FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BOOK 1: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
BOOK I
SENATE--94th Congress 2d Session
Report No. 94-755
Final Report of the Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with
respect to Intelligence Activites
UNITED STATES SENATE
April 26 (legislative day
April 14), 1976
D. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE INQUIRY
The thirty years since the end of W,17orld War II have been marked
by continuing experimentation and change in the scope and methods
of the United States Government's activities abroad. From the all-out
World War between the Axis powers and the allies, to the Cold War
and fears of nuclear holocaust between the communist bloc and West-
ern democratic powers, to the period of "wars of liberation" in the
former colonial areas, the world has progressed to an era of negotia-
tions leading to some easing of tensions between- the United Mates
and the Soviet Union. In addition, the People's Republic of China
has emerged as a world power which the. United States and other
nations must consider. The recognizable distinctions between declared
war and credible peace have been blurred' throughout these years
by a series of regional wars and uprisings in Asia, the Middle East.,
Latin America, Europe, and Africa. The competing great powers
have participated directly or indirectly in almost all of these wars.
Of necessity, this country's intelligence agencies have played an
important role in the diplomacy and military activities of the United
States during the last three decades. Intelligence information has
helped shape policy, and intelligence resources have been used to carry
out those policies.
The fear of war, and its attendant uncertainties and doubts, has
fostered a series of secret practices that have eroded the processes of
open democratic government. Secrecy, even what would be agreed by
reasonable men to be necessary secrecy, has, by a subtle and barely
perceptible accretive process, placed constraints upon the liberties of
the American people.
Shortly after World War II, the United States, based on its war-
time experience, created an intelligence system with the assigned mis-
sion at. home and abroad of protecting to protect the national security,
primarily through the gathering and evaluation of intelligence about
individuals, groups, or governments perceived to threaten or poten-
tially threaten the United States. In general, these intelligence func-
tions were performed with distinction. However, both at home and
abroad, the new intelligence system involved more than merely ac-
quiring intelligence and evaluating information; the system also un-
dertook activities to counter, combat, -disrupt, and sometimes destroy
those who were perceived as enemies. The belief that there was a need
for such measures was widely held, as illustrated in the following re-
port related to the 1954 Hoover Commission Report on government
organization :
It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose
avowed objective is world domination by whatever means
and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game.
Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply.
If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing American concepts
of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop ef-
fective espionage and counterespionage services. We must
learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more
clever; more sophisticated and more effective methods than
those used against us. It may become necessary that the
American people will be made acquainted with, understand
and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.
The gray, shadowy world between war and peace became the natural
haunt for covert action, espionage, propaganda, and other clandestine
intelligence activities. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk described
it as the environment for the nasty wars "in the back. alleys of the
world."
Although there had been many occasions requiring intelligence-
gathering and secret government action a.gdinst foreign and domestic
national security threats prior to World War II, the intelligence corn-
munity developed during and after that war is vastly different in
degree and kind from anything that had existed previously. The sig-
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nificant new facets of the post-war system are the great size, techno-
logical capacity and bureaucratic momentum of the intelligence ap-
paratus, and, more importantly, the public's acceptance of the necessity
for a substantial permanent intelligence system. This capability con-
trasts with the previous sporadic, ad hoc efforts which generally
occurred during wars and national emergencies. The extent and lnag-
nit.ude of secret intelligence activities is alien to the previous American
experience.
Three other developments since I orld War II have contributed to
the. power, influence and importance of the intelligence agencies.
First, the executive branch generally and the President in partic-
ular. have become paramount within the federal system, primarily
through the retention of powers accrued during the emergency of
World War II. The intelligence agencies are generally responsible
directly to the President and because of their capabilities and because
they have usually operated out of the spotlight, and often in secret,
they have also contributed to the growth of executive power.
Second, the direct and indirect impact of federal programs on the
lives of individual citizens has increased tremendously since World
ar II.
Third. in the thirty years since World War II, technology has made
unparalleled advances. New technological innovations have markedly
increased the. agencies' intelligence collection capabilities, a. circum-
stance which has greatly enlarged the potential for abuses of personal
liberties. To illustrate, the SALT negotiations and treaties have been
possilllc because technological advances make it possible to accurately
rllonitor arms limitations. but the very technology which permits such
preciso weapons monitoring also enables the user to intrude on the
private conversations and activities of citizens.
