NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300820001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 29, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of --Secret-
Intelligence
Near East and
South Asia Review
29 August 1986
Secrer-
NESA NESAR 86-020
29 August 1986
Copy 3 &A
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Secret
Near East and
South Asia Review
King Hassan's meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Peres has
increased the odds that Moroccan counterterrorist forces may have
to respond to attacks from Middle Eastern terrorists. Although
capable, these forces have not been tested by an actual terrorist
crisis.
Since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Damascus has
intensified its efforts to develop its capability to challenge the Israeli
Air Force. Despite improvements, Damascus almost certainly could
not prevent the Israelis from rapidly attaining air superiority in the
event of a major conflict.
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Secret
NESA NESAR 86-020
29 August 1986
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Secret
Iran's Bazaar Merchants: Challenging Regime Policies
Many Iranian bazaar merchants oppose government efforts to
increase supervision and regulation of the economy and have
responded by electing more conservative, traditional-minded clerics
to the Majles, Iran's parliament. The success of the bazaaris' efforts
and the deteriorating economy have forced the government to
compromise on key issues
The Sunni Islamic Call Party: Developing Political Interests
The Sunni Islamic Call Party is a worldwide organization of
fundamentalist Muslims whose primary goals have been religious
education and reconversion, but some branches in the Arab Gulf
states are showing signs of politization and adopting goals similar to
those of other fundamentalist groups.
Saudi Arabia-Pakistan: Strains in the Relationship
The close Saudi-Pakistani relationship is being strained by diverging
economic and regional interests that are rooted in the Iran-Iraq war,
the phasing out of Pakistani troops seconded to the Saudi armed
forces, and Pakistan's perception that Saudi Arabia has failed to
honor its aid commitments.
Implications of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Capabilities: 33
Potential Military Requirements
If India and Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons, they will face new
defense requirements as well. Both will probably seek to augment
their conventional forces as well as deploy nuclear forces.
Pakistan: Narcotics Press Coverage Falls Short
The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board is attempting to focus media
attention on drugs to raise public awareness of the threat, but
analysis of the Pakistani press during the first quarter of 1986
indicates that this program is making little progress.
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43
Nepal: New Antidrug Initiative
43
Regional Organizations: Economic Difficulties
44
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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordinated views.
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Morocco: Increasing
Counterterrorist Measures
King Hassan's meeting in July with Israeli Prime
Minister Peres has increased the odds that Moroccan
counterterrorist forces may have to respond to attacks
from Middle Eastern terrorists sponsored by Syria or
Libya. US Government observers assess Morocco's
security forces as capable, but these forces have not
been tested by an actual terrorist crisis such as a
hijacking, a hostage-takin , or an assassination
attempt against the King.
In addition, the Moroccan National Police maintains
a small, well-trained SWAT team taught by French
and West German instructors. This unit is responsible
for maintaining liaison with US Embassy security in
Rabat. Like the Gendarmerie units, it probably would
support the Atlas Commandos.
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Expansion of Royal Security Service
Hassan recently ordered the Royal Security Service-
charged with protecting the King and the royal
family-to expand its functions. 25X1
the first group of Security Service 25X1
officers is in France receiving training in
counterintelligence and technical operations,
intelligence collection and analysis, crowd control,
and security escort functions. In the past the Royal
Security Service has depended on other Moroccan
security services for such support. 25X1
this move is not an attempt to duplicate the functions
of the existing Internal Security Service or National
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-020
29 August 1986
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Police. It is more likely an effort by Hassan to gain
better control of Morocco's broad security and
intelligence network.
Active External Cooperation
Morocco has openly advocated better cooperation
among the Arab states to counter terrorism. King
Hassan succeeded in obtaining a general
condemnation of terrorism at the extraordinary Arab
League summit meeting in Casablanca in August
1985-no small accomplishment, given the Arab
political dilemma in distinguishing between
"terrorism" and the Palestinian "armed struggle"
against Israel. In a well-publicized address to the
Council of Arab Interior Ministers in Casablanca last
February, the King called for a better regional
exchange of information on counterterrorism. We
have no evidence that this proposal has been taken up
of local Libyan activities. Moreover, the lukewarm
nature of Hassan's support for Libya following the
US military strike last April, along with more
numerous joint US-Moroccan military exercises, had
already increased the possibility that Libya may
eventually support a terrorist attack by some of its
radical Palestinian clients. Even without Libyan
prompting, radical Palestinian groups that Tripoli
supports and that strongly oppose Hassan's efforts to
further an Arab-Israeli peace settlement could
independently mount attacks.
Although Morocco strongly supports pro-Arafat
Palestinians and clearly distinguishes between them
and radical elements, the possibility of terrorist
reprisals has raised Moroccan concern about the
potential threat from local Palestinian residents=
some Palestinians who publicly
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by the Arab League.
Heightened Terrorist Threat
Terrorist attacks on Moroccan targets from radical
Palestinian groups probably represent the greatest
threat to Moroccan interests in the wake of the
Hassan-Peres meeting. Syria has publicly sanctioned
anti-Hassan operations as legitimate acts of pan-Arab
resistance.
Hassan's persistence in maintaining the union with
Tripoli probably bought him time against Libyan-
directed terrorism. Even before the meeting with
Peres, the threat from Libya was increasing, and
Moroccan security officials stepped up the monitoring
Palestinians entering the country.
Morocco also has tightened visa requirements for
criticized the Hassan-Peres meeting were warned by
the police to cease their activities or face expulsion.
"tensions" subsided.
Morocco undoubtedly would prefer not to expel
Palestinians and probably imposed restrictions as a
warning that it would not tolerate criticism of
Hassan's strategy. Presumably to assuage PLO
sensitivities, the Palestinian official was told that
these restrictions were temporary until current
have been tightened.
Reducing Vulnerabilities
US officials in Morocco believe that security at the
Casablanca International Airport may be better than
at most West European airports of equal size and use.
Last October a US Federal Aviation Agency survey
team found that security at the airport was adequate
for the threat level perceived at that time. Moroccan
officials have requested FAA assistance in conducting
seminars on airline security practices. Since the
survey, US Embassy officers in Rabat report that
passenger security screening procedures at the airport
Morocco is paying considerable attention to stopping
the widespread use of forged Moroccan passports.
Security officials have begun issuing new passports
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that they claim are much more difficult to forge. They
also have produced a guide of known passport
forgeries for use by Western security services. It is too
early to tell how effective these measures will be in
stopping the production of counterfeit passports.
Future Targets
Like Jordan last year-when King Hussein was
taking an active role in the Arab-Israeli peace
process-Morocco may pay a price for its recent
political gestures to Israel by becoming a primary
target of terrorists. Morocco's intensified security
efforts appear sound, however, and may hinder
attacks. If so, terrorist groups may attempt reprisals
against Moroccan diplomats and economic interests
abroad where access to targets is easier. Jordanian
diplomats and airline offices in Europe, for instance,
were key targets of Abu Nidal in 1985.
Late last year Rabat's growing concern that its
embassies could be attacked prompted preliminary
steps to augment security overseas. Surveys of the
physical security of its missions were conducted in
West European cities where the threat from
Moroccan dissidents was perceived as high, and plans
were made to increase the number of security
personnel,
It is not known whether any o the
recommendations stemming from the surveys were
implemented. Even if they were, such limited
measures probably would be inadequate to foil all
plots by such determined and proven groups as Abu
Nidal or the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine.
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Syria: Countering the
Israeli Air Force
Since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982,
when the Syrian Air Force was thoroughly drubbed,
Damascus has intensified its efforts to develop its
capability to challenge the Israeli Air Force. With
considerable assistance from the USSR, Syria has
modernized its command and control network,
increased its electronic warfare capabilities,
reorganized and reequipped its air defense force, and
modernized the equipment in and begun to improve
the operations of its Air Force. Despite improvements,
continuing deficiencies in equipment and training are
such that Damascus almost certainly could not
prevent the Israelis from rapidly attaining air
superiority in the event of a major conflict.
