PRESS CLIPPINGS-1979
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CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9
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Document Creation Date:
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Publication Date:
December 8, 1979
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ARTICLEAn,;U WASHINGTON STAR
ON PAGE 8 DECEMBER 1979
,,.Cord Meyer
soviet radio and American silence
Stirred by the growth. of the millions. Although there to condemn the use of Rus. events abroad they may be
public support for increased have been a few defections, sian helicopter gunships less willing to play with fire
defense expenditures. some 75 of the world's Communist and napalm against the Mos. in the Middle East.
Carter advisers are urging Parties still owe their pri- lem villagers in Afghanis- Similarly, the bland VOA
the president to take advan- mary allegiance to Moscow. tan. No one protested the broadcasting to Cuba needs
tage of the groundswell to Heavily subsidized, they are proven use of Russian nerve to be stiffened with hard
strengthen the. American disciplined conveyors of. the gas against the Meo tribes is news of the heavy Cuban
ability-to influence opinion Soviet propaganda message Laos by the Soviets' Viet- casualties in Angola to in-
abroad. ' _* _' -with the advantage of oper- namese- ~ .allies. If these crease the domestic price to
The gross disparity be- acing from within non-com- atrocities had been commit,. Castro of his African adven-
tween the funds the Soviets munist societies. ted by the U.S.. Moscow--- tures.
spend on propaganda- work In the, U.S:' this=outpour- would- have-orchestratedate -The Cyrus __Vaace-Mat
and the U.S. allocation, is- ing of Russian propaganda- Worldwide outcry. shall Shulman axis in the
wider proportionately than has virtually no effect. Few -State Department is-reluc-
the military spending gap -Americans bother to listen Faced with this evidence tant - to see even these
and potentially as danger- itwice to the obviously of-Soviet-Cuban ability to modest improvements made.
ous. But compared.to the biased voice of Radio Mos- manipulate Third World They have consistently
price of modem weaponry, cow, and Soviet magazines. Opinion, some White House -relied. on discreet diplo-
the cost of the long-overdue in English have to be given aides are, urging a selective matic protests to Ambassa-
improvements- needed in away for lack of buyers. - concentration on weak spots dor Dobrynin to restrain
official U.S. information pro-But in the far reaches of in_ the Soviet _ protective Soviet misbehavior - with-
grams is modest. ., : the Third World, where armor. They are not advo- ? remarkably little effect. And
According to conserva-. widespread illiteracy makes cating a mindless return to they have leaned over back.
tive CIA estimates- the radio the prime means of the rhetoric of the cold war wards to improve the
gremlin is reckoned to communication, the steady but a realistic recognition chances for SALT by down-
s-ending more t as S2 bil 'denigration of American that the Soviets have never playing evidence. of Soviet.
lion annua on it - motives by Moscow's broad. accepted a truce in ideologi- interventions.
gan a a ara u The U.S casts has a cumulative im- cal warfare as part of their The other source of oppo?
spends about a third as. . pact. The- consistent por- :definition of detente. sition to- any expansion of .
much. in the words of a re- trayal of American society These Carter advisers the U.S. information pro.
cent congressional study, as a capitalist monster bent specifically urge that the gram is the Office of Man-
the Soviet Union has be- on imperialist aggression congressionally-funded agement and Budget. Car-
come the world's leading wears away favorable atti- Radio Liberty broadcasting ter's bookkeepers ridicule
international radio broad- tudes- toward the U.S. and to Soviet Central Asia be 'contentions that a S per cent
caster, beaming more than creates a foundation of dis- strengthened-by the addi- increase in the information
2,000 program hours a, week trust on which local dema- tion of powerful new trans- effort may be as necessary
in 82 languages over 28S gogues like Khomeini can mitters.-The present Radio as an increase in defense
shortwave transmitters to later build their edifice of Liberty broadcasts in the spending. -
nearly every country. hate. Turkic languages to the 40 But there was a glint of
Toorchestrate its world-' million Soviet Moslems in steel in Carter's perform-
wide -propaganda cam- Behind the shield of this Central Asia are so weak ance at his last press confer-
paigns, the Soviets secretly., propaganda offensive, the..,they_;cannotbe.heard above ence. The president can now
subsidize 13 separate inter.;-* have been' getting the jamming. Once the count on a. responsive Con-
national front organiza- away with murder. No neu- Soviet leaders realize they gress if he asks for the
tions.like the World Federa- tral country raised its voice can. no. longer protect. their modest amounts needed to
tion of Trade Unions. Each 'at the-meeting . of the non- restless Moslem population make the American voice
claims mass membership in - aligned natiotl-in? Havana from.- accurate ne%y- -of more clearly heard.
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ARTICLE APPEARM
ON PAGE
NEWSWEEK
17 DECKER 1979
2151'S All NX
The spindly towers of oil rigs surround the
Soviet city of Baku like some mammoth
metallic forest, sprouting on stilts from the
shallow Caspian seabed and ringing the
rocky hills that rise from the shore. Years
ago, Baku's spidery network of pipelines
and causeways supplied two-thirds of the
Soviet Union's petroleum. But Caspian Ba-
sin production has long since peaked: acces-
sible fields are nearly exhausted, and the
Russians do not have the technology to tap
more difficult reserves. Similar problems
plague Soviet energy efforts elsewhere. For
the oil-consuming West, the implications
are alarming: if the world's largest oil pro-
ducer cannot sustain its output, the interna-
tional oil crunch is sure to grow worse.
barrels a day. Already, in fact, Moscow has
been avoiding any promises that it will step
up supplies to meet its satellites' future
demands. That could compel the Eastern
bloc to turn to the world market, generating
new competition for OPEC supplies. But,
most Western analysts are convinced that i
the Soviet Union simply cannot afford to
cut back on the I million barrels a day it
now exports to the West. More than 40 per
cent of the nation's hard currency comes
from such sales. Rather than lose that cash,
which is badly needed for purchases of food
and- technology, the Soviet Government
might decide to shortchange energy con-
sumers at home.
Ironically, the Soviet Union may be far
richer in oil than anyone had
realized. A comprehensive new
analysis by Petro Studies, a
Swedish research firm specializ-
ing in Soviet petroleum, sets
proven Soviet reserves at 150 bil-
lion barrels--five times greater
than estimates by the CIA.
REMOT! WAST!St But to take
advantage of their oil wealth, the
Soviets will have to solve some
formidable logistical problems.
About 90 per cent of future on-
shore supplies lie east of the Ural
Mountains in the remote wastes
of Siberia and the deserts of Ka-
zakhstan. Yet 80 per cent of all
Soviet energy is consumed thou-
sands of miles away in the west-
ern part of the country. Devel-
oping the. new fields requires
huge investments in transporta-
tion and equipment. And so far,
development has not been very
efficient. In western Siberia,
about 30 smaller fields have been
found near the giant Samotlor
field, which has apparently
reached its peak production.
But say
S Bruce McK
Everett
.
,
Caspian Sea wells: Technological troubles ahead , the U.S. Department of Ener-
There is considerable disagreement
among experts over just how dangerous the
Soviet predicament may be. The U.S. Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency predicts that pro-
duction will peak this year or next at about
12 million barrels a day-and that it could
drop by one-third by the mid-1980s. Some
recent developments suggest that the CIA's
gloomy scenario could come true. Last
month, for example, an economic report to
the Supreme Soviet acknowledged that
1979 production will fall 59 million barrels
short of the Kremlin's target-and that the
projection for 1980 output had been dialed
back by 300,000 barrels a day.
Serious production problems, would
probably force the Soviet Union to cut
exports to its Eastern-bloc allies, which
now depend on the U.S.S.R.. for 2 million
gy's Soviet expert, "the Russians
have been consistently behind plan in get-
ting their equipment in."
The Soviets also lag in deepwater-drilling
technology. Thus, in the Caspian Sea, where
many of the old shallow wells are nearly
depleted, an estimated 3.7 billion barrels of
oil and 35 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
remain untapped farther offshore.
FOREIGN AID- For help, the Soviet Union is
relying heavily on Japan and the industrial-
ized West. A consortium of Japanese com-
panies directed exploration of the Sea of
Okhotsk off the Soviet east coast-and
discovered a giant new field. And Soviet
workers are now assembling a $50 million
semisubmersible rig to probe the Caspian's
depths. Its designers: an American-Finnish ,
consortium headed by Armco, Inc. Some
analysts think that the Soviets will spend
S24 billion over the nest decade for offshore
equipment alone--and that it is in Ameri-
ca's best interest to provide as much as
possible.
But it will besome timebeforesuch invest-
ments pay off in the form of new supplies.
Meanwhile, Soviet policymakers are stress-
ing domestic conservation measures and are
trying to hasten development of natural gas
and nuclear powerto replace oil useat home.
The Kremlin may even accept a slightly
lower rate of economic growth to keep ex-
porting oil. If such policies don't work,
however, the world oil market could soon
have thirsty new customers putting greater
pressureon prices and supplies.
MERRILL SIfEILS with WILLIAM E. SCH?MDT
in Moscow and W ILLIA:S4 J. COOK in Washington
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bonuses to workers, whose typical wage .of
to 160 rubies monthly is roughly in line
he national average. Earnings also are
used for buying new equipment and are ap-
plied to such projects as buying interests in
various nurseries around town, to guarantee
places for workers' children.
L elia's business success is shared-engi-
neered not only by its own workers (96% of
them women) but also by a sprawl of offi-
cial agencies. Many of them are: like Lelia.
under the Ministry of Light Industry; and
most of them are highly specialized.
Thus, when Lelia wants to. buy wool. it
goes through one government. unit: when it
wants to sell dresses, it goes through an-
other. For guidance on fashion trends, it
consults one.. official organization; for pric-
ing policy.it'consults another. It wages are
the question-then is yet another body .-It
Lelia needs new equipment, there Is an
agency'-.to do the buying'although.Lelja
foots the bill.
What's more.. Lelia-doesn't-always deal
directly'wtth the.-major decision-makers.
Gosplan, for instahce.? is an extremely itn':
porsant organization: bat Mrs. Hamra says
Lelia usually-.rloestr't work directly with-it.
rather. the' Ministry of Light Industry us&
ally deals with,the planners on Lelia's bet,
half.
The government's control of all the a
sal economic levers has its positive sides It
is.the reason.. for - instance.. that there isY ah
most no unemployment In-the U.S.M-It 13
also why the state can keep prices low on
such items. as. foodstuffs (which generally
are cheap, though supplies are spotty) and
baby clothes., -
:But, too. there are difficulties. Authority
Is ` fragmented, and one agency frequently
doesn't know- what another one it .doing.
Nonetheless; decision making within each
fragment- is highly ,centralized, and the cen-
ter often is tniles%L or continents-away from
the production site. Despite recurrent "re-
forms," the system and the bureaucr_ acy re_-.
main resistant to change. -
Like most far'Aung systems, this one is.
rife with inconsistencies. For instance, ' the-
government recently raised the price of fur
by 5Wo.. but it didn't increase the price of
Lelia's -coats with fur trimmings: Such a
change in raw-materials costs can "really
make it hard to follow the fixed price." Mrs.
Hazova says; but Lelia- hasn't' any{ choice.
Now, it is trying. to find cheaper materials
or figure out how else to cut costs. T~:?::.
Nonetheless, the system is more flexible
than many outsiders- realize. There is room-
for give-and-take between supplier and cus
tamer or between planners and producers.:
Indeed: Ts '' l people at. Lelia- tell:. it,' the;
gi e-andetake nuns' through' tile-: entire' pro=
cess
It all begins some 18 months before the
clothes, come oft the.-line . at'' Lelia..: with.
something called the Vltnius House of Fash-
ion-a unit of the Ministry of Light Industry
charged with keeping abreast of thelatest in
looks. The House of Fashion consults around
-with the- ministry. with ` local factories,
with. retailers-and then proposes. a. Hue-of,
clothing to be made in Lithuania. Those pro-
posals bubble through the system, and grad-
ually a production plan for Lelia and the'
other area producers takes shape. - ?
"Sometimes the ministry requests some-
thing that's impossible." Mrs. Hazova says.
"They might ask us to make a suit for
which we would have to change all our pro-
duction lines for suits. So we have to send
back the plan and say. 'We're sorry, we
can't do it'-but they can do it at another
factory that is situated in another place."
- By,May of each year, the Lelia factory
and the ministry are "generally agreed" on
the next year's plan. Mrs. Hazova says. By
year's end, the plan Is established in detail.
As the.production year unfolds, there might.
be minor adjustments In each quarter's
plan. (A. typical.. plan..calla, for. a certain
number of men's suits in- a particular styte-
and at a given price; it Is up to the factory
and its customers to work out such matters
as sizes. .
Once the plan is broadly set, Lelia gets in
touch-with its suppliers and customers. One
way it reaches. those outside Lithuania is
through trade fairs. Within the republic. It
has longstanding relationships with a num-
berof enterprises; it has two regular wool
suppliers, for example, and seven major re-
tail customers-although even with them, it
usually must work' through official tnterrtie-
diary agencies. (Nonetheless, the retailers
often suggest-and get-small changes in
Lelia's styles to suit their own tastes.)
Like producers everywhere, Lelia Is sub-
ject to the whims of consumers. who some-
times don't like its styles. Last year, one
item-a loose-fitting 'woman's coat lmit in
wool - bombed in - Lithuania; so Lelia
shipped its unsold output to another part of
the country, where the coat was a big suc-
Undaunted. Lelia's designers kept work-
ing with the style and turned It Into a more
tailored coat. This year, they Introduced the
revised version in Lithuania. It was an im-
mediate. hit. . . - : .. -- .. .
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1RTICT. !".PP" n
ei PAGE
LOS ANGELES TIMES
10 DECEMBER 1979
e
+Jf ' ra t Malaise: AN o ,Easy C
St?' is no respecterof ideological.bounda-;{? year:'Meanwhile; production in existing oilfields is:
res. In the Soviet Union. too, economic growth declining:::
is slowing. Production goals for such key items The jury. is still out on the ' American.. CIA's
as oil,-coal, steel and foodstuffs are not being met:-,- forecast that- the Soviet Union wiff. become a net
Hoped-for gains in productivity are not materializ im ort er o f o
il by 1982, but it does app ear a that
in,,. Consumer.. shortages persist.: And prices are overall production is pe g, and i gra
going up-. 1 Bunn t s.
Columbia : University's Research Institute on ...- few days ago, Soviet planning officials coned-
International Change, in its annual Global Political ed that 1979 production goals have not been met for
Assessment, concludes that the. Soviet Union's a whole- list of important items, including oil, coal,.
econonse performance in 1979 probably has been fertilizers, plastics, rolled steel and many consumer
"the worst in all the .years of Leonid. L Brezhnev's items. Targets for -1984 are, in many cases; being {
leadership.' %..' 'r. , . r ! .- - ;; '- scaled back tomore-modest levels..
The roots `of the Soviet economic malaise are too The CIA now expects the Soviet economy to w
fundamental to be cured easily. by less than 3% annually for the next few years;
The Kremlin's central planners devote 25% of'. .and says the growth rate could: fall to less than,
national 'investment funds to agriculture, a far "if worst-case analyses of the Soviet energy siua on
bigger.slice_than farming gets in the United States, -: groverue.:.
and -a disproportionate- one-quarter of the, Soviet The Soviet system has away
of muddling through
workforce works-in the countryside.. Yet there are--. economic ? problems. without the - necessity* of
chronic shortages of meat and fresh vegetables, and fundamental change. And. it could happen.. again.
the-; Soviet Union` is compelled to make massive Many experts are convinced, however, that, this
grain purchases from the West. -y time is different.
