PRESS CLIPPINGS NOVEMBER 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000501440001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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Miscellaneous
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THE NEW REPUBLIC
8 November 1980
Thinking the unthinkable.
The New Brinksmanship
by Tad Szulc
For the first time since the 1960s, the possibility of
nuclear war with the Soviet Union appears to be
seriously accepted by key figures inside and outside the
US government. What long have been unthinkable
though tnow are entertained by influential men and
women in Washington. Meanwhile the Carter admin
istration is moving apace with measures designed to
prepare the US-and US public opinion-for the con-
tingency of major wars. It is a new phenomenon, based
on the hardening conclusion that the Soviet Union's
overwhelming concern, aside from a determination to
achieve strategic superiority over the US, centers on
assuring itself of military endurance and survival as a
functioning society after a protracted nuclear ex-
change. A senior White House foreign policy specialist
says: "In 30 years, I never thought war was really
possible: now I think it is possible-if not necessarily
probable.-
...What does it all mean and where does it lead? Is it a
question of correct or incorrect perceptions held by
officials in Washington and Moscow? What are the
implicit dangers of such attitudes? There are no pre-
cise answers to these questions. But certain 'realities
are observable. In the US, the military response to the'
perceived Soviet threat includes the go-ahead for
the MX mobile missile system, the work on the"invisi-
.ble" Stealth bomber, a controversial 'shift in nuclear
targeting strategy against the Soviet Union, recent
decisions to. accelerate the production of weapons-
grade plutonium, and the restoration of US chemical
warfare capability. These preparations are developing
in a new. psychological climate that has evolved steadily
since early 1980 and goes well beyond the forums of
the presidential campaign.
The new climate, dampening the euphoria of the.
Soviet-American detente of. the last decade, can be
traced to. the mounting evidence of the build-up of-
Soviet nuclear and conventional forces, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan last December, and, most
recently, the dangers surrounding thecurrentPersian
Gulf hostilities. Thoughtful analysts at, the Pentagon
and the National Security' Council staff emphasize
Soviet advances in the accuracy of their huge SS-18
missiles (plus the fact that their throw-weight greatly
exceeds that of US intercontinental missiles); the
deployment of medium-range SS-20 missiles in Europe,
and the direct involvement of combat forces beyond 1
Soviet borders, from Angola and Ethiopia to Afghan-, I
istan. "The grand development in recent years by the
Soviets is the projection of their power into the world,"
says a senior Pentagon expert. And 'frequent and
unexplained movements of Soviet troops, have wor-
ried the administration and have led to secret alerts by
US armed forces this year.
The result of all this is that the hawks and doves in
and out of the government nowadays speak in strik-
ingly similar language about the inexorable deteriora-
tion in Soviet-American relations and its long-range
consequences-although their points of emphasis vary.
Of course nobody in Washington. desires or actually
predicts a nuclear war. But the Carter administra-
tion-and the Reagan team-are proceeding along a
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'ouble track. There is a desire on both sides to-obtain adversaries ..: attacked the United States of mer-
. drawing by Vint Lawrence
some kind of SALT agreement to limit.nuclear arse-ica," he said, ,"they will be committing suicide.".
nals (if it is acceptable to the Senate inits present form) Underlying this statement ' are ` Carter. administra
or if Moscow is prepared to .negotiate a Reagan-{ , tion assurances (questioned; by his critics) that , an,,".
inspired text). Yet at the same: time. there "is a .clear!. ': essential strategic equivalence 'currently'.exists be-
disposition i..
to strengthen. US`. defenses. through ?allj tween the United. States and the Soviet Union. The
available means.
