REORGANIZING THE CIA: WHO AND HOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000100170005-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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In FOREIGN POLICY 2 ,1 Szan-
ton and Graham Allison wrote that the
time had come to "seize the opportunity"
and restructure the American intelligence
community. In the exchange that follows,
William E. Colby and Walter F. Mondale
comment on their proposals and Szanton
and Allison reply.-The Editors.
William E. Colby,*...
Indeed we have an opportunity to rethink
and restructure American intelligence. A year
of intensive investigation by a presidential
and two congressional committees, world-
wide concern over sensational accounts of
CIA deeds and misdeeds, and a series of Con-
stitutional confrontations between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches cannot dis-
appear into our history books without
changes in American intelligence.
The first and easiest action would be to
tinker with the organizational structure of
intelligence. When in doubt, or under pres-
sure, reorganize; this is an old bureaucratic
ploy. It is also a tempting panacea for infi-
nite problems. With due respect for the ideas
suggested by Peter Szanton and Graham
Allison, but without agreement with many
of them, I believe this opportunity should
be seized in more important fields.
The fundamental lesson of the year of
investigation is that American intelligence is
? a part of and must operate under the Amer-
ican constitutional system. This perhaps ob-
vious fact for Americans is a stunning nov-
elty in the long history of intelligence. It is
as startling an idea to many developed de-
mocracies as it is incongruous to totalitarians.
It does not reverse any early American
53.
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doctrine to the contrary, but it does over-
turn longstanding and comfortable practices
which grew up before the question was
squarely faced.
Three conclusions stem from this new
status of. intelligence. First, the place of in-
telligence in the governmental structure must
be established and understood in open stat-
utes and directives. The National Security
Act of 1947 made a start in this direction,
and the A Acs t of 194 rovided statutory
authority for many of the essential attributes
of our intelligence service. Both contain
several vague and encompassingL clauses,
however..The resulting ambiguities 1gd_ tQ
actions which in retrospect fall below to-
day's standars.
President Ford's executive order of Feb-
ruary 18 makes a major stride in the direc-
tion of providing a public charter for Amer-
ican intelligence, describing its structure and
functions and clearly delimiting areas of au-
thorized, and unauthorized, activity. Sub-
stantial parts of this order, however, should
be enacted into law, our constitutional pro-
cess of establishing and recording our na-
tional consensus on matters of public import..
George Washington once said that upon
secrecy, success depends in most enterprises"
of intelligence. The past year has shown al-
most a total lack of consensus and even un-
derstanding of the role and limits of secrecy
in American intelligence. What were leaks
rose at times to flood stage proportions.
Strong voices are heard advocating almost
every variation on the spectrum from a mod-
ern version of "open intelligence openly ar-
rived at" to the contention that an Official
Secrets Act should protect an intelligence
structure totally hidden in the recesses of the
executive branch. President Ford has recom-
mended legislation which will impose the es-
sential discipline on intelligence_personl to
keep the secrets they learn but leave untram-
meled the First Amendment's guarantee of a
free press.
We have laws and sanctions to protect
many secrets necessary to the preservation
and operation of our free society. The se-
cret ballot box, the confidence between at-
torney and client, advance crop figures which
,might upset Me market, all are protected by
criminal sanctions against individuals who
might disclose them. Intelligence secrets,
however, are in effect only protected against
the foreign spy. But their disclosure to our
free society makes them available to the for-
eigner as well, and can cut our nation off
from sources and information which are es-
sential to its safety in a world which has not
yet been made, safe for democracy. Better
protection of our sources through law would
apply to the intelligence profession the same
discipline that journalism has found essen-
tial to its functioning... .
"The photographs must be pub
lished, the backgrounders attrib
uted, the publications edited tc
press...." -William E. Colb
regularly to all members of Con?
the substance of their reports ..
protect the sources but circulate.
respect to intelligence. It must assume its ful
self to exercise its constitutional role wit
Congress has an equal duty to arrange it
members of the executive branch.
