NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300950002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 14, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
e Intelligence
Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
14 August 1987
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p et.re
NESA NESAR 87-019CX
14 August 1987
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
14 August 1987
Page
Articles The Soviet Campaign Against Pakistan's Nuclear Program
For the past few years Moscow has campaigned actively against
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, attacking it both in the press
and in private demarches. Although Moscow's criticism is consistent
with its desire to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, it is also
exploiting the issue to its own advantage in South Asia.
Afghanistan: Insurgents Assess the Stinger
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Afghan insurgents believe that the Stinger surface-to-air missile has
had a significant impact upon their war effort over the past 10
months, helping to offset Soviet and Afghan regime airpower.
Insurgent successes with the Stinger have also boosted resistance
morale.
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Syria's Strengthening Coastal Defenses: Trying To Close 7
the Back Door
The bulk of the Syrian armed forces is positioned to face Israeli
threats from the direction of the Golan Heights and Lebanon, and
only in recent years has the Syrian regime revealed deep concern
about the vulnerability of its coastline. Despite new weapons and
training, Syria's ability to defend its coastline remains extremely
limited.
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NESA NESAR 87-019CX
14 August 1987
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Israel: Expanding Role for Attack Helicopters
Israeli military planners have substantially defined and expanded
the battlefield mission for the attack helicopter force. In a future
war Israel's attack helicopters will probably play a-. decisive role in
the air-to-ground arena, particularly in close air support, partly
supplanting the more conventional use of strike-fighter aircraft.
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Some articles in the Near East and South Asia Review are preliminary views of a
subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as
appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent
the view of a single analyst; an item like this will be designated as a
noncoordinated view.
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles
The Soviet Campaign
Against Pakistan's
Nuclear Program
For the past few years Moscow has campaigned
actively against Pakistan's nuclear weapons program,
attacking it both in the press and in private
demarches. Although Moscow's criticism is consistent
with its longstanding desire to limit the spread of
nuclear weapons, it also is exploiting the issue to its
own advantage in South Asia. Soviet attacks on the
Pakistani program escalate during periods of tension
with Islamabad?usually over Afghanistan?and
subside when Moscow is seeking improved bilateral
ties.
The Soviets have charged the United States with
complicity in helping Pakistan develop nuclear
weapons in return for Islamabad's cooperation in
projecting military power into South Asia and serving
as a supply base for the resistance forces in
Afghanistan. Moscow hopes to press Pakistan to back
away from its nuclear weapons program and, perhaps
more important, to modify its policy toward
Afghanistan. Moscow also is seeking to undermine
US-Pakistani relations, strengthen relations with
India, portray the United States as a threat to
regional stability, and project an image of a
respectable superpower seeking peaceful solutions to
regional problems. The Soviets have demonstrated
some caution in their exploitation of the issue,
probably because they do not want Indo-Pakistani
tensions to get out of control and because they do not
want India to activate its own nuclear weapons
program.
If the United States cuts aid to Pakistan as a result of
Islamabad's nuclear procurement activities, Moscow
probably will soften its criticism of Pakistan in order
to exploit the strain in US-Pakistani relations. If
Pakistan subsequently backs away from its support
for the Afghan resistance, Moscow almost certainly
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will seek improved relations with Pakistan to further
prospects for a favorable political settlement in
Afghanistan. The Soviets might reduce their criticism
of Pakistan's nuclear program but would continue to
counsel restraint in Islamabad to maintain credibility
in India. Should Pakistan test a nuclear device,
Moscow will protest strongly and launch a major
propaganda campaign against Islamabad's action.
Soviet Comment on Pakistan's Nuclear Capabilities
Moscow's public campaign against Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program has drawn heavily on Western and
Indian press reporting. In October 1985, TASS cited
a Western report that Pakistan had "already created
the necessary components for a nuclear bomb" and
had "even tested the explosive device" to trigger the
nuclear reaction. Shortly thereafter the Soviets cited
Indian press reports that Pakistan had the necessary
technology to produce two nuclear bombs annually.
