NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300860001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 5, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/27: CIA-RDP05502029R000300860001-9
Directorate of
Intelligence
Secrct
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Near East and
South Asia Review
5 December 1986
Vsrkbl
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eci e
NESA NESAR 86-027
5 December 1986
Copy 326
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Near East and
South Asia Review
5 December 1986
Articles Oman-US: Whither the Access Agreement?
Page
Oman is unlikely to renew the access agreement with the United
States in 1990. In Muscat's view, threats from the USSR and Iran
have lessened, and declining US economic assistance and the rise of
a new generation of leaders in Oman have placed the assumptions
underlying the agreement in question.
The Growing Iranian Threat to Persian Gulf Shipping
Tehran, reacting to its severe economic difficulties, is showing a
greater willingness to interfere with merchant shipping in the
Persian Gulf. The Gulf Arabs are increasingly worried and are
bracing themselves for possible military encounters.
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When an Ayatollah Dies. Implications for the Iranian Succession
When Khomeini dies, his successors will inherit the nascent
institutions put into place under his guidance, but they will not
inherit his religious authority. Indeed, Shia traditions will have a
negative impact on regime stability, and religious leaders will
probably play a disruptive role.
Pakistan: Growing Sunni-Shia Tensions
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Relations between Pakistan's majority Sunni Muslims and the
minority Shia community have deteriorated over the last few years,
resulting in more frequent and violent clashes between the two
denominations, Animosities are likely to intensify as parliament
debates the imposition of Sunni jurisprudence as the law of the land.
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NESA NESAR 86-027
5 December 1986
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Pakistan: Shifting Interest Group Politics in Urban Punjab
New alliances among urban interest groups in Punjab appear to be
emerging as the Army relinquishes its day-to-day political authority.
For most interest groups in Punjab, President Zia has skillfully
struck a balance among competing demands to ensure that his
transition to democracy has a reasonable chance of success.
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Pakistan: Economy of the Tribal Areas
Pakistan's tribal territories include some of the poorest regions in
the country. Islamabad plans to provide development aid to create
alternative employment opportunities to the lucrative trade in arms
and narcotics that has long dominated the local economy, but
tribesmen are resisting the government's efforts.
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Afghanistan: Postmortem on the Soviet Troop Withdrawal
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The recently completed withdrawal of six Soviet regiments from
Afghanistan was a sham. Two of the regiments and some tanks had
been introduced in recent months solely for the purpose of
withdrawing them, but the Soviet charade has failed to win over
world opinion.
Afghanistan: Cultural Factors in the Insurgency? 31
Mixed Blessings
Ethnic, cultural, and religious factors generally strengthen the
Afghan resistance's ability to resist Soviet domination. At the same
time, deeply rooted hatreds among ethnic groups and tribes,
xenophobic attitudes, opportunism, and individuality slow the
transition of fighters or even groups of fighters into a strong
insurgency.
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Western Sahara: Whither the Polisario Front?
The Algerian-backed Polisario Front continues to face
insurmountable challenges in trying to attain unilaterally a military
victory against Morocco in Western Sahara. In addition, the Front
is experiencing strains with its patron, Algeria, which is facing
severe financial difficulties of its own.
35
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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views.
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles
Oman-US: Whither the
Access Agreement?
Oman is unlikely to renew the access agreement with
the United States in 1990. In Muscat's view, threats
from the USSR and Iran have lessened. Although
Omani-US relations have been close, declining US
economic assistance to Muscat and the rise of a new
generation of leaders in Oman threatens the
relationship.
The 1980 access agreement granting the United
States extensive use of Omani military facilities laid
the foundation for close Omani-US relations.
Perceived threats to Oman's security, triggered by the
fall of the Shah of Iran?a longtime friend of Sultan
Qaboos?and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979, led Muscat to formalize its security relationship
with the United States. Despite certain reservations,
Sultan Qaboos agreed to extend the agreement in
1985 because of the growing threat from Iran.
In our view, Oman now sees the USSR and Iran as
posing less of a security threat and probably believes
it no longer needs a US military presence to deter
aggression. Muscat also has seen decreasing levels of
US financial assistance under the Economic Support
Fund (ESF) program and probably questions the US
commitment to Oman. In 1985, ESF loans and grants
to Oman totaled $20 million; in 1986, $19.5 million;
and for 1987, $15 million is budgeted. In a move to
get more aid, Sultan Qaboos last year publicly vowed
not to renew the access agreement when it expires in
1990.
Oman's newfound confidence is largely the result of a
growing sense of nationalism fostered by new
decisionmakers in Oman. In 1980 Oman was
governed by the "Muscat Mafia"?a small group of
Omanis and British expatriates intensely loyal to
London. Since 1982 a younger, more nationalist group
has emerged as the dominant force behind the Sultan.
1
These nationalists include Yusif bin Alawi, Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs, and Maj. Gen. Ali Majid
al-Maamari, President of the Palace Office. Both
support the Omani-US relationship, but their primary
motivation appears to be to use it to reduce British
influence. Alawi and Ali Majid are close friends and
together are creating a loose alliance of like-minded
colleagues in the military, government, and
intelligence services.
The nationalists are concerned that too close an
association with the United States will jeopardize
their efforts to develop closer ties to other Arab states.
They want Oman to be more influential in regional
and Arab politics. The nationalists probably believe
that Sultan Qaboos needs to avoid the charge that he
allowed Washington to establish permanent bases in
Oman. Omanis remember that the United States used
Omani territory without Muscat's knowledge or
permission for the Iranian hostage rescue mission in
1980.
Although renewal of the access agreement appears
doubtful at this time, Oman's economic problems may
encourage Muscat to reconsider. Increasing domestic
pressure will probably motivate Muscat to call for a
substantial increase in US aid, which most likely will
be directly linked to renewal of the agreement. Sultan
Qaboos probably believes that an increase in ESF
monies would help Muscat explain to its Arab critics
its continuing relationship with the United States.
The nationalists most likely hope that the agreement
has already demonstrated to the British that Oman
has become increasingly independent of London and
will continue to put distance between itself and
Britain.
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NESA NESAR 86-027
5 December 1986
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The Growing Iranian Threat
to Persian Gulf Shipping
Tehran, reacting to its severe economic difficulties, is
showing a greater willingness to interfere with
merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf. Since late
summer Iran has increased the strength and range of
its air and naval forces in the southern Gulf and has
expanded the scope of its antishipping operations.'
The Gulf Arabs are increasingly worried and are
bracing themselves for possible military encounters.
Although the Iranian military still displays some
caution, Tehran's recent aggressiveness and the threat
of more attacks increase the possibility of a widening
of the conflict.
The Politics of Ship Attacks
Iran has been attacking ships in the Persian Gulf
since 1984, usually in retaliation for Iraqi airstrikes
against tankers carrying Iranian oil exports. This
year, however, Iran has increasingly focused its
attacks?and its suspension of attacks?on
influencing the Gulf Arabs to reduce their support for
Iraq and to alter their oil production policies. The
greater determination shown by Tehran in the past
few months probably results from a desire to retaliate
for Iraq's effective air campaign against the Iranian
economy. In view of the damage to Iran's oil export
system, Tehran may also believe it needs to back up
its repeated threats to make Iraa's allies suffer if Iran
cannot export oil.
Iran is now focusing pressure on Kuwait, which is a
strong financial backer of Baghdad and serves as a
major transshipper of arms bound for Iraq. In
addition, Iran has been annoyed by Kuwaiti
intransigence over oil production quotas at recent
OPEC meetings. Tehran may view Kuwait as an
attractive target because it cannot effectively defend
shipping beyond its coastal waters. Most of the
Iranian ship attacks in the past few months were
conducted against Kuwaiti vessels or those trading
with Kuwait.
Antishipping operations include ship attacks and ship
interdiction?the stopping, inspection, and sometimes seizure of
merchant vessels
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The supertanker Akarita following an attack by
Iranian aircraft in mid-August 1986.
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Jane's Defense
eekly, 6 Sep 1986 25X1
Tehran is taking more of a carrot-and-stick line with
Saudi Arabia. Displeased with Saudi oil policies
earlier this year, Iran attacked three Saudi tankers
within one month in April and May after previously
exempting them from the antishipping operations. As
Riyadh has moved closer to Tehran's position on
OPEC oil production, Iran is again exempting Saudi
vessels from attack. Iranian pressure may no longer be 25X1
overt, but the threat is implicit in the increased size of
Iran's air and naval forces in the southern Gulf. 25X1
A Shadow Over the Strait
Iran has greatly increased its military presence in the
southern Gulf, where Tehran already had a major
naval base and airfield at Bandar-e Abbas. During
1986 the Iranians began staging helicopters from Abu
Musa Island and oil platforms in the southern Gulf.
Iran has further extended its operational range by
deploying aircraft to Kish Island,
since late summer, Iranian naval ships
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NESA NESAR 86-027
5 December 1986
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Iranian Navy frigates, like the Sabalan (nee Rostam), have
conducted the recent night attacks against merch
both Sea Killer missiles and their 4.5-inch guns.
have been more aggressive, attacking at night and
using antiship cruise missiles and naval guns against
merchant shipping for the first time in the war.
and both sites give it the capability to hit any ship
nassing through the Strait of Hormuz
Nearly two-thirds of all ship attacks by Iran during
the six-year Iran-Iraq war have occurred in 1986.
Moreover, Iran's deployment of air and naval units
has greatly expanded the range of its antishipping
operations since the fall of 1985. The area patrolled
by Iran is now so large that merchant ships cannot
avoid it or completely cross it at night when Iranian
air and naval forces are not as active. Using the new
staging areas, Iranian antishipping operations have
occurred throughout the western approaches to the
Strait of Hormuz and even in the Gulf of Oman. In
early November, Iranian Navy Commander
Malekzadegan said that merchant ships using Gulf
state territorial waters are within Iran's defensive
zone and subject to attack.
