold the view that nuclear war is
survivable. Then, what is the possibility of continued
hostilities and the role of other countries? What are the
mix of weapons and forces left, the nature and capabilities
of the surviving leadership, the degree of control over
remaining forces, the available communications, intelligence
and reconnaissance, and what is required to restore deterrence
after nuclear weapons have once been used massively?
The limited use of nuclear weapons, the theater-war
relationships and the Soviet recovery, civil defense, and
counterforce capability argue that the MAD strategy is
insufficient for deterrence. A broader perspective, which
ensures the existence of a nuclear war-fighting capability
vis-a-vis the USSR, may evolve as the determinant for stra-
tegic forces. This would provide a deterrence posture more
consistent with views held by the USSR--and thus more likely
to deter. The measures for strategic forces utility would
shift. Correlation guidance for cruise missiles attacking a
badly damaged nation would be examined. Even greater emphasis
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would be given to survivability. New emphasis would be
given to holding capability, reconstitutability, reload, re-
targeting, and reconnaissance. The old concept of an emas-
culated defense might be replaced with the possibilities for
effective defense from space against ballistic missile
attack.
STAT
World of Nuclear Proliferation
Mr. Rowen drew upon his prior writings "Life in a
Nuclear Crowd" to describe the likely spread of nuclear
weapons. He noted that despite a good deal of rhetoric
justifying national nuclear weapons programs, few of the
countries with the capacity to make them have done so. Two
developments now promise fundamental changes: one is growth
in civilian nuclear programs and therefore an increased
capacity to acquire nuclear weapons cheaply and rapidly; the
other is a weakening of confidence in American guarantees of
protection of allies.
By 1985 about 40 countries will have enough fissile
material to make three bombs or more; almost as many are
likely to have enough fissile material for 30 to 60 weapons
or more. The Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 may have been
the crucial "triggering" event between a linear growth in
nuclear weapons acquisition, and an exponential future. The
prospect that many countries will acquire weapons must be
taken seriously, as must the short leadtime within which
these weapons can be acquired.
Most analysis of nuclear stability is based upon a
model of the US-USSR relationship, with exclusive concentra-
tion by the two great powers on deterring attack on each
other's homelands. The possession of nuclear weapons by
third countries is likely to bring about changes such as
restraint by a large power in challenging what might be
construed by the smaller as its vital interests. Between
small powers, the relationships are likely to change with a
race to acquire weapons first, and with support provided by
the large countries in technology, in the reduction of
forces vulnerability, in replacement of nuclear forces
destroyed or in direct use of nuclear weapons against an
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ally's adversary. The nuclear forces of small nations will
be small, probably without reliable systems to warn of enemy
attack, and perhaps weak in safeguards against unauthorized
actions by those in the chain of command, and prone to acci-
dents and mistakes. The large powers will possess many more
resources for information gathering, offensive capabilities,
command and control, civil defenses, antimissile and air de-
fenses, etc. as well as the capacity to rapidly transfer
technologies or information which could rapidly make opposing
forces vulnerable or reduce the dangers of unauthorized use.
The countries most likely to acquire weapons are the
nonaligned and marginally aligned countries, and those that
feel threatened and fear abandonment. India, Pakistan,
Iran, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Israel, South Africa,
Argentina, and Brazil are some of nations with such rationales.
Proliferation will increase the need for alliances among
those countries threatened by rivals acquiring nuclear
weapons. However, it is not clear that the great powers
will be willing to make guarantees to countries with nuclear
weapons on the grounds these weapons are no longer needed,
nor to nations in a region with nuclear powers because it
may be too dangerous. The potential for nuclear spread will
have only been partially realized by 1985; many more poten-
tial entrants will remain during the following decade.
Acquisition will likely depend upon the availability of
materials and technologies, what happens to the countries
that have acquired weapons, and the degree of security
provided by alliance relationships.
US concerns, other than the instability that may follow
from proliferation, are likely to be the intentional or
unintentional use of nuclear weapons against US forces
abroad, the use among third nations to which we may or may
not be allied, the threat to US territory by another country
or terrorists, and the accidental or unexplained incident.
Mr. Rowen made clear that the main task is not just to
forecast, but to try and influence the process toward non-
proliferation. The discussion touched upon policies, prac-
tices, alliance relationships, and providing of nonnuclear
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capabilities and cooperative international efforts to reduce
terrorist possibilities. The prospects for control over
materials and technical knowledge were considered by most to
be too late and too little.
Mr. Emanski drew attention to the characteristics
expected of future land combat in Europe. He emphasized
continuous combat because the Soviets have established it as
their doctrine and equipped themselves to carry it off.
Savkin's "Operational Art and Tactics" establishes the
duration of the continuous offensive to be between 30 days
and 8 weeks. The Soviet concept is to echelon forces so
that the intensity of the offensive can be maintained at the
points of combat contact along the main thrusts.
However, he noted that continuous combat would have
evolved without a Soviet emphasis because it is a logical
The dimensions of continuous combat are far-reaching,
much more is necessary than simply emphasis on night opera-
tions. Fundamental changes in doctrine, organization,
training and equipment are involved. The tempo of operations
will increase as the present discontinuous or intermittent
operating capability is replaced by sustained combat.
