WARSAW PACT CONCEPTS AND CAPABILITIES FOR GOING TO WAR IN EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO WARNING OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000601570001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
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To Secret
N I E 4-1-78
WARSAW PACT CONCEPTS AND
CAPABILITIES FOR GOING TO
WAR IN EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS
FOR NATO WARNING OF WAR
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State and Defense, and the National Security Agency.
Abstaining:
The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the Treasury
Also Participating:
The Assistance Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistance Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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CONTENTS
SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS ..................................................................
Page
1
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 16
1. LIKELIHOOD OF A NATO-WARSAW PACT WAR ............................ 16
A. Soviet Views of Risks in War With NATO .......................................... 16
B. Chances of War in Present Circumstances .............................................. 17
II. SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN A WAR WITH NATO .............. 18
A. Limited Operations for Limited Objectives .......................................... 18
B. Total Victory-The Basic Soviet Objective ............................................ 19
C. Possible Pact Theaters of Military Operations in Europe .................... 19
D. Activities in Other Areas .......................................................................... 21
III. WARSAW PACT DOCTRINE AND READINESS .................................... 21
A. Doctrine ...................................................................................................... 21
B. Warsaw Pact Readiness .......................................................................... 22
IV. HOW THE PACT WOULD GO TO WAR .............................................. 22
A. Response to Crisis ...................................................................................... 22
B. The Process of Preparing for War .......................................................... 24
Deciding To Go to War .......................................................................... 24
Political Preparation .................................................................................. 24
Preparation of National Economies .......................................................... 25
Military Procedures ................................................................................. 26
C. Attack Options .......................................................................................... 26
Option I-The Standing-Start Attack .................................................... 27
Option II-Attack With Two Fronts ...................................................... 28
Option III-Attack With Three Fronts .................................................. 29
Option IV-Attack With Five Fronts .................................................... 30
Summary Judgments and Relative Likelihood ...................................... 30
D. Gradual Buildup ........................................................................................ 31
V. WARNING OF WAR ...................................................................................... 32
A. Definition of Warning .............................................................................. 32
B. Warning Indicators .................................................................................... 35
Indicators of the Decision ........................................................................ 35
Indicators of Political Preparations ........................................................ 35
Indicators of Civil and Economic Preparations ...................................... 36
Indicators of Military Preparations .......................................................... 36
C. Security, Concealment, and Deception .................................................. 37
Stringent Security ...................................................................................... 37
Concealment and Deception .................................................................... 38
D. Detection Time .......................................................................................... 38
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E. Warning Time ............................................................................................ 39
Option I ...................................................................................................... 39
Option II ...................................................................................................... 39
Option III .................................................................................................. 39
Option IV .................................................................................................. 40
F. Effects on Warning of. a Gradual Buildup .............................................. 40
ANNEX: MILITARY READINESS ........................................................................ 42
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SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS
1. Under present circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the
Warsaw Pact nations, or the. Soviets alone, would deliberately decide to
attack member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In
the Soviet view, the risks involved in a war with NATO would be
extremely high. The Soviets regard the possibility that such a war could
go nuclear with unpredictable consequences, perhaps including escala-
tion to massive nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union, as a major
threat to the existence of the USSR. The Soviets take a conservative
view of NATO capabilities and understand that a stiff NATO defense
might prevent a quick Pact victory, allowing time to bring into play the
greater manpower and industrial reserves of the West. Concern that its
East European allies might not fight loyally and effectively further
constrains Moscow's planning for aggressive war. Moreover, the Soviets
appear to rate more highly than we do the danger of China's taking
advantage of a conflict in Europe to strike the USSR.
2. For these reasons, we believe that war in Europe would become
likely only as a result of a profound change in the present political,
military, or economic situation and would be preceded by a period of
extreme tension in a crisis of unprecedented severity.
3. If, over a period of many months or several years, relations
between the Western and Warsaw Pact nations deteriorated badly, the
political, economic, and military posture of both alliances could be
expected to change. If this were to occur, the judgments in this
Estimate-drawn against the present political, economic, and military
environment-might no longer be valid.
Military Objectives in a War With NATO
4. If the Soviets decided to go to war with NATO, for whatever
reason, it is highly likely that their principal military objective would be
the rapid defeat of all NATO forces in Central Europe. Whether
France became an objective would depend on the course of the
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campaign and the part the French played in it. In the Soviet view, only
through a broad, rapid offensive campaign could the USSR hope to
interrupt or prevent NATO from developing equal or, possibly in the
Ionizer run. al in Europe. Soviet military writings
operations designed to achieve such a
rapid, total victory over NATO forces.
5. We judge it to be extremely unlikely that the Soviets might
deliberately attack with limited force to achieve limited objectives,
either as a first step in going to war with NATO or to obtain the upper
hand in a crisis while attempting to avoid war. As a first step in a larger
campaign, the limited-objective attack would have little or no military
value in destroying or interrupting NATO force development. It would,
in fact, completely sacrifice strategic surprise and ensure that NATO
mobilization would not far lag that of the Pact.
6. As a device to secure an important political objective (for
example, control of West Berlin or Hamburg) a limited-objective attack
would have serious flaws in the Soviet view. First, Soviet leaders could
not be confident that a limited-objective attack could succeed quickly
enough to avoid an undesired broadening of the conflict. Secondly, the
grave consequences of NATO response with nuclear weapons, however
slight the chances, would seem to outweigh by far any potential gains.
Even in the absence of war, such an action would signal the end of the
era of "peaceful coexistence" and would inevitably throw NATO into
serious preparations for war in Europe. Given their own conservative
view of NATO's rapid mobilization capabilities in the short run, and the
prospect of activating NATO's much greater industrial, manpower, and
economic potential in the longer run, the Soviets could perceive an
increasingly adverse balance of forces in Europe as NATO rose to the
task of confronting what would be considered an extremely serious
Soviet threat. Accordingly, we judge there is virtually no chance that
the Soviets would initiate an attack to obtain limited objectives in the
present military, political, and economic situation.
7. The Soviets evidently plan for military operations against
NATO in three separate theaters: in the northwestern USSR and
Scandinavia, in central and western Europe, and in southern Europe.
Although a crisis leading to war could develop as easily on one of
NATO's flanks as in the center, the Soviets would expect central Europe
to be the decisive theater of a large-scale NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.
Doctrine and Readiness
8. Soviet doctrine emphasizes a need for heavy superiority in the
main battle areas, with strong reserves to ensure the momentum of the
attack. Doctrine also stresses achieving surprise and, in general, the
Soviets will strive to achieve both surprise and superiority. If forced to
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choose between them, the Soviets are likely to opt for force superiority:
superiority in forces is real and affords advantages that are certain;
surprise is a less tangible advantage and always runs some risk of
compromise. In any event, Soviet strategy for war in Europe centers on
seizing and holding the strategic initiative through prompt offensive
action by all forces.
9. Another tenet of Soviet doctrine is joint action by all compo-
nents of the military forces, each of which is considered to have a
role-if only a contingent one-in any major operation. Related to this
is the longstanding Soviet insistence on the importance of the economy,
morale, and political stability of the nation in time of war. Because of
these factors-especially in view of the risk of nuclear war-prepara-
tions throughout the Pact countries and armed forces can be expected as
a prelude to any military venture.
10. The Soviets apparently believe that a period of increased
tension, called the Period of Threat in Soviet usage, will precede any
major use of military forces. The Soviets' heavy reliance on the warning
that they believe such a period would provide is reflected in the
peacetime readiness status of Pact forces, many of which require
augmentation through mobilization before commitment to combat.
They also recognize the chance that an enemy might drastically shorten
this period of tension. Each Pact nation has a dual alert and callup
system which provides both for the mobilization readiness of the
national administration and economy and for the readiness, alerting,
and mobilization of the armed forces. The key alert phases planned
under this dual system are: Increased National Defense Readiness and
Full National Defense Readiness for the national economies and
Increased Combat Readiness and Full Combat Readiness for military
forces.
How the Pact Would Go to War
11. Our judgments concerning our ability to sense that the Warsaw
Pact is taking steps to enable it to go to war in the near future derive
from our ability to monitor, on a near-real-time basis, the normal
pattern of Soviet and East European civilian and military activity in
peacetime.'Our confidence in sensing Pact preparation for war is based
on our judgment that significant early changes would almost certainly
be initiated in a wide range of civilian and military activities as the Pact
assumed a posture which would enable it to start a war.
12. The earliest indicators that the Soviet Union was taking steps
which would enable it to initiate war in Europe would be potentially
available as the Soviets and their Pact allies were making the decision to
undertake them. Given the present structure of Soviet political and
military leadership, the decision to prepare for or initiate war with
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Top Secret RUFF
NATO would necessarily be made by the full Politburo and almost
certainly with the recommendation of the Defense Council. We cannot
judge to what extent the counsel of East European leaders would be
sought in the initial decisionmaking process, but sooner or later the
commitment of principal East European political and military leaders
would almost certainly be required because their support would be
critical in the execution of a war with NATO.
13. Unusual activities on the part of the Pact leadership would
raise US and NATO awareness of possible imminent Pact activity of
some kind, and increase the likelihood that indications of actual
preparations would be interpreted quickly. Strong signals could be
reported to one of the NATO intelligence services directly from one of
the Pact principals or staff members involved in the decision process.
Nonetheless, such reporting probably would be difficult to evaluate if
there were no corroborating evidence and would not, in itself, support a
firm judgment that the Pact was taking steps which would enable it to
go to war in the near future.
14. A major concern of the Soviet leadership would be to guaran-
tee the support and stability of the population and public institutions in
both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Representations to the
regional leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would
probably be made, and a large-scale propaganda program to motivate
the Soviet populace to support the decision to go to war would be
planned or initiated. The more critical problem, in the Soviet view,
would be the elicitation of support and maintenance of firm political
control of the populace and public institutions of the principal East
European allies. Eliciting and enforcing the support of the Soviet and
East European population for a major attack on NATO could not be
accomplished in a low-key manner. There would likely be clear
indications of steps by the Pact leadership to ensure the political
stability of the Warsaw Pact nations.
15. In preparing to initiate hostilities with NATO, the Soviets
could not be certain whether the prospective war would be short or
long, nuclear or nonnuclear, and as a matter of prudence would have to
consider full civil and economic preparations from the start. The
process of putting industrial, agricultural, and civil defense systems on a
full war footing, whether begun before or after a war started, would be
both disruptive and visible and would take weeks or months to work
out, even with wholly adequate planning.
16. Soviet doctrine anticipates that a critical step in preparing the
populace and national economy for war is the declaration of a state of
Increased National Defense Readiness. The declaration, even if not
published, would be widely communicated throughout the Soviet Union
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and would, in itself, be a firm indication that the Soviets were preparing
for the contingency of war. Similarly, declaration of a state of Full
National Defense Readiness, even if not published, would be widely
communicated and would, in itself, clearly signal the serious Soviet (or
Pact) intent to prepare for war. The declaration and associated
measures would be impossible to mask.
17. The Pact nations consider the normal peacetime posture of
their forces to be a state of Constant Combat Readiness. The way in
which the Pact would modify its military posture during a crisis would
depend largely on the speed, urgency, and intensity with which the
crisis developed:
- In a slowly developing crisis the Pact countries might move to
institute Increased Combat Readiness (as defined in the table
appended to chapter III). In such a condition a wide variety of
measures might be undertaken, but these would fall far short of
placing the Pact on a full war footing. The process need not be
continuous; rather there probably would be periods of holding
at interim levels.
- Once the Soviets had determined that the likelihood of war was
high, the Pact's final preparations would be initiated by a
decision to go to Full Combat Readiness (as defined in the
above-cited table).
18. A key step in beginning the process of preparing military
forces for the contingency of war is declaration of a state of Increased
Combat Readiness. Indicators of preparatory measures necessary to
achieve this level of readiness include:
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Top Secret RUFF
19. As the Pact moved from a posture of increased to full
readiness, a much more visible set of activities would occur, including:
Warning of War
20. For the purposes of this Estimate, we define warning as an
intelligence judgment clearly conveyed to national decisionmakers
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that the Warsaw Pact is taking steps to enable it to go to war in the
near future and that the course of events has increased the likelihood
of war in Europe. This degree of warning, although it does not
incorporate all of the elements of ideal warning, could be provided to
national decisionmakers relatively rapidly and would provide an ade-
quate basis for decisions concerning appropriate counterpreparations
and other courses of action. We are unlikely to be able to be more
definitive than this in our initial warning and foretell when the enemy
will attack, where he will attack, or whether he will attack at all. The
perceived pattern of activity on which the initial warning would be
based is likely to be consistent with Soviet intentions other than a
planned attack on NATO, such as: preparations to defend, take a stiffer
stand, or achieve a better bargaining position in the crisis; or to take
action in a different theater.
21. The Warsaw Pact nations, and particularly the Soviets, have
the capability and the experience to employ many techniques of
security, concealment, and deception that could affect our ability to
detect or correctly interpret some indicators of their preparations for
war. We would expect the Pact to employ such measures, but we judge
that Pact security, concealment, and deception would not significantly
degrade our ability to interpret quickly the sum of identified activities
as preparations for war.
22. Once the Pact had made a decision that war is inevitable it
would sanction at least selective interference with our intelligence
collection. This could include space-based systems. While such interfer-
ence would degrade Western intelligence, it would, in itself, constitute a
strong warning indicator.
23. We are, in any case, confident of the ability of US and Allied
intelligence to detect and interpret correctly a great number of
indicators which would be given were the Pact to prepare for a large-
scale war with NATO. We are confident that we could inform
decisionmakers that the Soviet Union-with or without its Pact allies-
was taking steps which would enable it to go to war in the near future
within one day of the beginning of activity associated with the move to
Full National Defense Readiness or Full Combat Readiness.
