IN YOUR 24 OCTOBER 1978 EDITORIAL, THE CIA ON CAMPUS, YOU CONTEND THAT NO ONE SEEMS TO HAVE AUTHORITY OVER THE CIA, THAT THE DIA HAS TOO LONG BEEN PERMITTED TO CONTINUE THEIR SURREPTITIOUS ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE SLHERE OF CIVILAIN CONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000200430038-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: November 14, 1978
• Content Type: LETTER

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the uirector of c,entrai intemgence
Washington. D C 20505
14 November 1978
The Editor
Michigan. Daily
University of Michigan
420 Maynard Street
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48107
In your 24 October 1978 editorial, "The CIA on Campus," you
contend that "no one seems to have authority over the CIA," that the
CIA has "too long been permitted to continue their surreptitious
activities outside the sphere of civilian control" and "that the agency
has gotten out of control is apparent." This assertion is incorrect
both historically and as regards CIA activities today.
The Senate Select Committe chaired by Senator Church stated in
Book I of its final report, "The CIA has come to be viewed as an
unfettered monolith, defining and determining its activities indepen-
dent of other elements of government and of the direction of American
foreign policy. This is a distortion. During its twenty-nine year
history, the Agency has been shaped by the course of international
events, by pressures from other government agencies, and by its own
internal norms. An exhaustive history of the CIA would demand an
equally exhaustive history of American foreign policy, the role of
Congress and the Executive, the other components of the Intelligence
Community, and an examination of the interaction among all these
forces."
Although never released to the public, the report of the House
Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) was reported in Village
Voice to have arrived at an even more categoric conclusion concerning
the control of the CIA: "All evidence in hand suggests that the
CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive to
the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President
for Security Affairs."
After the first session of the 95th Congress came to a close,
Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, reported to the Senate that, "There is no question
that a number of abuses of power, mistakes in judgment, and failures
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by the intelligence agencies have harmed the United States. In
almost every instance, the abuses that have been revealed were a
result of direction from above, including Presidents and Secretaries
of State. Further, in almost every instance, some members of both
Houses of. Congress assigned the duty of oversight were knowledgeable
about these activities."
Today, the President's Executive Order 12036, signed January 24,
1978 (copy enclosed) lays out specific directions for carrying out
intelligence activities, restrictions on those activities, and creates
several new mechanisms for oversight.
In the Executive Branch, the new Intelligence Oversight Board,
composed of three distinguished civilians from outside the government,
are directed.to investigate all allegations of illegal or.improper
intelligence activity. Anyone may communicate directly with that
Board. Their findings go directly to the President.
In the Legislative Branch, a select committee. on intelligence
exists in both the Senate and the House. They are kept fully
informed of intelligence activities and, in turn, exercise genuine
control over all such activities. There is no question in my mind
or in the mind of anyone in the Intelligence Community that we are
held accountable for what we do.
These. two Congressional committees are now in the process of
drafting charters which will codify in federal law the various
restrictions and limitations as well as the missions of the
Intelligence Community. I fully and actively support that endeavor.
Consequently, rather than being out of control as you allege,
the United States Intelligence Community, and specifically the CIA,
are under the tightest internal and external controls of their
history.
Further, you find my refusal to comply with Harvard's faculty
guidelines peremptory and outrageous. In fact, it is neither. The
CIA and Harvard have been engaged in a productive dialogue for over
a year. During that time the majority of our differences have been
reconciled. There remain but three points of difference:
1. The Harvard guidelines require that relationships
between Harvard faculty members and the CIA be reported to the
Harvard administration.
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? is
CIA has no objection to this requirement but believes
it is the prerogative of the faculty member to reveal
those relationships which are external to his faculty.
responsibilities, not the CIA. CIA considers all such
relationships private and personal. The faculty member
may deal with them in any way he chooses.
2. That only relationships with intelligence agencies
are required to be so revealed.
While the guidelines you propose in your subsequent
editorial, "The University Guidelines" on 29 October
1978', recognizes the diverse opportunities for conflict
of interest which are present on all campuses, e.g.,
consulting arrangements with businesses, private publication
opportunities, part-time jobs, etc., Harvard's guidelines
do not. It seems naive to me to assume that only a
relationship with an intelligence agency has the potential
for conflict or for infringing on academic or personal
freedom. Additionally, this requirement infers that all
other relationships are preferable to one with the U.S.
Government. This is neither sound logic nor realistic.
If this guideline were extended to cover all business or
professional relationships external to the faculty
member's university responsibilities, CIA would have no
objection.
3. That CIA should not establish any confidential
relationships with faculty members for the possible purpose
of assessing or contacting foreign students.
Again, in light of the thousands of confidential recom-
mendations prepared annually by faculty members for
students applying to businesses, graduate schools, and
other government agencies, a guideline prohibiting the
same kind of recommendation to the Intelligence Community
is inconsistent with recognized and accepted faculty
practice. No student at a university is totally free of
confidential appraisal in one form or another; none of us
is either in school or at work. If a particular student's
qualifications result in a specific. work or study proposal
by a business, another university, or a government agency,
and the student is not interested, the student is free to
decline the proposal. It is difficult to see how this
abridges anyone's freedom.
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I am enclosing a copy of the CIA's internal regulation governing
our relationships with academic institutions and a statement I made at
the University of Kentucky which describes those relationships and the
oversight process in greater detail.
Enclosures
As stated
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