NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP05S02029R000300950003-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
55
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 18, 2012
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 28, 1987
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP05S02029R000300950003-7.pdf | 3.48 MB |
Body:
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Directorate of
1,, Intelligence
Near East and
South Asia Review
28 August 1987
Se
NESA NESAR 87-020
28 August 1987
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Near East and
South Asia Review
28 August 1987
Articles Sri Lanka's Politics Heat Up
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Last month's peace agreement between India and Sri Lanka aimed
at ending the Tamil insurgency is changing Sri Lankan party
politics. New life has been breathed into President Jayewardene's
Sinhalese opposition, Tamil militants have moved closer to the
political mainstream, and the ruling United National Party has
become a target of Sinhalese terrorists.
Succession Prospects in Sri Lanka
Page
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The next leadership change in Sri Lanka most likely will occur with
the national election scheduled for 1989, but President
Jayewardene's recent signing of the Indo?Sri Lankan peace accord
amid strong domestic opposition increases the likelihood of his
forced removal. Prime Minister Premadasa, who opposes the peace
accord, is the most likely successor.
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India?Sri Lanka: Prospects for Sustained Military Intervention
India can maintain a sizable military presence in Sri Lanka virtually
indefinitely, but it will face problems enforcing the Indo?Sri Lankan
peace accord in the face of determined Tamil or Sinhalese
opposition. India will avoid any long-term engagement that will
leave its troops in Sri Lanka caught in the middle of renewed
fighting.
Bangladesh: Is Another Coup Imminent?
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Bangladesh's President Ershad is losing support from the nation's
Army. No figure has emerged as a clearly preferable alternative to
Ershad in the Army's eyes, but there are rumors of coup plotting.
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Pakistan: Rough Waters for New Maritime Agency
Pakistan inaugurated its new Maritime Security Agency early this
year to protect the country's territorial waters and defend its
economic rights in the Arabian Sea. The Agency has achieved some
success in apprehending trespassing foreign fishing vessels, but half-
staffed ranks, outdated equipment, and low morale limit its
operational capabilities.
Pakistan: Political Conflict Inundates Kalabagh Dam
The Pakistani Government is slowly moving forward with plans to
develop the Kalabagh Dam in Punjab despite near unanimous
opposition outside the province. Although the project could
substantially improve Pakistan's energy outlook, a firm decision to
begin the project will not take place before the 1990 election.
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The Enemy of Our Enemy: China and the Afghan War
China's low-key support for the Afghan resistance contrasts sharply
with the media prominence given Pakistani and Iranian support, but
opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan remains an integral
part of Chinese foreign policy. Beijing supports the Afghan
resistance to increase the costs of the war and force a Soviet
withdrawal.
Afghanistan: Mine Warfare Takes a Toll
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Mine warfare has had a significant impact on military operations in
Afghanistan. The extensive use of mines by Soviet, Afghan regime,
and insurgent forces has caused high military and civilian casualties,
and the development of reliable countermeasures has become
increasingly difficult.
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Syria: Debating Policy on the Iran-Iraq War
President Assad has initiated a controlled debate among his closest
advisers on Syria's support for Iran in its war with Iraq. Although
all key decisionmakers recognize that Iran's long-term Islamic
agenda conflicts with Syria's secular goals, opinions differ on the
value of the alliance in the shorter term.
Syria: Wheat Shortages Highlight Economic Vulnerabilities
Syria is caught in a cycle of recurring wheat shortages that have
emerged as the most serious aspect of the country's economic crisis.
President Assad will be forced to continue to make minor political
concessions to obtain aid to weather the wheat shortages expected
later this year.
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Beirut: Economic and Social Turmoil
The continuing power struggle in Lebanon has transformed
Beirut?once the commercial, intellectual, and tourist center of the
Arab world?into a lawless militarized zone contested by
confessional and ideological factions. Beirut will continue to display
a curious dynamism, but the prospect for economic recovery is
diminishing.
Egypt and the M1A1 Tank: The Push for Coproduction
Cairo welcomes the preliminary agreement to eventually coproduce
the M1A1 tank as a sign of US intent to help Egypt continue its
force modernization and to develop its military industries.
Cancellation of the deal would temporarily hurt Cairo's relations
with Washington and could lead to the resignation of Defense
Minister Abu Ghazala.
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Morocco-Israel: Continuing Contacts
Morocco has in the past few years expanded its unofficial ties to
Israel. King Hassan sees these contacts as part of a larger effort to
position his country as a bridge between the Arab states and the
West, but he realizes that getting too far ahead of the Arab
consensus increases the risk of terrorism, assassination, and radical
Arab sanctions.
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Some articles in the Near East and South Asia Review are preliminary views of a
subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as
appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent
the view of a single analyst; an item like this will be designated as a
noncoordina ted view.
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles
Sri Lanka's Politics
Heat Up
Last month's peace agreement between India and Sri
Lanka aimed at ending the Tamil insurgency is
changing Sri Lankan party politics. Successful
implementation of the agreement is far from certain,
but its provisions have already breathed new life into
President Jayewardene's Sinhalese opposition, moved
Tamil militants closer to the political mainstream,
and made Jayewardene and his ruling United
National Party targets of Sinhalese terrorists opposed
to the accord. Although preparations for elections in
Tamil areas of Sri Lanka are making progress and the
accord enjoys support among most Tamils, divisions
among Tamil leaders and continuing Sinhalese
Opposition threaten to delay a return to elected
government in war-torn areas.
The Sinhalese Opposition
The Sri Lanka Freedom Party. The Sri Lanka
Freedom Party (SLFP) is the official opposition to
President Jayewardene and his ruling United
National Party (UNP). During the last general
election in 1977, the SLFP won only nine seats in
Parliament and has had little impact on government
policies since then. According to the US Embassy in
Colombo, the SLFP has consistently opposed all
proposals on Tamil autonomy offered by the
government and played almost no part in more than
two years of sporadic negotiations between Colombo,
New Delhi, and Tamil leaders. Although her political
rights were restored in 1986, SLFP leader Sirimavo
Bandaranaike has been unable to regain her seat in
Parliament.
The SLFP, however, remains a powerful political
force in Sri Lanka, especially in rural Sinhalese areas.
The SLFP's close ties to senior members of the
Buddhist clergy have given the party access to an
extensive network of temples and Buddhist leaders
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throughout villages in the Sinhalese south. Embassy
sources also suggest support for the SLFP may be
increasing because Jayewardene's UNP has held
power for 10 years and voters are likely to seek a
switch in ruling parties during the scheduled election
in 1989.
The SLFP's ability to provoke antigovernment
protests and rioting, in our view, has enhanced the
party's political power. Without sanctioning Marxist
revolution, the SLFP has forged operational ties to the
radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The
SLFP shares the JVP's hardline Sinhalese
chauvinism, opposition to Jayewardene, and strong
support in rural areas of the south.
the SLFP drew upon its ties to the
Buddhist clergy to incite antigovernment protests in
response to last month's peace accord.
Sinhalese opposition to the peace accord between
India and Sri Lanka is likely to enhance the party's
clout in domestic politics.
the SLFP is trying to unite disaffected
members of the ruling UNP and members of the
Buddhist clergy to oppose the accord and will use
threats against members of Parliament and their
families to prevent ratification. Prospects for control
of Sinhalese areas in Eastern Province by a Tamil-
dominated provincial council are likely to give the
SLFP a rallying point. Prolonged Indian troop
deployment will help the SLFP fuel traditional fears
of Indian invasion and destruction of Sinhalese
culture.
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The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna. Proscribed by the
government since 1983 as a subversive organization
and scorned by Sri Lanka's traditional leftist parties,
the JVP has the arms, money, and organization to
threaten the government's stability.
the JVP has recruited at least 5,000
members serving in the Sri Lankan armed services,
police, and civil service in addition to 4,000 deserters.
The US Embassy in Colombo estimates total JVP
strength is between 20,000 and 65,000, including
growing numbers of Sinhalese university students.
The government claims the JVP has amassed at least
1,000 weapons?mostly shotguns stolen from
government armories and police stations.
The signing of the Indo?Sri Lankan peace accord has
heightened government fears of JVP efforts at
subversion. The US Embassy reports the JVP was
probably responsible for organizing some of the
Sinhalese rioting immediately following the signing of
the accord. Colombo has accused the JVP of
launching the attack on Jayewardene in Sri Lanka's
Parliament on 18 August that killed one member of
Parliament and injured 14 others.
The JVP's revolutionary goals reflect the group's
roots among poor, low- caste Sinhalese of the deep
south. According to Embassy sources, many poor
Sinhalese in the south are economically worse off than
they were 10 years ago when Jayewardene launched
his economic liberalization program. Relying on its
good organization, the JVP has exploited a growing
resentment?fueled by caste differences with the
ruling elite in Colombo?among these economically
hard-pressed Sinhalese and is rapidly expanding its
membership.
The Buddhist Clergy. Sri Lanka's Buddhist clergy
enjoys ties to both the government and Sinhalese
opposition and holds traditional authority throughout
the southern rural areas. Senior members of the
clergy have long pressed Jayewardene to protect
Sinhalese interests and avoid capitulating to Tamil
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autonomy demands. Academic research indicates the
clergy's hard line on Sri Lanka's communal strife
reflects traditional expectations that secular rulers
must preserve and protect Sinhalese culture. The
failure of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike to address
Buddhist demands after his election as Prime
Minister in 1956 fostered the conspiracy of Buddhist
monks who assassinated him in 1959.
The strong opposition to the peace accord from
Buddhist monks?especially young ones who are
willing to use violence?is likely to undermine
Sinhalese support for the UNP. Jayewardene will not
allow his relations with the main orders of Buddhist
monks to deteriorate further, risking their defection to
the SLFP and its radical JVP allies. Continued
confrontation with the clergy could also undermine
the UNP's strong electoral base in Sinhalese rural
areas before the election in 1989. Regardless of
Jayewardene's efforts at reconciliation, he almost
certainly will have difficulty persuading the Buddhist
clergy that a single Tamil-dominated province
including a sizable Sinhalese population will serve
Sinhalese interests.
Tamils and Mainstream Politics
The suspension of hostilities between the government
and Tamil insurgents has increased prospects for a
return to electoral democracy in war-torn areas.
Colombo has announced its intention to hold
byelections for 16 seats in Parliament left vacant in
1983 by Tamil politicians of the moderate Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF) who refused to
renounce Tamil separatism. Press reports indicate the
Indian troop presence has enabled Colombo to reopen
some police stations in war-torn areas of the north and
east in a preliminary effort to reestablish a civil
administration, usurped by Tamil insurgents. Some
Tamil moderates in self-imposed exile in South India
have already returned to Sri Lanka to discuss
implementation of the peace plan, according to press
reports.
Tamil militant leaders are also making preparations
for elections. the main
Tamil insurgent group?the Liberation Tigers of
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Tamil Eelam?and a smaller insurgent group have
begun to establish political offices throughout Eastern
Province aimed at building popular support among
Tamils and Muslims the Tigers
are also conducting symposiums to promote Muslim
and Tamil harmony. The efforts of insurgent leaders
to cultivate popular support are the clearest indication
of their intention to abide by the accord and prepare
for elections to the provincial council. The insurgents'
lack of administrative experience and education,
however, are likely to make voters wary of giving
them full support soon.
The depth of popular support among Tamil civilians
for the TULF is also uncertain. Proscribed from
mainstream politics and forced into exile in 1983, the
TULF's aging leadership has had few opportunities to
assert a political role anywhere in Sri Lanka.
Although New Delhi enhanced the TULF's
credentials by inviting its leaders to participate in
Tamil autonomy talks throughout 1986, Tamil
insurgent leaders have drawn greater public support
since returning to Sri Lanka, eclipsing the return of
Tamil moderates.
Outlook
We believe a resumption of electoral politics in war-
torn areas of Sri Lanka will depend largely on
Colombo's ability?with Indian backing?to quell
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Sinhalese opposition to the accord. Hardline Sinhalese
opponents of the accord have already threatened
members of the UNP loyal to Jayewardene and are
well positioned to assassinate Sinhalese politicians
participating in elections to the proposed provincial
council. Although New Delhi would almost certainly
attempt to guarantee the safety of candidates, even
limited electoral violence could arouse doubts among
all parties of the legitimacy of the contest and delay a
return to elected government in the Tamil areas.
Successful elections will also depend on the ability of
Tamil militants and moderates to forge a consensus.
Tamil moderates have shown no support for the
Marxist leanings of the major insurgent groups and
have lived under constant threat of assassination from
the militants over the last four years. Unless the
Tamil parties can mend relations, election violence is
likely and a restoration of stable political relations
between Sinhalese and Tamils will almost certainly be
delayed.
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Succession Prospects in
Sri Lanka
The next leadership change in Sri Lanka most likely
will occur with the national election scheduled for
1989, but President Jayewardene's recent signing of
the Indo?Sri Lankan peace accord amid strong
domestic opposition increases the likelihood of his
forced removal. Prime Minister Premadasa would be
the most likely candidate to become president.
Premadasa, who opposes the peace accord because of
its concessions to both India and the Sri Lankan
Tamils, has strong support among voters and
considerable influence in the ruling United National
Party (UNP). His challengers include several other
Cabinet ministers from the UNP and former Prime
Minister Bandaranaike, the leader of the opposition
Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Premadasa has
largely avoided foreign policy issues during his decade
as prime minister, but his support for the UNP's free-
market economic policy suggests he would favor
economic cooperation with the United States.