Pact Options for Initiating War in Europe-Warning Implications
24. As Soviet leaders were considering the preparation of Warsaw
Pact forces for war with NATO, they would be faced with deciding the
location, timing, and size of the initial attack. A major dilemma facing
the Soviet leaders would be the degree to which they would care to
trade off Pact preparedness and full combat potential called for in their
doctrine for a greater degree of strategic surprise which might be
granted by a smaller, but more quickly generated attack designed to
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preempt the establishment of an organized defense by NATO. In the
evaluation of the risks, benefits, and warning implications of alternative
Soviet and Warsaw Pact options for the initial attack, we have defined
four Warsaw Pact options. The first, the standing-start attack
is included to present a more
complete range of Pact capabilities. The other three of these options are
selected on the basis of intelligence evidence
25. In describing certain of the options, we refer to Warsaw Pact
wartime organizations called fronts. (See the inset box accompanying
paragraph 55 of chapter IV.) In discussing the number of fronts for war
in Europe, we refer only to those that would be in Central Europe and
available for commitment in the initial attack. Warsaw Pact contin-
gency plans for war in Europe envision the establishment of a first
echelon of three fronts in the Central Region, with additional fronts
moved forward from the western USSR to form a second echelon. (See
figure 3, the foldout map appended to chapter IV.) This concept is
reflected clearly in
doctrinal literature, and other documentary evidence. If the USSR
should decide on war in Europe, it probably also would begin to
activate the wartime structure of fronts throughout the USSR.
Option I-The Standing-Start Attack
26. There is no evidence
which feature an unprepared, standing-start
attack on NATO from a peacetime force posture. The Soviets, however,
do have the capability to attack NATO units using ground and air
combat forces garrisoned near the inter-German border. As many as 10
to 15 Soviet division& and perhaps several East German divisions could
reach initial combat points and lead or support such an attack in the
Central Region in somewhat less than 24 hours. By dint of surprise and
local force superiority, Soviet planners would expect-and might
get-some early ground and air victories.
27. These initial successes would likely be the only advantage
which would accrue to such an attack, however. The considerations
which weigh against initiating a war from a standing start are
persuasive, and we judge that there is virtually no chance that the
Soviets would initiate a war against NATO with an attack from a
standing start. The Soviets would have to expect that the standing-start
attack would cause NATO to initiate massive and rapid mobilization,
almost simultaneously with the Pact, and the local force superiority
which would accrue in such an attack probably could not be maintained
if NATO forces reacted effectively. The Soviets, considering their
conservative view of NATO rapid mobilization capabilities (discussed in
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paragraph 4 of chapter I), might well conclude that the attacking force
could face an adverse situation before reinforcements could be commit-
ted. The attack would initially have to rely on incomplete lines of
communications. The Soviets would not have time to establish a front-
level command, control, and communications structure or to prepare
the Soviet or East European populace or national economies for
war-both basic requirements posed in Soviet military literature.
Finally, the standing-start attack would leave other Pact strategic and
general purpose forces-as well as the national economy-unprepared
for expanded hostilities. In particular, the Soviets would be concerned
about the threat of NATO escalation to nuclear war.
The forward movement of an attack force
of 10 to 15 divisions would provide many additional indicators to
NATO intelligence, which routinely monitors military activity in East
Germany.
29. Accordingly, in the extremely unlikely case of an unprovoked
attack on NATO from a peacetime posture, we judge that US and Allied
intelligence could sense and would report the massive movement0
within hours of the beginning of
preparation. Such activity would provide sufficient intelligence for
Allied commanders and decisionmakers to take precautionary steps.
Given the extremely unlikely nature of such an event, however,
interpretation of this activity would be ambiguous, and a final judg-
ment that an attack was imminent might not be reached before
hostilities occurred.
Option II-Attack With Two fronts
30. Extensive analysis leads us to
conclude that the smallest torce the Pact would use to start theater
offensive operations would consist of two fronts. This force would be
composed essentially of all Soviet ground and tactical air force units in
East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia together with most of the
East German and Czechoslovak units which are active in peacetime-a
total of some 40 ground divisions, plus support and tactical air units.
31. Extensive study of Pact contingency plans and
the Pact's theoretical capability to organize, deploy, an
prepare forces for war in Europe, indicates that, in the most urgent
circumstances, the Pact would need about four days to prepare a two-
front force. While initiation of an attack with slightly less than four full
days of preparation is possible, the complexity and magnitude of the
operation and the risks attending insufficient preparation would be
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likely to cause the Soviets to take more than four days to prepare this
two-front force. These preparations would be made using a compressed
buildup procedure which would exacerbate the confusion and disrup-
tions inherent in a transition to a war footing and, at least initially,
would yield combat units-and especially combat support units-with
less than full capabilities to undertake or sustain combat operations.
Preparations which, in a less demanding operation, would be under-
taken in a phased or sequential pattern would have to occur
simultaneously.
32. By waiting to establish a two-front attacking force, the Pact
would diminish many of the critical deficiencies of the standing-start
attack. Naval capabilities would be substantially improved, and the
minimal essentials of the command and control system could be
functioning.
33. Still, initiating hostilities after only these minimum prepara-
tions were made would entail serious risks for the Pact and would be
extremely unlikely except in the most urgent circumstances. The
attacking force itself would lack some front-level elements and would
have to cover the broad sector from the Baltic to Austria. Command
and control capabilities, particularly at the theater level, would remain
incomplete. Pact mobilization would not have proceeded far enough to
ensure immediate followup forces and supplies for the attack in Central
Europe and effective participation in the war by major forces in other
areas.
34. We are agreed that it is extremely unlikely that the Pact would
initiate war from this two-front posture in other than an extraordinarily
time-urgent circumstance. On this point there are two views. One holds
that the only circumstance which would cause the Pact to initiate
theaterwide offensive operations against NATO from this posture with
only four days of preparation would be the Soviet perception of the
threat of imminent NATO attack. Although NATO mobilization would
be viewed as a serious threat and would almost certainly cause the Pact
to make counterpreparations, the Soviets would be particularly averse to
initiating an attack with a force not fully prepared against NATO forces
which enjoyed some advantages of prior preparation or mobilization-
unless threat of imminent NATO attack was clear.'
35. The other view holds that the Soviets might choose to attack
with the two-front force in a variety of urgent contingencies. For
example, during a serious East-West political dispute, the NATO
countries (particularly the United States and West Germany) might
undertake a degree of mobilization and other military preparations to
improve their defensive postures and to demonstrate will in support of
' The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency and the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State.
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the diplomatic bargaining. The Soviets, of course, might see this as
weakening their own bargaining position, in particular by threatening
to upset the political advantage afforded them by superiority in forces-
in-being in Central Europe. In such a contingency, and if they
perceived truly vital interests at risk, the Soviets might set in motion the
rapid buildup and early attack option. Their efforts would be intended
to preempt NATO defensive and diplomatic preparations, not an
immediate threat of NATO attack.'
36. Preparation of a two-front attack from the normal Pact
peacetime posture would almost certainly require declaration of Full
Combat Readiness and Full National Defense Readiness. Even if the
alert were accomplished covertly, a host of indicators that a full
readiness posture was being taken would be available and would almost
certainly be interpreted and conveyed to decisionmakers within one
day. Accordingly, US and NATO decisionmakers would almost cer-
tainly have three days or more of warning in the case of a rapid Pact
attack with two fronts.
Option III-Attack With Three fronts
37. The third and fourth options are ones in which Soviet planners,
under a less urgent need to defend or attack, would elect to bring the
Pact to full readiness via a more efficient, phased buildup procedure
and to attack when the force available for initial operations totaled
three fronts (Option III) or five fronts (Option IV). The same evidence
cited earlier on Pact buildup planning and procedures indicates that, in
these circumstances, the Pact would require, at a minimum, about eight
days to achieve a three-front force.
38. The Pact preference for a larger than two-front attack is well
supported in Soviet writing The
phased buildup to three fronts-a total of some 50 to 60 divisions plus
support and tactical air units-would offer a reasonable expectation of
an orderly and efficient transition to an attack posture affording force
superiority, sustainability, and precautions against the risks of a wider
war. In addition, this option would provide opportunity for significantly
more naval forces to deploy. Accordingly, we judge that, except in
extraordinarily urgent circumstances (as described above in paragraphs
34 and 35), the Pact would prefer to prepare at least a three-front force
before initiating hostilities. Although these preparations could proceed
in a phased, organized manner, they would be massive and would
almost certainly bi/ initiated by an alert to Full Combat Readiness and
Full National Defense Readiness. US and NATO decisionmakers
2 The holders of this view are the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
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would almost certainly have seven days or more of warning in the event
of a Pact attack with three fronts.
Option IV-Attack With Five fronts
39. The Pact might elect to build up even greater forces in Eastern
Europe prior to initiating hostilities against NATO, depending on its
assessment of the political and military situation at the time. A five-
front posture-about 90 ground divisions plus support and tactical air
units and with additional naval units at sea-would fulfill Soviet
conservative doctrinal preferences to the extent possible in practical
terms and would take about two weeks to achieve.
40. The pattern of activity involved in developing a full five-front
attack force in Europe would be similar to that of the three-front force,
although the pace might be reduced somewhat. We judge that about
two weeks would be required to prepare for combat and move from the
USSR the two additional fronts. Western intelligence would almost
certainly be able to sense the change in overall posture even if the first
alert to increased readiness were not directly and immediately detected.
Therefore, we judge that in the case of a five-front attack option,
intelligence could provide warning that the Pact was taking steps which
would, enable it to go to war in the near future, possibly within hours,
but certainly within a day or two of the initial order to go to increased
readiness. Accordingly, in the case of a full five-front attack, US and
NATO decisionmakers would have 12 days or so of warning time.
Summary Judgments and Relative Likelihood
41. In summary, the following judgments are unanimous within
the Intelligence Community and are based on extensive analysis of all-
source data
on Pact planning, and information
related to the generation of military forces in the Central Region.
- The Pact would begin to organize at least five fronts for use in
Central Europe from the time of the decision to go to full
readiness.
- There is virtually no chance that the Soviets would attack from
a standing start.
- The smallest force the Pact would use to begin a theater
offensive would consist of two fronts, requiring about four days
of preparation; except in an extraordinarily time-urgent circum-
stance, it is extremely unlikely the Pact would initiate war from
this posture.
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- The Pact would prefer, before attacking, to prepare at least a
three-front force, which would require, at a minimum, about
eight days of preparation.
- Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build up even greater
forces in Eastern Europe before initiating hostilities against
NATO.
42. In paragraphs 24 through 40 we have discussed the Soviet
perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of each of the four options
and we have estimated approximate minimum preparation times which
would be required before the Pact could launch a coherent attack with
a force of a given size. Of course, any Soviet decision on when to attack
would be influenced by a set of sometimes contradictory military
factors, including the USSR's own level of preparations and its percep-
tion of the status of NATO preparations and deployments, the desire to
achieve surprise, and the urge to develop fully, in advance, as large a
force as possible. We are agreed that the ultimate decision to attack
almost certainly would not rest on purely military factors, but rather on
a combination of those and political imperatives, the state of diplomatic
negotiations, or other considerations.
43. Even though the various analysts within the Community have
used the same basic data, different conclusions have been reached
concerning the most likely timing of a Pact attack. This is due to
differing interpretations of data and judgments about the weighting of
the various military and political factors and considerations. One view
interprets the data and draws conclusions as follows:
two to three
fronts-which are the forces that the Pact would have available
in the forward area in the four-to-eight-day period.
- The Pact has the most favorable force ratio in this same period
after beginning preparations for war.
- These factors in the context of Soviet military writings and other
sensitive materials, emphasize the importance of surprise.
- Therefore, the four-to-eight-day period is the most likely time
for the Pact to attack.
44. All others believe that it is more likely the Pact would take at
least eight days of preparation (assembling three to five fronts) before
initiating hostilities. In their view:
- The Pact preference for an attack involving more than two
fronts is well supported in Soviet writing
' The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.
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- There is no agreed system of calculating force ratios, and several
methods other than that used to form the preceding view show
that greater force ratios occur after eight days of preparation. In
any case, force ratios would be only one of the considerations in
timing the attack.
- Soviet doctrine calls for force superiority, availability of resup-
ply and reinforcements, full preparation for joint action by all
components of the military forces, stability of the rear, and fully
effective command and control, and each of these is enhanced
with eight days or more of preparation.
- Although the Pact would attempt to achieve both surprise and
force superiority, if forced to choose between them the Pact
would likely opt for force superiority.
- Soviet military planning is conservative, and the risks the Soviets
would associate with potentially inadequate preparation would
be high.
Gradual Buildup
45. As a modification to any of the options previously discussed,
the Soviets, and possibly their Pact allies, could make gradual prepara-
tions for war over a longer period. Steps which increase the combat
readiness of any elements of their military forces could be taken
selectively over an interval of weeks or months. For example, such steps
as the mobilization of rear service support elements in the forward area
which would normally be accomplished during a period of Full Com at
Readiness, could be accomplished incrementally during a period of no
alert. Such steps, however, would probably be noted by Western
intelligence within days after their implementation and would be
interpreted as modifying the Pact peacetime military posture. Such
actions might result in reactions of a similar nature by NATO members
and would certainly increase Western intelligence efforts. Though these
Pact steps might somewhat reduce the time necessary to achieve the full
combat readiness of the forces discussed in Options II, III, and IV, they
would be taken at the expense of likely greater NATO preparedness
and vigilance.
46. Other measures which the USSR alone or in concert with its
Pact allies might undertake to carry out gradually could include more
time-consuming, but relatively unprovocative, civil and military
preparedness steps. These measures would not involve any steps
normally associated with the alert to Full Combat Readiness and could
improve the efficiency of the nation to support a war and the
sustainability of the forces but not necessarily the initial combat
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capability of the engaging forces. They would not greatly improve the
Soviet and Pact capability to move quickly to a posture of Full Combat
Readiness because the large-scale and most time-consuming actions that
are required in each of the previous options, and which would still be
very visible, would remain to be done.
47. Gradual Pact preparations for hostilities, either as a deliberate
policy in preparation for some "surprise" action including attack or in a
period of political crisis, would present more analytic problems for US
intelligence than would the sudden and widespread implementation of
war preparations. Although a gradual implementation would provide us
more opportunities to detect some of the preparations and more time to
validate our information, the early preparations would probably be
ambiguous and might be difficult to distinguish from "routine" force
improvements or exercises.