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STAT
Mr. Emanski observed that there are not three separate
Soviet doctrines for chemical, nuclear, or conventional war.
There is one. Soviet operational hardware includes protec-
tive garments, chemical warfare antidotes, automatic CBR
alarms, sealed vehicles, a complete family of decontamination/
washdown equipment, protected medical vans, a family of
chemical smokes and aerosol generators, and so on. Nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological,
do not reduce the importance of continuous combat but rather
underscore the reason this is likely to be the character of
the next war. The point was brought out in discussions that
while the US developed the neutron bomb, ostensively as a
defensive weapon, it would be in fact a natural weapon for
the Soviet style offensive since rapid movement into the
target area is one of its desirable characteristics.
Two other characteristics for future warfare in Europe
were identified by Mr. Emanski. First, it will be a coali-
tion war and interoperability of doctrine, equipment, procedures,
communications, and command and control is fundamental. A
team wherein one-fifth of its members are playing one game
while the other four-fifths play a separate game or games
cannot expect to win. Second, military operations in built-
up areas are unavoidable.
Mr. Greene added to the second point noting the continuing
urbanization of Western Europe. This degree of urbanization
will make obsolete NATO's long-standing strategy for forward
defense using tactics designed for operations in open country.
This is particularly evident in the North German Plain,
which has historically provided the best east-to-west route
for invading armies. Three urban complexes alone will cover
40 percent of the total NORTHAG-Second ATAF region by the
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year 2000. These large areas could be an enormous liability
to the defense of NATO, or they offer outstanding possibili-
ties for improved defense if appropriate strategy, tactics,
and equipments are developed and deployed.
Much discussion focused on these concepts for warfare
in Europe. The perspective of Soviet developments leading
toward a continuous warfare capability had clearly gone un-
recognized by many. Also unrecognized was the extent of
Soviet preparations for theater nuclear, biological, and
chemical warfare made pointedly clear in the colloquium by
Emanski, Greene and Augerson.
The result was a sobering appreciation of the situation
likely to be faced in a European war. Mr. Emanski noted
that the most significant benefit from recognition that con-
tinuous combat will be the nature of future battle would be
the unifying purpose this could bring to all combat and
material developments.
Information War
Dr. Rona stressed the conceptual aspects of counter-
measures to make a number of points about the future of
information disruption, manipulation, and misimprinting--
information war. He noted the spectacular advances that
have taken place in military technology--namely, propulsion,
guidance, and warheads--so that whenever a weapon can be
aimed at its assigned target it is highly likely the target
will be destroyed. Protection in the past has depended on
target hardening, target mobility, or timely counterattacks.
Protection in the future will depend more and more on mis-
information or information denial.
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The future, as he saw it, will tend to reinforce new
and sophisticated ways to apply countermeasures in their
broadest sense; especially as technology opens possibilities
for and vulnerabilities to transformation of about any
physical phenomenon into electrical signals with the atten-
dant capability for transmission, processing, and display.
He added some predictions. The use of target-connected
observables for high-accuracy terminal guidance of missiles
will be avoided whenever possible. They are likely to be
under the control of the enemy and therefore amenable to
relatively inexpensive countermeasures. The trend will be
away from high-value, concentrated, mobile platforms, to a
number of relatively small, possibly unmanned platforms,
synchronized by secure wideband data links. (The high asset
concentration represented by the Trident weapon system must
be seen as an anomaly in this respect.) The trend toward a
large number of cooperative elements will permit design of
small but significant individual differences thereby providing
multiple-complexions for the enemy to face. Space-borne
surveillance will reduce or eliminate depending upon emissions
direction-finding and thereby shift the emphasis from silence
(e.g. by ocean vehicle) to one of open broadcast where the
emphasis is upon achievement of confusion and disinformation.
The trend will be toward one-time-use systems such as an
unmanned precursor penetrator to deploy local beacons for
temporary target attack. C-Cubed systems will be adaptable
to rapidly changing combat environments, including the con-
fusion messages deliberately provided by the enemy days,
weeks, months, or even years before the actual start of
overt hostilities. Finally, equipment for training people
to handle various aspects of information war will be important,
in particular for the training of military people with
different cultural backgrounds.
During discussion Dr. Rona suggested two changes that
would be an important response to these futures. First is
the imperative need to address the information war-related
moves throughout the whole evaluation and operational life
of newly proposed or upgraded weapon systems. By contrast,
attention to countermeasures is now an afterthought fre-
quently lost in budget cuts. Second, a C-Cubed/intelligence
simulation laboratory is needed to explicitly focus on the
stressed behavior of complex combinations of high-performance
links and human interface under conditions of an unintention-
ally or intentionally distorted reference base. This labora-
tory could aid training as well.
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Small Unit Operations
Nonintervention as a defined or undefined national
policy is perhaps a rationale for inattention to small
combat units. Yet hazardous politico-military operations
such as "surgical strikes" in support of antinuclear pro-
liferation or assurance of energy supplies, the rescue of
hostages from terrorist groups, and selective antiguerrilla
operations are anticipated by many as likely low-level
conflict needs for small units over the next two decades.
Wartime raids against critical high-value behind-the-lines
targets form yet another role for specialized small unit
operations. General Henderson acknowledged these roles, but
presented a broader view of small tactical units applicable
at all conflict intensity levels and in all geographic
environments.