Iran has been forceful in making its presence felt in
the southern Gulf. Iranian naval units have
challenged Omani patrol boats and have twice fired
on aircraft of the United Arab Emirates. An Iranian
F-4 fired warning shots at an Omani reconnaissance
aircraft in September, according to the
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Jane's
Ship Attacks in the Persian Gulf, 1986
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Iran a
Iraq b
Total
42
59
January
3
4
February
3
6
March
9
5
April
4
4
May
3
7
June
4
4
July
3
August
8
8
September
3
6
October
3
5
November
2
7
a 1980-86 Iranian ship attacks total 70.
b 1980-86 Iraqi ship attacks total 127.
Moreover, Tehran has stopped
Soviet and US-Hag merchant ships as part of its
campaign to halt the supply of arms to Iraq. This
aggressiveness has been tempered by Iran's
recognition of its limitations. Iran has tried to avoid
confrontations with the major powers, and the Soviet
and US vessels that were seized were quickly released.
since October the
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Navy has been ordered not to seize any more Soviet or
US ships. The Navy has long operated under
instructions to avoid warships or merchant vessels
under military escort
The Gulf States Respond
The Gulf states thus far indicate a willingness to resist
the Iranian pressure. In late October, Kuwait fired
two surface-to-air missiles at what it believed was an
Iranian aircraft. By publicizing the event, Kuwait
probably hoped to demonstrate its resolve to protect
its sovereignty from Iranian aggression. A month
earlier,
Kuwait sent a similar message to Tehran by firing an
air-to-air missile at an Iranian aircraft crossing
Kuwaiti airspace after bombing an Iraqi oilfield.
According to
press reports, the Gulf Cooperation Council also will
ask the United States to approve an extension of
AWACS coverage over the southern Gulf.
While aggressively showing its desire to protect itself,
Kuwait has taken additional measures to increase its
defensive capabilities
The Kuwaiti Navy
has also begun escorting tankers through its own
territorial waters, according to the US Embassy, and
it recently held its first live-fire exercise in nearly a
year.
Riyadh is also responding to Tehran's growing
belligerence. The Saudis are deploying their newly
organized Marine Forces as well as naval special
forces from the Red Sea to Ras al Ghar in the Persian
Gulf.
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Shippers, Seamen Worried
In response to Iranian attacks earlier this year,
shippers ordered their tankers to avoid the Iranians by
traveling at night and spending the daytime protected
in safe anchorages. By early fall, however, the
extended range of Iranian antishipping operations and
the use of night attacks removed this defense. The
number of lives lost in ship attacks has dramatically
increased this year. More than 50 seamen have been
killed, according to press reports. Lloyd's reports that
insurance payments during the first eight months of
1986 totaled $80 million. According to a European
shipowners' organization, the owners, insurers, and
seamen's unions are becoming more militant over the
risk to lives and ships in serving Gulf ports. Convoys 25X1
are regarded as impractical by the operators, however, 25X1
and they do not expect the Western or Gulf state
naval forces to protect them. 25X1.1
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Outlook
There is a good chance that Iran will increase its
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because Tehran will consider that it has less to lose by
expanding the war in the Gulf. Iran's efforts to date
have not resulted in any significant reduction in the
movement of arms to Iraq, putting additional pressure
on Tehran to do more. Even if Tehran only maintains
the current pace of its ship attacks, the possibility of
more severe actions may cause some shippers to avoid
Gulf ports. Once Iran's HY-2 missiles become
operational?probably in early 1987?shipowners and
seamen may become even more reluctant to enter the
Strait. If Iraq continues to attack Tehran's oil export
facilities, Iran may clamp down on the Gulf states'
exports. Tehran might seize Gulf state oil shipments
to compensate for its own losses or eventually use
commando-style raids directly against their oil
facilities.
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Iran probably will not try to close the Strait of
Hormuz. Tehran does not want a confrontation with
Western nations, which depend on the oil shipped
through the Strait. Moreover, Iran needs to move its
own exports through the Strait and cannot afford to
have it closed. In addition, Iranian capability for such
an operation is limited.
Tehran will probably continue to modulate its ship
attacks to keep pressure on the Gulf states while
avoiding a dramatic escalation of its confrontations
with their militaries. The risk of hostilities, however,
is increasing because of Iran's more aggressive
activities and greater military presence. Saudi and
Kuwaiti actions to deter Iranian attacks could lead to
a military confrontation. Any confrontation is likely
to be followed by urgent requests for US assistance.
Iran will try to avoid clashes with Western or Soviet
naval forces. The risk of accidental confrontation is
increasing, however, because of the Iranian Navy's
expanding operations and because of Tehran's
increasing willingness to take risks in the Gulf as its
economic problems grow.
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Bad News for Shipowners
In October an Iranian frigate fired an Italian-made
Sea Killer antiship missile against a Kuwaiti-
chartered tanker. Thirteen crewmen were killed or
wounded, and the ship suffered serious damage in
this first use of an Iranian naval missile against a
merchant vessel. Shippers' concerns over this
development were further heightened because the
attack took place at night. Previously, merchant
ships traveled at night because Iranian aircraft?
Tehran's preferred weapon platform for ship
attacks?did not operate during darkness.
The threat to shipping will increase greatly in early
1987 when Iran will probably be ready to deploy its
Chinese-built HY-2 missiles. The HY-2 has a 500-
kilogram warhead that is nearly three times as large
as the French-built air-launched Exocet missile used
successfully by Iraq and is seven times larger than
the Sea Killer. In addition, the Exocet was designed
to damage naval vessels' fire-control and command-
and-control equipment, not to sink ships, but the
HY-2 is capable of sinking many types of merchant
ships. The HY-2, however, has a less capable
guidance system than either the Exocet or Sea Killer.
The HY-2 has a range of approximately 100
kilometers, or enough to cover the entire Strait of
Hormuz from launchsites along the Iranian coast.
Iranian frigates need to close to within at least 27
kilometers of their targets to fire the Sea Killer and
could be deterred by Western or Gulf state naval
escorts. Use of the HY-2s, which are positioned on
land, is unlikely to be effected by the presence of
foreign warships.
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Sea Killer
Warhead: 70 kg, semi-armor-piercing HE
Guidance: Beam rider/radio command
Maximum range:27 km
HY-2 missile
Warhead: 500 kg, HE
Guidance: Active radar
Maximum range:I00 km
Exocet
Warhead: 165 kg, HE
Guidance: Active radar
Maximum range:50 to 70 km
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When an Ayatollah Dies:
Implications for the Iranian
Succession
When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini dies, his
successors will inherit the nascent institutions put into
place under his guidance, but they will not inherit his
religious authority. Indeed, Shia traditions will have a
negative impact on regime stability, and religious
leaders will probably play a disruptive role.
Religious Succession: Shia Tradition
Observers of the rigorous procedures governing papal
succession in the Roman Catholic Church will have
little to compare with the informal process of
leadership transition in the Shia religious hierarchy.
Only recently?in the context of Khomeini's Islamic
republic?has Shiism begun to develop institutions
governing the transmission of religious authority and
regularizing advancement in the religious hierarchy.
Traditionally, Shia Muslims are required only to
follow the teaching of a mujtahid (jurisprudent)?a
cleric with sufficient training who is accepted by
ayatollahs to interpret Islamic scripture and tradition.
The religious chain of command extends upward from
the village/neighborhood level to the grand
ayatollahs?a handful of men who have developed
extensive regional followings and whose stature has
been acknowledged by their peers and superiors.
When a mujtahid dies?even Khomeini?his
followers turn to a new leader, his teachings lose their
authority, and any innovations he introduced can be
reversed by his successor.
The Islamic Republic: New Rules
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini's position as both head of
state and supreme religious jurisprudent (marja-e
taqlid) is unprecedented in Shia history, and his death
will have profound religious and political implications.
As marja-e taglid, Khomeini instituted clerical rule
(velayat-e faqih) as the basis of the government and
initiated efforts to institutionalize theological
authority. He formed a Council of Experts, which
completed Iran's Islamic Constitution in 1979. In
1985 an elected Council of Experts designated
Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri as Khomeini's
successor. In addition, Khomeini has attempted to
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ensure that his religious rulings outlive him. An
official textbook on the Koranic basis of the
constitution, for example, makes the controversial
assertion that the constitution cannot be changed
because it was written by mujtahids and that the
Majles (Parliament) should not deal with matters
related to Islamic jurisprudence. Nevertheless,
continuance of Khomeini's theological authority after
his death would run counter to 13 centuries of Shia
religious tradition.
Possible Implications
When Khomeini dies, Shia religious leaders will
probably play important roles in undermining regime
stability by attempting to supplant his teachings with
their own:
? Ranking clerics within the regime will probably
work to enhance their own positions. Ayatollah
Meshkini, the chairman of the Council of Experts,
will play a role in any succession struggle.
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he has 25X1
already made moves against both Ayatollah
Montazeri and Majles Speaker Hojjat-ol-Eslam Ali
Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. As father-in-law to
Intelligence Chief Mohammad Mohammadi-
Reyshahri, who supervised the arrests of
Montazeri's son and son-in-law, Meshkini has direct
access to a potential power base. 25X1
? Montazeri's succession could be challenged by the
surviving grand ayatollahs who outrank him and
who objected to the institution of the Council of
Experts. Grand Ayatollah Tabatabai-Qomi and
Grand Ayatollah Musavi-Golpayegani have
criticized the current regime, and we believe that,
unless further constraints are applied after
Khomeini's death, they could attack the theological
basis of the government.