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NESA NESAR 87-019CX
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? From May through July 1986, Soviet media
criticism of Pakistan was particularly harsh. Pravda
went beyond normal Soviet rhetoric to assail
Pakistan for its "criminal involvement" in
Afghanistan.
? Air and ground attacks from Afghanistan on
Pakistani border areas increased sharply in the first
half of 1986.
From the summer of 1986 until the spring of 1987,
Moscow's anti-Pakistan propaganda was muted, and,
to the best of our knowledge, no Soviet demarche was
made concerning the Pakistani nuclear program. This
paralleled a generally softer line by Moscow toward
Pakistan that may have reflected a perception by the
Kremlin that its pressure had been counterproductive.
In the wake of this episode, the Soviets intensified
their propaganda against Pakistan and made a series
of demarches on the nuclear issue. They approached
the United States, charging that Pakistan's nuclear
program was accelerating and calling on Washington
to prevent Pakistan from exploding a nuclear device.
Moscow stressed that such an explosion would
damage international nonproliferation efforts and
fundamentally change the strategic situation on the
Indian subcontinent. The Soviets simultaneously
delivered this message in London. This demarche
noted that the main suppliers of nuclear equipment to
Pakistan were private companies in Western Europe
and Canada.
By late 1986,
Moscow and Kabul had embarked on their "peace
offensive" in Afghanistan and were trying to pull
Islamabad into the campaign for "national
reconciliation."
By the spring of 1987 the Soviet attitude toward
Pakistan and its nuclear program had again
toughened, and pressure on the border with
Afghanistan intensified. When a leading Pakistani
nuclear scientist, A. Q. Khan, made a statement that
a bomb had "already been tested on a simulator," the
Soviets gave the statement extensive publicity.' One
Soviet press account cited US experts as having
concluded that Pakistan was capable of producing
"four or five Hiroshima-size weapons annually."
'In reporting Khan's statement, TASS acknowledged that the
scientist subsequently had repudiated his statement about
Pakistan's nuclear potential but recalled that in 1984 Khan had
blurted out comments about Pakistan's capacity for developing an
atomic bomb.
Top Secret
The recent arrest in Philadelphia of an individual of
Pakistani extraction charged with trying to export
from the United States material that could be used in
the enrichment of uranium for nuclear arms triggered
more critical Soviet commentary. TASS charged that
Pakistani agents had tried to purchase such
equipment and technology in the West for years. The
article claimed that US intelligence had information
that the Pakistani bomb would be analogous to those
developed in the United States during World War II
and would have a yield of 10-15 kilotons.
Soviet Charges About the US Role
The Soviets have coupled their attacks on the
Pakistani program with allegations about US support
for the program. They hope to undermine US-
Pakistani relations, limit US-Pakistani military
cooperation on Afghanistan, and weaken the
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prospects for better relations between the United
States and India. They may even hope to help provoke
US Congressional moves to cut aid to Pakistan.
Soviet charges of US complicity in Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program have been directed primarily at
Indian audiences and have emphasized the premise
that Pakistan could not manufacture nuclear weapons
without outside assistance. Moscow has charged that
Washington has supplied Pakistan with the means to
deliver nuclear weapons?even as it verbally
"restrains" Pakistan from producing such weapons?
and has accused the United States of violating the
Symington Amendment, which provides for the cutoff
of US assistance to any country importing technology
for unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
During its intense campaign against the Pakistani
program in mid-1987, the Soviet press elaborated on
these themes. Pravda stated that the United States
had trained Pakistani nuclear physicists, delivered a
nuclear reactor to Pakistan, and "resorted to various
ruses and illegal actions" to export nuclear technology
to Pakistan. It explained that the United States was
indulging Pakistan because the latter serves as a
"bridgehead for the undeclared war against
Afghanistan" and because having an "obedient ally,
armed to the teeth, and, moreover, possessing nuclear
weapons.. . fits well into US strategic plans in Asia."
lzvestiya charged Washington with having passed
nuclear technology to Pakistan and accused the
Reagan administration of having justified extending
military aid to Pakistan by assuring Congress that
Pakistan does not intend to create nuclear weapons?
even though Pakistan refuses to give such assurances.
