NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300830003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 26, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Near East and
South Asia Review
26 September 1986
NESA NESAR 86-022
16 September 1986
321
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Moderate Arab States
Moderate Arab states are increasingly becoming victims of major
terrorist attacks and threats by Middle Eastern radicals. Some Arab
leaders are calling for regional cooperation to counter the threat, but
traditional Arab rivalries will stymie comprehensive cooperation.
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Saudi Arabia's close relationship with Jordan remains measured
despite common foreign policy goals, extensive economic ties, and
intertwined security interests. Periodic irritants are likely to be short
lived, however, because both sides recognize the mutually beneficial
nature of their relationship.
Algeria is facing its most serious financial crisis since independence
because of prolonged soft world energy prices. Although President
Bendjedid has so far been able to sell austerity to the public, he may
run into serious problems with his opponents if they decide to use the
economy as a pretext to move against him.
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Scholarly studies in the past decade have emphasized the growing
self-identification of Israeli Arabs as Palestinians, implying their
political radicalization. Professors at Haifa University, however,
have concluded from years of research that Israeli Arabs are
becoming more "Israeli" in their attitudes and behavior.
i Secret
NESA NESAR 86-022
26 September /986
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Syria's Elite Military Units: The Changing of the Guard
In the last two years President Assad has directed sweeping changes
in the distribution of power among Syria's elite military units-
especially those responsible for protecting his regime from internal
threats-in an effort to prevent a recurrence of the power struggle
that threatened to topple his regime in the spring of 1984.
The Muslim Brotherhood of Syria: Possible Resurgence
The involvement of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members in
antiregime activity this year marks a significant departure from the
group's quiescence that followed its brutal suppression in 1982.
President Assad, however, is unlikely to face a major challenge from
the Brotherhood as long as he remains healthy enough to exert his
authority.
The disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, spiritual leader of the Lebanese
Shia community, while on a visit to Libya in 1978 remains a cause
celebre for his followers and an enigma to observers of Lebanese
politics. Like the Shia Imams of medieval times, Sadr has vanished
from the secular arena but remains a focus of Shia political passion.
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Iraq: Toning Down the President's Personality Cult
Iraqi propagandists are revising the cult of personality they fostered
to glorify President Saddam Husayn, as his reputation as a great
war leader is no longer credible following Iraqi defeats at Al Faw
and Mehran, but the propagandists will have to be careful not to
lose the support of the lower classes, to whom the cult is meaningful.
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Iraq's President Saddam Husayn apparently is on the verge of
putting some of his closest relatives on trial for corruption. He seems
to have decided that the public mood has turned dangerously against
his family, and, unless he acts, resentment is likely to rub off on him.
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Members of Iran's middle classes have been the major losers since
the Islamic revolution as the clerical regime has focused its attention
and energies on its more important lower-class supporters. Though
the middle classes pose little threat to the regime, they are slowly
gaining influence and could become a moderating force.
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The Pakistan Muslim League's rebirth last January signals the
latest effort to build a cohesive government political party out of the
original Muslim League that fostered the creation of Pakistan in
1947. Popular cynicism with politicians and the inability to fulfill its
promises will make it difficult for the League to expand its appeal.
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Neither India nor Pakistan has a clear edge in armor and artillery
assets. Planned modernizations by both sides will only reinforce
existing strengths in their respective tank and artillery inventories,
resulting in increased casualties rather than decisive advantage in a
future conflict
Afghanistan: Smuggling Across the Border
The reexport trade in Afghanistan-which involves the import of
luxury and manufactured goods that are then smuggled out, most
often to Pakistan-is atime-honored custom for Afghans and, with
the deterioration of Afghanistan's official trade, has become an
increasingly important source of hard currency earnings for the
Kabul regime.
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normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
will be designated as noncoordinated views.
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Prospects for Counterterrorism
Cooperation Among Moderate
Arab States
Moderate Arab states are increasingly becoming
victims of major terrorist attacks and threats by
Middle Eastern radicals.' The active involvement of
Jordan, Egypt, and now Morocco in the Arab-Israeli
peace process has made them targets of radical
Palestinians backed by Syria and Libya, while support
for Iraq in its war with Iran has increased the
exposure of the moderate Arab Gulf states to Iranian-
inspired terrorism. The close affiliation of many of
these states with the United States further exposes
them to terrorist attacks.
Security Force to mold it into a more professional
organization. The Force supports the Directorate of
Military Intelligence in protecting Jordanian
airports and airlines. In March the Force's bomb
squad was to have acquired more sophisticated
bomb detector and disposal equipment.
? Late last year Morocco formed the paramilitary
Atlas Commando unit, which
is the unit most capable of responding quickly and
effectively to a terrorist incident in Morocco.
The moderate states are responding to the threat
primarily by upgrading their security and
counterterrorist capabilities. Some Arab leaders,
however, also are calling for regional cooperation to
counter the threat. We believe the moderates have a
good chance to utilize area and bilateral relationships
in cooperating against terrorism, but traditional Arab
rivalries will stymie comprehensive, regionwide
cooperation.
The Tactical Response to Terrorist Threat
The moderate Arab states have firmly denounced
terrorism, enforced harsher internal security
measures, and upgraded their intelligence and
counterterrorist capabilities over the past year. Some
states have been more active than others and better
able to devote additional resources to improved
security:
? We believe Jordan has the best counterterrorist
capabilities among the moderates, and they are
being strengthened to correct weaknesses. Last year
King Hussein selected a new head of the Public
' This article focuses on Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi
Arabia, and the smaller Gulf states of Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab
? Since late 1985, Tunisia has expanded its
counterterrorist training to include more advanced
courses in marksmanship, SWAT techniques, sky
marshal operations, and the protection of
dignitaries.
? Since the Egyptair hijacking last November and the
Achille Lauro operation a month earlier, Egypt has
sought outside assistance to correct counterterrorist
deficiencies and is conducting more realistic
exercises to improve the performance of the Group
777 commando force, the unit that botched the
Egyptair rescue attempt in Malta.
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designated counterterrorist commando unit, but
some components throughout its large security
network have received hostage rescue training. The
Saudis plan to expand their teams of bomb disposal
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NESA NESAR 86-022
26 September 1986
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experts to eight smaller cities throughout the
kingdom over the next two years. It currently has
contingents in Dhahran, Riyadh, Jiddah, Mecca,
and Medina.
Smaller Networks: A Workable Solution
Bilateral and area efforts at coordinating
counterterrorist strategies have been successful and
probably provide an avenue for further cooperation
that is more realistic than broader efforts at the level
of the Arab League. The Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) is the best example of area security
cooperation.Z Its members share common interests
and, probably more important, characteristics that
make them vulnerable terrorist targets. Most have
Shia populations that could be exploited by Iran, as
well as large numbers of expatriate workers that could
pose an internal security threat.
For other Arab states, most of which lack the
homogeneity that has motivated the Gulf moderates
to work together, counterterrorism cooperation is
likely to expand through bilateral relationships,
Such counterterrorism cooperation does not always
succeed.
Tunisian intelligence and security services have not
always been responsive participants in exchanges of
counterterrorism information among the moderate
states, probably because of parochialism and,
possibly, limited competence. Tunisia may be more
receptive to bilateral cooperation in the future,
particularly with Morocco in view of rising mutual
concerns over Libyan-sponsored terrorism.
Regional and International Cooperation:
Less Likely Vehicle
Despite our optimism over tactical counterterrorist
improvements, we believe the moderates will continue
to be slow in developing a broad regional strategy for
countering terrorism. Most probably would admit
that the problem could greatly benefit from more
cooperation. Few, however, would be willing to tackle
such a complex problem in light of traditional political
rivalries and distrust of each other's motives. More
pressing regional issues for the moderates, such as the
Iran-Iraq war and the Arab-Israeli peace process, and
domestic problems also will divert attention from
counterterrorism.
better regional exchange of information on
The Arab League is the only existing forum for
broad-based Arab participation in counterterrorism,
but it is unlikely to make much progress toward
cooperation. King Hassan of Morocco succeeded in
obtaining a general condemnation of terrorism at the
extraordinary Arab League summit meeting in
Casablanca in August 1985. In awell-publicized
address to the Council of Arab Interior Ministers in
Casablanca in February 1986, the King called for a
The GCC, formed in May 1981, is composed of Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.
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In May, the Dutch Foreign Minister, acting in his role
as President of the European Community, met Arab
League Secretary General Chedli Klibi in Tunis to
antiterrorist cooperation with the West is blocked
partly by the Arab dilemma of how to define
terrorism without delegitimizing the Palestinian
"armed struggle" against Israel. The involvement of
some Arab states in terrorism against other Arab
states further hampers the success of a broad regional
strategy.
Last January Egyptian President Mubarak called for
an international conference under UN auspices to
conclude a "comprehensive counterterrorism
agreement." The US Embassy in Cairo noted at the
time that Mubarak was proposing a working group of
some 15 states and had contacted Italy and Austria.
The initiative appears to have lost momentum,
probably because of Egypt's preoccupation with more
pressing domestic economic problems, efforts to
resume the peace process, and a lull in terrorism
directed at Egypt. Egypt almost certainly will
continue bilateral security contacts with selected
Western and Arab states, however, partly in the hope
of eventually implementing the initiative.
Outlook
Over the next year, moderate Arab states will
continue to be targets of terrorist pressure from Syria,
Libya, Iran, and Palestinian groups. More active
efforts on the part of the moderates to resolve Arab-
Israeli issues as well as greater support for Iraq in its
war with Iran would significantly boost the risk of
terrorist reprisals.
We doubt that most moderates will have sufficient
resources to completely protect their diplomats and
economic interests abroad. The moderate Arabs are
likely to have more success at home in protecting
against terrorist attacks, given their incentive and
increasing efforts to improve their overall
counterterrorist capabilities.
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Saudi Arabia-Jordan:
A Measured Friendship
Saudi Arabia's close relationship with Jordan remains
measured despite common foreign policy goals,
extensive economic ties, and intertwined security
interests. Two meetings in the past six months
between Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and Jordan's King
Hussein have failed to make progress toward resolving
differences.
Riyadh acknowledges the importance of a stable and
moderate regime in Amman, but it fears that closer
ties to Jordan would antagonize Arab radicals and
shatter the fragile Arab consensus the Saudis have
sought to build on key issues in the region. Given the
Saudi desire to avoid confrontations with Arab
militants, strains in Saudi-Jordanian relations are
inevitable. Periodic irritants are likely to be short
lived, however, because both sides recognize the
mutually beneficial nature of their relationship.
Historical Legacy
Saudi Arabia's relations with Jordan have
traditionally been characterized by suspicion and
distrust as a result of longstanding historical, cultural,
and economic differences. The post-World War I
dynastic rivalry between the Al Saud and the
Hashemites remains a faded, but not forgotten,
memory that lingers in the background of Saudi-
Jordanian relations, according to US Embassy
officials. Cultural differences have served to breed
mistrust. The Saudis believe they are seen as
unsophisticated bedouin, while the Jordanians
complain the Saudis view them as outsiders. Amman's
economic dependence on Saudi Arabia-Riyadh
provides substantial financial aid and oil and is
Jordan's third-largest trading partner-is an
additional source of friction between the two
countries.
Common Interests
Despite cool relations, the Saudis share common
security interests and foreign policy goals with the
Jordanians. Jordan serves as a strategic buffer
between Saudi Arabia and Israel, allowing Riyadh
the luxury of committing only limited military
resources to defend its northwestern border.
Moreover, the Saudis regard Hussein's moderate, 25X1
well-armed, and stable regime as vital to their own
security, according to US Embassy reporting.
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war with Iran, support moderate elements in the PLO,
and are committed to a peaceful resolution of the
Arab-Israeli dispute. Amman and Riyadh both have
attempted to act as regional counterweights to the
hardline radicalism of Syria and have tried to wean
Damascus away from Iran.
Divergent Views
Several irritants, however, inhibit improvement in
bilateral relations:
? Saudi unwillingness to hold an Arab League
summit meeting despite Jordan's desire for one. The
Saudis fear that a summit meeting might prove
contentious and highlight Arab divisions rather than
promote unity. Moreover, although supportive of
Jordan's reestablishment of ties to Egypt, Riyadh
refuses to take the lead in advocating Egypt's
readmission to the Arab League.
? Amman's efforts to establish a military assistance
relationship with the Gulf states. No matter how
well intentioned, the US Embassy reports the
Saudis take a dim view of Jordanian involvement.
They see any outside assistance as unwanted
interference, believing Persian Gulf security is a
Gulf Cooperation Council job in which Riyadh has
the paramount role.
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Israeli peace process. Unlike Jordan, Riyadh does
not consider itself a confrontational state and
generally assumes a low profile. More important,
the Saudis are reluctant to test the limits of Arab
consensus and seek to preserve a facade of Arab
unity.
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NESA NESAR 86-022
26 September 1986
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Roots of the Al Saud-Hashemite Rivalry
For centuries the Hashemite family enjoyed a special
status as guardian of Islam's holy places. By virtue of
being a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, a
Hashemite ruled as Emir of Mecca from 1073. In
addition, the Hashemites traditionally controlled all
oj.Hijaz-the Red Sea coastal region centering on
the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
Following the outbreak of hostilities between the
Ottoman and British empires in World War I,
Hussein bin Ali, a Hashemite who had been installed
as Emir of Mecca by the Ottomans, allied himself
with the British. At the same time London tried to
enlist the support of Abd al-Aziz, the Emir of
Riyadh, in the Arab revolt. Refusing to subordinate
himself to Hussein, Abd al-Aziz conducted limited
unilateral operations against the Turks and their
Arab allies in north-central Arabia. With the help of
T. E. Lawrence in 1916, Hussein'slorces ousted the
Turks from Hijaz and later assisted in the capture of
Jerusalem and Damascus.
