PRESS CLIPPINGS SEPTEMBER 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000501420001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 196
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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ARTICLE AFPFARM
ON PAGE -~?? ~~GJ
NEW YORK TIMES
18 SEPTEMBER 1980
Senate Panel Acts to barrow, Intelligence Identity-Bi
'By CHARLESMOHR
Special to The New York Times
_.J unconstitutional. the identities of covert agents and expos.
One key amendment passed by the Sen ing such identities."
ate Judiciary Committee today would
make it a legal defense against prosecu- Immunity for Agencies
-lion if .the disc'osure of the identities of The committee also approved an j
agents "is an integral part of another ac- amendment that would a rentl
tivity such as news reporting of intelli- the Peace Corps and the Ag ency l , p for Inter-
gene failures or abuses; academic study
of government policies and programs, en- national Development legal, p
forcement b a private to avoid requests that they provide
y p organization of its .46internal' rules and regulations, or other ? cover.. for C.I.A. agents. Those agen-
activities'protected by - he First Amend- cies enjoy such immunity now by regula.?
tion, but the Intelligence committees';
This 1 a e was a bills had permitted the President to re-
angu g p,Rarently meant to I
protect so-called "mainstream" journal-, quire governmentwide cooperation ini
ists while permitting the prosecution of : furnishing concealment for agents. : 1
Today's amendments, some informed]
such private citizens. as the, staff of a!
sources conceded, were meant more to
Washington newsletter that has printed encourage good faith bargainin on the!
hundreds- names of C.I.A. officers in g
.
. WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 - The Senate
Judiciary Committee: today approved
amendments, intended to narrow the
scope of a bill protecting the identities of
covert intelligence agents from, disclo-
sure. , . -
The.amendments, proposed-by liberal
Democrats - on the committee, are ex-
pected to come under strong attack,iow-
ever, frompowerful forces in-the use
and Senate who are eager to demonstrate
support for the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy. ;.i
The legislation, as approved earlier by
both the Senate and House -Intelligence
Committees, would make it a crime for
officials and former officials:who had ac-
cess to secrets to name covert agents of
this country. Both bills, in slightly differ-
Lent language, extended 'the -criminal
sanction to, private persons, including
journalists, - who -repeatedly disclosed,
such names in an effort to impair covert
intelligence operations.
Critics of the legislation argue that it is,
what it says is an-effort to discourage so-
called covert intelligence' operations
-abroad. .. .:,fh
The amendme* trould also permit, for
example, a missintlary society to identify
anyone -it discharged for violating its
rules by working as a .covert agent.
and.Justice Department than.as finished
legisation.
The opposition to the softening amend-
ments came. mostly from Republican
members of the Judiciary Committee...)
r+?. ~?~ ca-acauuu~, mteutgence Commit? i-
Another amendment, which was ap- tee bills.
proved, 10: to '6, more narrowly defined
the crime. in- question; as an. action: "un-
dertaken for - the . purpose of uncovering
PRESS CLIPPINGS
SEPTEMBER 1980
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A T I C LE APPEAR39
ON, PAGX_4-2__
THE: WASHINGTON POST
18 September 1980
> ; Ws'sbtndon Tort acair w;lter I .
The:: Senate .Judiciary ?.':Cominittee .,
Voted.' by:'a razor-thin margin y' ester-:-
day to' narrow the impact of a. contro-
versial . new . CIA ' secrecy, bill' that
would make it a crime to disclose the..
names of U.S. intelligence operatives
stationed- abroad.-
In a hurried afternoon session, the
committee decided, 8 to 6,, to exempt
such' disclosures` if they are "an in-
. tegral part", of :'constitutionally . pro.
. elected. activities'";such.- as;. scholarly:'
studies- of . government' _ policies . and
programs -or news ? stories'. about- "in-
.telligence failures' or abuses."
. -'-Judiciary Committee,,-Chairman Ed.
ward.M. Kennedy. (D~Mass.), who pro.
'posed: the change,- said..the.lbillwould.
still outlaw :"the indiscriminate, publi
cation, of agents' names by-:anti-CIA
.periodicals such as the. Covert Action
Information Bulletin v
To prohibit such practices the
original bill-would make it ?a 'felony
to .disclose:,: -any: information, ! even.
.from unclassified sources, that serves-
to identify a covert agent .so long as I
the, government could shave this was
done. with. reason Ito believe it would
impair - or impede US. - intelligence
activities..'.,
The.American Civil Ube tiesUnion'
.:and 'other critics .mounted' a .concen-
trated --attack on the measure. in the
Senate committee .after striking out
elsewhere. The House and Senate In-
telligence.Committees and the House I -v
Judiciary-s., Committee shave all ap
.proved 'th':undiluted bill, which'.the
CIA hasp-been seeking for .years .`
In approving the original bill how-
ever, the?:Senate'Intelligence Commit-.
tee.',insisted' ui: its report'thatit'wasp
,net its, aim ,to prohibit news reporting
of . intelligence failures or'abuses;- aca- .j
demic. studies or other .-activities, pro-
tected by the First' Amendment-
Kennedy took,tlie.wording.of the In
telligence. Committee . report. and of-
.fered it:.as-ah:ainendmentto'the'..bi1L
'.Without sueh':a change',a number-of?
law:;t:professors. have::: contended it I
.would be;=unconstitutionaL::But ? advo-
cates of ::stiff-measure;.angerid-.by
attacks on.CIA" operatives abroad, are
sure: to :press for;.the;tougher wording
on. the. Hous ,and; Senate. Boors.....
:`.'Also exempted' under the Kennedy
amendmnentwould-be disclosures made
by private -organizations,' such- as uni-
versities and religious institutions,'
that' night have:.rules against 'mein
bens working secretly for the. CIA.:.:..
ACLU'spokesman Jerry Berman,sug-.?
gested 'last night. that. some negotiated
settlement was-'now possible:.' " "'Until.
now,' be said, "the Justice Department
,
hat been,:in'our view,. unwilling to try
.and = resolve theconstitutional ._prob-
les .that ' many of-us have with the
"billy .But with the .Kennedy.,amend-
mententhe agenda ,.Berman,said, the
administration may find,, it::"difficult
to, explain' why they. want to knock
out a: section that' protects the .First
Amendment"
'Most Senate and House Republicans i
appear to favor a stronger bill. in any
case,and have dismissed the charges of 1
unconstitutionality as exaggerated and
unwarranted. Declared Sen. Strom
.Thurmond: (R S CJ; ranking-minority
member'on Judiciary:, "We-can't risk
having our people killed."
Several other amendments Kennedy
offered were also-adopted at ' the meet-
ing, which:-was sandwiched between a
public and private session-with White
House, National Security. -Affairs
vlser ZbigniewBrzezinski oa.thely
Carter ?controversry.
.,.~?
One of -the changes was aimeda
little-noticed section of the'?.CIAJl
requiring-the president to.adopt. seeset
-procedures that, will afford U.S. nl-
-ligence operatives ,better :"cover'-' -es-
signments in American -e mbassies.;aid'
missions aboard. ? '
"The 'Judiciary-.Committee,-again-by
a vote of 8 to 6, :agreed that. the P"ee
Corps and the Agency for'Internatton-
al Development, should ,be-;exem ed
.by law-from - the , list. of governl tit
'agencies and departments' that' might
be ordered. to provide the,"cover."'An
'effort was also made' to exempt the +.
`International Communication, Agericy,'i
formerly U.S.Information.A envy bpt
that failed..
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NEW YORK TIES
17 SEPTEMBII3'` 1980.
. , 4 f
permit him under very limited-circum::
stances,to inform the committees after a :
covert action has been begun.
gene committees?anc the White House iwhether. the'President must provide the
On: Monitoti Ae On have agreed to an amendment that intelligence panels with prior notification
papers over differences about whether of covert actions.
Oflnt ll' '-' Ce .~IZIt.S the President is obliged under all circum- versions of the legislation would re-
stances to answer. all inquiriesfrom the I duce the number of Congressional com- I
intelligence panels. The amendment is to 1'mittees that must be informed ot such ac- !
be offered to the Senate version df legisia- tivities from eight to the two intelligence
By JUDITH MILLER ! tion authorizingfunds 'for intelligeeceI panels. The bills also concur-that, ia.prin
sr~w MM ?49W Yoac nom, operations ciple.. the committees must be' given ad-
WASHINGTON, Se t 16- The compromise amendment contains vane notlce,ofany covert
action. How-
, and ; language making it clearthat'nothmgin ~ ever, there.weire sharp divisions among
House negotiators have apparently the legislation-should be construed' as au.: Congressional' committees and the Ad-.~ -
reached agreement.wlth the Whdti House thority towlthliold information4rom'the1 ministration as to W}ietlter:theie should,
-.on legislation that would -define and. re: select committees on the.-,grounds;. that be ezceptions'tothat:priaciple;' and. over
strict the way Congress oversees the na- pr~dirigtheitiformation."would eonsti= the nature of those exceptions.
tion's- intelligence agencies, legislative e P kage woiild`enable; ,
aides said today. yy .. fled informati on 'or inforrdatfob elating the-1?resi eat; under some circum-
The. agreement, worked out :: after to intelligence f sources ,ai;rhethods.'! stances: to brief a total of eight key mem-
4, I %e Under the accord tentatively reached The other dispute thathas. Apparently
Compromise O, &ed Ip late today key-members of the intelli- been resolved involves the question of
auow two important bills authorizing.
'funds for American foreign aid programs
and intelligence operations for the fiscal
year 1981 to be taken up later this week in
House-Senate.conferences. Both confer-
ences. had been delayed by the impasse
:over`.the.controversial intelllgence,provi
islons. ^'c -- : c:
Re9min8 President to Respond
aides close to the- negotiations, MW the i' myriad :oflegislative:
question of to what extent:the President 3SS .. up _ - on Capitp
nd
- _-
__ -esro
to qution
posed and information requested esby. the-
activities ,that appeared, to require the;
President:-to.; respond to any and all in-
quiries from the two intelligence commit-
tees. Both'the House and Senate versions
of the bills addressed that issue, but .the
lIouse
vem~o~n.was more
g
i
ge Senate anouse versions of ?
the bills authorizing funds for intelligence
The' White 'House' bad been resiscinA~
7an
ua
n - -
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authority ! of the Congressiotlol' telli-
gence panels to' request:aati?obitalA infor-
mation frdai the intelligefceservlces -
However, the !authi. st111 con,
tams language; acknowl tithe m',
sponsibility of the Prftli6i rt. ` o ptr test
classified
?'Tfiit#?3s a fig:leaf fief 17Ze
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On Intelligence versa
Senate and House neg' otiators Se ate ,versions' of the' bills.ad-
have apparently reached agreement dressed'thisissue, but the Housed .
with the White House on'legislation bill- was :;more restrictive, as; to;'
that.woi ld define and- restrict. con -which.-requests for information. the'
gressiorial oversight of the nation's president, could ignore.
intelligence agencies, congres- Under- the agreement tentatively.
sional aides said yesterday. : 3 reached, key members;of the intelli
:.The agreement, hammered out,.. genre committees and the White, after, weeks of.intense discussions,, House have'agreedto an amend.'..
will enable two important bills that` meat that papers over differences
authorize funds'for U.S. foreign aid 'b out whether the president is
programs and-fiscal 1981 intelli- obliged; under all circumstances to
genre operations to :be taken . up answer-all inquiries from the intel-.
later this week inHouseSenate con- ;ligence panels.; The amendment, is
ferences. Both"`confererrces. had to be offered to the Senate. version,
been delayed by'the impasse over. of legislation authoring, funds. fora
the controversial intelligence intelligence operations. '
provisions. , The compromise amendment con,.
According to congressional aides tains:language that: makes:it-clear.
close to the negotiaations, at issue that: nothing in the?, legislation.
was to what. extent, the president shouIdbe`construedas;authority.~to
would be.required to;respond to. '`withhold information from thecse..
questions; posed and information re- lect committees on the ground. quested.by the House and Senate .providing the information-
committees-.that. monitor ; intelli would constitute the unauthorized.
genre activities. disclosure of classified information
The:White House had been resist- or:information relating to ntelli-
ing language in Senate.and House gencesourcesand. methods.
versions of the bills authorizing This language appears to. rein-
funds -for. -intelligence activities force the-authority, of, the.congres-
that appeared to require the presi- ? : sional intelligence-panels;torequest
dent. to respond to any and all in- and obtain ,in
been abroad.for.months::
ry
point .:: t" w S
One - law: enforcement ':source
think 'Terpil 1,
'may be J n Syria,- which last week",
signed _a merger agreement with
:Libya: Terpil is believed to have had a
multimillion-dollar. deal pending with
his Syrian connection.
- wherever he is, he doesn't look the'
same, since he shaved his mustache.
The "Bob Guccione of .the FBI was
'asked last week to take an airbrush to
:a mug-shot, and touch ' it up in' the
same way 'that' nude 'centerfolds in:
Penthouse, are itnproved,:.to show In.
terpol -how Terpil probably-looks now... Not that there were that many peo.
pie who knew what he looked like be.
.fore.. British publicationswere.'offering
$100,000 for -a -photograph ;'of -'-him at
one point:. .:y r CY.' ' ' ?*
1 :There area-few people'w
ho'iear
~ -that.Terpil ? may.: not;: be .:alive--He which wasmarked."SE--
:
"
'
CRET"
and was entitled
I,?residentialReview:
Memorandum/NRC-46,""has4fall the earmarks of a-
very professional job to discredit the president.
administration policy-towards Africa, black lead-
ers and national security auiviser Zbigniew Brze
zinski'??.'>
:Powell said the administration'.has asked the
attorney general and the- ' directorto investi'gate the forgery, but herepeatedly said he.has no:;
basis for knowing , who wafs responsible for dis-i
tributing the forged docuxt nts-._
"If. this is an attempt by' ja hostile foreign gov
ernment intelligence seri'ice to discredit U.S.
foreign policy in Africa," paid Powell, 'that is a.
matter to be dealt. with bappropriate' agencies.
But if it relates to the dom. tic political situation,
I cannot make a judgmen but the Department of
Justice can."