Assad's Strategy
Trained as an Air Force officer in the USSR,
President Assad has undoubtedly been heavily
influenced by Soviet doctrine and probably regards
air and air defense forces as subsidiary to the ground
forces. In planning for a surprise attack to recover the
Golan Heights, he recognizes that Israel would try to
buy time to mobilize its ground forces by using its Air
Force aggressively to cut off the battlefield and
provide close air support. As a former pilot, Assad
undoubtedly appreciates the time, expense, and risks
that would be required in enabling the Syrian Air
Force to counter the Israelis-especially in air-to-air
combat.
Consequently, in preparing for a war with Israel,
President Assad probably is counting on reducing the
Israelis' margin of superiority and freedom of action,
but he probably is not aiming to put the Syrian Air
Force on a par with the Israelis'. Instead, Damascus
probably intends to use electronic warfare and limited
airstrikes to disrupt Israeli operations, while relying
on its air defense missiles and air-to-air fighters to
wage a battle of attrition. In fighting as much as
possible on the defensive, Assad would hope to delay
the Israeli Air Force from attaining air superiority
over the battlefield and prevent it from massively
Improving Command and Control
Although Syria's early warning and ground control
intercept system in June 1982 consisted of a dense
network of radar sites and automatic or
semiautomatic data links, much of the equipment was
obsolescent. Since then, the Soviets have supplied
considerable new equipment to improve the system's
speed and accuracy and reduce its vulnerability to
Israeli electronic countermeasures.
Deliveries of late-model radars have enabled the
Syrians to expand and modernize their early
warning/ground control intercept system, increasing
overlapping coverage and reducing the effects of
terrain masking. In particular, the addition of the new
Tin Shield to the three main Syrian radar centers has
improved Damascus's ability to detect and track low-
flying targets, including cruise missiles and
reconnaissance drones. The Tin Shield is also
designed to be much less susceptible to jamming than
older Soviet radars
The Soviets have especially emphasized improving the
links in Syria's command and control system, trying
to stop the Israelis from isolating parts of Syria's air
and air defense forces, and then defeating them in
detail. In addition to providing more semiautomatic
equipment to relay air surveillance data from radar
centers to command posts, the Soviets have used a
fully automatic system, the Vektor-II, to interconnect
the three central defense command posts with the
major air defense missile brigades. The Vektor-II is
jam resistant and enables brigade command posts to
control battalion fire-control radars remotely. To
reduce the vulnerability of Syrian ground-to-air
communications, the Soviets delivered additional
Markham equipment, which enables a ground
controller to provide a fighter-interceptor pilot with a
reliable readout of the course, speed, and bearing of
his target.
attacking Syria's economic infrastructure
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-020
29 August 1986
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Tin Shield in operation near
Tiyas Airfield, Syria
Enhancing Electronic Warfare Capabilities
After the disastrous air battles four years ago in
which the Israelis jammed Syrian air and air defense
radars and thoroughly disrupted air-to-ground
communications, Damascus realized that electronic
warfare could be an effective adjunct to conventional
combat. Consequently, the Syrians began to rapidly
expand their inventory of electronic equipment to
support their naval as well as air and air defense
forces. As they added to their holdings, the Syrians
concentrated on acquiring command and control
equipment, and they now have a dense, well-
integrated electronic warfare system.
In expanding their electronic warfare holdings, the
Syrians have relied principally on the Soviets and
their East European allies for equipment, but they
also used scarce hard currency to purchase key items
from Western suppliers:
? The Soviets have provided a number of the modern
AKUP-22 systems to control the activities of
ground-based jammers that operate against aircraft
radars as well as exporting a number of jammers,
which are just beginning to enter service in their
own forces.
? The Czechoslovaks have supplied three Ramona-M
passive detection and tracking systems, which are
located in southwestern Syria to provide overlappng
coverage of aircraft flying over the eastern
Mediterranean Sea, Israel, and Jordan.
? The Syrians have acquired five Italian-made
electronic surveillance systems that collect against
ground-based radars, and they have purchased a
number of French- and British-made
communications and radar jammers to complement
their inventory of Soviet equipment.
Although the Syrians have given priority to training
as well as to acquiring more equipment, they have
encountered problems in operating and maintaining
their electronic warfare system. Part of Syria's
difficulties are attributable to its rapid expansion of
electronic warfare capabilities, which has been
proceeding concurrently with efforts to modernize the
air and air defense forces, but
most of the problems stem
from lackluster leadership by the Alawite officers in
charge of training and poor Soviet instructors. There
is an acute lack of training materials, and the Soviets
teach through interpreters and do not mingle with the
students
Revitalizing the Air Defense Force
Although Syria had a large air defense force in 1982,
the Israeli Air Force vividly exposed Syrian
weaknesses in equipment, training, and command. In
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Secret
addition to providing more communications
equipment to improve the Syrian air defense force's
data-handling capabilities, the Soviets have
apparently pushed to decentralize command and
control as well as expand their deliveries of surface-to-
air missile equipment.
Much as the Syrian Army has created three corps to
better control its growing number of units, the Syrian
air defense force has created a divisional air defense
echelon. One division is apparently responsible for air
defense operations in southern Syria and Lebanon; the
other controls activities in Syria north of the Greater
Damascus area. Although the divisions apparently do
not have operational control over tactical air defense
units, they are
responsible for overseeing training and maintenance.
Deliveries of new surface-to-air missile systems have
allowed Syria to expand and modernize its air defense
system, increasing the density of coverage and
complicating an Israeli attack. In addition to
delivering at least one battalion of SA- 13 heat-
seeking tactical missiles and outfitting two regiments
with SA-8 tactical missiles, which are both new to the
Israelis, the Soviets have been gradually reequipping
Syria's SA-6 tactical air defense regiments with a new
missile that is faster and more maneuverable than
earlier versions. The SA-6 units constitute the bulk of
By far the most significant addition to Syria's
inventory has been the receipt of the SA-5 in 1983,
which marked the first time it had been exported. The
two SA-5 complexes were initially manned and
controlled by the Soviets, but the Syrians gradually
supplanted Soviet operators and technicians and
assumed control in the spring of 1985. Although the
system is not well suited in defending against low-
flying aircraft, its long range enables Syria to fire at
targets flying over Israel, Jordan, and the eastern
Mediterranean. In time of war this would give
Damascus the ability to disrupt the Israelis'
reconnaissance and command and control operations.
Despite increased deliveries of modern air defense
equipment, the Syrian air defense force contains a
large amount of obsolescent surface-to-air missiles,
resident Assad's
drive to improve the quality o his surface-to-air
missile weaponry is well founded because the receipt
of modern equipment has done far more to enhance
Syria's combat capabilities than mere increases in
order of battle. This judgment is supported by a
comparison of quantitative and qualitative trends
using two different systems for measuring force
effectiveness-one developed by The Analytic
Sciences Corporation (TASC) and one used by the
Soviets, which we call combat potential.
jamming.
Modernizing the Air Force
Paralleling developments in the air defense force, the
Syrians have introduced a division echelon into their
Air Force organization-one for the northern sector
and one for the southern. The introduction of a
division echelon and the expanded use of the
Markham data transmission system are attempts to
correct command and control problems and reduce
the vulnerability of Syrian fighters to Israeli
As a result of the lopsided aerial combat in June 1982,
the Soviets were forced to replace a large number of
Syrian aircraft. In so doing, they belatedly
acknowledged the Israelis' wide margin of superiority
in air-to-air combat and began to supply Damascus
with some of their best equipment:
? Since the debacle over Lebanon, the Soviets have
exported two squadrons of MIG-23MLDs and a
squadron of MIG-25PDs. The MIG-23MLD is the
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Secret
Legend
^ OLD SANS
^ WAS .
latest version of the Flogger fighter, and the MIG-
25PD is the newest model Foxbat interceptor. Both
are equipped with improved radars that are more
difficult to jam and can detect targets quicker and
at greater ranges than those on earlier models.