President Carter set forth his philosophy of nuc learl
war at a news conference on September I8,,explaining
the reasons for setting yin motion the development ofd
the MX missile and,foi the new concept of strategic;
,
e
.targeting of the Soviet Union. "It's crucial for our.l.. . States is ahead in warheads. The present count (veri:- %.
nation, for our allies, and for our potential adversaries fied,under SALT I procedures) is 1,398 ,land-based.-,
to know that-if necessary -atomic weapons would bel intercontinental. ballistic`, missile launchers and 950
used to defend our nation,'. said :Carter.."And that;? submarine-launched 'ballistic missiles for .the. Soviet
knowledge is the deterrent that would prevent all. Union, and 1,054- ICBM' launchers and 656 ,SLBM
potential adversary from attacking our,countryand launchers for the United States. But the United States
ican lives... There is :.a likelihood-I can't say how;. ;
strong it might be; it's not an inevitability but it's ce
tainly a likelihood-that if anatomic exchange of anyt
kind should ever erupt, thatit might lead to a more l
massive exchange of intercontinental and highly de ,i,
structive weapons that would result in tens of millinne?f'
't lost lives on both sides. .'.:..If -necessary to'defend
:he freedom.and security of Western Europe and this
country, then.l.would use atomic.weapons.".Andin a.~.
campaign, speech on October 16,, thepresident re-''.
turned to the subject' ;of'- nuclear war. If potential!
administration's view is that. superiority by either side I
(Ro
eagan : argues, fr US superiority) is destabilizing, I
and all its new strategic. measures are, intended to'
maintain this. balance. While-the Soviet Union leads in ~?
the number of strategic missile launchers
the Unit
d I
only 6,000.?America also can deploy the air-launched
cruise missile,~permitting great accuracy in targeting.
These weapons;ceilings would be maintained pro-
portionately under SALT?.II, if ratified,. and Carter's
point is that if the treaty .:were allowed' to die,- the
Soviets ' no longer would be under numerical {On-
straints. There. are, of. course, differing schools of
thought as to the validity of SALT-imposed quantita-
tive limits, and the argument (even within the admin-
istration)is, that what really matters is the; qualitative
technological : state of the. nuclear arsenals.
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This has led to a concern that the Soviets have
caught up or are about to catch up with the United
States in nuclear technology. The central element is
missile accuracy. The US, using such super-sophis-
ticated course-correcting systems on its MIRVed mis-
siles as "Stellar Update" (a major guidance achieve-
ment), can hit' a target with extraordinary accuracy
-within 500 yards or less-under what is known as
the Circular Error of Probability. But the US Intelli-
gence community believes that the Russians are com-
ing close to this capability.
If they do, American specialists fear that the Soviet
Union could be tempted to take out US land-based
ICBM launchers in a highly precise counterforce strike
(an attack on weapons systems as opposed to civilian
targets), upsetting the strategic balance. This is why
more and more US experts no longer discount the
possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack, judging that the
Soviet Union is willing to risk an atomic exchange and
believes it can survive a submarine-launched US sec-
ond strike. The vast Soviet effort in civil defense,
.barely matched by the US, is seen as confirmation of
such strategic thinking.
A NIERICAN RESPONSES to, this new strategic
"ballgame," as Pentagon and White House offi-
cials describe it, are both long term and immediate. All,
however, are the product of evolution in US strategic
philosophy, stemming from the recognition that Mos-
cow now possesses capabilities endangering the US.
The administration seems to have decided that the
time has come to reveal in an orchestrated variety of
ways, including "leaks" to the press, the counter-
measures it is applying as signals to both the Soviet
Union and a disturbed domestic public opinion.
The decision to proceed with the mobile MX system,
expected to cost upward of $50 billion and still greatly
controversial among specialists and politicians, relates
directly to Soviet breakthroughs in missile accuracy.
The idea is that US.Minuteman ICBMs would be less
vulnerable to a Soviet counterforce strike if they could
be moved continuously from silo to silo over a huge
area in Utah and Nevada, keeping the Soviet taigeters.
gyessing at their. location; The MX,. however, poses
two problems. One is that it may push the Soviets to
create their own mobile missile system, which the US
strenuously opposed during SALT I negotiations. The
other is that the MX and the full force of Trident
submarines are unlikely to be operational before the
end of the 1980s. The best US intelligence estimates
are that the critics nuc ear con rontation period m y
come as early as 1985.
This notion has led Carter to sign, probably last July,
Presidential Directive 59, which adds a large number
o Soviet military targets-ICBM silos, bomber bases,
and submarine bases-and military and political com-
mand and control centers to the present list of Soviet
objectives on the American strategic list. PD-59, which
comes under the rubric of immediate measures,. has
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created a major controversy among US experts as to
its meaning and effectiveness, and it has resulted in
bitter Soviet protests.