After the war, the British and French established
Hussein's sons-Abdallah and Faisal-as kings of
Transjordan and Iraq. Meanwhile, Abd al-Aziz
mobilized the tribes of central Arabia and in the
mid-1920s captured Mecca and Medina, ousting the
Hashemites. In January 1926, Abd al-Aziz was
proclaimed King of Hijaz. The Treaty of Jiddah,
negotiated with the British in 1927, acknowledged his
authority from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea and
set limits on further Saudi expansion. In 1932, cd'ter
a period of consolidation, Abd al-Aziz proclaimed the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Personality differences and the leadership styles of
King Fahd and King Hussein further aggravate
problems in the relationship. According to the US
Embassy, Fahd is unemotional and a cautious
conservative, while Hussein is mercurial and apeace-
process activist. Fahd received a limited court
education, is more insular, and has played a role on
the world stage, first as Crown Prince and later as
King, only since 1975. Hussein is British-educated,
worldly, and has occupied his throne for over 30 years.
Shoring Up Hussein
Despite their differences, Saudi Arabia for at least
the past 15 years has sought to assist Jordan and
protect its own critical interests by providing
economic aid, financing for military purchases, and
diplomatic assistance. Last year Jordan imported over
13 thousand barrels a day of Saudi oil through the
Trans-Arabian Pipeline at a cost of $366 million.
Although there is conflicting reporting, it appears the
Saudis will provide Amman with a $182-197 million
grant to cover oil imports for the last half of 1986.
Saudi Arabia was the only state, according to
Embassy reporting, to make all of its Baghdad
payments-$357 million-to Jordan in 1985. In
addition, Riyadh gave another $300 million in
bilateral assistance last year.
Washington's failure to authorize an arms package
for Jordan earlier this year has forced Amman to look
elsewhere to replace its aging F-5 fighters. US
officials report the Jordanians will look to the
Europeans for replacement aircraft, but Saudi
financing will be the key to any deal because Jordan
cannot finance the purchase itself. Even though the
Jordanian Air Force prefers the Mirage 2000, the
Saudis are likely to have a large voice in the decision.
Embassy officials believe that if the Saudis consider it
to their advantage for Amman to purchase Tornados
as Riyadh has done, Jordan will have no choice but to
comply.
Financing for Jordan's military needs was a key topic
of discussion during both of Hussein's trips to Riyadh
this year, according to Embassy reports. Although
Fahd was sympathetic and supportive of Amman's
need for modern arms, recent
with no specific commitment for financing
Jordan's aircraft needs.
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The 1,250-kilometer Trans-Arabian Pipeline
(Tapline), completed in 1950 at the cost of $193
million, served for 25 years as a primary export route
for Saudi oil exports. It was one of the first large-
diameter, long-distance pipelines with a nominal
capacity of 500,000 barrels per day and linked the
Persian Gulf oi,Uields to the Lebanese port ojSidon.
Use of the line as a major export route ended in the
mid-1970s when transportation economics began to
favor supertankers operating from the Persian Gulf.
The pipeline continued to junction at a greatly
reduced level r~'ter 1975, but the combined etjects of
Israel's invasion of Lebanon and mounting.f~nancial
losses led Tapline offrcials to suspend Mediterranean
export operations in 1982. The Lebanese and Syrian
portions of the line were abandoned a year later.
Jordan continued to rely on the Tapline to supply
crude oil feedstock to its Zaraq refinery, and in 1984
Amman assumed responsibility for maintenance of
the pipeline.
Over the past five years, Tapline has been allowed to
slowly deteriorate-the line west of Amman has been
dismantled, Lebanese export facilities severely
damaged, and equipment cannibalized. The
maximum capacity has been reduced to less than
80,000 barrels per day, according to US Embassy
reporting. To cut operating expenses-$28 million in
1985-Tapline o,~cials reduced the size of its work
force to less than 100 early this year.
The Saudis have tried to bolster Hussein's position
through diplomatic means, in addition to financial
support. Embassy reporting indicates that the Saudis
encouraged PLO leader Arafat to work with Hussein.
Fahd signaled his displeasure with Arafat's failure to
cooperate with Hussein by refusing on several
occasions to meet with the PLO chief. In addition, the
Saudis helped fend off radical Arab attacks on Jordan
at last year's emergency Arab summit meeting in
Casablanca.
Outlook
We believe Saudi Arabia, which views Jordanian
stability as vital to its own security, will continue to
provide substantial economic and diplomatic support
to Amman. The Saudis are unlikely to reduce their
Baghdad payments to Jordan in the near term and
probably will continue to provide large-scale financial
aid after its obligation expires in 1988. Nevertheless,
we judge the Saudis are hesitant to commit
themselves to a significant increase in aid to Jordan-
including the funding of fighter aircraft-until oil
revenues recover substantially, an unlikely prospect in
the next several years.
Mutual suspicions, perceived aloofness, and
disagreements between the Saudis and Jordanians are
inherent in the relationship and are likely to cause
periodic disagreements between the two neighbors.
Amman's efforts to obtain Saudi financing for future
arms purchases will be especially frustrating for both
parties. The factors that divide the two Arab
moderates, however, are likely to be overshadowed by
common regional concerns and a shared perception of
threats to their security, forcing them to work
together.
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Algeria: Coping With the
Energy Price Slump
Algeria is facing its most serious financial crisis since
independence because of prolonged soft world energy
prices. We estimate Algeria will lose some $6 billion
in crude oil, condensate, products, and natural gas
earnings this year. Algiers has taken steps to rein in
government spending to offset these losses, and we
believe additional measures are in the offing. The
country is also making a concerted effort to boost
earnings by pushing aggressively within OPEC to
bolster oil prices while adopting a more
accommodating posture in negotiations with its major
gas customers to preserve its market share. Current
financial problems come at a time when President
Bendjedid has focused on the economy as a means for
moving away from the Soviet social and economic
model. Although he has so far been able to sell
austerity to the public, he may run into serious
problems with his opponents if they decide to use the
economy as a pretext to move against him.
The Current Scene
Hydrocarbons are the mainstay of the Algerian
economy, accounting for 98 percent of export receipts,
nearly 50 percent of government revenues, and 25
percent of GDP. Algeria has been switching gradually
since the early 1980s from mostly crude oil sales to
sales of a combination of petroleum products. This
expanded export base allowed Algiers to escape the
full impact of falling crude prices until the past year.
The collapse in refined product prices as well as
difficulties in moving Algerian gas have brought the
problem of export dependency to Algeria's front door.
? Real incomes are plummeting. GDP per capita is
still nominally among the highest in Africa at
$2,500, but wage increases have not kept pace with
inflation, which is running at about 14 percent-
double the 1985 level.
? Joblessness is contributing to growing delinquency
and crime among Algerian youth. Some 65 percent
of the populace is under 25, and the population is
growing at a rate of about 3 percent annually.
? Financial constraints are making foreign aid for
liberation groups-including the Polisario-more
burdensome.
Government Actions
The Bendjedid government has announced a variety
of measures to slow down the deterioration in the
country's financial position. As a result, Algiers has
revised the national budget, cutting overall
government operating expenses by 11 percent and
development expenditure by 26 percent, according to
Embassy reporting.
these reductions will slash imports by some $2 billion
by the end of the year. Algiers, in addition, has
suspended the government-subsidized C.O.D. postal
system, halved tourist overseas travel allocations, and
reduced annual allowances for pilgrimages to Mecca
to save scarce foreign exchange.
Algiers has also attempted to reduce the cost of
foreign services, which consumed as much as a third
of total imports last year, the latest period for which
data are available. According to the US Embassy,
Algiers is reducing the number of foreign technicians
in country by restricting access to work and residence
permits. The Italian expatriate community, for
example, has dwindled to 700 from 2,000 only 18
months ago. Technical assistance contracts are also
being canceled-including construction and possibly
some maintenance programs for gas liquefaction
plants. These measures could save Algiers an
estimated $600-700 million.
? Unemployment has hit a record 25 percent in many
areas, and unemployment and underemployment
together may exceed 30 percent.
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NESA NESAR 86-022
26 September 1986
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The Bendjedid government, in addition, has resorted
to rapidly drawing down reserves while pushing for
higher levels of foreign assistance. By the end of July,
foreign exchange reserves had fallen from roughly
$3 billion at the beginning of the year to about
$1.9 billion-the lowest level in nearly two years.
New foreign aid has yet to materialize.
Algeria's efforts to cushion the impact of falling
hydrocarbons earnings, however, have not come
without cost, according to Embassy reporting. Import
cuts have resulted in spot shortages of consumer goods
such as coffee, canned tomato products, and pepper.
Spare parts shortages are also beginning to affect
industrial and agricultural production. State farms
are being hit especially hard. Parts shortages are
immobilizing heavy machinery, causing planting and
harvesting delays. The problem is compounded by the
elimination of part of the C.O.D. postal service
through which many replacement parts were
previously ordered. Budget cuts are also slicing into
the provision of social services such as education and
housing. Cuts in the country's development
program-Embassy reporting indicates only
agriculture and import substitution industries are
being spared-are increasing pressures on the
country's already burgeoning unemployment rate.
The prolonged decline in foreign exchange earnings
has had a dramatic impact on Algeria's international
debt position. We believe Algerian debt exceeds
$21 billion, and the country's debt-service ratio could
hit a whopping 80 percent by the end of 1986 if
a source of national pride-is being eroded.
present earnings trends continue. Algeria's debt-
service ratio was less than 40 percent just two years
ago. Such a high debt-service burden is prompting a
more careful monitoring of principal and interest
repayments by Algeria's creditors. In addition, the
country's favorable international credit rating-long
difficult to win as the war for independence."
Domestic Reactions
The public response to austerity measures so far has
been muted. Embassy reporting indicates the
government has mounted an impressive nationwide
public relations campaign to mobilize popular support
to "counter the adverse effects of the present
international economic situation." Through media
blitzes and regional meetings and conferences, the
government is urging the people to cut down on
imports and eliminate resource waste. Embassy
sources report Algeria's theme is "self-reliance" in
fighting the "economic war that will be almost as
Although President Bendjedid has so far averted a
popular backlash from the economic crisis, he is
encountering problems within his government. The
President is in the midst of trying to turn Algeria
from what he sees as a cumbersome and inefficient
Soviet-style economy toward aWestern-oriented
system that relies heavily on private enterprise.0
Bendjedid has had to
spend considerable time defending this program-
particularly during the recent FLN Central
Committee meeting-and trying to convince his
detractors that his economic liberalization is not
responsible for the country's current financial woes.
There are already indications that Bendjedid has been
forced to allow the hardliners a greater say in foreign
policy matters in exchange for their tacit support of
his economic agenda. For example, Algeria has
recently engaged in foreign policy activities that are
contrary to its professed refusal to condone
international terrorism and its willingness to act as a
bridge between radical and moderate Arab
governments. Particularly noteworthy examples are
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the rapprochement with Libya, closer ties to radical
Palestinians, renewed activity within the
"Steadfastness Front,"' and Algeria's aggressive
posture within OPEC.
Cuts-albeit small-in the military procurement
budget are also hurting Bendjedid's standing with the
military. Rumors abound in Algiers that Bendjedid's
budget cuts are responsible for stalling Soviet-
Algerian arms talks. The military is worried that
Algeria's financial stringencies will prevent it from
purchasing MIG-29s before Morocco buys either US
F-16s or French Mirage 2000s to use against Algeria
in the 10-year struggle for control of Western Sahara.
Worst Case
Scenario
No. 1 a
Best Case
Scenario
No. 2 b
Current account
balance
- 1.2
- 7.1
- 3.3
_
Trade balance
3.6
- 2.3
0.7
Exports
12.6
6.7
6.7
Crude oil
6.3
3.1
3.1
Condensates
3.0
1.5
1.5
Refined
products
0.4
0.2
0.2
Prospects
Algeria's economic outlook for the remainder of 1986
is bleak. Without an improvement in prices for oil and
gas, Algiers could incur a current account deficit of as
much as $7 billion. Indeed, Algeria's losses could be
even greater should OPEC's new production accord
collapse or gas negotiations under way with major
European customers not end in Algeria's favor.Z
A deficit of this magnitude will require further
adjustments. Even if Algeria fully implements
austerity measures already in place, the remaining
shortfall far exceeds available reserves of $1.9 billion.
We believe Algiers will try to reduce government
spending still more to meet financial needs. Slashing
imports, consumer subsidies, and development
expenditures, however, are not a viable solution,
because the government cannot make deep enough
cuts without jeopardizing the modern economy.
Moreover, deep cuts risk a political backlash from
influential groups-such as urban workers and the
military-hit hard by the inevitable rise in prices and
unemployment.
' Radical members of the Arab League-Algeria, Libya, South
Yemen, and Syria-formed an informal bond called the
"Steadfastness Front" after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
Consumer 0.5 0.5 0.3
goods
Industrial 6.8 6.8 4.4
goods
Grants -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
a Assume average crude oil price for 1986 is $15/per barrel;
condensates' price is $13.42/per barrel; refined products' price is
$15.6/per barrel; second-quarter gas prices are average for the year
(gas contract renegotiations are inconclusive); production and
consumption of all hydrocarbons equals 1985 levels; and no
austerity measures are implemented.
n Assume all conditions in scenario 1 hold for first six months of the
year. Assume these same parameters remain constant during the
latter half of 1986 except each European gas price equals the
French rate of $2.36 per million Btu (the result of successful gas
contract renegotiations) and austerity measures slash imports,
services, and foreign aid.