-
.,Howard University's radjio station .and a New
York station were amon 'the persons who got the
forgeries.: iji
'
Powell noted
that th forgery headed PRM-46
was dated March 17, 1978, and then showed parts
of two pages. but not the text, of what he said was
year later on May 4, 1979.~The forgery.. as' enti=?
The forgery, conta'i s.recommendations`remi-
niscent of the. worst; days-of, :intelligence,.agency
_"dirtytricks."Some' fthe:proposals`in.the for=.
.... _ ..
~ _... .,:
1
? A recommenditilpp :;that, the ?FBI mount.
surveillance: operati.1ons::against black African.
:.munity to neutralizf Suchactivit}yp
?? Putting into effect programs-to petpetuate divi
sions i
th
bl
k
n
e
ac
movement and tostiult di-
.maessension.between.'different social strata in the
black communtty
`
! Supporting the :itif "lol" bc
.nomnaon oyalak:
,:public figures foxc federal and local offices -to`
make it easier. to txibtrol such "loyal" figures.
,?. Launching special CIA clandestine operations
to. generate mistrust and hostility in American
and world opinion-against joint -activity by black
African nationalists and Americanblacks:.'r:.
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BRZEZINSKI
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- "What was a routine - meating _ to you,"..
Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan.).-told
-Brzezinski l
"turned : out-to be worth a quarter of 'a 11
million. dollars for Billy Carter."
Brzezinski, who began testifying shortly
after. 8 am., left the: Capitol at 3:45 p.m.
after an- hour-long secret. session that fol-
lowed the-public hearing.
. Chief subcommittee counsel Philip Tone
told-reporters later that "lonse ends'.' still
to. be pursued include a number of '.tele-
phone calls that need to be explained "to
-try to complete the story." -.:, :, ,- _-?
Tone said. the. staff will 'conduct -more
interviews' and- depositions:-.but=aoded, .`.`I'.
doubt very much,there--will be much-news
unti~.we.:file our-repoit;
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II.F: 1 ~S ^`:,n ti17
ON PAGY_ THE BALTIMORE SUN
18 September 1980
"S -h
rzen.... ki 11r,AAefen ds,
1. en, reArets
,kplo Billy C ya
e k itinor, . arter fila''k to Lib
committee investigating Mr. Carter's ties with
the .I.ibyan government that in retrospect he
should-not have involved the president's young-
er brother in the Iranian crisis because it has.
caused too much controversy.
"The hostage situation was so unorthodox
that it called for unusual approaches,". Mr.
Brzezinski told the subcommittee. "The thought
was that we could use Billy Carter because the
Libyans'knew him.and had friendly relations
with him.". .
of Billy Carter in trying to gain Libyan support
in the:early days of the Iranian hostage crisis.
'however, Mr. Brzezinski told the Senate sub-.
Washington-National security Adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski defended yesterday his use
By Ctirt Llatthews
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Carter as an ad hoc envoy to gain support for
release of the 53 Americans taken hostage at
the.U.S. Embassy in Tehran came from Rosa-
Mr. Brzezinski said be called Billy Carter
November 20' and sought his help. Mr. Carter:'
a meeting. November. 27 with Ali el-Houdari.__.
the secretary of the Libyan People's Bureau
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
..testifies before Senate panel
(the Libyan embassy) in Washington.
"The meeting was an attempt to get the Lib- Vance before asking for Billy Carter's help and
yan government to say publicly what they were was told, "Anything is worth a try."
Mr. Brzezinski said the strategy was to iso-
saying privately in diplomatic discussions." Mr. - late" Iran by gaining support in Libya,a coon
Brzezinski told the subcommittee. :. try that had in the past supported revolutionary
He added that although there had been press activities in the Middle East.
support of the Iranian seizure of hostages be- Regarding Mr. Carter's' involvement in the.
fore November 20, two days after the meeting hostage crisis, Mr. Brzezinski said he did not
with Mr. Houdari the official position of the 'know whether the president's brother helped.
Libyan government called for -release of the At one point during his testimony, Mr.
.hostages. _ ,. Brzezinski came under bitter attack from Sena-
Senator'Dennis DeConcini (D, Ariz.) asked tor. Strom Thurmond (R, S.C.) who suggested
why Mr. Brzezinski himself had not arranged that rather than concerning himself with na-
the meeting with Mr. Houdari and not involved tional security matters, Mr. Brzezinskj was "a
the president's brother. Mr. Brzeziski said, "The political trouble shooter" trying rying' to prevent
issue was not one of making contact. . . it was Billy Carter.'s Libyan connections from becom-
to encourage a more friendly relationship with ing a problem.for the president.
uuuuuou, aim tnnuenao not justified by the
facts
" Mr
Brzezinski
id i
,
.
sa
n an angry retort.
According to the national security adviser, "I resent the allegation you're making?regarda
he consulted with Secretary of State Cyrus R. ipg my motives."
Senator Thurmond replied, "We're.after the
truth, we're trying to get the truth and we're
not sure you're telling it"
"You may not be sure, senator, but I am," Mr. Brzezinski said. ' .
Mr. Brzezinski, the last scheduled public wit- '
ness in the subcommittee's probe of Mr. Car-
ter's ties with Libya, insisted that the presi-'
dent's brother had no influence on U.S. policy
toward Libya. He also rejected the suggestion
by Senator Thurmond that the White House
decision to draw Billy Carter into the hostage'.
i
i
-cr
s
s was intended to enhance his?opportunlty.,
Mr. Brzezinski.testifled that when he learned
from Mm. tans ie rner, director o e
Central a enee Agency, that t rter
van of for a Jackson
7 7
a a.) firm, he called
s re aeons ip wi a press en
Mr. Carter turned aside the admonition and,
'in effect, told Mr. Brzezinski to mind his own
business, according to testimony by both men.- :
Although the public portion of the subcom-
mittee's investigation has concluded, the sub-
committee staff continues to sift information
gathered in recent days, particularly a set' of
telephone logs that show a -flurry of:calls: be
tween Billy Carter and a number of U.S.: and
Libyan officials.
Investigators have focused especially' " ori'+
calls Mr. Carter made December 6 to the Char-
ter Oil Company in Jacksonville and the Libyan
embassy. On that date, President Carter met
with the chief Libyan diplomat in the U.S.
Other records obtained by the subcommittee
show that on the day Mr. Turner informed Mr.
Brzezinski of Mr. Carter's ties with Charter Oil,
-a call was placed from Mr. Carter's office-in
the Best Western Motel in Americus, Ga., to
Libya. Similar calls were made over the next
several days, according to the logs.
The subcommittee has invited Mr. Carter to'
testify in-executive session .to clear up some
portions of his previous public testimony' and
perhaps to explain -the purpose, of some'f 4
telephone calls.
The final report orthe committee'is due
early next month.,,.:-:.,,, ;?.. ~:,,..:...,
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WALL 37-EFT 7
18 S.:,7;tember 1980
Angry Brzezinski Denies Compromising
Intelligence in Warning to Billy Carter
By a WALLSTREerJOORNAL Staff Reporter
? ' W.ASHINGTON-Zbigniew Brzezinski vig-
orously denied that he compromised intelli-
gence information or was politically, moti-
vated when he warned. Billy Carter against
a business deal with Libya.
Mr. Brzezinski, President Carter's na-
tional security adviser, also denied that he
used the President's brother as an emissary
.
to Libyan diplomats in order to enhance Bil-
ly's status in his business dealings with
Libya..
Mr. Brzezinski's comments came. in. a
day-long appearance before a special Senate
subcommittee investigating the Billy Carter
affair. The combative presidential adviser
sprinkled his testimony with indignation and
sarcasm regarding allegations that he had
done anything improper with regard to Billy
Carter and Libya.
Mr. Brzezinski's testimony concluded the
last phase of planned public hearings at
which private citizens, Justice Department
officials and State Department and White
House personnel have testified. Mr. Brzezin-
ski's testimony and that of other White House
officials in recent days failed to bring any
significant retractions or new disclosures in
the inquiry, but the inquiry is continuing and
investigators are expected. to take more pri-
vate depositions from witnesses..
Justice' Department 'officials have said
that Mr. Brzezinski may have divulged se-
cret intelligence information in a phone call
to Billy Carter last March 31. In the call, he
has testified, he said he knew Billy Carter
was attempting to get added Libyan oil for a
U.S-oil company, and he warned that' such
a transaction could embarrass the President
and the country.
"I was very careful that, nothing I said to
Billy Carter would convey to him the source
of the information," Mr. Brzezinski told the
Senators yesterday. "And I'm absolutely
confident," `he said, "that. the source hasn't
been compromised."
"I have dealt with intelligence informa-
tion for several years," Mr. Brzezinski said.
"I think I know how to handle it and how to
protect it." . He -added -that : his:- warning. to
Billy Carter was "necessaryand- justified."
Sen. Strom Thurmond.(R-,;S.C.) told Mr.
Brzezinski :,he saw "substantial' evidence
that you were acting as the'President's po-
litical trouble-shooter," -instead of guarding
national. security,'. when. the `.White House
aide warned Billy Carter-against the ? oil
transaction
Bristling. Mr..Brzezinski:called that an
"improper insinuation," denied it and said
he resented it.
"We're trying to get the truth," said Sen.
Thurmond, "and were not sure we're get-
ting iL'.'
You may be sure I'm sure," Mr. Brze-
zinski replied.
Sen. Charles Mathias (R., Md.) ques-
tioned Mr. Brzezinski on why he mentioned
his knowledge of the oil deal, derived from an
intelligence report, to Billy Carter while
Justice Department 'attorneys were denied
even that much information from the intelli-
gence report until June. "
Mr. Brzezinski disavowed " any responsi-
bility for the decision by Attorney General
Benjamin Civiletti against sharing the intel-
ligence report immediately with his investi-
gators. "I presume there were good'reasons
for handling it the way it was handled" at
the Justice Department, Mr.:;Brzezinski
said.
Mr. Civiletti has said be withheld the in-
formation to prevent 'any danger, that its
source would be discovered. Mr. Brzezinski
denied yesterday that. the different handling
of the information was politically motivated.
'r. Brzezinski defended his participation
in using Billy Carter as-an emissary, to set,
up a meeting with a Libyan diplomat .at the
White House Nov. 27,! 1974
Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.) contended
that the effect-of that .meeting "was to en-
hance" Billy Carter's reputation and finan-
cial.prospects in Libyan-eyes, whether that
was intended , or. . ,wasn't.. Mr. Brzezinski,
however, insisted that it was "preposterous"
to contend. that such. was his purpose in
using Billy Carter. to set up the meeting..:..
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ri TICLE THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
ON PAG!_ 18-September 1980
._.,j5rzezinski
fhallenged
Abus-M "Dill
Adviser's Judgment
Questioned by Panel
By Roberta Hornig
and Phil Gailey,
WasbingtonStar Staff Writers
A Senate subcommittee investi-
gating Billy Carter concluded its
public hearings yesterday by
sharply questioning the judgment
of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President
Carter's national security adviser,
in -using Billy Carter's Libyan ties
in a diplomatic initiative during the
early days. of the.Iranian hostage
crisis...
Five of the nine senators on the
panel charged that Brzezinski, by
asking the president's brother to ar-
range a White House meeting with a
Libyan diplomat last November,-had
encouraged Libya to try to buy Billy
Carter's influence with the promise
of.d-.lucratiyegii deal and $220,000
in payments- xu ..:-..
"What may have just been ar{rou-
tine meeting to you turned out to be
a quarter of a million dollar$ for
Billy Carter, Sen. Robert Dole,.R
Kan.. told Brzezinski: = 7"'
---Echoing Dole's charge, Sen. Pat-
rick Leahy ; D-Vt.,said: 'I.think-haw
ing sat here for several..weeks lis-
tening.to testimony and reading
depositions,.one, could easily: reach..i
the conclusion that-the result of the''I
`meeting was to-enrich Billy Carter.
whether intended or not.
.- In an unprecedented appearance
before a congressional investigat-
ing panel, Brzezinski spent eight i
hours sparring with senators as he I
defended- his-dealings with Billy
.Carter. The session was marked-by
- temper . flareups-and ?theatrics.that
_made it. the most spirited- day.of
hearings since.-the. star witness,
Billy Carter, appeared_before.thel'
senators last month:
In other developments, the sub-
committee:...
? Announced that it-will stake a
deposition from Billy Carter next
week in an effort to resolve discrep-
ancies between his. testimony and
.-.-that of top Justice Department and
other officials.
? Released new telephone records
...showing that Billy Carter was an
contact with oil company officials
minutes after Brzezinski, on the
basis of intelligence . reports, 1
.admonished him for attempting to
negotiate an oil deal?with Libya... ?
S Produced a- deposition in which
former Secretary of State Cyrus R..
Vance differed with.Brzezinski's
version of how Vance took the news
of-.Billy-Carter's role in arranging a
White House meeting between Brze-
zinski and- a Libyan diplomat to dis-.
cuss.the Iranian hostage crisis.'
In ? his testimony, Brzezinski
.called "preposterous" any sugges-
'tion that he or anyone else in the
White House ever intended "to en-
hance Billy Carter's opportunity for
commercial advantage in his rela-
tions with Libya." -
Brzezinski said his first contact
with Billy Carter was late last
November when,. at the.suggestion
.of First Lady Rosalynn Carter. he
'asked the president's brother to set
up a meeting between himself and
..the chief Libyan diplomat in Wash- '
ington, All Houderi.
The meeting was held in Brze-
zinski's office Nov. 27. Nine days
later Houderi returned for an Oval,
Office meeting with President Car-
.
ter..
Brzezinski said .the Nov. 27, ses--
. sion "was a part of our interna
tional campaign t o -
-enervate=
.pressure on behalf .of.. the .safety,
and, if possible, the release of the
!hostages. This contact was under-
taken with the knowledge of both
the president and the secretary of
state at a, time of extreme danger to
,state hostages.".