48. Because of the high risks and costs involved, the Pact would
defer general mobilization, major deployments of combat forces, and
other highly visible and provocative measures until the final move to
full readiness. We therefore believe that even after some months of
preparation, when a final or contingent decision to attack was made,
there would still be a discernible difference in the nature, scope, and
pace of preparedness measures. This would alert us and enable us to
provide warning that the Pact was initiating the final steps that would
enable it to go to war in the near future. Accordingly, even after a
gradual buildup, we believe we would detect within a day the final
moves to full readiness to attack.
49. A period of gradual preparations would improve Pact combat
effectiveness and civil preparedness under any of the postulated
buildup options. Depending on the number and nature of the measures
already taken and the political circumstances, the time required to
prepare the attack could also be reduced, perhaps by as much as a day
or more. We would, however, already have issued warnings, probably
repeatedly, of a growing danger of hostilities.
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DISCUSSION
1. LIKELIHOOD OF A NATO-WARSAW PACT
WAR
1. The Soviets keep strong military forces of their
own in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary in order to maintain their dominant position
in that region, to deter Western military action or to
fight effectively if deterrence fails, and to maximize
their influence upon West European affairs.
2. The danger of war in Europe has long been a
major preoccupation of Soviet security policy. Soviet
leaders would regard another European war-with
the prospects of nuclear escalation-as a major threat
to the USSR's existence.
A. Soviet Views of Risks in War With NATO
3. In considering a Warsaw Pact ' initiation of war
with NATO in Europe, the Soviets see two principal
dangers:
- NATO could put up a stiff defense which might
prevent a quick Pact victory and thus gain the
time to bring into play the greater manpower
and industrial reserves of the West.
- The war could go nuclear with unpredictable
consequences; the end result might be a massive
nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.
In addition, Moscow might well see a risk in
depending on its Pact allies to fight loyally and
effectively.
4. Soviet planners would anticipate a quick, strong
NATO reaction to any attack. Soviet reporting on
NATO's military capabilities indicates clearly that the
Soviets have good data on NATO's order of battle,
alert procedures, readiness categories, and mobiliza-
tion times and that they interpret this information in a
prudent, conservative manner. For example, a 1974
' The Warsaw Pact is a political-military alliance composed of the
Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria.
classified Soviet assessment ascribed to NATO the
capability to:
- Deploy covering ground units to forward areas,
within six hours.
- Deploy first-echelon ground units for combat
within one and a half to two days.
- Launch 80 percent of tactical aircraft within
three to three and a half hours.
- Deploy naval combat units to sea within four
hours.
- Launch almost 10 percent of tactical nuclear
missiles within five minutes.
- Emplace some nuclear mine barriers within two
and a half hours and the remainder within 11
hours.
- Complete the air deployment to Europe from the
United States of two divisions in three days.
These Soviet estimates assumed no prior NATO alert.
The Soviets assumed shorter times if NATO were in a
posture of increased readiness. Another assessment
indicated Soviet belief that NATO-with French
participation, which the Pact cannot prudently dis-
count-could field in Central Europe more than
35 division equivalents in five days and some 50
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prudent, sometimes exaggerated, appreciation of
NATO capabilities.
5. The Soviets would also be influenced by their
perception of NATO's long-term potential and of its
good prospects for external help. The Soviets are
aware that Sweden would fear a Warsaw Pact victory
and could complicate Pact problems on the northern
flank and that Spain too has potential for supporting
NATO operations. The Soviets probably see most non-
European nations as favoring the Western cause and
believe that some of them would likely join NATO in
a protracted war. Moscow must also recognize,
moreover, that most of those few states that might
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welcome a Pact victory would be constrained by
NATO's control of the seas and of trade.
6. Moscow fears that if it were engaged in a
protracted conflict in the west, Peking might take the
opportunity to strike in the east. We' think there is
little danger of a Chinese attack on the USSR, but the
Soviets, perhaps again as a matter of rudence rate
the dan er hi her than d we.
7. The second great deterrent for the Soviets is their
realization that nuclear operations could start at any
time after hostilities began and could quickly spread
would use nuclear weapons to avoid defeat and that
escalation may not be controlled short of a full-scale
exchange of strategic weapons. The mere existence of
the separately controlled British and French strategic
nuclear systems compounds the Soviets' uncertainty
about their ability to control nuclear escalation.
Publicity about US consideration of limited nuclear
options, the West's continued refusal to accept Soviet
no-first-use proposals, and the Soviets' expressed
concern with what they perceive as Western, espe-
cially US, unpredictability convince us that the Soviets
would be most unwilling to start a conflict with NATO
unless they had accepted the risks of both theater and
strategic nuclear war.
8. Doubts that its allies would fight loyally and
effectively would further constrain Moscow's planning
for aggressive war. The Soviets know that, if given a
free choice, few East Europeans would support them
in such a war. Moscow would rely on political and
military controls and on propaganda-particularly
anti-German propaganda-but we cannot say how
effective Moscow believes these measures might be.
9. The Soviets would recognize great risk in
initiating a war alone in the expectation of dragging
the East Europeans in after them. They must depend
on their allies in a NATO-Pact war because of Central
European geography and the interdependent Pact
force structure. The Soviets would have to mount the
attack from East European territory, and they
probably could not depend upon unwarned and
unprepared allies to commence and carry out immedi-
ately and effectively the tasks necessary to augment
and sustain the offensive. More than half the Pact
divisions and aircraft now in Central Europe are East
European, and they have been assigned combat roles
in the initial stages of conflict. Furthermore, the lines
of communication from the USSR all run through East
European countries, and these countries are largely
responsible for operating and servicing the land
transport systems and for provision of critical air and
rear area defenses.
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10. In light of Soviet views of the risks of a NATO- 25X1
B. Chances of War in Present Circumstances
Pact war, we believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets
would decide deliberately to attack NATO in the
present circumstances. It is also unlikely that the
Soviet leaders believe that NATO wants war or would
seek it as a deliberate policy. War in Europe would
become likely only as a result of a profound change in
the political, military, or economic situation. Changes
in the military balance and alterations in each side's
perceptions of the other's strengths and weaknesses
could, of course, affect the way the Soviets would
calculate the potential gains and risks in a crisis. A
significant weakening of NATO's military potential
would encourage the Soviets to think they could
exercise more influence in Western Europe and might
tempt Moscow into using pressure tactics. But changes
in the military balance would not likely lead to war so
long as the Soviets perceived that their losses would be
heavy and that the risk to the Soviet homeland would
be high.
11. We believe that a war in Europe would be
preceded by a period of extreme tension in a crisis of
unprecedented severity. The Soviets show
that they too
anticipate such a period of tension. In view of the
above-cited dangers of a war with NATO, the Soviets
would pursue a protracted search for an alternative
solution. Only when a crisis reached a point where
they saw their vital interests directly threatened would
the Soviets entertain the possibility of starting a war
with NATO.
12. In a period of extreme tension where neither
side wants war, there are likely to be moves and
countermoves in which cause and effect become
ambiguous, with each side believing that time and the
course of events are working against it. There is a
great deal of uncertainty in predicting Soviet behavior
in such a situation. We think it is highly unlikely that
the Soviets would allow minor hostile incidents to
evolve into open hostilities in the absence of a
deliberate decision to go to war. We believe, however,
that any Soviet decision to go to war is likely to be
preceded by some sequence of events involving
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escalations on both sides and miscalculations in crisis ing Pact forces. They then would seek a negotiated
management. settlement while deterring further military action
13. We do not believe that changes in the Soviet
leadership in the foreseeable future will have any
marked effect on the probability of a NATO-Pact war.
Differences of view, personally or institutionally
motivated, exist in the Politburo and, no doubt, will
continue to exist, but these differences are not likely to
upset the stability of the system.
II. SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN A WAR
WITH NATO
14. ndicate
clearly that the principal objective of Pact military
operations against NATO would be a rapid and total
victory in Central Europe. We consider it extremely
unlikely that the Soviets would deliberately attack
with limited force to achieve limited objectives, either
as a first step in going to war with NATO or to obtain
the upper hand in a crisis while attempting to avoid
war.
A. Limited Operations for Limited Objectives
t e Soviets
could, in a crisis, undertake military operations in
Europe on a limited scale to seize quickly a
strategically important territory or city. The theoreti-
cal objectives of such an operation could be either to
serve as an initial step in going to war or to settle the
crisis on Soviet terms while avoiding large-scale war
with NATO.
16. We see no advantage to the Soviets in beginning
a large-scale war with a limited-objective attack. By
definition, the limited-objective attack would have
little or no military value in destroying or interrupting
development of NATO's combat potential. It would,
in fact, completely sacrifice strategic surprise and
ensure that NATO mobilization would not far lag that
of the Pact.
17. As a device to secure an important political
objective (for example, control of West Berlin or
Hamburg) while attempting to avoid war with NATO,
a limited-objective attack would have serious flaws in
the Soviet view. The Soviets would attempt to present
the United States, West Germany, or NATO with a
military fait accompli by seizing the objective
quickly, with a minimum of resistance, while mobiliz-
through the threat of theater war with a fully
prepared Pact force.
18. The Soviets' perceptions of NATO forces and
doctrine and their concept of the overall "correlation
of forces" show that they would see the risks of a
limited-objective attack as far outweighing the short-
range gains. Accordingly, we judge there is virtually
no chance that they would initiate an attack to obtain
limited objectives in the present military, political, and
economic situation. The most serious risk would be the
expansion of armed resistance and its escalation to
general war. The Soviets could not be confident that
tactical nuclear weapons would not be used in
response to a sudden limited-objective attack. The
grave consequences of miscalculation and first use of
nuclear weapons in response to such an attack,
however slight the chances, would seem to far
outweigh the potential gains.
19. Even in the absence of war, such an action
would signal the end of the era of "peaceful
coexistence" and would inevitably throw NATO into
serious preparations for war in Europe. Given their
own conservative view of NATO's great mobilization
capabilities in the short run, and the prospect of 25X1
activating NATO's much greater industrial, man-
power, 25X1
and economic potential in the longer run, the
Soviets could perceive an increasingly adverse balance
of forces in Europe as NATO rose to the task of
confronting what would be considered an extremely
serious Soviet threat.
20. Soviet leaders could not be confident that a
limited-objective attack could succeed quickly. They
are aware that an attack to seize control of West
Berlin, for example, would be complicated, bitterly
opposed by Western forces in the city, and likely to
escalate to a broader war. Likewise, the occupation of
major urban centers near the inter-German border,
such as Hamburg, would require major deployment of
Soviet forces to the area to overcome the NATO forces
garrisoned there. In either case, protracted resistance
would inevitably cause the Soviets to increase the
weight of their attack and the attendant destruction of
their objective, thus increasing the chances that the
war would spread. The risks perceived by the Soviets
of beginning a war with NATO without the force-
wide military preparations they deem necessary to
sustain the attack and to guard against escalation are
discussed in chapter IV, on "How the Pact Would Go
to War," beginning at paragraph 39.
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B. Total Victory-The Basic Soviet Objective
21. If the Soviets decided to go to war with NATO,
for whatever reason, it is highly likely that their
principal military objective would be the rapid defeat
of all NATO forces in Central Europe. Whether
France became an objective would depend on the
course of the campaign and the part the French
played in it. The requirement to rapidly engage and
destroy all NATO combat formations in Central
Europe and to occupy NATO territory is driven by the
Soviets' high regard for NATO's greater war potential.
In the Soviet view, only through a broad, rapid
offensive campaign could the USSR hope to interrupt
or prevent NATO from developing equal or, possibly
in the longer run, greater combat potential in Europe.
Soviet military writing
operations designed to achieve such a rapid, total
victory over NATO forces.
C. Possible Pact Theaters of Military Oper-
ations in Europe
22. Soviet strategists have identified at least three
theaters of military operations (TVDs) in which they
envisage potential land conflicts with NATO. (See
figure 1.) These theaters are described below, together
with brief characterizations of the types of military
operations that the Soviets appear to envisage for each.
Pact planning is sufficiently flexible to allow for
variations in any of these elements, and exercises
frequently rehearse such variations.
23. Northwestern TVD. Information
indicateshe
Soviets envisage a Northwestern TVD that would be
based on the Leningrad Military District and encom-
pass the Scandinavian Peninsula. This information
implies the existence of contingency plans for the
defense of the Murmansk and White Sea areas,
including Northern Fleet installations, for neutralizing
or seizing the lightly defended NATO facilities in
northern Norway, and for deploying for a defense in
depth of the Norwegian Sea. The Soviets' large
Northern Fleet would also be used to restrict NATO
movements north of the Greenland, Iceland, United
Kingdom gap and against NATO naval forces and
merchant shipping in the North Atlantic where
possible.
24. Western TVD. The Western TVD would
include East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on
the Pact side and West Germany, the Benelux nations,
Denmark, and France on the NATO side. The bulk of
both NATO and Pact theater forces are either in
Central Europe or earmarked for use there. The Soviet
Baltic Fleet and the Polish and East German Navies
would likely be used in attempts to gain control of the
Baltic Sea, to support amphibious operations in the
Western TVD, and to secure passage to the open
ocean.
25. Southwestern TVD. Soviet planners envision
military operations against Greece and Turkey, and
probably northern Italy and Austria.
operations against Greece and
Turkey wou be-launched from Bulgaria and the
Odessa region of the USSR to secure the Turkish
Straits and support naval operations in the eastern
Mediterranean. Operations against northern Italy
intended to secure the southern flank of the Western
TVD might be launched from Hungary through
Yugoslavia or Austria. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet
(including the air component) and the much smaller
Bulgarian and Romanian Navies could support oper-
ations aimed at securing the straits and neutralizing
NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean and Black
Seas.
26. Operations against eastern Turke , on the other
hand, would be far from certain
oscow might we
prefer. merely to maintain a presence there sufficient
to tie down Turkish forces without weakening the
principal efforts elsewhere.