. Bad weather is obviously an important part of the -. To quote the Columbia. study, "The ? post-Stalin-
problem. But so are the.inefficiencies and d isincen == leadership is not used to, nor is the Soviet Union as
tives that appear to be endemic to Soviet commu- . it exists today prepared to deal with, those kinds-of
nism._ It's worth noting -that; more than 60 years emergencies confronting them in the 1980a"
after..the Bolshevik revolution,,. the big state and : Some.-- solutions, such as decollectivization- of.
collective farina produce only two-thirds of Russia's agriculture and adoption of fundamental reforms-in
food. The rest. comes from privately tilled plots.that. ? industrial planning and management, are likely to' i
make.uprjust.1/% of arable land.:.. remain ideologically out of bounds.
- -. ~r
Thanks in great part to demographic factors, the Military, spending, which exceeds that' of. the.':
Soviet economy faces an increasingly serious labor United States in both relative and absolute -terms,
shortage Whereas an average of more than 2.mil-. could be cut. And that is the option that Western
lion new workers entered the labor force each year governments, to. the best of their abilities, should
during the 1970s, this will fall off to about.300,000 , . try to encourage. But a large enough ieduction to do
per year by the mid-1980& s = y _ much good would require a virtual revolution in the
Making things worse, a disproportionate number Soviet Union's internal politics, where the military=
of-tfie new entrants into the labor force will come industrial complex. is far. more powerful than in
from the warmer, non-Russian regions of the south. , ` democratic societies. They may not. be - easily persuaded- to. work.. in..-: The Kremlin may, in the end, find. itself unable to,.
Siberia and other unattractive areas where they, will make-any of the hard choices and settle into an
be-mostneeded.=%~., tendedperiodofdebilitatingslowgrowth :': -- _,
-Soviet industry is also afflicted by overcentralized ' Unfortunately, 'as current Russian mischief-
planning-. and by -bureaucratic managers. who. are _ making . in Irani reminds , there is -another,
averse to risk-taking and resistant. to technological uncomfortable possibility.- -
innovation. And then there is the energy situation: If the. *,energy: squeeze does worsen. and bring
!.The Soviet Union has vast deposits of oil and.coal; : ?'. economic stagnation in its wake,. the Soviet Union
but these lie mostly.beneath Siberia and .the rough might come to see a grab for the Middle Eastern
and perpetually icy.waters of the Arctic and North oilfields: as -the:-least: unattractive. of -alternatives
Pacifies far from. the populous industrial centers. of ':Because:.vital-. Western -interests would' .be so '
European Russia; Transportation and other. bottle-' -'obviously threatened by such a.move, that.would bey
necks will' delay, full-scale development for~many bad news
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C- ac,--~S
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ON FAGEJ~t
WASHINGTON POST
13 DECEMBER 1979
Jack Anderson
Brzeziiiski Tactic on Ct" Iris Vance
For the gentlemanly Cyrus R. Vance,
words like "counterproductive" and "in-
appropriate" are as scathing as he ever
allows himself to use. Both words ap-
pear in an angry memo, which he has
addressed to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the
national security affairs chief.
This is the latest development in a
seething, behind-theacenes controversy
that I revealed Oct. 31. I reported that
Brzezinski had . drafted a top secret
memorandum outlining a three-phase
program to put the Soviets and Cubans
in their place. It could only be described
as a blueprint for reviving the Cold
War.
As part of the scheme, Brzezinski or-
dered a questionnaire sent to all U.S-
ambassadors requesting data on Cuban
activities in their areas for use in a
worldwide propaganda campaign.
The questionnaire, stamped Top
Secret Umbra, was opposed by Vance.
The secretary of state believes that the
United States should seek detente, not
confrontation, with the Soviets. Two-
thirds of the ambassadors also protested
the instructions, an unprecedented
show of opposition.
But Brzezinski would not be dis-
suaded. He wouldn't even allow the Ira-
nian crisis to interfere. Nov. 7, three
days after the American hostages had
been seized in Iran, the ambassadors
were reminded not to miss the Nov. 15
deadline for filing their Cuban reports.
This was too much for Vance. He
dashed off a sharp memo intended for
Brzezinski's eyes only. "The continued
U.S. diplomatic emphasis on the Cuban-
Soviet relationship is counterproductive
and particularly inappropriate at this
time," declared the secretary of state.
`The U.S. can best secure the coopera-
tion of Third World countries both in
the long run and during this crisis," he
suggested pointedly, "by recognizing
that they have legitimate national con-
cerns entirely apart from the U.S.Soviet
relationship."
The responses from the ambassadors,
meanwhile, flooded into the State De-
partment by secret cable from diplo-
matic posts all over the world. There
was no enthusiasm in the messages. The
ambassadors to anti-communist coun-
tries reported that a new propaganda
campaign would be preaching to the
converted. The ambassadors to nonalig-
ned countries warned that they had to
keep a low profile.
Ambassador Marilyn Johnson cabled
from Togo, for example, that the tiny
African nation "doesn't look at the
U.S.S.R.-Cuban relationship as nefar-
ious" and "doesn't believe the U.S. is
threatened by Cuba."
She concluded tersely. "Economic
and social development can keep Togo
more moderate; propaganda campaigns
against a Third World nation will not
. The ante for strong anti-Soviet pod-
tions is not words, but economic and
military support."
From the neighboring nation. of
Benin. Charge d'Affaires John Davidson
reported: "It is not productive to under-
take an effort to get out the facts about
the extent of Cuban dependence on
Soviet aid.... Benin has little reason for
focusing on the darker side of the affili-
ation between Cuba and the Russians."
Brzezinski's Cold War campaign has
aroused widespread revolt in the for-
eign policy establishment. Vance has
complained privately that the Brze-
zinski plan would "reverse 15 years of
American diplomacy," sources told my
reporter Ron McRae. But President Car-
ter is going ahead with it.
Iranian Threats - Incredibly, some
Iranians in the United States, far from
keeping a low profile during the Tehran
hostage situation, have been passing out
literature urging acts of violence against
Americans.
Among the terrorist suggestions are
attacks with knives and razor blades on
Jewish women, aimed at preventing the
reproduction of Zionists.
The FBI knows who is responsible for
these threats, and has them under con-'
stant surveillance. But because our laws
forbid the arrest of someone who makes
general threats without taking action,
the police are helpless.
Meanwhile, the Senate's sergeant-
at-arms has advised senators to change
their personalized license plates and
avoid routine routes on their way to : i
work. And additional metal detectors
are being installed at entrances to the
Senate office buildings.
Under The Dome - Robert Strauss,
Carter's reelection campaign chief, ex-
pects a bitter fight with Teddy Kennedy
for the Democratic nomination, and he's
not all that sure that the president will .
come out on top.
"We may not win," he told a recent
meeting of party leaders. "But we're
going to fight like hell."
? Susan's confusin' the U.S. Mint as
well as the public. A Gainesville, Fla.,
resident recently ordered a mint set of
the new Susan B. Anthony dollars, and -I
received instead a mint set of quarters. :1
The 25cent piece is close enough in size
and shape to be mistaken often for the
controversial coin dollar.
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DETROIT NEWS
5 DECEMBER 1979
oSt em ~b asses
pkovide cover
nor own !Bd pI(a s
By HUGH McCANN
News Staff Writs
'the primary purpose of an embassy is to provide
an official link between nations. But embassies
have 'traditionally also served to collect informa-
tion about the host nation.
Some of this information is public or is available
on request from the host country; other informa-
tion is secret and is known as "intelligence." Indi-
viduals who gather intelligence, or who recruit
others to collect intelligence, have always been
known as spies.
Such intelligence gathering usually is taken as a
matter of course and discovery of spying attempts
by a "diplomat" results in that fndividual's expul-
sion. But in the case of Iran, where students have
taken Americans hostage in the embassy, a differ-
ent response has arisen.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini says that the
Americans were involved in spying and will be
tried on that charge.
BACKING UP their complaints, students besieging
ehran produced a captured
the U.S. Embassy in Tehran'
document last Saturday purporting to back up
charges that embassy personnel were involved in
spying.
The document, dated Aug. 2 and marked "Se-
cret,"purports to be a communication from Lowell
B. Laingen, the embassy's deputy chief in Tehran,
to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Washington.
The message discusses a request for "cover" for
two men - Malcolm Kalp and William Daugherty
- who were on "SRF assignments."
"There is absolutely no way of guaranteeing
that the document is genuine," said ,a spokesman
for the Department of State. "There are many ways
that fakes can easily be made."
In the intelligence-gathering community, the.
term "cover" refers to an identity and/or occupa-
tion that an intelligence agent adopts so that he
may go about his real mission undisturbed by local
police or internal-security forces.
ASKED WHAT "SRF" stands for, the state depart-
ment spokesman said that it is "an internal defini-
tion within the State Department."
The second paragraph of the message reads, in
part."... We are starting from a clean slate in SRF
coverage at this mission, but with regard also for
the great sensitivity locally to any hint of CIA ac-
tivity, it is of the highest importance that cover be
the best we can come up with. _
Hehft there is no question as to the need for
second and third secretary titles for these two offi-
cers. We must have it.
"We should, however, hold to the present total
of four SRF officer assignments for the foreseeable
future, keeping supporting staff as sparse as possi-
ble as well, until we see how things go here,
"We are making effort to limit knowl
d
e
ge
within (the embassy) of all SRF assignments; that
effort applies particularly to Daugherty, pursuant
to (the) new program of which he is a product and
about which I have been informed..."
-
SEVERAL FORMER employes of the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency have written of the way in
which the agency operates overseas. They say that
the top CIA man in a foreign country - he is
known as the Chief of Station - often has the
"cover" of a special assistant to the U.S. ambassa-
dor or of the embassy's second or third secretary.
Under such an arrangement,, the CIA station is
inside the embassy building but insulated from
the workings of the rest of the embassy - except
! in the matter of operating communication facili-
ties with the U.S.
Ex-CLA man Victor Marchetti, writing in 72ze
CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, says that the CIA
station handles all electronic communication,
whether it is between the CIA station and CIA
headquarters in Langley, Va.; or between the
embassy and State Department headquarters in
Washington, D.C.-
For certain messages that the ambassador does-
n't want the CIA station chief to read, the State
Department has its own special codes - called
"Roger channels," says Marchetti.
THE MESSAGE produced by the Iran students is
identified as a "Roger channel" communication.
In Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelli.
gence, another one-time member of the CIA, Peter
de Silva, says: "More often than not, however,
'cover' would be relatively nominal and consist of
the agency station being a part of an official
American entity, such as an embassy.
"Presidential directives were explicit in de-
scribing the subardination of the CLA station chief
to the American ambassador, if cover were to be
established within the embassy.
"Furthermore, the ambassador had full rights to
know'anything and everything being done by an
agency station in the country of its assignment; it
only remained for the ambassador to set limits on
what he wanted to know and what.he didn't care
to hear about."
According to"former OIA man John Stockwell,
author of In Search of Enemies, "85 percent of all
CIA field case officers already are well known in
their local communities because of their liaison
relationships with foreign police, their own open
admissions of CIA identities, their free-wheeling,
high-profile lifestyles, and the gossip and conspic-
uous clannishness of their wives.
"In Abidjan (India), my first post, all CIA station
personnel were listed in the embassy's
unclassified, public telephone book as the 'Politi-
cal 11 Section.' 'Political 1 Section' was legitimate
State Department personnel."
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THE NEW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE
13 December 1979
Scholars. Foresee a New Age of Terrorism
By BLANCHE CORDELIA ALSTON
A group of experts on terrorism sug-
gested yesterday that the taking of
American hostages in Iran could be Indic-
ative of a new age of terrorism.
Yonah Alexander, the director of the
State University of New York's Institute
for Studies in International Terrorism,
said that the number of "significant
wherever they go because the host coun.
try cannot protect diplomats"
And if a country cannot send diplaa.~
mats, he said, "the fabric to resolve dis-I
putes peacefu ly" is weakened
Mr. Fin r rai ed President . Cairter's
cautious a roac to the crisis and bIs~
is on not to use torce to T
the three] c, su=m ted that "selective miiita as
1970 to 1,511 in 1978. In first
months of this year alone, he said, there ton-- CIO USSCL e a sail at t e to u-
had been 765 such acts. ence community "IS the key to the ter.
r
Of the 6,294 incidents noted between roT r
e d reactivate, strengthen and
1970 and 1979, Mr. Alexander said, more increase t e use o an e a td
ant
had takep place in the
than 60
ete
f n nut w re :n countries our n-
three P
past
.
year
s.
He said that about 45 percent of all ter Ceres are at stake," he Suggest . "Ter-
7 rorists acts were directed against busi-1 rorism is ous more is no raj
ness. "Future incidents will be much memedy for it. The Iran pattern will be
more costly in terms of protecting people repeated elsewhere unless we find some
and property," he said. leverage to use against a hostile regime."!
? Mr. Alexander spoke at a news confer- Part of that leverage, he said, might bei
ence sponsored jointly by the Institute for! for United States military forces to seize'
Studies in International Terrorism and i strategic oil terminals In the Persian Gulf
the City University of New York's Ralph as a bargaining tool. .
Bunche Institute on the United Nations.
Seymour M. Finger, president of the
Ralph Bunche Institute, said that the tak-
ing of hostages in Teheran was "a much
more serious threat to internati
peace and security than wehave known."
Diplomats Called Sitting Docks
"The Government of Iran has endorsed
the taking of hostages and has not carried
out its obligation of international law t
,.protect foreigners," he said at the new
conference at the New York City office o
the State University of New York, 60 East,
42d Street. "Diplomas are sitting ducks)
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AgTICLR LFPZ!PD
I S
oy PaG3
THE WASHINGTON POST
14 December 1979
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
Of the Soviets, Skeptical
The sudden upsurge of formal but
unpublicized complaints about Soviet
conduct now being conveyed by
President Carter's top diplomatic of-
ficials to Ambassador Anatolly Do-
brynin reveals a startling change In
Jimmy.Carter that was unimaginable
a few months age
The pres eat Is no longer a coo-
vinced partisan of the view that Rus?
like his own United States, plays
politics by rules. loose but roughly
The latest evidence of this change
is a request for "clarification" of the
Kremlin's stunning, still unan-
nounced incursion into Afghanistan
by at least one and probably two bat-
talions of organized military units.
The use of these troops, belonging to
a crack. Soviet airborne division,
marks the first time since World War
II that Moscow has intervened in a
Third World country with organized-
units under Soviet command, and',
Carter is demanding an explanation.
Carter's growing disillusion with
the Russians also expressed itself In a
private complaint direct from Secre-
tary of State Cyrus Vance to Dobry-
nin on Dec. 6. Vance was angry Over'
evidence of new Soviet nuclear test
ban cheating.
Lumped with Carter's dismay over
earlier Soviet rulatreak ng, such as its
outrageous radio campaign to Incite
violence against Americans In Iran
and its interference with food supplies
to starving Cambodians, these new sig-
nals of presidential anger hint that
Carter might aced belatedly
-be running out of patience.
Carter is reported by White House
insiders to have. been mightily
buoyed up by popular acclaim for his
handling of the Iran crisis. These inti-
mates believe the president's new
show of relative realism . toward
Moscow's superpower rulebreakint
has a psychological root in his spec-
tacular climb in the polls. This rein-
forces his disenchantment over
growing Soviet truculence in doing
what It wants, whatever various tree-
.ties and rules of conduct say.
Vane's confrontation with Dobry
nin on Dec. 6 was long overdue, con-
sidering unambiguous evidence of
repeated Soviet violations of the 1974
Threshold Test Ban Treaty. This sets.
a i54kiloton limit on underground'
nuclear tests.
