SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC--A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00280R000300230001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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JJII O_AVI V1 I,J 1 GL
Central
Intelligence
A Preliminary Assessment
Science and Technology in
The German Democratic Republic
Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Committee
So6ret
STIC 85-007C
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%-entrat
Intelligence
Science and Technology in
The German Democratic Republic
A Preliminary Assessment
Secret
STIC 85-007C
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The Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee is the DCI Committee whose
mission in part is to advise and assist the DCI with respect to production of
intelligence on foreign science and technology, to advise the National Foreign
Intelligence Board, and to coordinate activity, information processing, and
analyses in these areas. The Committee reports to the DCI through the DDCI and
to NFIB through the Board's Secretariat.
The current STIC Chairman, members, and associate members are:
(Chairman)
Dr. Robert L. Bingham
Dr. William Reese
Dr. Bertram B. Smith
Mr. Robert E. Upchurch
Dr. John MacCallum
Dr. Howard E. Sorrows
Mr. Robert A. Summers
Mr. Harvey B. Jones
Maj. Thomas J. Dyble
Mr. Ceferino Epps
Mr. Clarence E. Field
Mrs. Teresa C. Jones
Mr. John McGuinness
Dr. Laurence A. Mounter
Mr. James W. Cosby
Mr. Raymond F. Siewert
Lt. Col. Terry W. Thornton
Mr. Roger W. Deihl
Dr. Samuel A. Musa
Mr. James J. Stekert
(Executive Secretary)
Capt. Daniel L. Goulette
(Assistant Executive Secretary)
Department of Energy
National Security Agency
Department of the Air Force
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of the Navy
Department of the Army
Department of State
Office of Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering
Department of Commerce
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency
Department of Energy
Department of the Air Force
Department of Commerce
Department of the Navy
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of State
Department of State
Department of the Army
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of the Army
National Security Agency
Office of Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation
E Systems
Department of the Army
Central Intelligence Agency
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are:
In 1984, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) approached the Department of
State with a proposal to establish a science and technology exchange agreement.
The Department of State requested that the Scientific and Technical Intelligence
Committee (STIC) and the Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee (TTIC)
support their negotiating process with an assessment of the GDR's S&T infra-
structure and technical capability. It is very difficult to assess science and
technology in the GDR because of the very limited Intelligence Community
capability in this area; however, this paper addresses most of the important areas
for the negotiating process. The preliminary conclusions of this paper are subject
to change in the future due to more indepth analysis.
The integrator of this paper is Executive Secretary, STIC. 25X1
Further information paper may be obtained by calling the STIC
Secretaria he principal authors and contributors to this paper 25X1
Roy Frontani
Major (P) John Weske
N. H. Krikorian
Central Intelligence Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
Executive Secretary, Technology
Transfer Intelligence Committee
Air Force/Foreign Technology Division
(Chairman, STIC Structural Materials
Working Group)
US Army/Armed Forces Medical In-
telligence Center (Chairman, STIC
Life Science Working Group)
Department of Energy, Los Alamos
National Laboratories
Defense Intelligence Agency
(Chairman, STIC Computer Working
Group)
Army/Foreign Science and Technology
Center (Chairman, STIC Electro-optics
Working Group)
Analysts at the National Security Agency made a significant contribution to this
paper. More information on East German pyroelectric detectors can be found in
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Science and Technology in
The German Democratic Republic-
A Preliminary Assessment
Key Judgments In general, we believe that the German Democratic Republic would benefit
from a US-GDR scientific exchange program, but US gains would be
small. US scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence gains will also be
small, but East German and Soviet gains could be significant. The Soviet
Intelligence Services are certain to receive all information collected by the
East Germans.
The decisionmaking structure of the GDR consists of a hierarchical chain
of command topped by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). The
State Planning Commission (SPK) works closely with the SED to plan
economic goals. This planning process takes into account the availability of
material and human resources, anticipated technological progress, and
other factors. The SPK transmits tentative targets for each economic
sector to the government ministries which in turn pass them to subordinate
combines, enterprises, and basic production units. The Ministry for Science
and Technology is the main governmental organization for managing and
directing scientific research. It selects projects of national importance for
inclusion in the state plan for science and technology and monitors the
plan's fulfillment. The Ministry for National Defense monitors R&D in the
GDR to ensure that the military receives adequate supplies of weapons,
technology, and equipment; its technology and weaponry administration is
involved in R&D planning.
Worldwide, no East European intelligence service has been as active or as
successful in illegal technology transfer as the East German Ministry of
State Security (MFS). The Science and Technology Department (SWT) of
the Main Administration for Intelligence (HVA) is responsible for both the
acquisition and evaluation of S&T materials. Initially the SWT confined
its interests to the collection of information on military and armaments
technology from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and NATO
member nations, but, in the mid-1970s, began acquiring Western technol-
ogy by both legal and illegal means to close the technology gap with the
West. These MFS/HVA efforts have been able to supply East German
industry with technological processes or production capabilities that would
otherwise not have been available or which would have been far more
expensive to obtain legally. The MFS works closely with the Soviet
Intelligence Service (SIS) as does East German military intelligence with
the GRU. Basic decisions are made by the directors of the MFS and the
KGB, and the directors of the two military intelligence services with the
SIS acting as the senior partner in each case. The KGB liaison officer at
v Secret
STIC 85-007C
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HVA headquarters in East Berlin also levies collection requirements for
the SIS, as does his GRU counterpart on East German military intelli-
gence. Department IV of the HVA, which has special responsibility for
military S&T collection, also has a KGB special liaison officer who levies
SIS collection requirements
The GDR's interests in illegal technology transfer encompass the full range
of advanced technologies important to military and industrial development.
These include microelectronics, communications, computer software,
chemical technology, nuclear and conventional energy, materials technol-
ogy, and bioengineering. The principle focus is on developments that
contribute to the military and industrial strength of West Germany and
NATO. Concern with US developments that contribute to NATO is high.
Priorities for technology collection may be altered by Soviet requirements.
There is the likelihood of a large-scale MFS effort to use academics as will-
ing or unwilling sources as part of the GDR's broader effort to collect S&T
intelligence. Many East German academics work for the MFS. Such work
is in fact a prerequisite for advancement at home and access to foreign
travel to attend scholarly meetings or to undertake research projects at
Western institutions.
We are unable to completely describe East German technical accomplish-
ments because of a lack of information and analysts studying the GDR.
We do know, however, that the GDR exports six times as much to the Sovi-
et Union (USSR) as it imports from the USSR. We believe that the East
Germans have active R&D programs in many technical areas and have
been successful in developing an indigenous capability in many areas.
Some of these programs may be in support of the Soviet Union in areas
where the Soviets have not been able to develop technology for themselves.
We do not expect the GDR life sciences base to be very innovative;
however, they do have some areas of excellence like toxicology and
instrumentation. Funding for academic and basic research probably is
inadequate, and applied research and development tends to utilize com-
monly accepted methodology and off-the-shelf technology.