Intelligence Advisory Board, all will increas
the control and accountability of intelligent
to the president himself and to the senio
private citizens of The President's Foreig
independent review and supervision by th
and programs of national intelligence, an
executive control and responsibility for intel
ligenee. The stronger position of the directo
of central intelligence, the interagency com
mittee structure for the review of the policie
ture. President Ford has moved to:strengthe
intelligence; it lies with equal weight on al
three branches of our constitutional strut
This burden must rest not only on those i
that it must be responsible and accountable
The second conclusion from the new sta
tus of intelligence under the Constitution i
55.
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 but it does over=
nfortable practices
the question was
n from this new
t, the place of in-
stal structure must
:ood in open stat-
National Security
in this direction,
.?rovided statutory
essential attributes
ce. Both contain
mpassing clauses,
ambiguities lgd to
.St fall below to-
ive order of Feb-
;tride in the direc-
charter for Amer-
g its structure and
Hiring areas of su-
ed, activity. Sub-
,-however, should
onstitutional pro-
recording our na-
c of public import.
cc, said 'that upon
i most enterprises"
,car has shown al-
nsus and even un-
d limits of secrecy
What were leaks
;tape proportions.
advocating almost
trum from a mod-
ligence openly ar-
)n that an Official
ct an intelligence
the recesses of the
t Ford has recom-
Will impose the es-
c: nS~,~~erg_-1 to
but leave untram-
nt's guarantee of a
Colby
and operation of our free society. The se-
cret ballot box, the confidence between at-
torney an c ient,advance crop figures which
might upset the market, all are protected by
criminal sanctions against individuals who
might disclose them. Intelligence secrets,
however, are in effect only protected against
the foreign spy.- But their disclosure to our
free society makes them available to the for-
eigner as well, and can cut our nation off
from sources and information which are es-
sential to its safety in a world which has not
yet been made safe for democracy. Better
protection of our sources through law would
apply to the intelligence profession the same
discipline that journalism has found essen-
tial to its functioning.
"The photographs must be pub-.
lished, the backgrounders attrib.
uted, the publications edited to
protect the sources but circulate
the substance of their reports ...
regularly to all members of Con-
gress...." -William E. Colby
The second conclusion from the new sta-
tus of intelligence under the Constitution is
that it must be res onsible and accountable.
This burden must rest not only on those in
intelligence; it lies with equal weight on all
three branches of our constitutional struc-
ture. President Ford has moved to strengthen
executive control and responsibility for intel-
ligence. The stronger position of the director
of central intelligence, the interagency com-
mittee structure for the review of the policies
and programs of national intelligence, and
independent review and supervision by the
private citizens of The President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, all will increase
the control and accountability of intelligence
to the president himself and to the senior
members of the executive branch.
Congress has an equal duty to arrange it-
self to exercise its constitutional role with.
respect to intelligence. It must assume its full
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l
 s~'~'Y?ro3 6~9.f FYa 2x ?' x A ?" ~"ero ~V s} ~,r9 x~r +~,.: a t? r ~ x;yf{+;
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responsibilities in all senses of the word. It
must organize and carry out full and cur-
rent reviews of the intelligence community,
assuring that it not only remains within the
guidelines set for it, but also that it is effi-
ciently and comprehensively accomplishing
the tasks assigned. Congress' other respon-
sibility, however, is to do this without de-
stroying the ability of intelligence to carry
out its duties. Thus the secrets of intelligence
must be protected on Capitol Hill as well as
at the CIA's Langley headquarters. The min-
imum number of people, congressmen as well
as staff, who truly "need to know" should
be informed.and should be subject to sanc-
tions for improper disclosure. A single com-
mittee, in each House if necessary, should
represent their colleagues in this function,
ending the present requirement to brief at
least six committees.
The third conclusion which derives from
intelligence's advent to constitutional status
is that it must serve the constitutional pr9-
ccess. Traditionally and in other lands the
servant only of the executive, it must now
demonstrate its value to the Congress and
to the public. It must earn the large invest-
ment needed by modern intelligence, the
risks and inevitable occasional failures and
embarrassments incurred, and respect for its
professional discipline and secrecy. This must
be accomplished by sharing the fruits of the
enterprise with all participants in the Amer-
ican decision-making process.