The. tar. ets of our intelligence efforts after World War II-the
activities of hostile intellig*ence services, communists, and groups asso-
ciated with diem both at home and abroad-weie determined by
succeSS1ve administrations.. In the. 1960's, as the civil rights movement
grew in the country, some intelligence agencies directed attention to
civil rights organizations and groups hostile to them. such as the
Ku Klux Flan. From the mice-1960's until the end of the Vietnam war,
intelligence efforts. were focused on antiwar groups.
Just as the nature of intelligence activity has changed as a result of
international and national developments, the public's attitude toward
intelligence has also altered. During the last eight years, beginning
with Ramparts magazine's exposure of CIA covert relationships with
non-governmental organizations. there has been a series of allegations
in the press and Congress which have provoked serious questions about
the conduct of intelligence agencies at home and abroad. The Water-
gate disclosures raised additional nuestions concerning abuse of power
by the executive branch, misuse of intelligence agencies, and the need
to strengthen legal restraints against such abuses.
While the evidence in the Committee's Report emphasizes the mis-
guided or improper activities of a few individuals in the executive
branch, it is clear that the growth of intelligence abuses reflects a more
general failure of oil,- basic institutions.
10
11
Throughout its investigation, the Committee has carefully inquired
into the role of presidents and their advisors with respect to particular
intelligence programs. On occasion, intelligence agencies concealed
their programs from those in higher authority, more frequently it was
the senior officials themselves who, through pressure for results, created
the climate within which the abuses occurred. It is clear that greater
executive control and accountability is necessary.
The legislative branch has been remiss in exercising its control over
the intelligence agencies. For twenty-five years Congress has appropri-
ated funds for intelligence activities. The closeted and fra mentary
accountinff which the intelligence community has given to a desig-
nated small group of legislators.was accepted by the Congress as ade-
quate and in the best interest of national security. There were occa-
sions when the executive intentionally withheld information relating
to intelligence programs from the Congress, but there were also occa-
sions when the principal role of the Congress was to call for more intel-
ligence activity, including activity which infringed the rights of citi-
zens. In general, as with the executive, it is clear that Congress did not
carry out effective oversight.
The courts have also not confronted intelligence issues. As the Su-
preme Court noted in 1972 in commenting on warrantless electronic
surveillance, the practice had been permitted by successive presidents
for more than a quarter of a century without "guidance from the Con-
gress or a definitive decision of the Courts". Of course, courts only con-
sider the issues brought before them by litigants, and pervasive se-
crecy-coupled with tight judicially imposed rules of standing-have
contributed to the absence of judicial decisions on intelligence issues.
Nevertheless, the Committee's investigation has uncovered a host of
serious legal and constitutional issues relating to intelligence activity
and it is strong proof of the need for reform to note that scarcely any
of those issues have been addressed in the courts.
Throughout the period, the general public, while generally excluded.
from debate on intelligence issues, nevertheless supported the known
and perceived activities of the intelligence agencies. In the few years
prior to the establishment of this Committee, however, the public's
awareness of the need to examine intelligence issues was heightened.
The series, of allegations and partial exposures in the press and the
Congress provoked serious questions about the conduct of intelligence
activities at home and abroad. The Watergate affair increased the pub-
lic's.concern about abuse of governmental power and caused greater
attention to be paid to the need to follow and to strengthen the role of
law to check such abuses.
. Against this background, the Committee considered. its main task
as making informed recommendations and judgments on the extent
to which intelligence activities are necessary and how such necessary
activities can be conducted within the framework of the Constitution.
E. TIrF. DII.R1rMA or Sr?.cRrrY AND Ori x Co\srru 'IO~Ar.
GOVERN MEN T
Since World War II, with steadily escalating consequences, many
decisions of national importance have been made in secrecy, often by
the' executive branch alone. These decisions are frequently based on
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information obtained by clandestine means and available only to the
executive branch. Until very recently, the Congress has not shared
in this process. The cautions expressed by the Founding Fathers and
the constitutional checks designed to assure that policymaking not be-
come the province of one man or a few men have been avoided on nota-
ble recent occasions through the use of secrecy. John Adams expressed
his concern about the dangers of arbitrary power 200 years ago :
Whenever we leave principles and clear positive laws we are
soon lost in the ,wild regions of imagination and possibility
where arbitrary power sits upon her brazen throne and gov-
erns with an iron scepter.
