AMERICA IN A HOSTILE WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00620R000601580018-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

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er issue: Gidon Gottlieb pro-
nian agreement patterned af-
vian agreements that ended
ar. The following is an ex-
l Jacques Soustelle, former
at of Algeria, Gottlieb, and
armer Jerusalem bureau chief
York Times.-The Editors.
ioustelle:
?
niazed by Gidon Gottlieb's
at the Evian agreements could
Cl land framework for a solu-
,,oblem of Palestine.
the situation in the Middle
had
w
h
e
e one
different from t
at the so-called Evian agree-
Sroved an utter and dismal
)dy in this country would
Mention them nowadays. Not
.1raph of the detailed articles
En has ever been implemented
is or Boumediene's govern-
!illion two hundred thousand
Jewish refugees had to flee in
appalling conditions. More
sand men and women simply
All the provisions of the
ricerning the special status of
?igiers and Oran, or guarantee-
:)f the French citizens either to
perties or to get a just indem-
~en discarded. The Algerian
een despoiled of their proper-
hc smallest shop or apartment
rig one cent in compensation.
y, the Arab or Berber Alge
better off. Instead of more
`--colonization" has brought
ship and a police state. Those
'ended the nationalist cause in
Ipblivion, in jail, or dead. To
.* **********
* *****'*****
* **********
. ** **. **********
by Zbigniew Brzezinski:,.
Two hundred years after the birth- of the
first nation committed explicitly to the prin-
;ciple''of independence, the appearance of a
world .based on'self-determination. has be-
come somehow 'troubling and ;threatening `;
to the very nation that has contributed so
directly to the shaping of this new world.
Indeed, it poses the specter of. an' isolated.
America in a hostile world..
That world appears hostile not' because it
so proclaims itsel -t o--9--a parts of it do-
but because what. is happening in that world
seems so at. variance with American, values
and expectations. Global politics are becom-.
ing egalitarian rather.th a irL_iertarian, with
demands from more politically activated
masses focusing, predominantly on material
equality rather^ than 'on spiritual- or legal
liberty. Moreover; `the global distribution of
power is beginning.to favor political s ste s'.'
remote philosophically, culturally, ethnical-
ly, .anracia y tom merican antecedents,
'while the process ' of redistribution of that
power is threatening new forms of violence.
All of that makes for, an uncertainty in
America about the thrust of global change-
and in many parts of the world for the feel-
what America is against global change.
The result is a fundamental shift in the
way that Americans perceive themselves in
This article was adapted from a chapter in the au~
thor's forthcoming book of the same title to be pub-
lished by Basic Books.
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The. Third Century
relation to the rest of the world. and in the
way much of that world perceives America.
Traditionally, Americans have seen their
society as the wave of the future, and. as an
embodiment of libertarian values of univer-
sal pertinence; much of the world-be it
poor.immigrants or activist nationalist lead-
ers-saw America much the same way. This
libertarian link. defined America's place. in
the world and gave America a very special
standing.
Today, many Americans recoil in horror
in-the-wrong direction, while many abroad
--especially in the 'new nations-perceive
America as indifferent or even hostile to their
condition. America's bounty-which in*the
past" was seen almost as history's reward. for
America's liberty-has` become :the'focal
point of 'envy, thus breeding in turn anxi-
eties :regarding the ' egalitarian values 'pro-
claimed by the newly, emancipated nations.
The Danger of Philosophical Isolation
`. Anierica was born in liberty. That central
fact shaped much of America's character and
world role during the subsequent 200 years
of its history. It also defined the nature of
the world reaction to America during much
of that time, thus making the spiritual di-
world role.
To be sure, the social and even political
reality of America was far removed from the
libertarian ideal.. The America born 'in lib-
erty was largely a mixture of a slave-owning
rural : aristocracy and "a newly.;' 'emerged
urban commercial' class, with voting rights
restricted to a minority. The subsequent. 200
years of the country's history can be seen in
large measure as a struggle to fulfill that lib-
ertarian ideal and to give it substance in the
context of a changing socio-economic set-
ting. The struggle against slavery, the exten
sion of 'suffrage, the open doors to immigrat
ing millions, the implementation of social
rights, the violence surrounding the emer-
gence of the trade unions, the battles for civil
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rights for blacks, 'and lately women's
assertion went hand in hand also with
sonal fortunes, the- `widening: public,
of corporate influence-the emergence. of
bureaucratic clusters- of institutiona
power, and the pervasive cultural infl
of a commercialized .,mass- media, -base
only several, mostly. New, York City loc
national publications and three :'tele-'
networks.
Americans ..: ta:
many
uge in the reassuring simplici
the notion of the Hostile Wor
-This pattern gave an ambivalent me
to America's history-and it justifies
the most varnished as well as the mos
cal interpretations, of America's pas
herent in comple
th ambivalence in
at
torical processes-=does not negate'the
historical' symbolism and the histori
sence of the American message: Th
moments in history that capture an
bolize a mood, that express-howev
perfectly-a certain pervasive aspirati
give substance-however inadequate
a felt hope. ,The idea of liberty; `we '
the notion: of roress wa'in: the
the late eighteenth and early nineteen
tury-and the': appearance of Amer
some as offensive,' the above also..-e
why, Cuba or China. are today so a
to so many.:.The-idea of equality is
ingly the underlying- moo an the
piration in an increasingly congested
and it is more often than not first e
by intellectuals., Thus-in spite of
mentation and the pervasive cont
dominate both the Cuban and the
societies-to many people both
have become significant symbols,-n
the way that America impacted
sympathetic and. fascinated late Lei
 Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601580018-3
f the world, and in the
orld perceives America.
icans have seen their
f the future, and as an
carian values of univer-
1 of the world-be it
ictivist nationalist lead-
uch the same way. This
zed America's place in
America a very special
ericans recoil in horror
ippears to them headed
on, while many abroad
new nations-perceive.,
t or even hostile to their
bounty-which in the
as history's reward for
has become the focal.'
'breeding in turn anxi-?
egalitarian values pro-
ly emancipated nations."
osophical Isolation
in liberty. That central
America's character and
= e subsequent 200 years
,o defined the nature of
o America during much
raking the spiritual di-
ant aspect of America's-
social and even political
,as far removed from the
.ie America born in lib-
ixture of a slave-owning,
tnd a newly emerged
glass, with voting rights
ity. The subsequent 200
" s history can be seen in
ruggle to fulfill that lib-
)-give it substance in the
sing socio-economic set-
gainst slavery, the exten-
-open doors to immigrat-
mplementation of social
surrounding the emer-
iions, the battles for civil
,66.
Brzezinski
rights for blacks, and lately women's self-
assertion went hand. in hand also with the
appearance of larger and more powerful per-
sonal fortunes, the widening public scope
of corporate influence, the emergence of large
bureaucratic . clusters of ' institutionalized
power, and the pervasive cultural influence
of a commercialized mass" media based on
only several, mostly New York City located,
national publications and- three television
". , many Americans . take ref-
uge in the reassuring simplicity of
"the notion of the Hostile World as
the successor to the Cold War. .
This pattern gave an ambivalent meaning
to America's history-and it justifies both
the most varnished as well as the most criti-
cal interpretations of America's past. Yet
that ambivalence-inherent in complex his-
torical processes-does not negate the special
historical symbolism. and the historical. es-
sence of the American message. There are
moments in history that capture and sym-
bolize a mood, that express-however im-
perfectly-a certain pervasive aspiration, that
give substance-however inadequately-to
a felt hope. ,The idea of liberty, wedded to
the notion of z ogress, was ' in the air" in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
tury-and . the appearance of America ex-
pressed it. Though the parallel may strike
some as offensive, the above also explains
why Cuba or China are today so attractive
to so many. The idea of equality is.increas-
ingly the underlying moo an the felt as-
piration in an increasingly congested world,
and it is more often than not first expressed
by intellectuals. Thus-in spite of the regi-
mentation and the pervasive control that
dominate both the Cuban and the Chinese
societies-to many people both countries
have become significant symbols, not unlike
the way that America impacted on many
sympathetic and fascinated late eighteenth
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The Third Century
and early nineteenth' century' Europeans.
Indeed, on rereading some of-the contem-
porary accounts of early postrevolutionary
America, one is even struck by the extent to
which their style and content parallel the,
accounts rendered not quite 200 years later
after visits to China or Cuba. This parallel-
ism highlights the importance of -the rela-
tionship of political events to, a pervasive .
mood or emerging values; thee-event, both
crystallizes the mood and acts. as a catalyst
for it, making it into a. compelling outlook.'
An existing intellectual: receptivity is thus
translated into a state of mind by"an. account.'
of a reality that is said to correspond already
to the aspiration, an account made all the
stronger by its exotic quality:-as was. true
of a-visit to America then, or of a recent visit
to China-granting the-raconteur the aura
of having partaken of something unique and
perhaps historically sacred. ..
There are thus the repeated references to''
honest-and hard-working peoples,.. guided by
a high-sense of personal morality and'civic
dedication. As Brissot. de Warville put it in
his New Travels in the United States of
America, 1788, Americans have "the simple
and kindly but dignified look of men who _
are conscious of their liberty and to whom
all other men are merely, brothers and
equals." Bostonians particularly. a re report
ed to. be "courteous to foreigners and oblig-
ing to their friends; they are tender hus-
bands - loving-almost; ,; adoring--fathers,
and kind, masters.... -.-A girl believes an oath
pronounced by love, - and her young man
keeps -his word or else is: forever disgraced.
You see girls go off for a drive in the coun
try with their, sweethearts in a, chaise, and
their innocent pleasures are never beclouded
with insulting suspicions.
There are the breathless accounts of per-
sonal interviews with the. top leader, a man
endowed with' special graces and unique vi-
sion. In an extremely informative diary of
his travels over the eastern seaboard of
America, Julian Niemcewicz, a Polish noble-
man who had accompanied Thaddeus Kos-
Brzezins
ciusko' on his second trip 'to the Unit
States, gives in his Travels in America 179
1807: a detailed rendition of his sojourn wi
George Washington;-and it. reads-with
lese majeste intended-not unlike intervie
of more recent vintage., Niemcewicz,. havi
first been introduced.to the General in ear
May of 1.798 _at a social gathering in.Georg
town, spent in June of that year 12 days
a guest of - the former first president.
Mount Vernon and,provides a graphic a
count of the man, of his wife, of his li
style, and of his views. He is especially it
pressed by the political vision of the- Ame
can leader as well as byhis-civic spirit. Nier
1cewicz clearly' conveys, the feeling that',
.,.found- himself in . the presence of. histori
greatness, of "a great man, whose' virtues
equal to the merits of his seivice.to his cou
try.
Most important 'of all, the early chroi
clers convey the sense that the new Americ
reality is the beginning of something ve
special,'of a new age which it both symb
izes and is creating.: Edmund Burke,",
spite his skepticism toward democracy, . p
haps expressed this sentiment best of all:
great Revolution has happened-a Revo
tion made not by chapping and changing
power in any of the existing States, but
the appearance of a new State of a new S
ties in a new part of the Globe. It has m
as great a change in all the relations and b
antes of power, as the appearance of a n
Planet would in . the.: system of the s
not to.. draw parallels, between America
China, nor to doubt the validity of the
servations. Rather, it.'is to stress the pro;
sition 'that at given' stages of history. t
are merits that ac uire special si nific
-and that Americans, should be both pr
of theirs and be wary lest it become a transi
phenomenon. As R. R. Palmer obser
in his The Age of Democratic Revoluti
the American revolution coincided with
climax of the Age of Enlightenment. It
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 th century Europeans..
ng some of the contem-
early postrevolutionary
struck by the extent to
nd content parallel the
of quite 200 years later,
or Cuba. This parallel-:
importance of the rela-
I events to a pervasive
values; the event both
d and acts as a catalyst
:o a-compelling outlook.''