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NESA NESAR 86-027
5 December 1986
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Senior Shia Clerics
Hosein Ali Montazeri
. . . about 64. . . lacks
charisma, religious stature,
and political savvy of longtime
mentor, Khomeini. . . support
from some elements of
Revolutionary Guard. . . wants
to curb revolutionary
organizations and government
involvement in economy and
favors greater freedom of
expression. . . probably willing
to wind down the war.
Ali Meshkini
. . . about 65. . . probably wants
to succeed Khomeini . . . close
ties to both Montazeri and
Rafsanjani. . . Qom Friday
prayer leader. . . has good ties
to some Revolutionary Guard
commanders and leading Qom
theologians . . . vehemently
anti-Western. . . favors land
reform, nationalization of
trade, export of the revolution
. . . believes continuation of
Iran-Iraq war may undermine
regime.
Mohammad Reza Musavi-
Golpayegani
. . . about 90, but still active . .
highly respected grand
ayatollah . . . large network of
former students in Qom. . . has
occasionally supported the
government but opposes
velayat-e faqih, land reform,
continuation of the war. . .
dislikes Montazeri . . .
easygoing and uncomplicated,
Hasan Tabatabai-Qomi
. . . about 76. . . outspoken and
quick tempered. . . first grand
ayatollah to publicly oppose
Khomeini's government and
war policy . . . perceived as
opposing everything and
supporting nothing. . . some
support in the Revolutionary
Guard and revolutionary
committees . . . under house
arrest in Mashhad.
Shahab ad-Din Marashi-
Najafi
. . . about 88. . . timid . . .
generally avoids politics . . .
openly criticized government
for first time following death of
Grand Ayatollah Kazem
Shariat-Madari earlier this
year. . . opposes state control
of economy, state taxes, and
designated succession of
Montazeri. . . studied under
revered late Ayatollah Haeri-
Yazdi.
Abdol-Qasim Musavi-Khoi
. . . about 94. . . most senior of
the grand ayatollahs. . . has
lived in holy city of Najaf in
Iraq since his youth . . . many
religious supporters in Iran . . .
generally apolitical. . . opposes
designated succession of
Montazeri. . tacitly supports
Ba'th regime of Iraqi President
Saddam Husayn.
Secret
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? Grand Ayatollah Musavi-Khoi, who is based in
Iraq, also disputes Khomeini's teachings and
condemns his continuation of the Iran-Iraq war. His
followers, most of whom are in Iraq and Pakistan,
claim that he?not Khomeini?is the supreme
jurisprudent. Because he outranks Khomeini's
possible successors, Khoi will be in a better position
to compromise Iranian influence among
international, particularly Arab, Shia communities.
Reverse Blank
13
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Pakistan: Growing
Sunni-Shia Tensions
Relations between Pakistan's majority Sunni Muslims
and the minority Shia community have deteriorated
over the last few years, resulting in more frequent and
violent clashes between the two denominations. US
Embassy officials see a growing Sunni intolerance of
the Shias and, consequently, an increased sense of
insecurity among the Shias. Shias have long been
wary of President Zia's Islamization program, which
they interpret as the government's effort to establish a
Sunni-oriented state in Pakistan. Animosities between
the communities are likely to intensify over the next
several months as parliament debates the Shariat bill,
which, if passed, would impose Sunni jurisprudence as
the law of the land.
Background
The Sunnis account for 80 to 85 percent of Pakistan's
population. The community is divided into two sects.
Another 10 to 15 percent of Pakistan's population are
Shias. They reside principally in Punjab and the
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) but are also
concentrated in Karachi and other urban areas of
Sind, where many Mohajirs (Shia immigrants from
India after 1947) live. The Shias are generally well
educated and include many skilled entrepreneurs. US
Embassy officials say their general affluence
contributes to Sunni-Shia tensions.
Confrontations
Confrontations between Shias and Sunnis have
occurred sporadically, usually following Shia religious
processions marking the anniversary of the death of
Husayn, Muhammad's grandson. During these
processions, the Shias publicly curse Husayn's
persecutors, the early caliphs who are deeply
venerated by the Sunnis. Last fall, the processions
sparked violent clashes in Lahore, resulting in at least
10 deaths and numerous injuries.
US Embassy officials note that the intensity and
frequency of clashes between the two groups have
increased dramatically over the last five to six years.
They attribute the deterioration in relations to two
15
events?the introduction of Zia's Islamization
program and the Iranian revolution. The former
raised fears among Shias that the government would
try to establish a Sunni-oriented state in Pakistan,
while the revolution awakened in the Shia community
a new sense of pride and awareness of their faith.
Islamization
A Shia leader explained to a visiting US scholar that
Shia concern about Islamization stems from their
belief that, because both Shias and Sunnis struggled
together to establish Pakistan, both denominations
should have equal rights. He pointed out that Shias
believe there should be two sets of personal and public
laws, one for Sunnis and one for Shias. If that cannot
be, the Shias would prefer secular law over Islamic
law, which they see tilted toward Sunnis. To
demonstrate the difference between the two groups'
approach, the Shia leader explained that, while
Sunnis would cut off a man's hand for stealing, the
Shias would cut off only his fingers so he could still
perform his religious duties.
To protect Shia rights in the face of Islamization, the
Shias, under the leadership of Mufti Jaffar Hussain,
founded in 1980 the TNFJ?Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Figh-
e-Jaffria (Movement for the Establishment of Shia
Jurisprudence). Following the Mufti's death in 1983,
a split occurred in the TNFJ as two rivals, Arif al-
Hussaini in the NWFP and Agha Hamid Ali Musavi
in Punjab, attempted to gain control of the movement.
The struggle for succession radicalized the TNFJ,
with both leaders speaking out against the
government for not addressing Shia concerns. Their
actions have led to several confrontations with the
authorities, the most violent being the riots in Quetta
in 1985 in which approximately 60 people died.
The Shariat Bill
Members of two Sunni fundamentalist parties have
introduced legislation, which, if passed, would require
enforcement of Islamic law in Pakistan. One of the
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sponsors of the bill has made clear that he intends the
law to be interpreted according to the Sunni school of
Islamic law and that there would be no consideration
of Shia jurisprudence. Supporters have formed the
United Shariat Front, which includes about 20
different Islamic parties and organizations. They plan
to hold numerous demonstrations over the next several
months to build public support for the bill.
The bill has many critics. The Shias are its main
opponents, but members of one of Pakistan's two
Sunni sects also oppose the legislation because they
believe the other Sunni sect would use the law to
impose an austere lifestyle throughout Pakistan.
Other critics believe Zia is using legislation certain to
spark sectarian violence in order to build a case to
reimpose martial law. Still others see the bill as
threatening the reestablishment of democratic
institutions in Pakistan because the new Shariat
courts would have the authority to review, and even
amend, legislation passed by parliament to ensure its
conformity with Islam.
Zia has publicly endorsed the bill. Although Prime
Minister Junejo has been cool toward the idea, many
legislators feel politically incapable of opposing
anything done in the name of Islam. Embassy officials
therefore judge that some form of the bill will be
passed, but they believe legislators will attempt to
modify it to assuage some of the fears of its
opponents.
Outside Funding
External funding has encouraged extremists in both
the Sunni and Shia communities. Most Pakistanis are
convinced?and we agree?that Iran is supporting the
Shia extremist organizations, particularly the
Hussaini faction of the TNFJ and the Imamia
Students' Organization. The Iraqis are alleged to be
actively supporting Sunni extremist groups.
US Embassy officials say Islamabad feels constrained
in its ability to act against such interference because
it wants to maintain good relations with both sides in
the Iraq-Iran war. The Embassy judges that Pakistani
authorities will be reluctant to crack down on outside
meddling unless they conclude that it threatens the
stability of the government.
Secret
Outlook and Implications for the United States
Tensions between the Sunni and Shia communities
will continue to erupt into occasional confrontations,
hindering US efforts to foster the development of
democratic institutions in Pakistan. A drastic
deterioration in law and order might even prompt a
reimposition of martial law.
Further Shia disaffection would encourage the Shias
to seek closer links to their coreligionists in Iran. US
interests and personnel could then face new anti-US
sentiment in Pakistan.
If the Shariat bill is passed, the Shias may also
establish closer ties to the opposition, particularly
Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), to
underscore their unhappiness with the current
government. This would present the government with
a more formidable opposition. Shia leaders have
expressed support for the PPP in the past because of
its position in favor of secular law.
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Pakistan: Shifting Interest
Group Politics
in Urban Punjab
New alliances among urban interest groups in Punjab
appear to be emerging as the Army relinquishes its
day-to-day political authority. Among traditional
interest groups, the large industrialists appear to be
losing out to the landlords who dominate the National
Assembly. Nontraditional interest groups?
organized labor, students, and professionals, all of
whom expanded their political role in the late 1960s?
are apparently coalescing and could significantly
challenge Islamabad. For most interest groups in
Punjab, President Zia has skillfully struck a balance
among competing demands to ensure that his
transition to democracy has a reasonable chance of
success.
Traditional Interest Groups
Industrial Family Conglomerates. The large
conglomerates that before the Bhutto era controlled
large-scale industries, international trade, insurance,
and banking are unlikely to recover their influence.
Entrenched bureaucratic control operating in
partnership with retired Army officers, widespread
distrust of big business among the populace, economic
decline in key sectors, as well as the decision by the
industrial families to invest abroad are likely to limit
the concentration of industrial holdings.