The GDR is very advanced in some aspects of metallurgy including melt
processing of metals. Their electron beam and plasma melting and coating
equipment is very sophisticated. The East German capability in machine
tools, robots, and flexible manufacturing automation at least equals that of
all the other Warsaw Pact countries and their equipment compares
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favorably to similiar equipment produced in Western countries. Very little
is known about the overall status of electro-optics research in the GDR, but
the East Germans have been capable of producing sophisticated optics for a
long time. We know that they are working on lasers and related optical de-
vices for the military and that they have developed pyroelectric detectors
that could be useful to the military. They have produced more than 100 un-
sophisticated to sophisticated optoelectronic components for controllers.
The East Germans have an excellent capability to produce stable and radio
isotopes, which they export. The GDR is heavily committed to nuclear
power and has many trained nuclear scientists and technicians. The GDR
probably has not developed a reactor fuel reprocessing capability but is
strong in the other areas of the nuclear fuel cycle including production, ra-
diation monitoring equipment, and waste handling. East Germany is the
most advanced Bloc country in microelectronics and computers. Their
success is attributable to their well-funded efforts in industrial and
economic espionage, their pre/post-war technology base, and an excellent
capability to transfer technology from the West.
The East Germans do not appear to be very aggressive in requesting S&T
visits to the United States because only 310 East Germans requested visits
since 1975. The distribution of visit requests in the areas of chemicals,
materials, and semiconductors is similar to that noted during an examina-
tion of S&T visit requests by other East European countries. There was a
surprisingly small number of East German visit requests in computer-
related areas. The distribution of visit requests by year suggests that the
Soviets may have used East German S&T visitors as surrogates for the
acquisition of S&T information, since the number of East German S&T
visit requests varied inversely with poor US-USSR relations from 1978
through 1982.
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Key Judgments
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) 3
Technology Transfer 4
Metal Processing and Materials 7
Electro-optics 9
Optics 9
Optoelectronic Devices 10
Nuclear Technologies 11
Communications Technology 12
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Science and Technology in
The German Democratic Republic-
A Preliminary Assessment
Research and Technical Development Department
are responsible for working with the ministries in-
volved in S&T and R&D efforts and ensure that they
The German Democratic Republic has a strong com-
mitment to science and technology. This commitment
is formalized in Article 17 of its constitution which
states: "Science and research as well as the applica-
tion of their findings are essential foundations of
socialist society and are fostered by the state in every
respect. The GDR promotes science and education
with the aim of projecting and enriching society and
the life of the citizens, of mastering the scientific
technical revolution as well as of guaranteeing the
constant progress of socialist society."
The East German investment in science and technol-
ogy is large and growing. In 1983, more than 8 billion
marks were assigned to S&T-roughly twice the S&T
budget of 1971.
Scientific Policy Making in the German Democratic
Republic
The decisionmaking structure in the GDR consists of
a hierarchical chain of command topped by the
Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and its
general secretary, Erich Honecker. SED leaders play
a direct role in major policy decisions affecting out-
lays for and direction of S&T research and develop-
ment
The Politburo, the policymaking body of the party,
currently consists of 21 members and four candidate
members. Among the Politburo members whose opin-
ions carry considerable weight in S&T policymaking
are Guenter Klieber, a technocrat and industrial
minister with an interest in microelectronics, and
Guenter Mittag, the SED secretary who oversees the
economy. The Secretariat administers SED policy;
each of its 11 members has a specific area of responsi-
bility. Under the Central Committee are about 40
departments employing professional party workers
who collect data from lower-level party officers, pro-
duce "guidelines" for their work, and monitor the
performance of government ministries in implement-
ing party decisions. The Science Department and the
fulfill the annual and five-year plans.
In the fall of 1981, the SED Politburo issued a
resolution on improving S&T management and plan-
ning. Since then various laws and decrees have fo-
cused on improving efficiency in this sector, tying
planning more closely to production, and calculating
the cost-benefit ratio. A 1982 order designed to link
enterprise planning more closely to S&T objectives
stipulates that S&T drafts must be submitted ahead
of other sections of the economic plan. A 1983 decree
on improving cost accounting stipulates that all S&T
planning targets and criteria must be formulated
accurately and complied with. An overall economic
account (cost-benefit billing) projects the economic
effects of R&D projects, both for the year when they
are introduced and for the following year
State Planning Commission. The State Planning
Commission (SPK) is headed by Gerhard Schuerer,
who is also a candidate member of the SED Politburo
and a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.
Working closely with top SED authorities, the SPK
charts economic goals, taking into account the avail-
ability of material and human resources, anticipated
technological progress, foreign trade potential, and
the need for regular improvements in the standard of
living. The SPK has ties to the country's national
defense efforts: the Defense Law of 1978 stipulates
that economic management must support the national
defense at all times. The SPK includes a special
department for the armed forces headed by a general
who is one of the Commission's vice chairmen. F_
The SPK transmits tentative targets for each econom-
ic sector annually to the government ministries which
in turn pass them to subordinate combines, enter-
prises, and basic production units. At each level, a
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proposed plan is developed based on estimates of the
resources available. These plans then move upward
again to the SPK where various elements are integrat-
ed and any differences with the initial targets are
reconciled. After considering further recommenda-
tions from top party bodies, the SPK fixes the plan for
each economic sector. Targets are then sent to the
subordinate units; at the lowest levels, the annual plan
is further subdivided into quarterly and monthly plans
for each production unit.
National Research Council. The National Research
Council was founded in 1957 as an advisory body to
the Council of Ministers on S&T research and devel-
opment. It advises the SPK on questions of science
and technology; plans and coordinates research and
development in the natural sciences and technology;
supervises the implementation of research plans; and
coordinates research capacity and available resources.
It is assisted by central working groups of scientific
and technical experts and commissions specializing in
specific research areas
Ministry for Science and Technology. The Ministry
for Science and Technology was established in 1967.
It is the main governmental organization involved in
managing and directing scientific research, particu-
larly in the area of applied science, and plays a key
role in articulating S&T issues. It selects projects of
national importance to be included in the state plan
for science and technology and monitors the plan's
fulfillment. Its minister, Herbert Weiz, holds a promi-
nent place in GDR S&T efforts. In his capacity as a
deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, he
oversees the Research Council and the Academy of
Sciences.
Ministry for National Defense. The Ministry for
National Defense reaches into every corner of the
economy to ensure that the military receives adequate
supplies of weaponry, technology, and equipment. It is
involved in R&D planning through its Technology and
Weaponry Administration, which is headed by a
deputy minister. According to information published
in 1980, this administration includes subordinate de-
partments responsible for technology administration,
innovation, research and development, weaponry,
planning and coordination, procurement, medical
technology, and S&T relations and supply. The Plan-
ning and Coordination Department receives the mate-
riel plans for the military services and coordinates
them with the relevant sectors of industry. The overall
plan must then be approved by the SPK.