? They have also begun to export improved air-to-air
and air-to-ground missiles and continued to ship
additional late-model SU-22 Fitter fighter-bombers,
enhancing the firepower and deep-strike capabilities
of the Syrian Air Force.
? To support the operations of the Syrian Air Force,
the Soviets have stationed an electronic warfare
squadron outside Damascus. The squadron is
equipped with a variety of late-model
reconnaissance and jamming helicopters, including
one variant that has yet to be seen with Soviet forces
in Eastern Europe
Because of the introduction of more new aircraft, the
Syrians have thoroughly modernized their fighter
force, with qualitative improvements far outpacing
quantitative gains. The continuing growth of the
Syrian Air Force coupled with the need to train
additional pilots and replace those lost fighting the
Israelis, however, has complicated Damascus's efforts
to improve operational efficiency.
Force has begun to conduct more realistic operations,
emphasizing nighttime intercepts with their Foxbat
interceptors and antiradar sorties by their SU-22
fighter-bombers. Despite these improvements, the
Syrian Air Force continues to be hampered by relying
too much on ground controllers to direct fighters to
their targets, slavishly adhering to outmoded Soviet
air-to-air combat tactics and conducting too little
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QUANTITATIVE VS. QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT
IN THE SYRIAN AIR DEFENSE FORCE
1973
1975
1980
Legend
QUANTITY
O TASC
CO COMBAT POTENTIAL
O+
n
SYRIAN FIGHTER FORCE TRENDS
.00, 0.11 000*
Legend
^ OLn 2S
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QUANTITATIVE VS. QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT
IN THE SYRIAN FIGHTER FORCE
1973
2222,32 240
1975
1980
1985
Legend
Z] QUANTITY
O TASC
? COMBAT POTENTIAL
aircraft-are apparently stimulating Assad to
intensify his efforts to counter the Israelis, indicating
that further improvements in Syria's air and air
defense capabilities are in the offing
Outlook
Although Syria has made considerable improvements
in the size and quality of its forces, weaknesses in
selected areas of equipment as well as in command
and training continue to hinder President Assad in his
drive to counter the Israeli Air Force. Despite budget
cutbacks, the Israelis are continuing to emphasize
electronic warfare and are modernizing their
inventory, notably through the acquisition later this
year of US F-16C/Ds. Two recent shocks-the Israeli
shootdown of two MIG-23MLDs last November and
the poor performance of Libya's SA-5s against US
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Iran's Bazaar Merchants:
Challenging Regime Policies
Many Iranian bazaar merchants oppose government
efforts to increase supervision and regulation of the
economy and have responded by electing more
conservative, tradition-minded clerics to the Majles,
Iran's parliament. The success of the bazaaris' efforts
and the deteriorating economy have forced the
government to compromise on several key domestic
economic issues. When Khomeini dies, the bazaaris
may face tougher treatment because he has restrained
regime radicals, who see the bazaaris as part of the
unjust economic order they want to abolish
Background
The bazaaris played an important part in bringing the
Khomeini regime to power. Outraged at the Shah's
efforts to undermine their traditional role and status
in Iranian society, the bazaaris bankrolled the clerical
opposition and helped rally popular support for the
revolution.
Bazaari Political Reaction
The bazaaris are working closely with conservative
clerics to counter the regime's policies.
bazaaris are a main
source of financial support for conservative clerics.
This helps offset revenue losses that many
conservative clerics have suffered because the regime
has channeled religious contributions to
progovernment mullahs.
the bazaaris give several hundred thousand
dollars a year to the Hojatieh Society, a focus of
conservative opposition to regime policies.
Iranian press reports indicate that bazaaris and
conservative clerics worked to elect conservative
candidates during the Majles election in 1984.
Bazaaris threatened progovernment clerics
throughout Iran with the loss of tithes and other
contributions unless they agreed to cooperate with the
Despite their initial support for the new regime, we
believe that a majority of bazaaris have been
alienated by the ruling clerics' efforts to expand
government control over the private sector. The
bazaaris fear that greater government control will
lead to socialism and believe the regime's policies
have significantly contributed to Iran's economic
problems, according to Iranian press reports. They
also resent the Khomeini regime's efforts to regulate
their activities.
government representatives sit on bazaar councils in
both large and small cities. These councils set
guidelines for price and ration policies and establish
punishments for violations.
the government representatives use bribery, the threat
of negative media campaigns, and their control of
trade licenses to gain compliance with regime
guidelines. They also force the bazaaris to make
religious contributions directly to the government or
to favored clerics
effort to elect conservatives to the Majles,
This effort helped produce
a conservative bloc in the Majles of about 90
members, one-third of the total membership.
The bazaaris and their conservative allies have used
their increased strength to challenge the radicals on a
range of issues. Press reports indicate this bloc led the
Majles to reject four of radical Prime Minister
Musavi's Cabinet appointments in 1984, nearly
forcing the government to resign. They also headed
the fight last year against new tax legislation and
refused to vote for Musavi's reelection last October
despite Khomeini's endorsement.
Bazaaris are also trying to form a broad-based
coalition of moderates and conservatives to challenge
the radicals' dominance of the executive branch.
Bazaaris, conservative clerics, and moderates
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-020
29 August 1986
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The bazaar seemed immense. And because it was
covered and somewhat dark, expeditions to the
bazaar had a solemnity that other forms of shopping
lacked. From the outside the bazaar, with its great
gates, which were opened in the morning and closed
at night, seemed bounded and defined. From the
inside it appeared boundless and inexhaustible. It
was a place of manufacture as well as sale, and it
seemed more like a labyrinth because of its endless
turnings, its abrupt changes from retailer to
workshop and from alley to avenue. For example, the
quiet street where cloth merchants sat among their
bolts of material opened onto an avenue where the
clatter from the coppersmiths sometimes made it
impossible to talk.
To enter the bazaar was to enter a world of slow
formalities and quick wits. It was also a world of old,
even ancestral, loyalties. In general it was loyalty
that directed a customer's steps. Whether it was in
the small lane of the jewelers or the spacious, barrel
vaulted central avenue of the cloth dealers, shoppers
always went to the same merchant in any section, a
reliable friend of the family.
The bazaar and the mosque are the two lungs of
public life in Iran. Bazaars, like mosques, shrines,
and private houses, look inward, psychologically and
discussed forming a political party to run a candidate
in the 1985 presidential election
They planned to recruit technocrats
and professionals to their cause. We believe that these
groups share the bazaaris' desire for better ties to the
West and oppose radical proposals for land reform
and government control of the economy. Although the
plan to form a party apparently never got beyond the
talking stage, a well-known bazaar merchant
associated with the group was one of only three
candidates allowed by the government to run for the
presidency
architecturally, and more often than not they present
bland and unexplained walls to the street outside.
Bazaars, however, have a public character that is the
antithesis of the privacy of houses. For over a
thousand years the bazaar has been recognized by
Islamic law as a special arena of human life.
In theory relations between mosque and bazaar are
friendly; in practice they sometimes face problems.
Merchants have not always liked the justice of the
mullah courts (which in turn sometimes have
depended on government for the execution of their
decrees). Some bazaaris are patrons of forms of
popular religious expression which some mullahs
disapprove of.