The United States has obtained
"hard!' information that the Soviets
exploded two underground tests this
year not yet reported by the Carter
administration. It was those two tests
-each with an explosive force of be-
tween 180 and 210 kilotons-that
Vance wanted Dobrynin to expla:
Dobrynin predictably denied there
had been any violation.
That failed to satisfy Vance. He
called on Dobrynin to supply U.S. scien-
tists with the full geologic data on rock
formations surrounding the test site
and with geographic coordinates so
they could more precisely measure the
size of the two unannounced blasts.
At least one additional 1979 under-
ground test is known to have exceeded
the 154kiloton legal limit (by at least 50
percent). Three 1978 explosions also
broke the ceiling. Yet, until Carter or-
dered Vance to lodge his formal com-
plaint, nothing whatever had been
said to.the Russians. The American
people have never been told.
The TTBT is onl one of three trea-
ties that U.S. InteMence agencies
have to Carter t e Russians have
broken. One t ese, as we have re.
previously, is the 1963 Atmos-
pheric Test Ban Treaty, systematically
violated in 1978 and once again this
year, on Oct 19, when an underground
test "vented" its fallout Into the atmos-
phere through carelessness.
The third treaty that is now the tar-
get of a formal Carter administration
charge of violation is theanti-ballistic i
missile agreement Despite the spe-
cific proviso in Article 6 of that,
treaty,' which forbids antiaircraft I
radar to be used to track incoming
.ballistic missiles (rather than air-
planes), the United States charged a'
possible violation by the Soviets last
October, at the height of the crisis
.over Soviet combat troops in Cuba.
The radars used were the most mod-
ern model associated with SAM10
antiaircraft missiles,
Yet last. July, when U.S. intelli-
gence first reported Soviet testing of
SAM10 radars at Sary-Shagan in cen-
tral Russia to track incoming ballistic
missiles, not a word about violations
was said to the Russians. That failure
infuriated defense-oriented senators
who knew about the Soviet ma
neuver, including Republican Sens.
John Tower, Gordon Humphrey and
other members of the Armed Serv-
ices Committee. They are now lob-
bying Carter to make ,a diplomatic ;
issue of the' violations and let the
American people in on this secret:
the Russians have been playing fast'
and loose with vital treaties on which
the future security of both countries
could depend.
Whether or not Carter takes'that ad
vice, his transformation from a be-
liever in Soviet good intentions to a 1
chastened skeptic, while leaving room
for further growth, is a healthy sign of
political maturity that fits well with
his new showing in the polls.
o1Y7 Th 4Ent.iwta..,rnc.
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ARTICLE t~PEEAARFED -4-
Q.'( PAAGE
WASHINGTON STAR
8 DECEER 1979
TheNafioff!
Supposed CIA Agents Identified
Covert Action Information Bulletin, a periodi-
cal which says it is out to destroy the CIA, yester-
day published the names of 14 men and a woman it
identified as CIA-agents-under cover in various
U.S. embassies and consulates around the world.
It also gave the name of a 15th said to have been
the chief of station in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia who
"crossed the street'"-and was said to be working
now as adviser to.theSaudiforeignintelligence. -
Despite its policy of. "naming. names.. Covert-Ac
tion said: it had-declined to reveal the names of
any American intelligence agents attthe captured
- U.S. Embassy in Iran.:::
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At least one justice is so uncertain about the
S case that a lower court has been asked to send up
e e Tests. more data on it. Attorneys have-learned that Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens requested the full case file
Right, to Write from the Court of Appeals. Normally, the justices
by do not get interested in such files until after the
court has agreed formally to rule on a case. '
.
Only members of the court and their-staffs
E Employee know what problem any justice is having with the case.
l
h
ate t
at
;. But legal etcperts have begun to specu
By Lyle Denniston _ il' one significant factor could be the government's
w"h1?aeouStar sartwrlnr- -=i potentially sweeping claim that it has a right to
ARTICLE -APPEAR-F-% WASHINGTON STAR
0,A PAGE- _/.? 9 DECEMBER 1979
The Supreme Court is having trouble making up ! collect all the money that Snepp. has.made or will..
its mind on a key case on the rights of a former make from his book._'." `
CIA agent who turned'author and sharply crib=a` The government contends.that Sneppspromise-
cized U.S policy in Vietnam. ` tp the CIA not to write anything.. without permis.-
- Frank W. Snepp's appeal and'an opposing_appeal-4.'sfon. amounted to a legal "trust' and' he,has now-17
by the government pose a variety of significant .violated, or breached,. that trust. Thus, the govern.
legal and constitutional issues, but the court has -'? meat argues. Snepp has profited from that breach,
spent weeks pondering, whether it will even re- [:making the, money_he'has received "ill-gotten
April 1975.
view the case. i =
After resigning from the CIA, Snepp wrote be-
cent Interval, a book that. assails the U.S. with-
drawal from Vietnam at the end of the war in.
justice Department lawyers handling the. Snepp
case.reportedly were put.hnder pressure by CIA;
Director Stansfield Turner not. only- to go after
Snepp's'proceeds,-but also to attack his publisher,"
Random House, and'the CBS television network
promise to clear everything he. wrote with the. !- and CBS reporter Mike Wallace for a "60 Minutes:'
agency, and' the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals - program about the book. =
has ruled that the government is right. Snepp In .the Supreme. Court appeal by the govern .
major impact on the right of government employ-
ees, not only those who work for secret agencies..
to write about their experiences.
argues that he can't-be forced to clear in advance
any writing that does not include secret material:
his book is said to contain: none.
taking up the case. for at least brief discussion
with theirstafis, but.then putting,off any action ;
lawyers- following the case ha$e been told that .
it has been circulated among the justices at:least.
six times-without a vote.
Now it appears that the court will take no action
until at least early January. The justices have one
more-session, tomorrow,, before.taking:a? four-:;
weekrrecess. and. the Snepp case is not'likeI3? to, be,
mentAoned theta;
other writers, not themselves federal employees tion for profit."
or officials, who write books-or articles based on - The Court of Appeals, however, overturned that
what they have been told by persons in govern- part of Lewis' decision, and- ruled that the govern-_
ment~ If. meat "is not entitled to- a constructive trust." It'
Conceivably.' Some attorneys are now.suggest- s ould have been, that court said,, if Snepp had-.
ing, the case's final result might reach books like written about secret material.. ..' ..r.?;
The Brethren, the- new book about the Supreme - The government's claim- to the proceeds is the
Court by, two reporters, Bob Woodward and Scott only issue the Justice Department has taken to the .'
Armstrong of The Washington Post.;--h eourt r .,
Since much of that book came from secret court"`~ `
documents apparently' supplied by the. justices' Snepp, with the support of publishers and varilaw clerks` in violation of court policy if not the .ous-news organizations, has asked the court to*
clerks' own promises... it might fit the theory that rule that government officials and employees may
the government is using in the Snepp case legal not be`required to give up their constitutional
experts have said. -;;- .; _ , . r right of free. expression asa condition of their
The Snepp case has been pendingat.the Su- V o
>t r~ ~ ,;: ~.. N
preme Court since last summer. It was- ready for , ,i ~ The appeal also asks. the justices . to rule that
the justices' action when they returned to the-- Snepp should not. be.. required to-submit, in ad--?I
bench in early October-; ; ' ance; any writing that he: does about non class:-
The justices have spent: more` thanitwo months fled material. The court order requiring him to get.'
meat; however, only the proceeds to Snepp are
.the government's theory. Lewis imposed a "con-
structive trust for the benefit of the United States"
over any money Snapp makes - on the book, re-
clearaa`ce includes not only writings about the
CIA, but fiction as wells That order also extends to-"
publishers who wouldhandleSnepp.. :
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A.tTICLE APPSL l THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
0 PACB 9 December 1979
A Scandal Star's Mom
Says Judy's Sex, Spy Saga
Has Had a HapDv Ending
BY RUDY MAXA
es' a mother
to do when her.
22-year-old
!.r daughter- -ap-
g pears on na-
tional television. to admit she
is a prostitute? What do you
say to your Fairfax County
neighbors when she details in
a paperback her sexual adven-'
tures as a Washington hooker, :
a career that included a six-
month stint as paid escort to a-
celebrated Russian defector?
The parents of characters in
Washington's sex scandals are
,generally anonymous, and the
case of Judy Chavez's kiss.
and-tell -adventure last year
with a Soviet defector; diplo-
mat Arkady Shevchenko, was
no exception. Chavez's parents
avoided reporters clamoring
for details about the mystery
woman who claimed -the FBI
and CIA provided Shevchenko-
with more than $40,000 to buy
her expensive company.
"What do you do?"'
Marlyn Taylor, 51, asks
today. You try to keep
yourself busy doing something -
else. You don't think about it-
and hope - everything comes.
out for the best."
Taylor ? (Judy Chavez ' kept
the surname of her' former
husband) is a - feisty McLean
housewife and mother of two
adopted daughters who thinks,
-everything. has come out:- for
the- best--After 28 years as
civil. engineer with . the U.S..
Forest Service, her husband.
Heyward, is looking forward to'
retirement. The couple have
'put their home on the market
and plan to head for the sun to
operate the Gold Mine Saloon
they recently bought in Pan-
ama City, Fla. But this time
last year the Taylors sat -in
their tastefully decorated liv-
ing room and watched in horri-
fied fascination as their older
daughter's face appeared on
network television and the na-
tion's front pages. . -
At first they were shocked.
But by the time their daugh-
ter's paperback autobiography
appeared last spring, Mrs.
,Taylor was sending au-
tographedcopies to friends.
:.She collected press clippings
and today says, "Judy is grown ,
up, -and she's turned her life
over to the world now. We talk
about once a week ... she was
always very individualistic."
-As a young girl, Judy was a
Brownie and. Girl Scout whose
interests-: included ballet;: tap
dancing,, and the - piano.- She
graduated at age 18 from Fair-
far i County's Oakton ---High
School- after. - quitting- Fairfax
Christian School She married
a.- local'- boy-and _the couple
moved-td California before
turning to Washington to find
a job. They separated-m-1975.,
Gradually Mrs. Taylor
began to wonder., how her
daughter supported herself
"I always had a feeling," she
says. "She lived. well, drove a-
new Camaro, had a nice apart-
ment; kept irregular= hours.:
But when I asked her what she.
was doing, she'd just get up.
and- leave."
Recalls Judy- "I believe they
thought I was in real estate-I
was evasive;" JI
She gave her parents several
hours' notice before NBC-TV
-
broke the story of her vocation
and expensive- liaison with
Shevchenko. .
"I asked her why she didn't
marry him,"- Mrs. Taylor re-
calls, "and she said because
he's too old, 48. You know how-
l feel about him? He got ex-
actly what he deserves, mess-
ing around with a 22-year-old.
That dirty old man."
Today Chavez, lives in New'
York and works on a book
about ? how to be a femme fa-
tale. She attends classes in
French, music and ballet be-
cause, she says, it keeps her
.out of trouble.. A romance-
with a minor rock musician
-has faded, which makes her.
mother . happy--she . didn't
much like him the one time
y;_
they met.
'Judy likes `good' -living,"
says Marlyn Taylor:: "Maybe -
what got her off on the wrong
foot was I never gave it to her.
I always told her she had to
work for it. But evidently she
found an easier way-"' - -:
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ARTICLE AFPZ
on ?AG E_! _. _
THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
9 December 1979
Spy satellites can't see through metal
apartment buildings of North Ar-
lington, Mr. X cautiously opens the
door - to his walk-up flat. There is
no nameplate on the door or on the
mailbox. His telephone number is
not listed.
"I take precautions," says Mr. X, a middle-aged
Russian who bears a vague resemblance to Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance.
An orange rug covers the floor of his sparsely fur-
nished apartment and a picture of his wife, mother
and two grown sons-all in Moscow-sits on the
table beside the sofa.
"I have always been against the system," says Mr.
X, who defected from the Soviet Union two years ago
for "ideological reasons." .
"When I was a student I criticized it, even during
the years of terror. Then during Khrushchev's time, I
hoped Russia was changing. They released people
from camps. The armed forces were reduced 40 per-
cent, then ...." His voice trails off.
"The reason I didn't defect earlier was because my,
children were young," he says, pouring a glass of
Rhine wine and laying the table with typical Russian-
fare-pickled cabbage and herring, beets and sour
cream. "I miss them, sure; I want to get the Soviet
authorities to let them go, but when my son applied
for an exit visa, they put him in a psychiatric institu-
tion for three week's observation."
In Moscow, Mr.. X held a position related to arms
control Here he fills his day by working with right-
wing groups concerned about Soviet imperialism and
advising members of Congress about the pitfalls of
SALT. -
bus= atr i Russian min
BY RUTH DANILOFF rt
s darkness settles over the crowded
isgruntled Soviets like Mr. X can be more
effective watchdogs for the SALT treaties CoI TZ
than all the space-age electronic equip-
ment orbiting the earth. Atop-level defec-
tor could bring news to the West of Russian noncom-
pliance with the treaties. _
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,,if the Soviets are contem-
plating cheating. if they think
they can gain strategic advan-
tage, they have to think, `Can I-
get away with it? Supposing
one of my boys doesn't like it
and leaves,' " says former CIA
director William Colby.
A spy-in-the-sky can count
Soviet missiles, but only a spy I
on the ground could tell the i
CIA what the Kremlin intends
to do with them. He could also
say if the Russians secretly '
equipped their SS-18 and SS-
19 missiles with more than 10
warheads-in violation-of the
treatise.-ea -some senators
fear. Are they- surreptitiously
developing a devastating new
weapon - something- which
takes 12 years to get off the
drawing board and onto the
launch pad, where it can be
spied on by satellites? Elec-
tronic gadgetry can discover
much about the enemy's capa-
bilities, but it cannot see
through steel. It cannot look
into men's minds or learn of
high-level policy decisions in
the Soviet government.
In 1976, a presidential For-
eign Intelligence Advisory
Board, now defunct, warned
that the United States was too
dependent on electronic sur-
veillance.
"One well-placed human
agent in Castro's government
could have provided early
warnings of the Soviet bri-
gade's presence and described
what its true purpose was,"
says Cord Meyer, former CIA
assistant deputy director of
plans, and now a columnist.
Recruiting spies, however, is
easier said than done, espe-
cially in a totalitarian society
such as the Soviet Union, with
its closed borders and its
watchful KGB.
Soviet intelligence has some
built-in advantages when it
comes to gathering informa-
tion with people, not satellites,
say experts. "It costs us bil- i
lions of dollars to collect infor-
mation on the Soviet Union
which the Russians can pick
up out of Aviation Weekly for
nothing," says Colby. In addi-
tion to material on the open
market, the Russians have had
considerable success buying
top-secret information from
money-hungry U.S. citizens.
Although the Soviets can
find agents in the United
States,the United States wins
hands-down on- defectors.
They range from artistic de-
fectors such as Mikhail Bary-
shnikov or Mstislav Rostro-
povich, who move easily into,
U.S. society, to important
Soviet and,East European offs-
cis" whose whereabouts, intel-
I.ligence contributions and
adaptation to American life
!remain one of the darkest
secrets of the American spy es-
tablishment. -
However, since 1975, when
Congress began to investigate
the CIA, some information has
been made public about defec-
tors' lives in America.
These "leaks" are causing
alarm. "After all the publicity
about what happened to
Nosenko and Shadrin," says
Dr. Ray Cline, former deputy ,
director of the CIA, "we may
have trouble encouraging
other defectors."