He said that when he-informed
Vance of Billy Carter's role in. ar-
ranging the .meeting, .the then
::secretary.of state said "something
-:like, `Well, no harm in trying.,_ 7
In 'his deposition. -to the
:subcommittee,. however, Vance has
a different. recollection of his reac-
tion. Vance told Senate investiga-:
.tors'that he assumed Billy Carter
,.:was off on a private initiative and at..
the time he said he was skeptical of
~theattemvt. n,. .4.z, s_a and vw~ t A
Brzezinski replied: "Skepticism
describes a state of mind. He did not
show skepticism to me. He said it'
was worth trying, or something like
that."
The national security adviser
said Billy Carter's effort had a
"negligible impact" on the situation
and "on balance I would have been
happier if it had not taken place."
He said he still considers the use
of Billy Carter's Libyan contacts
"justified under the prevailing cir-
cumstances" and added that "we
had an obligation to try every
orthodox and unorthodox means"
of trying to win release of the
American hostages.
"There was a clear risk in using
.him, but I had no idea-at the time
whatsoever that he was engaged in -
financial dealings (with Libya),
Brzezinski said.' ?:
. Asked by one senator why he had'
not used normal diplomatic chan-
nels to set up the Houderi meeting,
.Brzezinski replied: "The issue was
not the absence of contacts with the
,Libyans. The issue was that the con-
up to that point had not pro-
tacts
-duced results."
Brzezinski, asked for his assess-
ment of Billy Carter's Libyan
activities, called them "counter-
productive, uncalled for and in
some respects reprehensible."
He added, "I see some potential
harm to our national interest, given
the relationship -of brother.. to -
brother."
Brzezinski said his second major,
contact with Bit Carter came on
Marc .31.w when he received an
' ante i ence re rt from CIA Direc-
tortansield Turner on the oil deal I
the president's brother was negoti-
atina between Libya and the Char-
ter Oil Co. of Jacksonville. Fla.
He said .,he telephoned Billy
Carter in Georgia and told him: "In
the course of my work a lot of infor-
mation flows across my desk; and
I've recently seen information that.!
you are engaged in business activi-;
ties" that could be embarrassing to
the president.
Carter's response, he said, was
"somewhat less than gracious in the
substance and in the tone." ,
'Some senators; including Chair-
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.
man Birch Bayh, D-Ind., challenged
Brzezinski's . judgment on -the
propriety of using sensitive infor-
mation in this case. --
"I was very careful that nothing I
said to him would convey my source
of information;" Brzezinski replied.
"I'm absolutely confident my source
was notcompromised:"
He added: "I can say to you -.I
hope without sounding boasting -
that I've- dealt with intelligence
information for several years.
There's-probably no one else in the
White House more sensitive than I
am on intelligence matters."
The telephone records released
by the.' subcommittee yesterday
showed-that- Brzezinski's -call im-
mediately,. triggered a series. of
previously undisclosed phone calls
from billy Carter to Jack McGregor,
a consultant for the Charter Oil Co.,
and six. calls to the Libyan Peoples'-
,:......:: :.. a
Bureau,
Sen. Strom Thurmond, R-S.C., lec-
tured Brzezinski for not passing the
intelligence information, on- to the
U.S. law enforcement officials.
"I consider that to be a serious
and groundless assertion," Brze-
zinski said.
Pressed by Thurmond on why he
had not asked U.S. intelligence
-agencies to keep a close watch on
Billy Carter after the March 31 dis-
closure of his oil deal, Brzezinski
said that they had already been
doing that. -
The= subcommittee's final day of
public hearings erupted in. an acri-
monious exchange-between Brze-
rinski and some of the senators who
.questioned his judgment and mo-
tives. - And at one':. point,-'
subcommittee members angrily
clashed with one another over the I
scope of the investigation. Brzezinski, surrounded by a-co-
~terie of:. White House: aides, lawyers
and security agents, responded to
some Republican questions with bit
ter sarcasm and scorn...:;::.::: -
The .president's national security
aide and Thurmond tangled angrily
after the senator accused Brzezinski
:of. acting. as a "political trouble,-
shooter" in his handling of intelli-j
gence information on Billy Carter's
oil dealings with Libya...
Brzezinski snapped: "I consider
that to be a highly improper insinu-
ation and innuendo not supported
by the facts. I resent the allegation
you are making regarding my mo-
tives." - -
Thurmond replied: "We're after
the truth; we're trying to get the
truth,:and we're not sure you're tell-
..
ing it."
A red-hot Brzezinski shot back,
"You may not be sure, senator, but I
am."
A few minutes later, Dole set off
tempers again. His efforts to ques-
tion Brzezinski about a 1980. trip
made by Atlanta lawyer Charles
Kirbo, the president's confidant,: to
Saudi Arabia were blocked by White
House counsel Alfred Moses, who
insisted that waiver of Executive
Privilege for, Brzezinski applied,
only to questions about Billy-Carter "1
and Libya.
"That's the most ridiculous thing
I've heard asserted,"-interrupted 'l1
Sen.' Dennis DeConcini; D-Ariz:, who
argued that the subcommittee's
mandate was broad enough to in clude Dole's question .'"You had bet-
ter go back, Mr. Moses, and look at
your law books." .
At this point, Bayh took exception 1
to Dole's suggestion. that the sub-..
committee was being "hemmed in"
in its work by restrictions on the-
use of intelligence information in
the panel's hands. .
Bayh told Dole he-resented the
suggestion and then lectured his
Republican. colleague for springing
the Kirbo gpestion out of the blue.
"We certainly wouldn't want to
surprise . anyone, would we?".Dole.
.retorted.
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ARTICLE APPE&RZ
ON PAG
NEW YORK TIMES
18 SEPTEMBER 1930
Text of Statement by Brzezinski
Sp*civWT &NewYork71mn.
WASHINGTON, Sept. 17-Following is the text of a statement today by Zbig
niew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, before a subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
I submitted a statement to the%com- The third 'contact,, in 'June of this
mittee on Aug. 4. That statement is now
part of the public record, along with a year, was initiated by Billy Carter. He
considerable wanted to know whether it would affect
body of other evidence the national security-for him to disclose to
subcommittee has assembled. I would
like to the Department of Justice the fact that
offer this morning a few obser- he had assisted in our earlier efforts re-
garding the hostages. .
that record. ; ...-I have cooperated with this inquiry in
The inquiry-has, of -necessity, ex-
plored classified matters. - Some determined every determined le that t way. The it is appropriate rehor
aspects of the case, therefore, can only the first time in recent memory, , that
cat
be discussed in executive session,.if we: the assistant for national securi at-
are to protect extremely sensitive intel ty
fairs appear, and testify under oath be-
-fore a Congressional committee. The
The facts relating to my contacts : facts of the matter have been placed
with Billy Carter,. however, are on the .under intense scrutiny. Some have
public record. There were three con- searched in all this for hidden motives,
tacts involving Libya. Each was 'ex-,
brief, , and notably narrow, in. 'cchhaango e of a course se in maneuver nu our signal a secret
scope:. _ - Middle East:;
The first- in late November of last` -`peace efforts - even a disregard for
year, was a part, of our international national security.. Such speculation is
capaign to generate-pressure on behalf--. groundless. Three elemental points are of the safety and, it possible, the re- beyond cavil:
lease of the hostages. This contact was (1) Billy. Carter had no influence
undertaken with the knowledge of both whatsoever on my views, actions or the President and:-the Secretary of : policy toward Libya. I' have-seen not a
State, at a time of extreme danger to. shred of evidence that he had such an..
the hostages. The suggestion that our effect on . the President, the.National .,
purpose was to enhance. Billy Carter's ' Security Council staff or the Depart-
opportunity for commercial advantage meet of State.._,
in his relations with Libya is Prel m
Gus. r (2) In none of- my meetings with the
The second contact was my call to ? Libyan officials did I discuss overall
Billy Carter in late March, to admonish United States policy toward the Middle
him that his commercial activities in-
volving East:
Libya might be exploited by a'- (3) As' Admiral Stansfiekd Turner is
foreign power. That he might be con- reported to have testified, ourintelli-
templating such an- arrangement was-,-': : gence was not compromised. in my ad-
unknown to -me in November orat any' monishing call.to Billy Carter.
time before -Admiral Turner brought I will be pleased now to respond to''
this intelligence.to myattention late in any questions to the extent I can do so
March. I. considered, '-and to .this day : in this open session. To the extent I can-
consider, it my duty to be careful, but not, I will be. happy.;to respond morenot passive, with respect to such infor- fully in the closed session that is to fol
rnation
low.
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A z' .i.:iX
ARTICLE
011i PAGE 1 6 -j~
Almost Everyone vs.
ITIME
122 September 1980
1 - Nation
Zbig
But the National Security Adviser hangs tough
Z bigniew Brzezinski. For most Amer-
icans the name is still a tongue. twist-
er, but it has become well known none-
theless, just as the proud, ambitious and
dynamic Polish-born professor hoped it
would when Jimmy Carter appointed him
White House National Security Adviser
nearly four years ago. But with his fame
has come more notoriety and criticism
than he expected. Aside from the Pres-
ident himself, Brzezinski is the most
controversial member of a highly contro-
-versial Administration. He is widely
blamed for many of the troubles that have
beset the U.S. since he came into office.
Citing thle delicacy of ongoing efforts
to secure eventual liberty for the hostages,
Brzezinski refuses to respond point by
point to Sullivan's bill of particulars.
(Khomeini last week specified the con-
ditionslfor freeing the 52 captives: the re-
turn oil the Shah's fortune to Iran; release
of Iranian funds now blocked in Amer-
ican banks; cancellation of U.S. claims
against Iran;land guarantees that the U.S.
will not interfere in Iranian affairs.) But
in an interview with TIME last week, Brze-
zinski characterized the Sullivan charges
as "totally self-serving." He also denied
one charge that, if true, would be espe-
The embattled Brzezinski in his office in the West Wing of the White House
Dazzling intellectual virtuosity, but theories sometimes too clever by half.
During a brief appearance - at last
month's National Democratic Conven-
tion in New York City, Brzezinski was
booed by many of the delegates. Last
week Brzezinski was the target of-a scath-
ing indictment by William H. Sullivan, :
former U.S. Ambassador to. Tehran. In.
the latest round of one of Washington's
favorite parlor games, "Who-Lost Iran?":
Sullivan pins the tail squarely-on Brze-
zinski, accusing him of undermining dip---.
lomatic efforts to open contacts with the-
Ayatullah . Khomeini and -thus -blunt the
anti-Americanism of- the- -revolutionary-
regime. Writing in the fall issue of For--- _
eign Policy magazine, Sullivan also claims -
that Brzezinski-first scuttled-a US.-plan
to mediate. between .Khomeini and the.
''Iranian armed -forces, - then - tried. -to,
organize by remote control-, an anti
Khomeini military coup, even after the
Shah had fled the country.. -- _ - - - -
cially damning. Sullivan writes that in
November 1978 Brzezinski dispatched
-Ardeshir Zaliedi, then the Shah's envoy
-to Washington, on a fact-finding mission
:to Iran,1 thus) circumventing and humil-
. iating Sullivan, and that Brzezinski con-
- sulted with Zahedi every day over an open
long-distance telephone line, with the So-
-viets presumably listening in. According
to Brzezinski: however, Zahedi returned
to Tehran on his own initiative and
phoned l only two or three times. "I have
no regrets," says Brzezinski.
This week Brzezinski is preparing to
defend another aspect of his performanch
during the Iran crisis, and he is sched-
uled to fdo so in an inquisitional setting
that his predecessors have been spared.
The White House has waived. the Ex-
ecutive privilege that normally protects
National Security Advisers from congres-
sional summonses, and Brzezinski has
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agreed to testify before the special Sen-
ate Judiciary subcommittee investigating
Billy Carter's ties with Libya.
In November Brzezinski asked the
President's brother to invite a Wash-
ington-based Libyan diplomat to the
White House.-'The purpose of the.
meeting was to- persuade the Libyans
to press Khomeini on the release of the
hostages. "It was a reasonable thing to
do in very trying circumstances," Brze
zinski maintains, adding that soon after
-and perhaps because of-Billy's inter-
cessions, Libyan Strongman Muammar
Gaddafi did indeed send the desired mes-
sage to Khomeini, although Gaddafi's
appeal had no discernible impact on"the
crisis. .
But the question remains: Why was
it necessary for either the President's
brother or his National Security Adviser
to act as intermediary with a member of
the Libyan embassy in Washington? Such
contacts are routinely handled by the
State Department. This case, like that of
Brzezinski's dealings with Zahedi, left an
inescapable impression that he was at-
tempting an end run around his supposed
colleagues in Foggy Bottom and the For-
eign Service. As a result, Brzezinski was
more mistrusted and even despised than
ever at the State-Department and among
career diplomats-hardly a desirable at-
titude toward the official who is supposed
to coordinate the various agencies of US.
foreign policy. .
?rzezinski also faces questions from the
? Senate panel on why, in late March,
he warned Billy that one of his Libyan
business deals-an attempt on behalf of
the Charter Oil Co. to obtain additional
quotas of Libyan crude-could be embar-
rassing to the Administration. Brzezinski
knew about the deal because he had re-
ceived from CIA Director Stansfield Tur-
ner a top-secret report based on intelli-
gence sources -who would be extremely
vulnerable if their identities were re-
vealed, or even guessed.
Once again Brzezinski has no regrets.
"I would have been in a reprehensible po-
sition if I had sat on it," he says of-the re-
port. Besides, "no classified information
was conveyed to Billy-. He knew what he
was doing." Justice Department officials,*j
looking into the possibility that Brzezinski
may have violated the nation's espionage
laws, say privately they think-there is lit-
tle chance he will face criminal-charges." -
But they question his judgment.-
So do many others; on many other is-
sues. A man of dazzling intellectual vir= .
tuosity and .erudition, Brzezinski has
sometimes seemed to be badly served. by
ing fancy theories, and he so likes to.-hear
himself spin them out,=that he' has tend-
ed to pay less attention than- he :should to--
making those theories work-in practice . - S
-and, indeed, to figuring oat whether'"
they can work. -Brzezinski was -a princi-= S,
pal author of the Carter -human :rights
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campaign, which has survived only in
drastically modified, and more modest,
form after its collision with Realpolitik
in South Korea, Iran and the U.S.S.R.