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International bankers believe Algiers will supplement
moderate new spending cuts by attempting to borrow
another $900 million this year. Finding underwriters,
however, could be difficult. Recent loan syndications
suggest that US and European bankers probably will
not participate. Japanese enthusiasm may also wane
as Algeria's economic problems deepen. Bankers
expect rising debt pressures will force the Bendjedid
government to reschedule some of its debt by next
year. Contrary to previous policy, we believe Algeria
in the interim may seek oil and gas barter deals,
particularly in exchange for needed food and other
essential imports and possibly arms. Algiers may even
go so far as to try to convince Libya to resume support
to the Polisario so that Algeria can reduce its
financial obligations there.
Political Realities
Algiers probably will be able to maintain public order
despite the hardships the new austerity programs are
likely to produce. The government has a large and
efficient security force, and it has not hesitated to
move quickly to suppress dissent. To be sure,
expectations among the predominantly youthful
population are rising. Younger Algerians probably
will not be so ready to accept the scarcities that have
been a hallmark of the government's emphasis on
investment over consumption since independence.
There has been an increasing number of
demonstrations and riots in recent years attributable
to social and economic grievances, and more are
likely. Islamic fundamentalists, who are disparate and
disorganized, will attempt to take advantage of the
disgruntlement.
Any further disturbances would weaken President
Bendjedid. Leftist ideologues would attempt to use
domestic problems to change government policy, in
particular Bendjedid's economic liberalization
program and outreach to Western countries. This
leftist threat would only become serious if the
ideologues win the support of a large group of military
officers. Although we do not expect Bendjedid to be
toppled from power, we believe he could be forced to
step back from some aspects of his austerity program
and many of his progressive goals.
Bendjedid will almost certainly continue his search
for aid from the West to help quell budding
opposition. We believe Algiers will try to use its still
solid international credit rating to secure more
commercial funds from Western and Arab banking
sources. We doubt Algiers will attempt to obtain a
large portfolio of official loans, however, since many
government leaders probably will not want to become
overly dependent on foreign governments. In our view,
Bendjedid will continue to seek military hardware
from both the Soviet Union and Western suppliers as
a bargaining tool to obtain favorable prices and credit
terms. We do not believe, however, that he would
make political concessions to either Moscow or the
West, to obtain them.
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Israel: A Reexamination of
Israeli Arab Radicalization
Scholarly studies in the past decade have emphasized
the growing self-identification of Israeli Arabs as
Palestinians, implying their political radicalization.
Professors at Haifa University, however, have
concluded from years of research based on public
opinion polls that, despite their self-labeling as
Palestinians, Israeli Arabs are becoming more
"Israeli" in their attitudes and behavior. According to
this thesis, most Israeli Arabs identify with Israel and
share the basic goals and ideals of their Jewish
neighbors. Most support an independent Palestinian
state in the West Bank and Gaza, but few would
consider moving there. The Haifa school's
conclusions, if true, augur well for the political
coexistence of the Jewish and Arab communities
within Israel's 1967 borders.
The "Israelization" of Israeli Arabs
According to the US Embassy's summary of the
Haifa school's conclusions, Israeli Arabs have
acquired pronounced Israeli cultural affinities. Their
attitude toward a Palestinian state is a key indicator.
Although they overwhelmingly favor the creation of a
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, only 8
percent say they would move there. Another 18
percent would consider such a move. Moreover, very
few want to see the destruction of the state of Israel.
According to the US Embassy, the rejectionists are
losing numerical strength but are becoming
increasingly vocal, thus perpetuating the perception
among the Jewish majority of growing radicalization
in the Arab community.
The Haifa school also denies the conventional wisdom
that contacts between Arabs in pre-1967 Israel and
the occupied territories are strong and growing. The
conventional wisdom argues that the Arabs in the
occupied territories exercise a radicalizing influence
on the Israeli Arab population. Prof. Sammy
Smoocha of Haifa University asserts that, despite the
ideological and national affinity of Israeli and West
Bank and Gaza Arabs, there are few commercial
links, marital ties, or other daily contacts. Even in
Arab villages that had been divided by the pre-1967
border, no extensive system of contacts has developed.
Israeli Arabs now have many more ties to Jews and
Israel than they have with the West Bank.
The Haifa school also stresses the Israelization of the
Arab community in its social orientation. The
majority of Israeli Arabs are fluent in both Arabic
and Hebrew. They thus are exposed to both Hebrew
and Arabic media. The best selling newspaper in the
Arab community is the Hebrew daily Yediot
Aharanot, which follows a generally conservative,
pro-Likud editorial line.
In other social indicators, the Israeli Arab community
also is closing the gap with its Jewish neighbors. The
number of Arab high school and university graduates
has risen dramatically in the last 10 years. As a direct
result, more young Arabs aspire to white-collar jobs.
Only in the status of women does the Arab
community lag far behind the mainstream, with many
women still at home and separated from outside
society. In urban areas, however, even the Arab
women's lifestyle is becoming more Israeli in that
they are more educated and integrated into the work
force.
Another significant indicator, according to Smoocha,
is the tendency of the "typical" Israeli Arab to
compare himself with his Israeli Jewish counterparts
when he evaluates himself and his achievements. He
does not want to be compared with the Arabs of the
West Bank or other Arab states. When he looks for
solutions to his problems, he looks for them within the
framework of Israel within its pre-1967 borders.
Israeli Arab Voting Trends
The Haifa school's findings seem to be supported by
the Israeli Arab voting record-with nearly half
backing mainstream "Zionist" parties in the 1984
national election. Israeli election records do not report
Secret
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Attallah Najar, a 34-year-old Israeli citizen, is a Communist and a graduate of Hebrew University
senior reporter for AI-Fajr (a pro-PLO paper with a degree in chemistry. His views were solicited
published in East Jerusalem). Attallah was born in by Amoz Oz, a leading Israeli author in his book In
the village oJArrabeh in the Galilee. He is a declared the Land of Israel:
done day a Palestinian state were established, peacefully coexisting with Israel
...would you decide to leave your diaspora in Israel and emigrate to the
Palestinian homeland?
No way. I'm an Israeli. It's a matter oja sense of identity. Even though I am
discriminated against in Israel, athird-class citizen, I consider myseU'absolutely
Israeli, and I will remain Israeli.
What does your sense of Israeli identity stem from?
Education, experience, friendships with Jews. From my soul. From my
attachment to the Israeli Ivestyle. Listen to a story. In 1967, during the war, I
was a kid of I5. Our entire village was glued to the radio, to the Voice of
Damascus ...and heard that the Syrians had entered here, entered, "cleaned
out" the entire Galilee, and all those bloody lies of theirs, and I heard all this and
began to cry. I didn't want to tell my parents that I was crying because I thought
the Syrians were murdering all my friends, all the Jews, all of our acquaintances.
Attallah, ctfter the massacre in Beirut, the only city in the world where there were
hundreds of thousands of protesters demonstrating was Tel Aviv. Not in Cairo or
Damascus, not even in Beirut itse(/. How do you explain that?
I wasn't surprised. I was even a little proud. As an Israeli, I always prefer to be on
the side of the underdog. After all, we Israelis see ourselves as the Chosen People,
don't we? And then, when there were all kinds of statements by soldiers and
officers against the invasion of Lebanon, and the demonstrations and the public
outcry, and the tear gas near Begin's residence, and the Commission of Inquiry, I
felt-in spite of my bitterness-that 1 was part ojthat society. I'm an Israeli for
better or for worse.
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the Arab vote separately, but estimates for the 1984
election give the Rakah Communist Party and the
leftist Progressive List for Peace (PLP) about half the
Arab vote and Labor and the small left-of-center
parties (Shinui, Yahad, and Citizen's Rights) the
other half.
Smoocha argues that there is no contradiction
between the significant support in the Arab
community for Rakah and the PLP and the growing
acceptance by Israeli Arabs of the existence of the
state of Israel. Both Rakah and the PLP accept the
existence of the state and are committed to working
within the system. Even the extreme nationalist "Sons
of the Village" group, which has been outlawed in
Israel because of its rejectionist stance, has factions
that are moving toward some form of accommodation
with Israeli society, according to Smoocha.
Implications
The stereotypical view that Israeli Arabs are
increasingly radicalized opponents of Israel suggests
negative long-term consequences by alleging a
deintegration of Israeli Arabs from Israeli society and
politics. The Haifa school's findings, on the other
hand, augur well for the continued integration and
peaceful coexistence of the Jewish and Arab
communities in Israel.
The Haifa thesis asserts an increasing tendency
among Israeli Arabs to reconcile themselves to the
continued existence of the state of Israel and to their
minority status within it. The Haifa revisionists posit
that "radical" Israeli Arab political behavior, such as
voting for Rakah and PLP, are reflections not of
disloyalty, but rather of a desire for equal treatment.
get and want access to personal benefits such as low-
interest mortgages, which the government provides to
Army veterans, who are predominantly Jewish.
During his term in office, Peres's Arab advisers have
tried to channel more benefits to the Arab
community. In a particularly symbolic move this past
summer, the government returned farm lands that
had been expropriated for use as a military training
area to three villages in the Galilee.
The policies of the National Unity government toward
Israeli Arabs are unlikely to change much after Peres
and Shamir switch portfolios in October. Labor will
continue to promote more benefits for the Arab
community. Likud has been more inclined to treat
Israeli Arabs with benign neglect.
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Ironically, the Israelization of the Israeli Arabs
appears to have increased their expectations, and they
increasingly consider the benefits provided by the
state as basic, deserved rights. Prime Minister Peres's
special adviser for Arab affairs told US diplomats in
Tel Aviv last year that the potential for radicalization
of Israeli Arabs hinges on "local" bread-and-butter
issues. They seek the same level of government
budgetary support for Arab villages that Jewish towns
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Syria's Elite Military Units:
The Changing of the Guard
In the last two years President Hafiz al-Assad has
directed sweeping changes in the distribution of power
among Syria's elite military units-especially those
responsible for protecting his regime from internal
threats-in an effort to prevent a recurrence of the
power struggle that threatened to topple his regime in
the spring of 1984. Among his most dramatic moves
were to reduce the size of his brother Rif`at's powerful
Defense Companies to that of a regular Syrian
armored division, remove his brother from the
country, and reassign the crucial job of protecting his
regime to the much smaller Republican Guards.
Assad also moved swiftly to balance the power blocs
behind other Alawite leaders and began to draw up
plans for a third Army corps that would be
responsible solely for protecting him and his office
from internal threats. Assad's deft handling of the
crisis repudiated the rumors-which were at the root
of the power struggle-that his heart attack in
November 1983 had seriously and perhaps
permanently incapacitated him.
Despite the President's restructuring of his praetorian
guard, the key issues that sparked the 1984 crisis
remain unresolved. The same senior Alawi officers
who blocked Rif"at's premature efforts to take over
the presidency still bitterly oppose him and any
suggestion that he might soon return from what is
apparently aself-imposed exile in Europe. Assad
evidently has not resolved the question of who will
succeed him as president-perhaps intentionally as
part of his scheme to maintain equilibrium among
potential contenders. A renewed power struggle-
possibly but not necessarily more violent than the
last-between Syrian military leaders is likely,
therefore, particularly if Rif`at returns to Syria and
reasserts his claim to the presidency.
Rif at's Controversial Defense Companies
Shortly after overthrowing his predecessor and fellow
Alawite, Salih Jadid, in November 1970, President
Assad placed his brother Rif`at in charge of an elite
armored unit assigned to protect key government and
military installations in the Damascus area. In
succeeding years this force-usually among the first
to receive newly arrived Soviet weapon systems-
assumed the character of Rif`at's private army.
Equipped with the newest armored vehicles in Syria
and its own intelligence, commando, and air defense
units, at the
time of the 1984 crisis, Rif`at's Defense Companies
numbered nearly 50,000 troops-more than triple the
size of a regular Syrian armored division.
Rif~at's personal style combined with the
disproportionate strength and preferential status of
his Defense Companies quickly antagonized other
senior Alawite leaders. His flamboyant displays of
wealth and reputation for brutality and corruption
sharply contrasted with the President's moderate
behavior and professed Ba`thist ideals.
angered his Alawite contemporaries. His soldiers,
writes an academic specialist on Syrian internal
politics, "were detested because their highhanded,
thuggish conduct, which included kidnaping, beating,
and extortion, went unpunished."
Rif`at's prolonged absence from Syria has not
diminished rival Alawite ofl^icers' concerns. Many
Alawites have long feared that Rif`at's dissolute and
often ruthless behavior would inflame Sunni
antipathy toward all Alawites and threaten control of
the government by the Alawite minority. Senior
Alawite officers, moreover, believe that Rif`at's return
and resumption of power in Syria would threaten their
own jobs and privileges. Some also believe his
procapitalist and pro-Western views threaten Syria's
political future.
The Republican Guards
The Republican Guards, formerly known as the
Presidential Guard, were formed soon after Hafiz
al-Assad came to power. A small group of Alawite
soldiers in the Air Force were selected for the Guards
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-021
16 September 1986
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because of their loyalty to the President,
The elite group numbered about
1,000 men and its duties, until just after the 1984
power struggle, were limited to providing personal
protection to the President, his palace and offices, and
time, Rif`at, after a brief return, left again and has
refused to return permanently until the President
appoints him to a powerful position or until he
manages to reestablish his own power base in Syria.
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visiting dignitaries.
~Rif`at resented the Republican Guards from their
inception and believed that his Defense Companies
should have sole responsibility for protecting the
President.
Brig. Gen. Adnan Makhluf, the President's brother-
in-law, has commanded the Republican Guards since
1970 and, is
one of the President's closest and most truste
security advisers. Unlike other senior Alawi officers,
Makhluf has not appeared inclined to use his
expanding power base for personal profit or to
maneuver himself into an influential position in a
post-Assad regime.