Yuri Nosenko was a watch-
dog for the KGB at the U.S.-
Soviet Disarmament Confer-
ence in Geneva when he de-
fected nearly 16 years ago, just I
three months after the Ken-
nedy assassination. His asser-
tion then that Lee Harvey Os-
wald was never in the pay of
the Soviets remains controver-
sial today. The information
smelled to certain CIA factions
of "disinformation," part of a
mission to distance the Soviet i
Union from the aseuaination.
Last year's testimony before
the House Assassination Com-
mittee revealed that in order
to "break" him, the CIA sub-
jected Nosenko to imprison-
ment for four years, including
a period of confinement in a
specially constructed 10'x10'
windowless vault of steel and
concrete. There, to keep his
sanity, he fashioned a chess set
from the threads of his clothes
and tried to keep track of time
in the dust. Finally, in 1967, a
decision was made to clear him.
N icholaa Shadrin
was a high-living
Soviet naval com-
mander, who, in
111958, stole his
ship's long boat and escaped
with his Polish fiance, Ewa, in
a 24-hour Baltic crossing to I
Sweden. In the summer of
1966, while- working for U.S.
naval intelligence in Washing-
ton, he was approached by
KGB agents to spy for the
Soviet Union. The FBI en-
couraged him to play along,
feeding the Russians carefully
selected "soft" information.
But three years ago, while ' in
-Vienna, Austria, to. meet a
KGB contact, Shadrin myste-
riously disappeared.
"The Swedes warned us not
to come to the U.S. They use
you and dump you," says Ewa
Shadrin, her eyes filling with
tears as she sits in the living
room of their Arlington house
surrounded by mementos. of
their marriage. ,
Mrs. Shadrin, who believes
her husband could still be
alive in the Soviet Union, ac-
cuses the CIA and the FBI of
using him as bait and of botch-
ing his surveillance in Vienna
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Most intelligence experts
agree with Ray Cline that if
disaffected Russians and East
Europeans are frightened of
becoming espionage casualties
like Nosenko and Shadrin,
then a vital intelligence source
is endangered On the other
hand, a few case officers who
have experience with defectors
wonder if the information they
supply justifies the troubles
they bring both to their per-
sonal lives and to the agency
resettling them in the United
States. "You never know if a
defector is for real," claims one
former intelligence officer_
"The- Russians- have Qooded-
the market with phonies."
The U.S. intelligence's first
task is to penetrate the lies, to
establish the defector's "bona
fides." Is he genuine, or is he a
"plant"? His name is run
through the computers and an
urgent meeting is convened of
the Interagency Defectors
Board, made up of representa-
tives of the CIA, Defense In-
telligence, the military serv-
ices, the State Department
and the FBL Speed is essen-
tial. Once the Russians learn
someone is missing, they start
agitating with ' the local au-
thorities. If that country is
friendly to Moscow, it may
mean smuggling the defector
"out black"-hiding him in
the trunk of a diplomatic car
or flying in a plane to pick him '
up.
In the United States high-
ranking defectors tend to
settle in the Washington area
to be near the CIA. "Wringing
out"-debriefing--can , take
two years, after which a defec-
tor may continue as- a "con-
sultant" with a stipend.
"The house was always full
of people," recalls Ewa
Shadrin. "The guards mostly
sat in front of the television
smoking. A couple came in to
do cooking and cleaning."
Indeed, the CIA and the
FBI become the defector's sur-
rogate family, giving new iden-
tities, providing Jobe and
houses, fixing up a divorce and
in tie case of Arkady Shev-
chenko, the Soviet's No. 2 man
at the U.N., who defected last
year, they. may have under-
written a call girl
"The business of hand-hold-
ing defectors," says one former.
CIA officer, "is an obligation
imposed for life. It does no
good to say 'but I left the
agency last year' when they
call in the middle of the night.
They cling to someone who
understands - their problems
and could do something." ___
ome defectors come
with grandiose ideas of
their own importance,
expecting Washington
to create miracles. One
particularly troublesome Rus-
sian. insisted on becoming a
professor, though he didn't
want to learn English. "In the
end the CIA gave him a
$35,000 stipend and found him
a special tutor. Then he
wanted us to send his kids to
private school, then to private
college. It was a terrible drag
on the agency," says one for-
mer CIA agent. -
Another who expected spe-
cial treatment was Anatoly
Golitsyn, who defected from
the Soviet embassy in Helsinki
in 1960. Allegedly the highest
KGB defector ever, he was the
man. who confirmed that Kim
Philby, head of the anti-Soviet
section of British Counter In-
telligence, was the mysterious
"third man" who tipped off
Donald Maclean and Guy
Burgess that M16 was about to
arrest them as Soviet spies.
(Anthony Blunt, Queen Eliza-
beth U's debonair arts curator,
was recently identified as the
fourth man who likewise
warned Philby.) At first, Golit-
syn insisted on being debriefed I
by the U.S. president. The
stocky Russian believed a
"mole" (a double agent) exist-
ed in the CIA. Give him $10
million, he suggested, -and he
would agree to become chief of 1I
NATO counter intelligence.
Successful adjustment to
the American way of life
largely depends on a defector's
reason for leaving his country
in the arst place. Motives
vary, though a large percent-
age are middle-aged men with
marital or drinking problems.
Some are attracted to the con-
sumer society. Other defec-
tors come to revenge their
country's political system.
This is particularly true of
East Europeans who want to
get back at the Russians.
"The defector who, comes
for ideological -reasons does
best,' says. Konstantine Bol-
dyrev, a, Russian- emigre who
has helped refugees in the
United States. "Their ideology
is a crutch. Those who come
for material reasons usually
break down. The intelligence
defectors are pretty pathetic;
all they are trained to do is
spy."
A secret CIA study in the
late 1960s on communist de-
fectors' adjustments to Ameri-
can life concludes that the
Soviets have the most diffi-
culty. A sentimental people,
they become depressed easily
and start drinking as they
wrestle with guilt and loneli-
ness in a society where indi-
vidual initiative, not' state
planning, is the key to success.
Whatever the motive, what-
ever the adjustment, one thing
defectors share is fear. U.S in-
telligence officials have been
told that every Soviet embassy
has a leather-bound "blue
book" containing names of J
traitors sentenced to death in
absentia-the KGB hit-list.
Since Stalin's death, the KGB 11
has curtailed its terror tactics,
though the Shadrin. kidnap-
ping and the Bulgarians' poi-
son umbrella attack in London
last year have caused defectors!
to worry. Today, in an ern of !
partial detente, a tacit agree-
ment has emerged that says,
"We won't trouble you if you
shut up and don't engage ini
anti-Soviet ? - activities."
Nonetheless, the KGB con-
tinues to track down some de-
fectors, trying to- "double"
them, or pressing them to
come home by mailing them
copies of Goloa Rodiny (Voice
of the Motherland). -
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-
After a bad start
his wife's suicide
in Russia, scan-
dals with a call girl
and a bout with 'I
the bottle-Arkady Shev-
chenko is determined to prove
that a defector can make it in
America without a change of
identity. Once . he completes
his memoirs, for which he re-
ceived a $600,000 advance, he
plans to come in out of the
cold as a public personality, to
lecture, teach, write and speak
out on issues. "He knows the
risk, but he prefers to live in
freedom for as long as he can.
That's.'- one reason ' why he
lel says-=Br11- Geimer - the'
Washington lawyer. Shev-
chenko hired to protect his in-
terest and to quash his play-
boy image.
Now married to an Ameri-
can, Shevchenko leads a quiet
life in a Washington suburb.
He has had no contact with
the Soviets since three days
after his defection, when Ana-
toly Dobrynin, the Soviet am-
bassador to Washington, and
Oleg Troyanovsky, the Soviet
ambassador to the U.N., tried
to persuade him to return
home. . .
U.S. intelligence experts say
the lives of defectors are often
fraught with problems and
risks. "But that's the business
they chose," Cline says. "I
can't feel too sorry for them.
They knew the name of the
game when they got into it."
Unlike reconnaissance satel-
lites, human spies cannot be
turned in for more sophisti-
cated models. As long as the
United States and the Soviet
Union remain political antago-
nists, defectors will be the sad
but vital pawns in the East-
West game of "I Spy." . - ^
Ruth Dansloff, a Washington free-lance writer, first became in-
terested in defector, afterencow-teringRusian spies Guy Bur?
gels and Donald Maclean in Moscow. -
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ON PAGE_CI -4 11 December 1979
By Maxine Cheshire F_
malty interested in a boot-encased leg
-which washed ashore recently. from
the- Chesapeake Bay onto a beach to
the community of Herald Harbor. Be-
cause the leg had been In the water
more than a year, investigators are
'trying to determine if there might be
a connection to the mysterious death
of former CIA official John Paisley,
whose badly decomposed .body was
:pulled from the bay on Oct. 1, 1978;
with a bullet hole behind the left ear:
G='~iarylaai~ police df$cials in sev
`~eral 3urlsdi~tions~are more.-than nor-
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Marks has suggested there might not
have been a drug culture in the United
States during the 196os if ISD and -
other chemical cocktails had not been
mass produced by pharmaceutical.
companies with MKULTRA contrails
PETERSON SAID that two. years ago
when the mind control project was un-
earthed, the CIA feared they would
find that many people received doses
of mind-altering drugs in the program.
"Now we think there was only a
handful," Peterson said. In one. highly
persuasive- cape, a victim jumped to
his death from a New York hotel room
window after a dosebt psychedelic
medicine`
While the CIA was de ;sing pfam to
.develop an LSD weapon, the Army .
was busy testing several germ warfare
agents em ww#iag Americanw-
another welIVMicisd, horror story..
Senate bearings in 2971 disclosed that
the Army tested a variety of "biologi-
'cal simulants" on unsuspecting people
in the U.S. between 1949 and 1968. The
germ; warfare simulanta do not cause '
disease, but allow the scierttists to test.:
just how effectively they can spread
the agent. in?a population.,
The Army tests ranged from.
Washington's National Airport m ?"
Hawaii, San Francisco to Key West,,*
and San Clemente-to-Alaska.-..r...?' -
Although the tests occurred from
1949 to 1968, therw is a puzzling gap of.
eight years between August,. 1955, when'
germ agents were tested in the Penn- ,j
sylvania Turnpike tunnels and- January,
1963, when a test was run off. the coast
1 RawaiL
1=TRA project there have been In-
dications that the CIA took charge of
these tests during the 1959.68 gap.
Based on thw the New York project
code named "Operation Big City' was
simply a continuation of the covert-. -
tests. -
I .,I
- "Big City" was one of 18G projects
that were operated under ;tU{ULTRA.
Sidney Gottleib, the official in charge,
has testified that he destroyed all ? ;:
memos, reports, and other documents
outlining what "Big City" was about.
He neglected, however, to destroy the
expense vouchers.
These vouchers have prompted a lot
of speculation by CIA watchers, not-
ably the church of Scientology, which -
has engaged in a dispute with Amerr
can intelligence agencies.
A group of Scientologists spent four!
months analyzing the "Big City" ex-
?pense vouchers and concluded that the,
. ing and used the, people of Manhattan:
as. human guinea pigs.
the House and Senate Intelligence and
Armed Forces committees as well as
the CIA and the-Army, the Scientolog
ists said. It also was delivered to jour
nalists, along with mimeographed
-copies of the. CIA expense vouchers'
that have
~~been available for nearly
two, ha ?e_" - -I
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ARTICLE AFFURED
Oli PAGE
f writer of the Christian Science Monitor
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 December 1979
" CambrWge,.Maetts
Assistants gilded in and out with the required deference: -
:ones flashed and rang,. And flashed again. The legendary
ratroop general seemed a trifle uneasy. He glanced at his
istwatcb as if a second wave had failed to jump on time..
;ig crisis here," be grinned.
General James Gavin might have been regrouping the
-,ttered 82nd Airborne Division after its D-Day drop. One
expected a wounded trooper to stagger in with the elec-
Eying news that a column of German Tiger tanks was spill-
; off Route 2 and grinding menacingly toward us. At any
)meat. I thought, we might have to dive under the desk as a
-arm of Messerschmitt 109s strafed the parking lot. Per-
ps I should be asking where the front was now, and how
any casualties we were taking, and would the boys be home
The former commander of the 82nd Airborne Division had -
situation well under control. "The phone calls," he_
oans with a wave of the hand. "I'm involved in saving Mar-
i and George Washington. You know. the pictures by Gil
rt Stuart that.the Smithsonian wants to buy from the (Boo-
, . - -. : - -
ii Athenaeum.".
The handsome face is a little more rugged these days. but-
gray-blue eyes are just as piercing. and the mouth every
as firm and combative as it ever was. He might not care to
ring from the door of a W-3 on a night jump, but-one sus-
cts that beneath the gray suit there still swaggers a green- .
id paratrooper. One recalls his feisty..message to the 505th
mbat Team prior to its airborne assault. on Sicily in 1943.
he term American parachutist has become synonymous-
th courage of a high order. Let us carry the fight to the en-
iy and make the American parachutist feared and re-,
ected." he declared. "Attack violently.'.''
General. Gavin is sitting here in his office at Arthur D.
tie, Inc.. - the industrial:. research and consulting firm.,
sere be's been successively executive vice-president, press
nt and chairman of the board. He's been acting as a consul-
-fi to the firm, since- he retired- in 1977. His graduation
)ma from Mount- Carmel Area Senior High-School in,
nnsylvania hangs on the wall. . ,
To have reached the general's office is something of an
lievement imitself-For several -minutes-one-seemed un-
ely to progress beyond the front desk: Cameras and tape
:orders are viewed as suspiciously here as they would beat
ne supersecret intelligence establishment. A card thrust
me demanded' to know whether I was a US citizen (which
i not) and wbethet I was on a classified visit (which I had
Early in 1977 General Gavin learned that I
-Jimmy Carter was- considering appointing
him CIA director- "It was the darndest thing
I've 'evergotten into," he remembers with 1
amused exasperation. 'I didn't- want to get
into that. I needed it like a hole in the head;
the publicity likewise. I really didn't need it."-
It seems that a member of Jimmy Carter's
transition team called him to let him know he
was on a short list. "I talked to Tip O'Neill's
office and said, `Well, what do you think about
this? If it comes up, do I have any support or
should I even consider it?' And then I went
see my old friend Frank Church. I took him to
Russia with me on a trip some years back. So
I asked him what he thought about it, and he
said, `Jim. I think it's the greatest idea ever-'
I talked to Barry Goldwater. He and I. werW
second lieutenants a long time ago. down in
Arizona. He said: `Jim that'd be great.. I'd
like to have you down in Washington.' So the
next darn thing that I knew. Tip O'Neill an--:
nounced to the press that I'd be a great candi-.
date, and Church did the same thing. I could
- have died.. And the. White House had its mind
,.made ups'.. _, '-:_'.'..}. '..rst:-?-.r-. .. _:f .;J v`-?~i.
General Gavin insists that the US "must.
-have the world's best espionage agency- -i
e s d the KGB has been having a field I
y of th what's been exposed bv-I
Congress and others." He says the CIA should
never "have gotten involved in Watergate,
-because it's to be used solely against foreiKn
ers. The CIA slot a little-off-base on that.. Bu
we absolutely must have a good CIA.> It's
-''!
Ge6eiErG a n is an avidreader'oiespionage book iie~
thoroughly enjoyed ,The Wizard War" by R. V. Jones and
"The Ultra Secret" by F. W. Winterbotharn - not to mention
Anthony CaveBrown's "Bodyguard of Lies."
_ = r. /,,"r ri
- "What the..British did during World War II is incredible..