Early in the Administration he promoted
the idea that the U.S. should relegate So-
viet-American relations to a less central
position in the seamless web of interna-
tional affairs. Trouble was, the Kremlin.
refused to accept the demotion.
It' was Brzezinski who unveiled in
1977 the concept of Iran and Saudi Ara-
bia becoming "the regional influentials"
on whom the U.S. could rely in the Per-
sian Gulf. Now that Washington's rela-
tions with Tehran are severed and those
with Riyadh are strained, Brzezinski is
fascinated by the potential of radical,
traditionally pro-Soviet Iraq as `.`the
new regional influential." -
Brzezinski's labels too often
seem facile, even interchangeable,
and-his theories too flexible, too
clever by half. In 1977-78 he ar-
gued that the U.S. must learn to
live with revolutionary change in
Third World countries. Then, in
1979, without admitting a major
shift in policy, he pushed. vigor-
ously, though unsuccessfully, for a
policy of backing Nicaraguan
Dictator Anastasio Somoza to .the
bitter end.
Brzezinski -has also, shown
poor judgment in indulging his
visceral anti-Russian sentiments
and his combative, provocative
personality in public. During a
trip to China in 1978, he chal-
lenged.an aide to a. race up the
Great Wall, saying, "Last one to
-the top has to fight the Cubans in
Ethiopia." It would have been a
harmless joke, except that the So-
viets as well as some State Depart-
ment officials were already quiv-
Soviet overtones of the trip, and A he
reporters gathered round were sure to
overhear the, quip and make news out of
it. They did.
Similarly, on a visit to the Af-
ghan-Pakistani border in February, he
allowed himself to be photographed pos-
ing with a Chinese-made AK-47 -auto-
matic rifle. Good fun, maybe, but def-
initely not statesmanship.
n private, Brzezinski is far less pugna-
cious. Says former-- Aide Samuel Hos- -
kinson, "He's a gentleman and a scholar
in the true sense of the words.". Seweryn
Bialer, a fellow Polish-American who suc-
ceeded Brzezinski as director=of the Re-
-search Institute on-International Change
at Columbia University, calls-him "ex-
traordinarily decent and honest." Bialer
says he has profound, disagreements with-
the Carter Administration, particularly.
over its difficulty. in promulgating clear.
and steady, policies, but he. does. notblame-.
Brzezinski alone:. "It's.. the, -P,resident's. _
fault. -My disappointment with Brzezinski.
is that he cannot change the President to
make himlless spasmodic."
Brzezinski believes that he is under at-
tack because of the politically super-
charged atmosphere and because he is
vulnerable to both the left and the right:
the left resents l im, in his view, for being
correct about the dangers of Soviet ex-
pansionism, while the right criticizes him
for supporting the embattled SALT II trea-
ty and the' human rights policy. Brzezin-
ski argues that despite the setbacks of the
past few years, I the Administration has
laid the ground for effectively countering
the Soviets, for repairing frayed ties with
Western Europe and Japan, for consol-
idating the newJSino-American relation-
ship (for which.. rzezinski takes personal
credit, with some justification), and for
improving) its dialogue with the Third
tended to take off for long weekends at
his seaside home in Maine. Brzezinski,
by contrast, is an indefatigable, even
exuberant worker. Between now and the
election, Muskie can get his way by go-
ing public with his annoyance at Brze-
zinski's methods, as he did last July when
the National Security Adviser completed
plans for the Administration's revised.,
nuclear targeting policy without consult-
ing the new Secretary of State.
D espite the problems he causes, pres-
idential political advisers are not like-
ly to press for Brzezinski's ouster. The rea-
son, according to a close aide: "Zbig may
be feeling some heat, but Ronald Reagan
is his best insulation. Carter is not going
to dump the house hard-liner just as he is
fighting to prove he is tough on defense."
tween the'President and his ad-
viser is still strong. Carter remains I
loyal to and dependent on Brze-
zinski as his mentor in. foreign of--:
fairs, a role he acquired in 19731
when the Columbia professor met
and. hit it off with the Georgia
Governor. Brzezinski's name is
still the first on the President's
daily calendar, and he is often the
last adviser Carter speaks to at'
night. Says Defender Huntington:
"Brzezinski retains the President's
confidence, and that is what is im-
portant." Leslie Gelb, who fought
numerous battles with Brzezinski
when he was a State Department
official and has criticized him pub-
licly since leaving the Govern-
merit last year, says, "I think Brze-
zinski has been damaged irrepa-
rably everywhere except with
Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter."
As he demonstrated in his
stubborn support for Bert Lance
three years ago, Carter tends to re-'
Pinning the tail on Zbig in ihe game of "Who Lost Iran?".
World-if, of course , Carter gets another
four years.
Whether Brzezinski, too, would be
around that long is an underlying issue
in the current controversy about him. Says
Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington, a
former colleague at the White House, and
one of his few public defenders: "A lot of
this criticism has erupted now because
people whd disagree with his views are
trying to keep hits out of a second Carter
Administration."{ Certainly there are
many people at the State Department who
hope Brzezinski',will go even if Carter
stays. But there is a good chance that if
Carter is re-elected, Brzezinski will pre-
vail over Edmund Muskie's State Depart-
-ment as decisively-,and sometimes bru-
tally-as het did over Cyrus Vance's.
For one thing I Muskie has been some-
thing of a (disappointment to his own
-troops. He has the ego and the stature to
compete with Brzezinski, but so far he has
-not shown the energy. He has complained
-about the amount of paperwork and the
complexity bf the problems, and he has
ject even the most persistent and often jus-
tifiable criticisms of a close-friend and
trusted adviser. The President's loyalty is =
more commendable than his wisdom in
Brzezinski's case, just as it was in Lance's.,
While the National Security Adviser)
cannot be blamed for the recent misfor-;
tunes that have befallen the U.S. or -ford
the President's own failures of leadership,
Brzezinski is personally responsible for!
exacerbating institutional tensions within
the Government, needlessly agitating for-
eign leaders with his penchant-for brag= -
gadocio, and sowing confusion-with pro-
nouncements nouncements that too often. sound like!
geostrategic gobbledygook. Thus he-has
contributed to the impression so wide-
spread at home. and abroad of an Ad-
ministration that is impetuous and in
disarray. In that sense, Brzezinski is un-
political problem; now: as the President
faces -;the election and later if he gets a
,second term. ' By Strobe Talbott. Report-!
ed by Gregory H. Wierzynski and Roberto ?
Suro/Washington =
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ARTICLE APP
ON PAGE
ESSAY
Nd, Ado
About
Plenty
. By William Safire -.
NEW YORK TIMES
15 SEPTEMBER 1980
WASHINGTON, Sept. 14'- On Dec.'
18, 1979, White House motor pool logs
*will show, the President's brother
summoned a White House limousine to
take him and aide Randy Coleman to
the Libyan Embassy-.- The check- for
arranging meetings that led to "assur-
ances" of a pro-Arab Carter policy
was not yet ready; a. few. days later,
Coleman -returned to pick up $20,600.
(Neither man has yet. been asked
about that Dec. 18 visit.). _
In an equally obscene combination
of the sale of influence and the abuse of
Federal perks, Billy Carter again de-
manded and got a White House limo on
March 4 of this year to drop off. Ron
Sprague, the accountant under drug
investigation, to press the Libyans on
Billy's behalf for more money.
Common taxicabs are not presti-
gious enough for First Brother on'his
private business: the White House
cars, chauffered by members of the
armed forces,.demonstrated to Libyan
officials that the President's. brother
was a man of influence. .
Billy's illegal peddling of that influ-
ence, made possible by a brother who
knew about his lawbreaking and would
not stop it, is a scandal of Teapot Dome
proportions. However, the new stand-
ard of political ethics is now "Is it as
bad as Watergate?" Unless impeach.
able offenses are proved, the already-
demonstrated . abuse of trust, mispri-
sion of felony and outright lying are dis-
missed as "much ado about nothing.'',:
Some interesting nothings:
1. The tennis court meeting. On June
11 of this year,. when Joel Lisker of
Justice told Billy Carter that the Gov.
ernment knew of secret Libyan pay-
ments, the President's brother. 'then
admitted to a $200,000 "loan". and an-
nounced he was going to' the White
House to complain' aboutharassment..::ii
The Qaddafi agent then hurried for
protection to Dr. Brzezinski, who
called in Presidential counsel Lloyd
Cutler, who in turn arranged for lwa-
yers sensitive to White House public
relations; needs. But in testimony last
week, a hitherto concealed fact popped
out: that same day, Billy also had a
"brief "'meeting on the tennis court
with Jimmy Carter. (Strange how the
President's most delicate meetings
are at first forgotten, then described
as "brief.")
On the tennis court that June 11,
Billy was in the biggest panic of his
life. I wonder: did he not complain to
his brother, as he warned Lisker he
.would, of harassment? Did- be not
mention. to his brother the meetings
just held with Brzezinski and Cutler,
or the fact that his Libyan payments
were known?
2. Brzezinski's selective - memory.
The normally meticulous National Se-
curity Adviser insists he. kept . no
record of the historic- White House
meeting on Nov. 27 with Billy and the
Libyan official. But now it develops
that three days later, Zbig had a tele-.
phone conversation with Billy Carter
- and maintains he has "no recollec-
tion of the call." Was nobody listening,-
-Or was anybody told not to listen?
One curious conflict in Brzezinski's
public statement concerns the se.
quence following his receipt of the top
? secret intelligence repor about Billy
Carter's impending oil deal. Brzezin-
ski attests this took place "in March,"
followed by his call to Billy Carter "on
the afternoon of the day I received the
report," followed by his briefing of the
President "the next day.-
But. dope this out with -me: The
White House says the President was
briefed by Brzezinski about the intelli-
gence report, as well as Zbig's call to
Billy, on, April 1 (Wisconsin primary
day). That would mean that 'Zbig re-
ceived the information from.C.I.A.'s .
Admiral Turner on March 31' (which
Turner will confirm) and called Billy
that same afternoon.
Billy Carter has testified, however,
that he thinks he returned the call from .
the Best Western Motel in Americus on
Perhaps Zbig will-change his story
from "the next day" or perhaps the
telephone toll records of the motel in
Americus will clear this up, but right
now the published dates do not jibe.
And somehow, the notion of any White
House staffer directing the Presi-
dent's brother to pass up a huge oil
deal without first talking to the-Presi_
3. The gaps in the President's diary
.
Jimmy Carter has made public 16
diary entries covering an 18-month l v
period on the subject of Billy and
Libya. Curiously, there w o ~-- _
tries f
A
or
pril 1 when statli
.,rng news - _1
about his b
th
'
ro
er
s OR fortunes b
e-
came known to the--President,-or -on-
June 11, when his brother dropped by
at the tennis court after his devastat-
ing experience at Justice. Not impor-
tant enough to note perhaps?
This week, as Appointments Secre-
tary Philip Wise exhibits his own for- .
gettery ... (Appointments . Secretary
Dwight Chapin went to jail for saying
"I don't recall"), Chairman Birch
Bayh will press to cut off the inquiry.
If he succeeds, the exposure ofthe. Bil-
lygate scandal will be postponed with
after the-election - leaving it to spe-
to include the President... - .. i
April 1, not March 31 - and has sup-
plied a wealth of corroboration, includ-
ing a vivid recollection . of his return
that morning from an April 1 meeting
with Charter Oil in Jacksonville.
Here's-the significance: If Brzezin-
ski's telephone conversation with Billy
took place after, rather than before,
Zbig briefed the President - then we
have been misled. Then Justice's in-
vestigation of the Zbig leak would have
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STEALTH
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AgiICLZ
ON PAGI_
THE WASHINGTON POST
- 17 September 1980
.bed:: misled` 'or-, consciously
playing gutter. .:politics."
-[The _Post.:published 'a.story?,:
low.-Aug.-.14"..-about administra------
:ti
wplans-a0 go Public during. -
the presidential campaign with:.
Stealth, . technological break.
throughs.: ':George C.`.Wilson,
author of ,the:: story,, said, yes-
terday that -Zumwalt, was "in-
correct" in,. his assertions'_about
the ` source.1
Carter Blamed
In Stealth Leak
Retired ,_-Adm. Elmo Zum-
wait, -a supporter of. Republi-
can Ronald Reagan's presiden-
tial candidacy; . quoted un.
named high-level sources as
saying -President Carter made
the decision - .to.'' leak- the
"Stealth" program as . part of
his presidential. reelection. ef-
fort.
The: former chief-.6f naval
operations;: `.
Although the-Russian was de-
scribed as an ordinary foot: soldier
with .no ~ articular intelli ence
a he o e Hite fates, his pres-
ence in a em d serve to
-exacerbate already-strained U.S.-
Soviet relations on the eve of a
scheduled meeting between Secre-
tary of State Edmund S. Muskie and
Soviets=to-Intervene wit. the.A - suade-.tne:.Russians.and.A9ighaas'to
ghan government to permit the sot-1 lethimleavet e.country:
dies to leave the, country.', In', the=meantime State Depart
.
The matter also was discussed went'
. spokesman;Joha.Trettuer
during a meeting in Washington on said, he will be given "temporary
Monday betweenDavid.D. Newsom,: :refuge- in. the embassy.. Privately,
undersecietary.ofstate for political State Department officials said.',the
affairs, and the Soviet ambassador: United States' was prepared to let I
to the United states, Anatoly Dobry- the soldier stay in the embassy in. .
nin' definitely if safe passage out of-Af.. ,
Security aroundthe. embassy in ghan-istan isnot,quickly secured::-
.Kabul, alread tight .bbecause of the U.S. officials' declined' to reveal
gener-la ly etenoranng situation in the man's name or:any-other:per-
wa;-tornf Afghanistan, was stepped sonal detailsabolit him "except ,to
up'following the defection, adminis- "say he speaks only : Russian and
said the
Th
id
o
ey
.
fficials sa
tration,
-rudimentary Carman
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ARTICLE E.A ED
ON PAGE
NEW YORK TIMES
16 SEPTEIBER 1930
Reagan Turns Down
Carter Intelligence Briefings
CORPUS CHRISTI, Tex., Sept. 15 (AP)
Ronald Reagan has turned down a Car-
ter Administration offer to give him intel-
ligence briefings on the Iran hostage
situation and other issues, the White
i House press secretary; Jody. Powell, said
today.