He argued that the expanded combat capabilities which
technology could give the small tactical unit would change
and dictate the nature of ground combat in scenarios fore-
seen and unforeseen. He noted the area controlled by a
large force (approximately 100,000 men) increased by five
between the Civil War and World War I, by 12 between World
War I and World War II, and by 10 since World War II. He
said another gain of this magnitude is possible by the end
of this century, that is, 30 to 50 man units could control a
four-square-mile area against the Warsaw Pact or nearly the
equivalent of today's infantry battalion. But this benefit
cannot be realized if we merely applique modern technology
in a random fashion to present day small combat units and
their operating concepts--the small unit must be developed
as a truly integrated combat system in a manner analagous to
that for a new tactical aircraft.
The small unit can have a terminal in global and local
positioning systems to locate and to direct supporting fire.
It can have the capability to transmit voice, digital and
video to support units. Automatic attention and output
interpretation from line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight
sensors can eliminate constant operator attention while pro-
viding detection and identification of physical objects and
emitters. Deception and decoy devices can be available for
those most likely to be detected and attacked by an advanced
technology enemy force. Organic multipurpose precision
weapons utilizing nuclear, electromagnetic pulse (EMP),
nonlethal CW and conventional munitions can be carried for
use against ground and air vehicles, structures, area targets,
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and electromagnetic emitters. Development of the combat
unit as a system is the key to realization of these capa-
bilities for large force conventional or nuclear conflict.
It is also the key to the versatility and effectiveness of
modified units for independent operations. The infyonics
concept, so labeled by General Henderson, prompted exciting
discussion. Many readily appreciated the significance of
small units if the promised gains of new technologies were
to be realized in large force operations. They also appre-
ciated the ready spillover of this focus for development of
small, independent teams. However, there was much doubt
that even recognition of these possibilities could overcome
the old habits of emphasizing the hardware.
Food/Water Crisis
Dr. Doty cited the production and distribution of food
as a potential security concern. Vulnerability exists
because of the increased dependence on a relatively few
species which for the most part do not have high resilience
to unusual infections or unusual variations in growing
conditions. The development and nurturing of new genetic
species and the storage of seed stores are logical defenses.
He foresees these, and vigilance against destructive acts,
as elements of national security in the 1990s.
Dr. Anderson drew attention to water as an essential
natural resource. Historically, the demands on water have
increased and will likely continue to do so. Economic
growth has not only stressed water supplies but, coupled
with land-use practices, water quality as well. We lack
understanding and modeling capabilities of water quality and
its attendant geochemical, biological, and hydrologic con-
trols, particularly regarding persistent toxic substances.
The issues of food and energy will invariably stress the
resources further. Whether climatic shifts will occur,
ameliorating or aggravating the imbalances of supply and
demand is uncertain.
National security has not been defined as an objective
of water planning. Had chance not conspired to end the
1930s drought before the nation entered World War II, the
consequences would have been harsher. He concluded by
noting that the resource systems evolved during the quies-
cent periods may well lack the resilience to respond to the
demands that might be imposed upon them during periods of
national stress.
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Energy-Related Scenarios
The technologies of ener were not addressed in the
colloquium, except far the electro-
magnetic gun, and some vehicle propulsion ideas. Energy as
a source of conflict was to have been included in the col-
loquium, however, the speaker who was to have discussed this
topic was unable to attend. A few of the points that would
have been addressed are included here in order to add to the
forecast considerations.
Increased world dependence upon oil through the rest of
this century is accepted even among those with optimistic
predictions for coal, nuclear, and solar power applications.
This creates a number of potential security problems. The
United States itself depends directly on sources in the
Middle East. Military contingencies must protect these
sources and their supply lines from acts by the Soviets, by
hostile Middle Eastern nations, and by terrorist groups.
Our major allies, Western Europe and Japan, are more
dependent on these sources and lines than is the US. Thus
protection of these sources and supply lines is essential to
their economies in peacetime and critical to their existence
and the conduct of defensive military operations in wartime.
Concern over continuous theater war seldom addresses this
vital supply question. However, far short of war, the more
critical dependence of these nations upon outside sources is
likely to bring about differences with the US which may
alter alliances during these next two decades.
The Soviet Union now exports oil to Eastern and Western
Europe. Many estimate that it will be unable to increase
its production sufficiently beyond the early 1980s to maintain
this favorable position. A further pinch in their economy
may result, as noted in the remarks by Mr. Earle. Reduced
supplies to East Europe may in turn cause these nations to
depend more upon Middle East sources and to seek more Western
hard currency to buy Middle East oil. If the Soviet Union's
shortfall were severe enough, it could become an importer of
oil and thus an active competitor for Middle East oil sources.
Japan, the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Korea
are potential competitors or collaborators in the development
of oil in the East China Sea. The less developed nations
(LDC) in their attempts to industrialize have no choice but
to depend upon oil and thus to compete with the industrialized
nations for the available supplies. Frustration and insta-
bility are certainly likely.
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Overall, two points were to have been made by introduc-
tion of this topic into the colloquium: first, that energy
supplies, particularly oil, are unquestionably a source of
tension and possible conflict during the next two decades;
second, that access to these supplies may even more impor-
tantly become the cause for change in current alliances and
the creation of formal or informal alliances between nations
now presumed to be neutral or joined in common interests
with the US or the USSR.