Jayewardene's Challenges
President Jayewardene's decision to sign the Indo?Sri
Lankan peace accord has led to greater threats to his
personal security, particularly from Sinhalese
chauvinists who believe he made too many concessions
to the Tamils. The militant Sinhalese opposition is led
by a proscribed Marxist organization, the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). According to the US
Embassy in Colombo, the JVP was responsible for
organizing some of the violent antigovernment
protests following the accord. Press reports indicate
Colombo also suspects the JVP was responsible for an
assassination attempt on Jayewardene on 18 August
that killed one member of Parliament and injured 14
others. Hardline Sinhalese military officers also may
try to unseat the President in a coup.
however, say many in the military
are less concerned with the political implications of
the concessions to the Tamils than with the benefits of
ending an increasingly costly military campaign.
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Jayewardene's agreement to allow Indian troops into
Sri Lanka and give New Delhi some control over Sri
Lankan decisionmaking heightens the possibility of
political challenges from opposition leaders and
members of his own party. Jayewardene's opponents
have staged several public protests and are working
behind the scenes in Parliament to challenge the
accord.
Although Jayewardene's opponents will use the
accord to encourage popular dissatisfaction with his
leadership, we believe his control of the ruling party
assures his hold on power until the national election in
1989. The ruling UNP holds a five-sixths majority in
Parliament, and Jayewardene almost certainly has
enough support among UNP members of Parliament
to defeat easily any challenge to his leadership from
within the party. He also has threatened to dissolve
Parliament if UNP members fail to support the
accord. We believe most UNP members will heed the
threat because they have not faced elections in 10
years and are ill prepared for the rigors and expense
of a campaign.
Jayewardene's opponents may try other political
means to remove him from office, but these are far
less likely. The only constitutional means to replace
him before the national election in 1989 is through
impeachment.
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Succession Mechanics
Prime Minister Premadasa would be the most likely
successor under almost all succession scenarios.
Premadasa would automatically become interim
president if Jayewardene, who is 81, were to die in
office. Premadasa could serve in that position for a 25X1
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How Could Jayewardene Be Impeached?
The Sri Lankan Constitution states that any member
of Parliament can introduce a resolution alleging the
President is incapable of discharging his duties if he
is guilty of intentional violation of the Constitution,
treason, misconduct involving the abuse of his office,
or any offense under any law. The Constitution
requires the member of Parliament filing the
accusation to detail the transgression. The Speaker
of Parliament can place the resolution on the agenda
if two-thirds of the members sign it or if half sign it
and the Speaker is satisfied that the allegations merit
inquiry. If the resolution is passed by a two-thirds
majority (including those not present for the vote), the
allegation is referred to the Supreme Court for
inquiry and a report. The Supreme Court then must
report its findings to the Parliament. If the court
decides the President is guilty of the allegations in
the resolution, the Constitution requires a vote of
two-thirds of Parliament to impeach the President.
scheduled end of the term. Using its parliamentary
majority, we believe the UNP could ensure the
election of a UNP successor to finish Jayewardene's
term.
We believe party and popular support for Premadasa
will help him secure the UNP nomination. US
Embassy sources say Premadasa probably can
command between 50 and 80 of Parliament's 145
UNP votes, either because he has served as a mentor
for UNP parliamentarians or because he has loaned
them money. Party members recognize him as a
politician who has paid his UNP dues. Premadasa
began his political life in Sri Lanka's trade union
movement and was later active as a UNP organizer.
He became Prime Minister in 1978 after holding a
parliamentary seat for Colombo since 1955.
In addition, Premadasa has for years parlayed his post
as Minister of Local Government, Housing, and
Construction, which he still holds, into a powerful
base of grassroots support and a means to burnish his
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populist credentials. According to the Embassy, his
"Million Houses" scheme, initiated in 1977, has
helped to improve housing and living standards in
poor Sinhalese areas. About 60,000 homes were
underwritten in 1986 alone. Premadasa has buttressed
his popular support with weekly visits to the new
development areas. Premadasa, unlike other Sri
Lankan political leaders, also benefits from an
experienced and well-connected staff, according to the
Embassy. His staffers have used his visits to
development projects to cultivate local party ties that
would prove useful during a national campaign.
Premadasa's family background?he is from a low,
small, washerman caste?is his most serious handicap
and, according to the Embassy, his only major
impediment to reaching the presidency. Sri Lanka's
chief executives have always been prominent
members of the large, high-caste goyigama, a
farmers' caste. Election of a low-caste president would
be a watershed in Sri Lanka's caste-ridden politics,
and Premadasa's detractors argue that caste alone
will prevent him from winning the presidency,
according to the Embassy. Embassy officials say rival
high-caste UNP members accept him as a leader with
strong reservations because of his caste, noting that
some even refused to attend Cabinet sessions
Premadasa chaired during his early years as Prime
Minister. Embassy sources, however, believe?and we
concur?that caste has lessened as a political
determinant in Sri Lanka, though it continues to play
a major social role in, for example, arranged
marriages. We believe his populist and devoutly
Buddhist image will help him overcome his caste
disadvantage.
Premadasa's Rivals for the Presidency
Premadasa's most serious UNP rivals are National
Security Minister Athulathmudali and Minister of
Land, Land Development, and Mahaweli
Development Gamini Dissanayake. Athulathmudali
attracts hardline Sinhalese who favor his strong
security measures against the Tamils, and
Dissanayake has won some support for his role in Sri
Lanka's large Mahaweli irrigation and land
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development project. Both men, however, have slipped
in popularity over the past year. Athulathmudali is
more closely associated than Premadasa with
Jayewardene and the peace negotiations and has
suffered because hardline Sinhalese either blame
guerrilla successes on poorly trained government
security forces or see government conciliation efforts
as a sellout of Sinhalese interests.
His support for the
peace accord, however, would probably win him
backing from Jayewardene's followers in Parliament.
Outside the UNP, the main challenge to Premadasa
comes from leaders of the opposition SLFP, which
includes former Prime Minister Bandaranaike and
her son Anura. The SLFP holds only nine seats in
Parliament, but a Sinhalese chauvinist backlash
against the UNP "sellout" to the Tamils may help
Bandaranaike make a strong run for the presidency in
1989.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
We believe any successor to Jayewardene in the near
term would be less committed to implementing the
peace accord. None of the President's likely
successors favors the agreement. Over the long term,
however, if Sinhalese opposition to the accord wanes,
we believe potential successors from the UNP?
particularly Premadasa?would try to minimize their
opposition to the accord to avoid stirring up Tamil-
Sinhalese tension during the next administration.
Premadasa as President. Premadasa's economic
interests suggest he would look favorably on economic
cooperation with the West if he were to become
president. Premadasa, with his merchant
constituency, has a strong reputation as a pragmatic,
pro-business Minister. We believe he would strongly
favor continuation of the Jayewardene government's
market-oriented economic policies.
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As Prime Minister, Premadasa has concentrated on
domestic affairs and has rarely spoken out on foreign
policy issues. He long avoided taking a position on Sri
Lanka's communal problems, but he is widely
regarded as strongly anti-Indian. He argues that
India, unhappy with Sri Lanka's foreign policy
independence since the UNP's rise to power in 1977,
is trying to teach the Sri Lankan Government a
lesson. US Embassy officials say he believes that
India's policy of regional hegemony played a role in
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press Sri Lanka to accept the Nonaligned Movement's
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SLFP Leadership. The accession of an SLFP leader
probably would lead to a government less willing to
cooperate with the United States than Jayewardene.
During her two terms as prime minister (1960-65,
1970-77), Bandaranaike favored a socialist-oriented
economy, nationalizing banks, private industries, and
most schools. US-Sri Lankan relations during her
periods in office were regularly marked by tensions.
After she returned to power in 1970, for example, she
expelled Peace Corps and Ford Foundation personnel
and terminated some US programs, claiming they
were fronts for US intelligence operations.
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More recently, SLFP leaders have said they would
favor a more genuinely nonaligned policy, according
to the Embassy. In addition, at an SLFP convention
in 1986, the SLFP bucked proponents of its earlier
socialist-oriented economic programs and issued a
platform saying it would maintain the country's open
economy, expand the free trade zone, and promote
exports.
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Buildup of Indian Forces in Sri Lanka, 14 August 1987
India
Pakistan
China
India
!dreaded*Aiiii;;Ile
Srit.anka
colemelt--)
Trincomalee
COLOMBO
111 Indian infantry brigade
area
in
atticaloa
Canka
o 50 Kilometers
I S
0 50 Niles
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711063 (800212) 8-87 SC 02644/87
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India-Sri Lanka:
Prospects for Sustained
Military Intervention
India can maintain a sizable military presence in Sri
Lanka virtually indefinitely, but it will face problems
enforcing the Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord in the
face of determined Tamil or Sinhalese opposition. We
believe Tamil insurgents will retain sufficient
weapons to resume military activity despite provisions
in the accord for arms surrender. Indian troops and
Sri ZLankan officials will become increasingly likely
targets of terrorist attacks by young Sinhalese
radicals, especially if joined by Sri Lankan Army
units. In our judgment, New Delhi will use whatever
military force it believes necessary to enforce the
accord, but it will avoid any long-term engagement
that will leave its troops in Sri Lanka caught in the
middle of renewed fighting.
India's Intervention in Sri Lanka
Within hours of the signing of an accord between
New Delhi and Colombo on 30 July for an end to Sri
Lanka's internecine fighting, Indian troops began
landing on the island's northern Jaffna Peninsula to
serve as a "peacekeeping force." Forces had been on
heightened alert in southern India at least since early
June, when New Delhi airdropped supplies into Jaffna
to provide relief to Tamil civilians suffering under the
government's three-month blockade of the insurgent-
held peninsula. Although the Indians may have
planned originally to fight the Sri Lankan Army, the
accord calls for Indian troops to secure key areas,
monitor and enforce the cease-fire, and assist Sri
Lankan authorities in receiving weapons surrendered
by the insurgents.
The Indian occupation of northern Sri Lanka was
swift. Approximately 3,000 troops from the 54th
Infantry Division, augmented by BMP armored
personnel carriers, were airlifted to the Jaffna
peninsula in a matter of days and established a line
separating Sri Lankan security forces from the
insurgents. The aircraft then began transporting Sri
Lankan Army units south to Colombo, where they
were needed to quell Sinhalese rioters.
9
Within a few days, the Indian Navy began ferrying
additional 54th Division troops to Trincomalee. This
force, also about 3,000 strong with some BMPs,
secured the city and moved north and northwest. It
soon linked up with troops moving south from Jaffna
and then moved south to Batticaloa?relieving Sri
Lankan Army units and helping accept surrendered
arms from the insurgents.
About 10,000 Indian troops had arrived in Sri Lanka
by the end of the first two weeks of intervention.
These forces probably included all three maneuver
brigades of the 54th Division, a brigade of the 18th
Infantry Division, attached BMPs, and at least four
batteries of artillery from the 50th Parachute
Brigade. The four brigades probably were operating
out of Jaffna and Mankulam in the north and
Trincomalee and Batticaloa in the east?well
deployed to control Tamil areas. According to the
has made plans to bring
over the rest of the J4th Division and units from other
divisions?including tanks?that could bring the
number of Indian troops in Sri Lanka to around
25,000 within a few weeks.
Sri Lanka as a Battleground
We believe the Indians will have little difficulty
maintaining a large and extended military presence in
Sri Lanka. A sizable slice of India's 1.1 million-man
Army has no immediate border commitments and, in
our judgment, can be kept supplied almost indefinitely
from bases in southern India by naval craft and Air
Force transports. The major determinant of the
duration of the Indians' stay will be New Delhi's
ability to implement the accord's provisions, which in
turn depends on the degree of resistance from either
the Sinhalese or Tamils.
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India's Military Intervention Capabilities
India has sizable forces to project military power in
the Indian Ocean. The Indians can transport up to
two infantry brigades?as many as 5,000 men?with
accompanying artillery and armor in a single
amphibious operation. The Navy has nine recently
acquired Soviet- and Polish-built Polnocny class
mechanized landing craft and eight utility landing
craft stationed with its amphibious squadron at
Vishakhapatnam on the east coast. Press reporting
indicates the Indians have finished construction of an
indigenous mechanized landing craft and plan to
build another. The Navy exercises its amphibious
squadron annually, escorted by submarines, frigates,
destroyers, and one of its two aircraft carriers in joint
operations with the Army and Air Force. According
to some recent
exercises have included civilian ships that help
bolster the fleet's troop lift and logistic support
capacity.
The Army's 54th Infantry Division?about 16,000
strong?is India's frontline force for intervention in
Indian Ocean states. The 54th Division, stationed in
the south, has long experience in amphibious
operations, and its 91st Brigade?about 2,500
strong?is often deployed in the Navy's annual
exercises. Other divisions stationed in southern and
central India with no immediate border commitments
are likely to be ordered to provide follow-on echelons
in a large intervention. the
Army has proposed the creation of a standing marine
force, patterned after the US Marine Corps, as well
as an air assault division of helicopter-borne troops
for highly mobile operations, and it appears to be
planning to use the 54th Division as the nucleus for
these forces. The Army also is planning to buy about
150 upgraded Swedish IKV-91 amphibious tanks,
some of which we believe would replace the 54th
Division's aging T-55 tanks.
India has improved its ability to support its
intervention forces with airpower as well as deploy
airborne forces. The Air Force has 10 Soviet-built IL-
76 heavy transports and around 100 AN-32 medium
transport aircraft and plans to buy 15 more IL-76s
and 20 more AN-32s. The Air Force also has
augmented its fleet of Soviet-built MI-8 transport
helicopters with larger, more powerful MI-17s. The
Air Force's transport fleet is capable of carrying
follow-on echelons of Indian troops into Sri Lanka
quickly and supplying them until local bases are
established. These aircraft could also deploy to Sri
Lanka all of the 4,500-man 50th Parachute Brigade
in an airborne assault, should that type of quick
reaction be necessary. Combat air support for Indian
ground forces would probably be provided by
deploying to the south some of the Air Force's 50
Jaguar strike aircraft or 40 Mirage 2000 multirole
aircraft as well as land- or carrier-based Sea Harrier
jump-jets of the Indian Navy.