Every time we landed in Europe - and I landed in Sicily.; -
Italy and Normandy = the Germans outnumbered us. They
could have easily have outnumbered us two to three-on divt-
sions, but they were always fooled out of position."..:,,
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ARTICLE AP~P}"!'~ ATLANTA Cv1YSTrITMa1V
on PAGE_GXs'l_: 8 DECEMBER 19T9
Terrorism Galls For The FBI And CIA.
.Lt was reassuring to read this -that is, the CIA that antedated. resolution adopted by the Society
week that the Carter administra- Watergate. 11- of Former Special Agents of the
tion has - di- - -f - w~ And to- combat terrorism- at Federal Bureau of Investigation
rected the-
-U.S. Marine;
Corps to
organize. . a
50,000-man."'.
spearhead- for
i a Rapid De-?
ployment
Force.
Such a force
home what we need is an effec- at its recent annual convention in
tive team along the lines of the Washington.
Federal Bureau of Investigation That resolution! "requests, as
-that is, the FBI that antedated justice demands, that the indict-
Watergate. meats of L. Patrick Gray III, W.
In the caterwauling generated Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller
by Watergate this nation's politi be dismissed upon the action of
cians indulged in some sort of -the attorney general as not being
frenzied hara-kiri which disem- in the best interests of. this na-
boweled . both the FBI and the tion and its citizens."
CIA. Neither has fully recovered.
Further, "the society reaffirms
its intention to 'continue to ex-
tend its full facilities and capaci-
ties to those present and former
FBI agents who have been in-
dicted or threatened with
criminal or other action or other-
wise harassed as a result of their
good-faith official ?investigation
of three Marine brigades, and the : And we are the losers, both na-
first is to be ready by 1983. 4 tionally and internationally.
The concept stems - from the : A, year ago when the troubles
unstable world in which we live in Iran were attracting our.
and with the, obvious need for the attention there were cries both
United States to be able to re- - within and without government
spond quickly and effectively - that the CIA had not kept us,
virtually anywhere in the world fully informed of what was possi-
robable-in that coon
artici- ble-or
th
M
i
dditi
t
I
e
ar
ne p
p
on
o
n a
= , of-, terrorist activities. without
pation, there will, of course, be a try. .
need for. aircraft and ships- Those who cried out either con- "personal gain ,.. f; for
. themselves ... ~., ' ::.: , .- ..
While all ' of '? this is encourag- . veniently forgot or chose to ignore that - Sen. Frank Church In addition; the- society called
,
ing, it can in no way be regarded D-Idaho, is hiss illconceived upon the Justice Department to
as the exclusive and entire solu- ambition. to be the Democratic pay the legal expenses of those
tion to the. complex problem of presidential nominee in 1976, had who have had to pay out of their.
terrorism and turmoil What this successfully al emasculated the CIA own pockets "for private counsel
force does is: respond when a in the defense: of employment--
crisis reaches a certain point order to grab headlines for related activities." In the name
of decency, honor and justice-if
What we need-in addition to-..-- And as for the FBI,.:we have those terms apply to the-federal
that is some- method of finding - the e-curious--and disgusting-
out in advance that. events- are-'-anomaly that the terrorists .are government anymore-that is an
covertly moving toward a crisis"` either- forgiven or made-, into elementary: demand. ,tee,:'
in a given country or aa, given heroes, while those in the FBI ? In an address to' they society, .
area... .... - ? r who, sought to serve the best James, L. Buckley made one of.
In short,+what'-we .need is an Interests of the nation are prose many telling points:-,.-
:.:.r ,.: :..~
effective team along, the lines of . crated-or persecuted. `" : ?+ `"The blunt fact is that editorial
the. Central, Intelligence Agency - That came to mind with.the - writers, call ege: presidents,-. and
eoxTiMM
T
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influential' churchmen condoned
the most appalling acts because
those committing them clothed
themseives. in the most. high-
minded causes: opposition to the
Vietnam war in the case of SDS;
to racism in the case of the
Black Panthers; and to what they
described as the predatory eco-
nomic and social order in the
case of the Weathermen.
"This collapse of the ability to
make the most elementary moral
distinctions between means and
ends had the effect of turning
criminals into victims; and this,
in turn, prepared the way for as
?a-- Miscarriage- of jus-
tice as we have seen- in recent
years, one with which you are all
too familiar. " .
Terrorism is on the rise
throughout the world. We must
have the means of combating it
both at home and abroad. The
concept of three Marine brigades
as a Rapid Deployment Force is
a partial answer.
But in addition -we need an
effective FBI and an effective
CIA, as we had before infamous
politicians goaded by blind ambi-
tion gutted them.:.
- Whether we can recreate such
effective organizations is moot.
But a lgood first step would be to
dismiss - the indictments against
I. Patrick Gray m, W. Mark
Felt and Edward S. Miller-and
compete ! all those who have
incurred legal expenses in their
defense ~ . ,
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ARTICLE APP_
03 PAGE
TRENTON TIM' (N.J.)
23 NOVERSH> ER 19T9
.,now . just anothe'' r-, recruilek,
ton Cain
`PRINCETON (AP) - The Central Intelligence Agency has invaded
enemy territory looking for converts.
Once the scene of massive anti-war, anti-CIA protests, Princeton
University is now the site of. a recruiting drive by the intelligence
agency-.
. "You have to recruit people-from somewhere, and a 'university is.
obviously a. good place to get qualified applicants," said, Kathy Pher-
son, public affairs spokeswoman for thejCIA.
"It's a normal recruiting situation; it's like any other government"
agency or large corporation trying to fill their positions," she said.
THERE WERE no protests when a CIA representative spoke to nine
potential employees on campus this week.
"We get a number of government agencies coming to campus to re-
cruit, and the CIA is one of them," said Minnie Reed, Princeton's act.
ing director of career services. r ? ' -
"They've been coming here every year since 1967, when We first had
business and government recruiting" for seniors.
Nine students of 1,100 Princeton seniors signed up for interviews.
The number was about-average: Eight had signed up the previous
year and 14 in 1977, Ms. Reed said.
James J. Fitzgerald, a CIA personnel respresentative based in New
York, told the students the agency is hardly all trenchcoats and cloaks
and daggers. He outlined the four main branches of the agency: Scien
tific and technological, administrative, intelligence and operational.
"MOST OF our employees work at headquarters in McLean, Va.,
ut we have people overseas, too," he said. "We're looking for people
ho want a career, not a job."
Most students. out of college start at $14,000 a year, while engineers
gin at $18,000, he said.. Vacation is 2% weeks every year, and a +' ;;.
month after three years in the agency. 3 .
The application process is grueling. A 17-page employment form re-
quests, detailed information about" every-. place the applicant has w*
about his entire family'
Eight references are necessary, as well`", a security check that
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Hardly a story this week that does not
use the threi manic letters - CIA.
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CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER
3 December 1979
Diplomat foresaw
-chaos after s?aah
'By Richard G. Zimmerman
P*i Os sr bw~ .
WASHINGTON - The State
_!rtment was warned 15-years
ago that "if a revolutionary
-change. were to occur in Iran, the
pent-up grievances are likely to
explode into demagoguery, extre-
mism, revenge-seeking, and a-
seaich for new enemies.:. .
The author of the .elassified
di etch, then a junior political
'counselor. who had been posted in
only 10 months, was just as
pessimistic over the ability of the
government .of Shah Mohammed
Reza Pahievi to survive.
-:'The. shah's regime is regarded
as an unpopular dictatorship not
onlyby its opponents but, far more
'si` ritficantl , by its - g Y i Proponents as
well," Martin F. Herz warned his
..superiors on the basis of own
.. rva ons and conversations,
:CLA'reports and other. diplomatic.
f President Carter obviously was,
,act-aware of how unpopular the
shah was with his own people until
it was too late- In 197T, during a
toast delivered in Tehran,. the
president lauded the shah for "the-
:respect, admiration and love
which your people give to you:')
While Herz', observations ob--
vioualy carried little weight. with-
his superiors; he did rise to- be-
come an ambassador. and is now
director of studies at Georgetown
University's Institute for' the Study
of Diplomacy... ; . ` .:
"Ambassador Holmes (Julius 1
Holmes, then. U.S. ambassador toy
Iran) let the report go through,
although he didn't relish.it, Herz
recalls today-1'He knew it would.
-Ponn y e grist for the lower levels
.at the State Department."
Herz recalled that Holmes
"`came from the old sohool,
slightly jaded, slightly cynical."-
-He- said Holmes felt the shah
:would be in power for some time
:and that it was in the best interest
:of the- United States to get along
with him.
Herz said he. was "quite pleas-
ed" when he recently. reread the
15-year-old memo in light of cur-
rent events in Iran.
' Herz, a realist, observed in his
dispatch that "even an unpopular
dictatorship. can be defended on,
the grounds that it is necessaryand that no viable alternative j
But Herz said' that in his 10
months in Iran "we have heard
this forthright defense of the re-
gime from only one man
General Hasan Parkravan, the
chieftof SAVAK, the shah's inter:
nal security organization.."
Yet even Parkravan, one of the-
most-hated men in Iran at- the
time, "is known to be periodically,
in despair about the situation be-
cause he feels that repression is
not a: solution: to. the - principal
problem of government in Iran,.
which into obtain a broader..
populary+- _consensus,";;~: Herz.
observed:.
The United States was making
a possibly fatal mistake by con-
tinual!y defending the. shah, by-
continually touting and overem-
phasizing his pro-American senti-
ments, Herz felt.
"By being given credit today
for 'power to influence the situa-
tion in Iran that we do not actually
possesss, we of course incur the
blame for deficiencies that we are
in no position to prevent or
remedy," the dispatch warned. Herz concluded that "the most
distressing aspect of this situation
is that concessions made to popu-
lar pressure, for instance by way
of giving leeway fQr freedom of
expression and assembly, are
quite- likely to be the very thing
that might set off a revolution in.
Iran."
(Fifteen years later, the. shah
was in the process of granting
concessions when he was driven
from his throne.) .
"The shah, in other words, is
riding a tiger from which hecan-
-not safely dismount," Herz cor-
rectly prophesied.....:..:-...___._.._._
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WASHINGTON AFRO-AMERICAN (D. C.)
4 December 1979
Crying for blood
Who can believe the wave of
emotional hysteria that we are now
experiencing in the midst of the
Iranian crisis? Is this the same
generation which just a few years
ago risked shooting and im-
prisonment in protesting U.S.
militarism in Vietnam? -
It hardly seems possible that the
American people (including its
youths) are now crying for blood.
Yet it is trae.
All kinds of anti Khomeini
memorabilia from tee-shirts to tavR
threaten to make mockery of the
season honoring the Prince of
Peace. The Iranian ayatollah is
even the center target on dart.
boards.
Worse than all of this, however, is
the wave of prejudice and outright
harassment of persons of Iranian
descent in 'the United States.
Crowds hurl cat-calls and other
objects at Iranian students, and
other persons (some of whom are
Iranians who have become
naturalized citizens of the U.S.)
report that they experience fear
just walking down the streets of our
cities.
All of this reminds us of horrible
parallels in our own past. It all
sounds too much like the treatment
blacks experienced for years in the
presence of whites in the South. And
it reminds us also of the terrible
wave of anti-Japanese fever that
caused thousands of U.S. citizens of
Japanese descent to be hurled into
concentration camps during the
last world war.
In reality, it seems as if many
amore us are literally begging for a
war. Part of this unjust and unfair
situation can be traced to President
Carter, whose own action against
Iranians dents has been criticized
as unconstitutional. (Although, we
must say that the response of Jo
Connally and some other potentia
Part of itjustappears to be a part
of the American psyche. (Although
it is almost unbelievable to see this
hysteria directed against another
Caucasian people - the iramans
are not Arabs.)
Even the State department and
CIA have joined in with such "old
hgr"-Rcusations such as those
which claim that the present
uprising is really being directed by
Communists or some Marxist
group like the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine. When as,
everyone Imows, the Muslim world
is an antagonist of the Communist
world.
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MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE
7 December 1979
Iran
Iranian students here have ex- 1
plained - and many of us have read
the same for years in church-mission
newsletters and journals - that the
U.S. embassy in Iran was used by the
CIA for directing "events" in Iran.
including which relatives of whom
should be tortured how.
The real danger in putting the shah
on trial is that U.S. financing and
training of torturers would receive
official light. This side of America is
a side we do not know how to discuss
publicly yet, it seems to me.
But we had better learn. Pretend
that some foreign country's embassy
In Washington began sending agents
out among us, leaving our friends'
bodies dying on our doorsteps from
torch burns. We would not be fooled
.by claims that the embassy must be
given diplomatic immunity. I doubt
t that that embassy would be standing
long. And I wonder whether we
would take as few embassy lives a-si
the Iranian "fanatics" have in tht#
process. -Robert Spottswood, Mi
^neapoi s.
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'BL= r IELD TELEGRAPH (W. VA.)
9 DECEMBER 1979
Church, as chairman of the Senate Foreign
; ? 'Never Learn? Relations Committee, has seemed bent on
In the television coverage of the month -long destroying the CIA as a functioning organ ization.
Iranian crisis, viewers have been treated over and there are indications that he has just about
and over again to the film clip of President succeeded.
Carter on his visit to Iran, standing beside a There also is good reason to believe that the
confident shah and praising that nation as "an folks back home in Idaho have caught on to
island of stability" in a troubled area. Church and are going to bounce him out of
The inevitable question is why did Carter Washington when they have the opportunity next
think the shah was secure on his throne - if he year. They certainly should do it, but in the
really did - or that Iranian dissension posed no meantime the damage he and his cohorts have
real threat to him or to'this nation? Was the inflicted on our intelligence apparatus needs to
President ignoring information our government be repaired, if that is possible.
had, or had he simply been given wrong in- Perhaps it isn't possible. There must still be
formation? some good people in the CIA and other in-
Whatever the reason for his apparent telligence agencies who know what should be
ignorance of the fact that the shah was about done and how to do it, but it may be that in the
through, it is obvious that he should have known. current climate in Washington it simply isn't
The taxpayers of this nation have forked over possible to operate the kind of intelligence
billions of dollars of their money to create a operations we must have if we are to survive in
number of intelligence agencies, notably in- the hardball game our opponents are playing
cluding the CIA which are supposed.to have firm overseas.
information on the stability, or lack of it, of our It also is quite possible that even in its
important allies. present stifled and defensive state, the CIA's
When we don't have that kind of information, . vast apparatus still is producing the hard in. or when our leaders ignore it when we do have it, formation that our leaders need to operate in-
we inevitably are caught by surprise and end up telligently in the world arena, and those leaders
looking like idiots, as Carter and the rest of his either aren't getting it or aren't paying any at. administration did in the case of Iran. tention to it when they do get it. It could be a little
It should be noted that the shah is claiming of both.
that U.S. pressure, meaning from the Carter Whatever the problem may be, the vast
administration, helped force him off his throne. majority of concerned Americans must be
It is perfectly possible that Carter did do that, thoroughly fed up with the continuing spectacles
without a backup plan to avoid the kind of thing which develop as we are caught by surprise
now going on in Iran. It can happen when again and again by overseas developments
Washington has no reliable information about inimical to our interests. Iran is merely the
such situations. latest instance of this, and certainly won't be the
It is of course true that our intelligence last.
agencies, again led by the CIA, have been under
a long and sustained attack by incompetent
charlatans like Sen. Frank Church of Idaho.
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AR.r!CT,'_.'
O`i P GI -
THE BUFFALO EVENING
15 December 1979
C`- 3c ? dies
]nto .&&1 St:ate3
? -> > >G
By MAX McCARTHY
.'wc VV,hing:or- 8unnu
WASHINGTON - -The
?. I
ets, according to CIA sources. The ob-
ject is said to be the hope'for Soviet
Soviet influence in a possible breakaway
Union is enlisting Iranian citizens for
military training in Afghanistan, The
Buffalo News has learned.