Spring 1984 Crisis
President Assad's heart attack in November 1983 and
his subsequent frail health set off the power struggle
in the spring of 1984. Rif at moved his tank forces to
cordon off some of the roads leading into Damascus
and deployed the SA-8 surface-to-air missiles under
his control to the top of Jabal Qasiyun, a hill
overlooking Damascus. Rif`at's intentions remain
unclear. he
overestimated the seriousness of his brother's medical
condition and intended to seize control of the
government. His chief opponents-notably Special
Forces commander Ali Haydar, Third Division
commander Shafiq Fayyad, and Adnan Makhluf-
clearly feared that Rif`at aimed to topple the
government and immediately moved their forces to
block him.
The President's hasty intervention to arrange a
compromise belied the rumors that he was near death
and losing his grip on the government. He evidently
feared that his appointment of Rif`at as Vice
President for Security Affairs would not be enough
to defuse the crisis, so he sent Rif`at and his main
adversaries, Haydar and Fayyad, out of the country
into what he probably viewed as temporary exile.
Although Haydar and Fayyad returned in a short
Forming a New Praetorian Guard
The crisis was sufficient warning to Assad that
Rif`at's Defense Companies-manned by troops more
loyal to his rash brother than to the preservation of
the regime-were dangerous and had to be disbanded.
He resolved to create a new praetorian guard out of
Makhluf's small, but trustworthy, presidential guard
force. As soon as Rif`at left Syria and order was
restored to the streets of Damascus,
rand sent it north to protect the
Hims SA-5 site. Perhaps the most punishing blow to
Rif`at, however, was the transfer of the Defense
Companies' perquisite for the newest, most advanced
military equipment to his longtime rival Adnan
Makhluf's force. In only a few months, Assad reduced
Rif`at's imposing Defense Companies to the size of a
regular Syrian armored division, seriously eroding his
brother's key power base.
After dispatching his quarrelsome brother to Europe,
the President assigned a high priority to expansion of
the Republican Guards into a credible replacement
for the Defense Companies and promoted Rif`at's
archrival to brigadier general. In less than two years,
the Republican
Guards' personnel strength jumped from 1,000 to
almost 9,000. In 1985 they were the first Syrian unit
to receive recently delivered late-model T-72
M 1981 /3 tanks-which had never previously been
observed with non-Soviet forces. Later that year,
during contract negotiations to upgrade their
communications gear, the Republican Guards were
exempt from a presidential directive that temporarily
canceled or delayed all military procurement because
of Syria's financial difficulties,
also has noted expansion and increased activity at the
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Republican Guards camp near Dummar, just west of
Damascus, and a probable Republican Guards facility
near Artuz, about 14 kilometers southwest of the
capital. the
President's 27-year-old son Basil's assignment to the
Republican Guards in early 1986 is further proof of
the importance Assad attaches to this unit
The internal crisis apparently also persuaded Assad to
form a third Army corps that would be based in
Damascus and be responsible for protecting the Assad
regime. His creation of the new 14th Special Forces
Division in the summer of 1984-part of his
resolution of the power struggle-suggests that, even
then, he was thinking of developing a third corps. He
assigned Rif`at's detached commando regiments and a
regiment from the regular Special Forces Command
to the new division and deployed it on the Lebanese
Rif at: Threatening Regime Stabilit From Afar
Although other
Alawite commanders, such as Ali Haydar, are in
trouble with the President because they have acted
without consulting him or have misused their power,
Rif`at still appears to be the primary "wild card" in
Assad's careful equation of strong Alawite officers.
Many of Rif`at's most outspoken opponents are
Assad's closest advisers, and the President cannot risk
alienating them by giving his brother real power in
the government. Rif`at's avowed enemies, such as Air
Force Intelligence Chief Muhammad Khuli and
Military Intelligence Chief Ali Duba, head most of
the security services that Rif`at wants to dominate.
Key Syrian military commanders also still strongly
Shihabi.
supporters of Ali Haydar were so hostile to President
Assad's suggestion that Rif`at return to Syria that he
retracted it immediately. The vanguard opposing
Rif`at also includes Syria's highest ranking Sunni
leaders, Vice President for Foreign Affairs `Abd
al-Halim Khaddam and Army Chief of Staff Hikmat
appeared to threaten his regime.
By upgrading the Republican Guards and possibly
creating a third Army corps to protect his regime,
Assad has further shown his determination to remain
in power and to keep his headstrong brother in check.
Assad probably calculates that, having dismantled his
brother's power base, he can avoid having to send
forces against his brother's remaining supporters-
now scattered throughout the military or dismissed
from service altogether. He undoubtedly would use
his new elite forces, such as the Republican Guards,
against organized Rif`at loyalists, however, if they
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The Muslim Brotherhood of Syria:
Possible Resurgence
The involvement of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood
members in antiregime activity this year, including
bombings and a rumored coup plot, marks a
significant departure from the group's quiescence that
followed its brutal suppression in 1982. Although the
organization remains fragmented and disorganized, it
appears that disparate Muslim Brotherhood elements
have served as a willing fifth column for Syria's
external opponents, namely Iraq and Lebanese
Christians. Perhaps more ominous for the regime's
stability, however, Sunni
junior officers may have enlisted the support of the
Muslim Brotherhood to challenge Syria's Alawite
rulers.
Syria's Alawite-dominated regime is probably less
concerned with a possible Brotherhood resurgence
than it is with a growing public perception that it is
again vulnerable to subversive activity. President
Assad relies on his extensive intelligence and security
apparatus to intimidate potential dissidents and may
fear that recent successes of the Brotherhood and
their confederates will encourage other disgruntled
Syrians to challenge the regime's authority. As a
result, Assad has been quick to dispatch
reinforcements to traditional hotspots of Sunni
dissent while officially minimizing the role of Muslim
Brothers in incidents of subversion.
Still Reeling
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the
leading opponent of the Alawites and the Bath Party
as early as the 1960s, mobilizing popular traditional
and conservative sentiment against the secular
orientation of the new elite. Urban merchants who
resent government interference in trade-and fear
that Ba`thist socialism is a weapon in the hands of
long neglected and suppressed rural people to exact
revenge against the cities-have supported the
Brotherhood in particular and contributed to the
revival of Islam as an answer to the wrenching change
of modernization and the loss of unity within the
Assad's massive use of force against Brotherhood-led
Sunni militants in Hamah in 1982 forced dissident
leaders to retreat from open opposition. The massive
toll in human life, estimated from 10,000 to 20,000,
apparently raised the price of dissent much higher
than the Brotherhood was willing to pay. The
increased security presence in Brotherhood centers
also proved disruptive to its paramilitary operations.
The Sunni opposition has shifted to mostly political
and organizational activity since 1982. The Muslim
Brotherhood merged with other Islamic groups in
1980 to form an "Islamic Front" and then entered an
even broader opposition coalition in 1982 that has
taken the name "The National Alliance for the
Liberation of Syria." Leaders of the group include
Adnan Sa`d al-Din, an educator from Hamah in exile
since the early 1960s and a prominent leader of the
Muslim Brotherhood, and Shaykh Muhammad
al-Bayanuni, who serves as the head of the Islamic
Front while in exile.
primarily to issuing press releases from Europe
denouncing the regime and outlining a liberal
platform for a new "Islamic" government. Perhaps to
avoid Syrian hit teams, Sa`d al-Din has moved to
Iraq. He has been criticized within the Brotherhood
for limiting his operations to a pamphlet war against
the Syrian Government.
Assad's granting of a general amnesty to the
Brotherhood in January 1985 was probably designed
to widen splits among the various factions of the
Sunni community.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-022
26 September 1986
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Rumors that returning Brothers suspected of past
subversive activities have been arrested, however,
have probably prevented the return of some of the
more activist members.
Nipping at the Edges
Despite its many hardships, the Muslim Brotherhood
continues to attempt limited independent operations,
and the scope and rate of these operations appear to
be on the rise. After several years of freedom from
antiregime violence, Syria has been wracked since
March 1986 with a series of bombings, mainly
directed against military personnel and public
transportation. For the most part Syria has officially
implicated Iraq,
thread in most of these attacks has been suspicion by
Syrian officials that Brotherhood cells inside and
outside of Syria facilitated these attacks:
? 16 April. Over a dozen explosions took place in
northern Syria and Damascus resulting in over 100
deaths,
~ecurity forces used heavy force to round up
suspects causing several
casaulties. Public confessions eventually were
extracted from Brothers who admitted to working as
Iraqi agents.
? 3 June. An explosion near the Dankinz Mosque in
Damascus resulted in at least 10 deaths and scores
of injuries,
The Muslim Brotherhood came to Syria in the 1930s.
It waslounded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna
as an underground society dedicated to the end of
colonial rule and the establishment of an Islamic
state. The first Syrian adherents were students of
Islamic law who had attended courses at Cairo's
al-Azhar University or who had been won over by
Egyptian Muslim Brothers touring Syria.
The earliest leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Syria commonly were from families of the "men of
religion. " Mustc~a al-Sabai, the.first Superintendent
General of the society and its leader from 1945 to
1957, came from a family that provided the preachers
(khatibsJ for the Grand Mosque in Hims. His
successor, Issam al-Attar-who guided the
organization until a split in its ranks in 1972 but
continues to play a leadership role-was a prayer
leader (imam) at the mosque of Damascus University.
organization.
In the late 1960s younger members of the Aleppo and
Hamah branches, shaken by the Arab military defeat
by Israel in 1967, agitated for more militant
opposition to the regime than the Brotherhood
leadership would accept. In addition to the
generational differences and the regional peculiarities
of the branches, economic disparities might have
accounted for the ideological variances within the
them.
With the appearance of more militant Sunni radical
factions, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria has
evolved into an even more loosely organized front. In
the 1970s acts of violence were attributed to groups
operating under various names-Youth of
Muhammad, Marwan Hadid Group, al-Mujahidun,
and the Islamic Liberation Party-while more
recently the militant faction has taken the name
Fighting Vanguard. In some cases, acts attributed to
the Brotherhood by the government probably were
carried out by Sunni radical splinter groups with
little or no ciliation to the Muslim Brotherhood
hierarchy, but spokesmen for the militants more
closely attached to the Brotherhood took credit for
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charter, many within its Sunni majority probably 25X1
identify with the Brotherhood's revolutionary aims.
Some of the founders of Fatah, including Salah
Khalaf and Khalil Wazir, were Muslim Brothers.
Jordan. Jordan officially ended its support for Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood exiles in November 1985 in the
interest of sustaining its reconciliation with Syria. At
that time, King Hussein admitted that anti-Syrian
operations had been carried out from Jordanian
territory, but he claims that they occurred without his
Calling All Patrons
Muslim Brothers depend on Syria's external
opponents for material support and/or safe haven and
reciprocate this patronage by offering use of its
limited assets within Syria. These alliances in almost
all cases appear to be marriages of convenience, since
the Brotherhood's long-term agenda for Syria is often
incompatible with those of its patrons.
Iraq. Iraq is Syria's principal regional rival and has
provided camps and paramilitary training for the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood since the mid-1970s,
Iraq's backing of
Brotherhood violence against Syria since the late
1970s is probably a response to Assad's backing of
Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. Although Iraq is a Sunni-
dominated regime, its secular Ba`thist dogma rules
out support for a Muslim Brotherhood-led
fundamentalist revolution in Syria.
wants to retain the Brotherhood as a lever against the 25X1
Syrians, who have consistently opposed the King's
initiatives regarding the peace process. Given the 25X1
King's suspicion of Jordan's legalized Muslim
Brotherhood organization, it is clear that the King
Lebanon. Several groups in Lebanon who oppose
Syria's policies there have coordinated operations with
Brotherhood exiles against targets in Syria despite
their mutual hostility. The Sunni fundamentalist
Islamic Unification Movement (IUM) located in
Tripoli has had close ties to Brotherhood exiles since
many of them fled to Tripoli from Hama in 1982.
Muslim Brothers fought alongside the IUM and
Fatah forces during the siege of Tripoli by Syrian-
PLO. According to the US Embassy in Damascus,
relations between pro-Arafat Palestinians and
Muslim Brotherhood exiles have drawn closer,
particularly as the enmity between Assad and Arafat
has increased in recent years. Operational cooperation
between these groups is probably facilitated by Iraq,
but contacts between the two may also take place in
Lebanon and in Europe. Since Arafat's recent
estrangement from Hussein, contacts in Jordan are
probably severely curtailed. Despite the PLO's secular
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Muslim Brotherhood alliances with foreign allies have 25X1
helped it maintain a high profile as an opposition
group, but its inability to attract new adherents within
Syria has prevented it from mounting a credible
challenge to the Assad regime. The Brotherhood,
however, may be forming ad hoc alliances within
Syria among other disaffected groups.
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Outlook
We believe that Assad is unlikely to face a major
challenge from the Muslim Brotherhood in particular,
or the Sunni population in general, as long as he
remains healthy enough to exert his authority. His
effective use of repression has deprived the
Brotherhood of an organized base within Syria.
In the broader Sunni community, appreciation of the
stability provided by Assad's rule, while less than
enthusiastic, has had an apparent dampening effect
on the ability of the Brotherhood to drum up mass
support.
In the event of Assad's death or incapacitation, a
Sunni challenge to a new regime would be unlikely to
take the form of an "Islamic revolution" led by the
Muslim Brotherhood. To succeed, mass opposition
pitting Sunnis against the new regime would require
breaking the coalition of Alawites and rural Sunnis,
destroying military discipline and Bath Party
identification, and detaching peasants, workers, and
the salaried middle class from their dependence on
state and party institutions.