All services
have permanent or temporary facilities in Madras
that can be augmented and used to coordinate
operations near or in Sri Lanka.
Resistance to Indian troops is more likely to come, at
least in the short term, from Tamil insurgents. So far,
India's military presence in Sri Lanka is confined to
Tamil-dominated areas of the Northern and Eastern
Provinces. Press reporting indicates that in the two
weeks following the accord the most powerful
insurgent group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
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Eelam, surrendered only about 800 weapons?mostly
old ones?of the 5,000-piece arsenal we estimate they
possess. Tiger leaders promised to surrender their
weapons by New Delhi's 18 August deadline but
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turned in only a couple hundred more. The Indian
Army estimates the Tiger arsenal at 2,000 pieces?
which we believe is too low and may allow for a
weapons surrender acceptable to New Delhi but still
leaves a substantial amount of arms in insurgent
hands. Colombo believes Tamil groups are hiding
caches of arms in the north and east as well as
spiriting some to supposed safety in southern India.
The Indians may eventually have to press the Tamil
leadership to surrender more weapons to preserve the
accord. If this is unsuccessful, the Indians are likely to
decide their only alternative is to mount extensive
cordon-and-search operations to root out and seize
major portions of the insurgents' arsenal. Such
operations would increase chances of armed resistance
to the Indians.
As the Indian presence drags on, chances of resistance
from Sinhalese radicals will grow. So far, Sri Lankan
President Jayewardene has been successful in
countering Sinhalese political opposition to the peace
accord and maintaining the loyalty of the Army in
quelling rioting and other acts of violence by
dissatisfied Sinhalese. Still, Sinhalese chauvinism
runs deep among political opposition leaders and
military officers. Radical groups adamantly oppose
the accord and may exploit their contacts with
mainline Sinhalese organizations to undermine it.
Colombo is concerned that Sinhalese radicals have
infiltrated the armed forces, giving them access to
military training and eventually the ability to weaken
the military's loyalty to the present government,
if
Jayewardene is threatened and insure the survival of
both the government and the accord.
Although Indian forces may be able to handle armed
opposition from either the Tamils or the Sinhalese, we
believe they are less prepared to maintain their
peacekeeping role should fighting break out between
the two ethnic communities. New Delhi may try to
head off this situation by allying itself with the side
that still supports the accord, but it would be denied
this opportunity should both the government and the
Tamils fall away from the agreement at the same
time and resume hostilities. Indian troops not only
would have failed in their mission to guarantee peace
on the island, but would be faced with two different
types of military threats simultaneously. We believe
New Delhi would then consider gambling on a major
commitment?flooding the island with troops, seizing
Colombo and other southern cities, and beginning
counterinsurgency operations in the north?but only
if it believed such actions could achieve quick results.
We believe Sinhalese radicals are capable of
launching terrorist attacks against Indian forces and
government officials--such as the hand grenade
attack on the Sri Lankan Cabinet on 18 August.
These attacks would not cause enough Indian
casualties to prompt a military withdrawal from the
island, in our view. The Indians probably would strike
back at the terrorists but could not stamp out their
activity. Government officials are more vulnerable, in
our judgment, and the future of Colombo's adherence
to the accord would be significantly jeopardized by
Jayewardene's assassination.
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Outlook
In our judgment, New Delhi will use whatever
military means it considers necessary to enforce the
Sri Lankan peace accord, but it will try to avoid a
long, hostile, and ambiguous involvement. Should
both Colombo and the insurgents break away from
the accord, the Indian Army would become a hostile
foreign presence in Sri Lanka with nothing to
continue enforcing. In our judgment, New Delhi is not 25X1
prepared to pay the political or military costs of a
prolonged and embarrassing occupation of Sri Lanka,
especially with its troops caught in the middle of
renewed fighting. We believe that, if Indian troops
fail to prop up or reinstate a government in Colombo
that supports the accord and do not succeed in
containing renewed fighting between Sinhalese and
Tamils, New Delhi would attempt to extricate its
forces.
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Bangladesh:
Is Another Coup Imminent?
Bangladesh's President Ershad is losing support from
the nation's Army. Since Ershad's successful coup in
1982, the Army has been his primary base of power,
but officers and enlisted men are dissatisfied with the
corruption on the part of Ershad and his senior
generals and alarmed at recent civil strife and the
possibility of a new, pro-Indian government. No
figure has emerged as a clearly preferable alternative
to Ershad in the Army's eyes, but there are rumors of
coup plotting. Soldiers recently attempted to
assassinate the President. Ershad's efforts to buttress
his power have lessened but not eliminated the
probability of a military coup this year.
The Army's Dissatisfaction With Ershad
Corruption is endemic in Bangladesh,
but, according to US Embassy reporting, many
soldiers and civilians perceive that President Ershad,
his family, and his appointees are outstanding
examples of venality even by Bangladeshi standards.
soldiers are
convinced that they are now issued jute socks because
officials are selling their standard-issue wool socks
and pocketing the profits.
The Army is also disgruntled by Ershad's handling of
events surrounding the District Council Bill,
according to the As
part of his effort to demonstrate his support for the
Army, Ershad conceived and rushed through
Parliament the bill, which authorized the President to
appoint senior Army officers to nonvoting posts on
local development councils. The bill has been highly
controversial and helped spark a 54-hour work
stoppage in Dhaka in late July that led to
antigovernment protests and widespread rioting.
13
President Hussain Mohammad Ershad
Seized power from civilian government in bloodless
coup in 1982. . . a lieutenant general at the time,
resigned from the Army in August 1986 . . . home
regiment was 2nd East Bengal Infantry. . . interned
in West Pakistan during 1971 revolution that gave
Bangladesh independence, repatriated 1973. . .
protege of assassinated President Ziaur Rahman . . .
alleged corrupt by London Observer last year. . . 57.
Ershad returned the bill to Parliament for
reconsideration on 1 August. Officers who might have
had to serve on the councils were probably relieved,
officers and enlisted
men appreciate Ershad's attempt to give them a
greater role in governing the country but worry that
the senior officers serving on the local councils will
use the positions to line their pockets.
Corruption and misrule have angered many civilians
who have vented their frustrations on the military. An
Army recruiting office in Dhaka was burned by an
antigovernment mob, and soldiers were beaten in
other parts of the city during the 54-hour work
stoppage in July,
Officers and men on leave have been abused by
families and neighbors who are angry with Ershad's
regime. junior
and middle-level officers worry that the corruption of
Ershad and his senior generals is tarnishing the
Army's prestige and pitting civilians against the
military as a whole.
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The parliamentary performance of the President's
ruling Jatiyo Party also annoys the Army. Ershad was
told by several senior officers in late July that the
Jatiyo Party is not adequately serving the Army's
interests The officers
believe the Jatiyo Party cuts too many deals with the
opposition and that Parliament should be dissolved.
The Bangladeshi Army is worried that the Awami
League, a pro-Indian opposition party, may return to
power. The Army's noncommissioned officers fear
that Ershad is sympathetic to the Awami League,
and they bear a
grudge toward the League because many of them
suffered under its rule during the 1970s.
the Army despises the Awami League
because its leader, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, has close
ties to India and has proposed eliminating the Army.
of a London newspaper article detailing Ershad's
corruption.
The Pot Begins To Boil
The Army's dissatisfaction with President Ershad and
certain senior officers has made many soldiers
ambivalent about the survival of his regime.
Political parties opposed to President Ershad have
gained adherents in the Army.
two-thirds of the Army now support the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party. A militantly anti-
Ershad faction of the nationalist Jatiya Samajtantrik
Dal has also developed "very good contacts" among
noncommissioned officers,
officers in the Dhaka
cantonment would not fight to save Ershad from a
coup but see no general they could respect were he in
Ershad's place as head of state.
Despite these trends, the Army's political leanings
remain unclear.
Anonymous letters denouncing Ershad and certain
generals have circulated among the troops. Although
such letters are not a new development,
Senior Army officers are delivering ultimatums to
President Ershad. After a division commanders'
meeting on 25 July, four generals told Ershad they
would continue to support him but wanted him to
remove current Chief of Army Staff Atiqur Rahman,
Gen. Amin Ahmed
Choudhury, a popular and respected officer, told one
of Ershad's confidants that he will support Ershad
only if the President changes his Cabinet, calls new
elections, and fires several generals.
No general or group of senior officers has emerged to
rival Ershad.
they are no longer ignored by military
authorities. In early July pamphlets denouncing
Ershad's corruption appeared in the Dhaka
cantonment,
several Junior omcers
were court-martialed in April for distributing copies
Secret
there are three political
alignments?followers of Chief of Army Staff Atiq,
Chief of General Staff Wahed, or Adjutant General
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A. S. M. Nasim. These generals are currently
locked in bureaucratic combat with each other at
Army Headquarters.
Ershad Moves To Defend Himself
Ershad knows his support in the Army is eroding, and
he is working hard to shore up that support as well as
to protect himself should it collapse. In May he
assured a gathering of general officers that the
military remains his base of power and that he would
not forget that the military was the most important
and efficient institution in
President Ershad has mended his fences with the
Army's remaining Freedom Fighters who fought the
Pakistani Army in 1971. Under Ershad's rule,
repatriates?officers who spent the revolution
interned in Pakistan--consolidated their hold on the
Army and excluded Freedom Fighters from important
posts. Recently Ershad, a repatriate himself,
appointed a few Freedom Fighters to highly visible
Army billets. US Embassy reporting says Ershad
picked these appointees with care. All had either
served in his former regiment or had worked with him
in the past.
Ershad seems to understand that his efforts may prove
fruitless, and he has taken steps to ensure he can
defend himself in the event of a coup attempt. In
April he proposed the unprecedented step of placing a
combat unit under his direct control,
Secret
President Ershad's efforts to protect himself ironically
have caused even more resentment in the Army.
middle-level officers suspect
that Ershad and certain senior generals are quietly
moving professional and energetic officers away from
Dhaka or into billets where they command no troo s
and cannot make trouble for the re
Outlook
Several factors tend to make a military coup unlikely
in the near future. Many senior generals are
distracted by the intrigues
among themselves. President Ershad understands his
peril and has moved to reduce it. Finally, the Army's
leaders fear that the Awami League might take
power, and this leads them to accept Ershad as the
lesser of two evils.
Nonetheless, President Ershad's time in office may be
near its end. Another scandal?
?could
lead to public calls for his resignation, and the Army
may decide it can no longer afford to appear to be the
prop behind Ershad's regime. Widespread violence in
the wake of strikes or protests or an assassination of
the President could convince the Army that its only
chance for preventing Awami League rule is to seize
power itself.
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Pakistan: Rough Waters for
New Maritime Agency
Pakistan inaugurated its new Maritime Security
Agency (MSA) early this year to protect the country's
territorial waters and defend its economic rights in the
Arabian Sea. The MSA has achieved some success in
apprehending foreign fishing vessels allegedly
trespassing in Pakistani waters, but half-staffed
ranks, outdated equipment, and low morale severely
limit the Agency's operational capabilities. In our
judgment, the MSA will play an increasingly
important maritime role but will constantly face the
challenge of acquiring adequate resources. The
Agency is looking to the United States and other
Western countries for training and equipment to
strengthen its capabilities.
Mission
The MSA?a civilian agency under the Ministry of
Defense headquartered in the port of Karachi?is
supposed to protect Pakistani fishing and economic
exploitation rights within Pakistan's 320-kilometer
exclusive economic zone, primarily through fishery
protection and prevention of illegal immigration and
smuggling. Other MSA responsibilities include
pollution control, oceanographic and scientific
research, and assistance to ships and personnel in
distress.
Islamabad could not assert and enforce jurisdiction
and sovereignty over these waters before the creation
of the MSA, according to Pakistani press reports.
the MSA was
created to supplement the activities of the corrupt and
largely ineffective Coast Guard. The Agency is
modeled after the US Coast Guard, even to the extent
of using an identical red, white, and blue color scheme
on its vessels. The MSA is gradually coming under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior,
presumably because of its domestic security
responsibilities.
Commodore Syed Rashid Hussain, a Pakistan Navy
officer, has been named the MSA's first director
general. Commodore Hussain, I _
s considered a particularly sharp
17
officer with no history of corruption?probably an
important factor in his selection. In addition, Hussain
professes to be close to the Chief of the Naval Staff
Inadequate Resources
Islamabad has not yet fully staffed the MSA. It was
initially staffed with naval personnel, and only about
half of the Agency's 1,060 positions are filled,
Some
personnel have been permanently assigned to the
MSA, but others are on two- or three-year rotations
and will return to the Navy. The MSA hopes to
eventually remedy this by filling all of its positions
with qualified civilians,
Equipment at the MSA consists of Navy castoffs. The
Agency's only vessels?an outdated ex-British
destroyer and four aging Chinese-built patrol craft?
greatly limit its patrolling capabilities. The destroyer,
cannot leave port on 25X1
its own power and is strictly a floating headquarters.
because of 25X1
the MSA's small number of patrol craft, patrols have 25X1
no regular course but remain in what they consider
the "hot spots"?probably the waters near Karachi.
In addition, the MSA does not have its own
communications net and must rely on the Navy to
maintain contact with MSA vessels at sea.
