A POSSIBLE SHIFT IN SOVIET NATIONAL PRIORITIES--THE FOOD PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00280R000200280003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
A Possible Shift in
Soviet National Priorities
The Food Program I
Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Committee
Top Secret
Top Secret
Juh /9SS?
(opl
C/7( H-(]/O( \
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Directorate of Tnn Secret
Intelligence
A Possible Shift in
Soviet National Priorities
The Food Program
This report was approved by the Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Committee on 9 June 1983.
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Note to Readers The Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC) is the DCI Commit-
tee whose mission in part is to advise and assist the DCI with respect to production
of Intelligence on foreign science and technology; to advise the National Foreign
Intelligence Board; and to coordinate activity, information processing, and
analyses in these areas. The Committee reports to the DCI through the DDCI and
to NFIB through the Board's Secretariat.
The current STIC Chairman, members, and associate member are:
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Chairman's Foreword This report presents the preliminary analysis of a potential shift in Soviet
prioril:ies, elevating the agricultural sector to a level more competitive with the
military sector. This preliminary analysis represents the opinion of the Scientific
and Technical Intelligence Committee; individual analysts may hold differing
views. If this shift can in fact be implemented by the Soviets, then we can expect
far-reaching effects in traditional resource allocation patterns. The STIC is
interested in policy issues such as this one because understanding these issues helps
us to forecast the level of Soviet effort in developing new technologies for future
weapons systems. The STIC also has a significant interest inenng technol-
ogies that could be emphasized in the "Food Program
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Top Secret
This report was prepared by the STIC's Soviet R&D Process and Resources
Working Group to alert the Intelligence Community to a possible shift in Soviet
national priorities and to suggest that the Community watch for cutbacks or
slowdowns in military-industrial activity, such as capital construction, research
and development, or production. The "Food Program" appears to be a serious
attempt to solve the agricultural problem through the application of techniques
that have proved successful in the military sector. This paper discusses this
program and the reasons it may impact the military. Questions concernine this
paper may be directed to the Working Group Chairman,
US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, telephone
x583. The principal author of this report i
v Top Secret
sT/C R-n/uc.A
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"hop Secret
A Possible Shift in
Soviet National Pr' The Food Progra
For nearly half a century the Soviet's military-
industrial sector has been accorded number-one prior-
it% in resource allocation, including capital, people,
and bureaucratic precedence. Until very recently, US
anal}sts expected this to remain true. Recent evi-
dence, however, brings this view into question and
suggests that the Soviets may be a,tempting to reor-
der the traditional pattern, giving greater priority
than before to the agricultural sccto1F__1
It is now clear that these incidents are a result of a
major policy initiative in the field of agriculture
unveiled by a special session of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee on 24
\lay 1982. Although the evidence remains incom-
plete, it is now apparent that the two traditional
requirements for priority resource allocation in the
Soviet system have already been met, namcl}, high-
level political backing and the creation of a supramin-
isterial structure to manage the program. To put these
developments in the context necessar} to assess their
potential impact on military development and pro-
curement requires a review of the events during the I t1
months following the official announcement of the
Food Progran
own to put us beyond chance.'
First promised 15 months before at another special
meeting of the Central Committee, the Food Program
was introduced by Brezhnev as "a radical turn toward
increasing the food supply." Just how radical the
change in direction was indicated by I3re,hnev's
statement that the Food Program has "not only top
economic priority, but is an urgent sociopolitical
task." Exactly what "top priority" meant was not
elaborated, but Brezhnev was frank to admit that the
program "proceeds from the need to reduce imports of
foodstuffs from Western countries." Although the I. S
grain embargo was not mentioned, Brezhnev took tfie
line that the needs of the counts demand that ''e
should have adequate food and fodder resources of our
Organizationally, the Food Program has led to major
structural changes at several strata. yew combines
known as Rayon Agro-Industrial Production Associa-
tions (RAPO) are being established at a local level
linking commodities producers, storage, transport,
and processing more efficiently. At the sank time.
number of production scientific associations for nar-
rowly specialized activities such as pig raising and
beekeeping are being abolished to end the "un.iustrfied
splintering of administration at the Rayon and oblast
level." In other words, at the localities, geographic
integration- not nroduct tinecialization is now being
emphasized
Brezhnev also noted in his speech that for the first
time the agro-industrial complex is being singled out
as an independent unit of planning. What exactly this
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might mean was indicated by the Council of Minis-
ters' recent establishment of a Commission on the
Problems of the Agro-Industrial Complex (APK),
apparently to function at the same level as the
Military-Industrial Commission (VPK). Here and in
the formation of vertically integrated agro-industrial
associations the Soviets appear to be taking their own
oft-repeated advice and attempting to apply the Mili-
tary Industrial Commission model to other critical
problems of the economy
There is ample reason to believe that the Soviets do
perceive their agricultural situation as critical. As a
share of total investment, agriculture has claimed a
substantial 27 percent over the last 10 years, far more
than any developed country. Despite these massive
inputs, however, agricultural output has stagnated in
recent years. Problems of climate, soil erosion, over-
centralization, inappropriate mechanization and fer-
tilization, poor seed and pesticide R&D all combine to
presage long-term dependence on food imports, so
long as the Soviet Union remains committed to steady
improvements in the national diet.