Although the influence of the industrial family
conglomerates remains significant, it has not gained
much under Zia. As a percent of gross national
product, private investment in big business increased
by one-third under Zia but remains one-third below
the level of the pre-Bhutto era. Key assets lost under
Bhutto, such as the domestic banking industry, have
not been regained. Another limitation on the families'
economic power is the general decline in key
industries upon which they had based their empires,
such as the provincial textile industry.
' This paper was prepared by an outside contractor. It was not
coordinated within this Agency. The views expressed are those of
the author.
17
Secret
As a whole, industry has benefited from the peace and
prosperity brought by Zia and the more apolitical
application of the government's regulatory and
licensing policies. Zia's industrial policies have sought
to encourage investment by the largest industrialists.
They have enjoyed substantial tax concessions under
Zia: a reduction from 66 to 45 percent on personal tax
rates and from 55 to 40 percent on corporate tax rates
for public limited companies (companies issuing stock
for public investment). Patterns of investment suggest
renewed confidence in bringing private resources back
to Pakistan. In 1983-84 private investment in large
and medium-size businesses surpassed that of the
public sector for the first time since 1973-74. Many
industrialists have also been attracted by the more
liberal import and export rules and other aspects of
the free market policies of the Zia regime.
Zia's policies have coaxed powerful businessmen into
more visible, official positions of influence. They have
become active in the Federation of Pakistani
Chambers of Commerce and Industry and play
increasingly visible roles in politics. The number of
industrialists and other businessmen in the National
Assembly increased to 16 and 34, respectively,
following the nonpartisan election in February 1985.
Businessmen also hold influential positions as internal
trade and export promotion advisers, Commerce and
Interior Ministers, provincial finance ministers, and
as Chief Minister of Punjab.
Under a democratic system that reactivates political
parties, the large family conglomerates and
businessmen could see a profitable period become less
so. The industrialists are concerned about industrial
unrest and realize that, without the instruments of
martial law readily available to suppress labor dissent,
business productivity could suffer. Most observers
believe that the businessmen in the National
Assembly would lose their seats in an open, partisan
election.
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Government Bureaucracy. The interests of the federal
and provincial bureaucracies have for the most part
been maintained under Zia. The federal bureaucracy
has substantially grown over the past 30 years,
especially under Bhutto. It controls $22.7 billion in
large-scale industrial assets and distributes industrial
credit through the nationalized banks. This large
regulatory apparatus bestows considerable power to
officials at all levels. Zia has attempted to tackle
bureaucratic corruption, but he has not substantially
reduced the bureaucracy's prerogatives.
Friction between private industry, which resents
bureaucratic extortion and what it views as regulatory
harassment, and the bureaucracy, which is generally
suspicious of the efforts of large industry to free itself
from Government control, is characteristic of the
urban political scene in Punjab. Under a more
democratic political system, the role of the
bureaucracy in regulating big business is likely to be
preserved. Public opinion strongly favors curtailing
the industrialists' power, and this provides support for
efforts to limit the pace and scope of deregulation,
privatization, and other policies that have benefited
industrialists under Zia. Rural landlords, some retired
military officers, and bureaucrats, who clearly want
to expand their own industrial holdings at the cost of
older industrial groups, are likely to support resistance
to deregulation. The removal in January 1986 of
Mahbubul Hach the architect and champion of
deregulation and private industrial investment, from
the powerful position of finance minister suggests that
the predominantly landed National Assembly has
successfully teamed up with bureaucratic and retired
military interests.
Small Business. Although small businessmen are
becoming increasingly dependent upon the
bureaucracy to transport, market, and export goods;
to render technical advice; and, especially, to secure
lines of credit, they remain a relatively independent
player in Punjabi politics. They still generally
function through market committees, bazaar
organizations, and kinship networks. Recently they
have begun to gain a voice through the Punjab
Chamber of Commerce, which suggests that they are
becoming better organized to make demands on the
political system.
Secret
Small businesses (defined as those with assets no
larger than $300,000 exclusive of land and buildings)
are arguably the most dynamic sector in Pakistan and
have played a disproportionate role in propelling
Punjab's economic growth since the early 1970s.
Small businesses are generally efficient, flexible, and,
with lower wage and overhead costs, more competitive
than some of the large-scale businesses in Punjab. The
provincial government in Punjab has been at the
forefront of small business promotion and assistance
in Pakistan.
National economic expansion and the less visible
capital injected by Gulf returnees have enabled this
sector to expand rapidly. Pakistani workers remitting
wages from the Gulf states have a much greater
propensity to invest in small businesses than in big
businesses with anonymous managers and
accountants. Gulf returnees believe they can control
or monitor a small, closely held business, an attitude
that reflects a deep distrust of big business among
Punjabi laborers.
Although small businessmen probably have
sufficiently profited under Zia, a significant downturn
in the economy could prompt this group to support
political agitation. As a still relatively independent
and unregulated sector, small business opposition to
the government would entail fewer risks than
opposition from groups more dependent upon the
government. An independent role leaves small
businessmen better positioned to concentrate
resources behind political agitation should their
interests be ignored or damaged?a factor in the
urban movement that unseated Prime Minister
Bhutto in 1977.
There is as yet no sign of general unrest among the
bazaar merchants in Punjab. A lack of order in the
markets, however, is a persistent complaint that has
reduced support for the regime among bazaar
merchants.
Labor and Students
Organized Labor. Organized labor, relatively
powerful under Bhutto, may be attempting to unite to
oppose the civilian government of President Zia and
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Prime Minister Junejo. Labor-management relations
in Punjab have historically been bitter, and labor
grievances are likely to have built up under Zia.
Several government policies have provoked labor
interests, including banning some unions outright,
holding labor unrest in check through martial law,
and devaluing the rupee over 60 percent from 1981 to
1986?benefiting the exporters but undercutting
workers' purchasing power. As with most other
groups, Zia has not ridden completely roughshod over
labor's interests and has preserved important
statutory concessions that labor gained under Bhutto.
Nevertheless, Zia is not regarded by labor as a friend,
and most of labor may join an opposition movement
against him. Although Zia's strategy to divide the
labor movement has been successful, there are signs of
growing cooperation among the old center and left
labor federations. They have jointly participated in
street demonstrations and apparently are cooperating
with other interest groups, such as students. Before
the lifting of martial law, sympathy strikes and
supportive press statements on behalf of other unions
were usually the extent of interunion cooperation.
The Pakistan People's Party will probably gain labor
support and try to use the labor unions to test the
intentions of the Army and the viability of the new
civilian government by promoting strikes and labor
unrest. Temporary coalitions among powerful
federations could be emerging to press the Junejo
government on labor issues.
Students. Punjabi students, who in the past were
catalysts for violence and served as "shock troops" for
antigovernment street demonstrations, are split
ideologically. The Islamic students usually are
members of the militant Islami-Jamiat-Tulaba (IJT),
the student wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami. The Islamic
students usually control student unions by using their
more effective organizations to defeat the larger, but
divided, moderate-to-left groupings. Student groups
have recently joined members of other interest groups,
including trade unions, professional groups, and
women's associations in protests in Lahore against
President Zia and US policy toward Israel and Libya.
Students in Karachi, Peshawar, Lahore, and
Rawalpindi also staged sympathy strikes for the
junior doctors in Punjab in October 1985.
19
There is a consensus that the ban on student unions is
the most pressing student issue in the country and
that it is the driving force behind the broadening
student discontent in Punjab. Even the IJT bitterly
opposes this ban and could unofficially help an anti-
Zia movement, even if the leaders of their parent
party do not. This issue has the potential to galvanize
student groups against the Zia/Junejo government. It
is the kind of issue behind which student groups of all
persuasions can rally and which opposition political
leaders will exploit to reach understandings with
student leaders.
The government attitude toward student unions under
civilian rule is changing due to increased pressure
from students, professional associations, and labor
unions. In his speech at the inauguration of a new
university hospital in Karachi in November 1985, Zia
blamed all campus unrest on outside agitators who
use the slogan "democratic rights" in order to gain
physical control of the institutions. By mid-February
1986 the newly reorganized Junejo Cabinet could not
dismiss student unrest so perfunctorily. Education
Minister Nasim Aheer recognized the necessity of
meeting with student leaders and confronting the ban
issue but could not adequately explain how he could
do so without recognizing the unions to which the
students belong.
Professionals
Punjabi professionals?doctors, lawyers, teachers,
and engineers?are split in their position on Zia.
Those ideologically drawn to Islam are usually
connected with the Jamaat-i-Islami, a supporter of
the President, although the party's position on the
Junejo government is less clear. The more secular-
minded professionals are among the most alienated
from the status quo. Some, like the lawyers, have had
their interests badly damaged by Zia's policies.
Others?doctors, engineers, teachers?work for the
government and are on relatively fixed incomes. Their
economic status has plunged as inflation has outpaced
salary increases, and they are bitterly envious of
unskilled and semiskilled workers who return from the
Gulf with modern appliances and considerable ready
cash. The professional associations, which can be
effective in molding urban opinion during times of
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domestic unrest, tend to express the views of the vocal,
alienated sections of the urban professionals. Despite
their dependence on the government, they will be a
significant opposition element in any political
movement against Zia. The Pakistan Medical
Association has denounced the treatment of political
prisoners and has sought access to them for physical
examinations.
Urban Poor
The poor comprise one-third of the population of
Pakistan's largest cities, Karachi and Lahore, and 20
percent of the village population. In Punjab members
of this group are politically disorganized, but their
plight?principally the lack of adequate housing?
furnishes the opposition parties with an opportunity to
contrast the conditions of the poor with those of the
rich under Zia. Left/liberal groups have traditionally
used the question of urban housing to generate
political support, although no organization
representing the urban poor has stepped forward to
press the government to take strong action. Under Zia
concern for the urban poor has generally been
overshadowed by rural development issues in the
National and Punjab Assemblies. The Zia/Junejo
government is well aware of the importance of the
housing issue but has taken few substantive measures
to resolve it.