Much of the confusion over PD-59 results from the
fact that its full text never has been made public (it
remains a closely guarded secret in the White Ho.use
and the upper reaches of the Pentagon)- What is
known of the PD-59 document is confined to incom-
plete material leaked to newspapers in the same
fashion- as the Defense Department revealed the
development of the Stealth bomber.
The administration confirms that, broadly speaking,
PD-59 is the US response to the menace of a Soviet
counterforce strike at American Minuteman and Titan
silos. It asserts that PD-59 is intended as the latest
deterrent in the nuclear game with the Soviet Union
(this was the sense of Carter's answer at the Sep-,
tember news conference) and that it represents the
culmination of studies conducted by it since 1977.
These studies were a follow-up on counterforce con-
cerns expressed by former defense secretary James R.
Schlesinger as far back as 1974 as well as on the so-
called "Team B" exercise conducted by the Central
Intelligenc gency ~n to assess oviet strategic
a vances. ear ma e up o outsi a experts u access to classified information, convinced the
Tor a ministration t at t e Russians were much
1d -
further ahead in strategic tec nology than the CIA's
on the basis of the same
own "Team a concluded
materials. ome\experts a ieve that PD-59 is an out-
growt o t e' ea earn B" work; others insist that Team
was w o y wrong in its conclusions and that there-
ore t fie PD-59 concept is equally flawed.
EYOND THESE points, interpretations of PD-59
vary widely among US specialists. Many insist
that PD-59 has simply codified what already had been
an evolving US targeting policy. Targeting is con-
stantly updated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Strategic Air Command under the Single Integrated
Operations Plan. Prior to PD-59, the current SIOP
included between 140 and 200 major Soviet targets,
among them cities and military and economic objec-
tives. PD-59, it is understood, has added at least 10
crucial targets, chiefly Soviet military and civilian
command and control centers.
The majority view, however, is that PD-59 consti-
a significant strategic milestone. It formally does
tutes
away with the old Mutual Assured Destruction doc-
trine, under which US and Soviet cities were held
hostages in a massive nuclear exchange, by introduc=
ing the concept of Limited Nuclear Options that Secre-
tary of Defense Harold Brown says the president must
have.available in an emergency. But contrary to state-
ments by both Carter and Brown, PD-59 does not
suggest the likelihood of a limited nuclear war because
in the views of both the US and the Soviet Union no
such' conflict can be confined to'a single counterforce
'
exchange. C'0 .
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'A protracted nuclear war thus appears to be the
equation faced by the two superpowers as PD-59
emerges in response to similar Soviet thinking. In the
opinion of many US experts, this new equation may
result in an increase in nuclear forces on both sides,
each seeking to use its deterrent to discourage a first
strike by the other side. But it has been argued that
this doctrine, as applied by the US and the Soviets,
could get out of hand at any given moment, especially
if one perceives that nuclear superiority is shifting to
the other.
JjOSCOW'S SHRILL denunciations of PD-59
have suggested to observers that it is seen by
the Kremlin as the confirmation of its worst fears, that
the US may be contemplating a first strike to destroy
its ICBMs, and, above all, its political and military
leadership on all levels. How Moscow will react to
PD-59 is the next step in the nuclear chess game.
The. administration insists that it is not deliberately
creating a warmongering atmosphere, preferring in=
stead to characterize its actions as simply responsive to
new Soviet nuclear realities. Nevertheless there clear-
ly is an effort by.the administration, quietly applauded
by influential personalities outside, to show its careful
consideration of the possibility of a protracted nuclear
war.
Thus, as early as November 15, 1979, Carter issued
the PD-53 on "National Security Telecommunications
Policy,"proclaiming that"it is essential to thesecurity
of the US to have telecommunications facilities ade-
quate to satisfy the needs of the nation during and
after any national emergency" and to "provide conti-
nuity of essential functions of government, and to
reconstitute the political, economic, and social struc-
ture of the nation." PD-53's principal goal was de-
scribed as providing for the "connectivity between the
National Command Authority and strategic and other
appropriate forces to support flexible execution of
retaliatory strikes during and after an enemy nuclear
attack." .