The Muslim Brotherhood probably believes that
carrying out operations against the Syrian regime,
however limited, will put it in a position to become the
vanguard of opposition to the Alawite regime in the
future. The Brotherhood may try to exploit
dissatisfaction with the economy among Syrians to
rally support for a Sunni regime that might be more
favorably disposed to its fundamentalist agenda.
Should the Brotherhood's foreign patrons abandon it
in favor of better relations with Syria, however, the
organization's capability to strike within Syria will
probably be significantly undermined.
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Musa al-Sadr: Lebanon's
Hidden Imam?
The impact of Musa al-Sadr on the Shia movements
in Lebanon is immense. Sadr infused the Shias with a
unique sense of political consciousness and is today
considered the main rallying force behind extreme
Shia activism. As a radical organization, Hizballah
was modeled on organizational structures inspired by
Sadr. He laid the foundation for the emergence of the
politically militant Shia cells associated with the
kidnaping of Western citizens in Lebanon. Sadr's
status as Shia spiritual leader continues to infuse the
leadership of the Lebanese Shia community with the
necessary ingredients to challenge Western influences
in the region as a whole.
Background
The disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, spiritual leader
of the Lebanese Shia community, while on a visit to
Libya in late August 1978 remains a cause celebre for
his followers and an enigma to observers of Lebanese
politics. A descendant of the Prophet Muhammad,
Sadr was related to several prominent Iranian and
Lebanese Shia families. His cousin, Muhammad
Baqir al-Sadr, founded the Iraqi militant Dawa
Party-long noted for its opposition to the Shah of
Iran and later to Iraqi President Saddam Husayn-
was executed by the Iraqis in 1980.
Sadr's disappearance has been a festering sore in
Lebanese-Iranian-Libyan relations and the motive
behind a long series of international terrorist
incidents. It is likely to continue to be a rallying cry
for Lebanon's Shias. Its poignancy is enhanced
because of the Shia belief that divinely gifted Shia
leaders in medieval times disappeared into occultation
rather than dying mortal deaths.
Lebanon's Shias
Until his disappearance, Musa al-Sadr was the
undisputed leader of the Lebanese Shia community.
The Shia community, which has become the largest
confessional group in Lebanon, constitutes the
neediest and most dynamic sector of Lebanese society.
When Sadr made his debut in Lebanese politics in
1968-69, the Shias were fragmented and were at the
mercy of the As'ad, Khazin, and Hamadah families of
the south (the Jabal Amal) and the northern Bekaa
Valley around Hermil.
The traditionally poor Shia regions became fertile
ground for Sadr's activism. Waves of Shia migration
from rural to urban centers in search of better
economic opportunities worsened the already
explosive demographic changes in Lebanon. Persistent
Israeli retaliation against southern villages in the
wake of the 1969 Cairo agreement between the
Palestinians and the Lebanese Government-which
legitimized the PLO presence-gave Sadr a rallying
issue and a focus for political action.
Sadr's Appeal
Sadr's initial political message centered on the need to
organize the majority of the "disinherited and the
dispossessed" lower-class Shias. He created the
Movement of the Dispossessed,Nprevailed upon the
Lebanese Government to help set up the Higher Shia
Council-an organization designed to funnel funds
for social and economic activities-and in 1975
founded the Amal militia dedicated to the defense of
the south. The Amal militia became increasingly
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-022
26 September l 986
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entangled in the civil war on the side of the leftist and
Palestinian forces and has fought numerous battles
against the Christian militias since. While openly
supporting coexistence with the Christians, Sadr
sought a bigger share of the country's political pie for
the Shias. His repeated criticisms of the Christian-
dominated government on social and military issues
proved to be an effective tool for political mobilization
and recruitment, especially among thousands of
advisers-Shaykh Muhammad Yacoub and Abbas
Baddredine-may have been partly accidental due
perhaps to heavyhanded torture by Libyan hosts, but
alienated Shia youth.
Sadr's unprecedented success in creating a Shia
political movement and militia in Lebanon stem from
his charismatic personality. He was seen by his
supporters as a redeemer-a leader genuinely
committed to transforming their lives. The plight of
the south, traditionally the home of most of Lebanon's
Shia population, became the centerpiece of his
Libya continues to deny any involvement m t e a r
affair, insisting that the cleric and his two companions
were put on an Alitalia flight bound for Rome from
Libya on 1 September 1978. Italian authorities insist
that Sadr was not on that flight.
message.
As a reformer, Musa al-Sadr wanted to create a new
Lebanese order. He preached that Israel's aggression
in the south robbed Lebanon of its pride and integrity.
The daily Israeli retaliatory attacks were not directed
at the Palestinians as much as they were directed
against the innocent local inhabitants, he argued, and
he blamed the Lebanese Government for failing to
protect its territory-even accusing it of complicity
with Israel. Ironically, Sadr's latter message
highlighted the government's weakness and made it
more vulnerable to attacks from other leftists and
repeatedly investigated his final days looking for
clues. We doubt any of these rumors were accurate.
More likely, Sadr died soon after his arrival in
Libya.
Sadr had a falling out with
Qadhafi during his visit-probably over Sadr's anti-
PLO activities in the south.
Palestinians with similar grievances.
Sadr eventually became disenchanted with his
Palestinian connection and by 1976 was pushing more
for Shia causes -a move that put him at odds with
the majority of the Palestinian leadership-and may
have set the stage for his disappearance. PLO-Aural
relations steadily deteriorated in the mid-1970s. By
1977-78 Aural was fighting daily skirmishes with the
Palestinians, whom many Shias considered an
occupying power and an overbearing intruder in the
south.
Sadr's Disappearance
Although the whereabouts of Sadr remains officially
a mystery, he was almost
certainly killed by Libyan intelligence. We believe
that his death, along with two of his trusted
We believe, however, that Libya probably
eliminated Sadr primarily at the behest of radical
Palestinians who opposed his efforts to establish a
Shia-run area in the south and the upper Bekaa
Valley free of the Palestinian presence.
Impact
The circumstances surrounding Musa al-Sadr's
disappearance have had a great deal of influence on
events both on a local and a regional level. In
Lebanon, Aural leader Barri uses Sadr's legacy to call
for moderation and unity in the Shia community's
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1 S January 1980
28 January 1980
10 March 1980
16 January 1981
3 September 1981
7 December 1981
24 February 1982
27 January 1983
17 March 1983
22 June 1983
23 June 1984
10 July 1984
2 September 1984
19 September 1984
10 October 1984
7 February 1985
16 March 1985
11 June 1985
17 January 1986
9 April 1986
Middle East Airlines jet hijacked.
Middle East Airlines jet hijacked.
Middle East Airlines jet hijacked.
Three rockets fired at Libyan Mission in Beirut.
Two rockets fired at Libyan Mission in Beirut.
Libyan jetliner on.flight from Zurich to Tripoli diverted to Beirut after a 10,000-
kilometer odyssey.
Kuwaiti airliner hijacked. Forced to land in Beirut gf~ter a 12,500-kilometer
ordeal.
Explosion on doorstep of Libyan Mission in Beirut caused by remote-controlled
bomb.
Bomb explodes at Libyan Mission in Madrid, Spain.
Romanian jetliner leased to Libya en route from Athens to Tripoli diverted to
Cyprus.
Libya's top diplomat kidnaped from lobby of Bristol Hotel in Beirut. Freed by
Amal gunmen two days later.
Explosion at Libyan Mission in Beirut caused by bomb.
Explosion at Libyan Mission Annex in Beirut.
Libyan diplomat shot in Madrid, Spain.
Spanish Ambassador in Lebanon kidnaped in Beirut.
Cyprus Airways Jfight from Beirut to Cyprus commandeered. Returns to Beirut.
Libyan diplomat Abd al-Basil al-Trabulsi kidnaped. Released on 23 March.
Jordanian airliner hijacked to Beirut. Later blown up.
Three Spanish officials kidnaped, later released in Beirut.
Libyan Mission in Beirut attacked with automatic weapons fire.
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dealings with other sects. Radical Shias-backed by
Iran-have also exploited Sadr's message but chosen
to highlight it as a call for Shia militancy and an
Islamic republic in Lebanon.
Libya's role in Sadr's death has been a cause for bitter
intra-Shia accusations:
? Nabih Barri has on several occasions criticized
Iran's close ties to Libya, calling them irresponsible.
The Shia demand for a Libyan accounting has been
the driving force behind a series of Shia terrorist
attacks against Libyan facilities-including several
airline hijackings. The so-called Musa Sadr
Brigades-a shadowy group probably tied to Amal-
even sent a congratulatory message to President
Reagan after the US airstrikes on Libya last
spring.
The disappearance of Musa al-Sadr has highlighted
the dichotomy between Lebanese Shia advocates of
social modernism and traditionalism, between
religious tolerance and fundamentalism, and between
political moderation and extremism. Every September
Shia politicians call for further investigation of Sadr's
disappearance and press to find him. For Shia
believers Musa al-Sadr is a key symbol who-like the
Shia Imams of medieval times-has disappeared from
the secular arena only to remain a focus of intense
passion in Shia politics.
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Iraq: Toning Down the President's
Personality Cult
The cult of personality fostered by Iraqi
propagandists to glorify President Saddam Husayn
apparently is being revised. Saddam's reputation as a
great war leader is no longer credible following Iraqi
defeats at Al Faw and Mehran. US diplomats in
Baghdad believe pressure to tone down the cult is
coming from Bath Party leaders who are concerned
that Saddam's public image no longer bolsters public
confidence. We believe some revision of the cult is
inevitable, although the propagandists must be careful
not to lose the support of lower-class Iraqis to whom
the cult is meaningful.
The Cult of Personality
One noticeable development of the Iran-Iraq war has
been the extraordinary cult of personality that has
grown up around Iraq's President Saddam Husayn.
Iraq's well-organized propaganda apparatus has used
a plethora of photographs, wall paintings, and lavish
public events to promote Saddam as a national hero.
The propagandists have focused particularly on
Saddam as a great war leader. They have praised him
as a natural military genius and a strategist whose
plans never fail. They also have portrayed Saddam as
a commander who cares for his men and will not
tolerate excessive casualties. During 1982-85, US
diplomats in Baghdad reported a high level of
acceptance of the cult among lower-class Iraqis,
especially poor Shias. Shia Islam has a heritage of
encouraging hero worship, a possible explanation of
this phenomenon.
Early this year, however, Saddam's image began to
lose some of its luster. The President had boasted that
under his direction Iraq's forces would hold the
Iranians at bay with minimal casualties. The Iranian
breakthrough at Al Faw and the heavy Iraqi losses
undercut these claims.
Saddam tried to recoup by ordering the Army in June
to seize Mehran, a deserted Iranian border town. The
Iranians retook the city in less than a week, however,
and again inflicted heavy casualties on the Iraqis. As
a result, the number of Iraqis felled this year has risen
to over 15,000, more than in all of 1985.
In the aftermath of Mehran, US diplomats reported a
sharp outburst of popular resentment as Iraqis
publicly began to criticize Saddam. This was an
extraordinary development in Iraq's police state,
where few persons have dared to speak out against
the President. US diplomats in part blamed the cult
for this backlash. Iraqis had been led by the
propagandists to believe that with Saddam as their
leader, they could not lose the war, but recent events
seemed to contradict this belief.
A Congress Is Called
Following the Mehran disaster, the ruling Bath Party
convened a national congress at which the conduct of
the war and Saddam's role were debated. The leaders
demanded that he stop trying to micromanage the war
and consult more frequently with his generals. The
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mood was becoming dangerously brittle, seems to
have gone along with these demands.
We believe that under the prodding of party leaders
Saddam also has agreed to tone down the cult of
personality. Two weeks after the congress he gave a
national address that was startlingly different from
previous speeches. He did not boast but instead
appealed to the people for support. He told them to
expect a major offensive by Iran, probably in
September, and asked them to make sacrifices for the
nation. Perhaps most significantly, Saddam made no
attempt to appear optimistic. He conceded the
possibility that Iraqi territory might be lost in the
offensive and that casualties could be high.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-012
26 September 1986
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Other Moves To Tone Down the Cult
Saddam has taken other actions suggesting that he is
toning down his personality cult:
? He has permitted Iraqi generals to take credit for
battlefield victories. Last month, Iran seized an
offshore oil platform that Iraq eventually
recaptured. The general in charge of the recapture
claimed that he had devised the plan for the
operation. In the past, such plans were worked out
by Saddam and his military advisers.
? Saddam has permitted Iraq's Defense Minister to
chair meetings of the General Staff. This formerly
was Saddam's exclusive privilege, and the minister
attended but kept well in the background.
? Saddam has begun referring to himself publicly as
"a man of the people." The President formerly
claimed that he was "the father of the people."
Outlook
We believe there will be further gradual changes in
Saddam's personality cult during the coming months.
Saddam will adopt a lower profile and allow his
generals and top party leaders to play a more active
part in the war. Propaganda will stress the need for
popular sacrifice, and the people will be lauded for
their contribution to the war effort.
Iraq's propagandists have demonstrated considerable
skill manipulating public opinion, and we believe they
will be able to successfully restructure the cult.
Middle-class Iraqis almost certainly will approve such
changes. According to US diplomats, this group has
long regarded the cult as crude and artificial. Among
the poor, however, the image of Saddam as a heroic
figure has been highly appealing, and the regime must
proceed carefully to maintain their support.
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Iraq: Saddam's
Family Troubles
Iraq's President Saddam Husayn apparently is on the
verge of putting some of his closest relatives on trial
for corruption. Members of the President's family-
the Tikritis-have long been involved in questionable
business deals, but Saddam has consistently protected
them. The President appears to have decided that the
public mood has turned dangerously against his
family, and, unless he acts, resentment is likely to rub
off on him. In addition, major figures in the
government and ruling Bath Party would like to curb
the power of the Tikriti clan.