The timing of recent initiatives demonstrates
government concern over the volatility of the housing
issue. Three days before PPP leader Benazir Bhutto's
return to Pakistan, Prime Minister Junejo announced
several measures to alleviate housing problems that
included an immediate grant of proprietary rights to
slumdwellers in Lahore. The record on past housing
projects has not been good. Past schemes have been
subject to problems of resident maladjustment, unmet
transportation needs, and land appropriation by real
estate opportunists. Experts recommend that any
housing scheme adopt specific measures, such as
freezing all new settlements and granting
untransferable?as opposed to proprietary?
ownership rights to slumdwellers. This provision
prevents the slumdwellers from selling their property
in times of economic distress, a widespread problem.
Secret 20
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Pakistan: Economy of the
Tribal Areas
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas and
the provincially administered Frontier Regions of the
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) include some
of the poorest territories in the country. Smuggling of
narcotics and arms has long dominated the local
economy, and tribesmen are expanding black-market
activities to underscore their opposition to government
efforts to suppress the illegal economy. Islamabad
plans to provide development aid to create alternative
employment opportunities. The government's efforts,
however, will probably not displace the lucrative arms
and narcotics trade.
Basic Facts of the Tribal Areas
About 2.2 million Pakistanis of the Pushtun ethnic
group and 800,000 Afghan refugees live in the Tribal
Areas, which are divided into seven units called
agencies that occupy nearly 29,000 square kilometers
along Afghanistan's eastern border. The Tribal Areas
are under the nominal control of Islamabad and are
not bound by provincial laws. In practice, rule by
tribal leaders prevails. Four smaller units, called
Frontier Regions, are also considered tribal territories
but are attached to a district of the NWFP and are
under the control of the provincial government. The
Tribal Areas and Frontier Regions share the common
label of "unsettled areas" because of their relatively
low population density and open landscape?desol
plains, barren hills, and denuded forests.
US Embassy reports state that the economic mainstay
of the tribal people is the smuggling of goods from
Afghanistan that are either banned or subject to a
prohibitively high customs duty in the settled areas of
Pakistan. In smugglers' bazaars near Peshawar
customers can purchase rocket launchers, heavy
machineguns, and antiaircraft guns. Other smuggled
goods include hashish, heroin, opium, watches,
household appliances, and even Russian caviar
The principal cash crop in the area?in fact, a major
source of income?is opium poppies, despite official
endeavors to eradicate the crop. Press reports state
21
Secret
474
..!
L. 44
Farmers in the border area.
that as much as $3 billion is earned annually by
Pakistan from the sale of heroin. Although we do not
have specific income figures for Pakistan or the tribal
territories, we believe that this figure is overstated.
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Foreign remittances earned by Pakistanis working in
the Gulf are the major source of legal wealth in the
frontier areas, according to US Embassy reporting.
Approximately 4 million Pakistanis working overseas
remit about $2.5 billion annually. Press reports state 25X1
that the tribal territories receive a large portion of
these funds because many of the expatriate workers
are from remote villages
Secret
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Afghan Refugee Camps in Pakistan
? Refugee camp (Not all camps
are shown One symbol may
represent multiple camps
Province-level boundary
100 K 0000:ter s
0 IOU Ms
*Qandahar
Asadablid
Afghan
Ghazni,
-JaIaIabad Fed.
AL
A A
A /
or
Admim Peshawar
arachinar ---1
A
'.Gardeyz jiA AAAAA L
A isLAnnABAa
A AA,ri
Khowst. A A AA A
A -k-
ibal
A KIM ell A
A Shall A A
A
Areas
A
SOS
A
A
Chaman
AA
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Ouetta.?
Baluchi tan
708167 (A05279) 8-86
Secret
22
r 4144 ee camps in province undetermined.
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Secret
Field prepared for opium poppies in the North-
West Frontier Province.
Some Pakistanis and Afghan refugees living in the
border areas engage in legitimate economic activity.
Gun manufacturing, carpet weaving, basketmaking,
and transportation are the most visible sectors of the
legal economy. The transportation sector is profitable,
according to US Embassy reporting, largely because
truckers are well paid to carry aid to the Afghan
refugees
Islamabad Searches for Answers
Islamabad is trying to promote legitimate trade and
agriculture, but it is hindered by its lack of control in
the unsettled areas, according to US Embassy
officials. The Tribal Areas operate under separate
laws, governed by treaties with the government, and
are responsible for their own internal affairs.
Pakistani customs and excise laws are not applicable.
A visitor, therefore, may buy items that are either
banned or subject to a very high duty in Pakistan so
long as he is willing to smuggle the goods into settled
areas.
Occasionally, Islamabad tries to exert control over
illegal activities through economic sanctions. It may
institute blockades to prevent tribal merchants from
reaching their market, seize property, or deny grazing
land for the tribes' herds. The government also has
imposed conditions on aid programs, such as
stipulations regarding poppy cultivation, but they
23
have not proven effective. Tribal people see little
incentive to planting legal crops,
because the income from a harvest of
poppies is about 20 times that of wheat. Residents
also believe they are entitled to public improvements
regardless of their illicit activities,
Islamabad has devised
programs to encourage tribesmen to find legal
alternatives to illicit trade. In the short term, they
envision a combination of financial relief, subsidized
food and agricultural imports, and the creation of
2,000 jobs to help meet the demand for housing and
infrastructure caused by the refugee presence. Long-
term recommendations are generally targeted at
industrial expansion, but the remoteness of both
markets and raw materials will almost certainly
hinder industrial development in the tribal territories.
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Islamabad's inability to provide profitable alternatives
has stirred unrest in the Tribal Areas and the NWFP.
Last year's poppy eradication effort resulted in 13
deaths in tribal regions of the NWFP, according to
Embassy reporting, as farmers protested the
government's failure to compensate them for the loss 25X1
of their poppy crop. the 25X1
farmers are preparing again this year to resist the
government's plan to eradicate the poppy crop.
Farmers are sowing poppy fields in several tribal
agencies, and, plan to 25X1
cultivate areas this season that have been poppy free
in recent years. 25X1
Economics and Afghan Refugees
The presence of Afghan refugees is adding to the
unease in the tribal territories. Refugees make up
about one-third of the total population there, and in
some tribal agencies refugees outnumber natives,
according to US Embassy reports. Tensions between
refugees and the local population are increasing as the
two groups compete for the region's limited jobs and
scarce resources. A large number of Afghan refugees
are involved in black-market activities?usually
dealing in narcotics, arms, and smuggled goods,
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IMPACT OF AFGHAN REFUGEE POPULATION
ON PAKISTAN'S PROVINCES (In Millions)
1 . 2
North?West Frontier Province
Federally Administered Tribal Areas
0
0.5
53.2-11111111111--0.1
4.7e
Punjab
Baluchistan
Sind Province contains no refugee camps.
Afghan Refugee
,40W
ib????4
300,000-400,000 refugees remain unregistered.
Pakistan
INN
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according to defense attache reporting. The return of
many Pakistani workers from the Gulf states and the
concurrent reduction in remittances are complicating
the situation.
Penetration of the Afghans into the economy has been
tolerated because the Afghans' labor skills and
commercial vehicles are in demand. Refugees create
ill will, however, by routinely undercutting prevailing
wages in the job market, according to a UN report.
They accept 15 to 25 rupees per day for unskilled
work, while Pakistani laborers demand as much as 30
rupees per day. Afghans are competitive in the
transportation sector but have not displaced
Pakistanis because of the growing demand for
carrying people and material to and from the border
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areas. Moreover, if not for the refugees, international
donors would probably not be so generous, and the
tribal territories would be worse off than before.
Government support for the Afghan refugees, which
Pakistani officials claim amounts to $70-100 million
annually, has created many speculative opportunities
for Pakistanis in the tribal territories. Housing
markets have experienced a miniboom because of
demand by wealthy Afghans residing in the border
regions and the availability of low-paid Afghan
workers for unskilled labor. Refugee commodities
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supplied by aid donors but transported under
Islamabad's supervision have found their way to
black-marketeers, who profit from the high demand
for necessities among the refugees.
Outlook
Although the tribal territories appear to be a drain on
the Pakistani economy, support for the tribal
population will probably continue because the
government sees this as serving wider national
interests. Islamabad believes its development aid, not
only props up economic activity in these areas, but
also provides infrastructure for supporting the Afghan
resistance and placates native tribesmen who are
growing weary of the Afghan presence in Pakistan.
Pakistani officials, however, will have to contend with
rising tensions between Pakistani natives and Afghan
refugees z s each groon comnetes for carce jobs and
resources
Even with plans to channel nearly $50 million to
promote legitimate development in the coming year,
continuing government aid is unlikely to displace the
lucrative trade in narcotics and arms. Islamabad's
unclear enforcement policies in the tribal territories
are equally unlikely to persuade either the tribesmen
or the Afghan refugees to seriously consider legal
sources of income. The government probably
recognizes that well armed poppy growers act as a
buffer between the war in Afghanistan and the rest of
Pakistan as well as bring income to the border area.
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Afghanistan: Postmortem on
the Soviet Troop Withdrawal
The recently completed withdrawal of six Soviet
regiments from Afghanistan, as promised in a speech
by General Secretary Gorbachev, was a sham. Two of
the "regiments" and some tanks had been introduced
in recent months solely for the purpose of
withdrawing them. Soviet hopes to make a maximum
positive impression on world opinion will not be
realized. Initial press coverage has largely been
skeptical
Playing a Shell Game
By the time the
Soviets were ready to begin the ceremonies in mid-
October, they had deployed the main elements of two
new motorized-rifle regiments and two tank battalions
to Afghanistan to be withdrawn.