Industrial Decision Making-The Combines. The
formation of combines (Kombinate)-industrial enter-
prises merged into large, tightly integrated economic
units-began in the GDR during 1966 and 1967.
Since then, they have developed into what East
German economists describe as "the chief pillar of
modern economic management." The combines were
created to provide unified management for various
enterprises, from research to production and sales,
and to speed up scientific-technical progress through
their own R&D efforts.
Industrial combines group together enterprises that
produce identical or similar products, employ similar
technologies, or represent interconnected production
states. They may include ancillary enterprises, re-
search institutions, production plants, and their own
foreign trade enterprises. R&D personnel, many of
whom had previously worked in independent facilities,
now work largely within combines with direct links to
the production process. For example, the R&D facili-
ties of Karl Zeiss-Jena employ about 7,500 people,
one-third of them highly trained technicians. As of
1984, centrally managed industry included 132 com-
bines with 20 to 40 enterprises each and an average
work force of 25,000; there were also 93 district-
managed combines employing a total of 206,000
people.
Since about 1980, the combines have been directly
subordinate to the national ministries. A combine
director general is personally accountable to his su-
pervisor minister, who theoretically has the exclusive
right to appoint, dismiss, or issue instructions to him.
The director general has similar authority over his
enterprise directors. In addition, he can assign goals
for exceeding state plan targets to individual enter-
prises; change enterprise tasks or shift them among
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enterprises; transfer sections from one enterprise to
another; create new sections; and decide which tasks
(for example, R&D) are to be centralized within the
combine.
Academy of Sciences of the GDR. About 20,000
people, including 7,000 scholars and researchers, cur-
rently work in the academy and its 100 institutes and
research establishments. Major research centers are
located in East Berlin, Liepzig, Jena, Dresden, Grief-
wald, and Rostokk. The overall mission of the acade-
my is to conduct basic and applied research with
special emphasis on the application of scientific-
technical progress to production. The academy plans
and coordinates research in the natural, mathemati-
cal, and technical sciences and coordinates functions
in some fields of social and medical research. It also
cooperates with state-owned combines and enterprises
in drafting long-range R&D strategies and speeding
up the development of new products, technologies,
and processes. Its institutes have worked closely with
industry in research on laser technology, ceramics,
medical technology, pharmacology, and robotics.F_
In June 1984, a new statute expanded the duties of
the Academy of Sciences and increased its authority
in international scientific cooperation, including the
expansion of relations with scientific institutions in
non-Communist countries. The statute also estab-
lished a council to advise the academy president,
Werner Scheler, on drafting plans, supervising plan
fulfillment, and organizing domestic and international
cooperation relations.
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).
CEMA has served as a framework for cooperation
among its members since its founding in 1949. Its
1971 Comprehensive Program set the guidelines for
CEMA activity through 1990 calling for joint plan-
ning through interstate coordinating bodies. The
CEMA Committee on Scientific-Technical Coopera-
tion is responsible for organizing and coordinating
multilateral S&T cooperation. The program also em-
phasizes multilateral projects for developing new re-
gional sources of fuels, energy, and raw materials-
projects that are jointly planned and executed. In
1982 more than 200 agreements and contracts on
joint research, development, design, and experimental
The most traditional form of cooperation in planning
is through the coordination of national five-year plans.
In addition, every year the directors of research
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at which time plans are drawn up, tasks assigned, and
responsibilities laid down. In 1982, there were 63
national scientific installations in CEMA countries,
including four in the GDR, acting as coordinating
centers for multilateral scientific-technical coopera-
tion in selected problem groups. Direct relations
among enterprises, combines, and institutions also
play an important role in cooperation among CEMA
countries
According to an East German article, scientific coop-
eration among the CEMA countries intensified con-
siderably during 1981-83. Scientists from member
states worked on projects in 23 multilateral problem
commissions, 14 in natural sciences, and nine in social
sciences. In addition, the multilateral Problem Com-
mission on Physical-Technical Problems of Energy
Science was established and its task groups on electri-
cal physics, electrical engineering, and low tempera- 25X1
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According to the same article, one of the most
effective forms of multilateral cooperation is the
CEMA base laboratory, which operates as a joint
research installation. Such laboratories have been
formed within the Problem Commissions on Comput-
er Engineering, Semiconductor Physics, High-
Molecular Compounds, Kinetics, Catalysis, and Pet-
rochemistry. Eight of the 42 such laboratories are in
the GDR, most of them involved in geophysical
research. In 1983, six research areas were given
priority for further cooperation efforts: energetics,
scientific equipment construction, computer engineer-
ing and data processing, raw materials sciences, bio-
technology, and the exploitation of natural resources.
The Soviet Union has received some important bene-
fits from CEMA, especially since 1970. Contributions
have been made to robotics, numerical programmable
controls for machine tools, anticorrosion techniques,
projects were in effect.
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and optical and computer technologies. Without the
contribution of the other members of CEMA, the
development of the Ryad-3 and -4 series of computers
by the Soviets might have taken much longer.
Bilateral GDR-USSR Cooperation. Cooperation with
the USSR extends to all sectors of the GDR economy,
from basic research to technical development and
production. Recent cooperation has focused on joint
S&T efforts in the advanced processing of raw materi-
als and the applications of microelectronics and robo-
tic equipment. In October 1984, the two countries
signed an agreement on cooperation in science, tech-
nology, and production through the year 2000. Ac-
cording to this agreement, joint GDR-USSR research
will increase in the following key areas: extraction and
utilization of domestic raw materials; refinement of
raw materials and fuels; microelectronics, optoelec-
tronics, and robot technology; coal refining; and bio-
technologies, especially microbiological processes ap-
plicable to agriculture.
Scientific and Engineering Education in the GDR. A
law establishing an "integrated socialist education
system," promulgated in 1965, provides for a state-
controlled secular school system. The core of the
system is the 10-year comprehensive polytechnical
facilities administered by the schools or by factories.
At the 10th grade level, teachers single out exception-
al students for two more years of study at the
expanded secondary school-the most important
channel for entry into colleges and universities. In
1977, only 9 percent of those completing the 10th
grade were so selected. The remaining students gener-
ally receive some form of vocational training.
The 71 universities and colleges in the GDR are the
country's highest academic institutions; to be admit-
ted, a student must pass the Abitur (university en-
trance exam). Other criteria for the selection of
candidates include their academic records, education-
al potential and social activities; the social composi-
tion of the population; and the needs of society. A full-
time university course lasts four to five years, except
for medicine which requires six. The curriculum
covers general subjects such as Marxism-Leninism as
well as the field of specialization. Students in the
natural and technical sciences also acquire practical
The GDR offers three academic degrees. The first,
bachelor of a particular academic discipline-for
example, B.Sc. (medicine) or B.A. (philosophy)-
requires completion of a university course of study
that includes the submission and public defense of a
written thesis. The second, that of doctor of a particu-
lar discipline-that is, Dr. med. or Dr. phil.-is
awarded after the public defense of a "doctoral thesis
B" or a corresponding dissertation of the highest
academic quality. To attain either of the doctoral
degrees, the graduate must hold the preceding degree.