:tual receptivity is thus
te of mind by an account
]id to correspond already,--,-z,
n account made all the.'
tic quality-as was true
then, or of a recent visit
the raconteur the aura
of something unique and .
sacred.
"he repeated references to
-)rking peoples, guided by
?sonal morality and civic
sot de Warville put it in
in the United States .of
nericans have "the simple
nified look of men who
eir liberty and to whom
:e merely brothers and
s particularly are report
s to foreigners and oblig-
Is; they are tender hus-
imost adoring-fathers,
A girl believes an oath
we, and her young man
else is forever 'disgraced..
f for a drive in the coun-
;:ethearts in a chaise,' and
,cures are never beclouded
)icions."
)reathless accounts of per-
ith the top leader, a man
cial graces and unique vi-
nely informative diary of
the eastern seaboard of
iemcewicz, a Polish noble-
'ompanied Thaddeus Kos-
ciusko on his second trip to the United
States, gives in his Travels in America 1797-
1807', a detailed rendition of his sojourn with
George Washington, and. it reads-with no
lese majeste intended-not'unlike interviews
of more recent vintage. Niemcewicz, having
first been introduced to the General in early
May of.1798 at a social gathering in George
town, spent in June of that year 12 days as
a guest of . the former first president., in.
Mount Vernon and provides a graphic ac
count o'f the 'man, of his wife, of his life-
style, and of his views. He.is especially im-
'pressed by the political vision of the Ameri.
can leader as well as by his civic spirit. Niem.
cewicz clearly' conveys the.: feeling that he:,
found himself in, the presence of historical.,:
greatness, of "a great man, whose virtues are
equal to the merits of his service.to his coun-
Most important of all, the early chroni-
clers convey the sense that the new American
reality is the beginning of something very
special, of a new age which it both symbol-
izes and is creating. Edmund Burke, de-
spite his skepticism toward democracy, per-
haps expressed this sentiment best of all: "A
great Revolution has happened-a Revolu-
tion made not by chapping and changing of
power in any of the existing States, but by
the 'appearance of a new State of a new Spe-
cies in a new part of the Globe. It has made
as great a change in all the relations and bal-
an'ces of power, as the appearance of a new
:Planet would in the system of the solar
World.". ,
The point in notingk,'all of the above is
not to draw parallels between America or
China, nor to doubt the validity of the ob-
servations. Rather, it is to stress the propo-
sition that at given stages of history there
are moments that acquire special significance
-and that Americans should be both proud
of theirs and be wary lest it become a transient
phenomenon. As R. R. Palmer observed
in his The Age of Democratic Revolution,
"the American revolution coincided with the
climax of the Age of Enlightenment. It was
?,.ti u.,.'. ,.e -..r ,. a, .r'._.. ??,N t .r:'e ..'.`. ~t i...e'. u-s;i e1. i^'%. i~'fit`'.?1.cdtiis. ?,i. ..i*w;,,- F"."! ?m
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 The Third Century
itself, in some degree, the product of its age."
The :American spirit of liberty and. the'
unique and novel American experiment with
a constitution infected Europe, and as a re-
sult-again in Palmer's words-"the ef-
fects of the American revolution, as?revolu-.
tion, were imponderable and very great. It
inspired a sense of a new.era. It added a new
content to the conception of progress. It gave
a whole new dimension to ideas of liberty.
and equality made familiar by the'Enlight-
cal watershed. The rhetoric of American in-
dependence and the principles of the Bill of
Rights expressed most explicitly ideas and
notions that were beginning to surface in
Europe but were constrained from. practical
application by the strength ' of traditional
European institutions. It was in the- much
more fluid and flexible American social con-
text that these notions could become politi-
cally dominant, and their surfacing as the
official belief of the new state had an im-
mensely captivating effect on progressive
Europeans, impatient with their own socio-
political structures and desirous of profound
change. In the absence of this ideological im-
pact, . the: very fact of separation from the
home kingdom of several remote, partially
traditional-rural and partially commercial
colonies would not have had much. global
The libertarian- aspect of America's birth
branded the American experience -in a par-
ticularly compelling fashion-and it had. a
lasting effect both on how Americans came
to define themselves and on how others per-
ceived America. It was the basis for a lasting
and powerful myth, enduring even when
America came to act like other states, even
when American business came to be a power-
fully'expanding and exploitative force with-
in weaker adjoining areas (especially in Cen-
tral America), even when America, became
the principal bulwark of states only remote-
ly to be characterized as motivated by a lib-
ertarian passion. It was the libertarian myth
70.
Brzezinski
which ,gave a special. quality to, the way
American troops were welcomed by ecstatic
crowds in Europe and ' even in' some - place
in Asia, and it was also the libertarian myth
and not just economic opportunity,., ?tha
drew to America-rather than to Lati
America or elsewhere-large numbers o
European immigrants.
It was a vital and a self -perpetuating tra
dition, nurtured by American public educa
tion, reinforced by -,the rhetoric of Amer
ican presidents, and. : eagerly absorbed: an
disseminated by, individual Americans.--eS
pecially in regard to'their countries of origi
To the extent to which the. nineteenth ce,
tury and the first half of the twentieth we
dominated politically by' ideas stressing li
erty and national self-determination,' 'th
American embodiment of libertarian valu
provided a philosophical reinforcement f
American foreign policy probably witho
precedent.
Moreover, American social structure a
social history were generally consonant wi
this primacy of the concept of liberty. Ame
ica was the freest society-even though ma
of its social arrangements made for inequ
ity and differentiated liberty-for the ve
dynamism of American social developme
and the open frontier-to the- immigra
in the East and to the pioneersin the W
-made for flexibility without precede'
Internal personal freedom, the free mar
social and geographic. mobility-all combi
to intertwine mythand reality in the not
of liberal democracy
".This condition could not last=-but it
last long enough to* stamp in a special
America's relationship to the world. It
a liberating relationship. Indeed, even,
profound crisis'- of American capitalism
the 1930s did not vitiate but reinforced t
relationship. Franklin Roosevelt, by
atively applying through the New De
mixture of liberalism with a dose of so
ism to the American conditions (with
theories representing' the major reaction
and normative syntheses of the earlier E
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 Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601580018-3
egree, the product of its age.
spirit of liberty and. the
'fel American experiment with
infected Europe, and as, a re-
Palmer's words-"the ef-
nerican revolution, as revolu-
ionderable and very great'. It
of a new era. It added a new
:onception of progress. It gave
dimension to ideas of liberty
lade familiar by the. Enlight.- '
7pearance was thus an histori-
'The rhetoric of American in-
the principles of the Bill of
ed most explicitly ideas.'and
-were beginning to surface ? in
ere constrained from practical
the strength of traditional
itutions. It was in the much
I. flexible' American social con-
: nations could become politi-
it, and their surfacing as the
nf. the new state had an im
vating effect on progressive
!patient with their own socio-
:ures and desirous of profound
absence of this ideological im-
} fact of separation from the
n of several remote, partially
al and partially commercial
d not have had much global
Brian aspect of America's birth
American experience in a par-
jeIling fashion-and it had a
noth on how Americans came
:selves and on how others per-
:i. It was the basis for a lasting
myth, enduring even when-
in business came to be a power-
ng and exploitative force with-
pining areas (especially in Cen
bulcvark of states only remote-
cterized as motivated by a lib-
n. It was the libertarian myth
Brzezinski.
which gave a special quality' to the way '.
American troops were welcomed by ecstatic.
crowds ' in Europe and even in some places
in Asia, and it was also the libertarian myth,
and not just economic opportunity, that
drew to America-rather than to Latin
America . or. elsewhere-large numbers.: of
European immigrants.'
It was a vital and a self-perpetuating. tra-
dition, nurtured by American public educa-
tion,.reinforced by the, rhetoric. of . Amer
ican presidents, and eagerly. absorbed. and
disseminated by individual Americans -es-
peciallyin regard to their countries of origin..,
To the extent to which, the, nineteenth cen-
tury and the first half of the twentieth were
dominated politically by ideas stressing lib
erty and, national self-determination, this
American embodiment of .libertarian values
provided a. philosophical reinforcement for
American. foreign policy' probably without
precedent.
Moreover, American social structure , and
social history were generally consonant.with
this primacy of the concept of liberty. Amer-
ica was the freest society-even though many
of its social arrangements made for inequal-.
ity and differentiated liberty-for the very
dynamism of American social development
and the open frontier-to the immigrants
in the-East and to the pioneers in the West
-made "for flexibility.. without precedent.'
Internal personal freedom, the free market,
social and. geographic mobility all combined
to intertwine myth and reality in the notion
This condition could not last-but it'did
last long enough to stamp in a special way
America's relationship to the world. It was
a liberating relationship. Indeed, even the
profound crisis of American capitalism of
the 1930s did not vitiate but reinforced that
relationship. Franklin Roosevelt, by cre-
atively applying through the New Deal a
mixture of liberalism with a dose of social-
ism to the American conditions (with both
theories representing the major reactions to
and normative syntheses of the earlier Euro-
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 rience) , shaped a model
iopeans became again a.
f the future. It seemed,,
n to enhance personal
that liberty also with
component. World War
re aftermath were thus.:,
1. to remember that
only America that".,.
c to shape a hostile._,?:
. American foreign pol-
ea philosophical base and
that provided unique as-;i,?.,
ably as important to the,:-"
I American paramountcy ?
y might and its relative.
luct to that of the rest of...:
h egalitarianism was, al-
5 gain momentum in the
eties, its appeal was ham
and by the discredited Sta-
)n and, on the other by.
of the rest of the world
ed with its own national
at emancipation, as Nehru
ukarno would often em
than from the Bolshevik
n
ese revolutions.
xess a subtle but accelerat=
iet was quietly Fecoming
yd, almost at their birth,
iusly perceived reality of
The attainment of their
rarely if ever matched by
thus became the point of
est for greater global equal-
more often defined exter-
ple, in "the Charter of the
ies of States" proposed by
11Y-with the result that in
72.
the space of two and a half decades the broad
preoccupations of the more. activist and ar-
ticulate international political actors have
been ran;rliv transformed...'
This new situation stands in sharp con-
trast to the situation which prevailed dur-
ing and right after World War II. The
Atlantic Charter did express the dominant
yearnings of a period-and America.sym-
bolized them. American values and interests
were consonant then with the values and
interests of. the more active and central parts.
the freedom of the Europeans; as promot
ing their, own economic . well-being by fi-
r r ? A of T-a
pan. Today, the traditional American values
of individualism, free enterprise, the work
ethic, and efficiency are contested both at
home and even more abroad by statism,'
'emphasis on the collective (national or so-
cietal) , ' on social equity,, and on welfare.