27. The Soviet Navy's Eskadra 2 in the Mediterra-
nean would be employed primarily against the NATO
carriers and ballistic missile submarines there because
of the threat they pose. Soviet land-based strike
aircraft would be similarly employed. The Soviets
probably would attempt to destroy these carriers and
submarines with conventional weapons at the outset of
hostilities, and would use nuclear weapons for the
purpose once nuclear warfare began. Any protracted
or extensive naval campaign would be beyond Soviet
capabilities, however, because of inadequate logistics
and poor local air support. NATO land-based air
forces that could be brought to bear over the sea, as
well as NATO navies, would be a significant tactical
threat to the Eskadra and to its essential lines of
communications through the Turkish Straits, even if
these were under Soviet military occupation.
' This Russian word would normally be translated as "squadron."
The Soviet naval force in the Mediterranean is larger than a US
squadron, however, and more nearly equates to a numbered US
fleet in size and in variety of ships.
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po'Ssfftall wari f pS? yhes (SFs ?17 FL/0?00iYY OopsoaffoU's (7NDo s) k C urrops
Reykjavik
Iceland
warsaw<
German *
th j- Berlin Poland IM,
Boundary representalon is
not necessarily authoritative
Bonn
Reou6lic
of Germany
Munich.
20
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Approximate TVD boundary
Warsaw Pact Countries
NATO Countries
0
?Kiyev
Bulgaria
Sofia
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28. Although a crisis leading to war could develop
as easily on one of NATO's flanks as in the center
(perhaps even more easily on the southern flank), the
Soviets would expect Central Europe to be the decisive
area of a large-scale conflict. It is the European locus
of power for both alliances and encompasses military,
political, and economic entities that the Soviets would
have to dominate or destroy to achieve victory. We
believe that the Warsaw Pact has the means to
conduct limited offensive operations in the Northwest-
ern and Southwestern TVDs while simultaneously
launching a full-scale offensive against the NATO
center, and it might do so in hope of both helping
Soviet naval operations and diverting NATO ground
and air forces from the decisive theater. In any case,
however, the Soviets would not launch flank offensives
before having made full preparations for hostilities in
Central Europe.
D. Activities in Other Areas
29. If the Pact were preparing for war with NATO,
the Soviets would also prepare for conflict in the Far
East with Chinese, US, or Japanese forces. On the
mainland, Soviet theater forces would be prepared for
the possibility that China might take advantage of a
war in Europe and attack Soviet forces. In the Pacific,
the Soviets would prepare for action against US naval
and air forces. During a period of tension or crisis we
would expect intensified surveillance and the initiation
of certain preparatory measures by ground, sea, and
air forces, such as the movement of ships to sea to
enhance their survivability as well as to position them
for possible war.
30. The small number of Soviet naval units
deployed in distant areas, such as the Caribbean Sea or
the Indian Ocean, probably have contingency missions
in the event of a NATO-Pact war. These units
probably would be prepared to engage Western naval
forces with conventional or nuclear weapons. Because
of the limited size and capabilities of the Soviet naval
forces, they would be extremely vulnerable to
counterattack. If they were able to carry out their
tasks and survive, they probably would try to join
other Soviet naval forces or-if they could be
resupplied-to disrupt Western shipping.
III. WARSAW PACT DOCTRINE AND
READINESS
A. Doctrine
31. The key elements of Soviet doctrine which
affect how the USSR might initiate war in Europe
include the principles of force superiority, combined
arms, surprise, the stability of the rear, and offensive
initiative.
32. Soviet doctrine emphasizes the need for heavy
superiority in the main battle areas, with strong
reserves-of supplies as well as forces-to ensure the
momentum of the attack. Concentration of force is, of
course, a fundamental principle for all armies, but the
concept has exceptional impact in Russian military
thinking and practice. Its continuing importance to
Soviet planning is demonstrated not only by doctrinal
statements, but also by Pact peacetime dispositions, by
exercises, and by the size of the forces fielded for the
intervention in Czechoslovakia.
33. Another tenet of Soviet doctrine, closely associ-
ated with that of force superiority, is joint action by all
components of the military forces. Each component of
the military establishment is considered to have a
role-if only a contingent one-in any major opera-
tion. Preparations by the ground and tactical air
elements, for example, would be paralleled by
readiness preparations in naval and strategic attack
and defense forces even if these forces were not
required to participate directly in the contemplated
action. Such preparations would be extremely im-
portant in the Soviet view since there would always be
the risk of nuclear war in any large-scale hostilities.
34. Soviet doctrine also stresses achieving surprise
in order to improve the effectiveness of either tactical
or strategic military operations. Although surprise can,
of course, be obtained through ruse or unexpected
tactics, Soviet planners recognize that there is usually a
tradeoff between force superiority and surprise, as
when the chances of surprise are improved by limiting
force size, or the size of the force is increased at the
risk of lessening surprise. In general, the Soviets will
make every effort to achieve both. If forced to choose
between them, they would likely opt for force
superiority. Superiority in forces is real and affords
advantages that are certain; surprise is a less tangible
advantage and always runs some risk of being
compromised, with results that can be counter-
productive.
35. Apart from the purely military aspects of Soviet
doctrine, there is a longstanding insistence on the
importance of the economy, morale, and political
stability of the nation in times of war. If circumstances
permitted, Moscow would institute special administra-
tive and security measures and propaganda campaigns
to ready the people and the public institutions for
conflict as a prelude to any military venture. If there
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were no time, or if surprise were considered essential,
such measures would be taken concurrently with the
opening of hostilities. The Soviets view morale-not
only of the troops but also of the general popula-
tion-as highly important, if not essential, to armed
struggle. They put almost equal stress on the effective
functioning of the political and economic institutions.
The "stability of the rear" was given first place in
Stalin's "permanently operating factors of war," and,
though his words are no longer used, modern Soviet
military theorists emphasize the same thought.
36. Soviet strategy for war in Europe centers on the
doctrine of seizing and holding the strategic initiative
through prompt offensive action by all forces. Pact
primary emphasis
on early launch of a large-sca e o fensive to destroy
the main NATO forces and to seize at the least West
Germany, the Benelux nations, and Denmark in a
campaign lasting less than a month. Although these
address the contingencies of an
actual or threatened NATO attack, the concept would
apply equally well to an unprovoked Soviet attack. In
this case, the shock and suddenness of the Pact
offensive would be intended to prevent NATO forces
from preparing for a counteroffensive or establishing a
fixed defensive line which might force the Pact into
prolonged positional warfare and provide NATO time
to develop its full wartime potential.
B. Warsaw Pact Readiness
37. The principle of the strategic initiative is also
consistent with Pact efforts to maintain capabilities for
rapid mobilization and emergency deployment. Dur-
ing peacetime the Pact countries maintain large
theater and strategic forces at varying levels of
readiness. Details on the readiness of selected elements
of the Warsaw Pact armed forces are contained in the
annex. The basic structure and most elements of the
entire theater force intended for early wartime use are
in being, although usually not at full strength. Most
Soviet strategic offensive forces are maintained at
lower levels of readiness than their US counterparts.
The Soviets apparently believe that a period of
increased tension, called the Period of Threat in
Soviet usage, will precede any major use of military
forces. The peacetime readiness status of Pact forces
reflects the Soviets' heavy reliance on the warning that
they believe such a period would provide, and their
recognition of the political and economic cost of
maintaining continuously a high readiness posture. It
is clear from force organization, deployment, and
readiness that Moscow does expect to have some time
for preparations before hostilities begin. The Soviets
also recognize, however, that an enemy might be
capable of drastically reducing the duration of this
period of tension.
38. Each Pact nation has a dual alert and callup
system
One part of the system, called the
National Defense Readiness Plan (or System), deals
with the mobilization readiness of the national
administration and economy, including the mobiliza-
tion of reserve manpower and civilian equipment for
military duty. The other part is the Pact-wide System
of Combat Readiness, which sets forth readiness, alert,
and mobilization requirements and procedures for the
active armed forces. In combination, these mecha-
nisms provide the control and coordination necessary
to change a country and its armed forces from a
peacetime status to a war footing. The table appended
to this chapter outlines the various alert and readiness
levels and the interrelationship between the two parts
of the system.
A. Response to Crisis
39. Because of the deterrents to war described in
paragraphs 3 through 13 of chapter I, we judge that,
from the beginning of any crisis, the Soviets would
make a major and protracted effort to resolve the
outstanding issue peacefully. They would attempt
diplomatic initiatives, both public and private, might
use pressure tactics or threats, and would prefer any
means other than war which offered a chance for an
acceptable solution.
40. Indeed, we believe that hostilities would more
likely follow from an escalating political crisis than
from an unprovoked decision to resort to war.
Diplomatic efforts in a serious crisis would be
hampered by mutual distrust of and possibly by
misreading of motives, leading to demonstrative or
precautionary military preparations and thereby in-
creasing the chances of further miscalculation and
escalation.
41. This and the following sections in this Estimate
discuss Pact options for initiating war with NATO
from its present political, economic, and military
posture. If, over a period of many months or several
years, relations between the Western and Warsaw
Pact nations deteriorated badly, the political, eco-
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Peacetime
The nation as a whole and the armed forces
maintain Constant National Defense Readi-
ness and Constant Combat Readiness re-
spectively. (These are standard Warsaw Pact
terms designating the peacetime posture.)
Selected elements can be ordered to higher
readiness levels to exercise the system or to
deal with problems not associated with the
international situation.
Period of Threat
Increased international tension would initi-
ate an evaluation of the situation by the
national leadership. Even before the eval-
uation had resulted in a decision, a few
national and armed forces activities-in par-
ticular, intelligence and reconnaissance-
could be ordered increased on a selective
basis. When the national leadership deter-
mines that a significant threat exists, pre-
paratory measures are taken by elements
within the nation having mobilization or
wartime assignments to increase national
readiness to convert rapidly to a war footing.
In the case of an immediate and obviously
severe threat to the nation, preparations may
be directed immediately toward fully mobi-
lizing the economy, the armed forces, and
the territorial, border, and civil defense
forces. During a period of gradually increas-
ing or fluctuating tension, preparations may
be subdivided into a number of phases de-
signed to ensure the availability of forces
appropriate for dealing with each stage of
the developing situation, while at the same
time avoiding unnecessary disruption of the
nation. Although the actual number of
phases used would probably vary with the
particular crisis, the preparations generally
fall into two subdivisions of the overall
Period of Threat.
-The first subdivision, called increased
Readiness, is characterized by various
measures intended to assure the ability of
various components to mobilize rapidly if
required and to increase the likely effi-
ciency of the components once mobilized.
Increased National Defense Readiness
for the nation and Increased Combat
Readiness for the armed forces are or-
dered either immediately for all compo-
nents or on a more selective and gradual
basis. Preparations may be covert and may
include calling selected elements to Full
Readiness. The duration of the period of
Increased Readiness is determined more
by the nature of the crisis than by the time
necessary to complete the preparatory
measures.
Warsaw Pact Alert and Callup System
In Constant National Defense Readiness
the national administration and the economy
satisfy routine armed forces requirements
and create the necessary conditions, such as
stockpiles of equipment, for a rapid mobili-
zation.
In Constant Combat Readiness the armed
forces are not on alert and are conducting
normal peacetime training.
At Increased National Defense Readiness
the nation fulfills tasks that are primarily of
an organizational nature and that produce as
little disruption as possible in the national
economy. Limited organizational changes in
the government and civilian administrations
occur. Equipment and supplies held in
national reserves, together with limited
numbers of reservists, vehicles, and equip-
ment, may be called up from the national
economy. Movement of all transport with
mobilization assignments is restricted.
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At Increased Combat Readiness, units are
placed on alert and take preparatory meas-
ures in anticipation of the declaration of Full
Combat Readiness. Depending on the politi-
cal and military situation, all military forces
within a country, or one branch of service,
one military district, or even one tactical
formation, may be placed on Increased
Combat Readiness. A few of the measures
taken are:
-Command staffs and operations groups b
alerted.
-Communications/command posts readied.
-Operations plans reviewed/modified.
-Security measures increased.
-Troops recalled to barracks and prepared
to deploy.
-Units prepared to receive reservists.
-Selected callups begun.
-Selected unit deployment may be made.
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Warsaw Pact Alert and Callup System (Continued)
-The second subdivision-Full Readiness-
is characterized by measures which pro-
duce a definite transition to a war footing.
Full National Defense Readiness for the
nation and Full Combat Readiness for the
armed forces would be ordered immedi-
ately if the country were under immediate
threat of attack. Because of the likely
confusion and inefficiency of a hurried
mobilization, Pact countries would prefer,
if time were available, to mobilize in a
more phased and orderly manner. Also the
Pact callup system provides for selective
mobilization.
At Full National Defense Readiness govern-
ment ministries and state administrative or-
gans assume their full wartime organizations
and provide services and support to the
armed forces. Reservists and equipment
from the national economy have mobilized
into the armed forces, and industry is con-
verted to the production of war materials.
Full Combat Readiness is the highest armed
forces readiness level. Full mobilization is
ordered and the forces prepare to undertake
combat missions immediately or to deploy
under combat alert conditions. All forces are
intended to achieve Full Combat Readiness
before the outbreak of fighting, although, in
the case of a defense against an immediate
attack, this may not be possible. A few of the
measures taken are:
-Wartime command structure activated.
-Units filled out with reservists.
-Forces deployed, ready to execute war
plans.
-Nuclear warheads released from storage to
user units.
a There are only three readiness levels for the armed forces. There are, however, varying numbers of readiness conditions for weapon
systems.
b In Soviet terminology, an operations group is a group of officers sent by the staffs of major field forces (or forma tions) o the services to
lead a particular grouping of troops (or forces). This group has the means of command, control, and communications and is responsible for
maintaining close coordination with these various staffs of major field forces.
nomic, and military posture of both alliances could be
expected to change. If this were to occur, the
judgments in this Estimate-drawn against the present
political, economic, and military environment-might
no longer be valid.
42. Nonetheless, the contingencies we discuss in this
Estimate could possibly derive from a short, severe
crisis developing from an extraordinary event, such as
a confrontation over Berlin, Yugoslavia, the Middle
East, or a strategic nuclear accident.
B. The Process of Preparing for War
43. For purposes of discussing how the Pact would
go to war, we have categorized expected activities into
four processes: deciding to go to war; internal political
preparation; civil and economic preparation; and
military preparation.