The article indicated that the administration has been
reluctant to provide Congress with such assurances
this year because it would be "laughable" and was
therefore asking Congress to make an exception to the
law banning military sales to nations pursuing a
nuclear weapons program.
The Indian Angle
Soviet propaganda play on
Indian fears of Pakistan's nuclear capability and
complement domestic pressure in India to reassess its
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longstanding policy of not developing nuclear
weapons.
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During the visit to India of the US 25X1
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in
August 1987, Soviet broadcasts to India were
particularly harsh in their attacks on the United
States for its failure to restrain Pakistan's nuclear
ambitions.
While seeking to exploit the nuclear issue with India,
the Soviets have shown occasional restraint?possibly
because they do not want Indo-Pakistani friction to
get out of control and do not want the Indians to
activate their own nuclear weapons program. During
a visit to India in the spring of 1987, when Indo-
Pakistani tension was high, Soviet Communist Party
Secretary Anatoliy Dobrynin tried to calm Indian
fears. According to press reports, he told a meeting of
members of Parliament at an All-India Congress
Committee reception that, although the Soviet Union
shared India's general perceptions of threats in the
subcontinent, it did not agree with the "paranoia" of
the ruling Congress Party. In response to questions, he
specifically minimized the threat from Pakistan,
saying that the USSR was not aware of Pakistan's 25X1
having a nuclear bomb.
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Outlook
The Soviets will continue to work to prevent Pakistan
from exploding a nuclear device and to focus attention
on Washington's "complicity" in Pakistan's actions.
They will emphasize Pakistan's success in importing
nuclear technology and materials, attributing this to
US collusion. They will ignore US efforts to cut off
nuclear technology to Pakistan and US success in
obstructing some nuclear transactions.
In exploiting the nuclear issue, the Soviets will
continue to ignore Islamabad's rationale for its
nuclear program?that it is needed as a deterrent
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against India?as well as President Zia's claims that
Pakistan does not intend to take the final step of
assembling a weapon. To avoid antagonizing India,
Moscow will not endorse Pakistani proposals for New
Delhi and Islamabad to sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and accept full-scope safeguards, a nuclear-
free zone, or other verification measures, despite
Soviet endorsement of nuclear-free zones in other
areas of the world. The Soviets presumably believe?
as do we?that India is not likely to accept any
nuclear arrangement in the region that limits its
options, even if this position leads to a nuclear-armed
Pakistan. Moscow's failure to press India with respect
to these issues strongly supports our belief that the
Soviets are less concerned with nonproliferation than
with exploiting the issue to gain additional leverage in
South Asia, particularly in regard to the war in
Afghanistan.
Toy Secret
If the United States cuts aid to Pakistan as a result of
Islamabad's nuclear procurement activities, the
Soviets may soften their criticism, hoping to
encourage Pakistan to alter its policy toward
Afghanistan. If Pakistan should respond by backing
away from the Afghan resistance, Moscow will be
even more likely to seek improved relations with
Islamabad to achieve movement toward a favorable
political settlement in Afghanistan. Under these
circumstances, Moscow probably will be less critical,
publicly and privately, of Pakistan's nuclear program.
To maintain its credibility with India, however, the
Soviets will have to continue to counsel restraint in
Islamabad. Should Pakistan test a nuclear device, the
Soviets will feel compelled to protest strongly and to
mount a propaganda campaign against Islamabad.
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Afghanistan: Insurgents
Assess the Stinger
Afghan insurgents believe that the Stinger surface-to-
air missile has had a significant impact on their war
effort over the past 10 months. They perceive that the
Stingers have helped to offset the Soviets' and Afghan
regime's most effective counterinsurgency weapon?
airpower. The insurgent belief that the Stinger is an
effective air defense weapon has boosted resistance
morale.