The desire for a "new economic order" is
symptomatic of the new global mood-and
America's relationship to that desire is much
more ambivalent. The quest for greater
global welfare appears to many America
as a claim on their ces and as portend-
ing the confiscatiori of the fruits of their
labor, with the result that symparny for
values and perceptions has opened netweeu
The attendant danger of. a philosophtcai
iisola. ion without precedent in American his-
tory has been accentuated by the new style
and substance of U.S. foreign policy, espe-
cially as pursued by the Nixon administra-
tion that came into power in 1969. Covert,
manipulative, and deceptive in style, it'
seemed committed to a largely static view of
the world, based on a traditional balance of
power, seeking accommodation among the
major powers on the basis of spheres of in-
fluence, and more generally oriented toward
preserving the status quo than reforming it.
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 The Third Century
This further widened the gap that was
opened already during the Vietnam war-
a war initiated by. an administration that
paradoxically was more sympathetic to glob-
al change-and provided the emotional un-
derpinnings for an increasingly hostile at-
titude abroad toward U.S. foreign policy.
Capitalism in One Country
The. emerging philosophical and polit-
ical isolation could,, in time, also become
economic. and social. While the world is
certainly not moving toward a single socio-
economic model-and the Communist ex-
pectation of global socialism is a doctrinal
remnant from the nineteenth centur- y inclk
nation toward simplistic utopias-the broad
pattern' o change i towar societies that
will be more urban, more industrial, more
welfarist;, more congested, and probably
more statist in the sense that governments
in most places will be the major initiators
of economic change and controllers' of na-
tional resources. But .for some time to come,
.the political as well as the socio-economic
complexion of the world's states will con-
tinue to differ greatly, without a single
model emerging as ideologically dominant.
..This diversity notwithstanding, the gen-
eral trend is toward systems that ddiver?e.
from the American blend of private enter-
prise, corporate ownership, and indirect gov-
ernmental control. While the United States
has not been immune to these trends, with
the post-Depression New Deal expressing in
America a new societal perception of the
government's role, it has been more reluc-
tant than most other advanced industrial
societies to accept governmental interven-
tion in social and economic affairs. Even its
immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico,
have gone considerably farther in social leg-
islation and in extending the scope of the
central government's economic powers.
Moreover, on the level of doctrinal rhetoric,
the American commitment to free enterprise;
to the business ethic, to the creative role of
the. profit motive-with its connected com-
mercial culture-stands out as quite dist
tive, unmatched even in such otherwise s
ilarly business-oriented societies as the
German or the Japanese. This rhetori
some respects is even in conflict with ac
realities, for such phenomena as. Amt
soon to be' followed by Conrail, .the
tional Housing Partnership, Comsat, fi
cial aid to Lockheed, not to speak of
much earlier Tennessee Valley Authorit
of the complex but certainly close rela
ship between the Defense Department
defense-oriented industries are all indic
of major shifts in America as well..
The fact remains, however, that in
industrialized democracies the eco
role of the state. has, grown more ra
. than in the United States. While Frenc
dicative' planning cannot be compar
central planning in. state-owned Co
nist-type economies and while the dir
role of the Ministry of International.
and Industry in Japan (even consi(
its symbiotic relationship to- the Keid
and the latter's links to the Liberal
ocratic Party's leadership) cannot be
pared to that of Gosplan, in both sta
economic role of the government is
more decisive and direct. As data in
mond Vernon's Big Business and th
indicates, public ownership in oth
vanced democracies has expanded co
ably and embraces the key sectors
industrial economy. The extent of
governmental involvement is even hic,
many of the developing states, es
since their nonagricultural private se
mains generally weak..
Capitalism in one country is the p
inherent in the American pattern.
the case with Stalin's "socialism
country," it could prompt in Am
siege mentality and, again, as in the
case, with much of it self-induced.
nomic diversity or even distinctiven
not prompt political-ideological h
especially if the distinctive model
ceasing to exercise attraction qua
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i the gap that was
the Vietnam war-
administration that
c sympathetic to glob-
Jed the emotional un-
icreasingly hostile at
U.S. foreign policy.
tosophical and polit-
.in time, also become '
While the world is.
toward a single socio-
3 the Communist ex-o
)cialism is a octrina
tic utopias-the broad
more industrial, more
, estcd, and probably
rise that governments
c the major initiators
nd controllers of na-
or some time to come,
as the socio-economic
orld's states will con-
ly, without a single
cologically dominant.
withstanding, the gen-
vstems that do diverge..:
lend of private enter-
ship, and indirect gov-
chile. the United States
env Deal expressing in
!tal perception of the
has been more reluc-
r advanced industrial
overnmental interven-
nomic affairs. Even its
Canada and Mexico,
y farther in social leg-
ding the scope of the
s economic powers.
meat to free enterprise,
ith its connected com-
Brzezinski
mercial culture-stands out as quite distinc-
tive, unmatched even in such otherwise sim-
ilarly business-oriented societies as the West
German or. the Japanese. This rhetoric in
some respects is even in conflict with actual
realities, for such phenomena as Amtrak,
soon to be followed by Conrail, the Na-
tional Housing Partnership, Comsat, finan-
cial aid to Lockheed, not to speak of the
much earlier Tennessee Valley Authority or
of the complex but certainly close relation-
ship between the Defense Department and
defense-oriented industries are all indicative
of major shifts in America as well.
The fam remains, however, that. in other
industrialized democracies the economic
role of the state has grown more rapidly
than in the United States. While French in-
dicative planning cannot be compared' to
central planning in state-owned Commu-
nist-type economies and while the directing
role of the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry in Japan (even considering
its symbiotic relationship to the Keidanren
and the latter's links to the Liberal Dem-
ocratic Party's leadership) cannot be com-
pared to that of Gosplan,. in both states the
economic role of the government is much
more decisive and direct. As data in Ray-
mond Vernon's Big Business and the State
indicates, public ownership in other ad-
vanced democracies has expanded consider-
ably and embraces the key sectors of the
industrial economy. The extent of relative
governmental involvement is even higher in
.many of the developing states, especially
since their nonagricultural private sector re-
mains generally weak.
Capitalism in one country is the potential
inherent in the American pattern. As was
the case with Stalin's "socialism in one
country," it could prompt in America a
siege mentality and, again, as in the Soviet
case, with much of it self-induced. For eco-
nomic diversity or even distinctiveness need
not prompt political-ideological hostility,
especially if the distinctive model-though
ceasing to exercise attraction qua model-
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remains for many the most appealing condi-
tion (as still remains very much, -the': case
with the United States) . In that contest for:
Americans to inject into American external."
relations the ideological claim that the: con
temporary world struggle is between: liberal:
democracy and various forms of despotic
statism is to provide a counterproductive:,
economic reinforcement to the already noted
political-.philosophical . tendencies toward
America's global isolation. M.akin1_ibPrat:-.
democracy__the...key_issue-as was done in
1975 by a ' number of key administration
spokesmen-also deprives the United. States of the opportunity to exploit its commit-
ment to pluralism with a positive. stress -on
U.S. support of global diversity; instead, by
'dichotomizing reality it tends to create .a
doctrinal coalition against the United States.
Such a coalition also can draw sustenance
from the widespread view abroad that the
external expansion of American business,
particularly in the guise of multinational
companies, entails a new form of American
political and economic imperialism. The ap-
pearance ' and major expansion of these in-
ternationally active American firms, often
.organized on a regional or national basis
(hence inaccurately labeled as multination-
als) , was in itself a response to the narrow-
ing of domestic opportunities for U.S. cap-
ital, in large part because of expanded social
.regulations and obligations.. However, it oc-
curred also at a time of sudden proliferation
worldwide in the number of governments
and of an intensified preoccupation with na
tional control over key or essential economic
sectors, all of which served to relate rese-Ilt-
rpents against foreign American ernnn+aic
presence to the nature of to ~meriz, ~
nomic system. As a result, national econom-
ic policy in a number of countries, especially
.though not exclusively in Latin America
and Africa, has acquired a distinctively an-
ti-American and anticapitalist bias.
This bias further widened the gap be-
tween American and non-American percep-
tions of world economic development. To
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Brzezi
many Americans, especially those in
business world, the "multinational" wa
creative response to the emerging new wo
of interdependence. A flexible and tra
national instrument for the disseminat
of technology, know-how, capital, and
duction, it was said in. the words of Jc
Diebold, "Multinational Corporations: V
be Scared of Them?" (FOREIGN P'
ICY 12). to be paving the way to a rr
truly cooperative world: "The logical
eventual development ... would be the
of nationality and national government
we know them." In contrast, the argun
heard more often abroad, though voiced.
by more radical American economists,
that the multinational corporation was,
manly an instrument for the indirect
tension of the power of American., cap
form of dependency and exploitation,
thereby "the economy of certain coun
is conditioned by the development and
"
pansion of another economy to whit
former. is subjected."1 This viewpoint
and large, tended to dominate the out
of the new nations. The argument ove
multinationals was thus an extension t
world economy of the more philosop
and political clash over the question o
proper relative weight of, and relatio
between, liberty and equality-and it
ther highlighted the danger of the sys
as well as conceptual isolation of the U
States.
Emerging U.S. vulnerability to . res
shortages in several'areas of key impol
to U.S. economic vitality makes this Ii
between philosophical and. systemic
ences even more threatening. U.S.
dente on imported minerals is gradual
creasing and thus also the U.S. sta
The Political Economy of Dominance and Dep
(New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 190, as
World Politics and International Economics
ington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
p. 44.
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Est appealing condi-
'ry much the case
In that context for
American external
Maim that the con-
is between liberal
forms of des= ai.c
counterproductive
the already noted
tendencies toward
)n, `la in liberal
k'-as was done in
1key administration
the United States
xploit its commit-
)a positive stress on
versity : instead, by
t tends to create a,'
~t the.United States.
an draw sustenance
1w abroad that the
American business,
of multinational
form of American
nperialism. The ap-
pansion of these in-'
perican firms, often t
l or national basis
Zled as' multination-
onse to the narrow-,. knities for U.S. cap-' of expanded'social
bns. However, it oc
sudden proliferation
ber of governments
occupation with naSa
pr essential economic ..r;
ved to relate resellt=
American ecpnnmic
lt,. national econom-
2
f countries, especially
v in Latin America
a distinctively an-
pitalist bias.
'-idened the gap be-
,on-American percep=
}uc development. To
Brzezinski
many .Americansespecially those in., the
business world,. the "multinational" was a
creative. response to the emerging new world .
of interdependence. - A flexible and trans-
instrument for the,' dissemination
national
of technology, know-how, capital, and pro-
duction,.`it was said. in the 'words of John.
Diebold, "Multinational Corporations: Why
be Scared of Them?" (FOREIGN POL-
ICY.12) , to be paving the ,way to a more
truly cooperative world: `The. logical and
eventual development ... would, be the end
as
`
and national governments
of nationality
we know them.' In contrast,' the argument";
heard more;oftenabroad, though voiced also
by more' radical American economists, was
that the multinational corporation, was pri
manly an instrument for the ..indirect ex-
tension of, the power of American,, capital-
ism, creating willfully or objectively a mew
form of dependency and exploitation, since
thereby' "the economy of certain countries ` ?.
is conditioned. by.the development and ex-
pansion of. another economy to which the
former is.subjected."1 This viewpoint, by`
and large, tended to dominate the outlook '
of the new nations. The argument over the
multinationals was thus an'extension to the
world economy of the more philosophical
and political clash over the question of the
proper relative. weight of, and` relationship
between, liberty ' and equality'-and it fur-
ther highlighted-the ' danger ;of the systemic
as well as conceptual isolation of the United
States
Emerging U.S. vulnerability' to resource :
'
tance
shortages, in several areas of key impor to U.S. economic vitality makes this linkage
between philosophical and systemic differ-
ences even more threatening. U.S. depen-
dence on imported minerals is gradually in-
creasing and . thus also the U.S. stake in
'Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism:
The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence
(New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 190, as quoted
in C. Fred Bergsten and Lawrence B. Krause .(eds.),
World Politics and International Economics (Wash-
ington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975),
p. 44.