Roots of Family Disputes
According to the US Embassy in Baghdad, Saddam is
finally preparing to bring his half brother Barzan
al-Tikriti to trial on corruption charges. Barzan was
dismissed from his powerful post as head of Iraqi
intelligence in 1983 amid rumors that he was involved
in corrupt business deals. No formal charge was
brought against Barzan at the time, and he was
allowed to retire to his estate.
In addition to Barzan, other members of the family
have been accused of trading on their family ties.
Saddam's uncle and father-in-law, Khayrallah Tilfah,
has long been suspected of using his relationship with
the President to garner a fortune, which is invested in
land. Last year Saddam said publicly he would not
In late August Saddam gave a long interview to
Al Thawrah-the paper of the ruling Bath Party-
in which he stressed his determination to curb his
relatives' corrupt activities. Saddam told the
interviewer, "I watch the behavior (ol my relatives)
and punish them decisively and strongly. There are
many people who are my relatives, including my
nephews, brothers, and sons, whom I have whipped
and caned for behavior I found improper. "Saddam
further asserted that "public figures should not covet
private property"(an apparent reference to Tilfah and
his large landholdings). "It is wrong, "the President
said, "to seek to acquire property to such a degree it
impedes the march of the people. A public figure
must not forget his principles or be greedy. "
allusion to Tilfah.
condone influence peddling by relatives using his
name. According to the US Embassy, this was an
against him.
Last month the US Embassy reported that another
Saddam relative, longtime foe Gen. Umar Hazza
al-Tikriti, had been arrested on unspecified charges.
Three of his villas were bulldozed and a cache of arms
discovered. According to the Embassy, Saddam
believes Umar Hazza may have been plotting a coup
The Public Opinion Factor
The behavior of Saddam's relatives has put the
President in a bind. On the one hand, the Tikritis over
the years have been among the President's staunchest
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-011
26 September 1986
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Barzan al-Tikriti
Barzan is Saddam Husayn's maternal hall'brother
and has gone from being one of his most useful to one
of his most troublesome relatives. Although only in
his midthirties, Barzan has served as Saddam's o.>~ce
director (1968-73J, was a member of his assassination
squad (1971-72), and was Saddam's personal
representative in Iraqi intelligence-Mukhabarat
(1977-79). Barzan is reputed to have organized the
bloody purge of 21 senior officials that occurred when
Saddam became President in 1979,
As head of the Mukhabarat during
1979-83, Barzan ruthlessly used the powerful
security service to suppress opposition to Saddam. He
also built a personal power base and a reputation for
personal extravagance and corruption, which
contributed to his dismissal in 1983,
The dismissal and a wholesale purge
ojBarzan loyalists from the Mukhabarat greatly
aggravated fissures within the extended Tikriti
Khayrallah Tilfah
The 70-year-old patriarch of the Tikriti clan,
Saddam's uncle Khayrallah Ti(Jah was Saddam's
surrogate father and longtime mentor. Ti(f~ah raised
Saddam following the death of Saddam's father and
inculcated him with his own revolutionary ideology.
Saddam married Tidfah's daughter in 1963.
Ti(Jah helped Saddam build his
power base during the 1970s and served as Saddam's
"eyes and ears" on Iraqi society. His house in
Baghdad waslrequently used by key leaders from
various interest groups to discuss government
policies.
Umar Hazza al-Tikriti
Gen. Umar Hazza al-Tikriti is one ojSaddam's
longtime foes. Throughout the 1970s, Umar Hazza
supported then President Ahmad al-Bakr, who was
Saddam apparently engineered Umar Hazza's
military retirement q/'ter he opposed the appointment
of Saddam's brother-in-law as Defense Minister.
Umar Hazza wanted the position for himself: During
the late 1960s to mid-1970s Umar Hazza
commanded the Republican Guard, the Baghdad
garrison, and an Army division. He also served as
Army Inspector General (1976-77J, and director of
the Defense Minister's ojlSce (1978).
Husayn Kamil al-Majid
Maj. Husayn Kamil al-Majid, still in his early
thirties, has become the most powerful figure in the
Palace next to Saddam. Majid married Saddam's
eldest daughter in 1983. This helped start the current
family squabble and may have contributed to
Barzan's dismissal,
Since 1983, he has been responsible for all
aspects ojPalace security and has served as the
President's watchdog over the intelligence services.
oversees "Tikriti affairs"for the President.
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supporters. They have expected to be rewarded for
their backing, and one way Saddam did this was to
overlook their influence peddling. On the other hand,
the Iraqis are in the midst of a costly war that has
gone against them. The President's personal prestige
is at a low ebb, and he cannot afford to have his
reputation further tarnished by his relatives' antics
and avarice.
In July, the Embassy reported an extraordinary
upsurge of public criticism, much of it focusing on
Saddam. Ordinary Iraqis blamed him for
mismanaging the war and for permitting his relatives
to make fortunes in war profiteering while the rest of
the country suffered.
Saddam, who is a savvy politician, apparently decided
that the time had come to put distance between
himself and his more flagrantly corrupt relatives. He
apparently feared that corruption was about to
become an issue that would crystallize popular
resentment against his regime.
Anti-Tikriti Forces
Saddam's action against corrupt relatives is popular
among key supporters of Saddam. The US Embassy
has suggested that Saddam's chief aide, Husayn
Kamil al-Majid, is spearheading the drive against
family members. A Tikriti himself, al-Majid is the
head of the Palace security unit and is a known rival
of Barzan. In 1983 it was al-Majid who personally
arrested Barzan and brought him forcibly to the
Palace. Barzan has never forgiven him for this, and
al-Majid probably would like to see Barzan
eliminated
Top leaders of the ruling Bath Party oppose Barzan
and Tilfah because their influence stems from
traditional family ties rather than the party.
According to the US Embassy, Barzan, before he fell
from grace, disdained the party leadership, believing
Implications
If Saddam puts one or more of his relatives on trial,
this would generate phenomenal public interest and
deflect public attention from the gloomy war news.
The conviction of Tilfah and Barzan on corruption
charges would almost certainly lead to the
expropriation of their wealth. Although property
confiscations probably would not significantly help
the economically strapped regime, they would send a
message to other wealthy individuals to avoid war
profiteering. Moreover, by cracking down on high-
level corruption, the regime would show that all Iraqis
are treated equally. This could help limit complaints
as the regime calls for new sacrifices from the public
because of the war and economic problems.
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Iran's Middle Class: Losers of
the Revolution
Members of Iran's middle classes have been the major
losers since the Islamic revolution as the clerical
regime has focused its attention and energies on its
more important lower-class supporters. The middle
class includes well-educated, largely pro-Western
technocrats and professionals, most of whom are civil
servants or work for nationalized firms. It also
includes many military officers trained before the
revolution, but not Revolutionary Guard officers and
bazaaris who have similar incomes but have fared
better since the fall of the Shah. In general, the
middle class opposes clerical rule, resenting
domination by religiously devout but untrained
mullahs and poorly educated members of the lower
class. Though the middle classes pose little threat to
the regime, they are slowly gaining influence, and
over the long term they could be a moderating force in
Iranian politics.
Background and Role in the Revolution
Middle-class professionals and technocrats opposed
the Shah for a mixture of economic, political, and
nationalistic motives. Many rediscovered national
pride through Khomeini and resurgent Islam. Civil
servants, in particular, resented being underpaid
compared with the private sector. The middle class
wished to replace the Shah's regime with a secular
democratic government that they hoped to control.
The involvement of middle-class youth in the
outlawed Islamic Marxist group, the Mujahedin
e-Khalq, has greatly heightened regime suspicions.
Western scholars report that most of the thousands
executed during the regime's effort to exterminate the
Mujahedin were middle-class college and high school
students.
The middle class has probably suffered a greater
reduction in living standards than any other group.
Thousands of technocrats have been purged since the
revolution. Moreover, civil servants' salaries and
benefits were cut right after the revolution, and they
have received only small increases since then despite
rampant inflation.
as of February 1986 the purchasing power of an
Iranian civil servant's income was only half what it
was before the revolution. Since the poor are not
taxed and merchants avoid taxes, most government
employees, who have taxes automatically deducted
from their salaries, have borne a disproportionate
burden of current efforts to raise tax revenues. The
middle class is also discriminated against in the
provision of goods at government-controlled prices,
housing, education, and other programs,
civil servants
frequently spend work hours waiting in line for scarce
goods or moonlight to supplement their incomes.
Under Siege
The middle class has lost out politically, economically,
and socially under the Islamic republic. Its brief bid
for political control of the revolution collapsed with
the fall of moderate Prime Minister Bazargan in
1980, and much of their remaining influence waned
with the ouster of President Bani-Sadr in 1981. The
clerical regime has found it expedient to condemn the
middle class as elitist, anti-Islamic, and in league with
Western imperialism or Communism. Alleged
middle-class counterrevolutionaries are blamed for
government failures. Middle-class politicians have
either been driven into exile or harassed and
The lifestyle of the middle class has been drastically
affected by the revolution:
? Vilification of wealth has made it impossible to
display expensive clothes and possessions in public.
? Religious strictures have pushed Western lifestyles
underground; theater, night clubs, and drinking are
banned.
prevented from running for office.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-022
26 September 1986
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? Job promotions and working conditions often hinge
on such factors as abjuring Western tastes in dress
and music in favor of traditional Persian styles.
? Educated women-prime beneficiaries of reforms
instituted by the Shah-have been pressed to return
to traditional roles regardless of their skills and
forced to conform to the dress and behavioral
standards of a theocratic society.
In contrast, the lower classes and bazaar merchant
class have fared relatively better. There are numerous
programs for the lower classes providing subsidized
goods. More important, the lower classes have gained
social status and economic mobility. The bazaaris
have benefited by a return to a more traditional
Islamic economic system and won substantial political
influence. Foreign exchange policies and rationing
have opened opportunities for the bazaaris to earn
large profits on the black market.
Middle-Class Reaction: Leave or Endure
Many middle-class opponents of the regime have
voted with their feet. An estimated 500,000 skilled
workers have fled Iran since the revolution. In
addition, many who remain in Iran have left their jobs
in frustration or have been purged by radicals. This
has created major problems for the Iranian economy.
For example, development projects have been delayed
by the lack of skilled engineers and construction
workers, and health care has suffered significantly
from a shortage of physicians. The regime
compounded these problems by closing Iran's
universities, including its only medical school, from
1980 to 1982 for fear that students might undermine
the revolution.
passive resistance include buying restricted goods on
the black market and covertly engaging in un-Islamic
activities.
The middle class has staged occasional protests to
support moderate opposition movements, but fear and
lack of strength have limited such activity.
Clandestine radio broadcasts from opposition leaders
abroad, such as former Prime Minister Bakhtiar and
the Shah's son, have triggered some rallies. In Tehran
these have been small and largely limited to creating
traffic jams-a relatively easy task, given Tehran's
overcrowded streets.
Opposition activity remains muted because
participants fear loss of their jobs, imprisonment, or
even worse at the hands of radical revolutionary
committees. Even a minor protest can bring a brutal
In addition, much of the middle class is
politically indifferent out of despair that anything can
be done. a common
sentiment is that there will be no change until some
outside force, such as the United States, chooses to
displace Khomeini and his lot.
The middle class has little enthusiasm for the war
with Iraq, and many have sought to avoid military
service for themselves or their sons.
the majority of the middle class is strongly
nationalistic, but most believe the human and
economic cost is too great and that there is little hope
of ousting the Iraqi regime.
bribes are paid to Revolutionary
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The remaining elements of the middle class constitute
a serious irritant but not a political threat to the
regime. some engage in
such passive opposition as not doing their jobs
many National Iran
ian
Oil Company (NIOC) employees had embarked on a
"slowdown" out of frustration with the incompetent
political appointees managing NIOC. This has
hindered progress on new projects and hurt
production and maintenance. Less damaging forms of
Guard commanders to falsely claim men as members
of their unit; to doctors to certify a son as unfit to
fight; and to government employees to alter education
records allowing students to remain in foreign
schools.
Regaining Influence
Despite its suspicions of the technocrats, the regime
has been forced to seek their expertise to help cope
with the difficulties of running a modern economy
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and society. The dismal state of the economy,
especially the poor performance of nationalized firms,
has encouraged the clerics to yield greater authority
to their better trained subordinates. Technocrats have
regained control of economic decision making at lower
levels in many instances.
To deal with economic and technical problems, the
regime is asking many of those who were purged from
their positions or who left the country following the
revolution to return. The Islamic regime has set up
programs to lure expatriate technocrats by appealing
to their sense of nationalism and promising access to
consumer goods, foreign travel, and exemption from
military service. the clerics at
least grudgingly accept skilled technicians who refuse
to adhere to such religious strictures as noon prayers.
Professional civil servants who left or were purged are
now being hired as consultants, especially in the
important oil industry, and some businesses have been
returned to former owners with badly needed
expertise. Some faculty members at universities
dismissed as potential counterrevolutionaries have
been rehired.
Few expatriates have returned to Iran.
NIOC has not succeeded in
attracting former employees living abroad.
Expatriates balk at the prospect of following Islamic
codes of conduct, find salaries uncompetitive, and fear
they could not send money overseas. Occasional
generous financial incentives do little to allay fears of
being drafted or harassed by squads of young Islamic
radicals. Many fear they would not be allowed to
leave again. Present restrictions on travel, such as
requiring wives of technocrats leaving the country to
remain behind, reinforce this notion.