According to CIA sources. the Ira=
nians are members of the Baluchi'
tribe in the. southeastern part of the
oil-rich nation.
Intelligence analysts believe that
this latest piece of information about
the ambivalent role of the Soviets in..
the U.S.-Iran- crisis suggests that-?:
Kremlin policy is geared toward the
"fragmentation of Iran into small;
independent states."
The Soviets previously have been
observed in actions that would tend
to foster:the breakup of the country-
into these parts;
state.
Kurdistan -The Kremlin is pour-
ing money into the coffers of the,
Kurdish Democratic Party which, ac-
cording to intelligence analysts, is;
under the influence of the Kremlin.;
Khuzistan - Heavily populated'
with:Arabs, many professing Marxist,
beliefs, Khuzistan in southwest Iran.
contains most of Iran's rich oil fields.
Experts on Iranian politics are!
now saying that if Iran were to losel
these four areas it would be "emascu-i
lated - left only with the ruling Per
sians with little to rule." The author-
ities recall that "The only way-the'
former shah and his father kept all'
these disparate' elements together'
Azerbaijan -Soviet broadcasts in= ",was with a strong central government':
Turkish- have been--aimed : at- this .backed up by a', big and effectivei
large, restless- province and have 'army-."
fueled aspirations for local autonomy.o
it estimated 500,000 Turkish-speak-I
ing Azerbaijanis this week marched.
through the provincial capital of
Tabriz declaring. support for their
religious leader: autonomy-minded)
Ayatollah Kazent Shariat Nladari.
CIA agents recall that the Soviet!
Union in 1946 fostered the creation of!
a Communist republic in the regions
and withdrew its troops only- after!
President Harry S. Truman threat-!
ened to use atomic weapons, on which
the U.S. then had a monopoly, if they
did not withdraw. : i
Baluchistan - Iranian advocates'
of an independent Baluchistan are re-I
ceiving political training by the Sovi-I
NEWS (N Y
e ana:_ sts a''so claim :hat
the gremlin is ;oiiowifl the so-
called ''rite fruit" policy in
Iran. Soviet leaders in recent)
;ears have likened Iran to a
piece of fruit which, when fully!
ripe, would simply drop into
their hands
Petroleum executives and
CIA analysts explain that the
Soviet Union is "rapidly run
ning out of oil in its own wells,
and will be forced to bring in
huge quantities' of foreign oil
within the next few years." !
Some analysts ascribe "ex-I
traordinarily devious" motives
to the Kremlin in the current
crisis. They are claiming that
the Soviet hierarchy "actually'
would like to see the United
States intervene militarily in!
Iran."
Their theory is that ani
American military strike
against Moslem Iran would in-
flame much of the Islamic
world into an anti-American
fervor. They note the irony cf'
"the fact that many of the 4,0L01
Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan.
today are killing Moslems" in'
that country, Iran's eastern
neighbor.
The same experts are also
saying that one reason the Sovi-
et Union may use its veto on
the U.N. Security Council to rill
possible U.S.-sponsored. U.N.
economic sanctions against-
Iran would be to folks the'
United States into exercising its,
military option to help secure,
the release of American. hos-'
tapes.
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pn PAGL
WASHI.TGTOY Wr E W
18 DEC EM 1979
The Washington Post has ignored reports of how.
the Soviets are forging U.S. documents. By con
trast, it has given front-page publicity to a claim by
terrorists in Iran that an embassy document links
the American hostages with the CIA.
On December 2, the Post carried a page one story
headlined, "Iranians Say Document Ties 2 Host-
story concerns charges by two of
" Th
e
ages to CIA. Khomeini's aides that a "purported secret State De-
partment cable" shows that two of the American
."
hostages are CIA.officers
However, in the fourth paragraph of the story, a
State Department official is quoted as saying that
the Iranians occupying the embassy "have an ample
record of forgery, misrepresentation and fabrica-
tion." And so have the Soviets. Sen. Gordon Hum-
phrey recently revealed that the Soviets have been
of a worldwide
t
.
forging U.S. documents as par
KGB misinformation campaign. This story has
been ignored by the Post.
Is this "purported secret State Department
cable" a KGB or Iranian forgery? The Post doesn't
know. But it went ahead with the story, which
linked American hostages to the CIA. The Post
Published In Miami Herald,
Houston Post and Dallas
Morning News - But Censoret
.By Big Eastern Media
even ran a photocopy of this allegedly secret docu-
ment.
The Post has often publicized charges that the
CIA has been involved in Iran. But often it
ignores charges of Soviet involvement there.
On November 23, for example, UPI released a
story charging that Ayatollah Khomeini was a Sov-
iet agent in the 1950s. According to UPI: "The Sov-
jets penetrated the Shiite Moslem sect as early as the
1950s and the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a
Russian agent at that time, according to a Polish
army counter-intelligence chief who defected to the
Westin 1960."
The former Polish espionage chief,-Col. Michael.
Goleniewski, was debriefed by the CIA and re-
portedly. told the agency that Khomeini was the
most important of five top Russian agents in Iran.
According to UPI, Goleniewski "reported to a high
Iraqi government official, who in turn passed infor-
mation to the Russian KGB through its agents in
Warsaw, where Goleniewski was headquartered."
UPI said that Goleniewski's information has
been reliable. It noted, that he had exposed Soviet, agents operating in Britain, Sweden and Israel.
The. story that Khomeini was a Soviet agent was
dramatic news. It was carried sYVa World. We also saw it by a New
?York Newspaper, the
in the Miami Herald, the Dallas Morning News and
the Houston Post.
Big Eastern Media-the New York Times, Wash-
ington Star and Washington Post-ignored this
UPI story.
Isn't a communist defector-whose information
has been proven correct in the past-as reliable as
some Iranian terrorists'who have a record of forte 1J
ery and fabrication?
Apparently not for newspapers like the Washing-
ton Post..
-Cliff Kincaid
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THE WASHINGTON POST
01 CAGE 19 December 1979
Jack Anderson
Cz T'teis Logic. VS
franian Fanatithm
A frustrated President Carter, with cautious, as dogmatic as Carter is rea-
his logical engineer's mind, cannot seem sonable, as militant as Carter is mild, as
to cope with the illogical, if not irra- bloody as Carter is squeamish. The aya-
tional Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini tollah apparently views Carter's forbear-
The president has turned, as he usu- ance as weakness, his restraint as timid-
ally does, to the textbooks for the an- ity, his concessions as appeasement. The
swers. He is studying two secret printers president, jeered Khomeini, "lacy
on the ayatollah. One is called "Ayatol- guts."
lah Khomeini of Iran: His Personality The secret studies also indicate that
and Political Behavior." The other is the ayatollah's advanced age and brood-
more specific, "A Psychological Perspex ing bitterness have affected his mind..!
tive: Khomeini's Political Behavior and He dared to defy the shah, risking pri-
Decision-Making in the Current Crisis." son and assassination. He is convinced
Carter's classified reading also in. , that the shah's agents murdered his
cludes other related documents analyz- - father and one of his sons. For 15 years,
ing the role that Khomeini's fanaticism the exiled Khomeini has nursed a smol-
has played in the Iranian crisis. The aya- dering, pious hatred for the shah. Now
tollah emerges from these studies as a at age 79, he won't be deterred from get-
dedicated, calculating, rancorous,impla. ting. revenge. This hunger for revenge,
cable old man who would sacrifice the analysts, suggest, is his dominant
Iran's oil wealth, his own safety, life it- - passion:
self to pursue his goals.
This strange, stubborn, unyielding
No threat of reprisal is likely to budge man 'has now been united with a popu-
him. Boycott? "If we have to lose our lace that for 25 years has been boiling
honor in order to fill our stomachs, then with anger without focus, grievances
we would prefer that our honor is pre. without unity, revolutionary hopes
served and we will go hungry," he said. without a revolutionary leader. He has
Oil cutoff? The Persian people lived given that revolutionary role a driving
with petroleum for 5,000 years, and force by his strident religious appeals.
Khomeini believes they can get along, More than 95 percent of Iran's 36 mil-
without oil again. Military attack? "Why lion people are Moslems, and most of
should we be afraid?" he retorted. "We them belong to the militant, martyr-
consider martyrdom an honor." - minded Shiite sect. Khomeini has fired
There is no doubt in the minds of Cen- them. up with ? calls for a more aggres-
tral to ence en analysts t at[ sive Islam, for a holy war against the in-
the a atoa means it During the street' fidels. This is "a struggle between Islam
fighting that brought down the shah, and the infidels," he has declared.
Khomeini sent 'instructions from his Nothing in the textbooks can instruct
exile in France for his followers to wear the engineer in the White House how to
white robes to show up the blood from overcome the vulnerability of a mighty,
their wounds. , comfortable, cautious nation before the
Khomeini is as reckless as Carter is : powerless zealot, or how to battle the
tyranny, of the aggressively weak over
the self-disarmed strong.. j
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ARTICLE AFT&0M
ell Paz A r_
NEW YORK TIMES
19 DECEMBER 1979
Ally of Khomeini Is Murdered
By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN
Special to The New York Times
TEHERAN, Iran, Dec. 18 - A promi-
nent Moslem clergyman close to the re-
gime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
was gunned down today along with his
two bodyguards by killers who escaped
on a red motorcycle through the con-
gested streets of Teheran.
The murder of Hojatolislam Mo-
hammed Mofateh, a 51-year-old former
member of the ruling Revolutionary
Council and dean of the Divinity College
of Teheran University, followed the style
of several assassinations attributed
earlier this year to a terrorist group
called Forghan, which seems directed
against clergymen in politics.
Plotting Is Charged
The Revolutionary Council issued a
.statement attributing the crime to agents
of the Central Intelligence Agency and
Savak, the Shah's secret police. By impli-
cation, the statement also accused the
Carter Administration of complicity.
[The allegation of C.I.A. i volvement
was denied in Was ingt
The Iranian radio and television said:
"Once again the criminal hand of the
United States emerges to deal a blow
against the Moslem people and divert
opinion from the crimes of the United
States and prepare grounds for plotting
against the Islamic revolution."
The murder diverted attention from
the 50 hostages who have now been held
six weeks in the United States Embassy.
The Revolutionary Council resolved
yesterday to set up a 24-member grand
jury to investigate United States policy
toward Iran. The hostages could appear
at such an inquiry, though possibly as
witnesses rather than defendants.
The relationship between this panel
and any hostage trial was not clear. The
regime appears to be waiting for instruc-
tions from Ayatollah Khomeini.
As Dr. Mofateh lay dying in a hospital,
followers mounting a vigil outside,
chanted "Blood will triumph over the
rifle" and "Carter will be annihilated."
Universities and schools as well as the
bazaar in Teheran have been asked to
close tomorrow in mourning. A demon-
stration scheduled at Teheran University
is expected to take on anti-American
overtones as it proceeds through the city.
The Iranians who are holding the em-
bassy issued a communique linking the at leDr. ast Mofateh who was
wren was a married and had
murder to the United States and Savak.
which ranks just below ayatollah in the
"Does the United States think that it
can change our people's minds in their hierarchy of the Shiite branch of Islam. A
fight against the United States with these native of Hamadan, he studied at the
kinds of murders?" the captors said. Qum seminary. The Iranian press said he
In an earlier statement, broadcast was jailed in 1975 under the Shah and
today, they accused Foreign Minister Sa- later helped organize anti-Shah demon.
dPOh Ghnth7adeh of sounding too concili- strations. When Ayatollah Khomeini re-
ctory toward the United States on the
issue of the hostages. The rambling state-
ment did not mention him by name, but it
evidently alluded to his interviews with
the Western press in saying that the For-
eign Ministry was "exceeding the limit in
remarks about the spies, their trial, their
release or meetings with them."
The statement said such remarks were
out of "rhythm" with Ayatollah Kho-
meini and the revolution. The statement
said it was "a disgrace to talk with the
enemy, and more important, with an
enemy like the evil United States, more
than is necessary." It reiterated that the
United States must return the Shah even
if he had left for Panama.
turned from Paris in February, Dr. Mofa-
teh served as his Arabic interpreter. .
He resigned from the Revolutionary
Council earlier this year, apparently to
devotemore time to teaching. But he con-
tinued to speak at. mosques and rallies. !
Official reports said he belonged to Aya-
tollah Khomeini's Islamic Republic
Party. Another account called him a
member of the rival Moslem People's
Party loyal to Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-
Madari, under whom he had studied at
Ghotbzadeh Seems More Cautious
Mr. Ghotbzadeh has seemed more pr . u-..
dent since the criticism.
Ayatollah Khomeini shed no new light
on the fate of the hostages when he spoke
today from the window of his home in
Qum to followers who had been injured in
the revolution. He repeated his conten-
tion that the only solution was to send the
Shah back to Iran for trial.
The Iranians holding the American;
Embassy also contended in today's com-
muniqu6that Iranian embassies abroad
were not revolutionary enough and pro-
posed that they be staffed by militant
youths, with "an ambassador raised
from the revolution and in service to it."
Kamal Kharazi, deputy director of the
Foreign Ministry's Political Department,i
said 402 out of 800 employees in his de-
partment had already been purged.
The attack on Dr. Mofateh took place
when *he was getting out of his Chevrolet'
Impala sedan in front of the Divinity Coi-
lege on Mubarezan Street at about 9 A.M.
Two young men, wielding pistols,'.
walked up and shot his two armed body-
guards first and then wounded Dr. Mofa-
teh in his right leg while an accomplice 11
maintained a lookout. The bearded, dark-
haired professor managed to limp into
the college entrance pursued by one gun-
man who shot him in the shoulder, the
wrist and finally the head, where the fatal
bullet entered his left temple.
According to several witnesses, the
gunmen scooped up the Israeli-made Uzi
submachine guns carried by the body-
guards, climbed onto a Yamaha 125
motorcycle and fled. Dr. Mofateh was
.
taken to Taleghani Hospital for surgery
but died about 1 P.M. without regaining
consciousness, hospital officials said.
Group Blamed for Some Killings
He was at least the fourth prominent
figure in the regime to be slain since last
spring. They included Ayatollah Morteza
Motahari, like Dr. Mofateh a member of
the Revolutionary Council. The terrorist
group Forghan has been blamed for some
of the killings. ? ' . - ? .
U.S. Denies C.I.A. Involvement
Special to The NewYorkTlmes
WASHINGTON, Dec. 18 - The United
States today denied allegations that the
Central Intelligence Agency had been in-
vo v In the mur murder of Dr. Molateh.
"That is absolutely untrue," Jody Pow-
ell, the White House spokesman, said.
"There is an effort on the part of the Ira-
nian authorities to escape the conse-
quences of their own actions and to divert
the attention of the Iranian people from
problems in Iran by continually blaming
every problem on the United States."
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ARTICLE THE WASHINGTON POST
ON FAGE~ ~' 19 December 1979
"homeini Aid' Is Killed;!'
Irama nis ame, the* C'_`
By Michael Weisskopf center where gunmen carrying what
Washinatan Pont Forum Service were said to be .45-caliber revolvers,
TEHRAN, Dec. 18-A leading Is- shot him in the head. He died in
_a ~
lamic scholar and close associate of Tehran hospital two hours later. .