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RESOURCES & UNCERTAINTIES - USSR
The Soviets' military competition was identified as
serious. Examples of good Soviet design, and of their
impressive match of doctrine and equipment were given
throughout the colloquium. Their nuclear-biological-chemical
capabilities drew special attention.
Dr. Stevens pointed out the inexorable commitment of
the Soviets to expenditures in defense and to maintenance of
a technological capability different than our program-by-
program approach. He noted on the other hand the inertia of
their system and the difficulties which they admit to them-
selves are likely to hinder their application of high tech-
nology. The forecast these may present was debated but
certainly not resolved during the colloquium.
Past analysis has innately assumed the Soviets to be a
mirror image of ourselves. Dr. Stevens noted our knowledge
of the Soviets, as illustrated during these discussions, now
is far greater than during the past decades. Consequently,
we can in fact be more selective in what we choose to pursue
to gain advantage for our forces.
Mr. Earle presented an overview of the generally
accepted estimate of decline in the Soviet economy; a decline
in annual growth from 4.5 percent currently to a 3 percent
during the later part of this century. This estimate is
based upon limitations in the work force, insufficient
energy production, along with the Soviets' normal problems
with agriculture. European perceptions are less negative
and tend to project growth of the economy at current rates.
The Europeans do not foresee the energy problems for the
USSR to be as severe as seen by US estimators.
The Soviet leadership does see problems ahead and does
appear to recognize that this means allocation difficulties.
However, it has not developed an economic strategy yet. The
next five-year plan, expected in 1980, might give insights
to the choices. But he thought it unlikely and suggested
the Soviets would probably wait out the period and make
changes in the subsequent plan.
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Foreign technology is a source of improvement for the
Soviet economy. Thus far the Soviets have concentrated on
achieving bulk additions to their capacity. Difficulties in
absorption continue, but clear gains have been made.
Beyond the question of how much gain, the basic question
is whether the USSR will make a long-term commitment to be
part of the world economy, or whether it will once again
withdraw into isolation. The exports it has developed have
paradoxically been products of high internal demand (autos
for example). However, this may be an example of conserva-
tive planning in that should the products fail in the export
market they can readily convert to fill domestic needs.
Projections of economic growth lead to projections of
defense expenditures. US estimators have previously disagreed
with the low numbers held by the CIA. The higher CIA numbers
now do not resolve the questions, as the shape of the expen-
ditures curve still does not reflect force deployments. It
is one thing to say what a number is not, it is quite another
thing to say what it is.
A decline in the rate of growth of Soviet defense
expenditures is projected. But the actual expenditures are
significant, and Mr. Earle estimated long-term growth of
defense expenditures at 4 to 6 percent annually; that is
growth faster than their overall economy. The military
sector is also expected to become more productive. He
cautioned that we should not look at the Soviet economy in
our terms. A stable economy, even if sluggish, is desirable
for the USSR. Opportunity costs are not viewed with the
disdain they are in the West, and thus the "burden" of
military expenditures is less troublesome. In comparative
terms, as the Soviets view the current turmoil and problems
of the Western economies they can live with their own
problems more comfortably.
Soviet R&D Patterns
The basic point made by Earle and Alexander was that in
comparing the US and USSR, we must think more in terms of
Soviet process. Dr. Alexander noted that evaluations of US
and Soviet military R&D often begin and unfortunately end
with inputs (budgets, engineers, educational levels, and so
on). However, given a gross comparability of inputs, it is
in the process and choice that sharp differences emerge
between US and Soviet practice.
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Dr. Rechtin gave examples from his experience with the
DOD where repeated assumptions were made that the Soviets
would use their comparable, or enormous, R&D investment to
close military technological gaps. Instead they apparently
have not seen our leads as that important for they have used
their resources quite differently than we.
STAT
Dr. Alexander identified recognized features for the
bulk of Soviet military acquisitions as simplicity in equip-
ment; common use of subsystems, components and parts; incre-
mental growth; and limited performance and mission capa-
bilities. This pattern has been pervasive in the past and
is likely to be so into the future. We have now acquired a
fundamental understanding and data that can enable us to
make sounder judgments of future Soviet capabilities--and
thus to be able to be more selective in our response.
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STAT
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RESOURCES F, UNCERTAINTIES - US
Concern was expressed throughout the colloquium that
the threat and problems not be overstated--but be credible.
The United States possesses fundamental economic, techno-
logical, industrial, and military strengths. More generally,
the industrially more advanced Western nations (NATO) have a
population of 560 million in contrast to the Warsaw Pact
population of 365 million and have a combined GNP over twice
as large as that of the Warsaw Pact. Clearly, adequate re-
sources are available.
Clear as well is that we in the United States have much
technology across all fields. The state of the art is high.
The presentations and discussions covered an impressive
array of our technological capabilities. Priorities likely
to maximize the leverage for the United States were suggested
for DOD technical resources.
Dr. Davis said the colloquium showed the military
systems to be beneficiaries of many technological options,
and not the captive of shortfalls. The presentations in 26
areas of technology provided reasonable comfort that desired
competition in technology will occur and is adequate for
intelligent selection of a few system efforts with a high
probability of operational success.
