NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300840003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 24, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP05SO2029R000300840003-9
T
Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Near East and
South Asia Review
Supplement
24 October 1986
NESA NR.4AR 86-024C
cza a tower i vao
Copy
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP05SO2029R000300840003-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP05SO2029R000300840003-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/18: CIA-RDP05S02029R000300840003-9
Near East and
South Asia Review
President Taya's hold on power appears increasingly precarious as
Mauritania's underpriviledged blacks and ruling Arabic Maurs
jockey for power. Black agitation along with Libyan meddling have
led Taya to crack down on black dissidents, but it is unclear how
effective this repression will be.
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Nazian: Valley of Disappointment for the Afghan Regim~ I 3 25X1
As part of a general drive to increase its control of the strategic
eastern border provinces, the Afghan regime tried without much
success during the first half of 1986 to block resistance forces from
using the Nazian Valley. The regime probably will not resume
major operations in the valley in the near future.
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views.
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Mauritania: Taya Strikes Back
Against Opponents
President Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya's hold on
power appears increasingly precarious. Since coming
to power in December 1984, he has taken a number of
steps to appease Mauritania's black population. These
measures, however, have only whetted black appetites
for more change because the blacks have always been
underprivileged despite their growing numerical
strength. At the same time, many of the country's
ruling Arabic Maurs perceive such concessions as
eroding their position at the apex of Mauritanian
society. Black agitation, along with Libyan efforts to
fish in troubled political waters, have led Taya during
the past two months to crack down on black
dissidents, but it is unclear whether his repression will
quash or add to the mounting unrest.
A Divided Society
According to the US Embassy, the Maurs-the
traditional elite in Mauritania-account for 30 to 45
percent of the population of this almost entirely
Islamic country and have a tight grip on both the
government and the economy. Fundamentally
different from the Maurs in psychology, culture, and
background are Mauritania's three principal black
tribes, which include up to 30 percent of the
population and make up the majority of the military's
enlisted personnel, the lower grades of the civil
service, and the unskilled labor force. Caught between
these two groups are the Haratin, a largely Arabized
black sector of society that includes an estimated 25
to 40 percent of the population and occupies servile
positions.
Since Mauritania received its independence from
France in 1960, the black tribes have grown
increasingly dissatisfied with their subordinate
position, and, in recent years, their discontent has
begun to spread to the Haratin. The Maurs, for their
part, worry that the blacks will try to supplant them
and change the character of the country from Arab to
African. The anxiety of the Maurs is increased by
their awareness that the black and Haratin
populations are increasing faster than their own. 25X1
Taya's Reform Program Unravels
As president and head of the ruling Military Council
for National Salvation (CMSN), Taya broke sharply
with the hardline policies of the previous regime and
tried hard to reach an accommodation with the
blacks. He probably believed such a policy was the
only way to maintain the status quo. Toward that end,
he ended political detention and internal travel
controls and recently began preparations for local 25X1
elections. Leaders of the principal black tribes,
however, used their increased freedom to press for a
larger share of political power. Their growing protests
alarmed many of Taya's Maur supporters and led
some to call for tougher measures to quell the growing
racial animosity and to question Taya's authority as
well.
By late summer Taya apparently believed he had to
crack down on dissident blacks. In September he
arrested 40 prominent members of the politically
active Toucouleur tribe on charges of subversive
activity-primarily for membership in FLAME
(Front for the Liberation of Africans in Mauritania), a
secret black antigovernment organization, and for the
dissemination of antigovernment tracts in Nouakchott
and other Mauritanian towns in the south and at the 25X1
recent Organization of African Unity and Nonaligned
summit meetings. 25X1
these tracts criticized the Maurs for 25X1
Top Secret
NESA NFSAR R6-0240
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Top Secret
dominating virtually every sector of national life and
compared the Taya government, controlled by the
be dane (Arabized white people), with the apartheid
regime of South Africa. These blacks were
subsequently tried, and 20 received stiff fines and
sentences ranging from six months to five years, to be
followed by 10 years of internal exile.
Along with these moves, Taya also sacked Minister of
Commerce Babaly, the most prominent of the blacks
on the CMSN, who lost both his ministerial and
CMSN positions. Babaly had lost his job in August as
Minister of the Interior because he refused to
authorize the arrest of black dissidents. He was
replaced at Interior by hardliner Djibril Abdellahi,
who proceeded with the arrests.