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was While the popular cleric underwent
shot to death this morning on a surgery, angry crowds gathered out-
crowded Tehran street, and Iranian side the hospital. Some of the shouts
leaders immediately blamed the assas- heard were: "Carter, Carter will be
sination on, agents of the CIA. ahnihilated ..:.Blood will win over
Iran radio quoted eyewitnesses as - the rifle . . . assassinating personali-
saying that Mohammad 1lloffath was ties has no effect any more."
gunned down by two or, three men on Tehran radio interrupted its normal
motorcycles as he and two bodyguards Programming after the shooting and
stepped from a car into a Tehran the. played funeral music while Iran's rul-
ology college which . Moffath .directed. ing Revolutionary Council declared:.
The guards also were killed. "This is the work of the CIA and Sa-
Moffath, a senior member of the yak (the deposed shah's secret po-
ruling clergy who strongly-supported lice.)"
political rule by Iran's religious hier-
was the third influential cleric
archy,
and Khomeini ally murdered since
Khomeini led his Islamic revolution
last February.
Although no one claimed responsi-
bility for today's slaying, the assassi- ?
nation. is similar in style to two previ-
ous murders for which a little-known
fundamentalist religious group that
called itself Forgan claimed credit.
The organization, which has de-
scribed itself in leaflets as fiercely op-
posed to political actions by Iran's
spiritual leaders, has been attacked by
leftist and religious- groups. as "'an
agent of imperialism" linked to the
Moffath, who said to be in his-1
50s, held the,clerical rank of hojatole
slam, one step -below -thee position, of
ayatollah..-He was exiled and jailed
under- tbe. shah and was-believed to
have served on the first secret Revolu-.1
tionaay Council- after the shah-was
overthrown.
A longtime friend of Khomeini
who served as the 'revolutionary lead-
er's Arabic interpreter in the period
leading up to the revolution, Moffath
fought for the section of the newly- ap-
proved constitution giving- supreme governing power to the ayatollah. I
According to eyewitnesses, Moffath
was shot first in the legs. He managed
to drag himself, into the theological,
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THE WASHINGTON POST
ARTICLE Gi'l's:.L.~.:D 19 December 1979
G!wtbzadeh gays U.S. Probe
Of Shah Could neso,l.ve Crisis
By Michael Weisskopf
and Stuart Auerbach
washington Post Forei?'1 Service -
Asa gesture to spur-the U.' S. deci-
sion on an investigation,. Ghotbzadeh'
said Khomeini had decided to allow
the hostages gifts from their families,
Yule trees and Christman; Eve services
conducted by Catholic and Protestant
ministers, who will also serve as the
long-sought independent observers to
certify the good- health of the 501
Americans.
.-."That is the gesture that we make
to disinflame the public opinion" in
America, he said.
As welcome as,the holiday services.
may be, the clergy are not the same
as the delegation of independent in-
ternational observers, including a doc-
tor, that the United States has de=
manded be allowed to see. the hos-
tages. These den{ands have been '
brought, to the -Foreign Ministry by
diplomats here who have volunteered {
before any of the hostages can be re-
leased.
At one point he mentioned a
con- gressional probe, similar to the ones
that sparked the national debate on j
America's- involvement in Vietnam.
But he emphasized that some assur-
ance of government action is needed
by Iran. .
If the hostages are released without j
the promise of a serious investigation, 1
he said. U.S. ,government . officials,
"will bury the more general issues"
which he listed as including CIA in-
volvement in Iran, the. wealth o t e
s a , e sale of unneeded _ military.
equipment of Iran and the alleged
--bribery of American officials by.Ira-,
nian diplomats.
He also said Iranian authorities will.'
supp y ma ena to ai the US. dov-
ern e probe an sugeeste that
newspapers use the Freedom of Inf r-
ma on c o get documents to show
w a t _e CIA has done in Iran..
Ghotbzadeh said word of American
Investigations into what he considers
the real issues separating the United
States and Iran-the alleged crimes of
the shah-could be' used as leverage
to ?persuade the students to give up
the hostages. - - - ?
"These things," he, said, "will at
least give a, certain impression here
that the American government is re-
ally trying to do something about the
real case." - .
Ghotbzadeh's suggestion, however;
presents problems for' the United
States which must decide how to re-
spond in a positive way without ap-
pearing to be giving in to extortion.
The foreign minister, a long-time
close aide of. Khomeini, visit
the .79-yearold religious leader
Monday in the holy city of Qom. Ghot-
bzadeh said they talked about general
foreign policy Issues, including the
outline"of policies regarding the hos-
tages.
"I am talking with full authority
and I know what I am talking about,"
said' Ghotbzadeh, referring to the,
charges of the radical students that he
is speaking out of turn. , . -
What Is important for Iranians,
Ghotbzadeh said, Is for the United i
States to . realize that "behind. the {
question of the hostages is the ques-
tion of the shah."
TEHRAN, Dec. 18-Iran's foreign
minister today expressed doubts that
any of the 50 American hostages here
will be freed before Christmas, and
said that an official U.S. investigation
into ? alleged crimes of the deposed
shah would be a "very positive step"
that could end the 45-day crisis.
Foreign \Iipister Sadegh Ghotbza-
deh said in an interview that his
scaled-down demands for the release
of the hostages carry- the "full author-
ity" of Iran's ruling hierarchy and are
"already cleared from- many angles."
He repeated twice that he was using
this interview to signal Washington
on ways to end the impasse that has
dragged on for more than six weeks.
The, call for a- full. probe by the
American government into relations
with Iran since the 1953 CIA-backed
coup that returned the shah to power
was far cry from the original demand
that the deposed shah be returned in
order to secure the hostages' release.-
While- the students still maintain
that demand, other Iranian - leaders
have steered further and further away
from'it as the hostage crisis drags on
and as the realization grows that the-
United States could not and would not
return the shall.
The foreign minister does not have
the final word on policy. decisions -in a
country, whose power is divided
among the radical students- holding
the U. S. embassy, the Revolutionary
Council which is nominally in charge,
and Ayatollah' Ruhollah Khomeini,
'who is the religious and .,political-
leader.
for example, today re-
Khomeini
,
peated the demand that the. United-
States return the shah even though he
is now in Panama, a country the reli-
gious leader said is -controlled by
America.
. Significantly, however' for the first
time in 45 days Khomeini's demand-
for the return of the shah was not'
o
linked to the fate of the hostages, who
were not mentioned in his tall[,.. , no..
Ghotbzadeh.. said authorities here
have not thought about allowing news
correspondents or television cameras
Into the embassy on Christmas Eve so -I
that the American public can see for
themselves the condition of the hos-
tages.
. Ghotbzadeh inlicated that authori-
ties here had been considering a "Par-
ticular -case" for pre-Christmas re-.
lease, but he declined to reveal any
details-Including why the release -
fell through, how many Americans
.were involved and how this "case"
differed from that of the rest of the
hostages,;
Diplomats here have `said they have
been trying to arrange for the release
of three Americans who are reported
fo suffer from chronic heart or circu-
latory ailments. -
Ghotbzadeh, though;. Insisted that
none of the hostages-whom he once
called "prisoners in a slip that he im-
mediately-_:corracted-"feel slightly
bad .in. any way:" -
-'Ghotbzadeh's retreat from his state- ?
ment Sunday, which raised the possi-
bility that some of the hostages could
be -home for Christmas, vividly Illus-
trates his lack of control over the em-
bassy. militants: -The students have
steadfastly maintained that no hos-
tages . would be released until they
all face. spy trials, and said today
that' the: foreign minister has "gone
over the limits" in statements about
the hostages.
During today's interview,. Ghotbza-
deh left vague what kind of investiga-
tion the United States should conduct,
and whether: It must get under way
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THE WASHINGTON POST
20 December 1979
b Carter think Khomeini simply tried to take I
t hey
on
Jac:, Anderson
11v IT s n T ante
belated leadership of a situa t
dininon istrarir at he atheir warnings nd Brzezinski- were ignored y didn't foresee, and has no real control
Top Carter a
are privately expressing angnge Ever since the preventable disaster over tstudent radicals-
are hoping that dealing with
third-rate intelligence information occurred and the Tehran embassy was over the
arlah is the way dealing end the
they have had to work with in the Ira-
seized, our long intelligence blackout the We
put hostage crisis, and are trying to crisis," one source said. "But we know
put the blame on past administrations. ?3c Co Co in Iran has caused serious problems
better."
It's understandable that the presi- for Carter . as they try to figure a
dent and his national security adviser, way out of the mess they helped to cre- ate. The sad fact is, our intelligence
ture the selvesnsld, would try to pic-
ure themselves as the innocent reap- agencies know practically nothing'
ers of a whirlwind sown by their about the so-called students who have
predecessors. That way, Carter also led the world to the brink of war by
can harvest the political windfall of taheir intransigence in the hostage situ-
the crisis without having to accent any associ-
Intelligence sources told my
responsibility for causing it ate Dale Van Atta that they have been
Unfortunately for Carter, it's a bum able to identify at least three separate
rap in many respects. While it's true among the terrorist-
that pdevotionto tshah. he aof ec their Captors of groups embassy personnel. But
hand uffed Sthe intelligence gent the haven't been able to provide
its ndc also true that U.S. at Carter and andd Brzezinski much more than the barest of thumb-
Indeed, some U.S. the
intelligence
had two years to correct the situation. lenail aders. sketches
Yet the Iranian revolution a year hasn't even determined the names of
ago. caught U.S. leaders by surprise- several of the apparent ringleaders.
either because our agents were provid- Small wonder, then, that our intelli-,
inc inaccurate information, or their re- Bence community is divided o the best
ports were being ignored by our way to deal with the fanatical phan-
policymakers. toms who are threatening American
Hardworking spies and analysts lives. e who tried to regain the ground that had Our experts aren't even surver. Some takeo been lost over the years in the Iranian stigated b he e embassy mad mullah. Some
intelligence desert, and by midsum. put pointin
that t pat. 've already at ayatollah omade, iinfl outatory state-
part. and State Department ex- menu several days before the seizure
perts warned, months before the in which he called the embassy "a nest
event, that U.S. diplomats might be of spies." They think he may still be
seized as hostages if the former shah calling 'Most Inteh Bence analysts, however, ots.
But
were allowed into this country.
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THE NEW YORK TIMES
20 December 1979
1. 4 c' ?
A.3ALlyof U.S.,
Militants Say Documents
of Embassy Show Links
By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN
Special teT , 4,ww YoftTmw
TEHERAN, Iran, Dec. 19 -The Ira-
nian militants occupying the American.
Embassy here announced tonight the ar
rest of Iran's Ambassador to Scandinavia,
and produced what they said were em-;
bassy documents to accuse him of having;
collaborated with the United States.
Abbas Amir Entezam, who served as
Deputy Prime Minister and spokesman;
for the former revolutionary Government
of Mehdi Bazargan, was the first promi
nent Iranian to be arrested after having,
been mentioned in American diplomatic)
correspondence seized by the militants.
Mr. Entezam's arrest, which according;
to one account took place at the Teheran
airport, occurred after he was summoned
home from Stockholm, purportedly for,
consultations. The militants said tonight
that they had waited for him to be taken
into custody before making excerpts
from the documents public.
Excerpts Road on Television
Two of the young militants, appearing'
unshaven and in rumpled army jackets
on a late evening Iranian television pro.,
gram, read extracts of papers said to
have been taken from the files of the
seized United States Embassy. In them,
Mr. Entezam was portrayed as a friendly
Iranian official who was eager to'mend
relations between his country and the
United States and who had offered to act
as a conduit from his embassy office in
Stockholm.
The excerots read out tonight did not
contain anthat clearly demon-
strated Mr. Entezam had been an agent
for a Central intelligence Agency or
sow at he had done anything to te-
tra his country. But the frequent menni
Iron of him in the documents held by the
radicals, given the current climate of
anti-American feeling, seemed sufficien
to bring accusations of disloyalty if not of
treason, a crime that is punishable byi
death under Iran's Islamic law.
'Intelligent Sneaker' for Regime
The two militants took turns reading
out references to Mr. Entezarn in Persian,
from sheaves of capers piled before them
and in interpreting their significance.
The dates of the correspondence were not
made clear, but they appeared co span a
period from last summer, when Mr. En-:
tezam stepped down as Government
spokesman, to the seizure of the Ameri-
can Embassy on Nov. 4, while he wasi
serving as Iran's ambassador to Sweden,'
Denmark and Norway.
One document read in Persian and at:
tributed to the embassy's charge d'af-
faires, L. Bruce Laingen, described Mr.
Entezam as an "intelligent speaker for',
the revolutionary Government" and "ac-
tively interested in maintaining contacts
with the United States and sincerely'
trying to mend bilateral relations be-,
tween Iran and the United States." The
documents said that the embassy would;
continue talking with him as much as pos-1
ble.
A second document, as read out by onel
of the Iranian radicals, said that the
C.I.A. had asked the embassy to inform
Mr. Entezam that it was rea to ex-
change information after Sept. 10. There
was no other evidence produced to sug-
gestest t ah t~ ntezam was knowingly in-
volved in contacts with the intelligence
agency.
t er purported documents quoted him
as assuring the Americans that it would
be "easier to talk in Stockholm" and that.
he would help when he returned to Tehe-
ran every two months for consultations.
The militants said that he also hoped to.
be appointed as Iran's ambassador to the!
United States.
Mr. Entezam, a former businessman
who imported electrical equipment, was
an active figure in the first Government,
that emerged from the February revolu
tion that deposed Shah Mohammed Riza,
Pahlevi. However, he made a number of
enemies and there were rumors in Tehe-
ran that he had profited from arranging
exit visas for wealthy Iranians who,
wanted to escape the new regime.
His arrest seemed likely to lead to a,
roundup of other Iranian citizens and to
heighten the current antagonism against
the United States in the wake of the em-,
bassy takeover.
Carter Called a 'Frightened Lion'
Earlier today, Ayatollah Ruhollah Kho-
meini likened President Carter to a'
"frightened lion" and said that military
and economic threats by Washington
would have no effect on the Iranian peo-
ple. "These are the cries an animal makes
to frighten its opponents," said the Ira-
nian religious leader, speaking of Ameri-
can pressures that have included a pro-posed naval blockade of the Persian Gulf.,
He made the-remarks in an Interview in
the city of Qum with Mohammed Hassa-j
nein Heykal, an Egyptian journalist now
In disfavor in Cairo., . - ----- - j
"We are not afraid of tough talk 'r-,m
Carter," said Ayatollah :Cwwmeini, w,:o
has consistently supported the takeov-r
of the United States Embassy by the r ac i-
cal youths more than six weeks ago.-.e
asserted that the Iranian people were not
frightened because they welcomed rather:
than feared death. "People say, ' We want,
to be martyrs,' "he asserted.
"Mr. Carter tries to frighten such a
people with military intervention," the
Iranian leader went on. "Mr. Carter him-,
self is frightened because he does not be-,
lieve in the afterlife."
While he was meeting with Mr. Heykal,
tens of thousands of Iranians surged
through the streets of Teheran in a fu
neral procession mourning a murdered
associate of Ayatollah Khomeini. The
procession turned into the most impas-,
sioned anti-American demonstration for:
several weeks.
U.S. Blamed for Killing
Hojatolislam Mohammed Mofateh, the
dean of the Divinity College of Teheran,
University, was shot down yesterday,
along with two bodyguards by unknown
assailants. The policy-making Revolu-i
tionary Council blamed the United States
and the C.I.A. despite the absence of any
evident aahd the contention was echoed,
by the crowds today.
The Ayatollah and his militant support-
ers occupying the American Embassy,
have not budged from their insistence;
that the 50 hostages there will be put oni
trial for espionage unless the deposed;
Shah is sent back to Iran. The only signs;
of a willingness to compromise have
come from a few officials within the Ira-,
nian Government.