Nonetheless, the religious establishment and the
bazaar give each other shape and sustenance. To be
successful, especially in commercial dealings over the
long term, the merchant has needed the capital of a
good reputation as much as he has needed material
capital. If a Muslim is to have a good reputation, he
must pay taxes to the mosque and seek the spiritual
guidance of a mullah.
The Mantle of the Prophet
by Roy Mottahedeh
Evasion of Government Control
Government efforts to monitor and regulate the
bazaar have elicited creative countermeasures from
the merchants. they
have created "shadow" bazaar councils that set
bazaar policy without government representatives
present. The bazaaris have responded to government
efforts to institute new taxes by securing religious
rulings from senior conservative clerics that such
taxes are un-Islamic,
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Secret
Prime Minister Musavi claimed last May that
in 1985 only 3 percent of tax revenues came from self-
employed businessmen, far less than what the regime
believes should be paid.
Bazaaris also have circumvented government controls
on prices and profits on a massive scale. Government-
supplied goods are regularly diverted to the black
market where they bring bazaaris several times the
official price. many
merchants keep their expensive products in the back
of the shop to avoid detection by government
monitors. Wealthy customers are invited to these back
rooms to discuss sales, and the purchases are delivered
to the customers' residences at night, often by taxi.
Bazaaris regularly pay off officials and regime clerics
to avoid their scrutiny,
Prominent bazaaris have developed a
"symbiotic" relationship with local clerics, providing
financial support in exchange for noninterference or
support. Payoffs are also used to acquire foreign
exchange or to permit the sale of items banned as un-
Islamic.
Government Accommodation
The bazaaris' success in the 1984 Majles election and
the deteriorating economy have prompted the regime
to give stronger public and private support to bazaari
concerns. Since late 1984, Khomeini's speeches have
emphasized the need to limit government interference
in the private sector and to respect the role of the
bazaar in Iranian society. More recently, the regime
appears to be tailoring its economic policies to meet
bazaar interests. The Iranian press reports that
bazaaris now hold seats on committees that formulate
trade policy, and last year a prominent bazaari
headed a delegation to Africa to assess economic
opportunities. Iranian diplomatic posts have been
instructed to cooperate more closely with bazaar
commercial representatives, according to the Iranian
Outlook
The continuing deterioration in the economy brought
on by the war, lower oil prices, and government
mismanagement are likely to increase bazaari
disenchantment with the regime and spur the
merchants to play a more aggressive political role. We
expect that the bazaaris will continue to use their
influence to block legislative proposals by the radicals
and will try to further reduce restrictions on business.
The Majles election in 1988 will provide bazaaris an
opportunity to increase the size of the conservative
bloc and possibly even to force changes in the radical-
dominated Cabinet.
The bazaaris will come under increased attack from
radicals once Khomeini is gone. Radicals in the
regime already blame the bazaaris for profiteering
from Iran's problems. We believe Khomeini, despite
his sympathy for many of the radicals' policies, is a
moderating influence because he fears that
domination by the radicals or the conservatives would
risk a civil war that could destroy the Islamic
republic. After Khomeini dies, no one is likely to have
the combination of unquestioned authority and
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press.
The regime also has eased its efforts to monitor
bazaari violations of price controls. The Supreme
Judicial Council announced last May that the "price
patrols" and the special price oversight board were
being disbanded because of bazaari complaints that
they were hurting business.
political skills needed to contain the radicals.
Over the longer term, the bazaaris are likely to face
problems similar to those encountered under the
Shah. Once the war is over and when oil earnings
begin to recover, the regime probably will focus its
energies on modernizing and developing Iran's
economy, which again will force the bazaar to
compete with technocrats and new industrialists who
may prove better able to maneuver in a less
traditional economic environment
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The Sunni Islamic Call Party;
Developing Political Interests
The Sunni Islamic Call Party (SICP) is a worldwide
organization of fundamentalist Muslims whose
primary goals have been religious education and
reconversion. In South Asia and elsewhere outside the
Middle East, where competing religions have
substantial followings, the SICP seeks to dissuade
conversions to other faiths and reconvert Muslims
who have left Islam. Although the SICP has stayed
clear of political matters in the past, some branches in
the Persian Gulf have been calling attention to
themselves by adopting goals similar to those of other
fundamentalist groups
Shifting Focus
SICP branches in the Persian Gulf are beginning to
show signs of politization and, as a result, are being
pressed by security authorities in Bahrain, Kuwait,
Qatar, and Oman. the
stated aims of the Gulf branches are:
? To establish Islamic republics in all the Gulf states.
? To establish Islamic law and stamp out corruption.
? To eradicate foreign influence in Islamic states.
? To compel Muslims to wear Islamic dress.
? To educate the sexes separately.
? To close, and destroy if necessary, all liquor stores
and bars.
Our information on SICP activities in the Gulf is best
in Bahrain, where the organization is closely
monitored. The group operates legally in Bahrain, but
some group members have been deported and others
may follow. Difficulties between the party and the
Bahraini Government,
have caused several SICP leadership changes in the
past year. Mahmud Yusuf Mahmud Muhammad
Bihzad, a Bahraini trader from an influential religious
family, took over leadership of the Bahraini branch in
July 1985 when the then chief, Abd al-Aziz Shir
Muhammad, was deported to Pakistan for unspecified
activities promoting the SICP. In late 1985, Bihzad
reported to In'am Hassan, world leader of the SICP,
that he could not perform his duties because of
pressure from Bahraini security authorities. Hassan
responded, I I by forming
a council to govern the Bahraini SICP, with Bihzad as
an adviser.
The Bahraini branch's woes may have been triggered
in 1985 by the activities of Shaykh Muhammad bin
Salman Al Khalifa, the younger and unconventional
brother of the Amir and Prime Minister. He had been
involved in the past with several government
opposition groups, and we speculate that his
connection with the SICP may have attracted closer
scrutiny. The combination of Shaykh Muhammad's
public role, speeches promoting violence to close
liquor stores, vocal support of Iran's Ayatollah
Khomeini, and talks with Shia groups and the Muslim
Brotherhood may have carried the SICP too far into
the political sphere for Bahraini security authorities to
tolerate
In response to the Bahraini crackdown and pressures
elsewhere, the SICP throughout the Gulf has adopted
additional precautions to ensure that group activities
continue without interruption from government
authorities. these
precautions were discussed during a conference in
Kuwait in February 1985 attended by 120 delegates
from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Pakistan,
Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco. The conference
adopted the following resolutions:
? The leader in each country will hold secret meetings
with senior members each month to discuss
domestic developments.
? Members should be lectured frequently on the need
for secrecy, and nothing should be written or
recorded.
? Contact with journalists should be avoided.
? When a member attends a lecture for the first time,
his name should be announced to the others present
to ascertain whether anything adverse is known
about him.
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Secret
Development of the Sunni Islamic Call Party
The Sunni Islamic Call Party (SICP) was founded in
Maiwat, India, in the 1930s by Maulana Muhammad
Ilyas, an Indian Muslim who was concerned about
the ignorance of Islamic tradition and ritual in his
village. His message and demands were simple-
daily prayers and respect for fellow Muslims. By the
time of his death in 1944, the movement had spread
to villages beyond Maiwat, and his son, Maulana
Muhammad Yusuf; took over an organization that
spread beyond India. Islamic Call world membership
is probably now in the millions.
The party has established hierarchical regional
organizations. Branches in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates report
to the Gulf regional headquarters in Kuwait, which is
run by Rashid Haqan and his deputy, Muhammad
Miryah. All other countries report to the
international headquarters in New Delhi, India,
where world leader In'am Hassan resides.
The intellectual center of SICP activity is the
Raiwind Center in Lahore, Pakistan, run by
Jamshayd Muhammad Ali, a Pakistani citizen. The
center holds classes, lectures, and conferences,
including an annual international SICP conference.