Deciding To Go to War
44. Given the present structure of Soviet political
and military leadership, the decision to prepare for or
initiate war with NATO would necessarily be made by
the full Politburo and almost certainly with the
recommendation of the Defense Council. (See figure
2.) Unless the reason for going to war were obvious to
the principal Politburo members, the decision would
be a contentious and probably protracted process. We
judge it unlikely that the Soviets could perceive a clear
cause or provocation that would not be obvious to the
West as well. Security surrounding such grave
deliberations would be extraordinary, but the decision
process would almost certainly involve scores of high-
level political and military officers. The initial
decision probably would establish the intent to prepare
for or initiate an attack on NATO and the degree of
urgency required. It almost certainly would not
establish the date and time of attack or irrevocably
commit the Soviets to attack. The final decision to
attack might not be made until a few hours before its
execution.
45. We cannot judge to what extent the counsel of
East European leaders would be sought in the initial
decisionmaking process, but the anticipated reactions
of the principal Warsaw Pact allies would almost
certainly weigh heavily in the decision. Sooner or
later, the commitment of principal East European
political and military leaders would almost certainly
be required because their support would be critical in
the execution of a war with NATO.
Political Preparation
46. A major concern of the Soviet leadership would
be to guarantee the support and stability of the
population and public institutions in both the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. Representations to the
regional leadership of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union would probably be made, and a large-
scale propaganda program to motivate the Soviet
populace to support the decision to go to war would be
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Soviet Command Authorities
Peacetime
Politburo
14 Members
National
Political
Authority
National
Military
Authority
Defense Council
Brezhnev (Chairman)
Kosygin
Ustinov (Minister of Defense)
and a few others
Minister
of
Defense
Collegium
Politburo
14 Members
State Committee
for Defense
6 to 14 Members
Chairman
Party General Secretary
(Brezhnev)
Supreme High Command
Supreme Commander in Chief
(Party General Secretary)
Stavka
11 to 20 Members
-------- - -----------
General Staff
I
Armed Forces
575463 3.78
This figure depicts those Soviet command activities which almost certainly would be involved in the decision
to prepare for war. Such deliberations would also likely involve scores of other high-level political and military
officers who would provide staff support for the principals.
planned or initiated. The more critical problem, in the
Soviet view, would be the elicitation of support and
maintenance of firm political control of the populace
and public institutions of the principal East European
allies.
47. Firm representations would almost certainly be
made to the principal political and military leaders of
the East European allies, and massive propaganda
campaigns would likely be orchestrated. Steps to
suppress and control potential dissident movements
would almost certainly be taken. Circumstances
permitting, the Soviets might undertake weeks or
months of such activity to ensure a coherent response
from the East European populace. In the case of a
sudden attack from a peacetime posture, the Soviets
would have to accept the risks of uncertain East
European political backing for their action, although
they might hope to enforce cooperation from the
outset if necessary and establish firm political support
during the initial stage of hostilities through control of
information and a "clear" call to war.
48. In preparing to initiate hostilities with NATO,
the Soviets could not be certain whether the prospec-
tive war would be short or long, nuclear or
nonnuclear, and as a matter of prudence would have
to consider full civil and economic preparations from
the start. As a crisis deepened and the chances of war
increased, the Soviets almost certainly would take
some steps to prepare the nation for war. Such
preparations would continue at an accelerated pace
when a state of Increased National Defense Readiness
was declared. (This state is described in the table
appended to chapter III.)
49. The process of putting industrial and agricul-
tural systems on a full war footing, whether begun
before or after a war started, would be both disruptive
and visible and would take weeks or months to work
out, even with wholly adequate planning. Many of the
measures would have to be implemented promptly.
For example, military control over the transportation
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facilities would have to be established early. Consider-
able time-probably weeks-would be required to
reroute and organize rolling stock to support the
movement and logistics support for the forces in the
field and the changed economic priorities. Likewise,
establishment of military control of critical commodi-
ties could not be delayed.
50. Civil defense preparations would certainly have
to be integrated with the political and economic plans
and would be considered in the early stages of a crisis.
Some preliminary steps might also be taken, such as
preparations to relocate leaders and to make shelters
ready. Other more drastic steps, such as selective
evacuation of cities, would begin, if at all, only in a
period of full preparation for war.
Military Procedures
51. The way in which the Pact modified its military
posture during a crisis would depend largely on the
speed, urgency, and intensity with which the crisis
developed:
- In a slowly developing crisis the Pact countries
might move to institute Increased Combat
Readiness (as defined in the above-cited table).
In such a condition a wide variety of measures
might be undertaken, but these would fall far
short of placing the Pact on a full war footing.
The process need not be continuous; rather there
probably would be periods of holding at interim
levels.
- Once the Soviets had determined that the
likelihood of war was high, the Pact's final
preparations would be initiated by a decision to
go to Full Combat Readiness (as defined in the
table). This decision could occur with or without
the preexistence of a state of increased readiness.
After that decision, preparations for war would
move rapidly and continuously.
52. Warsaw Pact contingency planning identifies
two basic approaches to achieving Full Combat
Readiness:
- The phased approach, to be undertaken while
the Pact still envisaged a chance of avoiding
hostilities, would be to move toward a war
footing in a deliberate and orderly manner,
bringing various force elements to full readiness
sequentially.
- The compressed approach, which would be
undertaken either after the unanticipated out-
break of hostilities or when the Soviets deemed
war both unavoidable and imminent, would
entail readying all forces simultaneously and as
rapidly as possible. The compressed approach
would create forces for commitment to combat
more quickly, but would exacerbate the confu-
sion and disruptions inherent in a transition to a
war footing and would yield combat units-and
especially combat support units-with less than
full capabilities, at least initially, to undertake or
sustain combat operations. In the compressed
approach, unlike the phased approach, there
would be no expectation and little possibility of
modulating the transition process.
C. Attack Options
53. As Soviet leaders were considering the prepara-
tion of Warsaw Pact forces for war with NATO, they
would be faced with deciding the location, timing, and
size of the initial attack on NATO. This decision would
be made against the background of those factors
discussed in the preceding sections of the Estimate:
Soviet planned military objectives; doctrine and plans
for readying the military forces, populations, and
economies of the Warsaw Pact for war; and Soviet
perceptions of NATO capabilities. The major dilemma
facing the Soviet leaders would be the degree to which
they would care to trade off Pact preparedness and
full combat potential called for in their doctrine, for a
greater degree of strategic surprise which might be
granted by a smaller, but quicker attack designed to
preempt the establishment of an organized defense by
NATO.
54. In the following evaluation of the risks and
benefits of alternative Soviet and Warsaw Pact options
for the initial attack, we have defined four Warsaw
Pact options. The first, the standing-start attack,
s included
to present a more complete range of Pact capabilities.
The other three of these options are selected on the
basis of evidence
55. In describing certain of the options, we refer to
Warsaw Pact wartime organizations called fronts. (See
the accompanying inset box.) In discussing the number
of fronts for war in Europe, we refer only to those that
would be in Central Europe and available for
commitment in the initial attack. Warsaw Pact
contingency plans for war in Europe envision the
establishment of a first echelon of three fronts in the
Central Region with additional fronts moved forward
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from the western USSR to form a second echelon. (See
figure 3, the foldout map appended to chapter IV.)
This concept is reflected clearly in
doctrinal literature, and
other documentary evidence. If the USSR should
decide on war in Europe, it probably also would begin
to activate the wartime structure of fronts throughout
the USSR. This could include a front in each
peripheral military district of the USSR from the
Norwegian border to the Soviet Far East.
A Front in the Warsaw Pact
In the Pact concept, a front would be a
combined-arms force usually consisting of three
to five field armies-each numbering three to
five tank or motorized rifle divisions; an air army
of some 600 tactical aircraft; and those naval
elements necessary to accomplish the mission of
the front. The ground forces of the front also
include numerous separate combat and combat-
support elements such as tank, artillery, missile,
and air defense units. A large service-support
element numbering about 100,000 men would
provide the front with transport, maintenance,
engineering, supply, and medical support, as well
as resupply of items ranging from ammunition to
fuel and missiles. The front itself would total
about 400,000 men after full mobilization.
Although not directly comparable to any Western
organization, the front would be similar to the
NATO army group in size, level of command,
and function.
56. Further, we believe that, in all of the options
described below, the Soviets would envisage the use of
forces from the western USSR as reinforcements
against the NATO center and would begin to organize
at least five fronts for use in Central Europe from the
time of the decision to go to full readiness. Three
fronts would be formed from Soviet and East
European forces already in Central Europe and two or
more would be formed from forces based in the
Carpathian, Belorussian, and Baltic Military Districts.
Option I-The Standing-Start Attack
an unprepared, standing-start attack on NATO from
peacetime force posture. The Soviets, however, do
have the capability to attack NATO units using
ground and air combat forces garrisoned near the
inter-German border.
58. As the means of initiating a large-scale war with
NATO, the standing start would, by definition, grant
the advantages of tactical surprise. As many as 10 to 15
Soviet divisions and perhaps several East German
divisions could reach initial combat points and lead or
support such an attack in the Central Region in
somewhat less than 24 hours. By dint of surprise and
local force superiority, Soviet planners would expect-
and might get-some early ground and air victories.
59. These initial successes would likely be the only
advantage which would accrue to such an attack,
however. The considerations which weigh against
initiating a war from a standing start include:
- Loss of Mobilization Advantage. The Soviets
would have to expect that the standing-start
attack would cause NATO to initiate massive and
rapid mobilization, almost simultaneously with
the Pact. The local force superiority created by
such an attack probably could not be maintained
if NATO forces responded effectively. The
Soviets, considering their conservative view of
NATO rapid mobilization capabilities (discussed
in paragraph 4 of chapter I), might well conclude
that the attacking forces could face an adverse
situation before reinforcements could be
committed.
- Rear Service Support. Because Soviet and East
European nondivisional rear service units are
normally manned at far below planned wartime
strength (see the section of the annex beginning
with paragraph 15), the standing-start attack
would initially have to rely on incomplete lines
of communication. If Pact mobilization of rear
service support were inefficient, interdicted, or
otherwise delayed, the operation would face a
high risk of failure. At the outset, the movement
of reinforcement units would be competing
directly with resupply requirements for the
capacity of an unprepared national transport
system.
- Command, Control, and Communications. The
Soviets would not have time to establish a front-
level command, control, and communications
structure until at least several days after the
attack was launched.
- Political and Economic Preparation. The stand-
ing-start attack would not allow for preparation
of the Soviet or East European populace or
national economies for war-a basic requirement
posed in Soviet military literature.
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- Vulnerability and Risk of Escalation. The
standing-start attack would leave other Pact
strategic and general purpose forces-as well as
the national economy-unprepared for ex-
panded hostilities. In particular, the Soviets
would be concerned about the threat of NATO
escalation to nuclear war.
60. These arguments lead us to conclude that there
is virtually no chance that the Soviets would initiate a
war against NATO with an attack from a standing
start.
Option II-Attack With Two Fronts
61. Extensive analysis
leads us to conclude that the smallest force the Pact
would use to start theater offensive operations would
consist of two fronts. This force would be composed
essentially of all Soviet ground and tactical air force
units in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
together with most of the East German and Czechoslo-
vak units which are active in peacetime-a total of
some 40 ground divisions, plus support and tactical air
units. (See figure 3, the foldout map.) While
organizing the initial two-front force, the Soviets and
their allies could begin preparations of other general
purpose and strategic forces and their national
economies for general war and for the risks of nuclear
escalation.
62. Extensive study of Pact contingency plans and
the Pact's theoretical
capability to organize, deploy, and prepare forces for
war in Europe, indicates that, in the most urgent
circumstance, the Pact would need about four days to
prepare a two-front force. While initiation of an
attack with slightly less than four full days of
preparation is possible, the complexity and magnitude
of the operation and the risks attending insufficient
preparation would be likely to cause the Soviets to take
more than four days to prepare this two-front force.
These preparations would be made using a compressed
buildup procedure which would exacerbate the
confusion and disruptions inherent in a transition to a
war footing and would, at least initially, yield combat
units-and especially combat support units-with less
than full capabilities to undertake or sustain combat
operations. Preparations which, in a less demanding
operation, would be undertaken in a phased or
sequential pattern would have to occur simultane-
ously. Before attacking, the Pact would probably:
- Call for a state of Full National Defense
Readiness for all Pact nations.
- Call for a state of Full Combat Readiness for all
Pact forces.
- Mobilize, assemble, move, and prepare for
combat the attacking force-a multinational
force of more than 750,000 men and some
250,000 major items of equipment, some of
which would move over 200 kilometers to their
initial combat positions.
- Bring most of the Pact's tactical aviation to a
readiness posture that would enable it to sustain
large-scale offensive operations in Central Eu-
rope from the outbreak of war.
- Set up at least minimal national systems of
logistics, particularly supply lines, that could
provide some reinforcement and resupply to the
attacking forces.
- Deploy and set up a command and control
system that would enable Moscow to control
adequately a two-front offensive in Central
Europe. The system would include at least some
links to supporting strategic commands and to
forces in other areas.
- Bring land-based strategic offensive and defen-
sive forces to full readiness and deploy them as
necessary to support the initial offensive, to
defend Pact homelands against air attack, and to
hedge against the possibility of rapid escalation
to a massive strategic nuclear exchange.
- Ready and send to sea as many warships as
possible (about half of the Soviet major surface
combatants and about 60 percent of their attack
submarines) to prevent their being attacked in
home ports and to enable them to perform their
assigned roles on the flanks and in direct support
of the Central European offensive (as described
in paragraphs 23 through 27 of chapter II).
- Begin civil defense preparations.
63. By waiting to establish a two-front attacking
force, the Pact would diminish many of the critical
deficiencies of the standing-start attack. Naval capa-
bilities would be substantially improved and the
minimal essentials of the command and control system
could be functioning. This attack option would give
NATO only a few days to organize. Although we
estimate that Pact war planners would expect to
achieve higher force ratios by delaying hostilities
further, the suddenness of the onset could be expected
to provide major advantages by inducing disorder and
reducing NATO time to prepare. The rudiments of
the supply system could support at least early success.