Perhaps this is the most challenging task
ahead for intelligence. It must develop the'
di.stinctic,nc b twgei P~t1Ag, the 4SX#fy
of its sources and to b.,bnigues and making
available the substance of its injormaiion
nd_Sogclsi, ups. It must face public criti-
cism and political challenge of its assess-
ments. It must maintain the independence
and objectivity of its judgments apart from
the policies and programs they may sup-
port or question. Internationally, we must
insist that an intelligence judgment is a step
toward policy, not a reflection of it, wheth-
er relating to ally or adversary. In a political
debate where knowledge can be powe
telligence. judgments must be supplie
partially to all factions, to help the be
lution to emerge, rather than a favored
This will require many changes in
ligence habits and concepts. The p:
graphs must be published, the backgrc
ers attributed, the publications edite
protect the sources but circulate the
stance of their reports.
With these changes, intelligence c<
distributed regularly to all memo of.
dress: not held under such high clas
tions that it cannot be circulated and
conveniently available. The estimate!
be debated and the sage unanimity
intelligence cloister challenged by thos
to the struggle and fearful of irration.
foolhardy, but real, surprises. Out
process, however, will come a better
standing of the role and value of mod
telligence, as well as better intelligence
"Seizing 'the opportunity" to imp.
these conclusions will mark a major t
point in the discipline and profession
telligence. In its wake may come s
the structural changes suggested by S-
and Allison and by others joining
close examination of intelligence spar
1975's investigations. Some of th
others' ideas will not be adopted, . a
ditional ones will arise for consid
But the coming of age of intellige
full participant. and contributor to t:
stitutional process will start a conti
view and renewal of intelligence to r.
challenges of the future. Among me
stantial substantive benefits to the
and to American intelligence, this wi
unnecessary another sensational an
tering updating of American intellig
Walter. F. Mondale:
Like most Americans, I have strop
ported the necessity of. our goveI
conducting intelligence activities.
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 the word. It
ull and cur-
community,
s within the
hat it is effi-
:complishing
ether respon-
without de-
,nce to carry
f intelligence
ill as well as
cs. The min-
;smen as well
tow" should
ject to Banc-
single com-
sary, should
ts function,
to brief at
derives from
tional status
utional
er lands the
t must now
o tress and
large invest-
lligence, the
failures and
spect for its
y. This must
;fruits of the
n the Amer-
.lengi.rg task
,develop the
Elie secrecv
?nd making
'lion
public criti-
its assess-
dependence
`>apart from
may sup-
We must
nt is a step
:t. tvheth-
a political
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Colby/Mondale
debate where knowledge can be power, in-
telligence judgments must be supplied im-
partially to all factions, to help the best so-
lution to emerge, rather than a favored one.
This will require many changes in intel-
ligence habits and concepts. The photo-
graphs must be pub shed, the background-
ers attributed, the publications edited to
protect the sources but circulate. the sub-
stance of their reports.
With these changes, intelligence can be
distributed regularly to all membe1,ss1f`Conx
ress not held under such high classifica-
tions that it cannot be circulated and made
conveniently available. The estimates will.
be debated and the sage unanimity of the
intelligence cloister challenged by those close
to the struggle and fearful of irrational and
foolhardy, but real, surprises. Out of the
process, however, will come a better under-
standing of the role and value of modern in-
telligence, as well as better intelligence itself.
"Seizing the opportunity" to implement
these conclusions will mark a major turning
point in the discipline and profession of in-
telligence. In its wake may come some of
the structural changes suggested by Szanton
and Allison and by others joining in the
close examination of intelligence sparked by
1975's investigations. Some of their and
others' ideas will not be adopted, and ad-
ditional ones will arise for consideration.
But the coming of age of intelligence as a
full participant and contributor to the con-
stitutional process will start a continual re-
view and renewal of intelligence to meet the
challenges of the future. Among more sub-
stantial substantive benefits to. the nation
and to American intelligence, this will make
unnecessary another sensational and shat-
tering updating of American intelligence.
Walter F. Mondale:
Like most Americans, I have strongly sup-
ported the necessity of our government's
conducting intelligence activities. But after
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witnessing hundreds of hours of testimony
before the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence, I am also convinced that basic
reform is necessary.