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The Third Century
orderly political relations with a number of
countries that are not likely to be in ideo-
logical sympathy with the United States.
Though any serious appraisal must take in-
to account the potential for substitution, or
for the development of alternative processes,
data developed systematically under the
Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970
by the Office of the Secretary of the Interior
points to the prospect of increasing com-
modity deficiencies, independently of polit-
ical factors, among such items as aluminum,
asbestos, barium, bismuth, cadmium,: cop-
per, diamond, fluorine, germanium, gold,
indium, lead, mercury;fsand and gravel, sul-
phur, tin, tungsten, . uranium, and zinc. A
gradual shift in the U.S. economy from
mineral self-sufficiency, to ? partial external
dependency has already: been taking place,
with the United States dependent in 1950
for only 15 per cent of its needs in dollar
terms on imports from abroad; by 1970,
the foregoing had increased to approximate-
ly 25 per cent; and by the year 2000, the
percentage may be anywhere from 60 per
cent to 70 per cent.
This development has so far not generat-
ed the more dire consequences predicted by
some observers immediately after the success-
ful 1973 price self-assertion by the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC)-notably the predictions both of
resource scarcities and of resource carteliza-
tion-but the trend is clearly oward ~u~:h
higher U.S. import costs. This as of itself
will generate the appearance of new con-
straints on the conduct of U.S. foreign pol-
icy, while some foreign powers may begin
to strive to exploit more deliberately the
fact that. only 6 per cent of the world's pop-
ulation consumes approximately 30 per cent
to 35 per cent of the total world production
.of petroleum, 55 per cent to 60 per cent of
natural gas, 15 per cent of coal, 20 per cent
of steel, 35 per cent of aluminum, and 30
per cent of copper.
The combination of systemic uniqueness
with unique wealth makes the United States
an obvious target for emotional hostilit
and economic pressure.. That pressure is like-
ly to come not from cartels based on a sin-
gle commodity (since the special, cireum
stances of OPEC are hard to replicate) bu
from mixed political-economic alliances ii
which clusters o iverse states might at
tempt to combine their varying assets in or
der to press the United States in a particula
direction. The inclination to try to do the
is likely to be enhanced by the general pc
liticization of world economics. The pr(
liferation of new states with weak priva
sectors has thrust many governments int
by private business.-The. growing emphas
on national control of resources has taus
widespread nationalizations of foreign a.
sets, especially in the extractive areas.2 Ti
need to provide some structure and stabili
to the management of global resources (1
deep-ocean resources) has prompted also tl
need for new international negotiatio
The widespread feeling among the new n
stinrnational ar
tions that exist
ments perpetuate their economic disa a
Cage has caused the United Nations to u
dertake explicitly an examination of the ne
for a new "international economic orde
All of that has had the effect of wideni
the role of governments in world economi
L F,
handled either by the private sector
through private- governmental negotiatio
largely on the basis of business criteria,
tending to become injected with politi
some cases to make dominant. the role
political motives and of political criteria
international economics.
In that setting, structural change in
there were some 37 major acts of nationatizatiior
nt
--
,,. ..._ - --
to tvv pe ce
Ateksandrooshaia and I. Matsenko, "Opyt i probt
natsionalizatsii v stranakh Afriki." Mirovaia Ekon
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 Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601580018-3
r.h a number of
to be in ideo-
United States.
al must take in-
Isubstitution, or
native processes,
illy under the
Ly Act of 1970
y of the Interior
increastng com-.
dently of polit-
(ns as aluminum,
11-11 cadmium, cop-
,l
irmaniurn, gold
1. and gravel, sul-
im, and zinc. A
economy from
partial external.
,en taking place,
pendent in 1950
s needs in dollar
>road: by 1970,
to approximate-
year 2000, the
here from 60 per
far not generat-
ces predicted by
t,,after the success-
n by the Organi-
-orting Countries
dictions both of
Eesource carteliza-
Irly towar mi-wh
This as of itself
ce of new con-
[U.S. foreign pol- .
towers may begin
e deliberately the
the world's pop-
ix ately 30 per cent
slworld production
to 60 per cent of
11 coal, 20 per cent
uminum, and 30
stemic uniqueness
the. United States
Brzezinski
an obvious target for emotional hostility
and economic pressure. That pressure is like-
ly, to come not from cartels based on a sin-
gle commodity. (since the . special circum
.stances of OPEC are hard to replicate) but
from mixed political-economic alliances in
which c usters o averse states might at-
tempt to combine their varying assets in or
l
i
ar
cu
der to press the United States in a part
direction. The inclination to try to do this
.is likely to be enhanced by the general po-
liticization of world economics.: The pro=
liferation of new-states with., weak private
sectors hasp-thrust" many governments into
external economic roles assumed. elsewhere.
by private business. The growing emphasis
on national control of resources has caused
widespread nationalizations of` foreign as-
sets, especially in the extractive areas.2 The
need to provide some structure and stability
to the management of global "resources (be
.it: commodity prices or the exploitation of
deep-ocean resources) has prompted also the. need for new international negotiations.
The widespread eelin among the new na-
tions that existing international aUange-
ments perpetuate their economic disa an-
tage has caused the United Nations to un-
dertake explicitly an examination of the need
for a new "international economic order."
All- of that has had the effect of wideni g
"the role of governments world economics.
That in turn means that issues heretofore
handled either by the private sector or
through private=governmental-negotiations,
'largely on the basis of business criteria, are
l
i
li
ca
t
tending to -become injected. with po
content. The effect is to reinforce and-in
some cases to make dominant the role of
political motives and of political criteria in
In that setting, structural change in the
3According to one count, in the years 1973-1974
e 37 major acts of nationalization in
e were som
ther 18 African countries alone, involving some 40 per cent
to 100 per cent of the affected foreign assets. See C.
Aleksandrovskaia and I. Matsenko, "Opyt Pe y.
" Mirovaia Ekonom-
iki
f
r
natsionalizatsii v stranakh A
,ika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheria no. 7. 1975,
pp. 51-52.
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The Third Century
American way of doing things becomes in-
evitable.. Resist as it might, the American
system is compelled gradually to accommo-
date itself. to this emerging international
context,.. with the U.S. government called
upon to negotiate, to guarantee, and, to
some extent, to protect. the various arrange-
ments that have been contrived even by pri-
vate business. The oil crisis also has had the
effect of stimulating. congressional pressures
for the assertion of greater governmental
control over the operations and practices of
U.S. oil companies, including negotiations
with oil-producing, states. This, too, has
served to enhance the role of the state. The
economic role ?f rho TJ S. government thus
continues to expand both for domestic and
international at o1 reasons, and in the process the
distinctiveness of capitalism in one country
may become somewhat blurred. Nonethe-
less, it is quite . clear that for a long time to
come - both fundamental philosophical as
well as structural differences will continue
to complicate the relationship between the
changing world and America.
The Problem of Will
In that context, America could easily slide
into a siege mentality. Warning signals
abound. The U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations, much to national applause, began
in 1975 to counterattack criticisms from
the new nations in terms almost as sharp
as those used in. the early 1950s by another
American ambassador to the United Na-
tions, appointed then to forcefully rebut
Soviet attacks. In a much cited speech of
October 3, 1975, he invoked, in words preg-
nant with emotionalizing imagery, the con-
cept of a beleaguered democratic minority
assailed from all sides by enemies:
In the United Nations today there are
on the range of two dozen democracies
left. Totalitarian Communist regimes and
assorted ancient and modern despotisms
make up all the rest. And nothing so
unites these nations as the conviction that
their success ultimately depends on our
80.
failure. It is sensed in the world th'
democracy is in trouble. There is blood
the water and the sharks grow frenzied. .
These words struck responsive chor
among various groups of American socie
To organized labor, they stood in welco
contrast to. what was perceived as a da
gerous tendency over the. recent years
U.S. officialdom to cater both to Corn
nists and to the new states; to the influent
Jewish community, long the source of s
port for enlightened internationalism,
words were a deserved rebuff to the Soy
Arab-Afro-Asian coalition against Israel;
the more conservative sectors of Ameri
society, they represented a belated reco
tion that American values were being thr,
ened by 'a counterproductive courtship
fundamentally hostile systems of values
governance. To be told that in the'com
and changing world-as they were in.
same speech-"most of the new states
most of the old ones have ended up ene
of. freedom as we would know it" w
provide a welcome escape from comple
even if in the guise of isolated self-right
ness.
Yet such isolated self-righteousness
prove particularly destructive to the
components of the underlying basis of
imacy of the American system as a
That' legitimacy, on the deeper psych
ical level, has been derived from a corn
tion of optimism and universalism..
Americans have instinctively believed
idea of progress and in their system
unique political expression of such
progress. And most believed that the
ican-type liberal democracy was a pot
model for the rest of the world. Y
plicit in the emergent new mood w
sudden recognition that perhaps "pr
was destructive and even dangerow
that the American system was no Ion:
carrier of a universally applicable
This could make for a much more
istic American self-perception, in so
spects thus more mature and realist-
0 Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601580018-3 j
81.
 Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601580018-3
things becomes in-
ght, the American
wally to accommo-
rging international
government called
guarantee, and, to
.he various arrange
it!"Ived even by pri-
sis also has had the
gressional pressures
zater governmental
5ns and practices of
hiding negotiations
fes. This, too, has
'ie of the state. The
A--government thus
}h for domestic and
d in the process the
!ism in one country
blurred. Nonethe.-
t for a long time to
al philosophical as
.cnces will continue
(onship between the
erica.
. rica could easily slide
f. Warning signals
issador to the United
anal applause, began
'tack criticisms from
rms almost as sharp.
ly- 1950s by another
to the United Na-
to forcefully rebut
puch cited speech of
;`oked, in words preg-
!ng imagery, the con
democratic minority
,by enemies:
ions today there are
?o dozen democracies
mmunist regimes and
a modern despotisms
es t. And nothing so
as the conviction that
tely depends on our
og
That legitimacy, on the deeper psycho
has
l
i
level
- - -
ca
, tion. of optimism and universalism. Most
ue political expression':of such human
uni
q
progress.'And most believed. that the?Amer
-- -
i
e
call-t p
------
model for the rest of the world. Yet im-
plicit in the emergent new mood was the
sudden recognition that perhaps "progress"
was destructive and even dangerous, and
that the American system was no longer the
This could make for a much more relativ-
istic American self-perception, in some re- .
spects thus more mature and realistic. But
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failure.... It is sensed in the' world that
democracy is in trouble. There is blood in
the water and the sharks grow frenzied... .