PD-53, suggesting that the US"accepts the likelihood
of a protracted war, was followed last July by PD-58,
which set forth plans for protecting American leaders
in a nuclear war. In the absence of a Soviet-type civil
defense network in the US, PD-58 called for a rapid
evacuation from Washington of the president and
other top military and civilian leaders to underground
command posts and aboard AWAC, aircraft. PD-59
was issued to complete the set of new detailed instruc-
tions to deal with a protracted nuclear war in which
Soviet strategic forces and leadership might become
chief targets. A separate section of PD-59, not leaked
to the press, discusses the ways in which US com-
manders in Europe might activate tactical nuclear
weapons if "connectivity" with the president is lost in
an initial nuclear exchange.
The issuance of PD-59 was followed in September
by a decision within the /administration to accelerate
the production of weapons-grade plutonium in the US
for the first time in 20 years to meet new strategic:
requirements. The Congress already has authorized:
funds for it. Taken together, all these decisions
strongly indicate that the Carter administration no
longer rules out a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.
Another straw in the wind is the study within the
administration of a new antiballistic missile system,,
intended principally to protect the MX deployments.
This would lead to the abandonment of the 10-year
ABM treaty signed with the Soviets under SALT I in
1972. But the Soviets are also known to be testing
what may develop into their new ABM system.
If counterforce attacks are to be key elements in the
new strategic equation, it is illusory to believe that it
would limit greatly the number of civilian deaths.,
Because most Soviet ICBM sites and air and naval'
bases are near populated centers, a US countetforce
attack could result in between 3.7 and 27.7 million
fatalities on the first day, according to a 1979 study by
the Congress's Office, of Technology Assessment.
This range is related to the degree to which Soviet
populations may have time to seek shelter, and to
manner of weapon utilization (ground or air bursts). In
a Soviet attack on US strategic forces, the OTA has
projected fatalities between two and 22 million Ameri-
cans, depending on roughly similar factors.
THER EXPERTS believe that a US attack on
Soviet strategic targets would result in a coun-
terstrike against American cities. This is one factor
that has led to criticism of the PD-59 doctrine. Another.
criticism, expressed by Air Force commanders, is that
the US currently lacks the capability for an effective
counterforce strategy.
Finally, the Carter administration is preparing for
other forms'of unconventional warfare. In September,
Congress approved over three million dollars in funds
requested by the administration to erect a plant for the
production of nerve gas. A decade ago, the US along
with the Soviet Union renounced first use of chemical
or bacteriological weapons, but Pentagon experts now 1
believe that Moscow has been actively working on
both, and-that America is lagging behind dangerously.
In the end, the US may devote four billion dollars to
the resurgence of the chemical warfare program.
The question is whether the chances of a nuclear
war are enhanced by the technological race on both
sides and all the related preparations, and how, ulti-
mately, their-plans may be affected by mutual percep-
tions. Again, nobody in Washington has a clear!
answer. But a senior administration official summed,
up the current situation when he remarked in private)
that "we wouldn't be taking these steps if we did not
feel the US was endangered." And the mood in the
capital. seems to reflect this sentiment, despite warn-
ings from many quarters about the perils of the US;
becoming engulfed in a war atmosphere, with all its'
attendant risks.
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of ~~?~s~__..
By Briars. ~ullain y l countries of1the world- is breaking down ....part of the evolution in American Inte11I-
because they see the examples of Japan. Bence that has occurred since Pearl Har
Multinational corporations are going to . _? Taiwan and,'. Korea, who have all cooperat bor.
begin gathering their own.'intelligence- ed with.the\Vest and experienced econom-- It has become more systematic. Facts
abroad .,because it. is ; too'-important :a . ic- growth. and an imyrovement in then are assembled under one roof, ?bought.
function to be left- to government,''- ac- reties 'about and;, examined- for meaning:'- Mr.'
cording. to:=William .E- Colby,:the,former _Mi Colby said he foresees the situation Colby noted that.bits of information indi-
director of central intelligence arisWg,where "cooperation is developed cating that the Japanese were thinking of
But the challenge-during the next. two to the mutual benefit and profit" of the de- attacking' Pearl -Harbor were known, to
decades facing both government: agencies veioped and less developed countries:: separate branches of government but they
and private corporations is. not` collecting -intelligence does- not provide corpora-.-,.: were never put together
ment,.with` a crystal :bail Another- development. was technology,
facts but: _"determining what do they Lions or govern
that allows them to see the future but like, the. U4 spy plane, that allowed gov-.
mean, ' ever. Colby noted:
Speaking .to, the -Baltimore chapter of -rather provides a warning and allows poll , ernments to, extend their knowledge into
the North American Society for Corporate. . cymake:sithe opportunity to "bring about : areas that other governments were trying.