Outlook
The middle class will not regain a significant degree
of political power in the near term. Iran's worsening
economy will encourage a greater role for technocrats
in economic decision making but only so long as the
regime is confident of its position. If economic decline
or the war generate serious domestic unrest, religious
radicals will blame shortcomings on the increasingly
visible experts for failing to follow Islamic ways. The
consequent retrenchment would bring new purges of
technocrats. A smooth post-Khomeini transfer of
power holds the best promise for the middle class.
Should radical ideologues prevail, a renewed exodus
of the middle class can be expected.
Middle-class technocrats probably will ally
themselves with the moderate opposition coalition of
conservative clerics and bazaaris because they share
the technocrats' most important political goal, a
return to secular government with clerics playing only
a supporting role. Both groups probably would be
comfortable with a government led by a moderate
such as former Prime Minister Bazargan. The
conservative clerics' position in favor of property
rights also finds support among the middle
class.
Nevertheless, such an alliance would be subject to
considerable internal friction. The middle class
supports less clerical control over the economy, but
not less government control; the middle class would
run the system in the absence of the mullahs. Those
with technical expertise in industry oppose the
regime's probazaar policies on exchange rates, price
controls, and taxes. The overvalued rial and price
controls harm technocrats who work on the
production side of the economy, while toleration of a
vibrant black market reaps large profits for bazaaris
and importers.
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The Pakistan Muslim League:
The Once and Future
Ruling Party?
The Pakistan Muslim League's rebirth last January
signals the latest effort to build a cohesive government
political party out of the original Muslim League that
fostered the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The current
version of the Muslim League is headed by Prime
Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo, and he has used
the government's patronage powers to induce most
Cabinet and parliamentary members to join. The
League has thus far successfully turned back
opposition leader Benazir Bhutto's demand for new
elections and is seeking to blunt her populist image by
appealing to the public with its own program of job
creation and urban development. Popular cynicism
with politicians, the inability to fulfill social and
economic promises, and differences with provincial
and religious parties, however, will make it difficult
for the League to expand its appeal beyond
conservative, opportunistic, and Punjabi politicians.
The Party of Independence
The Muslim League was formed in 1906, declaring its
mission "protecting and advancing the political rights
of the Muslims of India and representing their needs
and aspirations to the government." Academic studies
show that the League was made up of Western-
oriented professionals who wanted a Muslim party, in
large part, to counter the influence of the Hindu-
dominated Congress Party. Nonetheless, the two
parties cooperated through the 1920s to promote
independence for all India from British colonialism.
Their tacit alliance broke down in the 1930s because
of Muslim resentment at perceived Hindu attempts to
dominate the independence movement. Mohammed
Ali Jinnah, who joined the League in 1913 and
became its leader in 1934, gradually became an
advocate of a separate Muslim state for India's
Muslim minority.
In 1940 the League formally endorsed the idea of
partition of India into separate Hindu and Muslim
states. The League formally adopted "Pakistan" as
the name of the proposed state in 1943, and when
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the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) became the
ruling party and Jinnah head of state.
other political parties.
Decline and Eclipse
Scholarly studies show that, although the Muslim
League remained the ruling party in Pakistan through
the mid-1950s it gradually lost public support after
Jinnah's death in 1948. Its main base of support-
urban professionals and intellectuals-was narrow,
and it could not win over Islamic fundamentalists,
who considered the League too secular, or promoters
of provincial autonomy, who believed the League to
be controlled by the majority Punjabi ethnic group.
The League lost heavily in the 1954 provincial
elections and was forced into coalition with other
parties. After General Ayub Khan's military coup in
1958, the PML was formally dissolved along with
Ayub Khan resurrected the League in 1962 when he
allowed the resumption of political activity. He made
the League the official governing party and became
its leader in 1963. The Muslim League was the ruling
party of Pakistan until Ayub fell from power in 1969
and was replaced by another martial law regime.
During Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's years in power (1971-77)
and President Zia's martial law period (1977-85), the
Muslim League fell into disarray, splitting into three
factions.
Revival in 1986
After martial law and the ban on political activities
was lifted on 30 December 1985, the Pakistan Muslim
League was reconstituted with Prime Minister Junejo
as its head. The nucleus of the party is the Pir Pagaro
faction-followers of a religious leader based in Sind
Province-that had supported the martial law regime
of President Zia. The new PML formally registered
with the government in February, and 50 out of 87
Senators and 170 out of 237 National Assembly
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-022
26 September 1986
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Mohammed Khan Junejo, Pakistan's first prime
minister since the imposition of martial law in 1977,
is widely known for his high moral character and
cautious, conservative political views. Since taking
office, he has worked hard to establish himself as the
legitimate spokesman and chief policymaker of a
popularly elected democracy. Asserting his role as
the chief executive o.~icer, Junejo has played a key
role in formulating the government's response to the
political challenge posed by opposition leader Benazir
Bhutto. He has clearly stated his aim to serve in the
full capacity of his office until the next national
election, scheduled for 1990.
broad support in the party and owed much of his
success to his mentor, former PML leader Pir
Pagaro. Pagaro, however, has recently privately
criticized him for trying to build the party from the
top down. Junejo has worked diligently to ensure the
predominance of the PML in Pakistani political lVe
and to secure the loyalty of the pro-PML members of
the National Assembly. He is working on a
parliamentary and constitutional strategy to sustain
the power of the Muslim League. According to US
Embassy reporting, he excels in consensus building
and has earned a reputation as a man of moderation
who listens.
Junejo, 53, has been active in Sindhi politics since
1960 and has spent much of his political career
focusing on social welfare issues. He held several
positions of increasing responsibility in Sind,
including three provincial ministerial posts (1965-70).
Junejo adhered to the Muslim League's decision to
boycott the 1970 elections and did not hold office
again until President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq
appointed him Minister of Railways in 1978.
Dropped from the Cabinet in 1981, Junejo was
politically inactive until his election to the National
Assembly in 1985.
Although Junejo became president of the Pakistan
Muslim League (PMLJ in January 1986, he lacked
members joined the new party.
Junejo is assured a parliamentary majority until the
next election scheduled for 1990 because, by law, any
legislator who changes party affiliation during his
term is disqualified. President Zia has not taken any
role in the PML in conformity with his frequently
stated view that political parties are un-Islamic
because they foster divisions among Muslims.
The PML has recognized the need for organizing and
developing grassroots support.
Junejo gave priority in February to
establishing League offices in most major cities; youth
wings have been set up in each provincial party
organization; and the Prime Minister has undertaken
numerous speaking tours around the country. A
League official told US diplomats in July that 5
million voters had joined the party.
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Pir Pagaro, former president of the Pakistan Muslim
League (PML), retains considerable influence in
national politics through his close personal
relationship with Prime Minister and current PML
president Mohammed Khan Junejo as well as his
position as Pir (spiritual leader) of the Hurs. (The
Hurs are areligious/political sect that claim about
500,000 adherents centered in northern Sind. The
Hurs are known for their deep veneration of their
spiritual leader and their lawlessness.) Pagaro
strongly recommended Junejo, a relative and
political supporter, to President Mohammed Zia-ul-
Haq for the prime-ministership and supported his
candidacy as the new head of the PML. The Pir
supported him to ensure support for aparty-based
democracy and to curb the increasing influence of
conservative religious leaders. Because of his ties to
Junejo, he did not believe his own influence would be
at risk. (Junejo, a Hur, in theory owes absolute
obedience to the Pir. He rectlfirmed his loyalty to the
Pir last May, according to US Embassy officials.)
Although Pagaro is positive about the present
position of the PML and believes opposition leader
Bhutto's strength is waning, he does not believe
Junejo will last beyond 1987. He has expressed
disapproval of Junejo's party-building efforts and
doubts his political aptitude. Pagaro apparently still
entertains ambitions of resuming the leadership of
the Muslim League once party politics have taken
root. He won a Senate seat in the February 1985
election, and his two sons were elected to the Sind
provincial assembly.
Pagaro, an eccentric, is outspoken and takes an
undisciplined approach to politics. He believes deeply
in astrology and has faith in an old prediction that
the seventh pir (himseln would rule Sind.
Nevertheless, the party has a way to go before it can
match the numbers and enthusiasm of supporters of
Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP).
Bhutto's rally in Lahore in April attracted about
500,000 people, while a PML rally held there several
days before drew only 50,000, according to the US
Consulate. The League also could not prevent some
members of the Pagaro faction from breaking away in
February and forming a splinter party called the
PML-Pagaro faction, although Pagaro himself
supports Junejo's party. US diplomatic reporting
indicates that Junejo's lackluster speaking style has
failed to arouse much enthusiasm at PML rallies.
Challenge From the Independents
The PML faced its first challenge in the new civilian
government last May when independent members of
the National Assembly accused it of violating the
Political Parties Act by recruiting members before it
had registered with the government. The
independents claimed that Junejo should be ousted
from parliament because he joined an unregistered
party. The dispute was resolved when President Zia
issued a presidential ordinance eliminating any legal
basis for the independents' motion-in Zia's own
words, he "bailed Junejo out." PML members of the
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National Assembly voted to remove the speaker-
Fakhr Imam, an independent-for allowing the
motion to be brought to the election commission.
Bhutto's Return
The return of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto in
April has given Junejo new impetus to make the PML
a credible political party. His aim is to promote the
PML as a populist party in order to rival Bhutto's
PPP as the party of the have-nots. Shortly before
Bhutto returned to Pakistan, Junejo held a PML rally
in Lahore, where he announced the granting of
property rights to slumdwellers in Punjab Province,
provision of municipal services to the slums, and land
grants to landless rural inhabitants in Punjab. The
government has also announced a $120 million
"National Employment Fund" to reduce the
unemployment rate through public works projects.
PML skittishness about competing with Bhutto's
massive demonstrations led to government-opposition
clashes in August. Both the PML and the PPP were
scheduled to hold rallies in Lahore on 14 August,
Pakistan's Independence Day. The US Consulate in
Lahore reports, however, that Junejo canceled the
League rally out of fear of violence and concern that
the PPP might outdraw the PML. The US Embassy
reports that Junejo was "furious" with local PML
officials for scheduling the rally without his
knowledge. He called on the PPP to cancel its rally,
but it refused, leading to the government crackdown
on opposition activity and touching off the violence
that led to some 30 deaths.
Bhutto has been unable to make good on her public
boast last April that many members of the PML
Justice and Parliamentary fairs Minister Iqbal
Ahmad Khan was named secretary general oj'the
Muslim League in July 1986. He became active in the
party during his studies at Punjab University when he
joined the All-India Muslim League and, ctf'ter
partition, the Pakistan Muslim League (PMLJ.
Following his graduation, Ahmad Khan spent the
next two decades practicing law in Lahore,
highlighted by his tenure as president of the Pakistan
Bar Council (1979-83). From 1981 to May 1985 he
was a member of the Majlis-i-Shura, a now dej'unct
consultative body appointed by President
Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq. A member o.T the PML high
command, Ahmad Khan was elected to the National
Assembly in March 1985 and appointed Minister oJ'
Justice and Parliamentary Af3airs thelollowing
month. Politically conservative, hefavors the status
quo in domestic and.roreign policies.
Ahmad Khan has worked closely with Prime
Minister and League president Mohammed Khan
Junejo to ensure the predominance of the PML.
Together they are devising a statutory and
constitutional strategy to thwart the Pakistan
Peoples Party's call.for midterm elections and render
political agitation by unregistered parties illegal,
would quickly resign their legislative seats and defect
to her party. The League held together during the
antigovernment unrest in August, and there are no
indications that League members are planning to bolt
the party. The US Embassy reports that the PML is
increasingly confident that it can turn back the efforts
of Bhutto and the opposition to force new elections
because the reaction to the government crackdown
was less than the League had feared.
Prospects for the PML
Economic and social problems probably pose the
biggest long-term challenge to the PML. It probably
cannot fulfill promises to increase employment, wage
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The Pakistan Muslim League adopted the following
man~esto on domestic priorities in July 1986:
? Making Pakistan a modern Islamic state.
? Eradicating corruption.
? Establishing the supremacy of elected
representatives.
? Decentralizing local sell=government.
? Electrifying 90 percent of villages by 1991.
? Building a nationwide network of farm-to-market
roads.
? Solving the Katchi Abadi (slums) problem and
building low-cost housing.
? Generating jobs.
? Improving the justice system.
? Ensuring equal protection and freedom of
minorities.
? Promoting women's welfare and rights.
rates, and rural electrification because of budgetary
constraints. Difficulties in dealing with deep-rooted
social problems such as illiteracy, corruption, and
crime could also hurt the PML's credibility with the
public.
The PML remains vulnerable to charges that its
refusal to compromise with the opposition over new
elections will usher in a new round of political
instability. We believe recurring cycles of violence
between opposition and PML supporters, such as the
clashes in August, will create public disillusionment
with the League-and perhaps with those who initiate
the violence as well. The beneficiaries of this cynicism
could be moderate opposition parties such as the new
National People's Party, which was formed by anti-
Bhutto PPP politicians on 30 August.
We also foresee the League having difficulty in
forging ties to fundamentalist Islamic parties, such as
the influential Jamaat-i-Islami. Historically, the
League, while endorsing the sanctity of Islam, has
been a party of secular politicians. The US Consulate
in Lahore reports that the PML and the Jamaat
clashed in the National Assembly this summer over
the sharia bill, which is intended to replace secular
law with Islamic law. The Jamaat wanted religious
authorities to have more control over legal rulings
than the PML was willing to allow, according to the
Consulate.
The PML will also have to do more to change its
image as a vehicle for Punjabi domination of the rest
of the country to increase its popularity in the non-
Punjabi provinces of Sind, the North-West Frontier,
and Baluchistan. US diplomatic reporting indicates
that the PML has established a good grassroots
organization only in the Punjab-where 60 percent of
the population lives.