Recent Presidents have justified this secrecy on the basis of "national
security," "the requirements of national defense," or "the confidential-
i.tv required by sensitive, ongoing negotiations or operations." These
justifications were generally accepted at face value. The Bay of Pigs
fiasco, the secret war in Laos, the secret bombing of Cambodia, the
anti-Allende activities in Chile, the Waterreate affair, were all instances
of the use of power cloaked in secrecy which, when revealed, provoked
widespread popular disapproval. This series of events has ended, for
the. time being at least, passive and uncritical acceptance by the Con-
gress of executive decisions in the areas of foreign policy, national
security and intelligence activities. If Congress had met its oversight
responsibilities some of these activities might have been averted.
An examination of the scone of secret intelligence activities under-
taken in the east three decades reveals that they ranged from war to
conventional espiona,e. It annears.that. some United States intelligence
activities may have violated treaty and covenant obligations, but more
importantly, the rights of United States citizens have been infringed
upon. Despite citizen and congressional concern about these programs,
no processes or procedures have been developed by either the Congress
or the executive branch which would assure Congress of access to secret
information which it must have to carry out its constitutional respon-
sibilities in authorizing and giving its advice and consent. The hind-
sight. of history sugp'ests that many secret operations were ill-advised
or might have been more beneficial to United States interests had they
been conducted onenly, rather than secretly.
What is a valid national secret? What can properly be concealed
from the scrutiny of the American people, from various segments of
the executive branch or from a duly constituted oversight body of
their elected representatives? Assassination plots? The overthrow of
an elected democratic government? Drug testing on unwitting Ameri-
can citizens? Obtaining millions of private cables? Massive domestic
spying by the CIA and the military? The illegal opening of mail?
Attempts by an agency of the government to blackmail a civil rights
leader? These have occurred and each has been withheld from scrutiny
by the nuhlic and the Congress by the label "secret intelligence."
In the Committee's view, these illegal. improper or unwise acts are
not valid national secrets and most certainly should not he kept from
the scrutiny of f-a duly-constituted congressional oversight. body.
The, definition of a valid national secret is far more difficult to set
forth. It varies from time to time. There is presently general agree-
ment that details about military activities, technology, sources of
information and particular intelligence methods are secrets that should
be carefully protected. It is most important that a process be devised
for agreeing on what national secrets are, so that the reasons for nec-
essary secrecy are understood by all three branches of government and
the public, that they be under constant review, and that any changes
.requiring the protection of new types of information can be addressed,
understood and agreed on within a framework of constitutional con-
sensus.
The Committee stresses that these questions remain to be decided by
the Congress and the executive jointly:
-What should be regarded as a national secret?
-Who determines what is to be kept secret?
-How can decisions made in secret or programs secretly
approved be reviewed?
Two great problems have confronted the Committee in carrying
out its charge to address these issues:
The first is how our open democratic society, which has endured
and flourished for 200 years, can be adapted to overcome the threats
to liberty posed by the continuation of secret government activities.
The, leaders of the United States must devise ways to meet their respec-
tive intelligence responsibilities, including informed and effective con-
gressional oversight, in a, manner which brings secrecy and the power
that secrecy affords within constitutional bounds.
For the executive branch, the specific problem concerns instituting
effective control and accountability systems and improving efficiency.
'Many aspects of these two problem areas which have been examined
during the Committee's inquiry of intelligence agencies are addressed
in the recommendations in Chapter .VIII. It is our hope that intelli-
gence oversight committees working with the executive branch will
develop legislation to remedy the problems exposed by our inquiry and
described in this report. The Committee has already recommended
the creation of an oversight committee with the necessary powers to
exercise legislative authority over the intelligence activities of the
United States.
It is clear that the Congress must exert its will and devise procedures
that will enable it to play its full constitutional role in making
policy decisions concerning intelligence activities. Failure to do so
would permit further erosion of constitutional government.