Planning;; the director of central intellia better rather than a worse result." to keep secret.;.,
geocef from .1973 to -1976 explained that -The other function of. intelligence is not , He-also noted that the phrase-need to
corporate planning is, not much-different to provide: answers but to stimulate ques-know' has taken on new meaning-.
from intelligence activities performed lions "that cause you to think and act." Ramer than just meaning limited dia
by government agencies. As an' illustration; he said, the intelli tributian of information,, it. has also be-
Afnericancorporations, he noted, could genre community knew the basic facts come to mean that those who have the re-
become^future targets in: Third World about Iran. but they were not presented m sponsibility of making decisions, "need to
countries because these countries, wheth - a way to give them the proper relevance know all the relevant information:"
er by... political' design or. mob . turmoil,, to the policy-makers. applicable to businessasweUas
might find-i to then- political advantage Although the intelligence community ?government managers. beset noted. to think in terms of disrupting the active might have said the shah had only a 5 per Colby noted that intelligence Bath-
ties of multinational-'corporations rather cent:chance of?being overthrown before-:.Bring is a. normal function of human life.
lution in 1979 it did not convey
d
but is not always infalble. He pointe
;than cooperating with them. , , theerevo
They are likely to focus on US: comps th, devasting impact of such an over out that. Moses.. was the first spy master
riles because .we. are the easiest and civi throw sending out warriors to give the wander
lest target.'.' Had policy-makers been more aware of ing Israelites, a picture of What lay ahead.
Despite these seemingly pessimistic as-. these, drastic consequences. they might
in Canaan
sessments Mr Colby said he is optimistic have made more of an effort to preventing '"Chi r ~~ back it was a land;
about future relations with nations of thethat action from :taking place, Mr. Colby y epo
flowing with- milk and honey which wasp
Third Worlds' r v; _ said ,
He noted that unity among: the less de-o_.,:,.,_ Colby also noted that corporations then subject to;some criticism later Mr
athering information for their own use is Colby wrylyremarked -
g
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0N' F Ga
Loo
THE WASHINGTON POST
5 November 1980
Lnos1g. for an oasis: in conay's news
paper? Craving seniethingj to? read that.
has nothing to do with' the election?:
Want somethrng~6eyond returns, win
the agony of defeat;: rio`:reaction or coin-
mentaiy.;'.on-,the big: news''-of Nov::4?
'
You-: came 7W the:
right'
spot..
:.Today- is~?:quiaw;ay.. First: question:..
' Name=our: town's':' single;biggest-.gov=-
ernment operation::; Would `: you: pick: '
A) ..'the Central Intelligence-Agency,
Bk-Congress,' C ; the:; Department 'of.
Health. and . Human Services, . D) the
District :of Columbia' government,:-or<
E) the. Navy Department.'
The answer is, nearly all of the above.
-
=.In best-- bureaucratic' tradition, the'an-
swer- depends oil' several.things ``:';
If you are. talking .about sheer num.
hers, - the. District.: government;,: 'with
more than.40,000. employes, is the win-
ner,: hands down.: If '.:you- . area-talking .
'about. a "branch"; of government,, the.
legislative branch:which includes Con--
gress, is number one with .37,000 peo-
~ple .The. Senate.an&House have. 7,300
er legislative -.: branch agencies;. the - Li-
brary of Congress General: Accounting
Off'"e;' Government Printing Office and
Depaiti 'nt'ofWealth'and'Human Ser--=
vices' HHS, formerly they; Department.
of :Health;' Education and'Welfare, has'
. more than 35,000 employes: Back when
it.was HEW.-and included`the offices
that: are now- the Department of Ed-".
_ucation. the;rdepartment' had ._4,600
more people; here..