These words struck responsive chords
roups of American society..
ious
g
among var
To organized labor, they, stood in welcome
contrast to what was perceived as a 'dan-
gerous tendency over the. recent years for
U.S. officialdom 'to cater both to. Commu-
nists and to the new states; to the influential
Jewish community, long the' source of sup-
the
m
li
i
a
,
s
ona
t
port for enlightened intern
words were a deserved rebuff ? to the Soviet- -
Arab-Afro-Asian coalition against Israel; to
the more conservative sectors of American
ni
co
d
l
g
re
ate
society, they represented a: be
ened by' a' counterproductive. courtship of
fundamentally- hostile systems of values and
governance.. To be told that in the complex
and changing .world-as they were in the
same speech=--"most of the new states and
most of-the old ones have ended up enemies
of freedom as ' we would know it" was to
provide a welcome escape from complexity,:
even if in the guise of isolated self-righteous-.
Yet such isolated self-righteousness could
prove particularly destructive to the twin
components of the underlying basis of legit-
imacy of` the American. system as a whole.
l
 Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601580018-3
the sudden fading of the underlying sources
of the system's legitimacy could prove desta-
bilizing, and it could prompt many Amer-
icans to take refuge in the reassuring sim-
plicity of the notion of the Hostile World
notions substituting political dichotomy for
global complexity.
The temptation to escape from a world
which all of a sudden looked quite antipa-
thetic was also derived from internal changes
in 'American society, that had the effect of
shit ent g t e earlier consensus on foreign
policy and of undermining American will
to play a positive world role.' That con-
sensus has been reinforced by the presence of
a relatively homogeneous foreign affairs elite
which over' the years provided to American
society a broad sense of confidence and di-
rection, by the. internalization by the Amer-
ican public of a broad concept of world af-
fairs into which even new phenomena could
over some years be assimilated, and by the
underlying values and priorities widely
shared by most Americans. In brief, the
earlier consensus was based on the WASP
elite, on the cold war as the basic organizing
principle, and on the willingness of the pub-
lic to assign higher priority to external obli-
gations than to internal needs.
All of that had become the past by the
mid 1970s, with profound change within
America interacting confusingly with pro-
found changes outside America. The appear-
ance of new and more radical states, the
spread of statism, the demands for a new
international order did not fit the earlier
of a world balance of power assuring a gen-
eration of peace (as propagated by .Messrs.
Nixon and Kissinger), nor the benign ex-
pectations of the more internationalist crit-
ics of power politics and of the advocates
of peace through aid and development.
It is difficult to estimate how long it will
reasonably coherent yet necessarily flexible
conceptual understanding of the emerging
Brzezinsk
new world. Leaving aside the intellectua
complexity of the process of formulatin
propositions that can be simultaneously- re
sponsive to global complexity and yet su-
complicated by the changes in-the charact
of the contemporary American elite and i
American values. The waning of the WASt
eastern seaboard-Ivy League-Wall Street fo
eign affairs elite is a critically importa
in foreign affairs for more than a f a ce
tury, provided the country with much
its leadership during- America's thrust
world. greatness, and that leadership was
turn based on shared values and solid ins
tutional pillars of support.
These values-though they are elusive
precise definition-were a combination
the traditional Protestant ethic, of stro
American patriotism, of a blend of "m
ifest destiny with ? Wilsonian "univers
ism," of Keynesian economic neoliberalis
all strongly conditioned by the failure
the 1930s to shape a system of collec
security, in part because of American
negation. The strong sense of a special
global responsibility, inherent in this ble
was in turn reinforced by the post-W
War II Stalinist challenge. All this made
the public level for.at least an indirect
to greatness, combining the elite's ambit
to be the world's number one power v
the popular desire to be loved and with
general American belief in America's i
ism. At the same time, the . predomi
WASP elite enjoyed the institutional bacl
of the internationally-oriented eastern
ness-banking community, with which it
in a rather symbiotic relationship, an
was also tied--often by close personal I
-to the Protestant tradition.and ch
(Here, both Dulles and Acheson pr
striking but by no means the only examp'
The Vietnam war was the Waterlo
the WASP elite. But like Waterloo, a p
of decay preceded the final battle, and '
it. would be wrong to assume that the
 ~f the underlying sources
macy could prove desta-
td prompt many Amer-
in the reassuring sim-
n of the Hostile World
aclitical dichotomy for
co escape from a world
den looked quite antipa-`
y that had the effect of;
er consensus on foreign
graining American will:.
tforced by the presence of
treous foreign affairs elite.':
irs provided to American '_,
nse of confidence and di-
;ad concept of world af-.
Zn new phenomena could
assimilated, and by the.,
and priorities widely
nericans.' In brief, the
evas based on the WASP
tar as the basic organizing
he willingness of the pub-
priiority to external obli-
ternal needs.
become the past by the
profound change within
ng. confusingly with pro=
side America. The appear
more. radical states, the
the demands for a new,,,-,
did not fit the earlier '
nor the traditional view
of power assuring a gen-
as propagated by Messrs.
ger), nor the benign ex-
I -
,nore internationalist Grit
irics and of the advocates
laid and development.
estimate how long it will
to absorb and internalize a
znt yet necessarily flexible
standing of the emerging
_K.. t ?3 ;~`?7a' :::,Ytd.~ r.. k.. .4.1 ... '~vi';N
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Brzezinski,
new world. Leaving aside the intellectual
complexity of the process- of formulating
propositions that can be simultaneously. re
sponsive to global complexity and yet sus-
-wideracceptance. the matter is
ceptibl
complicated by the changes in the character
of the contemporary American elite and in
American values. The waning of the WASP-
eastern seaboard-Ivy League-Wall Street for-
eign affairs elite is a critically important
aspect of that change. That elite, dominant,
in foreign affairs for more than half a cen.
tury, . provided the country with much of
tutional pillars of support.
These values-though they are elusive of
precise definition-were a combination. of
the traditional Protestant. ethic,. of strong
American patriotism, of a blend of "man
ifest destiny". with Wilsonian "universal-
ism" of Keynesian economic neoliberalism,
the 1930s to shape a system of collective
security, . in part because of American ab-
negation.. The strong sense of a special U.S.
global responsibility, inherent in this blend,
was in turn reinforced by the post-World
War II. Stalinist challenge. All this made on
the public level for at least an.indirect will
to greatness,' combining the elite's ambition
to be the world's number one power. with
the popular desire to be loved and with the.
general American belief- in America's ideal-
ism. At. the same time,. the predominant
WASP elite enjoyed the institutional backing
of the internationally-oriented eastern busi-
ness-banking community, with which it was
in 'a rather symbiotic relationship, and it
was also tied-often by close personal links
-to the Protestant tradition and church.
(Here, both Dulles and Acheson provide
striking but by no means the only examples).
The Vietnam war was the Waterloo of
the WASP elite. But like Waterloo, a period
of decay preceded the final battle, and hence
it would be wrong to assume that the war
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The Third Century
by itself cracked WASP morale, motivation;-.
and monopoly of foreign affairs. Social
change by the 1960s was .bringing to the.
forefront of American society new groups,--
clamoring for recognition and proper place.--
Among them stood out the Irish and the
Jewish. Their rise on the social and philo-
sophical. plane coincided with the wider cri-
sis of American culture, brought on-as..I
argued much more fully in Between Two
Ages-by the unprecedented plunge of ,
American society beyond the industrial age
into a new postindustrial technetronic. era,
for which there was no prior philosophical
or cultural preparation. The result was an
upheaval in American values and culture, a
crisis of confidence as well as sharpened ethnic
cleavages. Of the latter,. the racial aspect
seized public attention, but the struggle to
displace and. to replace. the WASPs- was no
less significant, even if less visible. It was
waged with great intensity especially on the
cultural-mass media front, where it soon be-
came fashionable to denounce the WASPS in
terms which, if applied to any other group,
would have been considered ethnically or
racially prejudiced. The underlying theme
of David Hal erstam's widely read The
and the Brightest was the alleged arrogate
and the historical irrelevance gLthe WASPs
(with the two Bundy brothers depicted as
antiheroes), and in some ways the book was
a key weapon-as were many press articles
-of this cultural-ethnic conflict.
The entrance into the presidency of Rich-
ard Nixon coincided with the breakdown
of WASP domination of foreign affairs-as
well as with the collapse of the earlier con-
ceptual framework. It did not entail, how-
ever, the appearance of a new and equally
homogeneous foreign policy elite. Perhaps
the most successful ethnic group-replac-
ing the displaced WASPs-was now the Jew-
ish (ably represented in key administration
posts), but the dominant pattern was one
of greater fluidity and heterogeneity. In that
more' flexible context both ac 1 .n is and the
mass media merging to some extent as
84.
- Brzezinski'
the functional successors to business and
church-became the critical sources .of au-
thority, granting or withdrawing legitimacy
well as influencing policy. Neither. of
as
these two groups was dominated by the
neither partook to the same extent
ASPs
,
W
of traditional WASP values, both were less
committed to an.enduring world view, and
latter was especially inclined-in part
h
e
t
because of professional impulses-toward a
ore volatile and impressionistic attitude on
m
world politics. Moreover, neither of these
possessed the coherence of values nor the so-
cial confidence to generate sustained leader-
Academia was disillusioned and increas
hi
p.
s
ingly captivated by determinist pessimism;
skeptical while the struggle against presiden
tial abuse of power , encouraged more gen
erally an adversary style in relationship t
During the early 1970s the resulting pol
icy void was filled largely by Kissinger. H
-
ter------
more basic issues and gave the administr
tion-at least for a while-a certain roo
for maneuver in the field of foreign affair
disintegration of the earlier consensus whi
accompanied the decline of the WASPS, a
the secretive style and the manipulative ch
acter of Kissinger's stewardship had the
fect of accelerating congressional entry i
direct foreign policy making. For much
the postwar era, Congress-led by a lead
foreign affairs-felt it understood and p
r T1
foreign policy. On the basis of that sha
strategic comprehension, it was prepared
grant U.S. policy-makers considerable
tical flexibility. But - in a setting in w
Congress became increasingly. suspicious
proclaimed doctrines were essentially de
tive, and with the earlier consensus shatt
by the Vietnam war, Congress became
inclined to intrude into tactical issues .N
debating the larger strategic matters.
85.
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 Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP05S00620R000601580018-3
ale, motivation,
affairs. Social.
bringing to the
ty new groups.
pd proper place.
Irish and the
bcial and philo-
h the wider cri-
,ought on-as I
Between Two
ted plunge of
.ie industrial age
echnetronic era,
or philosophical
e result was an
yes and culture, a
sharpened ethnic
he racial aspect
t the struggle to
WASPs was no
visible. It was .
especially on the
,where it soon be-
tce the WASPS in
any other group,
ed ethnically or
underlying theme
?ely read The Best
kalleged arrogance
jce of the WASPs
thers depicted as
pays the book was
any press articles
onflict.
kesidency of Rich-
the breakdown
foreign affairs-as
of the earlier con-
not entail, how-
new and equally
icy elite. Perhaps.
is group-replac-
r vas now the Jew-
ley administration
pattern was one
erogeneity. In that
acajxmia and the
o some extent as
Brzezinski
the functional successors to business and
church-became, the -critical sources of au-
thority, granting or withdrawing'legitimacy
as well as influencing policy., Neither of
these two groups' was dominated: by, the
WASPs, neither partook to the same extent
of traditional WASP values, both ,were less
committed to an enduring world view,. and
the latter was especially inclined-in part
because of. professional impulses-toward a
more volatile and impressionistic attitude on
world politics. ~ Moreover, neither:,jof. these'
'
nor the so-
possessed the coherence of values
cial confidence- to generate sustained leader-
ship. Academia was disillusioned and . increas-
ingly captivated, by': determinist' pessimism;
the national mass 'media were professionally
skeptical. while the struggle against presiden-
tial abuse of power encouraged ' more gen-
During the early 1970s the resulting pol-
icy void was filled largely by Kissinger. His
."spectaculars" deflected debate from the
tion-at least for a while-a certain room
for maneuver in. the field of foreign, affairs.