The only exception is the honorary doctorate-
Dr. h.c. (doctor honoris causa), which is awarded to
academics and leading public figures for excellence in
their particular sphere of activity.
East Germany has been a traditional beneficiary of
COCOM-controlled Western strategic technology
from the Federal Republic of Germany because of its
common border and special political and economic
relationship with West Germany. The GDR has been
heavily dependent on the FRG for controlled, dual-
use (that is, civil-military) technology for its industrial
and military development. Moreover, the FRG is
generally acknowledged as the major source of illegal
acquisition of advanced technology by the Soviet
Union; much of that technology originates in the
United States and some of it reaches the Soviets from
West Germany via East Germany
who defected to West Germany
provided the first detailed picture of the GDR's role in
illegal technology transfer acquisition and, in particu-
lar, those of the Ministry of State Security (MFS)
allocated 5 million East German marks for the illegal
acquisition of documentation and models of advanced
technology. They spent 3 million marks of their funds
and acquired technology that was subsequently esti-
mated to have saved East German industry 300
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million marks, a leverage factor of 100 over their
expenditure. Since East German industry is required
to return 10 percent of such savings for the upkeep of
the MFS, they were under no compulsion to exagger-
ate their estimates of the value of these acquisitions.
There is no reason to believe that the situation has
changed significantly.
There are numerous examples of East German high-
technology espionage and illegal trade operations in
the West, particularly in the FRG. These sometimes
involve the suborning of single individuals in large
manufacturing firms, the use of small Western trad-
ing firms as intermediaries, the creation of dummy
front organizations for particular operations, and the
employment of small firms with a covert tie to an East
German governmental entity. Representatives of East
Germany's MFS usually masquerade as trade repre-
sentatives and often carry out negotiations within
East Germany itself making it difficult for West
German counterintelligence to be effective in any-
thing but direct espionage cases. By analogy with
other East European countries, we believed that cer-
tain requirements for illegal high-technology acquisi-
tions are levied on the GDR trading mission in
Moscow by Soviet authorities
The fact that West Germany regards East Germany
as merely another portion of a "Greater Germany"
facilitates the movement of goods and people between
the two regions. Movement of goods in illegal trade
between the FRG and GDR, however, often takes
place through Switzerland or Austria as transit areas,
rather than directly across-border into the GDR. It is
so easy to move goods, particularly small items, across
the border into the GDR from the FRG, that it is
surprising that this activity is not observed taking
place more often. Perhaps it does, of course, and we
are simply not aware of it
Worldwide, no East European intelligence service has
been as active or as successful in illegal technology
transfer as the East German MFS. The Science and
Technology Department (SWT) of the Main Adminis-
tration for Intelligence (HVA) is responsible for both
the acquisition and evaluation of S&T materials.
Initially the SWT confined its interests to the collec-
tion of information on military and armaments tech-
nology from the FRG and NATO member nations. In
the mid-1970s, the East German Government adopted
a policy which concentrated all available resources on
closing the technology gap with the West (estimated
at that time to be 20 years) and began acquiring
Western technology by both legal and illegal means.
The HVA, naturally, plays its part in this effort as
well as continuing its activities in military technology
transfer. These MFS/HVA efforts have been able to
supply East German industry with technological pro-
cesses or production capacities that would not other-
wise have been available or which would have been
far more expensive to obtain legally.
The SWT receives its mission allocations from a
variety of sources. There is a list of requirements in
support of economic development on file in CEMA.
The East German economy has a set of long- and
short-term priorities and the Soviets also call for
support for their economic and military needs. The
MFS also undertakes its own initiatives based on its
own appraisal of the needs of the East German
economy. Collection activities are also carried out on
behalf of several MFS-connected economic enter-
prises with highly specialized technical problems (for
example, Robotron, the main East German developer
and producer of robotics equipment). The Ministry for
Science and Technology (MFT), the Academy of
Sciences, the Research Council, and the Ministry for
University and Technical School Affairs may also set
requirements. Occasionally, the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs may establish acquisition priorities.
The executive management of the MFS handles
matters of cooperation with the Soviet Intelligence
Services (SIS) in supporting the Soviet military-
industrial complex. The MFS works closely with the
SIS as does East German military intelligence with
the GRU. Basic decisions are made by the directors of
the MFS and the KGB, and the directors of the two
military intelligence services with the SIS acting as
the senior partner in each case. The directors work out
long-range planning issues. The directors of the S&T
departments of the corresponding services also remain
in direct frequent contact with each other. For exam-
ple, the director of the SWT travels to Moscow at
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least once a year to consult with his Soviet KGB
counterpart. The KGB liaison officer at HVA head-
quarters in East Berlin also levies collection require-
ments for the SIS, as does his GRU counterpart.
Department IV of the HVA, which has special re-
sponsibility for military S&T collection, also has a
KGB special liaison officer who levies SIS collection
requirements.
The SWT works closely with the KGB, and the KGB
is given access to all intelligence information pertain-
ing to military matters. The Soviets can and do set
specific collection requirements in both military and
nonmilitary areas. The Soviet liaison officer also
receives MFS acquisition lists and can acquire materi-
al from these lists for forwarding to Moscow.
The GDR's interests in illegal technology transfer
encompass the full range of advanced technologies
important to military and industrial development.
These include microelectronics, communications,
computer software, chemical technology, nuclear and
conventional energy, materials technology, and bioen-
gineering. The principle focus is on developments that
contribute to the military and industrial strength of
West Germany and NATO and concern with US
developments that contribute to NATO is high. Prior-
ities for technology collection may be altered by
Soviet requirements. In fact, there is evidence of
periodic Soviet displeasure over East German empha-
sis on technology acquisitions for its own industrial
and military development with corresponding neglect
of Soviet requirements
indicate the likelihood of a large-scale
MFS effort to use academics as willing or unwilling
sources as part of the broader effort to collect S&T
intelligence. Many East German academics work for
the MFS. Such work is in fact a prerequisite for
advancement at home and access to foreign travel to
attend scholarly meetings or to undertake research
projects at Western institutions. Professors working
for the MFS attend conferences at home and abroad
where they pump their Western colleagues and identi-
fy candidates for future recruitment. These academics
are well situated to gain access to advanced produc-
tion techniques and emerging technologies.
Life Sciences
East Germany has traditional strengths in the biologi-
cal and biochemical sciences and in precision scientif-
ic instrumentation. Some of these strengths, equal and
surpass similar capabilities within the Warsaw Pact
countries. Nevertheless, East German progress in the 25X1
life sciences, with very few exceptions, does not match
the West and Japan in terms of quality or quantity. In
general, East German academic and basic research
capability in the life sciences is often not readily
translated into useful end products.