`... Mr. Powell said that'Mr.'Reagan had
been offered the briefings' customarily
extended in recent years to candidates by
incumbent Presidents.'Lyn Nofziger, Mr.
Reagan's press secretary, said that they
had been rejected. because= "we felt we
didn't want to compromise our ability to
use information we got from other
, - .. ;. .
surces. "
{ When-President Carter was the Demo-
cratic nominee in- 1976, he was briefed
several times by George Bush, then Di--
t rector of Central -Intelligence and now
Mr. Reagan's running mate.. .
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ARTICLE APPEA
ON FAGF
JACX AND R5CN
THE WASHINGTON POST
16 September 1980
Th~ MysteiF1as]
Although it happened almost a year about one-sixth the size of the atomic
ago, the-mysterious flash detected-.off '?. bomb dropped on Hiroshima.35 years
the coast of South Africa by a U.S. spy ago.
satellite is still a matter. of dispute The advantage of. tactical nukes to,.:::
among Intelligence experts. the three 'nations, as intelligence ex-
The Defense Intelligence Agency, as ? perts see it, is that they could be used
might be-.expected from its. military , for limited,. defensive purposes to fore-
orientation ,: is convinced. the mysteri-' stall invasion from aggressive: neigh-
ous flash-was a nuclear explosion: of bons without inviting massive retalia-
.some sort. Navy experts agree with the tion from the nuclear' superpowers..'
DIA's conclusion. i .I.a _ . -?- - __
._. ^!4'f !'iC : is=i .^. .1=~ tri?_ LSi,
ti.
- _ Z { ? T { I T al
TS!-~ AND UPTER BROUG _U? E ~! RE DIRE {ice TO REGISTER AS Ft
1. - RE+sii. 'i~~=T#_ _'a'"? a. _v?1'si_i?i
-~T ONE riI1?' i THE E ~- is t -- r
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i IT
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OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS
NEWS SERVICE
Date. ffSep 80
(tern Nc.
Ref. No. ,
DISTRIBUTION II
c
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ARTICLE APPEARED ND4 YORK TIMES
ON PAGE 22 SEPTEMBER 1980
'rose.cut?r:
At 10:36, Billy called Jack McGregor,
the man who was setting up his multi-
million dollar deal between Charter
Oil and, the-Libyans. At 10:39, Billy.
called - the : Libyan Embassy again.
From 11:02 to 11:12, the Libyan meets
with President Carter. At 2:22 P.M.,
Bllly,.calls the Libyans again,. and
makes three follow-up calls to Charter
oil.:,.,
_ :That was the meeting that.the.White.-
House claims Billy Carter had nothing;
to do with. A couple of weeks later,
Billy Carter summoned a White House
car; impressively chauffeured. by a
uniformed member of the U.S. Armed .
Forces,.to take him to theLibyan Em-.
bassy. ? Fie there dunned Libya for
WASHINGTON - Carterites -have: money; that - state gratefully-turned
set up a straw-man question to help: over $20,000 within a week: A month'
them denigrate the Billygate probe: later, Billy lied to Government investi-
Did the President's brother influence gators about his hostage profiteering.
brother to sell illegally his apparent in
fluence?'' ;:..zcrt
To be more specific: -'y~= ^ {:
1. Did the President's brother-get;'.
White House help in his profiteering on,
the hostage crisis? %
Yes. -Even the;. most see-know-evil'.
'Carter partisans:admit that Billy Car.
ter used his ability.to set up a White"
House meeting with his Libyan clients,-
ostensibly about the hostages' for his'
.personal profit. {?="
The White House claims that Billy
Carter merely set up a "semi-social'.'
meeting with Dr. Brzezinski and, a'
Libyan representative on, Nov. 27 ..of ,%
last year. But belatedly acquired tele-',
phone logs show how closely Billy was..
clued in to his Libyan client's visit
to his brother in the Oval Office on
been the real issue- President Car=
ter, if re-elected, would need no urging
to tilt Arab and recognize the P.L.O.
--lie central question is: Did the Carter
Administration permit the President's
brother's; unlawful activities from an,
Intelli enc. rt in April, did he act:
to enforce t e aw?
He did not. The President claims
that he merely approved of Dry.
Brzezinski's call to Billy warning of':
embarrassment, and did nothing for
three months: as his brother's deal`-`
moved forward. Dr. Brzezinski-who,
lest we forget; glibly lied to me about
his conversations with Billy about-,.
Libya before the Senate hearings-of
'fers the excuse-that President Carter.
3. Did Dr.. Brzezinski'sApril 1 call to
Billy Carter - revealing .Intelligence
:too secret: to be given the F.B.I.
alert the President's brother and the.
Libyans to secret surveillance?
Yes.. "He got no information from
.me that he didn't know," Dr. Brzezin-
ski explains. '"He knew what he was
doing." That is pure deception; as
Senator Charles Mathias observed
`sweetly, "He didn't know that any-
body else knew that he was doing it."
.
,
That December 'morning at-10:06,.1 Within four minutes of Dr. Brzezin-
Billy called, the Libyan Embassy. ,At ,ti -ski's revelationto Billy that the unlaw--
10:08, Billy called'AppointmentsSec-'_; ful deal-.was being monitored, the
retary Philip Wise -at the .WhiW1 President's brother was-on the phone
House. (Wise, who has the notation:-~ to oil lobbyist- McGregor - the same=
"10:10 Billy" on his telephone 'log, .man'who was given an audience with','
-professes no recollection; of the call.)., President Carter for picture-taking??
At 10:30, Dr. Brzezinskl called the- purposes, and. who testified that .he
Libyan Embassy to invite All el How."I, told the President how badly. 'Bill
y
dari to the, White House immediately. needed money. The morning after,
Brzezinski's :alert, Billy was on the
phone to his associates in Tripoli. -
As predicted here, Dr. Brzezinski: ;
has had to change his story under oath.
about when he briefed the President on
Billy's oil deal. In order to back up the.
President's assertion about learning of
Zbig's call after the fact, the date has
been moved to April 2; we are now
asked to believe that this hot family
news was withheld from the President,
down the hall,.for 36 hours.
The Director of Central Intelligence
ask r. rzezins to return, the m
cumin g ocurrnen . instea
urn it.
4. Was Justice obstructed by a White
.House tipoff to Billy" Carter about-a
{
grand jury in June? '
We do not yet know.'The man whose`
office is closest to the President's=?
.Philip Wise, who once .worked with't
Billy in the- warehouse - stonewalled
with so many "I don't recalls" and "no:,
recollections" that one Democratic-;
senator called his testimony "outra-
genus." The young man who ducked
repeated F.B.I. calls denies every-'_,
thing specific and forgets everything.;
embarrassing: he is not so stupid as he
would have us believe. - : - .
What's going to break this case? An-
swer: one witness cooperating under
prosecutorial duress. After the Senate
phase is finished, the sworn testimony,
with its many conflicts - will be sent"
to Justice. A special prosecutor will be':
required, not only to examine potential
perjury but to review the expected in-
ternal whitewash of the Attorney Gen
eral by Michael Shaheen.
The break in this case will come long:
after the election. At that time, voters,
will be asking: Why were we told that:
this was "much ado about nothing?" -
Where were the watchmen in the-
night?
By William Safire.
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ARTICLE AFFEA&M WASHINGTON STAR
ON PAGE , - L 21 SEPTEMBER 1980
Most ora Bil:ly Prob~:Pan~L
F~ei":Libva.M~ne
By Roberta Hornig. The only hints of partisan disagreement are But CIA Director Turner was also criticized-1
Washington seer seem venter on the, importance of the: inquiry and on..how by two of the investigators. Lugar and. Sen.
lon it should continue Charles Mathias,. R-Md.
A majority of the Senate subcom g
mittee - investigating. Billy Carter's] Most of the Democrats believe the Brzezinski is singled out for. asking Billy Carter,
Libyan activities is convinced that; probe-has at the suggestion of First Lady, Rosalynn Carter,
run , its course. "We've been stretching to .find to arrange a White House meeting between him
the 5220,000 he received from Libya issue issues,"says subcommittee Chairman Birch Bayh, and the Libyan diplomat last Nov. 27 for a discus-
was .a . gift,. and. not a .loan, as he D-Ind
claims: "_ - lion on the plight of the American ,hostages in
They, have also concluded; after But several of the Republicans interviewed say Iran. h --:
. public and about a:halfidozen ex- many questions remain unanswered and that the "1 don't-care how long Bnezinski pontificates!.
X10
ecutive sessions, that top administra? panel will be hard-pressed to. complete a final about the hostages, that was a bad mistake,".says
lion ? officials, including..Zbigniew report for the full Senate by the Oct. 4 deadline. Dole
Brzezinski, President .Carter's na ..There's a- good .many things that need to be. 'Inadvertently. or otherwise, that ' meeting
.tional security adviser,. Attorney tied down and explored," Vice Chairman Strom; played into Billy's hands," saidSen. Patrick Leahy,
General Benjamin R. Civiletti and Thurmond. R-S.C., said.-The sentiment was echoed:' D?Vt.
' ~ ? ? ' -' - ` -'' ~ "
CIA director Stansfield Turner, by Sen.-Robert Dole,--R-Kan. Mathias echoed the sentiment,' saying: I still
_s_ owe questions a judgment in.; "We're still learning, that's the problem,",said dgnt understand why he felt it was useful .or.
the roles they played in the Billy ++. Dole. " We've finished the first round of. public' dfsirable for Billy Carter to broker that meeting.
-Carter affair.. hearings and we're just now getting .important Its inexplicable."
Finally, while deciding that the information-like telephone logs." Civiletti was faulted by several of the Senate
president's brother had no influ? He -was- referring to subpoeaned telephone probers for. withholding from his own justice
ence on U.S. foreign policy; they con, records-which, when?recently compiled, revealed Department investigators.-informatioc he'. got
eluded that Billy Carter attempted (`a flurry of phone' calls by Billy Carter to the from a high-level intelligence report early.last
to-use his White House connection Libyan- Embassy-and to the -Charter Oil Co. April to the effect that Billy Carter was -on the
and that Brzezinski enhanced his for which he was trying to-negotiate increased'. 'verge of receiving money from Libya,
stature with the Libyans by asking oil allocations from Libya for handsome profits-! Civiletti, in his testimony before the subcom-
him to broker a -meeting with the 'after. Carter. arranged a meeting between mittee, said he did not want to divulge the intel
'zief? Libyan diplomat in Washing-. Brzezinski.'and' a Libyan' envoy, Ali Houderi. ligence source and that he knew that the Justice
gyn. There were similar flurries of phone calls on investigators would find out: the same informa-
This is the consensus that several other key days One was on Dec. 6, after Lion from their-own sources.:
emerged from interviews.with eight .President Carter met with the Libyan diplomat' However, it took-until June for the chief -Billy.
of the., ninesubcommittee members in the Oval Office..Another was on March 31, Carter prober, Joel S. Lisker;.head of the foreign
who, have been probing'.Billy Cart- when the national security adviser alerted Billy agents registration unit, to come up with the.
er`s Libyan ties since early August. Carter that he was aware of his oil .deal effort information.
The -ninth,. Sen: -Dennis DeConcini, and warned him that ..it could embarrass the Lisker's confrontation with Billy Carter on
D Ariz:,.:could..not be reached president- June it led to ,Carter's acknowled ement of his
The senators appear to be in gen- In my view, the hearing is not, ended," Dole receipt of money, and subsequently to his reg
concluded. 'if we o on,.we"li learna lot more... istration as a 'foreign agent for Libya.
eral agreement on these key points, g In his testimony, Billy
without any sign of partisan bick? There is- bipartisan agreement;: however, on y. -Carter- claimed that the l
ering. the, basic conclusions reached byFFmembers of S220,000 he tookd from Libya was part of a half-
-For example, on the key question the investigating 'panel -million dolar loan'he was trying to .negotiate ..I
'of whether the money that went-to :Bayh,said that both. Billy Carter and his con- But Carter had told Lisker in June that $20,000
-Billy Carter was a. gift or a Goanfidant and'. business'. associate,.: Henry, (Randy) of it was a repayment- of expenses: he incurred.
`a . question on which. Billy.' Carter.; Coleman,.' were trying .to make a fast buck, and while hosting a delegation of high-level Libyan
and the chief Justice Department to suggest they didn't-try to-use influence..t - hey officials. in Atlanta; in: early-1979.., :_ ,.,;; ;
investigator of his :case -differed had is not borne out by the record The,Senate probers are scheduled to 're
:question Billy Carter on this discrepancy some-
sharply - three. Republicans and 'I see'-no.evidence the money (paid to;Carter,
two Democrats says it was a,gift: . by the Libyans) was a loan said Sen Richard time this .week
The remaining two - Democratsand Lugar, R Ind. Turner .is cited for bad judgment foregoing `
one Republican. believe-it doesn't "I think it (the $220,000) was a payment'to only:to.Bnezinskf' with information that Billy i
matter ..because.:the terms were so ? Billy;? Sen.'. Max Baucus, D-Mont., agreed. But, Carter was negotiating a lucrative oil deal with.
generous that the payment -even he added,`"I don't.'think it matters anymore be- the Libyans.. and. not passing on the. news to
if it was a loan was tantamount cause- its been` exposed: By and large, the air's federal law enforcers.
been cleared ofr`this"matter
to- a gift. "If.;better judgment had beenexercised all
,...,.:
The eight panel: members were unanimous in around, this whole .filly' Carter expisode ;might,
their belief,'that -top"Carteradministration offi-. have been avoided,". conjectured . Mathias:.
cials had exercised': bad, judgment in their deal- Two of the *senators -Dole and.-.Lugar
?ings';with Bi Iy:.Carter. They cited .Bnezinski ] were also critical of -testimony by White House'l
-.and Civiletti; most. often..:_; -:7 ,".;x officials during?'the .open :hearings of the probe.;
They directed =most of. their criticism: at Phillip
Wise;;President Carters appointments- secretary,
and B.illy;CarteLclosestfy Vhite:?Iiouse:,friend. .