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64. Still, initiating hostilities after only these mini-
mum preparations were made would entail serious
risks for the Pact and would be extremely unlikely
except in the most urgent circumstances. The attack-
ing force itself would lack some front-level elements
and initial combat effectiveness would be less than
could be achieved with further force development and
organization. Because the northern front, made up
mainly of Polish divisions which require extensive
mobilization to prepare for combat, would not yet be
available, the Soviet and East German forces would
have to cover this area. Command and control
capabilities, particularly at the theater level, would
remain incomplete. Pact mobilization would not have
proceeded far enough to ensure immediate followup
forces and supplies for the attack in Central Europe
and effective participation in the war by major forces
in other areas. In particular, early opportunities for
coordinated naval actions or ground and air offensives
on the flanks would be limited.
65. We are agreed that it is extremely unlikely that
the Pact would initiate war from this two-front
posture in other than an extraordinarily time-urgent
circumstance. On this point there are two views. One
holds that the only circumstance which would cause
the Pact to initiate theaterwide offensive operations
against NATO from this posture with only four days of
preparation would be the Soviet perception of the
threat of imminent NATO attack. Although NATO
mobilization would be viewed as a serious threat and
would almost certainly cause the Pact to make coun-
terpreparations, the Soviets would be particularly
averse to initiating an attack with a force not fully
prepared against NATO forces which enjoyed some
advantages of prior preparation or mobilization-
unless threat of imminent NATO attack was clears
66. The other view holds that the Soviets might
choose to attack with the two-front force in a variety
of urgent contingencies. For example, during a serious
East-West political dispute, the NATO countries
(particularly the United States and West Germany)
might undertake a degree of mobilization and other
military preparations to improve their defensive
postures and to demonstrate will in support of the
diplomatic bargaining. The Soviets, of course, might
see this as weakening their own bargaining position, in
particular by threatening to upset the political
advantage afforded them by superiority in forces-in-
being in Central Europe. In such a contingency, and if
8 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
they perceived truly vital interests at risk, the Soviets
might set in motion the rapid buildup and early attack
option. Their efforts would be intended to preempt
NATO defensive and diplomatic preparations and not
an immediate threat of NATO attack.'
Option III-Attack With Three Fronts
67. The third and fourth options are ones in which
Soviet planners, under a less urgent need to defend or
attack, would elect to bring the Pact to full readiness
via a more efficient, phased buildup procedure and to
attack only when the force available for initial
operations totaled three fronts (Option III) or five
fronts (Option IV). The same evidence cited earlier on
Pact buildup planning and procedures indicates that,
in these circumstances, the Pact would require, at a
minimum, about eight days to achieve the three-front
force.
68. The more complete national and military
preparations permitted under Option III would aim at
ensuring a larger and better prepared force for the
attack on NATO, more efficient joint action by all
forces, more effective maintenance of the attack, and
added preparation for contingencies of possible
nuclear war. In this option:
- Those ground forces readied for offensive
operations would consist of most of the Pact units
garrisoned in peacetime in East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia, including all forces
in the two-front grouping described above with
the addition of Polish forces and some additional
Czechoslovak units. A total of some 50 to 60
ground force divisions.
- Pact tactical aviation could deploy forward and
adequately prepare additional aircraft, perhaps
including some from the western USSR, and
would improve its overall capabilities to mount
and sustain large-scale offensive air operations in
Central Europe.
- A more extensive Pact command and control
system would be established at the front, theater,
and national levels. Communications capacity
would be increased, and redundant channels
would be developed to guard against disruption.
- The readiness of Pact civil and military defenses
to withstand NATO counterattacks would be
' The holders of this view are the Defense Intelligence Agency;
the National Security Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
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improved, as would the transition of the econ-
omy to a war footing.
- Additional Soviet ballistic missile submarines
could be readied and deployed, thus furthering
the preparations for nuclear war.
- Naval forces could reach wartime operating areas
in much greater numbers for operations on the
flanks, in support of the Central European
offensive, and in more distant areas.
- Preparation of ground forces would continue
throughout the Warsaw Pact, and they would
develop a capability to undertake early offensive
operations on the flanks, while Pact tactical air
capabilities for supporting flank operations would
substantially increase.
69. The Pact preference for an attack involving
more than two fronts is well supported in Soviet
writing There is
evidence that Pact planners would want at least three
fronts available for initial operations in Central
Europe, with assurance of at least one additional front
for reinforcement within a week of the initiation of
hostilities. This option also fits better than do the
early-attack scenarios with Soviet doctrinal prefer-
ences for force superiority, national preparation, joint-
forces operations, and conservative threat interpreta-
tion. The phased buildup used would offer a
reasonable expectation of an orderly and efficient
transition to an attack posture affording force
superiority, sustainability, and precautions against the
risks of a wider war. This attack option would provide
time for an additional 15 to 20 percent of the Soviet
Navy to deploy. In about a week the Soviets could
probably put about two-thirds of their major naval
combatants and attack submarines to sea in order to
execute the plans indicated in paragraphs 23 through
27 of chapter II. Accordingly, we judge that except in
extraordinarily urgent circumstances (as described in
paragraphs 65 and 66, above) the Pact would prefer to
prepare at least a three-front force prior to initiating
hostilities.
Option IV-Attack With Five Fronts
70. Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build
up even greater forces in Eastern Europe before
initiating hostilities against NATO. A five-front
posture would fulfill Soviet conservative doctrinal
preferences to the extent possible in practical terms
and would take about two weeks to achieve. In this
option:
- The array of Soviet ground and tactical air forces
in the three western military districts of the
USSR constitutes the principal grouping of forces
apparently intended for early reinforcement of
Pact forces in Central Europe. Such additional
forces (about 30 divisions-probably organized
into at least two additional fronts) would
undoubtedly add to the momentum and sustaina-
bility of a Pact attack. The ground forces
available in the European Theater could total
some 90 ground divisions. (See figure 3, the
foldout map.)
- Even further general purpose naval, strategic,
and national defense preparations could be
undertaken prior to Pact attack. The increase in
Pact strength could be continuous, and the Pact
would maintain its capability to attack at any
time.
71. This attack option would, of course, afford
minimal opportunity for surprise, while maximizing
the weight of the attack. This option would also
increase the ratio of Soviet to non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
forces in the theater of operations. In this option, the
longer and phased buildup would offer the greatest
expectation of an orderly and efficient transition to an
attack posture, the greatest sustainability, and most
complete command, control, and communications
network, and it would allow the national transporta-
tion systems to concentrate on resupply with reinforce-
ments already in place.
Summary Judgments and Relative Likelihood
72. In summary, the following judgments are
unanimous within the Intelligence Community and
are based on extensive analysis of all-source data,
planning, an
to the t iration of
military forces in the Central Region.
- The Pact would begin to organize at least five
fronts for use in Central Europe from the time of
the decision to go to full readiness.
- There is virtually no chance that the Soviets
would attack from a standing start.
- The smallest force the Pact would use to begin a
theater offensive would consist of two fronts,
requiring about four days of preparation; except
in an extraordinarily time-urgent circumstance,
it is extremely unlikely the Pact would initiate
war from this posture.
- The Pact would prefer to prepare at least a
three-front force before attacking, and the
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preparation would require, at a minimum, about
eight days.
- Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build
up even greater forces in Eastern Europe before
initiating hostilities against NATO.
73. In paragraphs 57 through 71 we have discussed
the Soviet perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses
of each of the four options and we have estimated
approximate minimum preparation times which
would be required before the Pact could launch a
coherent attack with a force of a given size. Of course,
any Soviet decision on when to attack would be
influenced by a set of sometimes contradictory
military factors, including the USSR's own level of
preparations and its perception of the status of NATO
preparations and deployments, the desire to achieve
surprise, and the urge to develop fully, in advance, as
large a force as possible. We are agreed that the
ultimate decision to attack almost certainly would not
rest on purely military factors, but rather on a
combination of those and political imperatives, the
state of diplomatic negotiations, or other
considerations.
74. Even though the various analysts within
the Community have used the same basic data,
different conclusions have been reached concern-
ing the most likely timing of a Pact attack.
This is due to differing interpretations of data
and judgments about the weighting of the var-
ious military and political factors and consider-
ations. One view 5 interprets the data and draws
conclusions as follows:
two to
three fronts, which are the forces that the Pact
would have available in the forward area in the
four-to-eight-day period.
- The Pact has the most favorable force ratio in
this same period after beginning preparations for
war.
- These factors, in the context of Soviet military
writings and other sensitive materials, emphasize
the importance of surprise.
- Therefore, the four-to-eight-day period is the
most likely time for the Pact to attack.
75. All others believe that it is more likely the Pact
would take at least eight days of preparation
' The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of the Army.
(assembling three to five fronts) before initiating
hostilities. In their view:
- The Pact preference for an attack involving
more than two fronts is well supported in Soviet
writings
- There is no agreed system of calculating force
ratios, and several methods other than that used
to form the preceding view show that greater
force ratios occur after eight days of preparation.
In any case, force ratios would be only one of the
considerations in timing the attack.
- Soviet doctrine calls for force superiority, avail-
ability of resupply and reinforcements, full
preparation for joint action by all components of
the military forces, stability of the rear, and fully
effective command and control, and each of
these is enhanced with eight days or more of
preparation.
- Although the Pact would attempt to achieve both
surprise and force superiority, if forced to choose
between them the Pact would likely opt for force
superiority.
- Soviet military planning is conservative, and the
risks the Soviets would associate with potentially
inadequate preparation would be high.
D. Gradual Buildup
76. As a modification to any of the options
previously discussed, the Soviets, and possibly the Pact
allies, could make gradual preparations for war over
an extended period. There are many changes in their
economic, political, and military posture that the
Soviets can make gradually or piecemeal in response
to a crisis. Steps which increase the combat readiness
of any elements of their military forces could be taken
selectively over an interval of weeks or months. For
example, such steps as the mobilization of rear service
support elements in the forward area
w ich would normally be accomplished
during a period of Full Combat Readiness, could be
accomplished incrementally during a period of no
alert. Such steps, however, would probably be noted
by Western intelligence within days after their
implementation and would be interpreted as modify-
ing the Pact peacetime military posture. Such actions
might result in reactions of a similar nature by NATO
members and would certainly increase NATO intelli-
gence efforts. Though these Pact steps might some-
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what reduce the time necessary to achieve the full
combat readiness of the forces discussed in Options II,
III, and IV, they would be taken at the expense of
likely greater NATO preparedness and vigilance.
77. Other measures which the USSR alone or in
concert with its Pact allies might undertake to carry
out gradually could include more time-consuming but
relatively unprovocative civil and military prepared-
ness steps. These measures would not involve any steps
normally associated with the alert to Full Combat
Readiness. They could entail selected steps achieved
normally during a period of increased readiness. The
following are illustrative of such measures:
78. These kinds of steps can improve the efficiency
of the nation to support a war and the sustainability of
the forces but not necessarily the initial combat
capability of the engaging forces. They would not
greatly improve the Soviet and Pact capability to
move quickly to a posture of Full Combat Readiness
because the large-scale and most time-consuming
actions that are required in each of the previous
options, and which would still be very visible, would
remain to be carried out.
79. There is an added danger for the USSR in
attempting a covert buildup for attack in a period of
calm. At some point in the preparations it would be
necessary to include the other Pact countries, and this
would greatly increase the risks of compromise. The
East Europeans would not easily be persuaded to
cooperate unless they understood and accepted the
reasons for the Soviet intention to initiate war. In any
multinational dialogue on so critical a matter, leaks of
information would be likely. And, if the Soviets did
not bring the other Pact nations in on their plans, the
buildup would not improve the greater part of the
Pact military force which is the least combat ready. In
this case, the USSR would incur the same risks of
attacking without preparing the Pact countries-as it
would in the standing-start attack.
A. Definition of Warning
80. Ideally, intelligence warning of imminent hos-
tilities would have all of the following characteristics:
- Describe preparations that a potential enemy was
taking and state that these steps, if continued,
would enable it to go to war after a specific time
in the near future (hours, days, weeks, months).
- Relate these preparations to the course of crisis-
related events and conclude that the likelihood of
war in the near future had increased.
- Give specific details concerning the potential
enemy's plan for the time, place, manner, and
strength of the initial attack.
- Convey the information convincingly to national
decisionmakers in a clear, timely, and well-
documented form.
81. For the purposes of this Estimate, we define
warning as an intelligence judgment clearly con-
veyed to national decisionmakers that the Warsaw
Pact is taking steps to enable it to go to war in the
near future and that the course of events has
increased the likelihood of war in Europe.' This
degree of warning, although it does not incorporate all
of the elements of ideal warning, could be provided to
national decisionmakers relatively rapidly and would
provide an adequate basis for decisions concerning
appropriate counterpreparations and other courses of
action. We are unlikely to be able to be more
definitive than this in our initial warning and foretell
when the enemy will attack, where he will attack, or
6 This definition of warning is similar to the definition of strategic
warning provided in JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, 3 September 1974, which is: "A notification that
enemy-initiated hostilities may be imminent. This notification may
be received from minutes to hours, to days, or longer prior to the
initiation of hostilities."
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whether he will attack at all. The perceived pattern of
activity on which the initial warning would be based is
likely to be consistent with Soviet intentions other than
a planned attack on NATO: such as preparations to
defend, take a stiffer stand, achieve a better bargain-
ing position in the crisis, or take action in a different
theater. Certain key military activities, such as: the
pattern of movement of ground force units to initial
combat positions, may allow us to predict the likely
scope, location, and timing of the attack. This type of
continuing attack assessment would be the major
concern of intelligence following the initial warning
that the Pact was taking steps which would enable it to
go to war in the near future, but is not considered in
this Estimate.'
B. Warning Indicators 8
82. The following judgments on our ability to sense
that the Warsaw Pact is taking steps to enable it to go
to war in the near future derive from our ability to
monitor, on a near-real-time basis, the normal pattern
of Soviet and East European civilian and military
activity in peacetime. Our confidence in "sensing Pact
preparation for war is based on our judgment that
significant early changes would almost certainly be
initiated in a wide range of civilian and military
activities as the Pact assumed a posture which would
enable it to start a war.