Press reports indicate that over 500,000 people
attended the annual conference in November 1985.
All SICP leaders are trained there, and members
from around the world regularly attend events at
Raiwind. There is also a separate study center in
Lahore, attended by both civilians and military
officials.
forces should be increased.
In addition, the conference recommended that the
Saudi SICP leader, Muhammad Said, report directly
to party headquarters in India and visit regional
headquarters in Kuwait every two months to report on
party developments in the Gulf. Because Riyadh does
not allow unofficial organizations such as the SICP to
operate, the conference urged party members visiting
Full-time volunteers spend periods of six months or
more in training at Raiwind. When they return to
their homelands as preachers, they are organized into
groups of 12 to 14 who travel together throughout
towns and villages reminding Muslims of their
Islamic duties. The SICP does not pay its preachers.
Those who heed the call do so at their own expense.
This is feasible because the proselytizing membership
in most countries is composed mainly of middle- to
upper-class faithful.
We know little about the SICPs finances but
speculate it receives most of its funds from individual
contributions. the
Saudi Government may contribute funds to the SICP
even though the group is illegal in Saudi Arabia. The
Egyptian branch receives most of itsfundsfrom the
Islamic World Organization, a Saudi organization
that trains and educates religious leaders,
The Sunni Islamic Call Party is not to be mistaken
for other organizations with similar names. It is
known in Arabic as Hizb al-Dawa al-Islamiah as-
Sunni and in Farsi as Tablighi Jami'at Islami. It has
no association, however, with the Jamiat Islami, a
political group in Pakistan, nor is it related to the
Shia Dawa Party. The Islamic Call of Libya is a
separate organization. The Saudis support a group
known as the Islamic Call Organization, which is an
Islamic missionary group similar to, but separate
from, the Sunni Islamic Call Party.
contacting local party members
Links to Other Fundamentalists Groups
The extent to which the SICP is involved with more
politicized Islamic fundamentalist groups is not clear,
but there have been several reports of contacts:
? Former Bahraini leader Bihzad made unsuccessful
overtures to Shias in Bahrain during the fall of
1985,
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development policies in the region
governments, and the group's anti-West,
antiprogressive attitudes could prove detrimental to
the Gulf branches inc u de a large
a resolution was
adopted at the conference in Kuwait last year urging
members to join other fundamentalist groups if
invited "to discover their activities and give the
impression of unity with them." We believe the SICP
will be unable to develop close ties to Shia
organizations or the Muslim Brotherhood, however,
because of these groups' reluctance to attract
additional attention from local security services.
South Asian Success
The SICP has prospered in South Asia. Press reports
estimate that membership in Pakistan is about
500,000 and in the millions in India. Members
attribute the organization's popularity to the
simplicity of its religious demands. Members are
asked to spend an hour a week with the SICP and are
required to go to a mosque and pray. The Islamic Call
does not actively seek conversions to Islam in South
Asia, but it has won some
converts in India, where lower caste Hindus are
drawn to Islamic claims of social equality.
The party has established good relations with
authorities in India and Pakistan, where its activities
are strictly religious. The governments of these two
countries have encouraged the SICP in an effort to
quell the activities of more radical Islamic
fundamentalist groups. Press reports indicate that
India particularly favors the SICP because of its
nonpolitical nature and readily provides visas for its
mobile members.
Outlook
We believe that Gulf security services, worried that
the SICP could become a focal point for opposition,
will continue to monitor the group for signs of
growing politization. The stated objective of the Gulf
branches-the institution of Islamic regimes
throughout the region-is of concern to all Gulf
portion of expatriate workers, particularly Egyptians,
and security officials worry that the international
connections of the SICP could make it difficult to
control.
We believe the Gulf SICP leadership's preoccupation
with radical fundamentalism will not spread to the
general membership, which would probably react
negatively to extensive deviation from religious
activities. Although other Gulf branches may express
sympathy for the plight of the Bahraini branch, we do
not believe that their members will become as vocal
on political issues as the Bahrainis. Nonetheless,
security forces will work to keep the influence of all
fundamentalist groups, including the SICP, to a
minimum as economies worsen and Islamic panaceas
become more appealing
We do not believe that radicalism will spread to the
more populous South Asian branches, where the
SICP's growth and popularity are based on the party's
simple religious message about the afterlife.
Moreover, in India, the SICP's relations with
government officials probably would deteriorate
quickly if the organization actively solicited
conversions of lower caste Hindus to Islam or
broadened its activities beyond religious matters.
Militant Hindu organizations in India in the past have
attacked religious groups suspected of encouraging
conversions and would be quick to demand political
action by Hindu parties. New Delhi is likely to be
increasingly wary of efforts on the part of any
religious organzation-including the SICP-to
recruit members, press a sectarian agenda, and
thereby weaken the secular public institutions of
India.
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Secret
Saudi Arabia-Pakistan:
Strains in the Relationship
The close Saudi-Pakistani relationship is being
strained by diverging economic and regional interests
that are rooted in the Iran-Iraq war, the phasing out
of Pakistani troops seconded to the Saudi armed
forces, and Pakistan's perception that Saudi Arabia
has failed to honor its aid commitments. Such strains
are not expected to disrupt the relationship, but in the
short term they will hamper joint programs including
close cooperation in mutual defense.
Background
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
developed rapidly after 1979 when Islamabad lost its
main financial benefactor with the fall of the Shah of
Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
threatened Pakistan's western border. Saudi Arabia
feared Soviet designs on the Persian Gulf and worried
about the domestic impact of the revolutionary
rhetoric emanating from Iran. As a result, the two
states drew together to protect their interests. Saudi
Arabia looked to Pakistan to augment and train its
overarmed and underskilled military forces. Pakistan
turned to Saudi Arabia for economic assistance and
access to Western military equipment
In the early 1980s, Riyadh and Islamabad agreed to
increase cooperation on a variety of economic,
military, and political issues. In 1981 military
cooperation was extended to include the seconding of
15,000 Pakistani combat troops to the Saudi armed
forces. Riyadh in return agreed to help underwrite the
cost of modernizing the Pakistani armed forces,
particularly the purchase of armored vehicles and
F-16 aircraft from the United States. Saudi Arabia
also took the lead in convincing the Gulf Cooperation
Council to supply relief aid to Pakistan for the
Afghan refugees.
In the last three years, however, Saudi-Pakistani
relations have suffered because of unrealistic
expectations by both sides. Key areas of divergence
include the Iran-Iraq war, the mission of Pakistani
troops seconded to the kingdom, and the level of Saudi
economic and military aid commitments to Pakistan.
The Iran-Iraq War
Faced by potentially hostile states to the west and
east, Pakistan has tried to maintain good relations
with Iran. The two countries are major trading
partners, and Pakistan performs maintenance on
Iran's commercial air fleet. Pakistan has maintained a
neutral attitude toward the Iran-Iraq war and has
resisted Saudi entreaties to deploy Pakistani troops in
Iraq, referring to earlier treaties between Iran and
Pakistan. President Zia-ul-Haq has told the Saudis
that Pakistani troops will not be allowed to do battle
with any Islamic county
Pakistani Troops in the Kingdom
Both Saudi and Pakistani officials have expressed
displeasure with the status of the Pakistani troops in
the kingdom. The Saudis are uncertain about the
loyalty and the overall quality of the troops and are
concerned about their expense.
many of the Pakistani military personnel lack
su cient expertise in technical matters and that the
Islamabad fears that service in Saudi Arabia is
creating a new mercenary class in the Pakistani Army
because of the high wages paid for duty there. =
the Saudis have yet to
remit the 40 percent of troop salaries promised to the
Government of Pakistan since 1984.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-020
29 August 1986
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Secret
in isolated areas and have little responsibility; they
also are patronized by their Saudi counterparts.