Not only is the USSR now the world's largest import-
er of both grain and meat, but in the past few years it
has also relied on the import of substantial quantities
of butter, vegetable oil, soybeans, and soybean meal to
keep consumption of quality food from declining. By
1981 the hard currency cost of agricultural imports
had soared to a record $12 billion. The hard currency
value of imports in 1982 is estimated to have fallen to
$10 billion. The drop was largely because of lower
world agricultural prices, although demands for farm
products such as grain and meat also declined. Im-
proved agriculture performance in 1982 has enabled
the USSR to cut imports even more this year. Never-
theless, imports of farm products continue to be a
financial drain. In certain cases, the magnitude of
products involved is staggering, with the nearly 42
million tons of grain imported in 1981 amounting to
four times the tonnage brought in by India during the
1966-67 food crisi
The Soviets perceive this tremendous shortfall, along
with the almost $7 billion required yearly to pay for it,
as a significant strategic weakness. They believe a
day-to-day dependency, if not eliminated, will com-
In spite of the fanfare attached to it, the introduction
of the Food Program did not receive much attention
from the US and Western press, which concentrated
instead on the elevation the next day (May 26) of Yuri
Andropov to party Secretary of the Central Commit-
tee, thus putting him in line to succeed Brezhnev. It is
important to note, however, that both Andropov and
his major rival for power, Konstantin Chernenko,
have shown themselves to be supporters of the Food
Program; the former, in particular, doing nothing to
lower the program's status since his accession to First
Party Secretary. Further high-level backing for the
Food Program can be detected in the continuing
prominence of Mikhail Gorbachev (reputedly a propo-
nent of even more radical rural reforms) as both a
CPSU party secretary and a full member of the
Politburo
Yet, in the realm of personal politics, the Food
Program has resulted in both losers and winners. In
December 1982, the administrators of two notorious
bottlenecks in food production, the Minister of Rail-
ways and the Minister of Rural Construction, were
both dismissed from their posts. They were joined two
and a half months later by the First Deputy Minister
of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry,
who was fired in disgrace for building a dacha with
state funds. In addition, on March 28, the official
news media announced that three first deputy minis-
ters heading the meat, milk, and packing industries
had been given severe warnings and told to improve
performance or be held personally accountable.
On the other hand, on 22 November 1982 (the date of
Andropov's formal elevation as party chief) brought
the promotions of Geidar Aliyev to First Deputy
Chairman of the Council of Ministers and full Polit-
buro membership and Nikolay Ryzhkov to Secretary
of the Central Committee. While Ryzhkov is known
primarily as a technocrat, Aliyev's tenure as party
chief of Azerbaijan was marked by considerable
agricultural success. Also, it is notable that his posi-
tion on the Council of Ministers put him directly
above the newly formed Agro-Industrial Commission.
While there is no direct proof of his administrative
promise their freedom of action indefinitely
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Toy Secret
involvement, he did speak with considerable assurance
when asked by a delegation from Baku as to how the
Brezhnev initiatives would be put into practice.
"These things we already did months ago in Azerbai-
jan," he replied
13v early fall 1982, this confidence was reflected in
c~idence of the Food Program across a wide spectrum
of activities. At the Politburo level the new policy of
announcing in Pravda the topics of discussion at
regular meetings indicated that, apart from foreign
policy issues, agriculture and food have appeared most
frequently on recent agendas, with specific references
being made to the Food Program, the provision of
equipment to the food industry, preparation for spring
sowing, and the work of the new agro-industrial
associations. Perhaps more significantly, on 10 March
the Politburo announced major changes in local agri-
cultural contracting procedures as part of the Food
Program. Fxpounding on the system a week later,
Mikhail Gorbachev indicated that the program is
aimed at the voluntary creation of a collective con-
tract system in order to increase cost accountability at
the micro-management level and to give workers a
larger stake in the size of the harvest. This is a 1960's
experimental concept that is now being applied corn-
pre hensiveIy
Meanwhile, through the fall a number of articles in
kommunist Vooru:hennvkh SIL indicated that the
armed forces were in no way exempted from the
program and that the Soviet army, in support of "the
historic decision of the May plenum" was expanding
its own efforts at food production. The impact of the
Food Program on the military was further evidenced
on 28 October 1982 (the 20th anniversary of Krush-
chev's capitulation in the Cuban missile crisis) when
Brezhnev invited 500 generals to what would prove to
be his last major political speech. While the speech
V. reported as "truculent" and promising the mili-
tar\ "everything they wanted," the actual text ap-
pears somewhat different. In addition to ratifying the
necessity to "perfect combat readiness in an extreme-
ly responsible way" and operating "with due account
of the latest achievement in science and the art of
war," Irezhnev also noted that "we attach exception-
al importance to the Food Program adopted at the
May plenum." Although warning his audience that a
lag in military technology was inexcusable, he also
exhorted his generals to "wield weapons in a master-
ful way," making use of their full combat possibilities.