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India-Pakistan: Armor and
Artillery Balance
weapons pose a significant threat to their tanks. They
note that the rolling terrain of India's deserts and the
small number of Pakistani antitank missile launchers
will not produce ahigh-threat environment for the
Neither India nor Pakistan has a clear edge in armor
and artillery assets. India's 2:1 numerical advantage
in tanks, bolstered by a limited edge in the quality of
its armor inventory, will be considerably narrowed on
the battlefield by its deployment pattern, conservative
strategy, and inadequate logistics. Pakistan's more
modern self-propelled artillery assets are also likely to
inhibit Indian plans for a quick victory. Planned force
modernizations by both sides will only reinforce
existing strengths in their respective tank and artillery
inventories, resulting in increased casualties rather
than decisive advantage in a future conflict.
About half of India's tanks are Vijayantas, an
indigenized version of the 1950s British Vickers tank.
The remaining tanks consist of Soviet T-72s, T-SSs,
and PT-76s.
Most
of the tanks in the Pakistani Army are Chinese-made
T-59s. About 300 are US M48s and M47s.
India's numerical superiority is complemented by a
slight qualitative edge. All of India's tanks are
capable of sighting their targets at night. Only
Pakistan's M48ASs have this capability. India's T-72s
also are capable of engaging targets at longer ranges
than any of Pakistan's tanks and can fire projectiles
capable of defeating the frontal armor of all Pakistani
tanks. Only Pakistan's M48ASs can defeat the Indian
T-72s in a frontal engagement.
Pakistan has not offset India's numerical advantage in
armor by building an adequate inventory of antitank
missile launchers. The Pakistani Army has over 200
US TOW antitank missile launchers with more than
7,000 missiles and an unknown number of licensed
produced West German Cobra antitank missile
launchers and missiles, but we share the judgment of
Indian military writers who do not believe these
Indians.'
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Limiting Factors for India
Ambitious Goals. The Indian Army's strategy, 25X1
reflected in the deployment of its armored forces,
significantly reduces the importance of its numerical
war plans call for containing
expected Pakistani offensives aimed at seizing and
holding valuable Indian territory prior to a cease-fire.
Subsequent counterattacks by India's two strike
corps-built around India's only two armored
divisions-are designed to sever Pakistan's north-
south logistic line and engage and defeat Pakistan's
armored division, all in less than two weeks.
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The Army's decision to protect all of India's territory 25X1
from Pakistani occupation severely reduces the
number of tanks the Indians can concentrate for
sweeping offensive operations. Over half of India's
tanks along the border will be committed to relatively
static, defensive roles. We estimate the Army has
1,100 tanks deployed with infantry divisions and
independent armored brigades along the border with
' Indian military analysts compare their situation to the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war where a relatively flat terrain and a high concentration
of Egyptian antitank missile launchers in the Sinai posed a serious
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-022
26 September 1986
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Pakistan. We believe these tanks will be used in an
antitank role and for direct fire-support roles for
infantry units and in limited, diversionary offensives.
Poor Tactics. The two Indian strike corps have about
900 tanks, bu that
these tanks will not be massed. Indian Army doctrine
calls for keeping one of the strike corps as a strategic
reserve, and Indian Army commanders have
traditionally thought in terms of brigade-size
engagements, a tendency that may lead them to
commit their armor in a piecemeal fashion rather
than concentrating it for a single decisive blow.
furthermore, that the
start-stop pattern o movement used by the Indian
Army--conducting reconnaissance, attacking, and
then consolidating on an objective-is likely to slow
their advances.
Artillery Gaps. India's lack of mobile artillery is also
likely to hinder rapid movement of its armored forces.
The Indians have not complemented their tank
procurements with purchases of modern mobile
artillery. The armored corps have only about 150
aging British Abbot self-propelled guns able to keep
up with their other tracked vehicles. The lack of guns
on tracked vehicles will force the Indians to plan their
offensives along roads, making it easier for the
Pakistanis to prepare for and contain their attacks.
The Indians have a 2.5:1 numerical advantage in
artillery. India's arsenal of 3,800 guns consists of
towed guns assigned mostly to infantry divisions and
includes a significant number of artillery pieces-
some 1,100-not in the active inventory. As with their
armor, however, the Indians' ability to make effective
use of their strength in numbers has been narrowed by
their decision to defend against a potential Pakistani
attack all along the border.
Pakistani Defenses
We believe the Pakistanis plan a mobile forward
defense. They will attempt to capitalize on their
superior knowledge of the terrain to contain, encircle,
and destroy invading Indian units. They will probably
use their smaller tank force in maneuvers designed to
outflank Indian armored units and to destroy Indian
support equipment.
The Pakistani Army will rely on the superior quality
of its self-propelled artillery. The Pakistanis have over
100 modern 155-mm and 8-inch self-propelled guns in
their inventory of 1,500 artillery pieces. The
Pakistani's also have five US-made artillery locating
radars that will assist them in conducting
counterbattery fire.
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Indian and Pakistani Major
Ground Force Weapons
Type Total Active Along
Inventory Inventory Borders
India 3,400 2,500 2,100
Pakistan 1,600 1,200 1,100
Artillery
a For India, excludes forces deployed against China and in the
northeast. For Pakistan, excludes forces deployed against
Afghanistan.
Indians will probably begin to replace their
Vijayantas with the domestically produced Arjun
Main Battle tank scheduled to enter production in
1988. say the Indians also
plan to buy over 200 Itg t tan s, probably Swedish
IKV-91 s, for their armored reconnaissance and
amphibious forces.
to lag. Attempts to field a Soviet 130-mm gun on a
Vijayanta chassis have apparently failed.
Meanwhile, Indian purchases of towed guns continue;
focused on mating a US 155-mm turret to the
Vijayanta hull. Developing this new system, rather
than buying a proven design, will probably delay
fielding these important weapons until the mid-1990s.
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Logistics. We believe widespread maintenance and
logistic problems will greatly degrade the
performance of both sides after the first few days of
combat, but for the Indians this will be more serious.
armor and artillery units sulTer from spare parts
shortages and maintenance problems, compounded by
their dependence on foreign suppliers. They also
suggest that both sides have underestimated their
logistic needs in a future war. Stockpiles are based on
1971 wartime usage, but their weapons today are
capable of higher rates of firepower and more
demanding missions. For the Indians, who plan a
larger number of olI'ensive missions, this will be a
critical problem as their supply lines stretch into
Pakistan.
The Pakistanis plan to upgrade their Chinese tanks
and purchase additional US tanks.
officials that they may ask for 400 US M-1 tanks.
The M-1 is superior to any tank in the Indian
inventory but is much heavier and more complex-
particularly because of its turbine engine-than
existing Pakistani tanks. In our judgment, the M-1
would overburden Pakistan's roads and bridges and
complicate the Army's logistic and maintenance
system, without adding commensurate improvement
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Outlook
India and Pakistan continue to modernize and expand
their armor and artillery assets in accordance with the
dominant themes of their respective strategies. We
estimate the Indian tank inventory could grow from
3,400 to 5,000 in the next five years, increasing their
advantage from 2:1 to 2.5:1 over Pakistan. Current
Indian plans call for buying additional Soviet T-72
tanks before the Indians start coproducing the T-72
next year.
plans additional engine and fire-control
system improvements for the T-SSs and T-72s. The
in combat capability to its tank forces.
Islambad's artillery modernization plans call for
acquiring additional US-made self-propelled guns and
advanced artillery weapons. Pakistan has 88 self-
propelled guns on order, further expanding its edge
over India in this category. The Pakistanis are also
acquiring the Copperhead laser-guided projectile that
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will increase the tank killing capability of their
155-mm guns, and they are placing a high priority on
acquiring the Multiple Launch Rocket System from
the United States. This system is capable of firing 12
rockets armed with hundreds of antipersonnel and
about 4,000 fatalities on the western front after two
weeks of combat. We speculate that in a future war,
casualties from more modern weapons-particularly
from artillery, which accounts for 70 percent of
casualties in modern warfare~ould easily be four to
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antiarmor bomblets a distance of 30 kilometersa
In our judgment, these purchasing patterns will
reinforce the existing asymmetries in ground force
equipment between India and Pakistan. The
imbalance between New Delhi's highly mobile armor
and its largely towed artillery will continue to grow,
seriously curtailing the Army's ability to strike deeply
and quickly into Pakistan. Islamabad's defensive
strategy calls for fewer tanks than India, but it
probably has too few. Current acquisition plans,
compared with India's, over the next five years will
not close the gap. Pakistan's growing and more
modern mobile artillery inventory will not be large
enough to assure a successful defense.
Both sides will acquire a veneer of mechanization that
will not change the fundamental infantry character of
their armies. New equipment alone will not guarantee
success in battle but will guarantee a substantial
increase in the number of casualties both sides can
inflict. In 1971, Indian and Pakistani forces suffered
five times higher over a similar period.
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Afghanistan: Smuggling
Across the Border
The reexport trade in Afghanistan-which involves
the import of luxury and manufactured goods that are
then smuggled out, most often to Pakistan-is a time-
honored custom for Afghans and an important source
of income for the Kabul regime. This trade, although
illegal in Pakistan, is encouraged by Pakistani trade
restrictions that exclude some imports, subject others
to quota and licensing restrictions, and apply high
tariffs to additional categories, according to the US
Embassy in Kabul. The Government of Pakistan,
which cannot collect customs fees on the smuggled
merchandise, cannot stop the illegal flow of goods.
The Reexport Trade
The reexport trade has been given particular emphasis
by the Communist regime in the interest of earning
foreign exchange. Since 1982 it has been actively
promoted by the Soviet KGB in Afghanistan, working
through the Afghan Minister of Commerce,
according to press reports. Astate-owned company-
Afghan Kart-has been formed for the express
purpose of carrying out this trade.
approximately 80
percent of the goods imported into Afghanistan by
Kabul merchants are reexported-smuggled-
abroad. The reexports go primarily to Pakistan, but
some goods are also smuggled into Iran and India,
a valid Afghan customs clearance vouching that the
goods were legally imported into Afghanistan and
that all duties have been paid.
Kabul is the main transshipment center for this trade.
A common smuggling route for the goods is from the
capital to Bara in the North-West Frontier Province,
according to the US Embassy in Kabul. The
merchandise is carried by truck a few kilometers west
of the first Afghan customs checkpoint at the border.
There-usually in the early evening-the truck leaves
the paved road and approaches the border south of the
official crossing point. Goods are then transferred to 25X1
mules or camels for the trip to Bara, the main
transshipment point in Pakistan, according to the US
Embassy in Kabul.
Incentives
The trade is extremely profitable for both the Kabul
merchants who import the goods and the traders who
smuggle them across the border and retail them in
Pakistan and elsewhere. The price charged by Kabul
merchants covers the cost of the goods, customs duties
averaging 35 percent, plus a 15-percent profit margin.
Transportation costs and "taxes" to insurgent forces
along the road to the border are paid by the traders,
who nevertheless still make profits in excess of 100
percent on resale of the goods in Pakistan,
Textiles, electrical equipment, tires, and plastics are
the principal goods traded. They are officially
imported from Japan, the United States, South
Korea, and Western Europe and assessed customs
duties. They are then sold to buyers who will retail
them in Pakistan.
According to the US Embassy in Kabul, Afghan
merchants sell the goods to Pakistani traders-usually
Pushtun tribesmen~n credit, with payment due the
goods have been resold in Pakistan. Payment is
normally in dollars, deutsche marks, or other
convertible international currency. The buyer receives
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The reexport trade also enriches the regime's coffers
by encouraging imports into Afghanistan that
increases its revenues from customs duties. In
addition, because Afghan merchants receive payment
in hard currency, Kabul maintains an important
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Secret
NESA NESAR 86-012
26 September 1986
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Outlook
With the deterioration of Afghanistan's official trade
in recent months, the importance to the regime of
hard currency earnings from the reexport business has
increased, in our view. It is unlikely that Pakistan will
crack down on this trade in the foreseeable future
because of its inability to monitor the border area and
its interest in keeping the border open for the transit
of weapons and supplies for the Afghan insurgents.
Secret 56
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Secret
Near East and
South Asia Briefs
Official Arab reaction to the meeting between Egyptian President Mubarak and
Israeli Prime Minister Peres on 11-12 September was generally pragmatic, in
sharp contrast to the emotional criticism of the first Sadat-Begin meeting nine
years ago. Private reactions from the Gulf states were especially favorable; PLO
leader Arafat withheld comment. Except in Syria and Libya, even the press
carried mixed reviews rather than the overwhelming condemnation accorded
Sadat's initiative.
The reactions of most moderate Arabs to this meeting, as well as to the July
meeting between Peres and Moroccan King Hassan, reflect a willingness to judge
Arab-Israeli contacts on the basis of their results rather than to oppose in principle
any Arab meeting with Israeli officials. This Arab emphasis on results will lead to
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lose any benefit he might have gained from this meeting, as he is using it to bolster
his claim to Arab leadership in the Middle East peace process.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-022
16 September 1986
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Secret
new organization because of concern over government control, internal disputes
The Tunisian Government has consolidated the country's two primary labor
federations-the UGTT and the UNTT-in an attempt to strengthen control over
a primary source of opposition to austerity measures. Although membership in the
new UGTT is being enforced by the government, some workers are shunning the
over leadership, and the continued incarceration of labor leaders.
government control cannot be maintained.
wages and its willingness to confront the government on labor issues. In the short
run, union rivalries and the more progovernment stand of the UNTT membership
probably will cause the new federation to focus its energies on internal bickering
instead of against government austerity measures. In the longer term, however, if
the federation prospers, it could become an even greater force to reckon with if
particular, gained labor support in the past because of its aggressive stand on
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Secret
Secret
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