The tank and air defense
regiments had little military value and were
expendable
Reading the Cards
The Soviets probably hoped that publicity
surrounding the withdrawal would convince world
opinion of their desire for a negotiated settlment, but
initial evidence suggests that reporters attending the
ceremonies were not impressed. According to the US
Embassy in Kabul, one Russian-speaking journalist
described ceremonies at Shindand as a badly
organized spectacle. He noted that the troops he spoke
with were obviously well rehearsed, that many
nervously looked to their seniors for prompting, and
that some denied any combat contact with the
insurgents. Most West European press coverage
portrayed the withdrawal ceremonies as part of a
propaganda offensive with little military significance,
a view that was shared by most West European
governments
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Although the withdrawal almost certainly was timed
for maximum impact on the UN General Assembly
vote on Afghanistan on 5 November, there was not
much erosion in support for the Pakistani-sponsored
resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces.
The revelation of Soviet underhandedness in the
withdrawal, however, is unlikely to win the resistance
new supporters. Even those countries that have
accepted the legitimacy of the troop withdrawal have
largely dismissed it as an insignificant gesture. At
most, the gesture may make it more difficult in a few
Third World countries to argue convincingly that the
Soviets are intransigent.
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The Key Players Add Up the Points
The Chinese were quick to judge the withdrawal
pledge as a largely rhetorical gesture. Although Soviet 25X1
leader Gorbachev clearly hoped that the pledged
partial withdrawal of forces would help to remove one
of the three main obstacles that Beijing says stand in
the way of normalized Soviet-Chinese relations, he
has almost certainly not succeeded. From China's
perspective, Soviet policy on Afghanistan is
unchanged.
Pakistan probably was initially cautiously hopeful
that the withdrawal indicated a desire on Moscow's
part to be more flexible in the UN-sponsored
negotiations in Geneva. President Zia in early
October commented publicly that he saw the move as
"encouraging," but that he did not endorse a
withdrawal in installments. He insisted that, if the
situation had stabilized enough to allow a partial
withdrawal, all Soviet forces should go.
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Zia, who subsequently told the press that the Soviets
had introduced 15,000 troops this year into
Afghanistan, is unlikely to feel any pressure to
respond to the withdrawal with a "reciprocal gesture"
as the Soviets insist. Although the Pakistani President
may be unwilling to publicly criticize Moscow over its
duplicity, the Soviet ruse may affect Pakistan's
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Excerpts From World Press
Coverage of the Withdrawal
In France, the influential Le Monde: "The event,
which was noisily announced by the official press,
does not seem to impress the people of Kabul . . . ."
The right-of-center Quotidien: "A withdrawal whose
meaning has no relation with the formidable
propaganda operation surrounding it. . . they invited
140 correspondents in Moscow to witness the
withdrawal . . . a public relations operation . . . ."
In Belgium, the Catholic De Standaard: "The Soviet
decision can best be described as a subtraction from
an unknown quantity."
In Portugal, Diario de Noticias, the leading daily,
said that "the withdrawal is a mere gesture" that
signifies no basic change in Moscow's policy.
In Japan, the Daily Yomiuri said "There is some
doubt about the Soviet Union's true intentions in
starting its announced withdrawal of troops . . . but at
any rate, only 8,000 out of 115,000 troops are going
to leave and this will not really change the situation
much." The conservative Sankei Shimbun said, "The
Soviet Union should show a more visible withdrawal
figure as it is pulling out only 8,000 of its 115,000
troops estimated to be in Afghanistan . . . the Soviets
should announce a complete withdrawal timetable."
In China, Renmin Ribao said ". . . the number of
regiments scheduled to be withdrawn amount to only
a small part. In addition, the Soviet Union has not
yet published the troop withdrawal schedule and has
not stopped Soviet military operations in
Afghanistan. For this reason, people cannot
understand whether this is the beginning of a general
withdrawal. . . or a tactical step for the purpose of
gaining a favorable position in the US-Soviet talks."
In Yugoslavia, domestic radio commentators said, "It
is obvious that the military situation and the relation
of forces in Afghanistan have not changed
considerably. . . anyway, even if one discounts?but
one does not have to do so?the number of soldiers
who will be withdrawn . . . there is also the
composition of those forces. One of the six regiments
is a tank regiment, two are mechanized, and three are
antiaircraft. Not only do the mujahidin not have
tanks or planes, they do not have a large quantity of
heavy arms. This is why mujahidin members seem
not to believe much in a real withdrawal . . . ."
negotiating position at Geneva. The Pakistanis are
likely to be more suspicious of Soviet pledges, possibly
more insistent on strong monitoring provisions, and
probably even less willing than in the past to consider
any Soviet offer to withdraw all its forces over an
extended period. Pakistan, however, will continue
bilateral discussions with Moscow
At the same time, Moscow's attempts to convince the
world that it wants a negotiated withdrawal in
Afghanistan risk creating fears among Kabul's ruling
elite that the Soviets are beginning to abandon them.
We believe that the ruling party, seriously divided
since the Soviets installed Najib as party chief, would
suffer increased strains if party members were to
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believe that a genuine Soviet disengagement had
begun. Babrak Karmal loyalists, unhappy over his
replacement, have already formed an opposition party
with anti-Soviet overtones,
It was embarrassing for
Moscow, moreover, wnen Babrak was publicly
mobbed by well-wishers at withdrawal cermonies in
Kabul. This show of support followed his conspicuous
absence from pullout ceremonies a few days earlier in
Shindand and rumors of his arrest
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Looking at the Scorecard
The withdrawal almost certainly has failed to win
over world opinion and impress China and Pakistan
with what was meant to appear as a good-faith
gesture of the Soviets' willingness to solve the Afghan
problem. But the negative results of the venture,
primarily the charges of Soviet duplicity, were also
manageable. Even the reaction of the US Government
to the deception was apparently considered by
Moscow as within acceptable bounds.
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Afghanistan: Cultural Factors
in the Insurgency?
Mixed Blessings 1
Ethnic, cultural, and religious factors generally
strengthen the Afghan resistance's ability to resist
Soviet domination. Deep commitments to defending
family and religion sustain the will of the fighters,
while the fragmented nature of Afghan society tends
to hamper regime policies aimed at co-opting the
population. At the same time, deeply rooted hatreds
among ethnic groups and tribes, xenophobic attitudes,
opportunism, and individuality slow the transition of
fighters or even groups of fighters into a strong
insurgency.
Traditional Social Organizations
The tightly knit Afghan family, tribal, and village
structures provide strong barriers to Soviet
penetration. Traditional tribal structures have long
provided a basis for organizing opposition to outside
invaders, but the tribal leaders are fickle and quick to
shift their loyalties in return for bribes or to stay on
the winning side.
The Family. The primary allegiance of Afghans is to
the family. In rural areas the most common form is
the extended family consisting of brothers and their
families sharing the same household.
To an Afghan, family and extended kinship ties
determine to a great extent who he is, who he can
become, where he can go, and how he should fight the
war. Afghans do not take actions independently but,
rather, in kinship units.
Scholars of Afghanistan have pointed out that,
although a family may experience internal
competition and feuds, it presents a united front to the
outside world and is impermeable to outside influence.
In part, the Soviet movement of thousands of Afghan
youths away from their families for education in the
USSR reflects a recognition by Moscow of the
difficulties in changing attitudes within the
traditional family units.
' This paper was prepared by an outside contractor. It was not
coordinated within this Agency. The views expressed are those of
the author.
31
Providing for the family comes before fighting.
Historically this has meant that military campaigns
lasted for limited periods so that men could return to
farming or herding to provide for their families. This
is still largely the case with the Afghan guerrillas,
even in areas where there has been an attempt to
build a professional paid army.
Many men with families in Pakistan commute
between Pakistan and the battlefronts in Afghanistan.
Many guerrilla commanders have a rotation system,
with the men spending two weeks in Afghanistan and
two weeks with their families in Pakistan. For the
groups fighting deeper inside Afghanistan, the
rotation period is longer.
Tribes. The tribal areas of Afghanistan are in the
east, primarily among the Pashtuns near the Pakistani
border. The tribes include the Mohmand, Jaji,
Jadran, Mangul, Tani, Shinwari, and Waziri in the
Provinces of Paktia, Nangarhar, and Konarha. Tribal
structures divide characteristically into subtribes,
lineages, clans, and extended families.
In Afghanistan, as in other traditional societies, tribal
leaders can often mobilize thousands of men at a
moment's notice for a battle. The Pashtun tribes are
particularly bellicose. Fighting over pasture land,
tribal honor, or tribal autonomy against neighboring
tribes, national governments, or invading armies has
long been a way of life. Acquiring war booty is also a
motivating factor.
Pashtun tribal groups under traditional leaders have
fought against the Kabul regime and the Soviets in
many areas for several years, but their capacity to
increase pressure on the regime is limited. They
usually participate in the fighting only if it suits their
tribal objectives and tend not to fight in areas outside
their tribal region. They resist being organized into
units led by nontribal members and generally resist
military training from nontribal people. Tribal leaders
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often are allied with Gailani or Mojadedi, the so-
called traditionalist insurgent leaders, partly because
these groups are loosely organized and present no
challenge to established tribal authorities.
The tribes most often fight on the side of the
resistance but owe little allegiance to it. They strike
deals with Kabul when it suits their interest. Several
tribes?including part of the Mohmand, the Jaji, and
the Shinwari?cooperate to some degree with Kabul.