She emphasized that continued competition within the US
in technology is inexpensive; and should be proportional to
potential payoff, scientific uncertainties, and the quantity
of systems/components planned for procurement. Demanding a
winner before beginning R&D encourages a stifling conserva-
tism in contrast to a stimulating innovativeness.
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Technology As An Equalizer
Dr. Davis cited some group opinions that had evolved.
She noted that in the view of many we have fewer problems
generating new technology than in translating that technology
into fielded equipment. Dr. Lukasik noted that the time
between technology "generations" in a number of important
areas cited as less than the DOD procurement cycle. The DOD
acquisition process was seen to unwittingly degrade our
technological advantage and thereby equalize the US and
Soviet military prowess. We wish to meet the threat by
using high technology; and thus we must be concerned by
impediments.
Dr. Berenson echoed the keynote charge--the key question
is what technological initiatives should the US take in the
deployed military capabilities in the next 10 to 20 years.
We need to develop ways to decrease he time trom he avai -
ability of technology to full operational capability of the
system. Dr. Berenson emphasized that production, training
and maintenance technologies are important in addition to
the weapons system level of technology.
None doubted the fundamental technological strength of
the United States or in a larger context that of the West as
a whole. The USSR's "worship" of science, coupled with their
respect for Western technology adds to our basic strength.
Recognition of the seriousness and character of past and
current failings, and corrective actions, were seen to be
critical to the national security and to realization of the
benefits from our technological strength.
The colloquium discussions offered insights both for
significance of technologies and therefore selection.
Insights for more rapid assimilation of technology are
recorded in this section. The point made vividly by several
operational personnel was that our technological superiority
is not obvious to the man in the field. We cannot gain the
leverage we desire from our technology by selection alone,
we must focus on its assimilation into military operations.
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Numbers Are Important
This message was one that most participants put forward.
STAT
The fear was that technological superiority
or quality versus quantity has been for too long a cliche
preventing necessary investment in mass. Extracts from a
1976 speech by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia expressed this
point for most:
--At some point numbers do count.
--At some point technology fails to offset mass.
--At some point Kipling's "thin red line of heroes"
gives way.
The approximately 3 to 1 ratio of procurement to research
and development was cited as clearly disbalanced--with note
that industry figures are more like 10 to 1. Some concluded
the technology investment was about right and the procurement
should therefore be increased. Others said the need for
numbers was serious enough to warrant sacrifice from the R&D
budget so equipments could be procured for the field. This
emphasis does not mean to buy ships to counter ships, tanks
to counter tanks, and aircraft to counter aircraft--although
that is indeed part of the answer. Clearly it also means a
skeptical examination of the purported claims for one-on-one
performance, where the alternative is more of a cheaper
version, and it also means emphasis upon surveillance and
command-communications where these can affect appropriate
massing or avoidance of disadvantageous combat.
STAT
US hardware and software R&D has outrun what may be
termed operational R&D--or learning what it is good for.
Furthermore, we know that equipment by itself is not the
answer, but rather the combination of the right tactics and
the equipment as used by men. The development of tactics,
or assimilation of the technology, depends upon the existence
and use of numbers.
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STAT
Design For Mobilization
Mr. Kahn drew upon history to make a major point. The
debates of June 1950 were whether the United States could
afford a $14 to $18 billion defense budget. The Korean War
began and Congress authorized $60 billion. The consequence
was that we were able to afford such systems as the B-47,
B-52 and Minuteman, none of which singularly would have been
affordable under the expected service allocation of $5
billion annually. Our military superiority sprang from this
jump.
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STAT
This priority would mean investment in long lead items.
More importantly it would mean experimentation and design
with a view to rapid expansion of our capabilities. That
very well could mean deemphasizing from "ultimate" designs
in favor of simpler designs, and deemphasizing from one-for-
one replacement of ships, tanks and aircraft in favor of the
command and support systems. Other answers exist--Mr.
Kahn's point was that the capability for force expansion not
only is historically sound, but would generate desired
design directions.
Operations RFD
Dr. Lukasik described one of the more important suggestions
put forward for change in the acquisition processes as
"operations RFD." The concept is to achieve evolution
through operational exercises and use; and while obviously
not applicable across-the-board, it could be instrumental in
the development of many new uses, new doctrine, and the
actual assimilation of new technology.
This change was suggested to address what many saw as a
major failing of the acquisition system. That is, the pre-
sumption that each system is forever, and therefore its
characteristics must embody all future requirements--and
axiomatically all the latest technologies at its IOC.
The technologies of the future lend themselves to
incremental update of systems. The conflicts of the future
are likely to require adaptation. A point, already noted,
was that while the research and development community can
hypothesize the use, it really can not know. These, most
participants argued, are cause for explicit emphasis within
acquisition for field evaluation and experimentation with
many new equipments in order to learn of their use and to
feed back design changes. Innovation and rapid assimilation
of technology were seen as the gains; but time and money
needs to be explicitly provided within the acquisition cycle
in order to achieve these gains.
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United States should possess
great aavantage zor leverage from the processing explosion
in contrast with the USSR. But second, that this potential
is unlikely to be realized unless we can focus on experimenta-
tion and evolution along the lines brought out throughout
the discussions: infyonics, distributed systems, life
sciences, naval surveillance, microprocessors, and so on.