CONTIN1i
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"According to testimony from a .former White
House National Security Council Middle East spe-
cialist,. William-B. Quandt, and Brzezinski's for-
mer aide, Karl:lndurfurth, Wise had arranged
briefings.for Billy Carter.andhis. friend, Randy
Coleman,before the ,two.made their first trip to
.Libya in_'September 1978.
Therexwas also testimony = some, of it by
Billy Carter..- that Wise was the chief telephone
contact:at;the White--House for the president's
brothers
But.-Vise's testimony -during his appearance
last week was a series of "I don't recall's," concern-
ingboth the briefings and-the numerous phone
calls
"If someone' has responsibility to' serve -the
president of-the United.States, people would ex
pect moreintelligence and alertness," Lugar said.,
Snaped Dole: 'If President.Carter asked him
what happened on -a certain. date, he'd better
know:- or-':find -out. If::not, 'I'm -really concerned
about the Carter administration."
A Democratic senator-';who asked. to remain
unidentified- called: -Wise's testimony"outra-
geous:::i:,;...,_:...
"He's:either dumb `or he's lying. Either way
he hurts?the president;".he said..
Lugar said he believed several of the'key wit-
nesses, .including' Wise, -Coleman' and the star, -
Billy''Carter;. were :"superbly coached".:by their
lawyers:.;
Lugar.-,also complained that none -of"the top
administration witnesses, from Wise to Civiletti,
had been "forthcoming."
"Even if the White House did not evoke execu-
tive privilege (and refuse to testify), *there was.!
no particular attempt to'shed light; Lugar said-11
adding ,that administration witnesses only testi-
to;'what the;,`committee already.knew:
fied.
Lugar-and. Dole also. complained 'that the Billy
Carter. hearings:hack: moved so swiftly,' and with
so 'few: investigators, to tprobe- the facts; that, as
Lugar :' put : it, the'-committee-.; was,- not well.
prepared.either.;;individually or collectively"
?
The Senate probers differed on the-importance
of -the : investigation.
"We didn't know when we started out whether
we had . a: bear-by-the tail or a mouse -.by the
tail* 'said??Sen. Claiborne Pell,. D--RI:;-."I.-think''
we've- ended up as far ;ass national-:scandal.. goes, ,
with: a mouse,
Said Baucus: ", Up this this` point, no crimes
have been. committed as-far as:-we can tell. It
boils-down":to regrettable decisions that. are sig-
nificant but not consequential:
Lugai:,.reported ..:he believes-: the Carter affair;i
even: ifs: its ';implications are more ethical- than
..legal, "is ~.a_:setback :.in -the government-of the-!',
country..- That's the sadness:"
Lugarsaid`he believes the Carterepi ode only
-fuels cynicism-among the citizenry. toward gov-
ernment
"Hopefully," he ad'ded,." investigations like this
place a chilling effect on this kind of conduct
The subcommittee is expected to meet privately
within the next two weeks to determine. whether
its report to the Senate should be final, or whether
it should. be an interim report, with the inves-
tigation:continuing..
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AFTICLE APPLARED
011 PAGi
29 September 1980
Brzezinski
Keeps His Cool
He defends talking with Billy
Senator Strom Thurmond: We're try-
ing to get the truth, but we're not sure
you're telling it.
Zbigniew Brzezinski: Excuse me, Sen-,
ator. You may not be sure..I know I'm tell-
ing the truth.
That acerbic exchange was the high
-or low-point of an eight-hour
sparring match last week between
the special Senate subcommittee investi-
gating Billy Carter's profitable dealings
with the Libyans and Brzezinski, who be-
came the first National Security Adviser
ever to testify before Congress.
The subcommittee wanted to know,
why in November he had used the Pres-
ident's none too diplomatic brother as al
go-between to arrange talks at the White
House with the Libyans about the Amer-
ican hostages in Tehran. Brzezinski re-
plied that at the time, the White House
was desperately searching for help in any
quarter to free the hostages. He felt that
using Billy was worth a try since Arab so-
cieties tend to put blood ties above for-
mal positions in government. In fact, after
Brzezinski met with All Houderi, Libya's
top diplomat in Washington, the Libyan
government issued a statement condemn-
ing the Iranian action. That move, Brze-
zinski claimed, "certainly prevented the
jelling of a radical front at the time." He
felt that it may have saved American lives.
skeptical Senators wondered if Billy
gained anything from his diplomatic
mission: Vermont Democrat Patrick Lea-
hy asked if the "effect of the meeting, in-
tended or not, was to enhance the com-
mercial value of Billy Carter." Replied
Brzezinski, clearly bristling: "Our motive
was not to help Billy Carter but to help
the hostages." Billy served as "another
limited source of leverage." At the time
he asked for Billy's assistance, the Na-
tional Security Adviser said, he was un-
aware of the First Brother's business links
with-the Libyans.
The Senators .wanted to know why
Brzezinski felt free to use information
from a classified CIA report in warning
Billy that his actions in Libya mi t em-
arrass the Administration. B ezinski
explained that on receiving the damaging
report from CIA Director tans a ur
ner. he ondere the matter over unc
in his office, then concluded that `' would
serve the President better if first admon-
ished y." According to Brzezinski. the
President later told him, "You -did the
right t g. There was no reo se-
curity, said rzezins . nor did he risk re-
vea m the source of the CIA's m orma-
tion. Said Brzezinski: "Lots of e
knew about Billy's business attempts, and
certainly he
Not satisfied with this explanation,
South Carolina Republican Thurmond
complained that Brzezinski appeared to
have been acting as the President's "po-
litical troubleshooter." Visibly tensing and
almost spitting out his words, Brzezinski
replied: "I consider that to be a highly im-
proper insinuation, and it doesn't ade-
quately or accurately describe my motives
-to protect the national interest."
While Brzezinski was an open and of-
ten persuasive witness, some of his inter-
rogators thought some of his actions were
symptomatic of an Administration in dis-
array. Said Maryland Republican Charles
Mathias: "It seems to me that we're deal-
ing with a series of innocent blunders, but
they all add up to an appearance.of in-
competence." With Brzezinski the com-
mittee's last public witness, the Demo-
crats are in a hurry to wrap up the in-
vestigation by the subcommittee's Oct. 4
deadline and get Billy out of the news.
But that may prove difficult. Still an-
other of Billy's business ventures was dis-
closed last week. Billy and a California
businessman, Terry Barnes, have been
peddling souvenir $2 bills and Inaugural
envelopes bearing facsimiles of the Pres-
ident's signature for $150 each. The en-
trepreneurs aim to gross as much as $5.5
million. Barnes has already 'sold 13,000
of the envelopes, even though dealers say
their real value is no more than $12. ^
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SPY, TB 0116111 DEAD,
NOW REPORTED AUVE
Soviet Said to Commute Sentence
of Subject of Senate Inquiry;
.By.CRAIG R. WHTITQEY - - ,
..: -,Sp~elaltDMwN*aYorkTimm '. ,. `...
. MOSCOW, Sept.? 23 = A former Soviet
official' whose unmasking as an Ameri-
can spy is now under investigation by a
Senate committee in Washington was not
executed after his conviction but is still
alive in a Soviet prison, his lawyer said
today.
The underground agent, Anatoly N.
Filatov, was sentenced to death on July
'14, 1978, after a closed military trial in
Moscow on charges of spying for an un-
named foreign power, according to the
Soviet press agency Tass. . _
But his -lawyer at the trial, Leonid M.
Popov, said today that?the sentence was
never carried out. "It was commuted to
15 years in prison," he said after being
reached by The New. York Times. Mr.
-Filatov gave a full confession at the trial,
Tess said. '
The Senate Select Committee on Intelli
! gence is investigating. how a United
States agent in Moscow -with the code
name Trigon was compromised in 1977
Trigon is widely believed to have been,
Mr. Filatov, although other possibilities
have been suggested in Washington.
There have been unsubstantiated
rumors that a high American official
inadvertently revealed Trigon's identity.
The rumors, which said David L. Aaron,
deputy assistant to the President for na-
tional security affairs, was that official,
P1 1 YORK TI1'i S
24 September 1980
have been investigated by both the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and both agen-l
cies said they could find nothing to sup-
port the allegation that Mr. Aaron un-
masked Trigon. The White House also
called the allegations "completely un-
founded."
There are indications that the Soviet
Union may be saving Mr. Filatov to trade
for Soviet spies uncovered in Washington,
which might explain the bizarre twists
the case has taken.
Two months after Mr. Filatov's re-
ported conviction, a woman who said she
was his wife, Tamara, materialized in the
darkness of Red Army Park in downtown
Moscow and told this correspondent and a
colleague: "My husband worked for the
Americans as an agent. Now he is count-
ing on the mercy of President Carter to
save him."
. She said then that she had met her hus-
band twice at Moscow's Lefortovo Prison
after his trial. fie told her he had tried to
send a letter to President Carter from the
jail but that it had been intercepted by the
Soviet authorities. Her husband could
face a firing squad "any minute" unless
the Americans moved to save him, she
said.
At the time, two Soviet officials in New
Jersey were about to be tried on espio-
nage charges, and diplomats in Moscow
speculated that Mrs. Filatova's mysteri-
ous appearance was intended to suggest a
swap for them.
.ass Gave Account of Trial
The two, Valdik A. Enger and Rudolf P.
Chernyayev, were convicted and sen-
tenced to 50 years each. In April 1979 they
were traded for five imprisoned Soviet
dissidents, including Aleksandr Ginz-
burg, who went to New York on the same
plane that then took the two spies to Mos-
cow.
Meanwhile, Mr. Filatov's sentence was
commuted, although this fact has never
been published in the Soviet press.
The Tass account of his secret trial,
which began on July 10, 1978, said Mr.
Filatov, who was born in 1940, had
worked as a spy from February 1974 until
his arrest in 1977.
He confessed at his trial, Tass said.
that he had been blackmailed by a for-
eign intelligence service while on an off i-
cial mission in Algeria. The agents, ap-
parently American, set him up with a
"loose woman," the account said, took
detailed photographs and after recruiting
him, trained him to use radio codes, ci?
phers, miniature cameras disguised,as
cigarette lighters and secret mail drops
for passing on Soviet political, economic
and military secrets.
In exchange, he allegedly confessed, he
received money in cash and in secret for-
eign bank accounts.
Two committee members, Daniel Pat-
rick Moynihan, Democrat of New York,
and Malcolm Wallop, Republican of Wyo-
ming, have asked the intelligence com-
mittee staff to examine the case.
Trigon disappeared in 1977, the year
Mr. Filatov was arrested, after supplying
the C.I.A. with abundant intelligence in-!
formation.
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c r5c"L:C ~auure::.,
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portent h
uman source in the Soviet Union. 'Accord-
ing : to one of these articles; -suspicion has even
arisen that a mistake by a senior : , .... ~.
In most countries of the East, intelligence is of high prior-
ity and its practitioners have become an elite. They are bet-
ter trained than many of their counterparts in their nations'
regular diplomatic services.
"A diplomat who doesn't work for the intelligence service
is considered only half a diplomat," said Vladimir Kostov.
.The peoples of the Western democracies, however, have
mixed feelings, at least in peacetime, about the need for espi-
onage. The level of education for new recruits into the CIA is
high, but much of the American public still views the agency
with an uncertain mixture of fascination and mistrust. In
France and West Germany, it is difficult for the secret ser-
vices to recruit from the best universities, and those services
must rely heavily on military men.
' The intelligence services of both East and West-face cer-
tain common challenges in the 1980s. One of them is to under-,
stand the rapid changes that'are occurring in the 'developing
nations of the world. The ability of the United States and its'
partners to understand the changes taking 'place' In andl
around the Persian Gulf could be :of 'vital importance.' Al
highly placed American intelligence officer puts it this way:;
"Given increased. competition for raw materials, where the,
difference between the two sides may.lie in the decade.ahead,
is not in our ability to counter each'otlier'but `siriiply In dur'I
respective abilities to understand events in the developing
countries of the world."
The United States did not do well on that score in Iran. But
some people think it may before long get a further chance to
test its ability to understand rapid change in ancient societies,
- in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.
The countries of the East are expected to continue to de-
ploy special sections of their intelligence agencies in the com-
ing decade in pursuit of their longtime aim of splitting the:
United States away from its allies. Some expects think that in
pursuing this goal, the Soviet Union and its friends will rely'
increasingly on "disinformation," or deceptions, designed toy
mislead foreign public opinion. Other experts think that
disinformation is a much overrated phenomenon that back-
fires more often than it succeeds.
One thing is virtually certain, and that is that the East will
continue to place heavy emphasis on industrial and techno-
logical espionage. Hundreds of millions of dollars are to bed
saved through the stealing of Western secrets in these fields.
For the Western intelligence agencies, terrorism may be-
come of growing importance in the 1980s. Some American
intelligence officers think that not enough is being done to
penetrate terrorist groups before they launch attacks:
In the pursuit of almost all of their goals, the intelligence
agencies of the East work in tight coordination and under
overall Soviet guidance. The exception is Romania. Defec-
tors say that that country is able-to withhold a great deal of
information from the Soviets. .
A Czech defector who came to the West some years ago'
said he believed there had been tension between some mem-
bers of the Polish secret service and their Soviet counter-;
parts. One way in which the Soviets overcome such prob-
lems, he said, is simply by secretly recruiting .agents and
collaborators among comrades inside the various brotherly
secret services. In that way,. the Soviets know what's going
on even when some people may be holding back. They have
spies spying on their fellow spies. -
CONTINUED
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In the Western alliance, arrangements are looser. Ameri- I
can intelligence officers complain that their allies sometimes'
withhold specifics from them - the true nature of certain
sources of information, for example because of a fear that
the information will leak once it reaches the United States.