They will quickly abandon Kabul if they believe their
interests lie elsewhere.
Village Structure. In the non-Pashtun areas where
the village-based system predominates, allegiance
beyond the family traditionally goes primarily to the
local landlord, called khans in most areas. The khans,
often natural and capable leaders, control the
distribution of farmland and products as well as most
aspects of village life. They are also, in some cases,
quite despotic.
Since the beginning of the war the influence of
landlords has been challenged by young men, often of
humble origin who have gained prestige as successful
guerrilla leaders, and by some religious leaders. Many
of the landlords have been killed or have fled to
Pakistan or Kabul.
Antilandlord activity is a stated policy of the Islamic
alliance groups?Jamiat-i-Islami, both factions of
Hizbi Islami, and Sayyars Islamic Union?and the
groups fighting out of Iran. These groups espouse the
development of a more egalitarian society based on
Islamic principles. Leaders of the traditionalist
political groups, including Gailani, Nabi, and
Mojadedi, are themselves largely from the landlord
class and thus often support traditional village
structures.
The collapse of the khans as traditional leaders in the
villages in some areas, such as in the Panjsher, has
allowed development of a regional front uniting
various villages and groups. In other areas, the ousting
of the khans has had a negative effect, leaving many
villages without good leadership.
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Religious leaders, who generally did not play a large
role in village leadership before 1978, have become
more important, but in some areas the population is
led by an often ineffective local mullah.
Afghan Codes of Honor and Manhood
The Afghans, especially the tribal Pashtuns, have a
strong code of behavior that emphasizes bravery,
honor, and revenge. Called push tunwali, the code of
behavior is an elaborate although indefinite set of
rules that describes the duties of manhood. The rules
specify everything from how to entertain a guest to
how to fight. Among the nontribal people of
Afghanistan these codes have been largely replaced
by religious codes of honor. Among Tajik and other
Persian speakers, the concept of bravery and honor is
called jarvin maroi.
Codes of honor sometimes enhance the ability of the
Afghans to fight. They account for the incredible
bravery and tenaciousness of Afghan fighters. The
emphasis on the ability to withstand privation and
difficult surroundings without complaint accounts for
the ability of Afghan insurgents to wage war in bleak
circumstances.
Still, the codes often work against the development of
good guerrilla fighters and account for many of the
Afghans' problems in accepting training and in using
appropriate military tactics. The emphasis on bravery
and on individual action leads Afghans in many areas
not to bother with normal precautions in planning and
executing military operations. Insurgents often seem
to believe that only courage is required to succeed.
Training, intelligence, and other preparations are
often neglected.
Many Afghans are unnecessarily wounded or killed
because they believe that taking precautions would
show cowardice and violate the codes of honor in front
of fellow Afghans. Moreover, the individual approach
to fighting makes it difficult to develop cooperation in
fighting.
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The Insurgents Under Fire?Pluses and Minuses
The following account of an insurgent attack in 1985
on a regime post near Jegdalek in Kabol Province was
written by an experienced military observer. It
provides a useful account of the strengths and
weaknesses provided by Afghan cultural traits.
Elementary principles of warfare were violated.
Although there was no time pressure, reconnaissance
of the terrain was insufficient. No one knew the exact
location of the minefields. Fire support from infantry
weapons was, at a distance of 800 to 900 meters,
much too far from the enemy positions to have a
serious neutralizing effect on the target. The
insurgents were not divided into groups until 30
minutes before the attack. Thus, good coordination
between the combatants was impossible from the
outset. There was no contact between the two assault
groups and the fire support teams. No one thought
about the care of possibly injured troops. Even
bandage sets had been left behind in the base camp,
10 hours away by foot.
An impressive aspect was the calmness with which the
guerrillas from Jegdalek prepared for battle. Full of
confidence, they believed that they would capture
weapons and hoped for deserters from the enemy
camp. Enthusiasm in battle was correspondingly high
at the outset. After the disastrous explosion of a land
mine, the troops fell into retreat. During this phase
there was no discernible panic or despair. The
insurgents came to terms amazingly well with the
demise of one of their comrades. After three days they
set out, unflustered, on a new attack. They impressed
me as amazingly carefree and somehow fatalistic
because they did not draw any kind of basic
conclusions from their most recent defeat.
The guerrillas in Jegdalek apparently do not know the
idea or even the meaning of a cost-benefit analysis.
This vexing phenomenon is probably explained more
or less as follows:
? Because many Afghans from the rural population
scarcely have any higher education, their
imagination is basically supported by and limited
to their everyday surroundings. It is only with
difficulty that they can put distance between
themselves and their romantic concept of war,
anchored in tradition.
? Many Afghans are still bound to the idea that the
outcome of a war depends primarily on the courage
and boldness of the individual combatant.
Only a few have realized that in a modern war the
quality of the armaments, the level of military
training, and the application of appropriate tactics are
additional factors in determining success. Even fewer
are capable of drawing useful conclusions from the
above-mentioned realizations.
In Jegdalek, I got the impression that the fighters
scarcely make a direct association between their hopes
for victory and the successes or failures of an
individual campaign. The catastrophic consequences
of the war and the unimaginable strains of permanent
combat have thus far been endured by an amazingly
large number of Afghans without resignation. The
conviction that they are fighting for a just cause
appears to be invincible. Certainly, religion plays a
significant role in this context, found in the idea of the
"holy war" against the "godless Communists." One,
however, should be careful not to see purely religious
fanatics among the Afghan guerrillas. Their strength
of resistance is fed from other sources as well:
? The close connection to their home and their deeply
rooted demand for self-determination, which would
never permit the assimilation of imposed societal
forms, are other elements of their combat morale.
? Many Afghans would also have sufficient
motivation for maintaining their almost axiomatic
will for resistance even without strong religious
convictions. An enormous number of Afghans have
already lost everything except their lives. They are
driven to win back their country and their
independence.
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Martyrdom and Fatalism. Martyrdom and fatalism
are closely related to the codes of honor and manhood
and have much the same effect on the fighting. A
martyr in Islam is one who dies fighting in the sacred
Islamic war, the jihad. Like the codes of honor, the
Islamic notion of martyrdom encourages the Islamic
insurgents in Afghanistan to take large risks without
regard to danger, facilitating guerrilla attacks.
Although strong belief in a just cause and an ultimate
trust in God help sustain morale, in a guerrilla war
this fatalism also works against developing strategy
and tactics and against the acceptance of proper
training. Many Afghans believe that faith is enough
to drive out the Soviets and they need only to put
themselves in God's hands to win the war.
Afghan Attitudes Toward Other Nationalities
Afghans, a proud people who have defended
themselves against the outside world for centuries,
have built up prejudices toward other nationalities.
These attitudes affect Afghan relations with these
people and also the fighting when the other nations
are involved.
Pakistanis. An Afghan, generally speaking, views
Pakistanis and other peoples of the Indian
subcontinent with contempt. This can be observed in
several ways, including the naming of their major
mountain range the Hindu Kush?the killer of
Hindus?and the jokes they tell of the people from
that area. Afghans openly mock the speech of the
subcontinent and consider the Pakistanis to be
inferior. This dislike is strongest toward the Punjabis
and perhaps least noticeable toward the Pakistani
Pushtuns, who share a similar cultural heritage with
the Afghans.
As a result, Afghans find it difficult to be under
Pakistani supervision. This bias accounts, in part, for
the refusal of some Afghans to be trained by the
Pakistani Army. Even though many guerrilla
commanders admit that the Pakistani Army is good
and could probably help them, they cannot accept the
idea of working under an officer who most likely is
Punjabi.
The Afghans suspect the Pakistanis of cheating them
and resent having to plead with Pakistani (Punjabi)
officials for arms and ammunition they believe are
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rightfully theirs. Distrust of the Pakistanis also
accounts in part for the stockpiling of military
supplies by Afghan insurgents in the border region of
Afghanistan, even though these arms depots are not
defensible.
Iranians. The Afghans display an inferiority complex
toward the Iranians. Parts of Afghan culture are
closer to Iranian culture than to Pakistani culture;
Persian is the most widely spoken language in
Afghanistan; and Iran is looked to by many Afghans,
though not all, as the cultural heartland. Many
Afghans, Sunnis, and Shias, go to Iran to study.
Before 1978 it was considered desirable among the
upper class in Kabul to speak Persian with an Iranian
accent. At the same time, the Afghans rightly believe
that the Iranians look down on them. Afghans who
have gone to Iran report being treated rudely by
Iranians.
Other Nationalities. The Afghans hold varying
attitudes toward other foreigners, shaped by recent
history:
? Muslim Arabs are not well liked because the
Afghans find them overly puritanical, preachy,
arrogant, and effete.
? The Soviets are disliked, in part because they are
atheists, but largely because of the events of the last
eight years. Still, the Soviets are grudgingly
respected for their brutality and staying power.
Comments heard earlier in the war about inept
Soviet soldiers are heard less as the Soviets have
improved their fighting capability.
In Sum ...
The Afghans have proven to be brave, tough, and
skilled fighters. Their ability to fight an effective
guerrilla war has been heightened by the
characteristics of traditional Afghan culture and
social structure. Paradoxically, this traditional culture
has held the Afghan guerrillas back in many ways and
had a negative effect on efforts to develop a more
sophisticated, well-organized fighting force.
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Western Sahara: Whither the
Polisario Front?