Adm. Martell suggested further gains. He agreed with
the view of many that the most likely events of the next
decades were those of crisis, incidents, and challenges. He
related future responses to new challenges, in possibly new
geographical areas, to Mr. Kahn's point about emphasis upon
experimentation and designs for rapid expansion of capabili-
ties. He gave an admittedly parochial example: the need
not to buy for the fleet, but to experiment with droppable
sonar buoys which could be read out by satellites.
His fundamental point was that normal budget activities,
which focus on platforms, on mission definitions, and on
life-cycle costs, leave no room for such small quantity
experimentation and learning. These procedures force a
"commitment" to buy and deploy--after a cost-effectiveness
comparison with other future buys--even before the experi-
mentation takes place. Cheap learning, and possibilities
for expansion to meet new contingencies, are thereby forgone.
Rather, money, labs, test organizations, firms and opera-
tional units must be pulled together and given the oppor-
tunity, or even the explicit assignment, to undertake the
test for operational possibilities and problems before
commitment.
Innovation In US
The incentives and disincentives for innovation in the
US were the topic of an evening session at which Mr. Oliver
Boileau, President of Boeing Aerospace Company, and Dr.
Robert Noyce, Charman of INTEL, spoke. However, discussion
was not limited to this session, as the contrast between the
technically possible and the deployed prevailed throughout
the colloquium. Both a strong sense of frustration and some
suggestions for new directions were recorded. The topic is
particularly apt, since a long list of the technical possi-
bilities cannot comprise a forecast; but rather these possi-
bilities must be overlayed with trends that will bring
forward or constrain them.
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Mr. Boileau cited the fundamental advantages this
country has in its industrial and technological base. He
then addressed the inability to move technology into inven-
tory from a defense contractor's viewpoint. He identified
the government as the greatest inhibitor today, both the
regulations and the management processes. The latter is
best illustrated by the question of who is the customer:
the Service program office and boards, the DSARC, the Defense
Secretary, OMB, the President or the Congress. These com-
prise a hydraheaded buyer, any mouth of which can say no
before a system can be put into production long enough to
make money for the firm.
He addressed a common misunderstanding. Government
funding of developmental work does not cover all costs. If
you are innovating, industry must dip into its own resources.
BAC invested $50 million of its funds in the recently can-
celed Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMST); but increasing
losses from cancellations make it tougher to justify future
investments. Boileau's point was not to create a taboo
against program cancellation; but rather that this intoler-
able lack of common purpose and apparent national will to
maintain a strong defense undermines innovation.
Innovation funding, or the problems associated with
obtaining these, recurred throughout discussions. Mr.
Boileau contrasted the commercial marketplace incentives
with those of defense. The former have been substantial
enough in the past for Boeing to periodically risk its
entire net worth to bring out the next-generation product.
He noted that in current dollars, Boeing put 1.7 billion
into the 747. The point is real even though the contrast of
defense and commercial incentives may not be as drastic.
BAC does invest heavily in IR$D for defense; and a recent
Fortune article noted the potential sizable Northrop commit-
ment but not its entire worth to the F-18. Funds for
commercial innovation are not readily available either, as
Dr. Noyce made clear, citing the trend over the past five
years. This problem stemmed from tax disincentives, from
available money going into short-term returns, and from
investment houses unwilling to put money behind technology
without assurance of Xerox-like performance.
Others maintained that cautious attitude within govern-
ment laboratories inhibiting both innovation activities in
the laboratories or the funding of innovation outside.
Freedom to expend at least limited sums and manpower without
defendable mission results or assurances of success has
disappeared. This was seen in part to be the lack of
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"great directors," but likely more attributable to the
hyperactivity of budget and "exposure-minded" reviewers and
media. Lastly, note was made of the difficulties for uni-
versities to obtain research funding. The expenditure of
time and money to obtain a research dollar have become
excessive to the point where they inhibit active research.
Dr. Noyce made a strong pitch for increased government
funding of university research--but with greatly reduced red
tape. He argued that this is where the future innovative
industries, such as that of semiconductors, must begin. By
contrast, research within private firms is inadequate, their
research is not shared, nor is it directed at other than
short-term interests, e.g. defensive in nature. Further-
more, the technologists trained through research in the
universities are the source of our innovative manpower.
Different viewpoints were given on the problem of
government regulations and procurement practices. Mr. Dale
Church (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense R&E for Acquisition
Policy) described the effort under way to rewrite the pro-
curement regulations, the ASPRs. Simplification and incen-
tives for industrial motivation, including profits, are
sought through these changes rather than relying on regulations
Several discussants expressed caution over the expectation
that changed instructions, by themselves, would have much
effect without extensive re-education for all throughout the
government involved in the administration of procurement.
Dr. Rechtin pointed out that much government regulation
has come about because some in industry lobbied for the
regulation and cited a number of examples. He pointed out
that if less constriction is to come about, an industrywide
willingness to operate in a more competitive environment
will be necessary.
Mr. Boileau's example of the AMST cancellation brought
out another point. The Soviets announced their intention to
produce their smaller version of the AMST about the time the
US announced cancellation. It apparently uses the upper-
surface blowing technique developed by Boeing, it has the
same engine placement, landing gear, and so on. Thus the
Soviets are gaining experience with our innovation, while
our knowledge rests in file drawers.