This Committee has endeavored to include in its final public report
enough information to validate its findings and. recommendations.
Most of the inquiry and the documentation obtained by the Committee.
particularly that concerning foreign and military intelligence, is of
a highly classified nature. Determining what could and should be re-
vea]ed has been a major concern.
In a -meeting with President Ford at the outset of our inquiry ii:
It'ebruary 1975,' the Committee agreed
t t
di
no
o
sclose any classified ur-
formation provided by the executive branch without first. consult-
ing the appropriate agencies, offices and departments. In the case of
objections, the Committee agreed to carefull
con
ide
th
1
'
y
s
r
e
%xecntive
s
reasons for maintaining secrecy, but the Committee determined that
final decisions on any disclosure would be up to the Committee.
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The Select Committee has scrupulously adhered to this agreement.
The. Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders, the report on CIA activities in Chile, the report on illegal
NSA surveillances, and the disclosures of illegal activities on the part
of FBI COINTELPRO, the FBI's harassment of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., and other matters revealed in the Committee's public hear-
ings, were all carefully considered by the Committee and the executive
branch working together to determine what information could be de-
classified and revealed without damaging national security. In those
reports and hearings, virtually all differences between the Committee
and the Executive were. resolved. The only significant exception con-
cerned the release to the public of the Assassination Report, which the
executive branch believed would harm national security. The Com-
mit.tee decided otherwise.
Some criteria for defining a valid national secret have been agreed
to over the past year. Both the Committee and the executive branch
now agree that generally the names of intelligence sources and the
details of sensitive methods used by the intelligence services should
remain secret.. Wherever possible, the right of privacy of individuals
gront)s should also be Preserved. It was agreed, however, that.the
and
details of illegal acts should. be disclosed and that the broad scope of
ITnited States intelligence activities should be sufficiently described
to give. l,nl,lie. reassw ance that the intelligence agencies are operating
cnrlsistc?nt with the law and declared national policy.
'I'hc cleclassification working procedures developed between this
(,'ollinlittcc. the CIA and other parts of the intelligence community
constitute the beginnings of agreed, sound and sensible methods and
criteria for making public matters that should be made public. This
disclosure process is an important step toward achieving the national
consensus required if our intelligence system is toenjoy essential public
support.
There is a clear necessity, after thirty years of substantial secret ac-
tivities, for public debate and legislative decisions about the future
course of our intelligence system. This report is intended to assist the
Senate, the Congress, and the country. in making the vital. decisions
that are required to be made in the coming years.
This section of the Final Report focuses on the departments and
agencies engaged in foreign and military intelligence. The Commit-'
tee's findings, conclusions, and. recommendations in these areas can
be found in Chapter XVIII.
II. THE FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW
Permanent institutions for the conduct of secret foreign and mili-
tary intelligence activities are a relatively new feature of American
government. Secure behind two oceans and preoccupied with the set-
tlement of a continent, America had no permanent foreign intelligence
establishment for more than a century and a half. In times of crisis,
Americans improvised their intelligence operations. In times of peace,
such operations were not needed and were allowed to lie fallow.
Despite the experience of the First World War, Americans believed
they could continue this pattern well into the Twentieth Century. The
military services developed important technical intelligence capabil-
ities, such as the breaking of the Japanese code, but the American
public remained unaware of the importance of effective intelligence for
its security. As a world power, the United States came late to intelli-
gence. It came on December 7, 1941, when Japan attacked Pearl
Harbor. .
That searing intelligence failure led to the Congress' first effort to
deal with the necessity and complexity of modern intelligence. The
Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack, after a sweeping in-
vestigation, recommended in 1946 a unified and permanent intelli-
gence effort by the United States-concepts ultimately embodied in
the basic charter for American intelligence, The National Security
Act adopted by the -Congress in 1947. However, neither the Pearl
Harbor Committee, nor the National Security Act addressed some
of the fundamental problems secret intelligence operations pose for
our democratic and constitutional form of government and America's
unique system of checks and balances.
effectively governed in the crucial area of secret intelli~-elice.