East German scientists are considered to be among
the world leaders in certain fields of modern toxicol- 25X1
ogy. They maintain superior interest and expertise in
quantitative structure activity relationship (QSAR)
analysis. An application of this technology is the use
of sophisticated computer programs to predict the
chemical, physical, and toxicological properties of
newly synthesized chemicals. In application, the sys-
tem can design a chemical molecular structure that is
likely to provide a desirable property.
There are at least three centers for the storage and
production of CBW agents. In addition, there is a
fairly extensive CBW R&D program. In particular,
experimental work is carried on at the Institute of
Microbiology in Jena (animal experiments) and the
Institute of Chemical Toxicology (organophosphorus
chemistry). Unclassified East German publications
indicate research activity in organophosphorus chem-
istry, pesticides, alkaloids, cholinesterase inhibitors, as
well as psychotropic and neurotropic drugs.
East Germany has engaged in scientific exchanges
within the Warsaw Pact. One exchange between the
Institute of Biophysics in Leipzig and the Institute for
Biophysics in Moscow involves the study of thermo-
bioluminescence using both natural and artificial
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membranes. Another cooperative venture was the
development, with the Czechoslovaks, of automatic
injectors for CW agent antidotes.
groups within all of the twenty-plus government min-
istries. Overall, human factors R&D is conducted in a
fragmented fashion and is clearly immature; the
primary emphasis is on worker safety and job satisfac-
tion rather than on the design of machine systems to
East Germany has an active pharmaceutical industry
which produces items for consumption within the
Warsaw Pact countries and for export. Agreements
within the Warsaw Pact tend to minimize duplication
of effort. Overall, pharmaceuticals produced by the
GDR, particularly at "GERMED" in Dresden, are
probably superior in quality and efficacy to Soviet
drugs. End items include cardiovascular drugs, sex
hormones, chemotherapeutics, antibiotics, and bio-
active peptides. East German biomedical equipment
and instrumentation are the best in Eastern Europe.
Further, the East Germans are world leaders in the
biological effects of aerosol pollutants and the appli-
cations of therapeutic aerosols in medicine.
East German sports psychology and medicine are the
most sophisticated in the world. Psychological tech-
niques include imagery, covert rehearsal, and auto-
nomic conditioning. Conditioning techniques for ath-
letes also have direct application to performance
enhancement in many military tasks. Conversely,
East Germany has very poor clinical psychological
resources, such as psychopathology assessment de-
vices, psychotherapy techniques, and psychodynamic
application theory
The GDR is active in researching the biological
effects of nonionizing electromagnetic radiation
(NIEMR). Applications include the development of
occupational safety standards for microwave exposure
and laser therapy in medicine. However, their princi-
pal contribution is the manufacture of precision in-
strumentation, equipment, and optical components.
These are the best in Eastern Europe. End items
include a device to measure near-field electromagnet-
ic radiation, high-quality surgical lasers, and optical
filters, which are used throughout Eastern Europe. A
visit by a GDR scientist to the United States resulted
in the East German development of a very fast
(picosecond) spectrometer.
optimize the man-machine interface
The East German biotechnology programs are not
comparable to those in the West, Japan, and the
Soviet Union. GDR scientists are capable of innova-
tive molecular biology/genetic engineering research;
however, support and funding for existing programs
are inadequate. Attempts to develop cooperative
agreements in this field with the Soviets have enjoyed
limited success. East German scientists study all
phases of molecular biology, microbiology, pharma-
cology, and biochemistry. Western journals and publi-
cations are readily available. The lead institute for 25X1
molecular biology is the Karl Marx University in
Leipzig. Key scientists are Dr. S. M. Rapporort and
Dr. Harold Rosenthal. Dr. Rapporort is the director
of the East German research plan (MOGEVUS) in
molecular biology and genetics. This plan is designed
to assure growth and progress in these sciences for the
rest of the century through a coordinated national
effort between various GDR institutes and universi-
ties. Program success will be dependent on enhanced
government cooperation and financial support. 25X1
There are centers for plant pathology whose personnel
interact with foreign colleagues and attend confer-
ences. At the Institute of Phytopathology in Aschers-
leben there is an International Bank of Plant Patho-
gens.
Metal Processing and Materials
The German Democratic Republic is very advanced
in basic metal melt processes. The Manfred von
Ardenne Research Institute (MARI) in Dresden is one
of the foremost electron beam (EB) research institutes
in the world. They design and produce highly sophisti-
cated EB guns and systems. The latest gun, designat-
ed EH 1200/50, is a 1,200 kW gun used for produc-
ing large ingots up to 800 millimeters in diameter and
3 meters in length. The Institute makes the guns and
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There is a lack of data on East German military
human engineering/human performance R&D. With-
in the GDR civilian sector, human factors engineering
is referred to as work sciences. There are work science
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.Cl I V L
sells them to Kombinat VEB Lokomotivebau-Elektro-
technische Werke (LEW) in Hennigsdorf, which pro-
duces large multichamber furnaces. Many of these
furnaces are sold to the USSR. LEW has reportedly
manufactured a multichamber furnace for the USSR
with a power of 8 MW capable of melting 100-tonne
ingots
The East Ger 'ty also extends to i coating units. would like to move its
manufacturing capa ii y o produce EB guns (and by
extension coating furnaces) to the United States to
shorten the manufacturing time and to compete more
Another facility of high competence, working in the
area of basic processing, is the VEB Edelstahlwerk,
Freital, directed by Dr. H. Fiedler. This facility has
an excellent capability to design and produce plasma
guns which are used to melt metals and for a variety
of other metal processes. They have built a plasma arc
remelt (PAR) furnace with a holding capability of 30
tonnes and plan to build a 50-tonne capacity furnace.
The East Germans have developed these units in
conjunction with Soviet technologists, the GDR de-
signing and building the plasmatrons and the Soviets
the furnaces. There are indications that the East
Germans are not satisfied with this arrangement
because the Soviets apparently take credit for the
East German accomplishment
The East German capability in machine tools, robots,
and flexible automation technology at least equals
that of all other Warsaw Pact countries. The opera-
tional quality of machine tools produced in the GDR
compares favorably to those produced in Western
The East Germans have been manufacturing five-axis
computer numerical controllers (CNCs), capable of
three-axis simultaneous control, since 1982. Informa-
tion on newer models of indigenously produced CNCs
is not available. We believe, however, that the East
Germans have sufficient know-how and manufactur-
ing ability to produce the microprocessor controllers
necessary to operate advanced flexible manufacturing
systems (FMSs). This includes machine tool, robot,
and process controllers. The VEB Erfurt Electronics
"Friedrich Engels" Plant has set up a small produc-
tion center for microelectronic controls. This center
permits the rapid production of controls meeting the
special purpose of the user. The Engels plant will
design and manufacture future controls for newly
developed pressing and plastics machines of the Shap-
ing Technology Combine. Automation advances in
East Germany, including the production of 45,000
robots by the end of 1985, are expected to increase
production 500 percent over 1982 levels.