Dr. Alexander separately noted one of the reasons for
Soviet weapon effectiveness lies in the extensive field
testing of new equipments within large-scale exercises as
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part of the acquisition process--that is, the explicit
determination of the military utility of the equipment and
its features. Many expressed the belief that the US could
accelerate the choice of and assimilation of new technology
for military equipment if similar emphasis were given to
operational unit evaluation and experimentation. US unwill-
ingness to explicitly provide funds and scheduled time for
such experimentation was seen as a major impediment to both
useful innovation and effective assimilation of new technology.
The 10-year acquisition cycle was repeatedly cited as
outrageous because it means much of the technology embodied
is at least a decade old by the time it's deployed, because
it means stretch-out costs are unavoidable, and because a
malaise sets upon those in the technical and systems fields.
Dr. Noyce noted that in the commercial market you do not
tell the customer about your future line, or you will not be
able to sell your current line. Many thought this version
of "the best is the enemy of the good" explained much of the
long acquisition cycle. Military requirements were seen to
be less real than a statement of future technical promises.
Designer-managers of military systems were seen to de-
emphasize design simplicity and thus unable to reject attempts
to incorporate all advanced elements at once. Suggestions
included the clear demarkation of technology efforts from
those of systems development, more competitive and shorter-
term systems development, and explicit use of field experi-
mentation with new technology where the military utility
needs to be shown.
Mr. Boileau returned several times to the point that
when a need is seen to be serious someone steps forward and
quickly separates the vital from the unimportant, the criti-
cal from the unessential, priorities are set, and red tape
is cut. He and others cited examples drawn from wartime, a
national purpose--such as putting a man on the moon--or a
"skunkworks" type operation. However, the point many made
is that the problem is not how to exploit technology for one
project, but how to exploit technology across the spectrum
of military activities. Industrial approaches were suggested,
but caution was advised as to which experience should be
drawn upon. General Henderson suggested that AT&T, not the
Soviets nor the aerospace nor the automakers, might be a
good model for the DOD to examine as applicable to its
across-the-board activities.
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Mr. Kahn outlined his view that economic growth could
slow down, or even stop, not because of resource scarcities,
pollution problems, nor complex organizational difficulties
but solely because of indifference or even hostility to eco-
nomic growth and advanced technology--a cultural change.
Understanding the direction of cultural changes requires a
grasp not only of how people conduct their everyday lives,
but also of the aspirations and visions of various influen-
tial groups. As these visions are shared by more and more
people then personal, public, social, and economic policies
are altered to conform to these new directions. He cited 12
"new" emphases and trends in the US that are becoming in-
creasingly influential and threatening economic growth:
avoiding the risk of doing something positive by innovation
because it cannot be evaluated and the development of general
antitechnology, antieconomic attitudes were two of the more
obviously appropriate to the discussion.
Mr. Boileau noted, that the media, playing to these
attitudes, are responsible, directly or indirectly, for much
of the delay in getting technological innovation into the
field. They spread inordinate caution among the decision-
makers--what Arthur Kantrowitz calls a period of "timidity's
triumphs." He saw the growing disbalance in US-USSR strength
as sufficient cause for immediate attention. Waiting for a
crisis to suddenly change these cautionary attitudes and
then saying "go" to technology exploitation is not the
answer. Suggestions included a major national effort to cut
away government-created disincentives; an honest comparison
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces and the inevitable
consequences of the Soviet ICBMs; and an honest campaign to
demonstrate the positive gains of American know-how and
entrepreneurial ability to advance the economic good and
stability of the world.
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UNCLASSIFIED
PARTICIPANTS
(Authors denoted by *)
*Alexander, Arthur J.
Senior Analyst, RAND Corporation, engaged in studies on
research and development in the US and the Soviet Union.
*Anderson, I)on L.
Director, Seismological Laboratory, California Institute
of Technology.
*Augerson, William S. (Major General, USA)
Commander, US Army Medical Research & Development Command.
*Bement, Arden L.
Director, Materials Sciences Office, Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, on leave of absence from MIT.
*Berenson, Paul J.
Staff Assistant, Office of Under Secretary of Defense
R&E (Long-Range Planning).
STAT
Deputy Director for Research $ Engineering, NSA.
Boileau, Oliver C., Jr.
President, Boeing Aerospace Company.
Cacioppo, Anthony J.
Chief Scientist, Foreign Technology Division, Air Force
Systems Command.
*Chapman, Robert M.
Director, Marine Systems, The Garrett Corporation.
*Combs, Henry G.
Manager, Hypersonic Vehicle Programs, Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation.
81
UNCLASSIFIED
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Creedon, James S. (Brig. General, USAF)
Deputy Director for Tactical Information, DCS Plans $
Operations, HQS USAF.
Davis, Ruth M.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense R$E for Research
and Advanced Technology.
*Dertouzos, Michael L.
Director, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science.
Deutch, John M.
Director, Office of Energy Research, Department of
Energy.
Dickinson, Hillman (Major General, USA)
Commander, US Army Communications Research & Development
Command.
Dirks, Lester C.
Deputy Director for Science $ Technology, CIA.
*Doty, Paul M.
Director, Center for Science $ International Affairs,
Harvard University.
*Durbin, Eugene P.