The Saudis are phasing out Pakistani troops in the
kingdom as their current rotations are finished.
the Pakistani armored
brigade at Tabuk will depart in August 1986. A
similar rotation is planned for Pakistani flight crews
in the Saudi Air Force in January 1987
even though some Pakistanis will
Because of the departure of the Pakistanis, the Saudis
have been looking elsewhere for defense assistance.
Worker Remittances
Diminished economic opportunities have caused
frustration among other Pakistanis in the kingdom.
Some 500,000 Pakistani workers are employed in
Saudi Arabia, and their remittances totaled an
estimated $1.4 billion in fiscal year 1986. Many of
these workers are employed in construction and other
industries dependent on a buoyant economy. The
continuing reduction in Saudi oil revenues over the
past four years has cut the wages of many of these
workers and, in our view, has probably resulted in
forced repatriation for some.
Lower oil revenues and the return of workers to
Pakistan are having adverse effects in both countries.
blamed the reduction in oil revenues for an increasing
number of Pakistanis engaging in criminal activities
such as passport forgery and smuggling in the
kingdom,) IIn Pakistan
returning workers at a time of high unemployment
the government is concerned about the number of
Saudi Military and Economic Aid
The Pakistani Government's belief that aid from
Riyadh has been less than promised has been another
area of contention. Saudi aid payments to neighboring
states and to the PLO long have exceeded that sent to
Pakistan. Moreover, diminished oil revenues have
crimped Saudi aid. Although aid from Saudi-based
multilateral organizations has increased since 1982,
bilateral Saudi economic and military aid to Pakistan
has fallen from a high of $315 million in 1980 to $30
million in 1985. The Saudi Government also has
failed to honor arms procurement commitments.
Outlook
Saudi and Pakistani differences are likely to persist
for some time but are not likely to undo the
relationship. Pakistan will not abandon its neutral
position in the Iran-Iraq war and will continue to ask
for unrealistically high levels of Saudi aid. The Saudis
will further cool their military relationship with
Pakistan and will look to other countries for their
defense needs. Even so, a commonality of interests
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Secret
Saudi Economic & Military Bilateral Aid
to Pakistan from 1979-1985
Millions of US Dollars
~ Pakistan
regarding the Soviet threat, a commitment to Islam,
and mutual economic benefits will assure the
continuation of strong ties over the long term.
1983 1984 1985
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Secret
Implications of Indian
and Pakistani Nuclear
Capabilities: Potential
Military Requirements I
If India and Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons, they
will face new defense requirements as well. Both will
probably seek to augment their conventional forces as
well as deploy nuclear forces.
Pakistan probably would be satisfied with a small,
slowly growing nuclear strike capability. It would
hope that the ability to respond with a few atomic
weapons would be a strong check on New Delhi's use
of its superior conventional forces.
India would have much more demanding nuclear
weapons requirements. Its ambitions to retain
superiority would require India to meet gains by
Pakistan with an effort that is several times larger.
Moreover, India would have to develop a nuclear
force capable of reaching and inflicting substantial
retaliatory damage on China.
Indian Nuclear Force Requirements
The Pakistani Front. India's strategic policy
objectives toward a nuclear-armed Pakistan would be:
? To deter a Pakistani nuclear attack by building and
maintaining an unmistakably superior nuclear
retaliatory capacity.
? To preserve or regain credible options to wage a
short, intense conventional war against Pakistan for
political leverage.
? To acquire the means to dissuade or disrupt external
military resupply of Pakistan, particularly from
neighboring powers.
This strategy would rely on the threat of punitive
retaliation, but it would be reinforced by an offensive
conventional and tactical nuclear posture and possibly
also by a capability to wage unconventional war
behind the frontlines. The Indians would not
necessarily adopt a nuclear no-first-use posture.
' This article presents views from a study prepared for NESA by an
external contractor. NESA analysts do not necessarily agree with
the study's conclusions but believe it offers some useful insights.
New Delhi might want a force 10 times the size of
what Pakistan is estimated to be capable of and more
diversified in basing modes and delivery systems.
Such a force could consist principally of airborne
weapons, with a few allocated to sea-based aircraft
and a larger number to land-based aircraft. The latter
would be mainly for strategic purposes, but a few
would be designated for tactical purposes.
If India goes nuclear, it probably would make a
strenuous effort to develop surface-to-surface missiles
with nuclear warheads. Such missiles need only be of
short-to-medium range to reach vital Pakistani urban
targets from Indian bases. Deployment of a larger
number of the same type of missiles in a conventional
mode would provide a deceptive-basing scheme for
those that are nuclear-equipped and increase the
latter's survivability without the need for costly
hardened silos or mobile launchers.
The nuclear ordnance for airborne and surface-to-
surface weapons could be similar to or even identical
in design, weight, and other dimensions, provided they
could fit inside the missile. If not, a separate warhead
design for missiles would have to be developed.
A plausible early-generation nuclear force to support
the strategy depicted above might consist of:
Delivery Warhead
System Inventory
In the event a nuclear Pakistan can develop a force
with more than 10 or 12 warheads and begins to
diversify basing modes and delivery systems, India
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Secret
probably would feel the need for a larger and more
sophisticated force than indicated above. But the
requirements for such a force may be satisified by
planning for the China front.
The China Front. An Indian nuclear force dedicated
to Pakistan would be seen by China as threatening. It
almost certainly would generate pressure in China to
reallocate some of its own nuclear assets-though
probably few initially-to contingent target coverage
of India.
India's near-term strategy toward China would have
two objectives-to deter Chinese nuclear blackmail
on behalf of Pakistan, and to dissuade direct Chinese
conventional or conventional/ nuclear military support
for Pakistan in the event of an Indo-Pakistani conflict.
In the long term, India might find that it also had a
requirement to deter potential aggression from China,
unrelated to Pakistan. India would not have any
reason to seek conventional superiority over China,
except at localized points of tension along their
mutual border.
A key difference between the type of force India
would need to underwrite its strategy for China and
that for Pakistan would be in long-range delivery
capability. India's objective would be to target
China's densely populated urban areas, implying air-
delivered nuclear ordnance and/or missile capability
with an effective delivery range of 3,500 to 5,000
kilometers from northeastern Indian bases. For
launch sites located in southern India, the required
delivery range capability could be 7,000 or more
kilometers.
A near-term Indian deterrent force could be relatively
small, perhaps between 50 and 100 warheads
(including those in reserve and a portion dedicated to
tactical purposes), over and above that dedicated to
Pakistan, roughly doubling the required nuclear
warhead inventory overall.
India's planning requirement for such a force
probably would postulate the development of a
thermonuclear weapon capability within a few years.
Crossing the thermonuclear threshold would require a
more elaborate and prolonged testing program and
probably considerable additional expense. But it
would be a way of guaranteeing or prolonging the
credibility of a minimum deterrent force of relatively
small size.
A force for strategic deterrence of China after the
turn of the century probably would entail greater size,
more sophisticated and dispersable hardened or
concealed delivery systems, and more sophisticated
warning and command and control systems. The
Indian railroad network would provide infrastructure
for an eventual mobile missile option. Smaller ballistic
missiles could be strapped on medium-range bombers
or converted transport aircraft. India may seek-as
China has done-to develop nuclear submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and nuclear antisubmarine
warfare capabilities to cope with Chinese naval
capabilities of increased operating range.
Pakistani Nuclear Force Requirements
Over the next 10 to 15 years Pakistan is unlikely to be
able to develop a nuclear force of more than 20 or so
nuclear weapons. It would take substantial outside
financial or direct nuclear technical assistance to
change this prospect radically, but such aid does not
seem likely. Still, even a handful of Pakistani nuclear
weapons would have a profound effect on the military
relationship with India and on the self-confidence of
the Pakistanis.