Whether the statement and the speech ill general
should be taken as an admonition to make do cannot
be said with certainty; yet its timing and content
could lead to this conclusion
Possibly related to these issues is the appearance of a
series of speeches and articles by military leaders in
the Soviet press commemorating the 6sth anniversary
of Army-Navy Day (23 February ), and apparently
reflecting some conflict over the sufficiency of mili-
tary resources. On one side, Admiral Gorshkov, Com-
mander in Chief (CINC) of the Soviet Navy, Marshal
Viktor Kulikov, CINC of the Warsaw Pact, and Gen.
A. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political District of
the Army and Navy, all maintained that the interna-
tional situation demanded continued increases in re-
source commitments for defense. On the other hand,
Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff,
army Gen. Vasiliy Petrov, CINC of the Ground
Forces, Gen. V. F. Tolubko, CINC of the Strategic
Rocket Forces, and Marshal P. Kutakhov, CINC of
the Air Forces, seemed more conservative, stating
that the army and Navy are now equipped with
everything necessary for implementing their responsi-
ble tasks. In what may or may not be a related nrovc,
it was announced in krasnava Ivczda on 26 March
that both General Petrov and General Toluhko were
among a group of four officers promoted to Marshal
of the Soviet Union
At this date the ultimate meaning of' the Food
Program for the future of the Soviet military remain,,
unclear. It is apparent that the army has made the
commitment to raise more of its own food and that
additional military assets, especially personnel and
transport, will be used to help with the harvest.
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If this did eventually prove to be the case, however, it
would require extensive analysis to judge how much
and what parts of the military-industrial network
could be devoted to agro-industrial purposes. The
difficulty of such a task is illustrated by the Ground
Forces area where a good deal of armored vehicle
development and production capacity is compatible
with the manufacture of trucks, rail equipment, and
agricultural machinery-all items in short supply and
of relevance to the Food Program=
Thus, even in an environment of shrinking military-
industrial resources, such plants might continue to
expand. Understanding this and other phenomena
would require a clear concept of what was being done
and where, information that can only be derived from
microanalysis of the facilities. Similarly, the relation-
ship between fertilizer and ammunition production
and insecticide and chemical/biological warfare R&D
would also appear to require the same kind of mi-
croanalytically derived conclusions, which could then
be fit into a larger framewor
Meanwhile, relating the Food Program to broad
Soviet goals and objectives remains a thorny and
politically controversial topic. It is important not to
confuse prospects for success with intentions. Just
because the program seems to us to have a low
prospect for success does not mean that the Soviets
are not s or willing to reorder their
prioritie
It has been said that the military-industrial model is
simply not appropriate for an economic sector already
suffering from overcentralization. This may be true,
but it is also true that certain elements of the problem,
such as massive food imports, may be best approached
from a centralized perspective, which takes full ac-
count of broad strategic interests. In this regard, it
seems notable that, since the United States resumed
grain sales, the Soviets appear to be making every
effort to keep their purchases down to the 8-million-
ton agreed minimum, while at the same time diversi-
fying consumption among as many other external
sources as possible; this would put them in a position
to blunt the impact of a future embarg
This outlook, with its emphasis on strategic advan-
tage, could also help explain other anomalies in the
Food Program, particularly the absence of reported
investment increases of a sufficient magnitude to
indicate a major watershed in Soviet priorities. But if
the military-industrial model has been adopted and
the Soviets do see food primarily as a strategic
problem, it may be that published investment data has
no more relevance to actual budgets than published
defense spending has to real military outlays. If the
Soviets do see food as a prime national weakness, they
seem unlikely to give us gratuitous insights into the
magnitude of the problem. If, however, this is not the
case and published figures are in fact correct, there is
still the possibility, however remote, that a simple
change in priorities could improve the agricultural
sector. An example of how this might work is supplied
by the recent Decree on Tractor Production (Pravda,
15 April 1983) directing ministries typically enjoying
high priority (aviation, instrument making and control
systems, and petroleum machine building) to improve
the quality of materials and subassemblies to be
delivered to the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural
Machine Building in the 1984-90 time frame
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