But on both sides of the Atlantic, officials.say that relations
among the Western intelligence agencies are, in fact, often
better than those that prevail at the government-to-govern-
ment level.- - !
`A diplomat who doesn't
work for the intelligence
service is considered only
half a diplomat.'
-Vladimir Kostov I
"Perhaps the unrest in political relations has even con-
tributed to consolidating relations among the intelligence
agencies," said one high-ranking West European intelligence
officer. "It almost seems to be a rule that intelligence ser-
vices fill gaps.!, .
"They provide a kind of stabilizing force,".said another
West European intelligence officer.
Indeed, if one could imagine a "common market" of intel-'
ligence information, it would show major exchanges of infor-
mation,flowing among the US, Britain, France, West Ger-
many, and Israel. To a much lesser degree, but on certain
specific subjects, South Africa would be cut in. The relations
of Western governments with South Africa have been
ela-
South Africa is of importance to the spy world as a major.,
source of mineral resources and a potential trouble spot. It is
also considered important because South Africa's main for-
eign intelligence agency, known, until recently at least, as
BOSS the Bureau of State Security, has-information to trade.
BOSS is rated highly by'the Americans, West Europeans, and
Israelis for its information on southern Africa.
"Why are the South Africans good at intelligence work?"
asked a former intelligence officer. "Because they are fright-
ened. Because they have a lot of money. And because they do
a lot of business in the world." -
Intelligence is often "traded" under informal
understandings. Favors are received eventually in return for
information. One former intelligence officer said that after
Israel turned over to the United States a copy of Nikita Khru-
shchev's famous secret speech denouncing Stalin at the 20th
Communist Party Coa-gress in 1956, it was perfectly under-
stood there would have to be. a quid pro quo in it for Israel.
'American.sources say that Israel and the United States do
have a formal agreement not to spy on each other. But the
agreement is apparently unclear when it comes to the ques- !
tion of industrial and technological espionage. It is widely'
believed in the US government that Israel several years ago
illegally obtained uranium, for building atomic weapons,_-,
from a nuclear materials plant in Apollo, Penn.
Even closer than the US-Israeli intelligence relationship
fs that wtiicti. eziifs-b`-etween fhe tTnited States and?Brifaui'
The base of information from which the two'countries work is
.virtually.-the same:-An 'American official said that`through
cooperation. with Britain, particularly in the field of. signals
intelligence, some people estimate that the United. States
Sometimes the relationship between intelligence agencies'-
can be described only in business terms. Latin American in-
telligence services have been known to form "consortiums"'
against their enemJES,
Just as Japan does not have an army commensurate in
size and strength with its economic power, so does it not ap-
. pear to have much of an external intelligence service. But
one American informant gives high marks to the Japanese
for gathering economic intelligence, particularly in Asia.
The US, he said, was able at one point some years ago to
"piggyback" with the Japanese in order to get useful intelli-
gence on the Chinese economy. This arrangement apparently
reduced the importance of intelligence-"equities" which the
British were able to offer the Americans in Hong Kong and
Peking.:
In the novels of John le Carre, whose real name is David:
Cornwell. men of the British secret intelligence service, orj
the "Circus," speak of the need to barter information with'
the "cousins;" namely the rich American cousins in the CIA.
George Smiley, in.Mr. le Carre's "The Honourable School-
boy," sees it this way: "Unless the Circus produced, it would
.:". have no wares to barter with the cousins, nor with other
sister services with whom recriprocal deals were traditional.'
Not to produce was not to trade, and not to trade was to die."
But the British are not the intelligence power they once
were. Just as political power has been dispersed through the
rise of new nations, so has intelligence power spread. And
one gets ..the impression that a good deal of espionage
derring-do now is carried out by nations of which one is only.
dimly . aware.
"Don't ignore the Romanians," a West European intelli- 1
gence officer advised. "They're very active. -.. They can be
very dangerous."
Western intelligence experts also give high marks to the
external intelligence service of Cuba. The Direcci6n General
de Inteligencia, or DGI. This isnot only because of the DGI's
work in Miami, the Caribbean, Central America, and Africa,
but also because of its efforts to win friends and influence;
people among third-world diplomats in places as far-flung as
Paris and Tokyo.
Cubans in Tokyo? They are there not only to" work the
third-world beat but also to nab industrial secrets and watch
other C
b
u
ans, such as seamen coming in on ships.,.
Part of the Cubans' effectiveness seems to derive from a
revolutionary fervor that has long been absent among their:
A number of American intelligence men insisted that the
DGI is little more than an extension of the Soviet KGB, with
Soviet officers sitting in the Cuban headquarters in Havana.
Be that as it may, the Cubans sometimes have an appeal
among potential recruits from other nations that'is denied to;
the Soviets. A certain romance still attaches to the Cuban
revolutionaries. - -
"Cuban intelligence is-growing up," says Harry Rositzke, I
founder of the Soviet division of the CIA and author of a forth-
coming book on the KGB. "They are more acceptable in !
many places than the Russians.... They are brown and
black. They are a revolutionary power." r
Another secret service worth watching
b - but it is not easy
to find - is that of China. A former CIA specialist on the Far
East said that as the Chinese take a more active role in for-
eign affairs, so are they also likely to begin developing their
intelligence service into a truly global organization.
The Chinese apparently rely on third parties to do much of
their spying for them. They do not go in for the aggressive
pursuit of secret documents the way the Soviets do. They
have a great advantage in foreign countries where 'there are;
large numbers of Chinese residents. Many of these overseas
Chinese, as they are called, are likely to feel a strong identifi-
cation with their homeland. New China News,A
gency, the;
main news service, apparently helps with the gathering of;
political intelligence.
CONT'I.N'U'D
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The FBI seems to think the Chinese are going to make the'
United States a major intelligence target now that they have;
established diplomatic relations with the US. A China scholar,
from a major American university. said he was star-tied not;
long ago to find an FBI man in the audience when he was
giving a lecture on modern Chinese politics. The FBI man'
explained that now that many Chinese communists were
studying in the United States as well as visiting the US, he
and a number of his colleagues had to begin learning all they
could about China.
But most of the Chinese students in this country seem to,
be studying too hard to do much spying. And the FBI seems
to have its hands full trying to watch Soviet spies who pose as
visitors, seamen, diplomats, and trade representatives.
As the table on comparative manpower on the preceding
page indicates, it is the Soviet Union and the United States
that remain the truly big players in the worldwide intelli-
gence game. Only these two nations reach all the world, de-
ploying the full panoply of espionage, from spy satellites in
the sky to agents on the ground.
--'Next: The KGB?and the CIA
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Miscellaneous
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ON FAmc-L&
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
29 September 1980
Washington
Intelligence officials in the Mideast
are convinced that Israel will step up
its attacks on Palestinian strongholds
in southern Lebanon in coming
weeks on the assumption that it need
not fear any U.S. pressure before
Election Day.
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ARTICLE
ON FAGF S~"^
* 'd
~3ai11
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
29 September 1980,
ICY.
1"n P ?r 111
Just when the nation faces
massive problems overseas,
American diplomacy is
being hamstrung by confusion
and indecision at home.
With U.S. foreign policy being bat-
tered by one setback after another, the
people and institutions in charge of
managing America's affairs overseas
are coming under critical scrutiny.
Among the questions being asked
with increasing intensity-
Why is Washington constantly sur-
prised by such developments as Iran's
revolution, the alliance crisis over neu-
tron-bomb deployment and Pakistan's
cold rejection of a military-aid offer?
Who is responsible for the zigzags
that undermine the credibility of U.S.
diplomacy-for instance, a vote for a
United Nations resolution critical of Is-
rael, followed within hours by White
House repudiation of the action? .
Why is today's State Department so
seemingly ineffectual in shaping policy
or even implementing it overseas?
A broad inquiry into these questions
produces'a picture of a confused and
struggling policymaking apparatus,
torn by internecine rivalries, a prolif-
eration of agencies competing for a
piece of the foreign-policy action and a
steady disintegration of the nation's
professional diplomatic corps. .
It is, many experts warn,, a situation
with the potential for disaster for the
U.S. in the 1980s as America confronts
increasingly complex problems over-
seas and the challenge posed by over-
weening Soviet military power.
There is, says a former ambassador
with more than 30 years' service abroad,
"a greater danger than ever of our blun-
dering into a truly major crisis some-
where just through our sheer stupidity."
Often stymied. The most striking fea-
ture of the chaos in American diplomacy
is the hamstringing of the State Depart-
ment, traditionally responsible for shap-.
ing and implementing foreign policy. A
pair of recent incidents illustrates how
far that process has advanced.
One was the resignation of Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance last May. He quit
ostensibly in protest of the hostage-res-
cue mission in Iran that proved to be the
failure he had predicted. Still, that was
only the culmination of three years of
similar frustrations.
The other was a public complaint in
August by IVance's successor, Edmund
Muskie, that he had been frozen out of
deliberations that led to a crucial change
in U.S. nuclearf war strategy--a shift
with far-reaching implications for U.S.
relations with its allies and with its Sovi-
et adversaries.
Malcolm) Toon, a Veteran American
diplomat and former ambassador to.
Moscow, characterizes failure of the
new Secretary of State to force a test of
strength on this' issue as "a fatal mis-
take." SaysToori: "Muskie should have
threatened to resign on the spot if this
sort of thing happens again."
With weak bosses at the State Depart-
ment, an ambitious national-security ad-
viser, Zbigriiew Brzezinski, in the White
House and an increasingly powerful
Pentagon, the administration has. spo-
ken for more than three years with con-
fusing and often contradictory voices on
international affairs.
Failing "process." As a former high-
ranking State Department executive
puts it: `The failing of this administra-
tion in foreign policy has been a failing
not so much of substance as of process-
not a matter of -1,vhose view prevailed,
but the impression on the outside. that
everyone's (view prevailed." -
The result has been a series of diplo-
matic debacles largely because of mixed
signals at high levels:
^ Iran. In the months before the over-
throw of Stiah Mohammed Reza Pahle-
vi, the State, D1 partment, Brzezinski
1!,`U 'S
1 "Foreign
Service in
Profile
Embassies` overseas- :144
Consdlates 67
Missions to . ;I.
international organizations 'L2
.Liaison offices I
Foreign-service officers 3,564
Total State: Department
employes abroad
employed abroad 6,131
Budget'fordiplomatic $444:4
service overseas mil.'
Unhappy diplomats. Muskie says he is ig-
nored in decision making; Vance's frustra-
tion led to resignation.
and the Pentagon all were pressuring
the monarch in one way or another-of-
ten working at cross-purposes.
As the State Department was bar-
ring shipments of riot-control equip-
ment to Teheran, Brzezinski was en-
couraging the Shah to take a stand
against _ the mobs. Later, the White
House dispatched Air Force Gen. Rob-
ert Huyser to Teheran to deter the Ira-
nian military from seizing power. Con-
fused by all this conflicting diplomacy,
the Shah became increasingly para-
lyzed with indecision.
^ SALT. In the early weeks of the
Carter administration, a radically. new
strategic-arms-control proposal was
drafted in Washington without any in-
put from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
When Vance unveiled it to the ambas-
sador while both were en route to Mos-
cow, he was nonplused to hear that the
Russians would bluntly. reject it and
.that arms-control negotiations would
,be sidetracked for a long timt -a fore-
cast that was precisely on the mark.
^ Mideast. In early March, the
American envoy to the U.N., on State
Department instructions, cast the first
U.S. vote ever for a resolution. critical
of Israel's policies involving Arab land
occupied in the 1967 war. Criticized
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1960 1965 1970'1975 1980 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Since 1960, the number of U.S. embassies, missions to international bodies,
consulates and liaison offices overseas has grown by 36 percent, but the
heavier workload is being borne by even fewer diplomats than before.
11$ ... &z -aasc data U.S. Dept. of Stale
by Jerusalem and the American Jewish
community, Carter repudiated the
vote, asserting that it resulted from a
misunderstanding between him and
Vance. The Secretary took the rap.
? Cuba. Without the knowledge of
the White House, the State Depart-
ment disclosed through Senator Frank
Church (D-Idaho) the presence of a So-
viet combat brigade in Cuba. In the en-
suing confusion, Vance struck a tough
stance, claiming that the "status quo"
was "unacceptable." The Russians, con-
tending that the brigade had been on
the island for years and represented no
violation of agreements with the U.S.,
refused to budge. An embarrassed Car-
ter allowed the crisis to dissipate, with
Moscow's combat unit still in Cuba.
Parallel services. The collapsing in-
fluence of the Secretary of State is not
the only cause of confusion in foreign
policy and of the decline in the State De-
partment's role. Another is the growing
ble for these specialized areas assign
their own officials to foreign posts. As a
result, only a small minority of Ameri-
cans representing this country abroad
are foreign-service officers-fewer
than 23 percent of the total of 16,000
American officials who are assigned to
overseas missions.
They are outnumbered by the 5,000
military attaches, security-assistance
planners and other personnel from the
Pentagon. The Central Intelligence
Agency also stations a major contin-
gent of its own officials in U.S. embas-
sies. So do the Treasury, Commerce,
Transportation, Agriculture and justice
departments and dozens of lesser agen-
cies. Even the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority staffs one embassy post.
The most recent agency to create-its
own private "foreign service" is the
Department of Energy, which has as-
sumed responsibility for dealing with
international oil questions. This trend
complexity of U.S. interests overseas. ;i has multiplied the number of nondiplo-
The political and other diplomatic mats who communicate directly with
affairs normally discharged by the for- Washington through "back channels,"
eign service now are only one aspect of circumventing the State Department
this country's international relations. and diluting the professional foreign
Global defense, trade, finance, agricul- service's control over foreign policy..
ture, energy, aid, environmental prob-
lems, Peace Corps operations--all of
these and more are part of the business
embassies must conduct..
U.S. government agencies responsi-
That control has been undercut even
more drastically by-the ease of interna-
tional communication. On many occa-.
-sions, for example, Carter speaks via sat-
ellite. telephone directly with Egypt's
President Anwar Sadat and Israel's
Prime Minister Menachem Begin.