The GDR has been one of the world's leaders in the
implementation of FMSs. One system, the PRISMA
II, has been operating for more than 12 years with
productivity increases through software improve-
ments. Software and its application to FMS is the
most apparent machining-related technological area
where the East Germans trail the West.
The "Otto von Guericke" Technical Advanced School
in Magdeburg has recently acquired a new laboratory
that includes several computerized welding robots.
This laboratory will be used for extensive research in
the automation of welding technology. The computer-
aided analysis and control of welding processes is
something new for the GDR. All measurements are
fed through suitable channels into a computer labora-
tory. Here, with the aid of appropriate devices, these
measurements can be evaluated, analyzed in a model
MC 80 small computer, and processed for further
study
During 1985, the Thale Iron and Foundry Plant will
be converted from conventional steel production to
powder metallurgy. The East Germans believe that
this conversion can yield significant material-
economic effects in the national economy. They state
that Thale is among the pioneers in East German
powder metallurgy. When compared with other tech-
nologies, the technique of pressing workpieces out of
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iron powder renders most subsequent machining un-
necessary. The parts receive their near final form
during the pressing. The increasing use of pressed
parts in the construction of machines, cars, and textile
machinery, as well as in the office machine and
electrical appliance industries, requires the large-scale
production of iron powder. The new installation in the
Thale steel plant is for this purpose. It will obtain the
requisite molten metal from the plant's existing elec-
tric smelting furnaces that have already produced iron
powder low in phosphorus, sulfur, and oxygen; this
powder already meets the specifications for pressed
welding electrodes. This plant, as it is presently set up,
will not be capable of producing superalloy powders or
parts. Superalloys are used extensively in critical parts
for military systems. For example, the turbine parts of
high-performance jet engines are made from superal-
loys.
Some work on the explosive compaction of amorphous
powders has been noted at the Institute of Solid State
Physics of the GDR Academy of Sciences in Dresden.
X-ray diffracted analysis indicated that the material
remained in the amorphous state after compaction. It
is not clear whether this work on amorphous alloys
can be used for high-performance structural compo-
nents, but it does suggest an interest in advancing
rapid solidification technology-a new arena of mate-
rials science that has close ties to high-performance
powder metallurgy.
East German composites research appears to be
aimed at supplementing Soviet research in metal
matrix composites and in nondestructive testing
(NDT). The Soviet and East German literature con-
tains references to work occurring at the A. A.
Baykov Institute of Metallurgy in Moscow on graphi-
te/copper composites. In addition, a program involv-
ing East Germans, Poles, Hungarians, and Soviets
involves investigating exoelectron emissions and their
application to NDT of composites and other materi-
als; US technologists who have reviewed this tech-
nique are not convinced of its practical application.
Electro-optics
Electro-optics (EO) technology is one of the most
critical advanced technologies. EO technologies can
be used in a variety of "smart" weapons systems as
parts of sensor and signal processors. EO technologies
can also be used for optical computing and for
controlling other machines. Optical computing can be
a very powerful tool for addressing very complex
mathematical problems, and we believe that the Sovi-
ets lead the West in this. We do not know if the
Soviets have passed any optical computing technology
to the GDR. In fact, we have very little information
on GDR EO capabilities, but the GDR has a history
of precision optical manufacturing
Optics. The GDR's optical capability at Karl Zeiss-
Jena has been utilized by the USSR for a myriad of
programs since World War II. Much of the high
technology developed in the State Optical Institute
(GOI) at Leningrad was originally derived from Zeiss-
Jena technology. The GDR's optical scientists have
played a major role in solving the alignment problems
related to the "Delfin" glass laser system for fusion at
the Lebedev Institute (FIAN) in Moscow___________
it seemed to be common practice that
all optical instruments used in the Soviet satellites or
in the Inter-Sputnik program were of East German
manufacture from the Karl Zeiss-Jena firm.
Lasers. Basic laser research in the GDR is directed by
the Academy of Science. One of its major laser
laboratories is the Central Institute for Optics and
Spectroscopy (ZOS) in East Berlin. Because of the
emphasis on spectroscopy, a large research program
exists to study dye lasers. These lasers are tunable
over a large segment of the optical band and are,
therefore, extremely useful for spectroscopy. In par-
ticular, scientists at ZOS have done research on the
generation of very short pulses from a dye laser using
a saturable absorber. New materials and methods for
making tunable dye lasers have also been investigated.
For example, a laser has been constructed using
chlorophyll from plants. This laser was pumped by a
nitrogen laser and was tuned from 660 to 685 nano-
meters.
As part of an exchange program, ZOS scientists have
worked at FIAN in Moscow, performing research on
semiconductor lasers. A cooperative development pro-
gram has also existed between ZOS and the State
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Precision Engineering Works, Halle, to develop laser
devices for machining materials. The first product of
this cooperation was a 200-watt CO2 laser, which was
attached to a type K70 cutter. This device is now used
in various industries and can cut any shape desired in
both thin metals and fabrics. It is produced by the
Central Institute for Welding Technology (ZIS), Hal-
le, and is called the ZIS 738.
Both optical elements and lasers are being studied at
the Friedrich Schiller University at Jena. Carbon-
dioxide lasers discharged by microwaves are being
developed in a program sponsored by the GDR mili-
tary and government. Ostensibly, these lasers would
be used for the cutting, drilling, and annealing of
various materials. Another more esoteric area of
research at the University of Jena is on reflectors for
X-ray lasers. The cooperation between Friedrich
Schiller University and the Lebedev Institute in Mos-
cow was identified in a 1979 talk in which G. Sklizkov
described a unique X-ray microscope developed at the
Physical Institute of the Friedrich Schiller University
of Jena that is for diagnosing laser-produced plasmas.
Pyroelectric Detector Research. Pyroelectric infrared
(IR) detectors have applications in precise laser beam
alignment, intruder alarms, remote temperature
measurements, and thermal imaging. Their chief ad-
vantages are the potential for ambient temperature
operation, broadband spectral response, and low cost.