The committee heard respected former of-
ficials of our nation talk about institutional-
izing an assassination capability in the CIA
as though it were just another option. We
studied how the United States has used brib-
ery, corruption, and violence in almost ev-
ery quarter of the globe, and saw how es-
pionage is aimed at our friends as well as at
our foes. The committee reviewed how our
aca deic institutions, ess, and religious
institutions have been exploited for clan-
destine purposes, despite the special place
these institutions must have in our dem-
ocratic society.
"... there must be some funda-
. mental changes in America's intel-
ligence activities or they will fun-
dainentally change America."
-Walter F. Mondale
It is clear to me that we have paid an ex-
tremely high price for any resulting secret
success. American covert intervention often.
undermined the very democratic institutions
we sought to promote. Because of our clan-
destine activities, the United States is re-
rettably regarded less and less as an example
of ed mocracy to be admired and emulated.
Almost anything bad that happens in this
world is attributed to the CIA-including
the murder of King Faisal. And at home,
the confidence of Americans in their gov-
ernment is weakened when our leaders use
covert intelligence operations to mislead the
public and short-circuit our democratic pro-
cess. I have come to believe that there must
be some fundamental changes in America's
intelligence activities or they will fundamen-
tally change America.
The proposals of Peter Szanton and Gra-
ham Allison in the spring issue of FOR-
EIGN POLICY go in the right. direction.
They improve upon similar recomme
tions I made last fall. I recognize the a
in. such a reorganization, an eo
arw~. Jr., in his comment on the Szan
llison article, also in the spring issue,
pointed to certain aspects of them. But
sofar as substantive problems can be me,
structural change in the executive branc
believe that the gains would outweigh
costs.
The problem, however, is deeper.
As the committee took testimony da'
ter day on assassination plots, my first
pression was that we were grappling
some of the darker forces of human na
the undertaking of acts which would b
thinkable if not done in secret; the e
siasm with which we emulated our en
how patriotism and loyalty could be
verted to the point of dishonoring th
tion; the spectacle of men of great n
offering explanations and excuses at the
gin of credibility.
My initial conclusion was that th
swer lay in better accountability vi
congressional oversight plus a syst
which officials cannot hide responsibili
their actions. To this end, I have sup
a new Senate oversight committee wi
'
power to authorize all national intel
budgets.
But the problem, I am afraid, lies
still. It is not just a problem of mea
a question of ends.
When America saw itself as prima
sponsible for countering the Sovie
Communists throughout the world,
telligence services responded. Since V
I believe America's view of its resp
ities has changed. However, there h
'
h
e wo
n o redefinitic of our role in t
Asa start, I would suggest the foll
> Avoiding nuclear war is most im
It requires the best possible intellige
continuing suspicion and antagon
tween the United States and th
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 Mondale
They improve upon similar recommenda-
tions I made last fall. I recognize _thecosts
in such a reorganization, an ' eor .
'-Jr., in his comment on the Szanton-
:d former of-
institutional-
y in the CIA
option. We
as used brib-
n almost ev-
saw how es-
as well as at
ved how our
md religious
ed for clan-
special place
in our dem-
me fiunda-
rica's intel-
y will fun-
:rica."
E,. Mondale
paid an ex-
;ulting secret
'ention often
c institutions
of our clan-
States is re,
,s an example.
id emulated.
opens in this
k-including
nd at home,
n their gov-
r leaders use
mislead the
nocratic pro-
Lt there must
in America's
11 fundamen
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of the policies t yerl.U.y our mte i;
&ence ac , ,, ,
As a start, I would suggest the following:
> Avoiding nuclear war is most important.
It requires the best possible intelligence. The
continuing suspicion and antagonism be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
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ll n article, also in the spring issue, has
. _
pointed to certain aspects of them. But in-
sofar as substantive problems can be met by
structural change in the executive branch, I
believe that the gains would outweigh the
costs.
The problem, however, is deeper.
As the committee took testimony day af-
ter day on assassination plots, my first im-
pression was that we were grappling with
some of the darker forces of human nature:
the undertaking of acts which would be un-
thinkable if not done in secret; the enthu-
siasm with which we emulated our enemy;.
how patriotism and loyalty could be per-
verted to the point of dishonoring the na-
tion; the spectacle of men of great respect
offering explanations and excuses at the mar-
gin of credibility.