(15)
it is the result of a series of occurrences adversely affecting the liberties
of individual Americans and undermining the long-term interests and
reputation of the United States. In effect, the Select Committee was
created to deal with the question of whether our democratic system has
women serving in our intelligence services is to be commended.
This inquiry was not brought forth by an individual event such as
a massive intelligence failure threatening the nation's security. Rather
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities represents
the second major effort by the Congress to come to grips with intelli-
gence problems, in particular the basic constitutional and structural
issues arising from a permanent secret intelligence establishment.
While these problems were the subject of the investigation and are
the focus of this report, the Select. Committee wishes to emphasize that .
it found much that was good and proper in America's intelligence
efforts. In particular, the capacity and. dedication of the men and
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Mr. Clark Clifford, one of the authors of the National Security
Act of 1947, told the Committee that:
The law that was drawn in 1947 was of a general nature
and properly so, because it was the first law of its kind. We
were blazing a new trail.1
It has been the responsibility of the Select Committee to consider
where this secret trail has taken the nation, and with this as prologue,
to begin the task of charting the future.
A. TIIE BAsic IssuEs: SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY
The task of democratic government is to reconcile conflicting. values.
The fundamental question faced by the Select Committee is how to
reconcile the clash between secrecy and democratic government itself.
Secrecy is an essential part of most intelligence activities. However,
secrecy undermines the United States Government's capacity to deal
effectively with the principal issues of American intelligence addressed
by the Select Committee:
-The, lack of clear legislation defining the authority for permis-
sible intelligence activities has been justified in part for reasons of
Secrecy. Absent clear legal boundaries for intelligence activities, the
Constitution has been violated in secret and the power of the executive
branch has gone unchecked, unbalanced.
-Secrecy has shielded intelligence activities from full nccount-
al,ility and efTective. supervision both within the executive branch
311d h%? t lie Congress.
-Reliance on covert action has been excessive because it offers 'a
secret. shortcut around the democratic process. This shortcut has led
to questionable foreign involvements and unacceptable acts.
-The important. line between public and private action has become
blurred as the result of the secret use of private institutions and in-
dividuals by intelligence agencies. This clandestine relationship has
called into question their integrity and undermined the crucial
independent role of the private sector in the American system of.
democracy. .
-Duplication, waste, inertia and ineffectiveness in the intelligence
community has been one of the costs of insulating the intelligence
bureaucracy from the rigors of Congressional and public scrutiny. .
-Finally, secrecy has been a tragic conceit. Inevitably, the truth
prevails, and policies pursued on the premise that they could be plaus-
ibly denied, in the end damage America's reputation and the faith
of her people in their government.
For three decades, these problems have grown more intense. The
United States Government responded to the challenge of secret intel-
ligence operations by resorting to procedures that were informal,
implicit, tacit. Such an approach could fit within the tolerances of
our democratic system so long as such activities were small or tem-
porary. Now, however, the permanence and scale of America's intelli-
gence effort and the persistence of its problems require a different
solution.
B. THE SCOPE of THE SELECT COMMITTEE'S INQUIRY INTO FOREIGN AND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
The operations of the United States Government in the field of
intelligence involve the activities of hundreds of thousands of individ-
uals and the expenditure of billions of dollars. They are carried out
by a complex "community" of organizations whose functions interact
and overlap. Because of their scope, the Select Committee could not
deal in depth with all aspects of America's intelligence activities.
Instead the Committee focused on the principal organizations, their
key functions and the major issues confronting the United States in
the field of foreign and military. intelligence. In doing so, the Com-
mittee sought to uncover the truth of alleged abuses by the intelligence
agencies and to ascertain the legitimate needs and requirements
of an effective future intelligence system for the United States that
can function within the boundaries established by the Constitution
and our democratic form of government.
The Select Committee focused on five institutions :
-The National Security Council (NSC), which on behalf of the
President, is supposed to direct the entire national security apparatus
,of the United States Government, including the intelligence commu-
nity. As the senior policymakin body in the executive intelligence in the
field of national security, the NSC is also the ultimate consumer of the
nation's intelligence product.
-The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who is charged with
producing intelligence which reflects the judgments of all of the in-
telligence organizations in the executive branch. He is also supposed
.to "coordinate" the activities of these organizations.