Since Stinger-equipped insurgents first shot down
aircraft in Afghanistan in September 1986, many
insurgents have come to believe that they have a state-
of-the-art weapon with which to effectively challenge
Soviet airpower.
even those groups that do not possess the
Stinger have a more optimistic outlook on the
resistance's prospects.
insurgents said the withdrawal of Soviet air support
for attacking ground forces helped turn the tide in
that battle.
In addition, insurgent reports indicate that possession
of Stingers has affected air attacks on insurgent base
camps and supply caravans.
an insurgent base that had been
frequently bombed by the Soviets was not attacked as
often once Soviet forces realized the guerrillas had
acquired Stingers. When the Soviets did conduct
airstrikes, they used high-flying jets instead of attack
helicopters, reducing the accuracy and effectiveness
of the attacks.
Insurgent Reports of Stinger Effectiveness
The insurgents consider the Stinger's shootdown rate,
which they claim is over 70 percent, to be a key
measure of the missile's overall effectiveness.
Although that figure probably is exaggerated, other
sources indicate a sharp increase in Soviet and regime
aircraft losses since the introduction of the Stinger.
Furthermore, about half of the
losses last year occurred in the last three months?
following the introduction of the Stinger.
According to the insurgents, the Stinger has helped to
limit Soviet and regime air attacks during some
combat operations. They say that Soviet and regime
combat aircraft often will retreat after one aircraft in
an attack group is shot down or after the pilots see a
Stinger fired. Soviet
aircraft in one engagement immediately left the area
when resistance forces fired Stingers, even though the
targeted aircraft were clearly out of range. The
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Using the Stinger
The Stinger has some operational characteristics that
make it more valuable in comparison with other air
defense missiles:
? The missile is capable of engaging an aircraft either
as it approaches or leaves the gunner's area. In
contrast, the SA-7 is generally fired only at
departing aircraft.
? To date the Soviets evidently have been unable to
develop a consistently reliable countermeasure.
There are indications that Stinger attacks have not
been regularly deterred by the infrared jammer
being used in Afghanistan.
? The Stinger is a fire-and-forget weapon, whereas
the Blowpipe requires the gunner to stay in an
exposed position to guide the missile to the target.
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NESA NESAR 87-019CX
14 August 1987
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In our view, extensive training on the Stinger is a key
factor in insurgent successes with the missile. The
insurgents have obtained better results from the
Stinger than the Pakistani military did in early 1986,
almost certainly because of better training.
The insurgents have employed the Stinger effectively
in ambushes. In describing the tactic, insurgent forces
say that a gunner will situate himself in an ideal firing
location, such as close to an airfield. There he waits
for proper weather conditions and a target that is well
within the Stinger's acquisition range. Because of the
advance preparations and the element of surprise, the
Stinger gunner is more likely to achieve a shootdown.
Soviet and Afghan regime forces have sought to foil
ambushes by intensifying patrol activity near likely
attack positions and by buttressing perimeter defenses
around airfields, but resistance forces have managed
to find and exploit weaknesses in these defenses.
Insurgent groups also have learned to use the Stingers
in conjunction with other antiaircraft weapons to
increase the density and complexity of their air
defenses. For instance, by deploying both the Stinger
and antiaircraft heavy machineguns, the guerrillas
believe that they are better able to destroy aircraft
that fly below the Stinger's minimum effective
altitude.
Top Secret
Outlook
At least for the near term, the Stinger will continue to
be a useful counter to Soviet airpower. The guerrillas
probably hope that pilot concerns about the presence
of the missile will have a multiplier effect, helping to
inhibit combat airstrikes in areas where insurgent
groups do not have Stingers. Because of the Stinger's
successful operations for the better part of a year, the
guerrillas almost certainly do not anticipate that the
Soviets will soon have an effective and comprehensive
counterweapon.
Should the Soviets develop effective means of
countering the Stinger, the morale of the insurgents
would be affected. But resistance groups probably
would quickly resume tactics employed before the
acquisition of the Stinger, seeking to avoid
engagements in which Soviet airpower can be fully
applied.