Indicators of the Decision
83. The earliest indicators that the Soviet Union
was taking steps which would enable it to initiate war
in Europe would be potentially available as the Soviets
were making the decision to undertake them. Because
of the extraordinary security which would surround
such discussions, however, there is little likelihood that
direct evidence of a Soviet decision to prepare for war
would be available before clear evidence of its
execution. Indications that an important decision was
being considered could be apparent at the time,
however.
84. Because we judge it extremely unlikely that the
Soviet Union would initiate an attack on NATO
without the volunteered, elicited, or enforced coopera-
' The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines
attack assessment as follows: "An evaluation of information to
determine the potential or actual nature and objectives of an attack
for the purpose of providing information for timely decisions."
8 For a detailed listing of warning indicators of war preparations
in Europe, see USIB-D-28.6/6, USIB General Indicator List for
USSR/Warsaw Pact Countries. 11 lone 1974 (Top Secret
tion of its East European allies, indications that critical
Pact decisions were being taken (including the possible
decision to go to war) could be observed in a variety of
activities throughout the Warsaw Pact countries.
These could include:
85. Such activities are not likely to be interpreted
by Western intelligence analysts as clear indications of
Pact intent to prepare for war. They would, however,
raise US and NATO awareness of possible imminent
Pact activity of some kind, and increase the likelihood
that indications of actual preparations would be
interpreted quickly.
86. Strong signals that the USSR or the Pact was
considering whether to prepare for or to initiate war
could, of course, be reported to one of the NATO
intelligence services directly from one of the Pact
principals or staff members involved in the decision
Indicators of Political Preparations
87. Eliciting and enforcing the support of the Soviet
and East European population for a major attack on
NATO could not be accomplished in a low-key
manner. A clear statement of the grave threat to the
Pact nations and tightened internal political security
controls are likely to precede or accompany large-scale
war preparations. Clear indications that the Pact
leadership was taking steps to ensure the political
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stability of the Warsaw Pact nations, including the Increased National Defense Readiness would prob-
Soviet Union, would likely include: ably include:
As a crisis deepened, or if the Soviets and their Pact
allies decided to initiate war soon, the stridency of
their official statements and propaganda would likely
increase markedly and they would begin widespread
arrests of potential dissidents in the USSR and Eastern
Europe.
88. The transition of the national economies of the
Pact to a wartime posture would, in general, involve:
(1) civil defense, (2) increasing production of war
materiel, (3) controlling critical commodities, and (4)
organizing transportation systems to support military
activity. There is little question that such activities
would occur as the Pact countries prepared for war,
although their timing in relationship to military
preparations is difficult to predict.
89. If Pact preparations for war were protracted,
civil and economic activities could provide early
indicators of Pact intent. These could include:
90. Soviet doctrine anticipates that a critical step in
preparing the populace and national economy for war
is the declaration of a state of Increased National
Defense Readiness. The declaration, even if not
published, would be widely communicated through-
out the Soviet Union and would, in itself, be a firm
indication that the Soviets were preparing for the
contingency of war. Actions associated with a state of
91. Similarly, declaration of a state of Full National
Defense Readiness, even if not published, would be
widely communicated and would, in itself, clearly
signal the serious Soviet (or Pact) intent to prepare for
war. The declaration and associated measures would
be impossible to mask. Indicators associated with a
state of Full National Defense Readiness probably
would include such activities as:
Indicators of Military Preparations
92. As discussed in chapter III of this Estimate, the
military forces of the Soviet Union and its Pact allies
are maintained in a peacetime posture which keeps
only selected forces in a relatively high state of
readiness, and a large military unit structure which
can be rapidly mobilized to generate large forces to
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deter aggression or to undertake major offensive
operations.
93. The Pact nations consider this posture to be a
state of Constant Combat Readiness. A key step in
beginning the process of preparing military forces for
the contingency of war is declaration of a state of
Increased Combat Readiness. Indicators of prepara-
tory measures necessary to achieve this level of
readiness include:
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94. As the Pact moved from a posture of increased
readiness to one of full readiness, a much more visible
series of activities would occur, including:
C. Security, Concealment, and Deception
95. The Warsaw Pact nations, and particularly the
correctly interpret some indicators of their prepara-
Soviets, have the capability and the experience to
employ many techniques of security, concealment,
and deception that could affect our ability to detect or
Stringent Security
96. The first line of Soviet defense against detection
of military preparations would be rigid security. This
would be attempted through a multitude of means,
including: restriction of planning to a minimum
number of people, total control of the press and other
media, rigid counterintelligence and political controls
on the populace and members of the armed forces,
denial of travel by foreigners (and most citizens as
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well) in areas of military activity, conduct of troop
movements and other observable preparations
Concealment and Deception
98. The Soviets would expect that NATO would be
alerted in a crisis, and they could not hope to hide all
their military preparations for war. Therefore, their
best chance for deceiving NATO, if they were
preparing for hostilities, would be to mislead NATO as
to the scope and purpose of the preparations. They
could institute the following political and military
deception, propaganda, and misinformation tactics:
to the particular political and military situation in
which they are to be employed. This would weigh
against elaborate use of concealment and deception in
hastily prepared attacks. Attacks prepared with
greater deliberation over a longer period of time
would offer greater opportunities for concealment and
deception.
99. Once the Pact had made a decision that war is
inevitable, it would sanction at least selective interfer-
ence with our intelligence collection. This could
include space-based systems. The USSR has a variety
of capabilities, ranging from selective jamming of
military communications links to outright destruction
of intelligence satellites. While such interference
would degrade Western intelligence, it would, in
itself, constitute a strong warning indicator.'
D. Detection Time
100. We are, in any case, confident of the ability of
US and Allied intelligence to detect and correctly
interpret a great number of indicators which would be
given if the Pact were to prepare for a large-scale war
with NATO. In general, this confidence is based on:
101. We are confident that we could inform
decisionmakers that the Soviet Union-with or with-
out its Pact allies-was taking steps which would
enable it to go to war in the near future within one
day of the beginning of activity associated with the
move to Full National Defense Readiness and Full
Combat Readiness.
To be effective, concealment and deception operations
must be carefully and extensively planned and tailored
9 See NI IIM 77-001J, "Prospects for Soviet Interference With US
Space Systems During Crisis or Conflict," January 1977.
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102. Further, we are reasonably confident that we
would warn of Pact actions to achieve a state of
Increased National Defense Readiness or Increased
Combat Readiness within a day.
108. Preparation of a two-front attack from the
normal Pact peacetime posture would almost certainly
require declaration of Full Combat Readiness and
E. Warning Time
103. Warning time-the period between warning
of Pact preparations for war and initiation of
hostilities-would, of course, vary according to the
timing and sequence of key Pact preparations.
Option I
104. A Soviet standing-start attack from a peace-
time posture would be designed to provide as little
warning to NATO as possible. In considering such an
attack, the Soviets, we assume, would forgo political
preparation and a period of increased readiness which
might alert NATO. Nonetheless, the Soviets could not
prepare the attacking force for this initial assault
without calling most of the groups of Soviet forces in
Europe to a state of Full Combat Readiness. Minimal
preparation and movement of 15 or so Pact divisions
to attack positions on the inter-German border would
probably require somewhat less than 24 hours. In
addition, the Soviets would certainly not risk initiating
war without first bringing their strategic nuclear
forces to a status of Full Combat Readiness.
106. The forward movement of an attack force of
some 15 divisions would provide many additional
indicators to NATO intelligence which routinely
monitors military activity in East Germany. This
massive movement would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to mask as an exercise for long.
107. Accordingly, in the extremely unlikely case of
an unprovoked attack on NATO from a peacetime
posture, we judge that US and Allied intelligence
could sense and would report the massive movement
within hours of
the beginning of preparation. Suc activity would
provide sufficient intelligence for Allied commanders
and decisionmakers to take precautionary steps.
Because of the extremely unlikely nature of such an
event, however, interpretation of this activity would
be ambiguous and a final judgment that an attack was
imminent might not be reached before hostilities
occurred.
Full National Defense Readiness.
Moreover, the
Soviet Union and its Pact allies would likely take steps
to ensure political stability at least in the East
European Pact countries. Even if the alert were
accomplished covertly, a host of indicators that a full
readiness posture was being taken would be available
and would almost certainly be interpreted and
warning conveyed to decisionmakers within one day.
We have concluded (chapter IV, paragraph 62) that
the Pact would require about four days to prepare for
the two-front attack; thus US and NATO decision-
makers would almost certainly have three days or
more of warning.
109. Available evidence on Pact plans to prepare
for a three-front offensive against NATO indicates
that the Pact would plan on about eight days of
preparation at a minimum before initiating the attack.
Although these preparations could proceed in a
phased, organized manner, they would be massive and
would almost certainly be initiated by an alert to Full
Combat Readiness and Full National Defense Readi-
ness. Propaganda broadcasts would probably be an
orchestrated part of the preparation process.
110. Even though these preparations would be
undertaken using a phased-buildup approach, they
would, if accomplished in eight days, constitute a
prodigious logistics effort. From a peacetime posture
of some 950,000 active ground force troops in the
Central Region, the Pact would have mobilized some
600,000 men, brought some 30 understrength or cadre
divisions to full strength, moved the some 56 divisions
to initial combat positions, prepared them for combat,
set up wartime command and control networks, and
established logistics lines of communications.
the simultaneous widespread
activities which the Pact military would necessarily be
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undertaking would raise many alarms in the US and
Allied intelligence networks that the Pact was
vigorously taking steps to prepare for war. A judgment
that this was the case could be provided national
decisionmakers within a day of the Pact alert to full
readiness status. Accordingly, US and Allied decision-
makers would almost certainly have at least seven days
of decision and preparation time preceding a full Pact
attack with three fronts.
Option IV
112. The pattern of activity involved in developing
a full five-front attack force in Europe would be
similar to that of the three-front force, although the
pace might be reduced somewhat. We judge that
about two weeks would be required to alert, fill out by
mobilization, transport to the East European theater,
and prepare for combat the combat and support
elements that would make up the two additional
fronts.
113. To achieve a full five-front posture in the
minimum time, the Pact would have to initiate the
preparation process by declaring Full National De-
fense Readiness and Full Combat Readines
With two weeks to prepare, however, the Pact would
have greater opportunities to mask its intentions in the
earliest stages of preparation. Nonetheless, Western
intelligence would almost certain! be able to sense the
change in overall osture
Therefore, we judge that in the case of a five-front
attack option, intelligence could provide warning that
the Pact was taking steps which would enable it to go
to war in the near future, possibly within hours, but
certainly within a day or two of the initial order to go
to increased readiness. Accordingly, US and NATO
decisionmakers would have 12 days or so of warning
time.
F. Effects on Warning of a Gradual Buildup
114. Gradual Pact preparations for hostilities, either
as a deliberate policy in preparation for some sur-
prise action including attack, or in a period of political
crisis, would present more analytic problems for US
intelligence than would the sudden and widespread
implementation of war preparations. Although a
gradual implementation would provide us more
opportunities to detect some of the preparations and
more time to validate our information, the early
preparations would probably be ambiguous and might
be difficult to distinguish from routine force improve-
ments or exercises. Such incremental preparations
would provide the Soviets opportunities for conceal-
ment and deception, but the effectiveness of such
measures would decrease in proportion to their scale.
115. In a period of political crisis we would be
expecting the USSR and its Pact allies to undertake
some readiness measures, and both the collection and
analytic elements of the Western community would be
alerted to recognize and report promptly any unusual
activity. In these circumstances the Pact might refrain
from hiding some preparations in order to signal its
resolve and determination. It might, in fact, undertake
some fairly overt alerting and mobilization of units, as
well as civil defense and other civilian preparations. In
this case, which might involve a crisis of some weeks
or months, we would almost certainly issue a series of
preliminary warnings that the Pact was taking steps to
improve its readiness for hostilities, but we would also
be able to judge that final preparations (that is, a
general imposition of Full Combat Readiness and the
deployment of large combat forces) had not yet been
undertaken. 25X1
116. If the crisis continued and both sides took a 25X1
number of preparedness measures in an action-
reaction situation, the dangers of war as a result of
escalation or miscalculation would clearly be increas-
ing. It would be particularly difficult in these
circumstances for intelligence to judge whether Pact
preparations were essentially defensive against a fear
of NATO attack or were being made for possible
offensive operations. We would, however, be able to
judge that the Pact was improving i abilit to
initiate hostilities on short notice. 25X1
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117. Because of the high risks and costs involved,
the Pact would defer general mobilization, major
deployments of combat forces, and other highly visible
and provocative measures until the final move to full
readiness. We therefore believe that even after some
months of preparation, when a final or contingent
decision to attack was made, there would still be a
discernible difference in the nature, scope, and pace of
preparedness measures which would alert us and
enable us to provide warning that the Pact was
initiating the final steps which would enable it to go to
war in the near future. Accordingly, even with a
gradual buildup, we believe we would detect within a
day the final move to full readiness to attack.
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118. A period of gradual preparations would required to prepare the attack could also be reduced,
improve Pact combat effectiveness and civil prepared- perhaps by as much as a day or more. We would,
ness under any of the postulated buildup options. however, already have issued warnings, probably
Depending on the number and nature of the measures repeatedly, of a growing danger of hostilities.
already taken and the political circumstances, the time
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ANNEX
MILITARY READINESS
1. The intent of this annex is to provide additional
background information on the readiness of various
components of Pact forces. It begins by briefly
discussing the strategic forces, both offensive and
defensive. It then discusses, in more detail, the theater
forces-ground, air, and naval. It does not make an
overall estimate of how long the Pact forces would
take to prepare wartime operations.
A. Strategic Forces
2. Despite the emphasis the Soviets give in their
military writings to the requirement for high combat
readiness, their strategic forces are not normally
maintained at high levels of readiness. This posture
probably is the result of policy decisions based on a
number of considerations. Chief among these is a
belief that a period of increased tension will precede
conflict. Other factors probably include confidence on
the part of the Soviets in their early warning
capabilities, the survivability of some of their offensive
systems, the rapidity with which some strategic forces
can achieve full readiness, and an appreciation of the
costs that high combat readiness entails.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force
3. We believe that in peacetime the Soviet ICBM
force is not maintained at the highest readiness.