-Thee Central Intelligence Agency, which houses the government's
central analytical staff for the production of intelligence, but which
devotes its major efforts to developing new means of technical collec-
tion and to operating America's clandestine intelligence service
throughout the world, In the latter capacity it carries out covert action,
paramilitary operations and espionage.
-Tlw Department of State, which is the primary source of intelli-
gence on foreign political and economic matters, and as such is both a
competitor in the collection and evaluation of intelligence and a po-
tential source of external control over clandestine intelligence activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
-The Department of Defense, which is the major collector of in-
telligence, the largest consumer, as well as the principal manager of
tho resources devoted to intelligence. It houses the largest intelligence
collection organization, the National Security Agency (NSA)
and
,
the largest intelligence analysis organization, the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA).
C. THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS : THEORY AND REALITY
..These organizations, and sonic f their 'Ofl'shoots
constitute the
,
United States intelligence community. In theory at least, their opera-
tions can be described in simple terms by the following cycle:
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-Those, who use intelligence, the "consumers," indicate the kind
of information needed.
-These needs are translated into concrete "requirements" by senior
intelligence managers.
-The requirements are used to allocate resources to the ". ollectors"
and serve to 'nu de their efforts.
-The collectors obtain the required information or "raw
intelligence."
-The "raw intelligence" is collated and turned into "finished in-
telligence" by the. "analysts."
-The finished intelligence is distributed to the consumer and the
intelligence managers who state new needs, define new requirements,
and make necessary adjustments in the intelligence programs to im-
prove effectiveness and efficiency.
In reality this pattern is barely recognizable.
There are many different consumers, from the President to the
weapons designer. Their needs can conflict. Consumers rarely take
the time to define their intelligence needs and even if they do so there
f t nslatinm them into
a
b
is no effective and systematic mechanism or r
ts
.
inteiligence requiremen
Therefore, intelli ;once requirements reflect what intelligence man-
agers think the consumers need, and equally important, what they
Since there are many managers
e
d
.
uc
think their organizations can pro
and little central control, each is relatively free to set his own
requirements.
Resources therefore tend to be allocated according to the priorities
and concerns of the various intelligence bureaucracies. Most intelli-
ns-the De-
ti
i
.
o
za
gence collection operations are part of other organ
partment of Defense, the Department of State-and so their require-
ments and their consumers are often the first to be served.
Collecting intelligence is not an automatic process. There are many
different kinds of intelligence, from a radar return to an indiscreet re-
mark, and the problems in acquiring it vary greatly. Information that
is wanted may not be available, or years may be required to develop
an agency or a technical device to get it. Meanwh_ ile_ntelEgence.agen-
cics collect what they can.
TT'the.'-world-of -bureaucracy, budgets, programs, procurement,
and managers, the needs of the analyst can be lost in the shuffle. There
has been an explosion in the volume and quality of raw intelligence but
capabilit.ies. As a
acity of analytical
ca
th
i
~
p
e
n
no equivalent increase
result "raw" intelligence increasingly dominates finished intelli-
,
s on a treadmill where it is difficult to
l
h
d
ve
emse
t
gence; analysts fin
do more than summarize and put in context the intelligence flowing.
in. There is little time or reward for the task of providing insight.
In the end. the consumer, particularly at the highest levels of the
.government, finds that his most important questions are not only
unanswered, but sometimes r_ot even addressed.
To some extent, all this is in the nature of things. Many ciiestions-.
cannot hm~_nswered. The world of intelligence is domin` edby uncer-
tainty and chance, and those in the intelligence bureaucracy, as else-
where in the Government, try to defend themselves against uncer-
tainties in ways which militate against efficient management and
accountability.
Beyond this is the fact that the organizations of the intelligence
community must operate in peace but be prepared for war. This has
an enormous impact on the kind of intelligence that is sought, the way
resources are allocated, and the way the intelligence community is
organized and managed.
Equally important, the instruments of intelligence have been forged
into weapons of psychological, political, and paramilitary warfare.
This has had a profound effect on the perspective and preoccupa-
tions of the leadership of the intelligence community, downgradin g
concerns for intelligence in relation to the effective execution of
operations.