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Syria's Strengthening Coastal
Defenses: Trying To Close
the Back Door
The bulk of the Syrian armed forces is positioned to
face Israeli threats from the direction of the Golan
Heights and Lebanon, and only in recent years has
the Syrian regime revealed deep concern about its
vulnerability to attacks launched along its relatively
undefended northwestern front?the approximately
135-kilometer coastline between Lebanon and
Turkey. Long the most neglected service in the Syrian
military, the Syrian Navy has profited from
Damascus's resolve to strengthen its coastal defenses
as have the Air and Air Defense Forces and the
Electronic Warfare Directorate. Despite new weapons
acquisitions in place along the coast and an increase
in the frequency and complexity of joint training
between Syrian naval and air assets, Syria's ability to
defend against air or naval attacks in the coastal area
remains extremely limited?particularly if attacks
were to occur with little warning or at night
catalyst for expanded Syrian coastal defense training.
Syria's efforts to strengthen its coastal defenses
continued throughout the summer of 1986, probably
spurred by revelations in the Western press about the
central role of Syrian intelligence in the terrorist
Nizar Hindawi's bungled attempt on 17 April to
bomb a crowded El Al jetliner in London
Syria almost certainly became acutely aware of its
coastal defense weaknesses during the war in Lebanon
in 1982, when Israeli amphibious landing forces
inserted numerous armored vehicles and troops north
of Palestinian concentrations along the southern
Lebanese coast. Damascus could scarcely avoid
concluding that in a future war the Israelis could
divert Syrian troops from the principal battlefields on
the Golan Heights and in Lebanon by opening a
northern front along the Syrian coastline. Israel's use
of amphibious landing forces in 1982 also evidently
boosted Syria's interest in developing a similar
capability. Although Soviet advisers had provided
instruction on seaborne operations against Israel since
1980, Syria did not
acquire its first amphibious landing ship until January
1984.
Worldwide focus on the extent of Syrian state-
supported terrorism, particularly since late 1985, has
increased Damascus's longstanding fears that Israel
would launch retaliatory airstrikes through Syria's
relatively undefended coastal area and served as a
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What Is at Stake?
Syria's most vulnerable front to Israeli attack?the
coastal area?is home to virtually all of the country's
most important economic installations and?of
symbolic importance?is the birthplace of most of
Syria's Alawi ruling elite. Syria's primary petroleum
facilities are at Baniyas on the coast, where about half
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The other half of Syria's domestic refining capacity is
at Hims, only about 70 kilometers inland. Baniyas 25X1
and the port of Tartus also serve as Syria's only export
and import facilities for petroleum products. Syria's
largest thermal power plant is located in the Baniyas
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NESA NESAR 87-019CX
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area, and a second power plant is near Hamah, about
65 kilometers inland. Syria's major ports?Tartus and
Latakia?handle nearly all maritime traffic, and
Tartus is the Syrian military's lifeline for Soviet
military equipment deliveries. The mountainous area
just east of the coast is considered the Alawi
heartland and contains Qardaha, the secluded
hometown village of Syrian President Assad.
Upgrading the Navy
The Syrian Navy began to receive some long overdue
attention in 1984 as part of the Soviet rush to replace
Syrian weaponry lost during the conflict in Lebanon
in 1982 and to upgrade Syrian defenses. Although the
Soviets' primary concern was to modernize Syria's
Air and Air Defense Forces as well as to upgrade
Syrian armored forces, they and the Syrians gradually
turned their attention to the lackluster Navy and
weak coastal defenses. In addition, the Syrian Navy's
somewhat improved status might have been due to the
appointment as naval commander in July 1984 of
Major General Tayyarah, an uncle of Syrian Vice
President Khaddam
By early 1984, Syria had received two new coastal
defense missile systems, the SSC-3 with a range of 90
kilometers, and the SSC-1B, which has a range of 335
kilometers. Syria also acquired its first amphibious
landing ship, a Polish-built Polnocny?capable of
carrying six tanks?and would receive two more a
year later. In late 1985 the Soviets delivered two
aging Romeo-class submarines
So far in 1987, there has been less
training than in recent
years, possibly due to the same fuel constraints that
evidently have caused a sharp decline in this year's
according to a Lebanese radio
report, in late July 1987 Syrian naval vessels conducted an
amphibious landing exercise at Shikka Harbor, which is 13
kilometers southwest of Tripoli, Lebanon.