Manager of the RAND Corporation Strategic Assessment
Program.
*Earle, M. Mark, Jr.
Director, Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford
Research Institute
*Emanski, John J., Jr.
Senior Operations Analyst, Stanford Research Institute.
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*Fair, Harry D., Jr.
Chief, Propulsion Technology, Army Munitions Command.
Foxgrover, James H. (Rear Adm., USN)
Commander, Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River.
Frieman, Edward A.
Chairman, JASON Committee.
Gray, Alfred M. (Brig. General, USMC)
Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command -
Atlantic.
*Greene, Terrell E.
Manager, Tactical Programs, R&D Associates.
*Hart, Peter E.
Director, Artificial Intelligence Center, Stanford
Research Institute.
*Hedrick, Ira Grant
Senior Vice President, Grumman Aerospace Corporation.
*Henderson, F. Paul (Retired Brig. General, USMC)
Senior Consultant, RCA.
Hermann, Robert J.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense R$E for Communications,
Command, Control and Intelligence.
*Hicks, Donald A.
Senior Vice President, Northrop Corporation.
Huberman, Benjamin
Assistant to the President's Science Advisor.
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 Approved For Release 2009/07/16: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601600003-9
*Hyde, David W.
Staff Specialist, Office of Assistant Navy Secretary
for Research E Engineering.
*Joseph, Earl C.
Staff Scientist-Futurist, Sperry Univac.
*Justice, James W.
Founder and President of Center for Analysis.
*Kahn, Herman
Director and Chairman, Hudson Institute.
*Kassel, Simon
Senior Staff Leader, RAND Corporation, for comparative
analysis of Soviet applied science and engineering.
*Kear, Bernard H.
Senior Consulting Scientist at United Technologies
Research Center.
*Kury, John W.
Leader of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Non-Nuclear
Ordnance Program.
*Laudise, Robert A.
Director, Materials Research Laboratory, Bell Telephone
Laboratories.
*Longuemare, R. Noel
Manager of Engineering, Aerospace Division of Westinghouse
Defense & Electronic Systems Center.
Lukasik, Stephen J.
Senior Vice President, RAND Corporation.
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 Approved For Release 2009/07/16: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601600003-9
MacDonald, Gordon J. F.
Director of Environmental Studies and Policy,
Dartmouth College.
*McDaniel, John L.
Senior Consultant, Hughes Aircraft Company.
*Mantle, Peter J.
President of Mantle Engineering Company, Inc.
(Manager, US Navy Advanced Naval Vehicles Concepts Project).
*Martell, Charles B. (Retired Vice Adm., USN)
STAT
Chairman, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee.
Noyce, Robert N.**
Chairman of the Board, INTEL Corporation.
*Nye, Howard H.
Manager of Advanced Airborne Missile Systems Development,
Boeing Aerospace Corporation.
Perry, William J.
Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering.
Press, Frank
Science and Technology Advisor to the President of the
US.
*Popolato, Alphonse
Senior Engineer, Engineering Design, Los Alamos
Scientific Lab
**Dinner Speaker Only
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 Approved For Release 2009/07/16: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601600003-9
*Rechtin, Eberhardt
President Aerospace Corporation.
*Rona, Thomas P.
Senior Analyst, Corporate Strategic Planning and
Technology Investment, Boeing Aerospace Company.
Rothenberg, Herbert C.
Deputy Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence,
National Foreign Assessment Center.
*Rowen, Henry S.
Professor of Public Management, Graduate School of
Business, Stanford University.
Shef, Arthur L.
Senior Staff Member, Office of Scientific Intelligence,
National Foreign Assessment Center.
*Shulman, Hyman L.
Senior Staff Member, RAND Corporation.
*Skolnik, Merrill I.
Superintendent, Radar Division, Naval Research Laboratory.
Smith, Gordon S. (Rear Adm., USN)
Vice Commander, Naval Electronics Systems Command.
Stevens, Sayre
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment Center.
Stever, H. Guyford
Industrial Consultant. Former Presidential Science
Advisor.
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Sullivan, Gerald D.
Project Director and Rapporteur of Technology Trends
Colloquium, DOD.
*Tachmindji, Alexander J.
Vice President, METREK Division of the MITRE Corporation.
*Talkington, Howard R.
Head, Ocean Technology Department, US Naval. Ocean
Systems Center.
Thurman, Maxwell R. (Major General, USA)
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate,
Office of Vice Chief of Staff, US Army.
Turner, Stansfield (Admiral, USN)
Director of Central Intelligence.
*Vander Stoep, Donald R.
Manager, Terminal Sensor Evaluation, The Analytical
Sciences Corporation (TASC).
Vezza, Albert
Senior Scientist, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science.
STAT
Deputy Director for Scientific and Technical Intelligence,
Defense Intelligence Agency.
Walsh, Thomas E.
Staff Assistant, Office of Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense R&E (Research & Advanced Technology).
*Weiss, Robert F.
President, Physical Sciences, Inc.
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 Approved For Release 2009/07/16: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601600003-9
*Wunsch, Carl I.
Chairman, Earth Sciences Department, MIT.
STAT
STIC Secretariat
Partain, Philip M. (Capt., USAF)
STIC Secretariat
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 Approved For Release 2009/07/16: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601600003-9
Secret
Secret
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