My initial conclusion was that the an-
swer lay in better accountability-vigorous
congressional oversight plus a system in
which officials cannot hide responsibility for
their actions. To this end, I have supported
anew Senate oversight committee with the
power to authorize all national intelligence
budgets.
But the problem, I am afraid, lies deeper
still. It is not just a problem of means, it is
a question of ends.
When America saw itself as primarily re-
sponsible for countering the Soviets and
Communists throughout the world, our in-
telligence services responded. Since Vietnam,
I believe America's view of its responsibil-
ities has changed. However, there has been
no redefiniti of our role in the world, nor
11'
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Union and the levels of nuclear weapons on
each side, place a premium on the most ac-
curate assessment of Soviet military capa-
bilities and political intentions. Agreements
to control nuclear and conventional arms
need a strong intelligence base to ensure both
sound agreements and compliance. To this
end, I believe the Soviet Union and its allies
must remain our Number One intelligence
priority.
> Containing Soviet adventurism is the re-
sponsibility of all free countries. Each na-
tion must look to its own resources first. If
U.S. help is needed, covert action could
prove vital. But, in general, I see little rea-
son why U.S. aid should go through covert
intelligence channels. Except in extrao
nary circumstances, nations wiss, ng m r
ican support shoul be prgR~ed to admix,,
The American people and the Congress must
not be left in the dark about new commit-
ments.
> Support for democracy. America remains
the greatest friend of liberty in the world,
if no longer the sole defender of every regime
that calls itself anti-Communist. But help-
ing the shattered democratic parties of West-
ern Europe survive in the late 1940s is one
thing, and seeking to overthrow a democrat-
ically elected government in Chile in the
1970s is quite another. Moreover, despite
possible short-term success, covert action can
be the enemy of democracy. It often amounts
to corruption and nothing is more destruc-
tive of a democratic political system than
corruption, in particular from a foreign
source. If American ai~Lt..Q.dexacrac}c,SS pC-
sential to offset Soviet subversion, we should
finks ~vay to do this openly. Perhaps our
political parties can assume some of this re-
sponsibility, much as European Social Dem-
ocratic parties have in Portugal.
> Meeting the problems of hunger and dep-
rivation and building a more equitable
world economic system are urgent tasks un-
suited to clandestine activity. A foreign pol-
icy which relies heavily on covert interven-
tion and espionage will be self-defeating in
this area, for it will cast doubt on the le
'
d assistanc
gitimacy of our cooperation an Clandestine activities may prove essenti
to protect and advance our national interes
certain critical situations, such as thwar
i
n
ing terrorism, controlling narcotics, an
in
i
g
ng
br
ship. But it has been naive for us to thin
h
t
t
a
.. with a couple of lies, a few guns, or a pack
of dollars. We have ignored the strength
nationalism and people's determination
shape their own destiny. The Marshall P1
along with the underlying vit
d NATO
,
an
ity of the countries themselves, saved Euro
The
from the Communists, not the CIA.
Hance for Progress contained.Cas o,-in
early 1960s, notCQperation E'
most cases, I believe America can be m
effective if we are direct about what
want. Diplomacy and economic cooperate
are the tools that America uses best to
cure its interests.
I find myself in the unhappy positio
ot being able to take the stand that
n
covert action should be banned. With
world as it-is, I am afraid we may so
times need it. But it is clear we have un
taken too much clandestine activity in
past. We need to control it through
kind of structural changes proposed by S
...
ke it armun
d
ma
an
through strong congressional oversight.
beyond this, I believe we need a new s
ment of the role of clandesti artiviti
t th
th
e
a
U.S. foreign policy. I hope
president of the United States speaks t
l1
f
o
world as
American people and the
ill be the policy of the
I
t w
to conduct its relations with
S
tates
on a straightforward basi
i
es
countr
will deal with other governments it
'
We .w
fidence but not in stealth.,
i
n
plain and direct about our own
A _L._..< what we
and
and LUIl. L-- -- -
from others. We reject a police of
intervention - into
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 f nuclear weapons on
ium on the most ac-
oviet military eapa-
tentions. Agreements
1, conventional arms
.e base to ensure both
co-npliance. To this
Union and its allies
fiber One intelligence
dventurism is the re-
. countries. Each na-
:cn resources first. If
covert action could
aeral, I see little rea-
ld go through covert
x_e t in extrao -
ions N
per- ared to admit it
ad the Congress must.