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Despite Israel's
overwhelmingly superior coastal defense capabilities, the Syrian
Navy probably nurtures the hope of being capable of launching
seaborne commando operations against the Israeli coastline.
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ground forces training exercises. The MI-14
helicopters have operated farther offshore this year,
however, indicating that they will eventually conduct
over-the-horizon targeting for the coastal defense
missiles.
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Ground Forces in the Coastal Region
Aside from the 1 1 th Armored Division, which is
headquartered in the Hims area, all of the Syrian
Army's regular divisions are stationed in the
Damascus area or just opposite the Golan Heights.
The only armored unit stationed near the coast is the
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826th Armored Regiment, equipped with T-55 tanks
and probably subordinate to the coastal regional
command.
The Army has evidently shelved its plans?at least
temporarily?to create two new armored divisions?
the 17th and 18th?in northwestern Syria.
Their designated areas
of operation suggest they would have been responsible
for defending against a seaborne invasion by armored
forces and against an attack mounted from Turkey.
This year, with the usually insulated military
suffering unprecedented budget cuts, the Army has
almost certainly been compelled to postpone plans for
the new divisions.
Outlook
Despite recent improvements and remedial efforts,
Syrian coastal defenses almost certainly could not
prevent an Israeli airstrike from damaging or
destroying key economic and military installations.
Syrian President Assad's resolve to increase coastal
defense preparedness?as a result partly of the
airspace violation last November?suggests, however,
that Syrian air defenses could inflict some losses on
the attacking force. The most critical factors behind a
Top Secret
timely Syrian response to an air attack launched
along the Syrian coast include the ability-of Syrian air
defenses to identify hostile aircraft and their intent
and warn the appropriate interce tor s.uadrons and
surface-to-air missile batteries.
Syrian installations in the coastal area remain
particularly vulnerable to ship-launched missile
attacks, in part because the coastal defense missile
brigade probably has only a limited capability to
target ships that are over the horizon. Syrian Haze
helicopters probably will become more active in
providing over-the-horizon targeting data, a role the
Romeo submarines might also eventually assume.
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Israel: Expanding Role
for Attack Helicopters
Israeli military planners have substantially redefined
and expanded the battlefield mission for the attack
helicopter force on the basis of its past successful
performance in Lebanon and during recently modified
training. In a future war Israel's attack helicopters
will probably play a decisive role in the air-to-ground
arena, particularly in close air support, thus partly
supplanting the more conventional use of strike-
fighter aircraft in such operations.
The attack helicopter emerged on the Middle Eastern
scene following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, during
which fierce tank battles exacted heavy armor losses
on both sides. Armed with the latest in antitank
weaponry, the attack helicopter seemed an ideal
acquisition for both Arab and Israeli commanders
seeking an alternative means for destroying enemy
tanks. Moreover, the impressive showing of the attack
helicopter by both Israel and Syria during Israel's
invasion of Lebanon in 1982 validated the role of
attack helicopters in supporting ground operations
and highlighted their potential for influencing the
battle's outcome much as tanks have done in the past.
Faulty Air Doctrine
Israel's growing reliance on the attack helicopter to
perform ground support missions has resulted from
the poor performance of fixed-wing aircraft in this
capacity during the 1982 Lebanon war, according to
Errors in target
identification undermined efforts to provide close air
support, often resulting in the strafing and bombing of
Israeli troops. In one instance, Israeli planes attacked
an Israeli armored battalion, leaving 75 dead and
wounded.
13
Pilot training in the years preceding the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon, therefore, emphasized tactics
intended to facilitate neutralizing enemy air defenses
and improving offensive counterair capabilities and
strategic interdiction techniques. Coordinated air and
ground training was scant, reflecting the view that the
use of sophisticated, high-performance aircraft in
close air support was not cost effective. Despite Israeli
efforts to implement more rigorous combat pilot
training procedures to remedy this deficiency, close
air support continues to be a low priority for the air
force?indicating that real improvement will come
only through the deliberate application and innovative
tactical use of the attack helicopter.