These problems alone would undermine any rational scheme, but
it is also important to recognize that the U.S. intelligence community
is not the work of a single author. It has evolved from an interaction
of the above internal factors and the external forces that have shaped
America's history since the end of the Second World War.
D. EVOLUTION OF TIIE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMIUNIT
The evolution of the United States intelligence community since
World War II is part of the larger history of America's effort to
come to grips with the spread of communism and the growing power
of the Soviet Union. As the war ended, Americans were torn by hopes
for peace and fear for the future. The determination to return the
nation promptly to normal was reflected in demobilization of our
wartime military establishment. In the field of intelligence, it was
clear in President Truman's decision to dismantle the Ofce of Stra-
tegic Services, scattering its functions to the military departments and
the Department of State.
The Second World.War saw the defeat of one brand of totalitarian-
ism. A new totalitarian challenge quickly arose. The Soviet Union, a
major ally in war, became America's principal adversary in peace. The
power of fascism was in ruin but the power of communism was mobil-
ized. Not only had the communist parties in France, Italy, and Greece
emerged politically strengthened by their roles in the Resistance, but
the armies of the Soviet Union stretched across the center of Europe.
And, within four years, America's nuclear monopoly would end.
American military intelligence officers were among the first to per-
ceive the changed situation. Almost immediately after the fall of Ber-
lin to the Red Army, U.S. military intelligence sought t.o determine
Soviet objectives. Harry Rositzke, later to become, chief of the CIA's
Soviet Division, but at the time a military intelligence officer, was
despatched to Berlin by jeep. Although the Soviet Union was still an
ally, Rositzke was detained, interrogated, then ordered expelled by
the Soviet occupying forces. He managed, hou ever, to escape his So-
viet "escort" and arrive in Berlin. He described his experience to the
Committee : .
We got on the outskirts of Berlin and yelled out "Ameri-
kanski," and were highly welcomed. And as we gent over the- -
ion
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Germany well before the war, was a long walking group of
German males under 16 and over 60 who were being shep-
herded to the east by four-foot-ten, five-foot Mongolian sol-
diers with straw shoes.
The Russians also had been looting. With horses and farm
wagons they were taking away mattresses; wall fixtures,
plumbing fixtures, anything other than the frame of the
houses.
We then made our way through the rubble of Berlin-most
were one-way streets-identifying every shoulder patch we
could, and passed the Siemans-Halske works, in front of
which were 40 or 50 lend-lease trucks, on each of which was a
large shiny lathe. drill press, e.t cetera.
When we had seen enough and were all three extremely
nervous, we headed straight west from Berlin to the British
Zone. When we arrived we had an enormous amount of ex-
uberance and a real sense of relief, for the entire 36 hours had
put us in another world; The words that came to my mind
then were. "Russia moves west." a
At home, the Truman Administration was preoccupied by the tran-
sition from war to an uncertain peace. Though dispersed, and in some-
c axes (lisball(led, America's potential capabilities in the field of intelli-
gence. were considerable. There were a largo number of well-trained
former OSS ol,)eration officers, the military had developed it remark-
able caparit for cryntologic intellinenc.e (the breaking of codes) and
cnuunn!:ir?ntio])s intelligence (COMTNT) . there was also it cadre of
foruiei? O SS iiitelli_'once, analysts both within the government and in
the ar;uleinic eouunnnit.v.
];. (1 Ii,. Oki(7ixs or TII1?; POSTWAR IN-,n r, ,TCn NCP Co1nrUNITY'
1W'it]i the experiences of World War II and particularly Pearl IIar-
l,or still vivid. Chore WAS It recognition within the government that,
nnf. vithstandingg demobilization, it was essential to create a central-
ized body to collate. and coordinate intelligence information. There
was also a need to eliminate frictions between competing military
intelligence services. Although there was disagreement about the struc-
ture and authority of the nostwar intelligence service, Presiclont Tru-
man and his senior advisers concluded that, unlike the. OSS, this
centralized body should be civilian in character.
The military resisted this 1lldgment. Virtually all of America's
competing intelligence assets were in the armed services. Then.- as
now, the military considered an intelligence capability essential in
wartime and equally important, in time of peace to be prepared for
military crises. Thus, the services were strongly opposed to having
their authority over intelligence diminished. In contrast, factions
within the State Department were reluctant to accept any greater
responsibility or role in the field of clandestine intelligence..