Nevertheless, a significant portion of the force is
capable of reacting a few minutes after receipt of a
launch order even if not at Full Combat Readiness.
There does not appear to be any technical reason why
a significant portion of the entire silo-based force
cannot be held at Full Combat Readiness levels for
long periods-that is, months.
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The new D-class SSBNs could
launch their missies from their home ports, or very
close to them. Units of other classes, however, would
require, even with high-speed transits, about six days
to reach suitable launch areas for US targets.
Strategic Bombers
6. The Soviets do not normally maintain any
strategic bombers at high readiness. The long-range
bombers and tankers in Long Range Aviation (LRA)
are concentrated at a relatively small number of
bases-a practice which constitutes a degree of
vulnerability. Also we believe that they are not
maintained in a condition appropriate for immediate
launch. Thus, the launch of the Soviet strategic
bomber force from its peacetime posture would
require at least several hours
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7. Even without launching aircraft, it would
require several hours to bring LRA forces to Full
Combat Readiness at their home bases.
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available, most LRA regiments probably would
disperse in order to reduce vulnerability. The entire
process probably would require many hours if not
days.
assemble and check out two interceptors in the launch
area support facility. When these preparations are
finished, the two interceptors could be moved to the
launch pads, fueled, and launched in about one hour.
Strategic Defensive Forces
8. Soviet strategic defensive forces are normally
maintained in a state of Constant Combat Readiness,
but there are various readiness conditions for weapon
systems. Only a small portion of defensive forces are
ever at the higher readiness conditions. There seems to
be a standard procedure of rotating units between the
various readiness conditions so that, at any one time, at
least some components of a major unit are immedi-
ately available for combat.
9. Air Defense Aviation. The Warsaw Pact main-
tains a small portion of its air defense aircraft in a high
state of readiness for air defense emergencies. In
peacetime, two to four aircraft from each of the Soviet
and East European air defense regiments are kept on
alert and ready to take off within minutes. It would
take about four hours for most of the other regimental
aircraft to reach full readiness. If redeployment to
dispersal airfields were required, the time for the
entire force to reach full readiness would increase to
between eight and 24 hours.
10. Air Defense SAMs and Radars. Surface-to-air
missile regiments and brigades are not normally held
in the highest readiness stage. Instead, a rotation
system is used to maintain a "quick reaction"
capability. Under this system, one or two battalions of
a regiment or brigade are held in a condition which
allows them to be ready to fire in less than 10 minutes.
It could take as long as two hours, however, for an
entire regiment or brigade to reach Full Combat
Readiness. Units engaging in maintenance would take
several additional hours to reach full readiness. The
radar elements of these SAM units have similar
constraints.
11. Antiballistic Missiles. About 75 percent of the
launchers in the Moscow antiballistic missile system
are normally equipped with missiles, and much of the
system would be capable of operation within the time
available from tactical warning. The radars require up
to five minutes to reach operational status, after which
the missiles on launchers could be fired immediately.
12. Antisatellite System. The Soviet orbital inter-
ceptor has been operational since 1971. After a
decision to prepare the system for launch has been
made, we estimate that it would take about one day to
B. Theater Forces
13. Soviet theater forces-ground, air, and naval
units-are normally maintained at various peacetime
preparedness conditions. Soviet forces in Eastern
Europe are maintained at the highest levels of
preparedness. Soviet forces in the border military
districts, both in the western USSR and along the
Chinese border, are less prepared. Those forces in the
interior of the USSR are maintained at even lower
levels of readiness.
14. The following discussion addresses both Soviet
and East European forces since all of them in Central
Europe are arrayed against NATO. Indeed, the Soviets
have placed increased reliance on the East Europeans
in recent years. East European forces also reflect
Soviet readiness practices. But East European forces,
for the most part, are less ready than their Soviet
counterparts in Eastern Europe.
15. In peacetime Warsaw Pact ground force units,
together with their support and command and control
structures, are maintained at widely varying strength
and preparedness levels. As these units mobilize
during the transition to a war footing, they would
reach Full Combat Readiness over varying periods of
time. Most divisions which are active in peacetime
could be filled out within a few days. But Pact
doctrine calls for the use of such divisions as parts of
army and front* organizations and many army- and
front-level elements particularly rear service units,
require longer to mobilize than the combat units
which they support. Additional units, with little or no
real structure in peacetime, would continue to
mobilize throughout the course of a war. In calculat-
ing the time at which various portions of this force can
be applied against potential Pact opponents, such
factors as the time necessary to set up effective
command and control, logistics, and transportation
facilities, movement time, and time necessary for
preparations for combat also must be considered.
16. The combat elements of Soviet ground forces in
Central Europe would require some preparation to
*For a description of a Pact front, see the inset box referenced in
paragraph 55 of chapter IV.
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Top Secret RUFF
achieve full combat effectiveness. But, if required to
act immediately, Soviet divisions can vacate their
garrisons within about two hours and could conduct
combat operations soon thereafter. Although most of
the East European forces are manned at lower levels,
some of their divisions could conduct limited combat
operations on short notice. These Soviet and East
European divisions maintain detailed alerting proce-
dures and rehearse them frequently.
17. The Soviets maintain seven airborne divisions in
a high state of readiness, all inside the USSR. Using all
of the some 700 medium and heavy aircraft that
belong to the USSR's military air transport fleet, the
Soviets could move the assault elements of two
divisions. This would be unlikely, however, because
many of the aircraft would be needed to fulfill other
high-priority requirements that would arise at the
outset of a war. In a more likely case, the Soviets could
deliver the assault elements of one airborne division,
with three days' supplies, to a distance of 1,600
kilometers (850 nautical miles) using as few as 350
medium transports. These elements would have
limited ground mobility, however. There is also one
Polish airborne division, but it would depend mainly
on Soviet aircraft for mass airborne operations. (See
also paragraph 29 of this annex.)
18. Significant portions of the Soviet and other
Warsaw Pact rear services required for wartime
operations do not exist during peacetime. The Warsaw
Pact has developed plans for rapid mobilization of
major elements, such as medical and transport units,
from the civilian economy to support Pact operations
in a war with NATO. The following items are but a
few of those required for such a shift (the time
required to mobilize and deploy these elements would
vary):
- Organize and deploy large rear service units
(medical, maintenance, POL, transportation,
administrative, etc.) forward to the battle area.
Each front could have some 100,000 personnel
and 60,000 vehicles in its rear service
organization.
- Provide theater, front, and army units with
enough depot supplies (fixed and mobile) to meet
established norms; these norms are designed to
assure adequate supplies throughout an offensive
despite some disruption of the resupply effort.
- Reorganize the transportation system (including
the lines of communication) between the USSR
and the forward area to support a NATO-Pact
war. This includes, among other things, mobiliz-
ing large rail and highway transportation units
from the civilian sector.
19. The Soviets and their Pact allies do not
maintain wartime command, control, and communi-
cations networks in peacetime. The establishment of
the wartime structure for command and control would
be complex and time consuming. The Soviets'
concern for tight, centralized control over military
operations makes it very unlikely that they would elect
to begin combat operations without adequate com-
mand and control. At a minimum, Moscow authorities
would need multiple means of direct communications
with front and army commanders. In addition, within
the front, the establishment of communications links
necessary for battle management is critical. Without
such links, commanders could not control their forces.
A few measures that would have to be accomplished
include:
- Establishment of extensive communications and
data transmission networks.
- Activation of command posts, including deploy-
ment of commanders and staffs.
- Dispatch of operations groups and liaison
personnel.
- Review and adjustment of battle plans and
issuance of combat orders.
20. The actual time it would take the Pact to
convert from a peacetime to a wartime command and
control system is not known.
21. In a crisis in which the Pact had some control
over the timing of events, the Pact would plan to
prepare the ground forces for war in a phased,
deliberate manner. Initial preparations would be
aimed at improving combat efficiency, and at
enhancing readiness to mobilize and would bring
selected force elements to Full Combat Readiness.
The phased implementation toward full readiness is
designed to assure the availability of forces appropri-
ate to different stages of an international crisis and to
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increase the chances of an orderly and efficient
transition to a war footing while at the same time
avoiding premature or unnecessary disruption of the
economy. In a slowly developing crisis the Pact,
because of the phased nature of the progression
toward readiness, would be able to hold most ground
forces at preparedness plateaus short of Full Combat
Readiness. If the Pact used a phased mobilization
plan, our best evidence indicates that it would take six
days to bring its ground forces as well as a large
portion of its logistics and command and control
structures to Full Combat Readiness. This assumes
that there were no delays or plateaus in the
implementation of full readiness. This does not
consider deployment and final preparation time for
particular postures which the Pact might desire to
attain prior to initiating hostilities. Depending on the
posture desired, either the same or more time would
be required.
22. Alternatively-in an extremely urgent situa-
tion-all Pact ground forces could move directly and
simultaneously from a peacetime posture to full
readiness. This procedure would maximize mobiliza-
tion speed but would result in greater confusion and
lower initial combat efficiency. Using this procedure,
our best evidence indicates that the Pact would plan to
cut in half the time required for its ground forces and
a large portion of its logistics and command and
control structures to reach Full Combat Readiness.
Once again, this does not consider total time needed to
achieve a particular desired Pact operational posture.
meeting the concomitant requirements for additional
trained maintenance personnel. In some cases short-
ages of such personnel- have persisted for more than a
year following delivery of new aircraft.
26. We estimate that it would take a minimum of
48 hours for the Pact air armies in Central Europe to
deploy their wartime command post structure and
establish the command and control required to engage
in offensive air combat operations in support of a
front commander. We believe, however, that it would
take a total of about 72 hours to make the command
and control preparations (including the updating of
battle plans) needed to support a coordinated theater-
wide air offensive, including LRA, against NATO
airfields, nuclear weapon sites, and other priority
targets as envisaged in Pact plans.
27. The other requisite preparations for a major
offensive action could probably be accomplished
within the time specified above. These would include
any final maintenance and the arming and fueling of
aircraft, and the activation of additional airfields for
dispersal or recovery purposes.
28. The introduction of additional aircraft from the
western USSR into Central Europe would not be
required prior to the initiation of combat. Should they
decide to deploy these aircraft from the western USSR
into the forward area, however, the Soviets could
complete this deployment within 72 hours of the
decision to do so.
23. Some Tactical Aviation regiments are prepared
to conduct limited combat operations within three
hours, and most within 10 hours, utilizing existing
peacetime strengths, locations, and command and
control means. The principal problem areas appear to
involve the peacetime manning practices of Pact air
forces and the need to set up extensive command and
control facilities prior to major offensive operations.
24. Pact air forces in Central Europe have hereto-
fore been judged to be manned at or near their
intended wartime operating strengths. Recent evi-
dence indicates that there is some undermanning,
particularly in support units.
25. Another factor which appears to be adversely
affecting the current readiness of specific Soviet and
possibly non-Soviet Pact air force units is maintenance.
Defectors have indicated that Soviet units which are
receiving new aircraft have experienced difficulties in
Military Transport Aviation
29. We estimate that about 80 percent of the Soviet
Military Transport Aviation (VTA) aircraft are oper-
ationally ready on a day-to-day basis and, like Tactical
Aviation units, would require little preparation to
reach full combat readiness. We estimate that about
six to eight hours would be required to recover those
aircraft which are flying routine training missions,
service them, change crews as required, brief the new
missions, and reconfigure the aircraft for their desig-
nated missions. During the transition to a war footing,
civil aircraft (for example, those of Aeroflot) would be
placed under military control. This might take several
days or more.
30. In addition to the tactical nuclear systems, such
as army surface-to-surface rockets and missiles and
tactical nuclear aircraft which are integral parts of the
theater air and ground forces, a portion of the longer
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range missile, bomber, and ballistic missile submarines
just discussed also provide theater support. These
include medium-range and intermediate-range ballis-
tic missiles, intermediate-range bombers, and some
support by naval delivery systems such as older class
ballistic missile submarines. Most of the strategic and
peripheral strike systems used in a theater support role
could be brought to Full Combat Readiness within
hours as could theater-based tactical nuclear aircraft.
Readying ground forces surface-to-surface rockets and
missiles is complicated by the requirement to process
and distribute warheads from central storage areas.
More than one day would likely elapse before a major
portion of this force could be ready to conduct nuclear
operations.
31. Principal Surface Combatants. The normal
peacetime status of Soviet major surface units is as
follows:
Major Overhaul ......
20-25
Unavailable
Minor Repair or Re-
fresher Training
25-30
. Reduced Readiness
Home Waters ..........
35-40
Operable
Deployed ..................
10-15
At Sea
Under normal peacetime conditions about half the
Soviet major surface combatant force is ready for
combat or could be ready within a day or two.
the readiness of naval forces were increased during an
extended period of tension, the number of ships able to
put to sea on short notice would be increased, while
training and maintenance probably would be acceler-
ated to improve combat effectiveness. Many of the
combatants undergoing minor repair or in refresher
training following repairs probably could regain an
acceptable level of combat readiness within a week or
two and most could be made combat ready within two
months. The rest of the force-in long-term overhaul
or modification-would be unavailable for combat
operations even with several months' preparation.
32. The operationally available ships in home
waters provide the Soviet Navy with a capability for
contingency deployments in crisis situations, but
transit times to operating areas are substantial-from
days to weeks. Ships of the Northern Fleet would
require about three days to reach the critical operating
areas in the vicinity of Iceland.
33. Attack Submarines.
34. The Soviets' practice of keeping most of their
submarines in port and ready for deployment makes a
large number of submarines rapidly available for
action in areas close to the USSR. But unless there
were time for transit to Atlantic Ocean areas-1,500 to
3,000 nautical miles distant-at best the Soviets would
have only a few submarines on station in those waters.
35. Naval Aviation. Naval aircraft normally main-
tain a low level of peacetime activity. Most naval
aircraft could reach full combat readiness in several
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time to operating areas in Europe could take several
hours, while deployment to overseas airfields, such as
those in Cuba or Guinea, would take longer.
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