Inventory Trends and Limitations
Israel's attack helicopter inventory
will grow slowly to about
the end of the 1990s, in our judgment. A
reduced defense budget imposed by economic
austerity measures and uncertainty over the fate of
the Lavi fighter aircraft program?Israel's top air
procurement item?have virtually halted expansion of
the attack helicopter fleet, according to
Consequently, acquisition of t e as vanced
US AH-64 Apache helicopter is likely to be postponed
indefinitely until a decision on the Lavi is made or
unless the United States offers Israel a dramatically
more favorable repayment schedule. Canceling the
Lavi fighter would release substantial funds to the
defense budget and would almost certainly result in
purchase of the advanced AH-64 attack helicopter.
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NESA NESAR 87-019CX
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14 August 1987
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Bell AHIS Huey Cobra flying patrol for the
Israel Defense Force
IAF Magazine
Barring private-sector arrangements, the Israelis will
concentrate over the next several years on improving
the quality of their existing attack helicopter fleet,
which includes both heavy and light attack
helicopters. Older models will receive modern
components to ensure continued combat effectiveness.
By careful maintenance of helicopter subsystems the
Israelis will aim to prolong the life of the equipment
and sustain the combat readiness of the force.
estimates that
Israel has 40 Bell AH-1S Cobra heavy attack
helicopters, which are based on an older technology
Top Secret
Israel's light attack helicopter, the Hughes 500
MD Defender
Jane's
compared to that of the AH-64 Apache. The AH-1S
Cobra is armed with up to eight TOW antitank
missiles, a three-barrel 20-mm cannon in the chin
turret, as well as 40-mm grenade launchers, rockets,
and bombs.
Thirty Hughes 500 MD Defenders and two captured,
refurbished Syrian SA 342L/Gazelles constitute
Israel's light attack helicopter fleet, according to
The Hughes 500 MD
Defender is less capable than the Cobra because it is
armed with only four TOW antitank missiles. The
Gazelle helicopters are capable of delivering both the
French HOT and AS11/12 antitank missiles.
The threat of hostilities with Syria, terrorist activity
against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, and the
relative peace prevailing along Israel's southern
border as a result of the peace treaty with Egypt will
lead Israel to point its attack helicopter fleet toward
the north for the foreseeable future
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Exploiting the Attack Helicopter Potential
Israeli strategists consider the attack helicopter to be
a pivotal element in their ability to mount a
coordinated air and ground operation to blunt an
initial Syrian thrust to reclaim the Golan Heights?
particularly during the crucial 24 to 36 hours Israel
needs to mobilize its reserves. To this end, Israeli
military commanders have placed considerable
emphasis on developing a superior helicopter warfare
capability capitalizing on the advantages of the attack
helicopter while minimizing its vulnerability to
heavily armed ? round vehicles and enem attack
helico ters
15
Prospects
The attack helicopter has proved to be a highly
mobile, maneuverable, and lethal weapon system
ideally suited to support Israel's concept of an
armored war of movement.
By comparison, Syrian attack helicopter training has
progressed little beyond the basic maneuvers needed
for close air support. In the final outcome, the
rudimentary skills of the Syrian pilots will continue to
be no match for their Israeli counterparts.
Economic austerity, however, has proved to be a
double-edged sword for Israel's attack helicopter
fleet. On the one hand, the helicopter's cost
effectiveness has made it increasingly attractive for
executing missions previously reserved for high-
performance aircraft?which are extremely expensive
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Top Secret
to replace. On the other hand, a scaled-down defense
budget and a continued costly commitment to the
Lavi fighter have curtailed procurement of much-
needed additional attack helicopters?either for
replacement or modernization purposes. Without
major acquisitions of attack helicopters, especially
advanced models like the US AH-64 Apache, the
Israeli military will find it increasingly difficult to
incorporate an aging helicopter fleet into its ambitious
plans for the future.
Top Secret 16
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