The Algerian-backed Polisario Front continues to face
insurmountable challenges in trying to attain
unilaterally a military victory against Morocco in
Western Sahara. Conventional warfare has proven
ineffective against Rabat's berm strategy. In addition,
the Front is experiencing strains with its patron
Algeria, which is facing severe financial difficulties of
its own. In our view, the Polisario has three options in
Western Sahara: continuation of the current low-
intensity conflict; initiation of terrorism; or
disengagement. We believe that the most the Polisario
can hope for is the first option as long as Algeria
insists on limiting the conflict. Escalation through
terrorism could develop as the war drags on with a
reduction in Algerian assistance. Any political
solution involving Sahrawi autonomy is unlikely while
Rabat has the upper hand militarily.
Background
The Western Sahara problem, like many Third World
conflicts, has its origins in the process of
decolonization. Primarily the product of the conflict
between the desire of Saharan nationalists for self-
determination and Moroccan territorial claims, it has
been greatly complicated by the longstanding rivalry
between Morocco and Algeria. Spain's decision to
grant independence to its Saharan colony in 1976 set
the stage for the small-scale war that has been fought
since then by Morocco and the Algerian-backed
Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of
Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro).
The military and political prospects for the Polisario
and its government-in-exile, the Saharan Democratic
Arab Republic (SDAR), have diminished over time.
Although the Polisario initially achieved some
military gains, the tide of war has turned against it
since the early 1980s. At that time, Morocco began
constructing a network of earthen berms to wall out
the Polisario insurgents. The SDAR has been more
successful on the diplomatic front, gaining diplomatic
recognition from 65 countries and the Organization of
African Unity. These political advances, however,
have not had a significant effect on the battlefield.
35
Leadership and Organization. The Polisario remains
fairly stable as a political and military movement 12
years after its creation. Mohamed Abdelaziz has
served as President of the SDAR and political chief of
the Polisario since the death of its founder in 1976.
Senior positions in the movement are held by a small
coterie of leaders who stress non-Marxist Arab
socialism, unity, and nationalism as the main features
of the Polisario struggle. A nine-member Executive
Committee is the formal executive body of the
Polisario, while the Council of Ministers of the SDAR
is the administrative and governmental apparatus.
The only apparent differences within the Polisario
arise over strategy, in which a group including
Defense Minister Ghali and Foreign Minister
Mansour want to pursue more aggressive military
tactics against Morocco, including terrorism.
Stability within the Polisario Front probably stems
primarily from the fact that Algeria provides it with
the necessary financial and military support and a
territorial base. Algeria claims that it gives the
Sahrawi refugees, housed in four camps around
Tindouf, about $100 million per year?a sum
probably not overly burdensome even with Algeria's
economic problems. The number of Sahrawi refugees
has been a source of contention: Algeria and the
Polisario claim as many as 165,000 and Morocco
15,000. An American scholar believes the number
falls between 17,000 and 35,000?a range we
endorse. Algeria also has provided the Polisario with
an impressive arsenal of weapons, including
approximately 100 tanks, 150 armored vehicles, 40
howitzers and mortars, SA-6 air defense missiles, and
500 trucks and land rovers
Difficulties Facing the Movement
SDAR officials are facing challenges from Algiers.
financial aid to the Polisario has diminished as
Algeria copes with falling petroleum revenues. In
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Table 1
Countries Recognizing the Saharan Democratic
Arab Republic
Year/
Africa
Asia
Latin America
Europe
Number a
1976
Algeria
North Korea
10
Angola
Benin
Burundi
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Mozambique
Rwanda
Togo
1977
Seychelles
1
1978
Congo
South Yemen
Panama
5
Sao-Tome and Principe
Tanzania
1979
Cape Verde
Afghanistan
Dominica
16
Ethiopia
Cambodia
Grenada
Ghana
Laos
Guyana
Lesotho
Vietnam
Jamaica
Zambia
Mexico
Nicaragua
St. Lucia
1980
Botswana
Iran
Costa Rica
12
Libya
Syria
Cuba
Mali
Vanuatu
Sierra Leone
Swaziland
Chad
Zimbabwe
1981
Kiribati
5
Nauru
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Tuvalu
1982
Mauritius
Bolivia
4
Suriname
Venezuela
1983
Ecuador
1984
Burkina
Peru
Yugoslavia
5
Mauritania
Nigeria
1985
India
Colombia
2
1986
Uganda
Guatemala
4
Dominican Republic
Trinidad and Tobago
a Total number of countries from 1976 to 1986 is 65: Africa (30),
Asia (15), Latin America (19), and Europe (1).
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Table 2
Political Leadership of the Polisario Front
SDAR Ministers
Polisario Front
Mohamed Abdelaziz President
Secretary General
Bechir Mustafa Sayed
Deputy Secretary General
Mohamed Salim Ould Salek Secretary General of the
Presidency
Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed Prime Minister
Omar Mansour Foreign Affairs
Brahim Ould Mustafa Ghali
Mohamed Ould Zayou
Defense
Justice
Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed
Education
Taleb Omar
Interior
Ould Boubeh Ould Youssef Salek
Ould Ahmed Baba Hammoudi
Health and Welfare
Communications and Energy
Ibrahim Hakim Information
Mohamed Ould Sidati Ould Sheikh Counselor to the Prime Minister
Omar Hadrani
Director General for Foreign
Relations
addition, Algiers imposes limits on Polisario military
planning and operations because President Bendjedid
fears that an escalation of the war could lead to a
direct confrontation between Algeria and Morocco.
Polisario leaders are
displeased with 13endjedid's cautious stance on
prosecuting the war. The friction stems from the fact
that the Polisario Front has lost its capability to win
the war through military means. The insurgents have
increasingly used hit-and-run tactics because
conventional military assaults have proven ineffective
against Morocco's defensive berms.
Foreign Relations. Libya does not appear to be a
major alternative source of support. Qadhafi gave aid
before Libya's union with Morocco in 1984, but such
support was sporadic and unreliable. The recent
schism between Morocco and Libya raises the
37
prospects for a resumption of Libyan aid,
events such as Polisario leader
Abdelaziz's journey to Tripoli shortly after the
rupture of the Moroccan-Libyan union. Polisario and
Algerian officials would almost certainly welcome
renewed Libyan financial or military support, but
they would not allow Tripoli to influence military and
dipomatic strategy.
Mauritania's policy toward the Polisario has hardened
since the emergence of the Taya government in late
1984. Whereas Mauritania favored the Polisario
cause under President Taya's predecessor, the current
government in Nouakchott appears more sympathetic
toward Morocco. Mauritania is attempting to remain
officially neutral, however, and has been unable to
prevent the guerrillas from using its territory for
attacks against the berms.
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Social. The Polisario leadership's control over, and
support from, the Sahrawi population in Algeria
appears fairly firm. Every aspect of life in the camps
is heavily politicized and militarized, including
complete indoctrination of youth. According to the
the techniques of education
resemble brainwashing, and student youth rallies have
been likened to those of the Nazis. Although this
indoctrination has not led to terrorism, the potential
for radicalization of the Front?similar to the PLO?
is great and could pose a problem for Algeria over the
long term. Some credible press reports indicate
disaffection among the population and desertions
among Polisario fighters,
Options
The Polisario Front and Algeria can choose among
three alternative courses of action: continuing the
status quo; escalation through terrorism; and
disengagement. Of the three, we believe that
continuing the status quo is most likely, at least for
the short term, and that disengagement is the least
palatable for the Polisario. Polisario officials cannot
devise any strategy without the concurrence of
Bendiedid given the Front's dependence on Algiers.
From the military standpoint, the Polisario and the
Algerians have shown no sign of devising a new
strategy for winning the war. Even so, both Algeria
and the Polisario probably will at some point decide to
intensify the fighting through use of armor, air
defense weapons, and more aggressive commando
raids. Algeria under Bendjedid and his economic
austerity program is unlikely to allow the Polisario to
drag it into a full-scale conflict with Morocco.
Morocco, for its part, has no need to adopt more
aggressive measures, given the success of its berm
strategy.
Diplomatically, there are no signs of progress toward
a negotiated settlement. Other than the general
concept of a cease-fire, little has been agreed upon
because the Algerians want Morocco to negotiate
directly with the SDAR, a position unacceptable to
Rabat. The definition of the voting population in
Western Sahara is a subject of disagreement with
regard to holding a referendum on the political status
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of the territory. In addition, the composition of a
peace-keeping force to safeguard the polling would
need to be worked out.
Terrorism. A less likely scenario is the Polisario's
initiation of terrorist operations. Because terrorism is
not yet used, all sides in the dispute would view such
action as an escalation of the war. The Polisario
probably realizes it must adopt new methods of direct
confrontation to turn the conflict against Morocco
the SDAR
Defense and Foreign Ministers are attempting to
obtain Algerian approval to mount terrorist
operations. Terrorist attacks carried out behind
Moroccan lines against military targets in Western
Sahara probably would be less controversial to Rabat
than terrorism against civilians within Morocco
proper
Disengagement. Abandonment of the conflict
probably is the least likely option for the Polisario.
Such a course is unnecessary, given Algerian military
commitments and the SDAR's diplomatic gains.
Algiers, for its part, would not want to stop the
fighting at this juncture without a face-saving
solution. Algeria probably views the current Polisario
military campaign as a way of encouraging Rabat to
accept a negotiated settlement.
Implications for the United States
We believe Polisario attitudes toward Washington
will reflect those of Algiers. Polisario leaders rankle at
Washington's support for King Hassan, but they have
been restrained in their comments about
Washington's position and have sought to curry favor
with the United States.
Only a serious escalation would encourage the parties
to go beyond their limited attempts to draw
Washington into the conflict. Algeria's attitude
toward the United States will be a key factor in
limiting the adverse impact of the conflict upon US
interests. So long as Algeria keeps the Polisario under
tight control, there is little likelihood that the
guerrillas will challenge Rabat in ways that could
destabilize Morocco in the near term.
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