These characteristics are particularly attractive for
thermal imaging applications where conventional
semiconductor detectors require cooling, often down
to 77 degrees Kelvin. Their operation is based on the
pyroelectric effect. When IR radiation is absorbed in
a pyroelectric material, a change in temperature
occurs and this results in a change in material
polarization. If this material is sandwiched between
two electrodes and coupled to an amplifier, then the
change in polarization will be reflected as a change in
current in the external circuit. Pyroelectric detectors
operating on this principle can be configured as
single-element devices or multielement arrays and
also can be linked to charge-coupled device (CCD)
readout electronics.
fabrication techniques, and applications. Their cur-
rent emphasis probably is on fabrication and design
techniques to increase detector performance. They are
aware of US efforts and actively seek to benefit from
them. Their interest in developing LiNbO3 and PVF2
indicates an emphasis on stability, robustness, and
cost of manufacture. These are prime concerns in the
production of military devices. They have the capabil-
ity to fabricate advanced detector arrays for thermal
imaging applications, but no production capability is
evident. The research in coupling pyroelectric arrays
with CCD output suggests an interest in developing
this area. This technology could be applied to IR
missile seekers
Optoelectronic Devices. Micro-optoelectronic compo-
nents, manufactured primarily by the Television Elec-
tronics Plant in Berlin, are used in almost all areas of
the national economy. They convert electronic signals
into optical signals and conversely. The spectrum of
models includes signal lamps, (for example, light
emitting diodes [LED] ), information displays, picture
reproduction sensors, picture recording sensors, com-
ponents for radio transmitters and radio receivers, and
couplers (SEK and controllers). The 2- to 5-mm
coupler elements, which operate in the infrared light
range, control and regulate motion processes in the
production of industrial products and consumer goods.
With their aid, for example, machine tools and cas-
sette recorders can be automatically switched, televi-
sion sets can be operated remotely, and electrical
potentials of several thousand volts can be reliably
disconnected. From 1975 to the present, more than
100 optoelectronic components have been developed
and produced.
Advanced research is being done at the Dresden
Technical University to develop an optoelectronic
reflex sensor for optical tool geometry. This sensor
could significantly improve machining efficiency in
operations like turning, milling, and drilling by moni-
toring and compensating for tool wear. This sensor
would also be useful for postprocess measurements.
East Germany has an active pyroelectric detector
research program. This program includes the investi-
gation of pyroelectric materials properties, detector
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Nuclear Technologies
The East Germans have a world-class production
facility for both stable and radioisotopes at the Cen-
tral Institute for Nuclear Research (CINR) at Ros-
sendorf near Dresden. They export these isotopes.
CINR has strong ties to the Soviet Nuclear Research
Institute at Dubna, and the GDR has produced and
shipped large quantities of the Nitrogen- 15 isotope to
the Soviet Union.
In 1979, East Germany had completed one 70-mega-
watt (MW) pressurized water reactor (PWR) and had
two 440-MW and one 100-MW PWRs under con-
struction. East Germany is heavily committed to
nuclear power and, therefore, has many trained nucle-
ar scientists and technicians. According to a recent
German visitor, the Soviet Union has not allowed the
GDR to develop a reactor fuel reprocessing capability.
The GDR, however, is strong in the other areas of
nuclear fuel cycle including production, radiation
monitoring equipment, and waste handling
Computers and Microelectronics
The GDR is the most advanced of the Bloc countries
in the areas of microelectronics and computer sys-
tems. Their success is attributable to their well-
funded efforts in industrial and economic espionage
(estimated over 500 active agents), their pre/post-war
technological base, and an excellent capability to
transfer technology from the West through France,
Italy, Austria, Japan, and West Germany. As a
technical leader in CEMA, we believe that the GDR
contributes computing technology to Warsaw Pact
military programs, as well as conducting R&D for
applications in East German weapon systems, com-
mand and control, and support to other military
programs
The East Germans are capable of technical innova-
tion, are relatively successful manufacturers of com-
puter goods as compared with their CEMA partners,
and have consistently been a valuable conduit for the
flow of Western technology into the Bloc. The great-
est strength of the GDR is their competent engineer-
ing that enables successful production of computer
equipment and other goods with imbedded computing
technology, including military systems. Table 1 high-
lights East German strengths and weaknesses in
Table 1
East German Computing
Industrial applications (for ex-
ample, flexible manufacturing
systems, robot controls, and
CNC)
Dependence on other CEMA
nations for materiel supply (for 25X1
example, some microcircuit de-
vices and peripherals)
Instrumentation (lack of high-
quality instruments in adequate
numbers to support RDT&E of
their products)
Office automation (for example,
word-processing and unit record
systems)
Widely accessible microcom-
puters (low quality of machines
impair the growth of new ideas
and more applications)
The GDR was probably the first Eastern Bloc country
to obtain microchips, both logic and microprocessor
(Intel 8080/8080A and Zilog Z8000), in quantities
sufficient to export significant numbers of micro-
computers to the USSR (approximately 1,000 K1520
computers based on the Intel 8080 in 1979). They
have since developed their own production capability,
which is very good. The GDR is probably attempting
to produce a version of the Z8000 microprocessor.
The East Germans market microprocessor-based sys-
tems for office automation, the machine tool industry
(for example CNC and robot controls), and image
processing.
The GDR appears to be the CEMA leader in develop-
ment of flexible manufacturing systems including
robots. They do competent R&D on robot/computer
vision systems and the adaptive control of robots.
Image-processing systems offer a solid market poten-
tial because of the cooperation between Robotron and
Karl Zeiss-Jena. The Soviet Space Institute has a
joint development with the East Germans on an
image-processing system, A64710
computing technology.
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The GDR is extremely adept in software development
and is considered the best in the Eastern Bloc. More
recently, they have concentrated efforts in software
enhancement of existing machines in order to increase
machine productivity. The ES-1056 is a software-
enhanced ES-1055. Speculation is that efforts in
software enhancements are necessary because of the
current restriction placed on hardware technology
transfer from the West. The GDR is currently respon-
sible for software development for the Ryad program.
CEMA countries' national computer projects were
realigned to support the cooperative development of
IBM 360 compatible systems in the Ryad program
under the direction of the Soviets. The East Germans,
in spite of their natural tendency to preserve autono-
my and their independent success in the CEMA
market with office automation, transitioned to the
Ryad program. The ES-1040 computer introduced in
1972 by the Robotron plant achieved prominence in
the Ryad 1 project by being a successful computer
design; its success was enhanced by the serious prob-
lems with the ES-1050 and ES-1060-the only
Ryad I models designed to have greater performance
than the ES-1040. The German entry in Ryad 2 was
the ES-1055 computer. Although it was a respectable
machine, it did not earn a reputation similar to the
ES-1040 and was never produced in quantity. The
GDR's entry in the Ryad 3 project is the ES-1057.
We do not know how successful this computer will be.
Under the Ryad program the East Germans have
produced a variety of peripherals including magnetic
tape units, low-speed line printers, a video display
system, and several data transmission devices from
modems to terminals. We believe that they are quite
dissatisfied with Bulgaria being assigned a leading
role in the manufacture of high-capacity magnetic
disks; and like most CEMA customers of disk units,
the Germans are frustrated by the low quality of disk
units shipped for use with their Ryad computers. The
East Germans would like to produce high-capacity
magnetic disks, but there are rumors of reliability
problems with the GDR disks.
Communications Technology
We believe the GDR is focusing on technological
improvements to both the landline communications
system and the backup microwave networks used by
the East German Communist Party and the Ministry
of Defense. These improvements include the use of
pulse code modulation (PCM) equipment on both
communications networks, the transistorization of the
microwave networks, and the microwave networks.