about new commit-
icy. America remains
iberty in the world,
ender of every regime
mmunist. But help--
ratic parties of West
he late 1940s is one
'erthrow a democrat-
>nt in Chile in the
r. Moreover, despite
ess. covert action can
icy-. It often amounts
ling is more destruc-
olitical system than
lar from a foreign
C n derr~orr jc e -
ibversion, we should
oaenly. Perhaps our
ame some of this re-
uropean Social Dem-
)Portugal.
sof hunger and dep-
a more equitable
are urgent tasks un-
ivizy. A foreign pol-
on covert interven-
be self-defeating in
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s to
president of the United States spea
American people and the world as follows:
It will be the policy of the United
duct its relations with other
States to con
o a straightforward basis. We
__.-_._:
es
r
-
l
with ot?-e
a- - -
Will dea
fidence but not in stealth. We will be
plain and direct about our own interests
A _
hat we expect
bout w
from others. We re ect a olic a_s-n
intervention _ into
other nations.
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this area, for it will cast doubt on the le-
gitimacy of our cooperation and assistance.
l
i
a
> Clandestine activities may prove essent
to protect and advance our national interests
in certain critical situations, such as thwart-
ing terrorism, controlling narcotics, and
bringing truth to nations blinded by censor-
ship. But it has been naive for us to think
that we could change a country's history
with a couple of lies, a few guns, or a packet
of dollars. We have ignored the strength of
nationalism and people's determination to
shape their own destiny. The Marshall Plan
and NATO, along with the underlying vital-
ity of the countries themselves, saved Europe.
from the Communists, not the CIA. The Ale
in~c~ Casa r~i I the
liance for Progress conta T
early 1960s, not< peration M
most cases, I believe America can be more,
effective if we are direct about what we
want. Diplomacy and economic cooperation,
backed by adequate military strength-these
are the tools that America uses best to se-
cure its interests.
I find myself in the unhappy position of
not being able to take the stand that U.S.
covert action 'should be banned. With the
world as it is, I am afraid we may some-
times need it. But it is clear we have under-
taken too much clandestine activity in the
past. We need to control it through the
kind of structural changes proposed by Szan-
ton and Allison and make it accountable
through strong congressional oversight. But
beyond this, I believe we needstate-
ment of the role of clandest ac
t the next
h
a
U.S. foreign policy. I hope t
the
k
 Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100170005-1
America will continue those intelli-
gence activities essential to its security and
that of its friends and allies. We will do
what we can to check Soviet adventurism
and to promote democracy on an open
basis, but these are first the responsibility
of the countries concerned. Covert action
will be r~'~Prl'P `r~Fa6lr~,n~r~! stances in which the security of this na-
tion or of its allies is in ~erin~0_n ~r
The era of covert day-to-day manipu-
lation of media, people, and events by the
United States has ended. American intel-
ligence activities will be restructured ac-
cordingly.
Peter Szanton &
Graham Allison:
Surely, William E. Colby is right in as-
serting that the fundamental lesson of the
past year is that American intelligence must
operate within our constitutional system.
And equally clearly, Walter F. Mondale is
right in arguing that the deepest problem of
American intelligence is one of ends, not
means; a problem to be solved not by tinker-
ing with the intelligence community but by
rethinking and restating our values and ob-
jectives in the external world.