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The MSA's significant budget increase for next
year?from $1.4 million to $18.7 million,
supports the Agency and is willing to devote more
resources to it. With this increase in funding, the
MSA plans to purchase two or three inshore patrol
boats and a like number of maritime surveillance
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aircraft]
The MSA is looking to the US Coast Guard and at
least one US shipbuilding firm to strengthen its
operational capabilities. The US Embassy in
Islamabad reported in January that the MSA had
indicated a desire for narcotics interdiction training,
and in April a US Coast Guard training survey team
visited Pakistan to determine the training
requirements of the MSA as well as Pakistan's Coast
Guard and Navy. The Agency's search for new patrol
boats has led it to at least one US shipbuilder, which
appears to be one of those favored from a large list of
possible contractors.
hat the overriding factor in the
contract selection will be cost, even at the expense of
performance.
Other Problems Facing the Agency
Morale is low at the MSA, largely because of the slow
manner in which it is being transferred to the
Ministry of Interior.
MSA personnel remain on straight naval pay and
have not received the additional pay and allowances
associated with Ministry of Interior employment.
Morale has been further damaged by the movement
of the Agency's mother ship from the Karachi Port
Trust berth, with easy access to and from the city, to
the center of the harbor, where crew changes and
routine duties are more difficult.
Tensions have arisen between the director of the MSA
and the Karachi Port Magistrate,
Although the Agency
possesses the legal powers to arrest and detain
individuals suspected of breaking the law, it does not
have facilities to keep those it arrests for any period of
time and must turn them over to the Karachi Port
Magistrate for detention and trial. The magistrate is
critical of the MSA's director and accused him of
Secret
trying to start a war by seizing hundreds of Indian
fishermen last spring. We suspect the magistrate's
criticism was due more to the fact that he suddenly
experienced a tremendous increase in his workload.
The initial controversy over jurisdiction between the
Agency and the Coast Guard seems to have been
resolved. According to the
inauguration for four years.
as of early July, the
jurisdictions of the MSA and the Coast Guard had
been defined to the satisfaction of both services. The
MSA is responsible for enforcing Pakistani laws at
sea, with its jurisdiction ending at the mouth of a port.
The Coast Guard is responsible for land and riverine
patrols and has authority within ports. Relations
between the two could again sour once the MSA has
been transferred to the Ministry of Interior and is
competing with the Coast Guard for resources, but at
present no evident jealousies exist between them.
Political Dimensions
The Agency is a pet project of Prime Minister Junejo,
a native of Sind Province, and has become an
important political issue for him. The MSA is
generally believed by Karachi Port officials to be a
means of building a constituency through the creation
of jobs?both in the MSA and in Karachi shipyards?
and the protection of Sindhi fishermen from violations
of Pakistani fishing grounds,
The MSA was established amid allegations of
repeated intrusions by Indian ships into Pakistani
waters, according to press reports. MSA arrests of
hundreds of Indian fishermen last spring provoked
tensions with New Delhi and sparked retaliatory
seizures of twice as many Pakistanis by the Indian
Navy, The
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Associated Press of Pakistan claims that formerly
many of the Pakistani fishing vessels captured by the
Indians were seized in Pakistani waters.
success
in arresting Indian fishermen had forced New Delhi
to negotiate the repatriation of the captured
Pakistanis in exchange for the Indians, leverage
Islamabad did not enjoy before the MSA's creation.
Prime Minister Junejo, announcing the inauguration
of the MSA, said it was regrettable that some
countries?presumably India?misused their
technological advantages to exploit illegally the
maritime resources of developing countries.
Outlook
We expect some successes for the MSA in the coming
months simply because its existence?however
troubled?increases Islamabad's ability to enforce its
sovereignty over Pakistan's territorial waters. The
Agency has already demonstrated competence and
initiative in performing its duties. Continued
government budgetary support and a transfer to the
Ministry of Interior relatively soon probably would
13 enhance the o erational effectiveness of the MSA.
A constant challenge for the MSA will be to acquire
adequate equipment?both in numbers and quality?
to improve its operational capabilities. MSA funds,
despite budget support from Islamabad, probably will
never be adequate to purchase all or a large part of
the equipment the Agency needs to maximize its
effectiveness. The new patrol boats it plans to buy will
only replace aging equipment and will not provide
additional equipment. The stipulation that the boats
be built in Pakistan almost certainly will delay their
acquisition and might force the MSA to purchase
equipment that does not meet its needs. It appears
that the MSA's goal of strengthening its capabilities
could be compromised by financial constraints that
force the Agency to accept lower quality because the
price is right.
In time, however,
the Agency may well become a target for well-
established interests trying to protect lucrative illegal
immigration, narcotics, and smuggling activities.
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Pakistan: Major Dam Projects
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eshawar 0
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Pakistan: Political Conflict
Inundates Kalabagh Dam
The Pakistani Government is slowly moving forward
with plans to develop the Kalabagh Dam, one of the
world's largest earth-filled dams, in Punjab despite
near unanimous opposition outside the province. The
project has become a widely debated political issue.
Critics of the project cite the $4-6 billion price tag
and the shortage of water downstream as hazardous
to the country's long-term social and agricultural
development. Government officials counter that
Pakistan can finance the project through aid?
including funds from the $2.28 billion six-year
economic aid package from the United States?and
that the power provided by the dam will boost
industrial production and exports. Because
loadshedding?selected power cutoffs?has become a
fairly regular occurrence, exploitation of Pakistan's
hydroelectric resources is vital to the country's
industrial and economic development.
Purpose of the Dam
The Kalabagh Dam project is part of Islamabad's
strategy to reduce its reliance on imported energy.
Expenditures of $650 million on power projects
comprise the single largest item?roughly 25
percent?in the Annual Development Program in
fiscal year 1987. Scheduled to be operational in 1993,
the Kalabagh Dam initially would have a 2,400
megawatt (mw) electrical capacity. Pakistan would
then have an energy shortfall of 4,500 mw if the dam
is not completed,
When completed the dam would reach 3,600 mw,
nearly doubling hydroelectric generating capacity,
according to Pakistan's Water and Power
Development Authority (WAPDA).
Along with supplying low-cost hydroelectric power,
according to WAPDA's official plan, the dam would
assist in controlling the flood waters of the Indus
River and provide irrigation water to Punjab and Sind
Provinces. The Mangla and Tarbela Dams?currently
the two largest dams in Pakistan?are becoming less
useful for storing water and power generation as their
reservoirs gradually full with sediment, according to
press reporting.
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Without the Kalabagh Dam, we believe the Pakistani
economy will suffer continued power shortages and
loadshedding that led to a 50-percent shortfall in
WAPDA's system during a severe electricity shortage
in January 1985. The effect of loadshedding cost
Pakistani industry and trade more than $1 billion in
fiscal year 1985, according to expert sources of the
US Consulate in Lahore, and $1.8 billion in fiscal
year 1986.
Provincial Winners and Losers
Officials in Punjab, dominant in national politics,
support the Kalabagh Dam project. According to the
US Consulate in Lahore, Punjabis have a
longstanding priority to obtain more hydroelectric
power and irrigation water. In a "Gallup Pakistan"
poll done in April 1986, 63 percent of Punjabi
speakers favored the project. Even the opposition
leader in the Punjab assembly favors the dam,
publicly stating that those who oppose the dam oppose
Pakistan's development.
The project would not be a total windfall for Punjab,
in our opinion. Similar to the Mangla and Tarbela
Dams, the main burden of resettlement will fall on
Punjab, according to an interview with a WAPDA
official. Some 60,000 to 70,000 people at a cost of
$375 million will have to be relocated from villages in
Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province to
accommodate the 62,000 hectare flood plain created
by the dam, according to official reports.
Moreover, anti-Punjabi sentiment in the other
provinces, which has been increased by the
disproportionate effect on them of the Afghan war,
could be further fueled by the Kalabagh Dam. The
Punjabi-dominated military has had to step in on
several recent occasions to settle ethnic disputes in
Sind and the North-West Frontier, adding to anti-
Punjabi hostility in the smaller provinces. According
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MAJOR EARTH FILLED DAM PROJECTS
POWER GENERATING CAPACITY IN MEGAWATTS
Mangle (Pakistan)
BOO
Tarbela (Pakistan)
Aswan High (Egypt)
Kalabagh (Pakistan) I Nsss *Potential capacity of 3,600 MW
1, 400
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to US Embassy reporting, the Kalabagh Dam has the
potential to unite Sind, the North-West Frontier, and
Baluchistan against Punjab.
Leaders elsewhere in Pakistan are not favorably
disposed to the dam. Political leaders in the North-
West Frontier have seized on the Kalabagh Dam as
another example of Punjabi domination on national
issues. The North-West Frontier would lose 26,000
hectares to flooding-42 percent of the affected area,
according to official Pakistani estimates?while
Punjab would receive most of the irrigation benefits,
according to the North-West Frontier provincial
government. The controversy has fueled calls for
Pushtun nationalism the dominant ethnic group in
the North-West Frontier. Leaders of the prominent
Awami National Party have openly stated that the
dam is meant to destroy the people of the frontier and
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2,400*
V
threatened to "blast the dam" if it is constructed.
Local political leaders, according to Embassy
reporting, have made claims that up to 2 million
villagers would be affected by waterlogging because
the Kalabagh reservoir would raise the water table in
the North-West Frontier.
Officials from Sind also have spoken out against the
Kalabagh project, claiming the province would
become a desert if the dam is constructed. Despite
federal officials' claims to the contrary, Sind
provincial officials are concerned that power
generation will necessitate storing water upstream at
the very times it is needed for irrigation, according to
Embassy reporting. Leftwing leaders from Sind have
stated to the press that the project is a blatant attempt
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by Punjabis to expand their domination over the
smaller provinces. Benazir Bhutto, the major
opposition party leader whose base is in Sind, is
against construction of the dam, citing its polarizing
effect on Pakistan and recommending that alternative
sites be considered, according to US Embassy reports.
Troubled From the Start
Similar to the immense Tarbela Dam project?
completed in 1976?the Kalabagh has met resistance
since the first feasibility study was done in 1953.
Many of Tarbela's problems, according to a civil
engineer who worked on the dam, stemmed from poor
construction and engineering designs that led to
nearly 10 years of repair and modification before the
project fulfilled its promise of flood control and power
generation. Delays in the implementation of the
Kalabagh Dam are centered around feasibility and
design of the dam, according to press reports.
Moreover, significant increases in the estimated cost
of the project?from $2 billion to as much as $6
billion?have brought back memories of Tarbela's
budget, which overran planned costs by 80 percent.
Securing the roughly $2.5 billion needed in foreign
exchange for the project is the first hurdle Pakistan
must overcome before construction can begin.
Pakistan would be hard pressed to come up with the
needed funds out of its own foreign exchange
earnings. Foreign exchange reserves are only $900
million. Mehbub-ul Haq, former Finance Minister
and current Minister of Commerce, estimates that
Pakistan could raise $100 million annually for seven
years from the World Bank and like amounts from
the Asian Development Bank, the Arab countries, and
the Aid to Pakistan consortium?a group of Western
nations?making a total of $2.8 billion. Haq believes
additional funds for the dam could come from the $50
million in development assistance provided yearly by
the US aid package.
We believe it will be difficult for Islamabad to fill the
gap between foreign financing and the $4-6 billion
price tag from the domestic budget. For example,
officials were forced to rescind many proposals for the
current budget to increase revenues?much of them
23
allocated to the Annual Development Program?in
the wake of heated opposition to tax hikes. Pakistan is
already under pressure from the United States and
other donors to reduce its budget deficit?$2.5 billion
in fiscal year 1987?and will be faced with some hard
choices over allocating scarce funds to Kalabagh or
other development needs.
Outlook
As the controversy continues, WAPDA has proposed
alternative designs for the construction of the
Kalabagh Dam to placate provincial opposition and,
we believe, to demonstrate the government's
determination to build a dam at Kalabagh. Original
plans called for a dam height of more than 275
meters, but, in view of the North-West Frontier's
concerns about flooding, revised plans envisage an
elevation of 250 meters, according to press reports. In
addition, levees are to be built alongside to protect the
flood plain of the dam. WAPDA officials have
publicly stated that, because of these revisions,
irrigation water would be available in sufficient
quantities to Sind, probably an attempt to allay fears
of Sind officials that the dam would rob them of
irrigation water.
Alternative sites upstream of the Kalabagh and
Tarbela Dams have been studied, but officials insist
that they are part of development programs to exploit
the Indus River after the Kalabagh Dam is finished.
These sites?located in the Northern Areas of
Pakistan?would provide equal or greater generating
capacity than Kalabagh, according to Embassy
reporting. Most critics agree that irrigation benefits
from upstream sites would be shared equally by all
provinces because there is no opportunity to divert the
water in mountainous terrain. We believe donor
countries favor upstream sites because they would
raise fewer political concerns. The dam would not be
located in populated provinces, and few people would
have to be relocated.
Although the project could substantially improve
Pakistan's energy outlook, we believe that a firm
decision to begin the project will not take place before
the election scheduled for 1990. Prime Minister
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Junejo probably wants to avoid the political cost of
diverting resources to the dam project. Junejo is
staking his political future on an ambitious five-point
program that emphasizes education and land reform
and would be reluctant to cut spending on it to free
funds for the dam.
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The Enemy of Our Enemy:
China and the Afghan War
China's low-key support for the Afghan resistance
contrasts sharply with the media prominence given
Pakistani and Iranian support, but opposition to the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan remains an integral
part of Chinese foreign policy.