Navy,'for. a. long time, was the- largest i
federal' operation in Washington.. But.
it. has' slipped in recent years as .Con
gress aid HEW '(now HHS). hired more
people:;Navjr now has'only. 14,000"ci-'
vilian workers locally. ,The Army which.
tries to keep-'up, has just. over 24,000
and the poyr:old' Air Force only about
6,500'civilians here
L r1 ;~:: .
'The CIA does not freely give 0I nit er
gunnel- ata. nor oes.t e. supersecret-
National curs . Agenc~y).Ibut both
are estimat y;: to e m e rye
ot. thw Justice' - eoartment, which: as
about, 16,400. people here.. Although-'
metropolitan.., ngton. is. -short- 'o'ni
farms, and. farmers, the. Department of.'
-Agriculture'isrone-o00f'theybiggies here,
with just:: over; 13,0 people: Stilt'it
piker when compar?ed.to-Commerce'
with .23,000 and Treasury; with 18,000. I
The Department '-of Energy- seems
much" bigger' than its local,-payroll,
which h6'8 000 workernot includ- I
ing::'outside.:.consultants,' 6f: course.
Transportation has 10,000 people, and
Interior, ..which we don't, hear, much
about,. more.. than 11,000: = ;.,
There- is. some dispute.. over which'
.federal.agency here is smallest; because:
some are sosmallthat if two people re- ..
tire, or-three arehired;-their relative-po-,
sitions change Among. the little guys+.
.are the.Commissionort hineArts, which't
had'six staffers at last.count,`and: the 1
.Coastal;? Plains: Regiorial_ Commission,:
which recently had. eightemp'loyesr The-..
-Advisory: Federi4' Pay.
last spring -had .only two- employes; but
it'has recently' done some hiring, putt---
ins. it up~with. they Coastal'Plains Re=.
gional Coinmissioix The klaska-Natural
Gas ? Transmission System=, has about;
50 people here and"abcurt. I7'elsewhere,
one presumes in Alaska:
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Don't
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THE NEW YORK POST
291 October 1980
By KIERANG'Ivt? T
ON PE,c~ -~_ 5
PRESS / B,AL~N BERGER
-tulle when' eachside in thclran lrao war ;''
0~
g jtne united States-for conspiring with?the-
e October. issue-of:an Arab magazine The
1411ddT East; featured an interview with a former
G :operative Wilbur' Eveland. 'His revelations
atlt American covert actions in the Mideast over
ttte;ast three decades could be read; as a partial con-"=
ation.of. the'region smost paranoid suspicions...
s disclosures included. bungled t inerican.
o rt to. give coverta1d t6the late Egyptian Press=
dQitr&amat~Abdel?,Nasserand-toorganize a coin,
a_jta n Syria;. assassination',schemes American-
i ent?in Lebanon's;civil war; and -a secret
mil asith Israel to allow the _Israelis to develop a nu=:
:a:icelandjis the author of a book released last
itled Ropes of Sand. -America s Failure in'.
t s ' it could not ;preve it publication: the CIA us
; iersvgrantpd. to-the;:agency by recent court
took the= opportunity to delay the book,'
l n'; o the-CIA from alternately, the White House.
t S to Department and the Defense Department:
F,.ox fNe years he said he y was former CIA Director
A'l*r 'Dulles-: main; representative in the- Middle
n aftermath-of theagency's success In restoring
shah to. power in Irai7 This was taken as an-
cation that the CIA could 'change governments
land recalled. "We needed an Arab leader, and'
d'the:coup',-.Kermit 'Kiln' iRoosevelt:`,(the-.:6IA:-
5 nded him. He. was a natural Arabi leader. and
thoughth would be'tractable. But he!turned
o $ to have so !' ideas of his own."
E B-)STON GLOBE
November. 1980
Eveland; who said- he' was in charge of the:'
Mideast for the secretary of defense's office at the
e: said there was general consensus" against
western military aid to. regional governments-. "The
feing was that you, don't make- peace by arming
i v ' r.'because of the huge British. base at Suez_.i
Iwypi'wanted the 80,000 British troops out. In
q4itary, aid : to the Egyptian army. : This?was a cou-:
~40us act because the Israeli lobby:was,very-much
lsiness until we could get through all the formals-'
Pte, the CIA was authorized to make:$3 million in
- .-b .--,.. a ..-.ne
ollh%actual payoff as an instance of how the: CIA's'
haps also the course. of history ']J 'It had been
slgtarits with-.a messagethat 'was this for Gamai.'