Airborne diplomatic missions are
taking over much of the process of._rie--_.r
gotiation with foreign coun't'ries. -Spec-
tacular feats of summitry and shuttle
diplomacy have relegated traditional
low-key diplomacy to a back seat.
A vast parade of junketing senators
and representatives is increasingly get-
ting into the diplomatic act, adding to
the confusion already aroused. by the
expanding role of Congress in foreign-
policy issues. "In many ways," says one
observer, "the State Department has
become a. glamorous travel agency."
Professional envoys also complain
about the antics and utterances of
Washington officials on hastily planned
"diplomatic" trips to sensitive areas.
Disturbing "amateurism." To quote
former Under Secretary of State
George Ball: "There is an amateurism
about these people.in the administra-
tion and in Congress that worries me
very much. Very often their idea of di-
plomacy is to climb into a big jet with
lots of television cameras and go have a
good time."
Brzezinski is singled out for special
criticism. Two examples of the nation-
al-security adviser's freewheeling style
of diplomacy frequently are cited:
a He is quoted as telling his Chinese
hosts while climbing China's Great
Wall in May, 1978: "If we get to the top
first, you go and oppose the Russians in
Ethiopia." The indelicacy of his remark
at a sensitive moment in superpower
relations over Russian moves in Africa
distressed U.S. diplomats.-
^ At the Khyber Pass in Pakistan af-
ter Moscow's invasion of neighboring
Afghanistan, Brzezinski ostentatiously
aimed a rifle across the border as he
joked about "a march on Kabul."
While the authority , of professional
American diplomats has-been whittled
away from the outside, it' is also being
buffeted by a crisis from within...
A survey by the. American Foreign
Service Association discloses that. 48
percent of diplomatic officers serving
overseas are "seriously considering"
resignation. Among senior diplomats,
the number is even higher-as much as
60 percent: Included in their' griev-
ances: A feeling that they are no longer
where the action is, that the real busi-
ness of diplomacy is'being conducted
in Washington rather than overseas.
"An institution under assault" is how
the. association's president, Kenneth
Bleakley, describes the-foreign service.
He'adds: "We are in danger of hosing
our talent and ability to maneuver in
what is going to .be a very dangerous
world in. the years ahead." .
It is not only job frustration that ac-
Ih0~D
COST
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Salvadoran guardsman stalks leftist rebels after rocket attack on U.S. Embassy. Over
last decade, Americans have been targets of unprecedented terrorist attacks.
counts for the threatened exodus of U.S. diplomats is falling behind that of
America's most experienced diplomats. Americans working at home by 3 to 4
The mounting stress of their everyday percent annually, according to the Of-
lives is another factor. lice of Management and Budget.
Terrorism is ever a concern . Long be- Another analysis estimates that, dur-
fore the U.S. Embassy in{ Teheran was ing the course of their careers, U.S.
seized last November 4, the 1970s had diplomats earn 25 percent less than
become a decade of unprecedented vio- counterparts in the civil service.
lence against American diplomats. The increased workload stems from
Alarming tally. The record of the past several factors. One, with roughly the
10 years: -14 American diplomats, in- same number] of officers, the foreign
eluding 5 ambassadors, murdered; 32 se- service is staffing 60 more missions
riously wounded in terrorist attacks; 38 overseas than }t did 20 years ago.
kidnapped. All told, there were 208 Also: Consular work, such as visa pro-
armed assaults either on Ameri can offi- cessing and assistance to American na-
cials or diplomatic missions, an average tionals abroad, has increased 900 per-
of 1 attack every 17.5 days. On Septem- cent as a'result of the enormous growth
ber 16,' for instance, leftist guerrillas in foreign tourism and commerce.
fired three rocket grenades at the U.S. Washington's demands for reporting
Embassy in El Salvador. cables from U.S. embassies ? overseas
In the past 18. months! alone, 3,500 have increased fourfold. "It's a hell of a
diplomats and dependents have been crunch,"I says I Benjamin Read, under
evacuated from foreign capitals be- secretary of state for management,
cause of violence or the threat of attack. "and it has hurt deeply."
Adding to the pressures on diplomats Even rnore disturbing for the veter-
is the impact of America's social revo- an diplomatic corps is what many offi-
lution. Foreign-service wives-and in cers see as a steady dilution of tradi-
some cases, husbands-no longer are Lions of excellence that the foreign
automatically content to accompany
spouses overseas at the expense of their
own career opportunities at home. The
result is increased divorce, marital dis-
cord and personal stress.
Some experts see these as potentially
the most serious clouds over the future
of the foreign service. William Bac-
chus, a top State Departrent official,
puts it this way: "Ten years ago, we
never got complaints about this. Now,
it's all we hear."
Further undermining the morale of
the career diplomatic service is a one-
two punch of seriously declining in-
come compounded by ait expanding
workload. Hit by worldwide inflation
and the decline of the dollar, the pay of
vice has leaped from 289 to 845 during
the past decade. Blacks and members
of other minorities, once less than 1
percent of foreign-service strength,
now account for 8.3 percent..'All mi-
nority applicants who passed the writ-
ten exam last year were invited for fur-
ther job processing. This compares
with 46 percent of applicants over all.
At the same time, foreign-service
language requirements for men and
women joining the State Department
for overseas service. Because of the
dramatic decline in foreign-language
studies in American high schools and
universities, familiarity with a second
language is no longer required of new
recruits at the time of acceptance.
As a result, according to a study by the
General Accounting Office, language
competence in U.S. foreign-affairs agen-
cies is "less than required for maximum
effectiveness and efficiency."
What is most distressing for many ca-
reer diplomats-and most damaging in
their view-is an increasing tendency
to politicize the State Department.
The Carter administration . carried
the trend to a new extreme, naming
noncareer political appointees to all
but six of the 25 top department posts.
No other administration since World
War II has approached that level.
And despite a campaign pledge to
name envoys solely on the basis of merit,
Carter nevertheless has made extensive
use of top assignments for political pa-
tronage. These have included ambassa-
dorships in such critical areas as Saudi
Arabia, Mexico and the Soviet Union.
The trend provokes this reaction
from career diplomat Martin Herz, for-
mer envoy to Bulgaria: "We've gone
too far in destroying excellence and
professionalism. Who would you want
to send to the moon-a highly trained
astronaut or John Q. Public?"
Fix-up moves. There are faint signs
of growing concern about the decline
in professionalism in the cond
ct
f
o
u
service claims as a hallmark of its trade. American foreign policy. Congress, for
They complain, for one thing
of a instance
is movin
to u
ade th
,
,
g
pgi
e pay
loweringlof admission standards to en- for career foreign:service officers, a
able more women and minority appli- move that could cost an additional 34
cants to qualify. While top State De: million dollars in 1981 plus more than
partment officials hotly deny this 200 million over the next five years.
criticism,lthey acknowledge a change in The. administration also is taking
scoring the written service examination steps to bolster the security of diplo-
to eliminate perceived cultural biases. mats in the wake of attacks on missions
After the change, the number of in Iran, Pakistan and Libya.
women passing the exam jumped dra- But.' the; consensus among foreign-
maticallyl from 19 to 43 percent in one policy experts is that it will take much
year, while minority applicants receiv- more than cosmetic measures to re-
ing passing grades climbed almost 300 verse the decline of U.S. diplomacy-.
percent ifrom~ 6.4 to 17.4 percent. . and with it, the conduct and credibility"
Whether or not it is a .direct result of of a superpower's foreign policy. 0
revised grading for written tests, the
number ;of women in the foreign ser- By ROBERT S'DUD.\EP
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NEiiS;vEEK
29 :Le tember 1980
Playing the Game
of News Leaks
Leaking secrets to the press for political advantage
is one of Washington's oldest games, but lately things
seem to have gotten out of hand. In recent weeks
details of the new U.S. nuclear strategy, the stealth
aircraft, the shortage of plutonium for nuclear war-
heads and the combat shortcomings of six Army
divisions have all turned up in the media. There
are even phony leaks: last week, several news or-
ganizations received copies of a memo, purportedly
signed by national-security adviser Zbigniew Brze-
zinski, urging U.S. intelligence agencies to spy on
U.S. black groups. Some of the leaks seem designed
to enhance President Carter's re-election chances;
others seem to have come from his political foes.
tie
New radar
Drnectit~e ~ylod, f1e
Planes'Invisiblea to Smote D
r
?j.. I'll ? for a
.~ yo.e O.1 J War
Nuclear
f..l.n+. S.ctt~.r/ N.rou -;;
fraction of the Soviet defense:tpdget ;
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-DAILY OKLAHOMAN
6 September 1980
Politically Sensitive `Secrets' Bur ie g,
By Bach Taylor
Staff Writer
WASHINGTON - For the last eight)
months, sensitive U.S. Intelligence informa-
tion has been handled under a new and unu-
sail system that effectively cuts off most
congressional, military and other govern-
ment officials, sources familiar with the sys-
tem told The Daily Oklahoman Friday.
The new security classification system
was secretly ordered by President Carter on
Jan. 7. It installed a classification called
"Royal" above the previous highest classifi-
cation, "Top Secret," the sources said.
The "Royal" system is considered highly
unusual by the intelligence community be-
cause it is vague and general in scope and is
not associated with protecting sensitive
sources or particularly sensitive informa-
tion.
The five sources, all of whom deal with ex-
tremely sensitive intelligence on a daily ba-.
sis, contend the "Royal" classification is in-
tended primarily to protect only politically
sensitive information.
The real effect, the five sources contend, is
protecting President Carter from potential
embarrassment.
However, an administration official said
Friday, "Those allegations are totally false."
The official denied that "Royal" is in use,
saying it is part of a classification system
that has not yet been implemented by the
government.
"It's part of a new and still un-implement-
ed system for handling extremely sensitive
classified information," the official said.
"Within that system, 'Royal'. is only one of
many designations."
The five sources say the type of intelli-
gence classified in "Royal" is sometimes of
more .significance from a political than an
intelligence viewpoint.
For example, some intercepted diplomatic
-
cable traffic among Libyan diplomats was
given the "Royal" treatment -including
the cable in which 'the Libyans described the
President's brother, Billy, as "our agent of
influence."
Other information classified "Royal;' and
therefore restricted to only a handful of offi-
cials in government,; according to the sourc-
es, has included:
- Reports surfacing early this year, sup-
pressed for two months
within the intelligence
community, that the So-!
viet Union had conduct-,
ed tests in November of
a new surface-to-air
missile, the SA-10. The
administration still has
not acknowledged the
reports, though they
have become an Issue in
Congress because of the l
potential violation of
both the Anti-Ballistic
Missile and SALT I
treaties.
- The more signifi-
cant reports about the
Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan, including de-
tails that the adminis-
tration had received its
first intelligence, based
on deployment of initial
small units of..Soviet
troops, Weeks bofore the ,
actual infusion of
enough troops to call it
an invasion.
"All 'Roya;' does is in-
stitutionalize this sort
of thing," one source
said. "Nobody sees the
information, so it, can
never become an issue."
The new system'is so
restrictive that even
the National Intelli-
gence Daily, a summary
sent to only 100 key' in-
dividuals in govern-
ment, has become de-
void of meaningful in.
formation - or, as one
senator put it privately,
"lifeless."
? The very existence'-of
the "Royal" system` is
ar a^..'rei to 3t" i? i1.,
mi a' I'ce Gt:grars?
mintary oTIlcerra snd
other government offi-
cials who have "Top Se-
cret" clearances don't
even know It exists.
',Rep. Philip M. Crane,
an Illinois Republican
who was ab early pre i-
dential candidate this
year, was surprised l
when asked about it Fri-
J.
day.
"I've =never heard IDf'
it," he `said. "But it's'
certainly intriguing and
I intend to find out
about it.".
Only eight members
of Congress - four sen-
ators and four congress-
men - have been given
access to "Royal"?infor--
mation. '
In the, Senate, they
are Sen. Birch Bayh, D-
Ind.; sen. Barry Goldwa-
ter, R-Ariz.; Sen. 1-
lard Baker, R-Tenn., and
Sen. Rdbert .Byrd, D-
W:Va.'
The only congression-
al staff members given
hccess'are the staff di-
rectors of the Senate
and House intelligence
.committees.
But because "Royal"
Information is closel3'-'
held, even' -the eight
members of Congress
are unlikely to be aware
of its daily digest unless
they take the time to to.
.to intelligence commit-
tee offices each day to
rep d it,' "the sources
sat 1.
"When you establish
something this restric-
tive, you, in effect, deny
access to the minority
party, which could have
an effect on policy," one
source said. "In fact, it
is against administra-
tion policy which re-
quires making all veri-
fica,tions and SALT vio-
lations available to all
parties."
Politically sensitive
information such as
some intercepted Lib-
yan diplomatic cables
concerning Billy Carter
never get to P.enublicAn
members of Congretix
the sources.sAid,
cause the system is+rti;- r
Y n ~ ri:+t+ tunic plied ~itjt I
the c~>iixistration. r
- No:?,;;;tl intelligeht ?
;zforrn:aioa is class:-?
fit- 'Confidential," "Se-
or "Top Secret."
I ere are special:
code name classifica-
tio::s beyond "Top Se.
='et" for communica-
tion intelligence, satel-
lite photography, intel-
ligence collection;
.methods and crypto-!,
graphic technology.
But, unlike "Royal,"
which fits the broader
category of general In-
telligence, all "code
names" deal with sours-
ere Of collecting informs-
Oon,
Acnoording to one of
the. sources knowledge-
able about "Royal,"
Zbign iew Brzezinski,
the president's national
security adviser who
personally picked the
.word "Royal," wrote .
A6m.`Stansfield Turner,
director of the CIA, that
the new system is de-
signed "..to .protect..the
product 'regardless, of
"That translates,
said one source "too-
tecti:ng politicalysensw
lire, potentially emba*,,
?rassing information."
Aster sibly, the sourc-
es said, the.. directive
implementing this .i;ys-
tem states tha? it is in-
tended to provide selec-
tive key policy-makers
with advanced intelli-
gence so they can for-
mdlate._ggsltfons; that
will appear, publicly at
least, more timely and
responsive. should 'a
subject of the reports
. become an issue.
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