Beijing sees the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan as part of a larger Soviet strategy to
encircle and isolate China and control the West's oil
supply. Beijing cites the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan?along with the Soviet troops along
China's northern border and Soviet support for the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia?as an obstacle to
improved Sino-Soviet relations and a continued source
of regional instability. In our view, Beijing supports
the Afghan resistance--despite its anti-Communist
orientation?in the belief that the Soviets will only
withdraw from Afghanistan if the costs of the war
grow unacceptably high.
the
Chinese are wary about political negotiations with the
Soviets over Afghanistan. According to the US
Embassy in Beijing, China supports the Geneva
negotiations in part because they are a forum for
publicizing Soviet activities in Afghanistan. The US
Embassy reports, however, that Chinese leaders
believe the Soviets are using the negotiating process to
gain the time needed to strengthen their position and
reduce foreign criticism of their presence in
Afghanistan. China
believes that concessions to the Soviets will only
encourage further Soviet adventurism in South Asia.
Chinese officials have termed Pakistan's seven-month
withdrawal timetable as "quite reasonable,"
according to the US Embassy in Beijing, and have
claimed that, if the Soviets were sincerely seeking to
withdraw, they would propose an "acceptable"
timetable. In our judgment, China will back any
settlement that Pakistan is willing to sign but would
probably urge Pakistan not to make concessions on a
withdrawal timetable or the makeup of the post-
Soviet Afghan government.
25
Afghanistan in Sino-Soviet Relations
China first sought improved relations with
Afghanistan in 1960 in an effort to strengthen its
regional position after an uprising in Tibet and border
disputes with India. After more than a decade of
neglect, Chinese interest in Afghanistan increased 25X1
when Mohammad Daoud deposed King Zahir Shah in
1973. the Chinese 25X1
believed Daoud?who as Prime Minister in the 1950s
was partly responsible for Afghanistan's growing ties
to the Soviet Union?carried out the coup under
Soviet direction. Since the Soviet invasion in 1979,
Afghanistan has become one of Beijing's chief Asian
foreign policy interests?both, we believe, for its own
sake and for the diplomatic benefits Beijing has
reaped from its opposition to the Soviet occupation.
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In our view, China made little attempt to compete
with the Soviet Union for influence in Afghanistan
before the Afghan Communist takeover in 1978. In
the 1960s contact was limited primarily to barter
exchange and an aid program that ranked as one of
China's smallest in Asia,
Although China substantially increased its aid
to Afghanistan in 1972?donating $44 million for
Afghanistan's fourth five- year plan,
fghanistan was still only 15th
on China's foreign aid list, in contrast to third on the
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Soviet aid list,
In January 1980 Beijing suspended bilateral political
talks with the Soviets, declaring that they were
"inappropriate" in the wake of the invasion, according
to media reporting. Beijing has since cited the
Afghanistan issue?along with Soviet support for the
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the Soviet
troops along China's northern border?as one of three
"obstacles" to improved Sino-Soviet relations.
Although Beijing resumed political talks with
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Moscow in 1982,
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping has claimed that
Sino-Soviet political relations will remain stalemated
until all three obstacles?which Beijing claims are
direct threats to Chinese security?are removed.
According to the US Embassy in Beijing, the Chinese
have told US officials that they rejected a Soviet
proposal at the most recent Sino-Soviet talks in April
to establish working groups on Afghanistan and
Cambodia before reaching a broad bilateral political
agreement.
Despite reports of heightened Soviet interest in a
negotiated settlement, China remains dubious of
Soviet intentions. The sham withdrawal of about
4,000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan in October
1986 according to the US Embassy in Beijing,
appears, to have confirmed Chinese suspicions that
the Soviets are not seriously seeking a solution.
Beijing
similarly interpreted a cease-fire announced by the
Kabul regime in January 1987 as a Soviet attempt to
exploit the West's limited attention span and improve
the Soviet image. Beijing
feared that the cease-fire would dry up Western
assistance, enabling the Soviets to continue their
occupation at a lesser cost. China has reacted to each
of these Soviet "concessions" by reiterating its
demands for a prompt and complete Soviet
withdrawal.
Chinese Aid to the Resistance
Beijing has publicly declared that it provides both
"moral and material support" to the Afghan
resistance, but information about the actual amount
of Chinese support is fragmentary. We estimate that
the level of Chinese military aid increased by 20 to 30
percent in 1986 to about $65 million in light and
heavy arms. At the same time, however, actual
Chinese contacts with the resistance have decreased,
according to the US Embassy in Beijing. Although
China had previously responded directly to resistance
requests for training, occasionally providing weapons
and medical training within China, Beijing now routes
all resistance requests through Islamabad. As a result,
resistance requests have declined, and fewer fighters
have been trained in China.
however, China still maintains direct contact
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with the resistance through its Embassy in Islamabad,
which sends officers to Peshawar four or five times a
year to talk with resistance leaders.
Although we believe resistance leaders are wary about
dealing with a Communist power, most groups are
apparently willing to accept Chinese aid.
leaders of the fundamentalist
Jamiat-i-Islami place a high priority on relations with
the Chinese, less for what relations will yield in terms
of practical assistance than for the prospect of using
the Chinese to influence the Pakistanis.
While supporting the resistance as the chief means of
raising the cost to the Soviets of the Afghan
occupation, Beijing is apparently unwilling to allow
much media attention to its support. In May 1987,
Chinese officials refused requests that they allow the
establishment of a resistance press office in Beijing,
according to diplomatic reporting. The Chinese press,
we believe, has also moderated discussion of
Afghanistan during periods of warming Sino-Soviet
relations.
Afghanistan in China's Third World Relations
China has scored some diplomatic, economic, and
military gains from the world reaction to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, in our view. Beijing's
attempts to increase military and economic
cooperation with the West grew more successful when
detente broke down after the Soviet invasion. Since
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China has taken
advantage of reduced Soviet credibility with a series
of overtures to Middle Eastern and African countries.
We believe many of Beijing's diplomatic initiatives
are aimed at using the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
to undermine Soviet influence in the Middle East.
Chinese leaders told Islamic Conference Organization
Secretary General Pirzada during his visit to Beijing
in June 1987 that the "1 billion souls" represented by
the organization and China's own 1 billion citizens
account for a preponderant share of the world's
population whose moral weight could be a strong
barrier against Soviet "hegemonism," according to
the US Consulate in Jiddah. Chinese leaders also
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.,
Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang and Pakistan President Zia-ul Hag
visit an Afghan refugee camp at Nasir Bagh near Peshawar in
Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province on 2 June 1981
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approached Pirzada about expanding ties to members
of the Conference, including those with which Beijing
has no diplomatic relations, and claimed that China
had a role to play in the Gulf. Beijing has also become
a major supplier of arms to Iran and Iraq?primarily,
in our view, to earn hard currency. We believe,
however, that China also sees these transactions as
necessary to keep Tehran from turning to Moscow for
arms and as increasing Iranian willingness to
cooperate with China in support of the Afghan
resistance.
According to diplomatic sources, Beijing has actively
lobbied the nonaligned states in support of Pakistani
and US initiatives in the United Nations. Frequent
reporting from the US Mission to the United Nations
indicates that China, with Pakistan, has taken the
27
lead in pressing members of the Nonaligned
Movement to join in votes condemning the Soviet
occupation and human rights abuses in Afghanistan.
Reporting from US embassies throughout Africa
indicates that Beijing continues to use the argument
that it?rather than the Soviet Union?is the
"natural ally" of the Third World both to oppose
Kabul's attempts to expand its diplomatic relations
and to expand its own political and economic ties.
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China and Pakistan
China has long had close ties to Pakistan, which,
Beijing believes is 25X1
the next Soviet target. Pakistan was the first Muslim
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state to recognize the Communist government of
China and remains Beijing's closest ally in the Islamic
world. Prime Minister Junejo's first official trip
abroad was to Beijing, and President Zia has visited
China three times. China is one of Pakistan's chief
markets, and Islamabad has also benefited from a
variety of Chinese aid and military sales agreements.
More important, in our view, the Beijing-Islamabad
relationship provides each with an important
counterweight to Indian and Soviet expansion in the
region.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increased both
Pakistan's importance to China and Beijing's
perception of Pakistan's vulnerability,
Pakistan blocks further Soviet
expansion toward the Persian Gulf and the Middle
East and toward South and Southeast Asia and
controls a southern avenue of attack into Xinjiang and
Tibet the de facto
Soviet annexation of Afghanistan's Wakhan salient
and the large-scale introduction of Soviet troops there
are seen by Beijing as a direct threat to
communications and transportation between Pakistan
and China along the Karakoram Highway.l
During Chinese Premier Zhao's visit to Pakistan in
June 1987, he pledged continued support for
Pakistan's Afghan policy and, according to media
accounts, expanded Sino-Pakistani military and
economic cooperation. According to the US Embassy
in Beijing, Chinese humanitarian aid to the Afghan
refugees in Pakistan during the first half of 1987
included 1,250 tons of rice, 30 trucks, 800,000 square
meters of cotton cloth, 200,000 pairs of a shoes, 50
tons of tea, and approximately $100,000 worth of
medical supplies
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Role in a Settlement
According to press accounts, Beijing favors a political
solution to the Afghan problem based on the UN
resolutions calling for a Soviet withdrawal. Chinese
leaders have, according to these reports, repeatedly
insisted that the withdrawal must be unconditional to
prevent Moscow from gaining political advantages
that it could not have won militarily. According to
media reports, Beijing rejects Soviet demands for
guarantees of noninterference in Afghanistan before a
withdrawal, as well as any direct negotiations with
Kabul that might indirectly legitimize the regime.
Although China can influence negotiations on
Afghanistan, we do not believe it has direct influence
over the eventual outcome and will probably accept
any Afghan deal agreed to by Pakistan. We believe
Beijing's material and diplomatic support for
Pakistan, however, is important to Islamabad's ability
to continue its Afghan policy. The Soviet and Afghan
regime's sabotage campaign inside Pakistan has led to
rising domestic criticism of the government's policy
toward the Afghan refugees. In our view, Chinese
I support for the Afghan resistance helps Islamabad
combat the growing domestic perception that the
Afghan question is simply a US-Soviet issue. Pressure
from Beijing to remain firm on conditions for an
Afghan settlement may become even more important
if Pakistan's efforts to acquire a nuclear capability
lead to reductions in Western aid.
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Takes a Toll
Mine warfare has had a significant impact on military
operations in Afghanistan. The extensive use of mines
by Soviet, Afghan regime, and insurgent forces has
caused high military and civilian casualties. Over the
past few years, mine warfare in Afghanistan has
become so varied and complex?because of the
introduction of new mines and more sophisticated
emplacement techniques?that development of
reliable countermeasures has become increasingly
difficult.
Dramatic Impact of Mine Warfare
Resistance minelaying has been costly for Soviet and
Afghan regime forces. Widespread mining around
Herat over the past year, in particular, has resulted in
numerous casualties, including Mohammad Ali
Samem?the ruling party's provincial committee
secretary?and three army commanders. Elsewhere,
the mere threat of
landmines has slowed movement of Soviet and regime
forces and supply convoys and forced groups to be
preceded by a minesweeper. The mine threat has
turned a three-hour trip from Kabul to Jalalabad into
a 12-hour journey. According to US Embassy sources,
Soviet convoys moving between Qandahar and Herat
often go off the road because of heavy mining and the
threat of insurgent attack on the main road.
insurgent
commanders are increasingly worried about the
effectiveness of Soviet mine warfare and characterize
it as a serious problem
mine-induced casualties, by far the most
frequent, have had a harmful effect on resistance
morale. the Soviets
have successfully used mines to cut off resistance
escape routes and to force the insurgents to use
secondary infiltration and resupply routes?causing
higher transportation costs and delays in delivery
time.
29
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Soviet and Regime Forces' Improvements
The Soviets have significantly upgraded their mine
warfare capabilities in Afghanistan with the
development of new mine types and delivery systems.
Most of these new models are more lethal and
designed to thwart insurgent disarming and
countermeasure techniques:
he Soviets began
using seismic mines in 1985.
the mines can be detonated selectively
within a 10-kilometer range.
Last year the Soviets introduced a new pressure-
activated, blast-type antipersonnel mine.
it is more shock
resistant than its predecessor and contains a unique
molded rubber cap that acts as a counter-
countermeasure.
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developed a family of scatterable mines designed to
be delivered by different means?such as
helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and multiple rocket
launcher systems?to maximize tactical flexibility
and logistical simplicity.
? The Soviets are using a new family of fuzes for
conventional landmines. The new fuzes, according
to technical analysis, probably are being used to
convert standard landmines to complicated delayed-
detonating or antidisturbance munitions to foil
insurgent countermeasures.
air- and artillery-
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especially in areas where access is difficult for
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mechanized forces
at least 2 million mines had been strewn along
Afghanistan's border with Pakistan by 1985.
The Soviet and Afghan regime forces have made
extensive use of mines to protect defensive perimeters,
lines of communication, and urban areas.
insurgents have a healthy respect
for the minefields that encircle most Soviet garrisons,
airfields, and field positions because of the tripwires,
boobytraps, and multiple mine types used.
Soviet and Afghan
sapper units have planted thousands of conventional
antipersonnel mines in potential ambush sites and
along primary highways to forestall attacks on
convoys. Heavily mined defensive perimeters around
Kabul, Qandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif have
made it increasingly difficult, but not impossible, for
guerrilla forces to move in and out of the cities.