Cat~tel It is commonly referred togas-'Roosevelt's erec
7.58. Eveland recounted. 2'V number of:different-
' Butall.these-activities. were. founded : on. nothing,
Secretary: of State John Foster :Dulles and his_
tillttec Allen Dulles-who was inchrargeoftheCIA
3 d We ought to get'rid of this problem in Egypt;"
Another aftereffect'- of the' 1956?Suez?crisis, ac-
ding to*Eveland.:wasa covert bargain between.,
the. Israeli-withdrawal from Egypt 'in 1956 was
arrangement ?.between the US and Israel, a veryl
tlieiracquiring a.nuclear capability and then not
rnit'thak
f
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 Approved For Release 2009/06/08: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501440001-0
Evelarid -linked-this arrangement to the CIA's
chose. working :relationship with the Mossad. al-
-t ugh-he pointed out' that ."the. connection is less
else since the mid-'70s, when former CIA chief Bill
05lby fired James Angleton (head of CIA counterin-
.teiligence) or forced him to resign. Angleton was the
.n'Zvith Mossad. It.(the connection) certainly still
tzstsi and I was.told in 1959 by Allen Dulles that it
4s going to be expanded. I said-that this seems to.
Me putting. a mouse in cnargc ut l l3cc~c. 1aa~ .+
..about Communist or nationalist penetra-
;tfdn in Arab states would be biased."
Summarizing the lessons of his experience. Eve-
zxFer CIA: But.1?think: most of Its members ought:
adhe-meant,by?Anierica's failure in the. Miaale.
th&area as asource of oil and a platform for Lnili-
r people;first. and the at! . second:. then :we won:'t
, e& be other; the military. _oases.;.;. TZ,... tir
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 Approved For Release 2009/06/08: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501440001-0
L _- 4T.'I T07 .K I'rDIES
c*. - ~~ Rtr/tts, 2 November 1980
e.mosttar-reac
ook OR it
iish~ti III
tecen
WALTER LAQUEUR 4 ;~: }4 ::
=a
..
s 3
Blending.histoncaYrenection with internationat 4etwork functions.
-served-the CIA-with distinction Angola; and-much more: "Any-
- tqr. 20 years takes:a. provocatveI . one interested in the real world of :
look . at. the agency's goals aizd intelligence should not fail .to read
the=past three decades. Cord I -= =J - - RICHARD H?LMS
fi
Meyer re-traces his own colorful "As autob o hy it is mol
rina,
career-as the wounded veteran lip g,
who became the first President of as history illuminating, as assess-
the United World` Federalists, the, merit alarming,' and:as advocacy. - ~;
intelligence ofEcial who became.; con `~ g. It deserves to be read" '
carefull
:'
:
.
T
.
the.target of McCarmpte accusa-
lion and provides unprece SAMUEL P.-HUNTINGTON,
dented .inside acxounts of the ` ' Director; Harvard University
_ .
faces behind the headlines: the Center for International A f fairs ,
CIA :s real :role in. Chile, how it
"Must readin for ever
serio
y
us
attempted:to avoid: involvement ; - . student of today s world situation:
'
in: Watergate how theKG-B
s-PAUL . NITZE.
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 Approved For Release 2009/06/08: CIA-RDP05T00644R000501440001-0
THE INDEPENDENT (ANDERSON, S.C.)
15 October 1980
By Tony Kiss ? , It- was a full-time job,' he_ said. "A
"`Jack Maury'. never; planned ao be a. pro-
fessional spy.: He. was locked up and questioned a few
was a lawyer who-was in the Marines times by the Soviets ;-
dunng' World War, II;'. he?. said I-was ".'.They knew. we had some intelligence
assigned to Russian intelligence connections," he said. I never: felt I. was
"'When I came. back: home,. they. were in great danger. }
"But. I?. got 'nervous a few times..The
starting the CIA and I joined-":. , .~:,