Six months after V-.T Day, and three months after lie hod dis-
banded OSS, President. Truman established the Central Intelligence
' Harry Iiozitzlce testimonv, 10/31/75. p. 7.
` For an organizational history of the CIA, see Chapter VT.
Group (CIG). CIG was the direct predecessor of the CIA. It re-
ported to the National Intelligence Authority, a body consisting of
the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and their representatives. CIG
had it brief existence. It never was able. to overcome the constraints
and institutional resistances found in the Department of State and
the armed services.
The National Security Act of 1947 1 was passed on July 26,1947. The
Act included, in large part, the recommendations of a report prepared
for Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal by New York investment
broker Ferdinand Eberstadt. Though largely concerned with the crea-
tion of the National Security Council (NSC) and the unification of the
military services within the Department of Defense, the Act also
created it Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and a Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The powers of the DCI and the CIA
were an amalgam of careful limits on the DCI's authority over the
intelligence community and an open-ended mission for the CIA itself.
The power of the DCI over military and diplomatic intelligence was
confined to "coordination." At the same time, however, the Agency
was authorized to carry out unspecified "services of common concern"
and, more importantly, could "carry out such other functions and
duties" as the National Security Council might direct.
Nowhere in the 1947 Act was the CIA explicitly empowered to col-
lect intelligence or intervene secretly in the affairs of other nations.
But the elastic phrase, "such other functions," was used by successive
presidents to move the Agency into espionage, covert action, para-
military operations, and technical intelligence collection. Often con-
ceived as having granted significant peacetime powers and flexibility
to the CIA and the NSC, the National Security Act actually legislated
that authority to the. President.
The 1947 .Act provided no explicit charter for military intelligence.
The charter and mission of military intelligence activities was estab-
lished either by executive orders, such as the 01 10 creating the National
Security Agency in 1952, or various National Security Council di-
rectives. These National Security Council Intelligence Directives
(NSCII)'s) were the principal means of establishing the roles and
functions of all the various entities in the intelligence community.
They composed the so-called "secret charter" for the CIA. However
,
])lost of them also permitted "departmental" intelligence activities,
and in this way also provided tllo executive charter for the intelligence
activities of the State Department and the Pentagon. IIowever, the
intelligence activities of the Department of Defense remained with
the military rather than with the new Defense Department civilians.
At. the end of the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to continue.
the inter-Service coordinating mechanism-the Joint. Intelligence
Committee-which had been created in 1942. With the 1647 Act and
t he establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it working level intelli-
gence operation was created in the Joint Staff, known as the Joint
Intelligence Group, or.T-2.
The structure created by the 1947 Act and ensuing NSCTD's was
hi:rlilV decentralized. The task of the CIA and the Director of Central
` Sec Chapter VII for an analysis of the 1047 Act.
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Intelligence was to "coordinate" the intelligence output of all the vari-
Oiis intelligence collection programs in the military and the Depart-
ment of State. The CIA and its Director had little power to act itself,
but the potential was there.
F. Tklr Ri.-sroxsu TO THE SOVIET TIIREAT
Immediately after its establishment, the CIA and other elements
of the. intelligence community responded to the external threats fac-
inz- the United States.
-The threat of war in Europe. Following the war there was a dis-
tinct possibility of a Soviet assault on Western Europe. Communist
regimes had been established in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Biil-
aria. Czechoslovakia went Communist in 1948 through a coup sup-
r- by the Russian Army. There was a. Russian-backed civil war in
Greece. And. above all, there was the presence of the Soviet Army in
Eastern Europe and the pressure on Berlin.
In light of these developments, U.S. policvmakers came to the con;
elusion that outright war with the Soviet Union was possible.. The U.S.
intelligence community responded accordingly. The CIA assumed the
erpinna,re task, ruining agents and organizing "stay-behind networks"
in the event time Soviets roiled west.. Agents. mostly refunees. were sent
into the East. to report. on Soviet forces and, in particular, any moves
That sihr.rmallcd war. The U.S. went so far as to establish contact with
1'l