Resistance Forces' Improvements
The insurgents employ a variety of tripwired,
pressure-detonated, or electrically detonated plastic,
metallic, and homemade mines.
most of these mines are of
Soviet, British, Italian, and Czechoslovak
manufacture. Most of the Soviet models have been
seized during combat operations. Many insurgent
groups also build their own mines by using
unexploded Soviet aerial ordnance and explosives,
Mines are among the more popular weapons for the
resistance because they offer a relatively cheap, low-
risk, and efficient means to inflict casualties on Soviet
and regime troops. Panjsher Valley insurgents
consider them to be among the most effective weapons
in their inventory,
The guerrillas use mines primarily against Soviet and
Afghan supply convoys and troop movements, as well
as along avenues of approach to insurgent positions.
some
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guerrillas mine roads and shoulders to destroy
vehicles that attempt to attack insurgent ambush
positions. Hizbi
Islami (Khalis) insurgents in the Qandahar area have
become adept at destroying enemy armored vehicles
by using interconnected antipersonnel mines to trigger
antitank mines by a connecting detonator cord. In
some areas?such as Herat, Baghlan, and the
Panjsher Valley?insurgents also mine roads,
hillsides, and primary elevations to slow the advance
of enemy forces. Soviet heliborne troops are
particularly concerned about Panjsher Valley
commander Masood's method of mining potential
landing zones near his bases,
Countermeasures Inadequate To Deal With
the Threat
The Soviet and Afghan regime forces have had
difficulty overcoming the insurgent mine threat
because of inadequate training, insufficient
manpower, and effective insurgent countermeasures.
The neutralization of large quantities of insurgent
landmines creates a constant drain on Soviet and
Afghan engineer resources.
The Soviets have used a variety of equipment and
techniques for mine clearing. Soviet magnetic mine
detectors, mounted on trucks or armored vehicles,
were used effectively during the initial months of the
war but were obsolete by mid-1980 when the
insurgents introduced nonmetallic mines,
Soviet and regime forces have since
relied heavily on the Soviet tank-mounted KMT-5
mine plow and roller, even though the plow cannot
negotiate steep grades, tears up roads to a depth of
approximately 30 centimeters, and slows convoys to a
speed of approximately 2 to 3 kilometers per hour.
The insurgents have devised a counter to the KMT-5
by laying mines on hilltops because the vehicle must
roll over the crest with its plow raised before making
contact with the ground.
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The Soviets have deployed a new mine roller and plow
that is designed to defeat pressure-detonated mines
and to emit a magnetic signal that detonates
magnetically fuzed mines
the Soviets are testing a new
mine-clearing vehicle consisting of a T-55 tank
chassis with a permanently mounted KMT-5 device.
The prototype vehicle,
may represent a shift in Soviet combat engineer
vehicle development. Previous Soviet practice has
been to temporarily attach mine-clearing fixtures to a
tank.
31
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clearing operations. The dogs can find nonmetallic
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The insurgents' countermeasures are comparatively
rudimentary. Their methods?based on lessons
learned from combat and word of mouth?are
generally slow and extremely dangerous.
the guerrillas' most significant
countermine problem is dealing with perimeter mine
belts during attacks on Soviet and Afghan regime
positions. Masood recently indicated to a
knowledgable Western observer that he and many
other commanders in northern Afghanistan are often
prevented from overrunning regime and Soviet
outposts because of an inability to neutralize the
minefields surrounding them. Masood emphasized his
immediate need for more sophisticated minefield-
clearing equipment.
To get through minefields, resistance forces resort to
several tactics.
one of the more effective mine-clearing
techniques is a hand-held rake. The rake is used by an
insurgent to clear a path through a minefield. The
rake scoops up shallow buried mines. The ones that
are not tripwired or boobytrapped are picked up by
hand. Exploding boobytrapped mines destroy the rake
but usually not the operator. In other areas, the
insurgents drop ladders in a series across a minefield,
exploding any mines under the rails, and then use the
ladder's rungs as a bridge. Some insurgents have also
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used animals or prisoners to clear paths through
minefields.
hand-held electronic
mine detectors have not been highly effective in
Afghanistan because most of the areas where mines
are encountered have been subjected to repeated air
and artillery bombardment that has left metal
splinters that foil the detectors. In other cases, the
insurgents have been unable to properly operate the
hand-held equipment because of inadequate
instructions.
Outlook
Mine warfare in Afganistan is likely to become more
complex and casualties are likely to increase as Soviet,
regime, and insurgent forces continue to improve their
mining capability with new mine types, delivery
systems, and minelaying techniques. The Soviets and
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rc.
Ihtlintunor
Resistance forces examining a deactivated
mine.
the Afghan army are likely to use increasingly lethal
mines that are difficult to detect and defuze, both
along infiltration and escape routes and for defense
around bases. Resistance commanders, in turn, are
increasingly worried about the effectiveness of Soviet
mine warfare and probably will attempt to acquire
improved training and more sophisticated equipment
with which to counter the Soviet-Afghan mine threat.
Afghan insurgents select mine sites carefully.
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Syria: Debating Poli7
on the Iran-Iraq War
President Assad has initiated a controlled debate
among his closest advisers on Syria's support for Iran
in its war with Iraq. Assad's efforts this year to
improve relations with Iraq, which appear to be
motivated by tactical considerations, probably
prompted him to seek the advice of his inner circle on
the implications of breaking with Iran. Although all
key decisionmakers in Damascus recognize that Iran's
long-term Islamic agenda in the region conflicts with
Syria's secular goals, opinions differ on the value of
the "strategic alliance" when weighed against the
short-term problems it creates with other Arab states,
the Soviets, and efforts to impose political order in
Lebanon.
Sunni-Alawi differences do not play a key role in the
Syrian debate over the Iran-Iraq war, in our view, nor
does the debate split along interest group lines. The
debate transcends these divisions and is instead
focused on the relative costs and benefits of the
alliance.
External and Internal Impetus for Change
Assad's decision to begin a dialogue with Iraq last
spring probably resulted from growing external
pressure to abandon his relationship with Iran:
? Syria has long been pressed by the Soviet Union to
abandon support for Iran in its war against the
Soviets' other key ally in the region, Iraq. Assad has
tried to use Syria's importance to the Soviets as a
means of rebuffing Moscow's arguments. With the
advent of the Gorbachev regime, however, Moscow
has taken a harder line with Damascus on this issue.
During Assad's trip to Moscow in April, Gorbachev
hinted at possible reductions in Soviet aid if Syria
failed to make progress in reconciling with Iraq.
Assad's initial meeting with Iraqi President Saddam
Husayn last April probably resulted from Soviet
pressure applied during Assad's meeting with
Gorbachev earlier the same week,
35
Syrian Decisionmaking
After 16 years of autocratic rule Assad still makes or
is involved in all key policy decisions in Syria.
Assad's maintains a loyal inner circle of advisers
whose value is based more on their execution than on
their formulation of policy. Since these individuals
are hand picked by Assad, they necessarily identify
with and support Assad's agenda. Assad holds
consultations with key advisers to confirm his policy
direction or to lay the groundwork for a possible
policy shift. Although he allows the discussion of
alternative positions on these occasions, once his
decision is made, everyone is expected to support it
without question.
? Moderate Arab states, particularly those in the Gulf
that have provided financial aid to Damascus, have
pleaded with Syria to withdraw support from Iran,
which they fear is determined to export its
revolution throughout the Gulf. Assad justifies his
position by claiming Syria is a channel for the
Arabs to Tehran and can offer mediation in the
Iran-Iraq war. Saudi Arabia?the only Gulf state
still making payments to Syria under the Baghdad
accord?has pushed especially hard for talks
between Syria and Iraq. The expiration of the
Baghdad payments this year may place additional
pressure on Syria to show more regard for the Arab
position.
Syria also faces growing internal pressure to
reconsider its Iranian connection:
? Syria's ability to contain the growing strength of the
pro-Iranian Shia Hizballah in Lebanon has been
hampered by its desire to preserve its relationship
with Iran. Damascus believes Hizballah, with its
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fundamentalist doctrine, poses a major obstacle to
Syria's efforts to impose political order there.
Damascus probably also believes its secular
socialist system is menaced by the prospect of
Islamic fundamentalism in Lebanon.
? Assad recognizes that his support for Iran is not
popular with Syrian Sunnis and continually
reiterates through the media the strategic nature of
the relationship. Many Syrians dislike Shia Iran and
feel sympathy toward Sunni Iraq in the war. A
great majority of Syrians?like the ruling minority
in Iraq?are Sunni Muslims, and both countries
share a common Ba'thist political heritage.
close ranks with other Arabs to block the spread of
the Iranian revolution. They cite Hizballah an an
example of how Syria is flirting with disaster if it
makes concessions to Iran. They believe that Syria's
economic problems can be resolved only by ending the
Iran-Iraq war. This would make available more aid
from the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, which
are expending millions on Iraq's war effort,
The Policy Debate
Assad is apparently preparing contingencies to his
policy of support for Iran and has solicited advice
from members of his inner circle who hold varying
views on the issue.
these advocates have crystallized into distinct
camps.
Pro-Iran. This group of foreign policy pragmatists
calls for continued Syrian support for Iran in the Iran-
Iraq war and opposes improving Syrian-Iraqi
relations
They argue that Syria can exploit Iranian radicalism
to validate its rhetoric of actively confronting Israel.
In particular, Syria can identify itself with Hizballah
attacks against the Israeli security zone in South
Lebanon. The pragmatists claim Iranian economic
aid, particularly oil, is an important factor sustaining
Syria during its current economic crisis. Finally, they
believe an end to the Iran-Iraq war will diminish
Syria's position in the region by allowing Iraq to
reassert itself as a major player in pan-Arab affairs.
The principal advocates of the pragmatist view are
two Sunnis, Vice President for Foreign Affairs Abd
al-Halim Khaddam and Army Chief of Staff Hikmat
Shihabi, and an Alawi, Military Intelligence Chief
Ali Duba.
Anti-Iran. This group consists largely of hardline
Ba'thist ideologues who yearn for a reunification of
the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'th parties. They point out
that Iran's export of Islamic fundamentalism poses a
threat to Syria's Ba'thist regime and that Syria should
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Finally, they believe
that Iraq would be a better strategic ally than Iran in
Syria's confrontation with Israel. The most influential
advocates of these positions include Sunni Prime
Minister Abd al-Ra'uf al-Kasm and two Alawis,
Commander of the Special Forces Ali Haydar and
President of the General Federation of Trade Unions
Iz al-Din Nasir.
It is worth noting that advocates of both camps
appear to cut across bureaucratic lines within the
regime. Assad is probably confident that the ad hoc
nature of the debate will lessen the chance of serious
policy divisions in his regime, which might be the case
if, for example, the preponderance of advocates of one
position were in the military and the other in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
We are skeptical of claims by some observers that
Assad's approach to Iran is influenced by religious
ties between Shiism and Assad's Alawi faith. Alawis
are not Shias, although Assad sought recognition for
the Alawis in the early 1970s from Lebanese Shia
leader Musa Sadr.
Assad sees Iran as a key strategic ally for
the Arabs against Israel, and his main goal is to
prevent a resumption of the close Israeli-Iranian ties
that existed in the Shah's era. Assad has been
working to improve Syrian-Iranian ties since the early
1970s and was a major supporter of the Islamic
resistance to the Shah. For example, the Iranian
Islamic ideologue Ali Shariati was given a state
funeral in Damascus after his mysterious death in
1977. We believe Assad's hatred of Iraqi leader
Saddam Husayn also plays a key role in his support
for Iran.
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An outcome of breaking ties to Tehran that all
members of Assad's regime probably believe is
inevitable will be support by Tehran for Syrian
subversives. The principal Syrian opposition group,
the Muslim Brotherhood, has had some contact with
Iran, but it is
probably wary of a closer relationship because of
Tehran's support for Assad. The Brotherhood, a
Sunni fundamentalist organization, advocates an
Islamic republic for Syria but has basic doctrinal
differences with the Shias and is not likely to become
an Iranian puppet. Should Damascus break with
Tehran, we expect that the Iranians would offer the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood substantial support to
challenge the Assad regime and that the group would
accept such aid.
Outlook
Assad seems content to encourage the advocacy of
opposing views among his lieutenants while steering a
middle course. The Syrian President appears
determined to keep his options open and finesse his
relationship with both Iran and Iraq. In any event,
should Assad decide to commit himself to one position
or the other?a decision he alone will make?the
debate will cease, and Assad's key advisers will be
expected to fall into line.
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Syria: Wheat Shortages Highlight
Economic Vulnerabilities
Syria is caught in a cycle of recurring wheat shortages
that have emerged as the most serious aspect of the
country's unprecedented economic crisis. President
Assad will be forced to continue to make minor
political concessions to obtain financial aid and gifts
to weather the wheat shortages expected later this
year.
Syria has been a net importer of wheat since before
Assad took power, but, until recently, Damascus
could secure the necessary foreign exchange to
compensate for the shortfalls in its harvests. Primarily
rainfed, Syria's agricultural production has fluctuated
widely. A combination of bad weather, poor planning,
and severe hard currency shortages has produced the
worst crisis in Syrian agriculture in Assad's rule.
According to the US Embassy, Assad's acute need for
additional wheat early this spring was a contributing
factor in his willingness to meet with his archrival,
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn.
Running on Empty
According to the US Embassy, Syria ran out of wheat
on 10 June but weathered the crisis by implementing
stopgap measures. The Syrian wheat authority
combined 50,000 tons of wheat borrowed from
Jordan, an early domestic harvest, and flour
purchased from France at a relatively high price by
Syrian businessman Umran Adham. In addition, the
Syrians increased the volume but reduced the quality
of flour by grinding hull and bran into the flour.
Bakeries were forced to reduce the size of bread
loaves, according to the Syrian press, and, outside
Damascus, deliveries were cut by 20 percent.