Taya also removed from the CMSN Colonel
Boukhreiss, a prominent leftist Maur, Arab
nationalist, and pro-Libyan. Boukhreiss has a wide
following in the military, the police, and civil
government and is reported to espouse cooperation
among Arab and black nationalists. In addition, four
Boukhreiss supporters were arrested for allegedly
selling Mauritanian passports to the Polisario.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
We believe that rising expectations on the part of the
blacks combined with foreign meddling will make it
increasingly difficult for the Taya regime to govern.
We believe that the President will continue with the
crackdown. Even if he succeeds in stifling black
protests for a time, they are likely to break out again,
with increasing strength. On the foreign policy front,
Taya's insecurity will encourage him to maintain
strict neutrality on the Western Sahara issue. If
Qadhafi increases his pressure, Taya may be
compelled to look to Morocco for support.
In our view, Taya's successor probably would be less
friendly to the United States. He is likely to be
replaced by either a far left and pro-Libyan Arab
hardliner such as Boukhreiss or, more likely, a far
rightist such as Abdellahi. Changes likely to be
instituted by a successor regime could include harsher
enforcement of Islamic law, more emphasis on Arabic
municipal elections planned for December.
rather than French as the official language, and an
abandonment or slowdown of the movement toward
democracy, with perhaps even the cancellation of the
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Top Secret
Nazian: Valley of Disappointment
for the Afghan Regime
As part of a general drive to increase its control of the
strategic eastern border provinces, the Afghan regime
tried without much success during the first half of
early 1986 to block resistance forces from using the
Nazian Valley. Besides hindering resistance
infiltration and resupply operations, the government
wanted to have a secure base to facilitate its support
for Afridi tribesmen linked to the Pakistani dissident
Wali Khan Kukikhel.
A Strategic Valley
The Nazian Valley in eastern Nangarhar Province is
important for insurgent forces in the area, most of
which belong to the Hizbi Islami (Khalis) party.
Several major supply routes from Pakistan intersect
at the town of Nazian. The trails cross the Safed Koh
mountain range south of Nazian through five passes
that are open only during the summer and fall.
This part of Nangarhar Province is also close to an
area of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province
occupied by the Afridi tribe. The leader of a fractious
clan of the tribe, Wali Khan Kukikhel, has
longstanding ties to the Kabul government
Objective: To Secure the Valley
In early 1986 Soviet and Afghan regime forces
intensified military pressure on guerrilla forces in
Nangarhar Province as part of an overall effort to
stem insurgent resupply and infiltration from
On 30 January, Afghan and Soviet forces began a
new offensive in the valley to capture guerrilla
weaponry, secure a route for pro-Kabul Pakistani
tribesmen, and continue interdiction of resistance
During the week of 24 February, Afghan and Soviet
forces launched another operation against insurgents
in the Nazian-Towr Kham region,
The sweep, probably intended to keep
the insurgents from challenging the regime's newly
established outposts, was apparently poorly planned,
and the regime sustained more casualties than the
insurgents.
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cto er
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As long as the regime had a preponderance of force in
the valley, insurgent forces drew back. Starting in late
March, however, when the regime was forced to use
some of the forces deployed in Nazian to respond to
insurgent activity in Paktia and Vardak Provinces, the
insurgents took advantage of the pullout to escalate
attacks. Over the next two months, the guerrillas
increased their strength in the valley sufficiently to
seize five border posts, according to the US Embassy
in Islamabad. Resistance forces also interdicted
several regime convoys and captured some
ammunition stocks.
The level of guerrilla activity increased enough by late
May that Afghan regime and Soviet military
commanders once more prepared to resume combat
operations in Nazian.
Before this new offensive began, the insurgents
overran more Afghan army posts in the Nazian
Valley. In response, Kabul ordered airstrikes and
some reinforcements from the army's 11th Infantry
Division at Jalalabad. Although those actions
momentarily permitted the regime to fend off
insurgent attacks, the guerrillas shortly thereafter
assaulted four regime security posts in the valley,
causing heavy casualties.
Prospects
The Afghan regime probably will not resume major
operations in the Nazian Valley in the near future.
The surge of guerrilla activity throughout
Afghanistan during the summer strained the army's
capabilities to respond to a widespread threat, and
resistance pressure in other sections of Nangarhar and
Paktia Provinces has put regime forces there on the
defensive. To undertake another major offensive in
the Nazian Valley, the poorly trained and
understrength Afghan military will need substantial
assistance from Soviet forces. Even then, a large-scale
offensive would probably provide only fleeting control
of the valley.
Events in the Nazian Valley underscore the Soviet
and Afghan Governments' inability to pacify
permanently important border areas. Insurgent
activity can be stifled only in the few instances where
the regime can afford to station large units.
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