However, it did so only for a while. The
.disintegration of the earlier consensus which
accompanied the decline of the WASPS, and
the secretive style and the manipulative char-
acter of Kissinger's stewardship; had, the ef-
fect of accelerating congressional entry into
direct foreign policy making-Tor much of
ship that tended toward bipartisanship on,
took of the basic strategic objectives of U.S. ?
foreign policy. On the basis of that shared
strategic comprehension, it was prepared to
grant U.S. policy-makers considerable tac-
tical flexibility. But in a setting in which
. Congress became. increasingly suspicious that
proclaimed doctrines were essentially decep-
tive, and with the earlier consensus shattered
by the Vietnam war, Congress became more
inclined to intrude into tactical issues while
debating the larger strategic matters.
85.
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 The Third Century
The; result was not, only an executive-
legislative conflict over a number of foreign
policy issues (be it Cyprus 'or Panama) but
also-given the wider changes in American
society-the increased intrusion of more
fragmented concerns into policy debates.
With the earlier consensus absent with_tbe
WASP elite no on er er a1izing..Ld.legit
imating.an_.asserted_-overall__natianal-i- Br-
est, the Creeks could Lo_bb_}c...more-e#fec-brvely
-and with less danger of being accused of
insensitivity to the national interest-on the
Cyprus issue; the 1z3_s cou_l- da sc cm the
Israeli-Arab conflict and more generally on
American policy toward the Middle East or
the United Nations; Southerners could block
change in .U.S. policies toward Panama and
derivatively toward Latin America..
This fragmentation of national motiva-
tion Was accompanied by a broader ,shift
in public attitudes toward. foreign policy.
Though public opinion polls are not a re-
liable indicator of enduring trends, though
much depends both on the manner in which
specific issues are posed and on the mood of
the moment, and though the massive doc-
umentation that is available on U.S. public
opinion attitudes on foreign affairs does not
offer in all cases a consistent picture, enough
of a pattern has emerged from a number of
separate public opinion studies to warrant
some important conclusions. Eschewing de-
tail, the polling data suggests that in' the
course of the last decade the U.S. public:
(1) has downgraded U.S. foreign and de-
fense priorities and. upgraded do wzsyc pri-
Qxjtieg to a point in which the latter pre-
dominate to a considerable degree; (2) has
become disinclined to support in a consistent
fashion higher budgetary allocations for de-
fense; (3) has become less inclined to view
the Soviet Union and/or China as an im-
minent threat to U.S. interests; (4) has be-
come generally more inclined to favor cuts
or withdrawals of U.S. forces stationed
abroad; (5) has become increasingly skep-
tical about the efficacy or desirability of for-
eign aid; (6) has become much more critical
86.
of the United Nations and of the coalition
of the Third and Fourth Worlds increas-'
ingly dominant in it;. and (7) has even
begun to favor less U.S. foreign trade. More,
generally and even more surprisingly, the
American public has ;become increasingly
willing to describe itself as isolationist (in
response in 1974 to a Roper poll bearing
on self-identification 42 per cent of the re-
spondents described themselves as interna
tionalists and 37 per cent as isolationists)
despite the negative connotations that over
the years the term' "isolationist had a.c
quired.3 .. .
However, it would be. wrong to conclude
from the foregoing that' a' new isolationist
consensus has finally taken shape. The data
did not support the proposition that Amer-
ica was unambiguously turning inward. On
some issues, such as foreign intervention, the
public tended to be constant. in most cases
against, but in the few favorable ones also
constantly so over the years (with a larger
and also relatively constant' number willing
to provide supplies to friendly nations that
Have been.attacked) More importantly, the
public remained willing to back internation-
al efforts on behalf of human rights, and t
support (by a margin of 66 per cent a'
compared to 68 per cent in 1947) an "ac
tive part" by the United States in work
affairs. Finally, polls showed a heightens
recognition of the need. for internationa
cooperation in dealing with various tie
On the whole, such public sentiments tended to
consonant with elite attitudes', where in some respect
they were even more dominant. As B. M. Russett note
"Anti-military-spending attitudes are concentrated pr
cisely among those most likely to take an interest i
international affairs, to vote, to make campaign co
tributions, and otherwise to be politically active."
Chicago Council study of public and elite attitud
noted a similarly greater leaning to one side among t
leadership groups. That tendency was especially mark
among the new congressmen that came to Washinyt
after the 1974 elections (and especially among ti
"new liberal" Democrats, only 20 per cent of who
in response to a request to identify the nation mo
threatening to world power named.the Soviet Unio
with another 20 per cent similarly identifying Israel!
Overall, the House of Representatives, for instance, w
reported in mid-1975 to be opposed to foreign aid
a margin of 53 per cent to 41 per cent.
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 Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601580018-3
ly an executive-
smber of foreign
nor Panama), but
ages in American
frusion of more
w policy debates.
sen with_ the
!,b
talizing aRdlegit-
iL.national-ir er-
jnore_affeetvely
being accused of
1 interest-on the
Ld0_sn nn the
lore generally on
he Middle East or
erners could block
ward Panama and
America.
national motiva-
y a broader shift
rd foreign policy.
polls are not a re-
ng trends, though
e manner in which
id on the mood of
% the massive doc-
~le on U.S. public
tgn affairs does not ,
znt picture, enough
from a number of
studies to warrant
ns. Eschewing de-.
ggests that in the
the U.S. public-
S. foreign and de-
!aded do Psi. pri-
ich the latter pre-
)le degree; (2) has
,port in a consistent ;
:. allocations for de-
ess inclined to view
it China as an im-
terests; (4) has be-
?lined to favor cuts
S. forces stationed
increasingly skep-
desirability of for-
e much more critical
Brzezinski
of the United Nations and of the coalition
of the Third and Fourth Worlds increas-
ingly dominant, in it; and (7):; has even.
begun to favor less U.S. foreign trade: More
enerally and even more surprisingly,. the
g
American public -has become increasingly
willing to describe itself as isolationist. (in
response in 197.4 to a Roper poll bearing
on self-identification 42 per cent of the re-
ondents described themselves as interna-
s
p
tionalists and 37 per. cent as isolationists)
despite the negative connotations that. over
the years the term "isolationist''',j.had ac-
However, it: would be wrong to,conclude.
from the foregoing.' that a new 'isolationist
consensus has finally taken shape. The data
did not support the proposition that Amer-
ica was unambiguously turning inward. On
some issues, such as foreign intervention, the
t cases
i
n mos
public tended to be constant:
constantly so over the years (with a larger
and also relatively constant number" willing
to provide supplies to friendly nations that
have been attacked). More importantly, the
ublic remained willing to back internation- ,
p
al efforts on behalf of human rights, and to
cent as
66
per
support (by a margin of
''
1947) an
compared to 68 per cent in^ac-
by
i
-
ve part
t
---
T. in l lv nulls showed _ a heightened
nal
i
o
recognition of the need for internat
cooperation -in dealing with various new
., r to such public sentiments 'tended to be
Ludes
, - ----
consonant with elite u...
they were even more dominant. As B. M. Russett noted,
"Anti-military-spending attitudes are concentrated pre-
cisely among those most likely to take an interest in
international affairs, to vote, to make campaign con-
tributions, and otherwise to be politically active." A.
Chicago Council study of public and elite attitudes
noted a similarly greater leaning to one side among the
leadership groups. That tendency was especially marked
among the new congressmen that came to Washington
after the 1974 elections (and especially among the
only 20 per cent of whom
l" Democrats
lib
,
era
new
" in response to a request to identify the nation most
threatening to world power named. the Soviet Union,
with another 20 per cent similarly identifying Israel!).
Overall, the House of Representatives, for instance, was
reported in mid-1975 to be opposed to foreign aid by
87.
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The Third Century
global problems (notably, food, energy, and
inflation) and' for closer cooperation among
the advanced countries, as well 'as., recogni-
tion of the close linkage between develop-
ments abroad and future internal prospects
for America. In brief, despite the sharpen-
ing cleavage within public opinion,. isola-
tionism was not the dominant mood.
Brzezin
both the public and leadership 'ranked t
export of either at the bottom of a list
18 suggested goals) .',Also manifest, hol
ever, was a great deal of confusion about t
future and uncertainty about specific polic
to be followed. 'A public opinion that
ambivalent but constructively malleal
emerged from the surveys and it heighten.
the 'need for. national leadership that v
capable of defining politically and mora
Internationalist/isolationist trends 1964-1975*
In percentages
compelling directions 'to' which the put
But in the absence. of such leadersl
there remains the real risk that drift.. co
become a decisive trend. Such a trend wot
be in keeping with some pertinent and str
ing predictions made years:ago,'which no
the cyclical nature of the American publ
attitudes on foreign affairs. The first
.these studies, by the Russian economic 1
torian Nikolai D:. Kondratieff, pointed
the recurring pattern' of recessions in Arr
ica and-an important corollary often
nored by those who refer to the Kondral
cycles-to the related phenomenon of
litical-cultural change in American soci
Using data on wages, prices,, interest rz
and capital flows, Kondratieff noted a
ularity in upward and downward trend
the capitalist economy, on the basis of wl
he predicted in the mid-1920s that
1970s will witness an inflationary peak
be followed by ' a long downward "wa'
1968
The figures for 1964 and 1968 are derived from
responses to five statements concerning the general
posture the United States should assume in world
affairs. The figures for 1972, 1974, and 1975
reflect responses to the same set of five statements,
as well as two new statements regarding possible
U.S. military intervention in defense of allies.
Source: Potomac Associates, Washington, D.C.
Indeed, the data even suggested a poten-
tial for a constructive global attitude and it
indicated relatively little predisposition in
favor of a crusade either on behalf of cap-
italism or of liberal democracy (in a 1975
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations study
accompanied by sharply heightened
ican social conservatism and indifferenu
world affairs.
An American social scientist, focu
more directly on U.S. attitudes toward
ternational affairs, ' reached in the 195
remarkably similar. conclusion. Frank
Klingberg, having systematically toll
data concerning foreign affairs-preside
messages, party platforms, election res
frequency of foreign treaties, naval ex
ditures, armed expeditions, wars, an
ations, diplomatic warnings-argued
since 1776 America's relationship to
world has been characterized by altern.
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 fi
~iy. food, energy, and
i?r cooperation among
as well as recogni-
age between develop
internal prospects
despite the sharpen
; I
public opinion, isola-
porzinant mood.