Damascus has been acutely aware of the wheat
problem and attempted to take measures to avoid
bread shortages, but the delayed arrival of 100,000
tons of free wheat pledged by Saudi Arabia after
Assad grudgingly met with Iraqi President Saddam
Husayn caused Damascus to scramble to meet the
crisis. Due in late June, delivery was stalled by
arguments over the payment of delivery costs and how
the wheat was to be shipped.
39
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Umran Adham: Syria's Wheat Broker
Syria's primary negotiator of European wheat and
flour purchases . . . a Sunni Muslim businessman
living in Paris with family business interests in the
Bekaa Valley in Lebanon . . . alleged to deal in guns
and armaments . . . able to negotiate deals with
France through direct ties to the French Presidency
. . . rumored to have lost enormous sums of money
due to the price changes of wheat purchased for
Damascus . . . personal motivation unclear.
New Harvest
Because of the severe shortages, Damascus began the
1986-87 harvest season early in June. Hot winds
prematurely ripened some of the grain, but these same
winds were responsible for stunting wheat growth in
other areas, such as a primary growing area in eastern
Jazira region, which lacked rain. Revised estimates
from the US Embassy indicate that the total harvest
was relatively small?under 1.5 million tons,
compared with an annual average of 1.9 million tons
in the early 1980s.
Damascus increased its efforts to fully utilize this
year's crop. Besides raising the official purchasing
price by 47 percent to encourage farmers to sell their
crops to the government, authorities reduced the
amount of wheat individual farmers could retain for
personal use to 20 percent of their crop, according to
the US Embassy. In previous years farmers were
allowed to retain as much as 50 percent of their crop,
which often found its way into the black market. In
addition, the Embassy reports that Damascus is
cracking down on illegal transportation of wheat, and
the allotment skimmed off the top, previously
assumed as "waste," is now tightly controlled.
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Syrian Wheat Harvests in the 1980's
? rarimseg.
Despite these efforts, Damascus probably recovered
no more than 40 percent of the harvest. Wheat that
did not enter official channels was bought up in large
quantities for animal feed, according to the Embassy.
Even if Damascus succeeds in recovering some of this
contraband, our best estimates are that Syria will be
able to purchase no more than 600,000 tons of
domestic wheat. Even in poor years, the US Embassy
reports that the government has usually been able to
purchase 700,000 to 800,000 tons.
The Cycle Continues
All evidence, including the government's large
purchasing efforts, indicate that Damascus has no
intention of changing its ad hoc approach to meeting
current needs. Syria is milling approximately 4,600
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tons daily and blending it with flour already promised
from France and flour milled from the Jordanian
wheat loan. The arrival of the Saudi gift, expected
shortly, will be added to present consumption stocks.
Human consumption needs amount to approximately
1.5 million tons of wheat annually. Planned deliveries
are sufficient to last for the next three to four months.
Negotiations with French authorities are continuing
through Syrian businessman Umran Adham for two
deliveries of 150,000 tons each. If these deals succeed,
Syria will once again need wheat in January 1988.
The US Embassy estimates that, from February 1988
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until the next harvest in late May, Syria will have to
purchase 360,000 tons of wheat for consumption, plus
another 50,000 tons to repay the Jordanian loan.
Outlook
Unlike previous years when Syria had maintained a
three-to-six-month stockpile, the wheat purchased by
Damascus is being immediately consumed, not stored.
Thus, the potential for a greater crisis looms down the
road. Because the Syrian wheat authority is working
without any reserve, it may be forced to conclude
negotiations quickly and therefore drain hard
currency by paying a higher price than it could obtain
through extended negotiations. In addition, the efforts
to purchase wheat for human consumption have
reduced grain available for animal feed.
Compounding the problem, the government's
requirement that farmers sell such a large percentage
of their crop to the state at a price lower than the
market rate may discourage planting in the future.
Damascus has faced the problem of insufficient wheat
for some time, but with Syria's continuing hard
currency shortage it is no longer possible to purchase
all required commodities without reallocating funds.
Also, without hard currency to purchase needed
equipment, Syria cannot substantially increase the 15
percent of total area presently irrigated to increase
total output. Until Assad institutes reforms, such as
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ending subsidies, or allocates hard currency from
other sectors of the economy, such as the military, the
wheat crisis will continue to recur. The measures
taken thus far?a price rise accomplished by the
reduction in loaf size, the adulteration of flour, and
the crackdown on black-market opportunities?are
shortsighted remedies.
Given the autocratic and inflexible Syrian economic
and political systems, true reform measures will be
difficult to implement without direct presidential
initiatives. Until such time, aid and gifts from abroad
will continue to play a large part in avoiding domestic
shortages. Therefore, the ability to supplement the
harvest depends greatly on political choices, and
Syria's economic vulnerability will remain a major
political preoccupation for Assad.
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Beirut: Economic and Social
Turmoil
The continuing power struggle in Lebanon has
transformed Beirut?once the commercial,
intellectual, and tourist center of the Arab world?
into a lawless militarized zone contested by
confessional and ideological factions. Turf battles,
terrorism, rampant street crime, and the lack of
centralized authority make the area, especially the
Muslim western sector, extremely dangerous for both
residents and foreigners. Beirut's lawlessness has
markedly curtailed social and economic activities of
Western institutions and provides sanctuary for
extremists of various affiliations.
West Beirut has become a patchwork of small areas
loosely controlled by confessional or ideologically
based militias and plain gangsters. The traditional
dividing lines between West Beirut's sectarian
neighborhoods have blurred as clashing militia forces
plunge the city deeper into anarchy. Many fighters
are uncommitted to any single militia and sell their
services to the highest bidder. Over the last few years
the pro-Iranian Hizballah has emerged as a new force
to be reckoned with and has gained strength in the
shantytowns of Beirut's southern suburbs and in the
neighborhoods near the Green Line?the unofficial
border between Muslim and Christian Beirut.
East Beirut is somewhat more stable under Christian
control. It is also generally more prosperous. The
East, however, has experienced numerous turf battles.
A series of coups, called Intifidas or uprisings, have
occurred within the dominant Christian militia, the
Lebanese Forces, killing scores of people since 1985.
Power Vacuum
Before the civil war Beirut was an open meeting place
of Middle Eastern and Western culture. The
Lebanese prided themselves on their sophistication
and claimed with some justification that they
benefited from the best of both worlds. In the late
1960s the arrival of Palestinian fighters intent on
43
using the country as a base of operations against
Israel sowed the seeds of Lebanon's political collapse.
A civil war began in the mid-1970s as the burgeoning
Palestinian presence disrupted relations between the
country's disparate religious sects, and the central
government collapsed.
Lebanon's war in the streets is all but certain to
continue as a generation reared in civil war comes of
age in Beirut. Many young militiamen know no other
condition. Fighting to them is a part of everyday life,
as is the absence of government instruments of law
and order. The Lebanese cannot work out a political
deal between the country's confessional groups that
would end the civil war, and each group continues to
jockey for power and political status. The central
government is too weak to assert its authority. Foreign
attempts to stabilize West Beirut have, thus far, been
failures.
Beirut's Chaotic Economy
All of Lebanon's population suffers from the unsettled
situation, but Beirut residents have experienced the
largest relative drop in living standards. The influx of
Shia refugees from South Lebanon since 1975 has
expanded the population of Beirut's southern suburbs
by more than 500,000 and produced fertile ground for
proselytization of disaffected Shia youth by radical
Shia groups. Similarly, East Beirut was flooded with
Christian refugees following the Israeli withdrawal
from the Shuf region in 1985. The excessive burden
on Beirut's poorly maintained public services results
in erratic supplies of electricity and water and
periodic shortages of fuel and staple foods.
Despite growing economic problems, Lebanon still
displays a dynamism that allows the economy to
continue functioning. The resourceful population still
possesses the talents required to survive, and many
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even prosper. The absence of effective government
control has resulted in one of the freest economies in
the world:
? Money transfers are not taxed or restricted, and the
bank secrecy laws are legendary.
? Most imports arrive through militia-controlled ports
not subject to customs duties.
? Deficit spending allows the government to continue
providing salaries, telephone service, electricity, and
subsidized wheat and fuel. The pound's
unprecedented slide (in 1985 a pound was worth 20
cents; now it is worth a half cent), however, may
force reductions in spending.
The chaotic environment allows Beirut's businessmen
to operate with few regulations or burdensome taxes.
As a result, Beirut is a center for a lucrative arms and
narcotics trade. The city is also an entrepot for
consumer goods imports for smuggling into Syria.
Lebanon's currency depreciation has boosted exports
of jewelry, clothing, furniture, and chemical products.
A Lebanese economist estimates that exports
expanded in 1986 to about $220 million. Lebanon's
banking industry also remains vibrant, with over
$3.56 billion in deposits at the end of 1986. The
number of branch banks has expanded to more than
620 to compensate for the difficulties in traversing the
city.
Beirut's remarkable resiliency is eroding. Inflation is
running over 100 percent annually. Residents of
Beirut, who rely on imports for most of their
consumption, are hard pressed by higher prices, poor
employment prospects, persistent housing shortages,
and reduced availability of medical care. Beirut's
lively foreign exchange market has shrunk from $10
million to $3 million daily, with the Central Bank as
the primary supplier of dollars. Lebanon's foreign
payments, which were in surplus in 1985, fell into a
$190 million deficit in 1986, according to a Lebanese
economist.
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Lebanon's confessional militias have asserted control
as central authority has declined. The militias act as
quasi-governmental institutions by collecting taxes
and providing social services. For example, the
Christian Lebanese Forces imposes a 5-percent
surcharge on gasoline sales and collects taxes at ports,
restaurants, cinemas, and the Casino du Liban. In
return, the militia sponsors neighborhood repairs,
subsidizes health care, and administers public
utilities, such as trash collection in East Beirut.
Foreign sponsors such as Syria, Libya, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia also provide funds that fuel the Beirut
economy.
Outlook
Syria is portraying itself as a moderating force in
West Beirut and has pledged to restore order, but it is
unlikely to be successful. Militiamen have been
"disarmed," and Syria's military intelligence chief in
Lebanon has pledged to ease traffic between the
Christian and Muslim sectors. Under Syrian
direction, the Lebanese Army has reopened several
Green Line crossing points to pedestrian and truck
traffic, although erratic closings are commonplace.
Syrian troops have not deployed into East Beirut or
the southern suburbs controlled by Hizballah. As long
as Syria occupies only parts of the city, stability is
unlikely.
Beirut will continue to display a curious dynamism,
but the prospect for economic recovery will diminish
as increasing numbers of Lebanese emigrate and sever
ties to the country, as evidenced by the estimated 70
percent drop in expatriate remittances since 1980.
Lebanon's economy can be expected to lurch along
with the vast majority of the population becoming
steadily impoverished and the prospect for genuine
reforms unlikely because of confessional political
differences.
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Egypt and the M1A1 Tank:
The Push for Coproduction
Cairo welcomes the preliminary agreement to
eventually coproduce the M1A1 tank as a sign of US
intent to help Egypt continue its force modernization
and to develop its military industries.' The Egyptians
consider the M1A1 the "best tank in the world" and
expect that it will significantly improve the
capabilities of Egypt's armored forces. US military
aid programs and the prospect of coproducing and
exporting the tank to earn foreign exchange also are
strong factors influencing the Egyptians' choice of the
M1A1 over its competitors.
A cancellation of the deal would temporarily hurt
Cairo's relations with Washington and could lead to
the resignation of Defense Minister Abu Ghazala, a
strong supporter of military cooperation with the
United States. In such a case, Egypt probably would
turn to British and West German firms to fulfill its
requirement for main battle tank production
Search for a Main Battle Tank
Cairo wants to acquire a new, more advanced main
battle tank by the 1990s to improve its capabilities
relative to its neighbors. The Army has about 2,400
tanks in its inventory?M-60A3s, T-62s, T-54s, and
T-55s. As a short-term solution until a new tank can
be produced, Cairo is seeking to enhance the
capabilities of its aging T-54 and T-55 tanks by
retrofitting them with 105-mm British-made guns and
adding new fire control systems. Even so, US
Embassy sources say Armed Forces Chief of Staff
General El Orabi is concerned about whether the 105-
mm gun?also on Egypt's M-60A3s--can defeat
Libyan T-72s, and the Ministry of Defense is
disturbed that the Libyans have antitank guided
missiles that can penetrate the M-60A3's armor at
more than 2,000 meters. Cairo expects the Soviets to
supply Tripoli with even more advanced T-80 tanks
during the next decade. Senior Egyptian defense
'Although the agreement calls for eventual coproduction, the
Egyptians will produce mostly the less sophisticated parts of the
tank and will be mainly assembling it from US components.
Egyptian T-55 main battle tank fitted with a
British 105-mm tank gun.
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officials also are uneasy about qualitative
improvements in the Israelis' arsenal and hope a more
advanced tank would be a strong deterrent to possible
Israeli aggression.
We suspect that national pride and a desire to lead the
Arab world in terms of military technology are
driving Cairo's search for a main battle tank. Senior
Ministry of Defense officials have decided on more
sophisticated technology?mostly from the West?
over simpler and less expensive tanks. We believe that
they have met with a variety of suppliers, including
the United States for the M1A1 and probably the
West Germans for the Leopard II, France for the
AMX-40, Italy for the OTO Malara OF 40, Japan
for the Type 74, the British for the Vickers Mark VII,
45
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Egyptian M-60A3 tank armed with a
I05-mm gun.
and Yugoslavia for the T-72.2
Cairo's shortage of funds probably has restricted its
options only to US tanks and others offered under
concessional or grant programs. Without external
assistance, Cairo does not have sufficient resources to
pay for expensive, long-term projects, in our view.