Mondale, a leading figure in the Congress,
looks principally to executive leadership for
;mnrrvomont Jr is hard not to conclude that
rectify the constitutional balance, while the resu
in the executive branch, asks Congress to more
k lts In short organizational
But two aspects of these attractive and '
serve the newt y necessary for such
large-minded concepts are troubling. One
is that Colby, after a professional lifetime They will also require arrangements
reliably confront decision-make
the work of analysi a-
4 amount and to enlarge the skills a
t 1t 4U111 116U1"G III LUV 1eV11bl GdlA,
looks principally to executive lead- llems? Their solution will require far s
ership...." -Szanton & Allison er incen s within the community t
d assessment
stitutional balance, while Mondale, ~~ polic leaders ., -- i,rrvr
Szanton & Alliso
the country would be far better off ha
C
olby sr`--- --- -
ess while Mondale occupied the Whi
gr
The second is that while focusing o
se
H
.
ou
constitutional and high policy issues is hell
it also tends to foreclose attention to less
LIU,
This is the nation's first opportunity
quarter-century to rethink what it wa
a
m intelligence and how to get it. Abs
f
ro
further scandals or disasters, it will lik
be the last such opportunity of this centu
Once the constitutional balance has b
intelligence agencies to perform unjusti
i
or repugnant or useless acts abroad, 1-
. still remain the problem of how w to
prove the performance of these agencie
ajor task:
i
h
r m
e
what has always been t
viding the U.S. government with early
authoritative understanding of developm
abroad. In recent years, the, commua
analyses and assessments have proven
ly variable in quality and far from sat:
ing. Their too frequent misuse and no
The already receding opportunity for re
should be used to insure not only tha
community operates within constitut
br iindaries and in the service of a sup
able policy, but that it performs its na
"...Colby, after a professional J least glamorous, and most important
lifetime in the executive branch, to higher standards, and that the resul
asks Congress to rectify the con- heard. Neither alertness in the Con re
- 11:1
ul-
62.
'3}
For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000100170005-1
 11 continue those intelli-
essential to its security and
nds and allies. We will do
check Soviet adventurism
to democracy on an open
e are first the responsibility
~s concerned. Coverr_ t action
Lfo,Xtr-l+rrl,nar3- rirCnm-
tich the security of this na-
illies is in SQ.i s jznp2xA1L.
covert day-to-day manipu-
a, people, and events by the
has ended. American intel-
es will be restructured ac-
Lon &
lison:
i E. Colby is right in as-
'fundamental lesson of the
American intelligence must
ur constitutional system.
rly, Walter F. Mondale is
that the deepest problem of
pence is one of ends, not
to be solved not by tinker-
lligence community but by
pstating our values and ob-
kjt~rnal world.
after a professional
the executive branch,
ess to rectify the con-
lalance, while Mondale,
figure in the Congress,
.pally to executive lead-
2;. Szanton & Allison
acts of these attractive and
icepts are troubling. One
fter a professional lifetime
' branch, asks Congress to
Btitutional balance, while
ng figure in the Congress,
to executive leadership for
s hard not to conclude that
Szanton & Allison
the country would be far better off had
Colby spent the last eight years in the Con-
gress while Mondale occupied the White
House. The second is that while focusing on
constitutional and high policy issues is help-
ful in clarifying the transcending problems,
it also tends to foreclose attention to lesser
but still quite important questions.
This is the nation's first opportunity in
a quarter-century to rethink what it wants
from intelligence and how to get it. Absent
further, scandals or disasters, it will likely
be the last such opportunity of this century.
Once, the constitutional balance has been
struck, and once we have stopped asking our
intelligence agencies to perform unjustified
or repugnant or useless acts abroad, there
will still remain the problem of how to im-
prove the performs of these agencies at
what has always been their major task: pro-
viding the U.S. government with early and
authoritative understanding of developments
abroad. In recent years, the community's analyses and assessments have proven high-
ly variable in quality and far from satisfy-
ing. Their too frequent misuse and nonuse
by policy-makers is a closely related problem.
The already receding opportunity for reform
should be used to insure not only that the
community operates within constitutional
boundaries and in the service of a support-
able policy, but that it performs its hardest,
least glamorous, and most important task
to higher standards, and that the results are
heard. Neither alertness in the Cons no
tial as both are, will solve those latter Qh .
lems. Their solution will require far strong-
r nce ' s within the community to treat
the work of anaji is and assessment as par-
amount, and to enlarge the skills and pre-
serve the newt ' y necessary for such work.
They will also require arrangements which
more reliably confront decision-makers with
the results. In short, organizational reform.
Approved For Release 2009/05/06: CIA-RDP05T00644R000100170005-1