-------------
,nist trends 1964-1975*,
id 1968 are derived from
yy
the general
a same set of five statements,
itements regarding possible
an in defense of allies.
sociates, Washington, D.C. .'
even suggested a poten
rive global attitude and it
y little predisposition in
either on behalf of cap-
t.-al democracy (in a 1975
Sn Foreign Relations study'
Brzezinski
both the public and leadership ? ranked the
export of either at. the bottom of a list of
18 suggested. goals). Also manifest, how-
ever, was a great deal of confusion about. the
future and uncertainty about specific policies
to be followed. A public opinion that is
ambivalent 'but constructively malleable
emerged from the surveys and it heightened
the need for national leadership that was.-
capable of defining politically and morally
compelling directions to which the public
might then positively respond:::
But in . the absence of., such . leadership,,
there remains the real risk that:: drift could '.;`
become a decisive trend. Such a trend would
be in keeping. with some pertinent and strik-
ing predictions made years agog which noted
the cyclical' nature of the American public'"s
attitudes ~on- foreign affairs.:. The first. of
these studies, by the Russian. economic his-
torian Nikolai D. Kondratieff, 'pointed to
the recurring pattern of recessions in. Amer
ica and-an important corollary often ig-
nored by: those who refer to, the Kondratieff
'cycles-to the related phenomenon of po-
litical-cultural change in American society.
Using data on wages, prices, interest rates,
and capital flows, Kondratieff. . noted a reg-
ularity in upward and downward trendsin
the capitalist economy, on. the basis of which
he 'predicted in the mid-1920s that the
1970s will witness an inflationary peak, to
be followed by along downward. "wave,','.
accompanied 'by sharply heightened Amer-
ican social' conservatism and indifference to
world affairs:
An American social scientist,''. focusing
more directly on U.S. attitudes toward in-;
ternational affairs, reached in the 1950s a
remarkably similar conclusion. Frank L.
Klingberg, having systematically collated
data concerning foreign affairs-presidential
messages, party platforms; election results,.
frequency of foreign treaties, naval expen-
ditures, armed expeditions, wars, annex-
ations, diplomatic warnings-argued that
since 1776' America's relationship to
e
world has been characterized by alternating.
89.
 t
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The Third Century ,
.cycles of ','extroversion" and "introversion. -4
With each phase of extroversion having
lasted about 27 to 28 years, Klingberg con-
cluded,. with remarkable prescience, that "in-
view of. America's past record,. and of.. the
presumed role of 'internal' factors in pro-
moting. the introvert-extrovert rhythm it
seems logical. to expect America to retreat to
some extent at least from so much world
involvement and perhaps to do so sometime
in the 1960s.".
The possibility that a secular and long-
range trend is at work ' heightens-rather
than lessens-the -centrality of the leader-
ship response in America and makes all the
more dangerous appeals calculated to exploit
American disenchantment with world af-
fairs. In, contemporary -American attitudes
there are the makings of xenophobia-but
there is also the potential for constructive
response: Powerful but paralyzed by the ab-
sence of will could be the American destiny
if the leadership needed to translate that
potential into reality fails to materialize.
America the Indispensable
Such a failure would be' disastrous not
only for America but even more so for the
world at large. It is doubtful that a self-iso-
lated America in a rapidly changing world
could maintain (especially given the twin
impacts of communications and economics)
its own internal equilibrium, its own val-
ues, 'and eventually perhaps its own polit-
ical system. Internal polarization and fears
would be likely to generate grave tensions,
ultimately undermining from within the
spiritual substance and the political resilience
of any would-be fortress America.
However, the capacity of America to act
consistently and constructively is limited by
the paradoxical nature of America's relation-
ship to the changing world. It is an inter-
active relationship, in which the world is
subjected socially to a process of American-
' Frank L. Klinberg, "The Historical Alteration of
Moods in American Foreign Policy," World Politics,
January 1952.
JBrzezins
ization even while America politically see
to be undergoing a process of Europeaniz
tion. While America impacts in a novel fas
ion on the rest of the world through i
technology and mass culture, American po
itics appears to be becoming more fra
mented doctrinally, with 'less consensus a
more ideology, thus reviving on America
soil some of the older Right-Left Europea
.battles. Global Americanization and Ame
ican Europeanization make for a particula
ly uncertain blend, inhibiting the Unit
States from applying constructively i
unique global influence.
This is cause for concern because - t
American impact 'on the world remains,
the whole, positive: because American po
er, both political and economic, remaii
central; because the basic American messag
some specific policies notwithstanding, co
tinues to be relevant. An America that tur
inward-repelled by-'the ugliness of t
world around it. and beset by internal ide
logical conflict-would create a vacuum th
would be filled less by any single pow
though that might be the result in some r
gions, and more simply by escalating cha
The American impact on the wor
should not be underestimated. For all
shortcomings, America remains the global
creative and innovative. society. It impac
on the lifestyles, mores, and aspirations
other- societies to a degree not matched t
day by any other system. This is true of t
world of academia,' with the' United Stat
having emerged not only as the major sour
of learning, but also as the most attracti
magnet for foreign students, again: to a d
gree that outdistances other nations by far
U.S. policies, the attraction of the United States
foreign students has continued to grow. According
students in the United States and 2,000 additio
foreign students came as immigrants; in 1965
only 17,500. In effect, about one out of every fc
foreign students was choosing the United States.
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 Approved For Release 2009/06/05: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000601580018-3
nd "introversion.
ktroversion having
!'prescience, that 'in?
q record, and of the
pal, factors in pro-
krrovert rhythm it.
om so much world
5s to do so sometime
~`a secular and long-
er
heightens-rather
.....
f the loader-
o
,a and makes all the
x American attitudes
of xenophobia-but
1tial for constructive
paralyzed by the ab-
15the American destiny
fed to translate that
ells to materialize.
ole
ld be, disastrous not
even more so for the
ubtful that a self-iso-
aidly changing world
pially given the twin
lions and economics)
41 1 um, its own val
t_rhaps its own polit-
polarization and fears
nerate grave tensions,
ng from` within the
the political resilience
ress America.
city of America to act
ructively is limited by
of America's relation-
s world..It is an inter-
n which the world is
process of American-.
be Historical Alteration of
an Policy," World Politics,,
40.
ven while America politically seems
tzation.e
to be undergoing a process of Europeaniza-
_, c ti, _
hile
A --------
tiou.. W
ion on the rest of the world:,through its
and mass culture, American pot-.
l
g
h
o
y
no
tec
itics appears to be becoming,. more frag-
mented doctrinally, with less consensus and
thus reviving on American
l
more ideo
ogy, soil some of the older Right-Left European
n and Amer
ati
i
o
z
ican
battles. Global Amer
anization make for a particular;
n Europe
ica ly uncertain blend, inhibiting the United
ctively its
States.' from. applying constru
b
l
a
--- ---
unique g, o
'This is cause for concern because the
American impact.on the world remains, 'on
the whole, positive; because American pow .
economic, remains
.?_?__,
an
central; because the basic American message,
some specific policies notwithstanding, con-
tinues to be relevant. An America that turns
inward-repelled by the ugliness of the
internal ideo-
t b
b
y
ese
d it and
world aroun logical conflict would create avacuum that
ould be filled less by any sg power.
w
W
though that might be the result in some re-
gions, and more simply by escalating chaos.
The American impact on the world
t be underestimated. For all its
hould no
s
America remains the globally
tcomings
h
,
or
s
creative . and innovative society. It mp is
on- the lifestyles, mores, and asp ons
ties to a degree not matched to-
i
r
e
soc
othe
day by any other system. This is true of the
ited States
U
h
n
e
world of.academia, with t
having emerged not only as the major source
of .learning; but also as the most attractive
foreign students, 'again to a de
' f
or
gnet
ma gree that outdistances other nations by far;5
It is noteworthy that despite much global criticism of
U.S. policies, the attraction of the United States for
tinued to grow. According to
has con
foreign students m
data fro UNESCO and from the Institute for Interna-
tional Education, in 1960 there were 48,000 foreign
students in the United States and 2,000 additional
foreign, students came as immigrants; in 1965 the
respective figures were 82,000 and 6,000; in 19an70,
114,000 and 20,000; in 1975, 155,000 d
65,000. In contrast, the Soviet figure for 1970 was
only 17,500. In effect, about one out of every four
foreign students was choosing the United States.
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 ~.,n. ,vim.. ,f ~; ?~,... .'~2..~5 ,l?~,.'~...,.`_N1z~zM t..`ST*.X .r~x nr~~~. '~~.: ~'~`i~". .~ ~^a,_t> ?:tv4. ,>x, ,.r''I.? .~.~ A.?~.x .c~~ `.~, ;i:?.
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Brzezi
it has more recently become true of the ar-
tistic world, with New York. City emerging
as the global center for., many -of, the arts;
it is very true in the case of modern man-
agement techniques, with' American busi-
ness schools ? and management consulting
firms pioneering new skills; it certainly has
been the case with the women's liberation
movement and with the ecological move-
ment and even with the New Left; it is
very. much the case with mass leisure and
culture, with American music, jeans, and
.social habits rapidly ,, becoming 'the world
norm.
As'America plunges: into -the uncharted
new; teclr_, i Vie, increasingly dominated
by lect nits and ?tuba. ogy (hence the
neologism "technetronic".) , even its short-
comings become. more broadly significant..
.Be it the drug culture or the setbacks in
shaping more harmonious race relations, or
the psychological problems of excessive per-
missiveness, the negative lessons of America
acquire a wider, significance and are closely
scanned by others. In brief, contemporary
America is the world's social laboratory. Its
ferment, its new ideas, its experiments pro-
vide both stimulus and warnings... .
Moreover, the overall impact of America
is to stimulate change. Indeed, there is a par-
adox here in that American policies have
seemed to be oriented against change where-
as the broad social/political impact of Amer-
ica'has been inherently anti-traditional and
antiauthoritarian: Generally speaking, the
American social impact, and hence at least
derivatively also political, has been to en-
courage more social experimentation, more
institutional flexibility, more willingness to
welcome rather than to oppose breaks with
tradition. An inward-oriented America
would gradually cease to perform that role.
American power remains similarly central
to global stability and progress. The failure
of Europe and of Japan to surface and to
assume major political responsibilities rep-
resents the central and continuing disap-
pointment of American postwar policy. Had
these nations become more actively z
constructively engaged in coping with glc
al problems the pressures on America, z
the American role would have been ml
reduced, and the prospects for an East-\
accommodation with a more effectively ,c
rained Soviet Union greatly enhanced.
30 years after the end of the war,. nei
Europe nor Japan are prepay d to nla'
major Ole-neither in regard to the tr<
.tional nor in regard to the new global pr
lems. (Toshio Kimura, former foreign rr
ister of Japan and. the head of the Jap
ese delegation to the. Seventh Special Ses,,
of the United Nations General Assembl}
19 75-where the United States was the o
advanced nation to submit detailed pre
sals for changes, designed to move tow
a new economic order-quite bluntly st;
that he was ashamed of. the "general
metaphysical" character of the staters
that he had to submit on' behalf of his g
.eenment.) Admittedly, France did take ti
ly procedural initiatives in 1974-1975,
pecially in launching the so-called Tripa:
Conference on Commodities which.brot
together both the advanced and the de
oping nations, but the success of these c
ferences was again dependent largely on
American reaction.
Moreover, the economic dislocations
fered by the advanced industrial socie
especially because of the higher oil p
exacted by OPEC, have underlined the crt
economic and political. role of the Ur
States-indeed, making the. United S
more pivotal than it has been for almos
years. Furthermore, despite the underst;
able resentment within the poorer part
the world over , a situation in which
sixteenth of the world's population
consuming one-third of the world's
reusable resources, the global stake in A
ican prosperity and higher production- (l
also consumption) was inducing by l
more and more governments to put pre
on the United States to accelerate its
economic recovery from the ongoing r
93.