Slow Improvements in Capabilities
Acquisition of the M1A1 probably would not
dramatically enhance Egypt's military capabilities
against Libya or Israel in the 1990s.3 We would
expect Cairo to try to replace at least its oldest T-55s
and T-62s with MlAls and to develop plans that
would enable M1A1-equipped units to respond to
threats on both Egypt's eastern and western borders.
Nonetheless, possible improvements in the mobility,
firepower, and armor protection in Libyan and Israeli
armored units, probably with the T-80 and Merkava
Only the MI A I, Leopard II, and T-72 are first line tanks. The
others have lesser capabilities.
'Despite Cairo's peace agreement with Israel, the Egyptian
military believes it must maintain an adequate deterrent force in
case a more militant leadership emerges in Tel Aviv that would be
less interested in preserving the peace.
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MIAl Abrams tank
III and IV respectively, could offset the technical
advantages of the M 1 Al. For example, the T-80 is
faster, and both the T-72 and the T-80 outgun the
M lA 1. The Israelis also are unlikely to be
intimidated by Egyptian M 1 Al s. Besides having
advanced Merkava tanks in their inventory in the next
decade, the Israelis may buy their own MlAls.
Integration of the M1A1 into Egyptian armored units
is likely to be slow. The Egyptians continue to
experience maintenance and training difficulties with
the M60A3 and would face even more problems in
trying to absorb a more advanced tank.' To take
advantage of the M 1 Al's full capabilities, the
Ministry of Defense would have to make adjustments
in its tactical doctrine. The M 1 Al's speed, rapid
maneuverability, and capability to fire accurately
while moving, for example, encourage responsiveness
to changing situations on the battlefield. Egyptian
armored units, however, have eschewed tactical
flexibility and continue to use standard Soviet
formations and maneuvers that do not even fully
exploit the capabilities of the M-60A3.
Desire for Coproduction
Egypt has long sought to reduce its dependence on
foreign suppliers and may be willing to spend more in
the short term to produce weapons indigenously than
to buy them outright. Cairo is not interested only in a
sale by the United States of M1A1 tanks,
'We believe maintenance of the MI Al's turbine engine would pose
a significant challenge to the Egyptians, given the region's desert
terrain
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Soviet T-80 tank
Characteristics of Selected Tanks in the Middle East
(Estimated for the 1990s)
Tank
Weight
Engine
Maximum Speed
Estimated Armor
Main Armament
(metric tons)
(kilometer/
hour-road)
Protection
Levels a
(millimeter)
MIA I (US)
63.8
Gas turbine
67
380 (ADPS)
120-mm gun
(1,500 shp)
900 (HEAT)
M-60A3 (US)
51.9
Diesel
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143 (hull)
105-mm gun
(750 bhp)
230 (turret)
T-80 (USSR)
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Gas turbine
90
450-710 (APDS)
125-mm gun
(1,000 hp)
580-1,140 (HEAT)
T-72 (USSR)
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Diesel
60
350 (APDS)
125-mm gun
(780 hp)
450 HEAT
T-62 (USSR)
37.5
Diesel
50
230 maximum
115-mm gun
(580 hp
MERKAVA-III (Israel)
58
Diesel
40-46
Not available
120-mm gun
(1,200 kp)
a Penetration with vary depending on the munition used and the
composition of the armor.
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Defense Minister Abu Ghazala
Field Marshal Mohamed Abdel Halem Abu
Ghazala, Minister of Defense and Deputy Prime
Minister, is popular with the armed forces and has
emerged as one of the most popular and charismatic
leaders in Egypt. The 57-year-old artillery officer is a
veteran of four wars. Between 1976 and 1980 he
served as defense attache in Washington, where he
was an advocate of US-Egyptian defense cooperation.
He became Minister of Defense in 1981 and was
made Deputy Prime Minister and promoted to field
marshal in 1982.
Abu Ghazala 's power is second only to that of
President Mubarak, and, as head of the armed
forces, he commands the most influential single
institution in Egypt. The Defense Minister remains
strong in his support for US-Egyptian friendship and
cooperation and has been able to silence critics by
securing access to sophisticated arms for the
military.
Abu Ghazala also has consistently pushed for
improvements in Egypt's defense industries and on
many occasions has publicly stated that the
military's aim must be to achieve self-sufficiency in
arms production. We believe he is particularly
pleased with his ability to reach an agreement with
the United States to coproduce the M1A1 and
probably looks at the project as another means of
increasing his standing in the armed forces and
against political rivals.
E. Gazette ?
Defense Minister Abu Ghazala
The M1A1 deal comes during a time when a variety
of setbacks are increasing Abu Ghazala 's sensitivity
to criticism. Mubarak, with his reelection almost
guaranteed this fall, has recently demonstrated his
authority over the Defense Minister, especially by
retaining his choice as Armed Forces Chief of Staff
over Abu Ghazala 's objections. The Defense Minister
also may be irked over the Mubarak government's
decision to allow the Soviets to reopen consulates in
Egypt. We suspect he continues to smart over his
inability to achieve military debt relief from the
United States
We suspect that many senior
defense officials are concerned that the military is
developing a reliance on the United States similar to
its dependence on the Soviets from the 1950s to the
1970s, and this could leave Egypt unable to maintain
and repair equipment if cooperation with the United
States ended.
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The Ministry of Defense probably hopes that Ml Al
coproduction will serve as the keystone of its efforts to
revitalize Egypt's defense industries and open new
markets. Attempts to manufacture more sophisticated
Western weapons were set back by Egypt's separate
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peace with Israel and the subsequent withdrawal of
Arab money from joint projects. The Arab Gulf
states, however, recently have been seeking closer ties
to Egypt, in part to counter the increased threat from
Iran. Iraq already buys large quantities of Egyptian
arms and ammunition, and Cairo expects the Saudis
to try to acquire the
has
continued to publicly promote the establishment of an
Arab military industry and may try to exploit the
gradual warming of relations to push for M 1 Al sales
and renewed cooperation on defense production.
Cairo's Perception of the Deal
We believe Egypt's defense industry lacks the
technological base, expertise, and manufacturing
infrastructure to independently design and produce
modern tanks. Nonetheless, with foreign technical
assistance, the Egyptians turn out small arms,
ammunition, artillery, vehicles, and aircraft of poor to
fair quality. They probably could assemble the M1A1
with US assistance. except
for base metal manufacturing of specialty steel and
aluminum, Egypt's arms factories could produce in
limited quantities many of the parts needed to
assemble a main battle tank. To insure M1A1 quality,
substantial US supervision and participation in
quality control inspections probably would be
required.
The Egyptians understand the initial agreement will
lead to coproduction of the M 1 Al by 1996, but
basically they will only be assembling the tank, mostly
The specifics of the subsystems to be included have not been
determined.
49
using items manufactured in the United States.
Gradually, they will begin making a limited number
of parts for the tank?tracks, hubs, and road wheels,
for example. They are not scheduled to produce key
items, including the turret structure, special armor,
selected fire control articles, engines, and
transmissions.
Nonetheless, the Egyptians are confident in their
ability to assimilate the M 1 Al technology and are
more ambitious than the initial agreement suggests
The Egyptians apparently also want to
expand their production role at least by
manufacturing the 120mm gun tube and training
ammunition.
Looking for Other Suppliers
Cairo is not confident that the United States will give
final approval to clear the M 1 Al for export and
coproduction and is continuing to negotiate with other
possible suppliers of sophisticated main battle tanks.
Senior
Egyptian ministry of Defense othcfals have made
several trips to West Germany and the United
Kingdom during the past six months to seek
assistance, apparently for a tank that Cairo hopes to
develop concurrently with the MIA I.
Abu Ghazala has also been negotiating with Turkish
officials about coproduction, though we suspect his
eagerness far surpasses Ankara's.
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New Egyptian tank _factory under construction at Abu Zabal
the Defense Minister talked with the
Turks in May about a joint effort to produce Leopard
II tanks. Abu Ghazala probably also discussed the
possibility of collaborating on M1A1 production. He
publicly promoted Turkish-Egyptian coproduction of
the M1A1 last spring, saying it would cut costs by as
much as 40 percent, allow for parts specialization, and
increase the scale of production.
Implications
Cairo believes it is furthering US-Egyptian
cooperation and friendship in selecting the M1A1 and
expects the United States to give final approval to the
deal. Acquisition of the technologically sophisticated
tank has become a matter of national pride for the
Egyptians, particularly in light of US military aid to
Israel.
Defense
Minister Abu Ghazala, a strong advocate of US-
Egyptian defense cooperation, also has a personal
stake in the deal, having lobbied for the tank in
Washington and publicly announced that Egypt has
the license to coproduce it.
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Washington Post C
Cancellation of the deal would hurt US-Egyptian
relations. Mubarak and other senior officials would
regard such an action as displaying a lack of faith in
Egypt's capabilities and as further evidence of
Washington's willingness to put relations with Cairo
behind those with Tel Aviv. Moreover, the Egyptians
probably believe they are doing the United States a
favor in choosing the M1A1 over its competitors
because the deal will enhance military cooperation
and increase Egypt's reliance on US technology.
We would expect damage from a cancellation to be
only temporary because of common strategic interests
and Cairo's continuing need for US financial aid.
President Mubarak, however, probably would respond
to a cancellation by publicly lashing out at the United
States. We would also expect him to become more
recalcitrant in such areas as the transit of US nuclear-
powered warships through the Suez Canal.
Temporarily putting distance between himself and the
United States would help protect him from political
attacks by critics of his close relationship with
Washington.
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Defense Minister Abu Ghazala would be infuriated
by the failure of the United States to give final
approval to the M1A1 deal and might seriously
consider resigning.
The Defense Minister appears to
have staked his reputation on the M1A1 deal,
boasting of plans to expand Egypt's defense
industries, and publicly acknowledging the
agreement. If he is thwarted again in his dealings with
the United States, Abu Ghazala will probably take a
much more cautious approach to US-Egyptian
defense cooperation. His resignation might lead to the
appointment of a defense minister much less
favorably inclined toward the United States.
Reverse Blank
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Morocco-Israel: Continui7
Contacts
Morocco?with its well-established Jewish
population?has in the past few years expanded
significantly its unofficial ties to Israel. King Hassan
sees these contacts as part of a larger effort to position
his country as a bridge between the Arab states and
the West. His meeting with then Israeli Prime
Minister Peres in July 1986 was his most sensational
attempt to insert himself into the Middle East peace
process and at the same time to curry favor with and
perhaps win assistance from the West. His failure to
obtain significant new aid, particularly from the
United States, disillusioned him, and this experience
and the ephemeral results of the Peres meeting
suggest Hassan will not seek another summit meeting
with Israeli leaders in the near term. The King,
however, will pursue informal contacts with Tel Aviv
Background
King Hassan's meeting in 1986 with Israeli Prime
Minister Peres was the most recent and visible sign of
continuing contacts between Rabat and Tel Aviv. The
Alaouite dynasty is the protector of the 2,000-year-old
Moroccan Jewish community?the largest in the
Arab world and the King's principal vehicle for
unofficial contacts with Israel. According to the US
Consulate in Casablanca, the community numbers
less than 10,000?down from nearly 350,000 in 1956.
Nevertheless, Jews still play an important unofficial
role as financiers, businessmen, technical and
professional experts, and advisers to the King.
Particularly noteworthy are the community's leader
and palace insider David Amar, businessman and
foreign policy adviser Serge Berdugo, and member of
parliament?since 1985?Johanna Ohana. There are
400,000 to 500,000 Jews of Moroccan origin in Israel,
100,000 in France, and significant numbers in
Canada and the United States, and these populations
serve abroad as important interpreters and supporters
of Moroccan foreign policy.
53
Hassan's Motives
We believe that the King's policies toward Israel and
the Moroccan Jewish community are driven by
several goals. Although Hassan professes to follow a
nonaligned foreign policy, he has adopted a pro-
Western stance and wants Morocco recognized in the
West as a moderate alternative to fundamentalist and
radical regimes. This longstanding incentive for
maintaining unofficial ties to Israel became more
important during the period of his union with Libya
(1984-86). The King's consistent hope has been that
the West would reward his constructive policy toward
Tel Aviv with increased economic and military
assistance, and that interest grew as he pursued more
austere economic policies at home in recent years.
The King also would also like to carve out a wider role
for himself in the Middle East. He is convinced that
his ties to Israel, his membership in the Arab League,
the Islamic Conference Organization, and the
Jerusalem Committee, and his detached perspective
on the Middle East qualify him far better than
Jordan's King Hussein?indeed, perhaps uniquely
qualify him?as a mediator in the Arab-Israeli peace
process. This was almost certainly why he risked
Libyan and Syrian subversion and condemnation by
the radical Arab states to talk with Peres. He is only
the fourth Arab head of state to meet openly with an
Israeli leader. The others?King Abdallah of Jordan,
Egyptian President Sadat, and Lebanese President
Bashir Gemayel?were assassinated.
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Informal contacts between Morocco and Israel will
almost certainly continue, notwithstanding the chill
that set in for several months after the King's meeting
with Peres. Despite Hassan's disappointment over
Israeli inflexibility and lack of followup and the
failure of Washington to give greater assistance, he
decided in March 1987 to reinvigorate the dialogue
with Tel Aviv. As initial signs of the rekindled
interest, he revived plans for a book to be published in
French, English, Arabic, and Hebrew on his relations
with and support for the Moroccan Jewish community
and approved a series of bilateral visits. The factors
that impelled Moroccan diplomacy in this direction in
the past will probably keep Hassan on that course in
the future. By the same token, however, the King is as
mindful of the constraints on his Israeli policy as he
was in the past, and we believe that the Rabat-Tel
Aviv dialogue will stop well short of another
publicized summit meeting in the near term.
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