Pakistan probably would view a force of 20 weapons
or less as essentially an air-deliverable strategic
deterrent to be used mainly against Indian cities.
Islamabad would seek to ward off national collapse in
the face of an irresistible Indian invasion. The fact
that most Indian cities contain large Muslim
minorities would not be a vital consideration in
Pakistani planning.
If its nuclear weapon stockpile exceeds a dozen,
Pakistan probably could allocate a few air-deliverable
weapons for tactical purposes to serve as a kind of
tripwire. The Indians would have to plan on this
possibility in any case, requiring some dispersal of
battlefield forces in time of crisis. This in turn would
increase the period of warning to Pakistan of an
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Secret
Indian conventional attack, since India's battlefield
forces probably would have to be concentrated for an
assault.
By the turn of the century, it is conceivable that
technological developments in Pakistan could both
increase its nuclear weapon production capacity and
provide alternative delivery systems, allowing for a
larger and more diversified nuclear force.
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Coverage Falls Short
Islamabad recently instituted a media-based drug
education program to increase public awareness of the
threat of narcotics abuse. Pakistan grows opium,
refines and traffics heroin, and has a rapidly
escalating rate of domestic heroin abuse-issues that
Islamabad believes are largely ignored by the general
public. A comprehensive education and information
program recently gained impetus in Pakistan under
the auspices of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board
(PNCB), with funding from the UN Fund for Drug
Abuse Control and assistance from the US
Information Service and the US Embassy Narcotics
Assistance Unit. The PNCB is attempting to make
the Pakistani public more aware of the dangers of
drugs by distributing narcotics-related publications to
the mass media, to selected segments of the public,
and to leading government officials. The revitalization
of the PNCB media program in early 1986 was
concurrent with greater press openness following the
transition to civilian rule, which allowed for a
substantial increase in media coverage of narcotics
issues and other social problems.
'Pakistani Urdu-language papers lack the
resources for serious investigative journalism.' The
English-language press appeals to an elite readership
apparently considered unreceptive to narcotics-related
articles. It concentrates primarily on economic news,
with secondary emphasis on national political and
cultural events.
The Karachi Morning News-published in English
and managed by the government-controlled National
Press Trust-comes closest to focusing on the
intricacies of the narcotics problem. It divides its
coverage almost equally between analysis of the
various aspects of the drug issue and notices of arrests
or seizures. Echoing Islamabad's sentiments, it has
run several articles condemning the United States and
other developed countries for failing to adopt harsh
measures to check their own involvement in
international drug trafficking. Furthermore, the
extent of its influence on the public is subject to
question, since the Morning News has a daily
circulation of only 90,000 and is widely viewed as a
government mouthpiece.
Press Coverage Weak
Analysis of press coverage of drug-related issues in
leading Pakistani newspapers and periodicals during
early 1986 indicates that the PNCB awareness
campaign is making little measurable headway.'
Narcotics-related articles were published infrequently
during this period-almost never on the front page-
and the majority were simple notices of arrests or
seizures. Furthermore, those items not concerning
arrests or seizures were generally limited to coverage
of major meetings or speeches on narcotics by
government authorities. There were no aggressive
investigative articles or surveys that would encourage
grassroots efforts to combat the narcotics threat.
'This study examined narcotics coverage in five Urdu-language
daily newspapers, four English-language daily newspapers, and two
English-language weekly magazines during the first quarter of
1986; evaluated the narcotics-related articles; and examined their
placement and content.
Press analysis reveals that only limited coverage is
accorded Pakistan's domestic drug abuse problem.
eroin use
in Pakistan continues to rise des-pite establishment
of national drug treatment programs. Estimates of the
number of heroin addicts range from 250,000 to
300,000, and middle- and upper-class youth are
reported to be increasingly affected, according to the
Pakistani press. In our judgment, Islamabad views
drug abuse as an embarrassment rather than a
problem to be solved and releases little information on
this menace through the state-owned wire service. The
2 Chronic newsprint shortages since 1971, along with inflationary
trends since 1972, have resulted in increasingly high production and
distribution costs. In addition, Pakistan has more dailies than
advertising and readership can support. These problems have
undermined press economic viability and have led to an increase in
the price of newspapers, creating a decline in circulation.
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-020
29 August 1986
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NEWSPAPER ACCOUITS OF ARRESTS AND SEIZURES
Percent of Total Narcotics-Related Articles
PAKISTAN
DAILY NARCOTICS PRESS COVERAGE
ENGLISH ROUTINE
MARCH
URDU ROUTINE
MARCH
DAILY NARCOTICS
ARTICLES
. DAILY FRONT-PAGE
NARCOTICS ARTICLES
Associated Press of Pakistan, which supplies the
Pakistani press with as much as 60 percent of its
news, concentrates on narcotics-related arrests and
seizures to the virtual exclusion of information on the
growing problem of domestic drug abuse.
Gadoon Incident Covered Extensively
The one exception to the limited treatment of the
narcotics issue by the Pakistani press concerned the
clash between government enforcement personnel and
opium poppy farmers in the Gadoon District of
North-West Frontier Province last March, which was
reported extensively in both the English and Urdu
press. The increase in press coverage, however,
probably did more harm than good to the PNCB's
public awareness effort. The overall tone of the press
coverage was antigovernment and pro-opium poppy
farmers. We believe the Pakistani press used the
Gadoon incident to print articles critical of Islamabad
to test the limits of press freedom under the civilian
government. Most articles about the government's
opium eradication efforts depicted the opium poppy
growers as the innocent victims of excessive
government force. Islamabad's defense of its actions
was given little space in the press. Instead, extensive
coverage was given to condemnations of the
operations by National Assembly member Yaqub
Khan Jadoon and others.
Editorials in independent papers during March also
attacked the United States for its role in Pakistan's
antinarcotics program. Although the editorial writers
for these papers were generally opposed to narcotics
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Percent of Total Narcotics-Related Letters
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Language
Location
Estimated
1985
Circulation
Independent, liberal, skeptical of US and Zia's Afghan policy
Jang
Urdu
Karachi,
Rawalpindi,
Lahore,
Quetta
507,000
Independent, conservative, pro-Arab, no political affiliation
Independent, liberal, influenced by the Jama'at-i-Islami, Sunni
fundamentalist
Mashriq
Urdu
Peshawar,
Karachi,
Quetta
160,000
Nawa-i-Waqt
Urdu
Lahore,
Karachi,
Rawalpindi,
Multan
250,000
Independent, democratic with Islamic orientation, anti-
Communist
Dawn
English
Karachi
70,000
Independent, liberal, no political affiliation
Morning News
English
Karachi
90,000
Managed by government-controlled National Press Trust
Muslim
English
Islamabad
30,000
Independent, pro-Iranian, skeptical of US and Zia's Afghan
policy
The Pakistan Times
English
Lahore,
Rawalpindi
50,000
Pakistan and Gulf
Economist
English
Karachi
20,000
Leftist, political/literary, may receive some Soviet funding,
generally hostile to United States
production, some argued that poppy cultivation was a
local tradition and that Islamabad's antinarcotics
policy was adopted because of pressure by the United
States. The influential Islamabad Muslim-an
English-language daily-was quite sharp in its
criticism and repeatedly blamed the United States for
the police action. Other independent papers echoed
this view. The Lahore Urdu-language daily Nawa-i-
Waqt, for example, stated that the US complaint that
Pakistani heroin subverts US youth sidesteps the more
important issue of "stemming the flow of narcotics
pills and capsules being manufactured in US
laboratories and exported to Pakistan" and elsewhere.