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 4?..
.S lr. .. ..n {+"t9:
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become true of the ar-
ew York City emerging
for many of the arts;
case of modern man-
with American busi-,
management consulting
skills; it certainly has
i he women's liberation,.'
b the ecological move-
h the New Left; it is
with mass leisure and
ican music, jeans, and
becoming the world
ges into the uncharted .
increasingly dominated
tudL.,ology (hence the
`)nic"), even its short-,..z
~re broadly significant.
)Ire or the setbacks in
timous race relations, or
)blems of excessive per-
rive lessons of America
ficance and are closely
[n brief, contemporary .
F's social laboratory. Its
4s.' its experiments pro-
nd warnings.
.rail impact of America
r. Indeed, there is a par-
merican policies have
against change where-
litical impact of Amer-
;ly anti-traditional and
generally speaking, the
:act and hence at least
itical, has been to en-
,experimentation, more
iy, more willingness to
'.to oppose breaks with
.: to perform that role.
1mains similarly central
d progress. The failure
pan to surface and to
al' responsibilities rep-
nd continuing disap-
tn postwar policy. Had
Brzezinski
these nations become more. actively and
constructively engaged in coping with glob-
al problems the pressures on America and
the American role would have been much
reduced, and the prospects for an East-West
accommodation with a more effectively con-
tained Soviet Union greatly enhanced. Yet
30 years after the end of the war, p either
Europe nor Japan are prepared to pl
major ole--neither in regard to the tradi-
tional nor in regard to the new global prob-
lems. (Toshio Kimura, former foreign min-
ister of Japan. and the head of the Japan
ese delegation to the Seventh Special Session
of the United Nations General Assembly of
19 75-where the United States was the only
advanced nation to submit detailed propo-
sals for changes, designed to move toward
a new economic order--quite bluntly stated
that he was ashamed of the "general and
metaphysical character of the statement
that he had to submit on behalf of his gov-
ernment.) Admittedly, France did take time-
ly procedural initiatives in 1974-1975, es-
pecially in launching the so-called Tripartite
Conference on Commodities which brought
together both the advanced and the devel-
oping nations, but the success of these con-
ferences was again dependent largely on the
American reaction.
Moreover, the economic dislocations suf-
fered by' the advanced industrial societies,
especially because of the higher oil prices
exacted by OPEC, have underlined the crucial. .
economic and political role of the United
States-indeed, making the United States
more pivotal. than it has been for almost 20
years. Furthermore, despite the understand-
able' resentment within the poorer parts of
the world over a situation in which one-
sixteenth of the world's population was
consuming one-third of the world's non-
reusable resources, the global stake in Amer-
ican prosperity and higher production (hence
also consumption) was inducing by 1975
more and more governments to put pressure
on the United States to accelerate its own
economic recovery from the ongoing reces-
93.
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The Third Century
Sion. Nothing could be more illustrative of
the American centrality to global economic
.well-being than these calls for 'a higher
American rate of growth.
More generally, the systemic. role of
America, both economically and politically,
has become that of the key stabilizer. This
has been especially the case with food, with
the United States having emerged as the key
. source of global nutritional stability,. but it
has clearly.also been so with trade, mon-
etary affairs, and regional security. When
. America falters, the world economy and the
political equilibrium become unstable-a les-
son well drawn explicitly in these terms by
Charles Kindleberger's The World in Depres-
:sion, .1929-1939 and even more applicable'
to the .present conditions. What is more, to
cite' the words of Robert Gilpin, writing in
Bergsten's and Krause's. World Politics and
International Economics:.
The scale, diversity,, and dynamics of the
American economy will continue to place
the United States at the center of the in-
ternational economic system. The univer-
sal desire for access to the huge American
market, the inherent technological dyna-
mism of the American economy, and
America's additional strength in both
agriculture and resources-which Europe
and Japan do not have-provide a ce-
ment sufficient to hold the.world economy
together and to keep the United States at
its center.
The same happens to be true politically and
strategically, especially in Europe, the Mid-
dle East, and the Far East. .
.An America that ceased to project. a.con-
structive sense of direction would hence con-
tribute directly to major global economic
and political disruptions.
. Finally, the broad historical message of
America still retains much of its validity,
provided it is not dogmatized into terms
that could only produce American isolation.
The basic message of the American expe-
rience was the primacy of liberty. But in-
herent in that was also the centrality of
pluralism. Personal liberty was best assured
Isrzezin
by a society that was pluralistic. On t
global scale, pluralism means diversity a
not a march toward a homogeneous wo
based on a single ideological model. T1
message remains valid and has become.
pecially valid because of the appearance-.
some 150-odd sovereign nation-states. Mo
over, tied to more specific proposals for glo
al cooperation, it could serve as the point
departure for a relevant. concept of a n
and more diversified international syste
All of that requires an America that
cooperatively engaged in shaping new gl
at relations, both despite and because of t
rising global egalitarian passions. Americ
should not forget that external hostility
not generalized to the extent that it appl
to the American society as a whole. _It is p
marily 'a doctrinal rather than a patio
hostility; and even as such it may still
be deeply rooted. America still provides
most people in the .world., the most, attr
five. social condition (even if not the mod
and that remains America's special streng
The Soviet Union is not even a rival in t
respect. But that strength can only be
plied if American foreign policy is sym
thetically sensitive to the significant shift
global emphasis toward a value which
not been central to the American experien
This need not entail an American embr
of egalitarianism as the supreme virtue
its artificial application to a differentia
and still much more open, less congest
and certainly more affluent American s
ety. But it does imply a policy that does
ignore (nor reciprocate with doctrinal h
tility) the global pressures for reform of
isting international arrangements. To red
global complexity and the emerging glo
preoccupations to the simple dichotomy
democracy (or freedom) versus despoti
(or statism) is in fact to sever the lib
tarian linkage between America and t
world, it is to reinforce radical passi
abroad, it is to promote America's phi
sophical and hence also political isolati
Finally, these broad-ranging conside
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13be more illustrative of
.ity to global economic
sse calls for a higher
the systemic role of
k ically and politically,
the key stabilizer. This
[e case with food, with
wing emerged as the key
citional stability, but it
so with trade, mon=
:gional security. When
world economy and the:
kbecome unstable-a les-
2,icitly in these terms by-
''s The World in Depres--
d even more applicable
'ions. What is.more, to
bert Gilpin, writing in
se's World Politics and.
(nics:
`y, and dynamics of the.
y will continue to place'
at the center of the in
mic c system. The univer
.s to the huge American ,:
_merican economy, and
final strength in both
sources-which Europe
of have-provide a ce-
'bold the world economy
!o be true politically and
Ily in Europe, the Mid
it East.
ceased to project a con-
,ection would hence con-
{major global economic T-I
lions.
id historical message of
4s much of its validity,
dogmatized into terms
duce American isolation.
j of the American expe-
iacy of liberty. But in-
also the. centrality of
'liberty was best assured
k 94.
Brzezinski
by a society that was pluralistic. On the.
global scale, "pluralism means diversity and
not a march toward a homogeneous world
based on a single ideological '.model. That
message. remains valid and has.' become es
pecially valid-because of the appearance of
x
over, tied to.more specific proposals for glob-.
al cooperation, it could serve as the point of
departure' for a relevant concept.,of a new .
and more diversified international system.
All of that requires an America' that is,
cooperatively engaged in shaping new glob-
al relations, both despite and because of the
rising global egalitarian passions. Americans.'
should not forget that external hostility is
not generalized to the extent that it applies
marily a doctrinal rather than ' a national
hostility. and:. even as such it may still not
be deeply rooted. America still provides to .
most people in the world the most attrac-
tive social condition (even if not the model)
and that remains America's special strength.
The Soviet Union is not even a rival in this
respect. ' But that strength can only be ap-
plied if American foreign policy is sympa-
thetically sensitive to the significant shift in
global emphasis toward a value which has
not been central to the American experience.
This need not entail an American embrace
and still much more open, less congested,
and cortainly more affluent American soci-
ety. But it does imply a policy that does not
tility) the global pressures for retorm or ex-.
;cring international arrangements. To reduce
preoccupations to the simple. dichotomy or
democracy ' (or freedom) versus despotism
(or statism) is in fact to sever the liber-
tarian linkage between America and the
world, it is . to reinforce radical passions
abroad, it is to promote America's philo-
sophical and hence also political isolation.
Finally, these broad-ranging considera
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The Third Century
tions have also more immediate application.
In the ongoing Conference on International
Economic Cooperation, the United States
has the opportunityto shape a policy toward
the developing. world that takes the philo-'
sophical dimensions as well as the political
realities discussed earlier more fully into ac-
count, a position which the Europeans and
even the Japanese have so far appeared more
willing to adopt. ' Moreover, in the foresee-.
able future the United States may be facing
difficult crises in. parts of Africa or Latin
America. There may also be ? political in
stability in Eastern Europe. The underlying
premises that will guide the American at-
titude toward these issues may very directly
affect the ultimate capacity of the United
.States to respond in a manner which is in
America's longer-range interest and which
enables the United States to coalesce around
.itself the sympathies and support of the ma-
jority of mankind:
Nothing could, be more destructive than
for the United States to position itself as
the ultimate shield of the remnants of white
supremacy in Africa at a time when racial
equality is coming to be accepted. as an im-
perative norm. This would rally all of Af-
rica and much of Afro-Asia against us.
Similarly, American longer-range interests
would be harmed by continuing indiffer-
ence to the mounting desire in Central Amer-
ica for greater social. justice and. national
dignity, as our indifference will only make
it easier for Castro's Cuba to exploit that
desire. Much of Latin America could be an-
tagonized by any resulting conflicts. Finally,
America would be untrue to its own initial
values if it adopted a cynical view regarding
the Soviet relationship to those East Eu-
ropean countries that either seek to enlarge
or to protect their own national indepen-
dence. The consequences of such a stance
would be harmful to 'the United States in
all of Europe and even in China.
Above all, it is vital to remember that
ultimately it is only America that has the
power to shape a hostile world for itself.
96.
A SENSE OF DRIFT,
ATIME FOR CALM
by Richard Holbrooke
For 1.2 years, until one year ago, o
-Vietnam-provided a relatively
litmus test for everyone. People wer
with relative.ease on a single-band.sl
from hawk to dove; and individuals
along it, invariably from right to lef
war ran into increasing difficulties an
ing opposition at home.
Many thought that the battle line,,
during those years of hard and divi
tional. debate ,would continue in tf
Vietnam era., Had they survived' int
debate would have been relatively c
easier to understand and follow, tha
fact been the case. But that did not
..The sides' are no longer clearly
Indeed, the confusion is often so g
one cannot even tell which side of
debates some of our highest, leader
One week the'president seems'to si
those fearful that America has beco
tarily inferior to the Soviet Unic
next week, he asserts that America
"second to none." His uncertain
is matched by others, including h
tary of state, whose private gloom
decline of the West is exhibited only
public, where he sticks for the. most
statements that if America will onl
its national consensus and follow
mander in chief, it will again be t
powerful nation on earth. Critics ai
we are getting weaker and must tak(
action to regain clear-cut supremac}
assail us for continuing the arro:
power, of insensitivity, to the new
That these are the most difficult 4
our nation must face is obvious. Bu
swers are neither obvious nor, ul
empirically derivable. They must
fact, out of the confusion of the nat
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