The GDR has been active in the development and
utilization of PCM technology. Several firms manu-
facture PCM equipment, which has been exported to
several nations including the Soviet Union, Hungary,
and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. In
1984, the GDR and Poland were planning a program
of scientific and technical cooperation for the develop-
ment of new PCM technology and the marketing of
already existing equipment to third parties. The GDR
plans to use PCM technology on a new communica-
tions system for the energy sector, which is to be in
use by 1987 or 1988. The East German Air Force/Air
Defense (EGAF/AD) plans to use PCM equipment in
conjunction with the FM-24/400 microwave radio
system.
The EGAF/AD began upgrading their communica-
tions facilities by installing the PM 2A/400 micro-
wave radio system at least as early as November
1981. They planned to have their system fully opera-
tional by 1 November 1985. The PM 24/4000, which
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is a frequency-modulated, 24 channel microwave ra-
dio system operating in the UHF range, is gradually
replacing the RVG-950 low-capacity system through-
out the GDR. EGAF/AD began installing the
FM960.11000 microwave system in 1984. The
FM960.11000, which is a frequency-modulated 960-
channel system operating in the SHF range, has been
plagued with problems since its installation and is not
yet fully operational.
Other developments in communications technology
include the following:
? The Ministry of Defense is planning to acquire a
new voice communications device, designated the
Alpha Memory, in 1986.
? The Koepenick Radio Works and the GDR Rail-
road developed a new VHF railroad communica-
tions system.
? The International Maritime Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT) satellite communications equipment
has been installed on GDR merchant vessels.
? The Statsionar-4 satellite earth stations in the GDR
will be equipped with new transmitting and receiv-
ing equipment between 1985 and 1987 as part of the
modernization of Intersputnik communications
which includes conversion to digital communication.
This section is a review of East Germans who request
ed visits to the United States in S&T areas from 197
to 1 March 1985.
No East German visits are
on file prior to 1975, apparently because the United
States did not have a formal diplomatic relationship
with East Germany until then. Since 1975, however,
only 310 East German S&T visitors requested entry
into the United States
Table 2
Focus Categories
1. Computer networking
2. Computer systems
3. Software
4. Automated real-time
controls
5. Materials
6. Directed energy
7. Semiconductor and
electronic components
8. Instrumentation
9. Telecommunications
10. Communications, navigation,
guidance, and control
11. Microwave
12. Vehicular
13. Optical and lasers
14. Sensors
15. Undersea systems
17. Chemicals
18. Nuclear
20. Agriculture
21. Transportation
22. Biology
23. Medical science
24. Earth sciences
25. Mathematics
26. Nonnuclear power
Note: No data are contained in the data base for focus categories
16 and 19. These were prospective MCTL categories which were
deleted sometime after the data base was in operation.
A formal government-to-government S&T agreement
has yet to be formulated. The East German S&T visit
requests were made under the aegis of the US-GDR
cultural agreement, various private arrangements,
and business relationships with US firms. The ab-
sence of a formal S&T agreement has not been an
obstacle for East Germans attending technical meet-
ings in the United States, studying at US academic
institutions, or visiting US companies.
The information was
tabulated according to the focus categories, the visit
purpose, and the year(s) for which the visit was
requested. The focus categories are derived from the
major headings contained in the Military Critical
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Table 3
Visit Category by Year
Technologies List (MCTL). The individual specialties
are reflected in the assignment of focus categories,
but they are not used for tabulation purposes because
of their lack of specificity, for example, physics,
engineering, information processing, and so forth. The
visit purposes are identified broadly as academic,
conference, commercial, and commercial training. No
attempt was made to tabulate specifically where the
proposed visits were to occur because of the wide
distribution among the facilities and locations listed
under proposed visit itineraries
The purpose of the visit is tabulated for each individ-
ual by year. Hence, a given individual may be counted
more than once if he requested entry into the United
States in more than a single year or if he changed his
visit purpose during his stay over a particular period.
This factor accounts for the totals given in the tables
and figures being in excess of 310.
Frequency of Visits
The lack of formal diplomatic relations between the
United States and East Germany apparently served to
inhibit S&T visits until 1975. The establishment of
diplomatic arrangements, however, did not seem to
act as catalyst for East German S&T visits since only
14 requests for visits in technical areas are recorded
Commercial Commercial Totals
Training
for the years 1975 through 1978 (see figure 1). In
1979, the number of requests increased to 30. Visit
requests increased to a peak of 85 in 1982. Since
1982, the numbers decreased to 60 in 1984 with
requests projected to be about 50 in 1985, if the
current rate remains constant.
Purpose of Visits
The purpose of the visits is primarily conference
attendance as both spectators and participants (see
table 3). The kinds of conference visits included
international and national society technical meetings,
academic seminars, surveys of technical areas, exhibi-
tions, and specialty conferences such as the Gordon
Research Conferences. Academic visits were almost
equal in number to conferences.
Study, research, exchange of research information,
and teaching/ lecturing were the main pursuits de-
scribed under the academic category. The commercial
visits were few and involved mainly business and trade
visits. Commercial training visits were also few in
I
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Secret
Figure 1
East Germany: S & T Visits, 1975-85
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
number and covered food processing, chemical syn-
thesis, and electronic instruments. Proposed visits
encompassed all but four focus category areas which
were directed energy, microwave, sensors, and under-
sea systems. The technical interests of the S&T
visitors were concentrated in chemicals, materials,
semiconductors and electronics, medical science, and
optics and lasers (see figure 2). The number of visits
by focus category and year is shown in table 4.
Cursory reviews of visit concentrations for other Bloc
countries have shown similar distributions.
The data base information alone does not suggest a
reason for the distribution of East German visit
requests shown in figure 1
ast ermany is one of
the three East European countries favored by the
USSR for collecting S&T intelligence, the others
Figure 2
Number of Visits by Focus Category,
1975-85
Note: See table 2 to identify focus
categories by number.
1-3
4
5
7
8
9
10
12
13
17
18
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Unknown
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being Poland and Hungary. The decline and resur-
gence of US-USSR relations could account for the
up-and-down distribution of visits shown in figure 1.
US-USSR relations were beginning to decline in the
1978-79 time period due, in part, to the imposition of
special trade controls particularly in the petroleum
and natural gas exploration and development areas.
East German S&T interests increased significantly in
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Table 4
Number of Visits by Focus Category and Year
1979. During 1980-81, a further deterioration in US- requests declined noticeably. This sequence of events
USSR relations occurred as evidenced by US reluc- suggests that the USSR may have been using East
tance to renew various S&T agreements, an increase German resources to gain S&T information which
in export control restrictions, and the Soviet invasion could not be acquired directly by the Soviets due to
into Afghanistan. East German S&T visit requests constraints imposed by the United States.
continued to increase from 1980 through 1982. A low
point in US-USSR relations was reached in 1982 and
1983. At the same time, a peak number of East
German visit requests were received. As the United
States and the USSR began to reconcile some of their
differences in 1983-84, the East German S&T visit
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