The government-controlled National Press Trust
(NPT) newspapers carried numerous stories relating
Islamabad's defense of its actions and the denial of
US Government involvement in the incident by
Minister of the Interior Aslam Khattak and US
Attorney General Edwin Meese. Two of the papers,
however, the Peshawar Mashriq in Urdu and the
Lahore Pakistan Times in English, each carried an
editorial in March expressing disapproval of the force
used against the poppy growers. In addition, all of the
NPT papers covered the protest rallies of poppy
growers in the Gadoon Valley and Yaqub Khan
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The Gadoon District enforcement action took place
on 8 March 1986, when some 450 troops of the
frontier constabulary supported by local police
moved into Gadoon-Amazai, the site of a US-funded
development project, to enforce Islamabad's ban on
growing opium poppies. They were met by armed
resistance from the growers, who objected to
eradication so late in the growing season that
substitute cash crops could not be planted. In the
fighting between the constabulary and the growers,
five persons were killed and 31 were injured. In a
second clash, an antienforcement demonstration
became unruly, and another eight persons were killed
and 13 wounded. According to Embassy reporting,
only 25 percent of the Gadoon-area poppy crop-
some 220 hectares-was destroyed during the
operation. National Assembly member Yaqub Khan
Jadoon was arrested for inciting the demonstrators
but was later released on bail by authorities. The
arrest of Jadoon precipitated a walkout in the
National Assembly. As a result, the government
withdrew the forces, and the eradication effort was
halted. A judicial inquiry was ultimately conducted,
and the remainder of the poppy crop was harvested
without further incident in early April.
Jadoon's speech to the National Assembly charging
that the enforcement was undertaken with US
backing. Even the government's press mouthpieces
failed to support Islamabad wholeheartedly after the
Gadoon raid.
Response From the Public Disappointing
Public response to narcotics issues in early 1986 was
minimal in both the English-language and Urdu-
language press, an indication that the PNCB's media
awareness program is making little headway. Very
few letters to the editor were carried, even during
March, and the content of those published indicated
little support among Pakistanis for Islamabad's poppy
crop eradication program. Approximately two-thirds
of the letters condemned the government action at
Gadoon, and several suggested that poppy cultivation
be made legal again. One letter noted, "In our
subcontinent poppy cultivation has been going on
since time immemorial and is a source of bread and
butter for many families." Another stated that if the
United States "is so keen to stop illegal production of
poppy, let it buy our crop legally as it is doing from
India and let Pakistan earn some badly needed foreign
exchange." In addition, press analysis indicates that
Pakistanis have not changed their perception that
narcotics is a Western problem. Nearly half of the
letters printed during March referred to US domestic
drug problems. One letter asked: "How or why should
Gadoon be accountable for the diseases in the United
States and their ever increasing thirst for heroin?"
We believe that the public's unwillingness to
acknowledge narcotics as a domestic problem is
rooted in the culture of Pakistan. According to
academic sources, Pakistanis tend not to see
themselves as culprits; they prefer to blame others.
This behavior is reinforced when high government
officials publicly blame narcotics problems on
Western countries. For example, when Minister of
State for Parliamentary Affairs Mir Nawaz Khan
Marwat called for an endless jihad against drugs in
late February 1986, he stated that Pakistan was being
blamed without any valid reason or justification for
being a bastion of drug producers and traffickers,
although the responsibility lay with the developed
countries. This speech was well publicized and
underscores the fact that even Pakistani officials do
not fully comprehend the dimensions of Pakistan's
narcotics abuse problem.
Realizing the Media's Potential
The lifting of martial law in Pakistan has inspired a
boom in the newspaper business, suggesting increased
influence. A new English-language daily, The
Frontier Post, for example, has recently been started
in Peshawar, and the publishers of the two largest
Urdu papers, Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt, are considering
launching their own English-language papers from
Karachi and Lahore. The radio and television
industries in Pakistan, moreover, are growing rapidly.
There are more than 5 million radios in use in
Pakistan, and Islamabad estimates that 85 percent of
the Pakistani people listen regularly. Television sets
number 1.24 million, and sales are growing at an
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Secret
annual rate of 35 percent. Furthermore, foreign aid
donors have agreed to help establish a second
television channel that will run educational and
instructional programs geared to serving the needs of
the people. The potential influence of the media, in
our opinion, may be even more extensive than these
numbers indicate. Although the national literacy rate
is only 10 percent, Pakistanis frequently read
newspapers aloud in public for their illiterate friends
and neighbors. Islamabad estimates that radios and
television also have multiple users.
We judge that drawing the media's attention to the
issue of domestic drug abuse offers the best prospect
of swaying Pakistani public opinion and would be a
key element in an effective awareness program. A
significant portion of new heroin addicts-and the
number is rising rapidly by President Zia's own
estimate-are educated, middle- and upper-class,
urban males. These youths are not only vital to
Pakistan's future; some are the sons of the most
influential members of society. In our judgment, the
Urdu-language newspapers, which tend to be
concerned with social issues, would be a natural
starting point for a stepped-up awareness program.
The independent papers are less likely to avoid
controversy and would readily publish articles
portraying the severity of domestic drug abuse.
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Secret
Near East and
South Asia Briefs
indefinitely-taking delivery of two Boeing 747 aircraft,
Delivery of the two passenger planes had been scheduled for late August
more than $100 million and cannot make the payment
equipment worth an estimated $1.34 billion. The Saudi Government agreed in
1984 to barter crude oil-perhaps as many as 50 million barrels-for about 73
percent of the cost and arranged to have Saudia pay the remainder in cash upon
delivery. The oil barter portion has been completed, but Saudia has a deficit of
1986 and was to complete a countertrade deal for 10 B-747s and associated
transshipment point for opium and hashish bound for the West.
Kathmandu has begun an aggressive effort to reduce Nepal's role as a prime
King Birendra, disturbed by the country's reputation as a growing
of drug cases to corrupt local officials.
international narcotics-trafficking center, ordered his new inspector general of
police in August to take "bold steps" to stem the trade. In response to this
mandate, the inspector general has created an independent narcotics branch within
the national police and begun to modernize the country's drug enforcement
capabilities. he plans to ask the King to approve
special drug eradication teams to destroy marijuana and poppy fields. He also
plans to call for independent national antinarcotics tribunals to bypass the current
narcotics enforcement system, which often leaves the responsibility for prosecution
family members.
Previous attempts to initiate effective antidrug programs have not reduced Nepal's
importance as a transshipment point for drugs bound for the West. The King
appears committed to his recent initiative and has promised to prosecute users and
traffickers rounded up in the sweep. The investigations, however, are likely to
uncover the involvement of powerful members of the royal family and the
government. Although the King will probably support the prosecution of lower
level government officials to demonstrate his support for the antidrug campaign,
he is likely to reevaluate the program if information appears implicating royal
Secret
NESA NESAR 86-020
29 August 1986
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Secret
Regional Organizations Economic Difficulties
The Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization face significant
financial problems that could undermine their activities. More than half of the
Arab League's 21 members have not paid dues to support this year's budget of
over $30 million, according to Tunisian press reports later confirmed by the
League's secretary general. Several states have been delinquent for more than a
year-reflecting domestic economic problems caused by the weak oil market and
the regional recession. We believe that some members have also reduced
contributions to underscore their dissatisfaction with the League's ineffectiveness.
The Islamic Conference Organization's problems are even more severe. Only 11 of
its 46 members have contributed funds, representing only 15 percent of this year's
$10 million budget,
The secretaries general of both groups have threatened to withhold employee
salaries to force members to fulfill their obligations. The Arab League has delayed
paying bills, stopped the activities of some subsidiary organizations, and reduced
hiring. Secretary General Klibi almost certainly will raise the League's financial
problems at a ministerial meeting in September. A continued lack of funds is likely
to compound the effects of political disunity in Arab and Islamic ranks and erode
both groups' regional and international influence.
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Secret
Secret
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