Hashemi Rafsanjani, the acting 1Minis-;
ter of Interior and a member of the Revo
utionary Council, raised the possibility
in a Teheran newspaper interview today,
that relatives of the hostages might be al-;
lowed into Iran to see them in the Christ-'i
mas period. I
"About the hostages," he said, "I;
should say that we will be extremely
happy if, from the human point of view,
we create conditions so that these people
can have contact with their relatives and
the American nation so that it can be in-'
formed about the health of these individu-,
als and understood to some extent that
our issue is not the issue of these 50 people
who are hostages but the interests of a
country." Mr. Rafsanjani also has the
title of hojatolislam, of lesser importance
than ayatollah, in the Shiite religious'
hierarchy. The interview appeared in the
newspaper Bamdad.
Decision Up to Khomeini
Asked whether his statement meant;
that the Iranian Government might let
the families of the hostages visit them
during the Christmas season, Mr. Raf-
sanjani replied that this decision was up
to Ayatollah Khomeini and the militants
holding the embassy.
"However, there is a possibility their
families will be allowed to visit them and
we would like such a thing to take place,"
he said.
CD;, TI.v UE,Q
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Militants at the embassy, reached by,
telephone, played down the idea of such!
visits while not ruling it out. A spokesman
called it only a "suggestion" by Mr. Raf-
sanjani and said: "We haven't reached
any decision about that yet."
,L, -,e militants have agreed to accepts
some Christmas cards or the hostages'
though it is not 'Known whether the Amen
cans nave received them, and apparently
they are willing to allow Christian clergy-'
man to see the hostages during the holi
day time. Most of the hostages have been
kept out of sight since their capture on
Nov. 4 and assurances from Ayatollah
Khomeini and the radicals that they are
all in good health have not been con-
f irmed independently.
There were previous hints yesterday
that some Government officials were.
looking for a graceful way to resolve the
confrontation over the hostages. The For-
eign Minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, sug-
gested in an interview that it might help it
the United States undertook its own in-?
quiry into the Shah's alleged misdeeds.,
Mr. Ghotbzadeh had previously been re-'
buked by the embassy militants for sug
gesting that some hostages might bei
released by Christmas.
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yZT 1 ~l+lf .a+ ~.w~
o:1 PAGZ_~L
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WASHHI:+GT0;1 STAR (: LOB)
20 DECDOER 1979
,. custody after secret U.S. Embassy he spoke with the full authority of
?~^~ R ej e redocuvolmuentstionary were p turned over to the Khomeini, but the religiotis leader
j rosecutor. T remained virtually silent on the
;
+. spokesman claimed the ca lured power struggle. . '
~~ documents )rove t e an,. assa.vr Ghotbzadeh's immediate predeces-
tras a sn sor, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, also r an
e red out portions of the Ameri- afoul of the militants. He was subse-
o Hostaves can documents, quoting one in quently replaced.
7 which Charge d'Affaires Bruce Lain-
TEHRAN, Iran (UPI) - Militant gen wrote that Amir-Entezam had. Diplomatic sources said the future
students, scuttling anothr proposal been working to re-establish closer of the hostages might rest on the out
by a member of Iran's government, ties with the United States. come of the struggle. The militants
ruled today that relatives will not be The ambassador, a dgpury premier insist the hostages will be placed on
allowed to make Christmas visits to in'fie rovtsioiia government of trial for spying unless their "mini-
the 50 American hostages being held ormer rime 14inister Atehdi Bazar mum" demand that the shah be
in the U.S. Embassy. : i an tense i trans erre to i returned to Iran is met by the United
"No relatives will be allowed to Swe,en to maintain his A cots States - even though the former
see them at Christmas," a militant facts the spokesman charged. ruler is now in Panama.
spokesman said. "After all, they are\ : He read another document nur-
hostages." - portedly showing a former y , Fighting between rival groups in
art He ' eastern Iran's troubled Baluchistan
He refused to say whether the political officer identi h ro ly CIA officer region, meanwhile, left two persons
hostges - in their 47th day of cap- Mr Stempel had been a
tivity, -- would be allowed to attend in Iran. dead and 36 others wounded, Tehran
Catholic and Protestant church serv. ne militants' announcements Radio reported today. -,.. I
ices next week as promised by For- have been a deep embarrassment to
eignMinisterSadeghGtiotbzadeh. Ghotbzadeh and heightened the It was the latest outbreak of vio-
"That's his opinion, not present struggle with the students lence in areas of Iran where ethnic
necessarily ours," the spokesman -for influence in Iran and the ear of minorities have been Khomgi for
said. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. greater y from
Interior Minister Hashemi Rafsan Earlier this week Ghotbzadeh sug- central government.
jai had raised the possibility of gested a U.S. inquiry into the ousted
Christmas visits yesterday when he shah's rule might improve the cli
said, "There is a possibility their mate in the hostage crisis and possi-
(the hostages') families will be al.. bly speed their release. The
lowed to visit them for Christmas militants opposed the idea, and
and we would like such a thing to Khomeini later said any such pro-
happen." ceeding would have to be in !ran.
The students and Ghotbzadeh In the holy city of Qum, Khomeini
were ocked in a yower stru,~le today said the majority of Americans
after Iran's ambassador to Sweden now oppose any U.S. military inter-
wa arrested on charge of being a vention in Iran to free the hostages.
g "Many of them (Americans) have
TAmilitant s said come to our side. Fifty-five percent
nspokesman
that Ambassador that oa Abbas state of the American public opinion op-
television poses military intervention," he
Amir-Entezam was taken into said. "The American nation is experi-
encing an awakening and will soon
see through these superpowers
trying to impose their will," the 79-
year-old Iranian leader told several
hundred revolutionary guards who
marched past his house shouting,
"We are your soldiers Khomeini."
The militants at the embassy this
week launched a full-fledged public,
attack on Ghotbzadcli, calling his,
optimistic statements on the future
of the American hostages "irrespon-
sible."
They accused him of "deviating"
from Khomeini's wishes and said
many Iranian embassies were nests
for "counter-revolutionaries" and
threatened to occupy them. Ghotb-
zadeh defended himself by insisting
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THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
21 December 1979
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cTi,'T' ~P'~~" ED
o PAGE -
THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
21 December 1979
J.S. ~Iants
Hostages
mute if Tried
?
The Carter administration at
present wants the U.S. hostages in
Iran to stand silent if they are put on
trial and may not provide them with
lawyers. -
Official sources say.this is the.
tentative decision on handling a
situation that the administration is
still trying to head off. Hopes are
waning that the release of the 50
hostages can be obtained before
some form of trial, despite U.S. warn-
ings of further economic pressure or
possibly a naval blockade.
Iranian authorities are talking
about convening an international
tribunal next month to examine al-
legations of U.S. crimes in Iran dur-
ing the rule of deposed Shah Moham-
Reza Pahlavi. The hostages will
med
be used as witnesses before the
tribunal, some authorities have said.
The militants holding the U.S.
embassy in Tehran are still talking
about having spy trials for the cap-
tives. It is not clear whether the
tribunal might merge into trials.
American officials have warned'
that the hostages must not be put on
trial. They have implied that mill.
tary action will be taken if trials are
held. And in public statements they
have refused to discuss the question
of legal defense for the hostages, in-
sisting instead that trials would be
illegal.
But in confidential discussions
the administration has been consid-
ering how to react if a tribunal or
trials go ahead.
The official thinking now is that
the United States will denounce
them as a violation of international
law, which prohibits legal action'
against diplomats, refuse to partici-
pate in the trials, and try to get word
to the hostages that they. should not
testify.
"It's sort of like prisoners of war
they shouldn't give anything more
than name, rank and serial num-
ber," one official said yesterday.
But the administration recognizes
that after two months in captivity
some of the hostages might be in
such a mental condition that they
will cooperate in a trial. Responsible.
officials here hesitate to talk loosely i
about "brainwashing," but the possi-
bility is in their minds.
One reason for not having the hos-
tages testify, officials said, is that
anything they say is likely to be
twisted. While some of the material
found in the embassy and made nub-
the militants seems to show
CIA involvement - which the mili-
tants say proves spv,g - the mili-
tants have also implied hostile and
espionage meaning to routine
embassy materials.
As an example of twisted interpre-
tations, one official mentioned the
papers cited by the militants to
justify the arrest of a former deputy
premier, Abbas Amir Entezam. He
was called home from his post as
ambassador in Sweden and charged
wit being a CIA say because he had
dealt with the embassy in an effort
to improve Iranian-American rela-1
tions.
A second reason for not letting t
hos a es testify is that a material
imp ying acne ty cannot be ex-
Ta ineci away- icia s here concede
that there were personae in the i
em a sy. ey quickiZ add none
01 t e ei activities violated interna-
tional aw on embassy wor and
therefore there is no legal basis for a
trial.
ince any-Iranian jury or interna-
tional tribunal selected by Iran
presumably would already have its
mind made up, the' United States
does not think there is any purpose
in providing lawyers for the hos-
tages.
An attempt to argue points of law
with a regime that is flouting inter-
national law and defying a decision
of the International Court of Justice
- which said last Saturday that the
hostages should be released immedi-.
ately - would just be appearing to
dignify the proceedings -without
helping the hostages, officials think..
The staff of the legal adviser to
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
prepared a memorandum recently
that outlined four possibilities on
providing legal defense if the hos-
tages face trial or tribunal.
The options-were trying to send
lawyers from the United States to de-
fend them, engaging international
legal experts who could argue as
neutral specialists, hiring Iranian
lawyers, and letting the hostages de-
fend themselves. One of them is a
lawyer with experience of repre-
senting the .State Department in-
legal proceedings. -
The memo has been left lying on
top officials' desks and the options
are not being pursued, one source- I
said, because no defense at all seems
the best way to handle the situation.
- Henry S Bradsher.
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ARTICLE
G:i PAGE
21 December 1979
Few Iranian
ats-Hav~m
Left U.S.1.
By Don Oberdorfer
washinE1o Post stolf write[
Despite the widespread public im-
pression that most Iranian diplomats
here have been ordered to leave the
country, ,the State Department said
yesterday that few,, if? any, have actu-
ally left and it is uncertain whether
any will depart in the near future.
The order announced Dec. 12 called
on Iran to cut down its representation
In this country from 218 accredited
diplomatic personnel to only 35, with
a deadline of last Monday, Dec. 17.
The action was taken "to demonstrate
to the government of Iran our contin-
iding concern over the Illegal. holding
of hostages and American property in
Iran," it was announced last week.
State Department officials said the
Iranian Embassy furnished a list Wed-
nesday of 34 officials who have. been
designated to remain. At the same
time, spokesman Hodding Carter said
it Is "murky" whether and when the
vast majority of the diplomatic per-
sonnel will leave.
A substantial number of the Irani-
ans are married to- Americans or are
long-term residents pressed into serv-
ice temporarily by the Iranian regime
after the downfall of the shah, accord-
ing to the State Department. These
people have a claim to remain here on
other grounds, even though they lose
their diplomatic status. -
Other Iranian diplomatic personnel
may wish not to return, on grounds
that they may face persecution at
home, according to the State Depart-
ment. However, there is no report
that any current Iranian diplomats
have sought political asylum.
Those who intend to-leave have
been granted "a decent interval" to
get their affairs in order, Carter said.
He said,the slow-moving and murky
situation is due to "our courts, our
own laws, the procedures of' a civi-
lized' country and the difficulties of
sorting out who Is who" In a demo-
cratic society.
In his daily briefing for reporters,
Carter also said that the possiblity of
a Soviet veto or an unfavorable vote
from other nations in- the U.N. Secu-
rity, Council would not deter, the
i'i.:.ns THE WASHINGTON POST
United States from seeking economic
sanctions against Iran.
No such decision has been made, he
said, but it is among the options un-
der consideration. Some officials be-
lieve President Carter will authorize a
drive for United Nations sanctions in
the next few days. -
"The United States intends to seek
its goals through every appropriate le-
gal avenue ... whatever we think-of
the chances of success," the State De-
partment spokesman said.
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Do-
brynin had been expected to return
from Moscow this week with an answer
to U.S. feelers about economic sanc-
tions on Iran. But Soviet Embassy
officials said Dobrynin is not back,
and they have no indications when he
will return.
The State Department, reversing
last week's strong criticism, praised
Japan for cooperating with measures
to put pressure on Iran. Spokesman
Hodding Carter noted recent state-
ments by Japan's Prime Minister Ma-
sayashi Ohira, as well, as new actions
to prohibit in influx of Iranian oil in
Japan. Carter said- the United States
has been assured that "Japan will,,
keep step with European countries:;,
in applying economic pressure.
While -the administration continues
to expound its policy, a former high
official of the Nixon, Ford and Carter
administrations was sharply critical of
the U.S. failure to take stronger ac.
tion.in the early days of the crisis.
James R. Schlesinger, who served as
CIA director, defense se retarv ar &t
energy secretary, among other ne.
told reporters that the United Stag.:
should have set a deadline for relea3
of the hostages and threatened Irair
with "punishment" if the deadllne'was
not met. +
Asked about the risks to ? the hd -.
tages and the U.S. stakes in the 311d r,
East, Schlesinger declared that-;
"the greatest risks are those assocs.,
ated with inaction." He said tat a
strong. military force should- have
been dispatched to the region at the,
same time the initial ultimatum was
delivered.
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"People think Nixon is a crock and Henry Kissinger
is honest. To me. both of them shared an evil vision
whereby the world would ? be ruled by American power
and a few other powerful nations, plus some multina
tional. corporations - none of which is concerned with
the suffering of the Third World.
"To me, that's the immorality that needs to be at-
tacked: an immorality of social vision."
He preached that view for 17 years as Yale chaplain.
He arrived in 1958 and said the students were a privi-
leged elite with no sense of the injustice in the world. He
became a campus hero in the 1960s, first for his civil
rights activities, then for opposing the Vietnam war.
He was a leader of marches on Washington, a codefen-
dant in the most celebrated antiwar trial (his conviction ,
was reversed on appeal), a leading figure in Norman
Mailer's nonfiction account of Vietnam protest, "Armies
of the Night." With the possible exception of Yale Presi-
dent Kingman Brewster Jr., now Ambassador* to the
Court of St. James's in Britain, Coffin was the than Yale
men most admired.
Unlike Brewster, an aloof and majestic figure, Coffin
mingled. On the opening day of school in 1967, freshman
wearing coats and ties trooped in to watch a processicr,
led by Brewster wearing formal academic robes. After
dinner that day, Coffin appeared in corduroys, a sweater.!
no coat or tie, and sat on the edge of the tage to "rap."
He invariably recognized students, even recent gradu-
ates, as they passed him on the street, called out to them,
made them feel like valued friends.
But by the early 1970s, with the war over and a reces-
sion making getting jobs difficult, the next generation of
students had turned generally conservative. They came.
to regard Coffin as a benign irrelevancy. The media
stopped asking for comment, the activist organizations
disintegrated, Coffin turned 50, and in 1975 he retired to
write an autobiography.
He was something like the bearded would-be-hip
coffeehouse reverend in Garry Trudeau's "Dooaesbury,"
a 1960s activist who ran out of time and causes.
When he took a job, he returned to the establishment,
at Riverside. the Rockefeller family church in New York.
To his embarrassment, his only public opponents on the
church board ignored his decades of activism and con-
demned his two divorces as unseemly for a man of God.
Occasionally he made headlines - blessing a 10-ton.
food shipment to North Vietnam, the first since the end
of the war, or organizing a defense fund for an accused
North Vietnamese spy. But he also presided over the fu-
nerals of Nelson and John D. Rockefeller, who epito
mized the American Imperium he had so often de-
nounced.
It seemed that at 55 he had made his private peace
withAmerica.
Until he was invited to go to Iran.
One of his first comments after the invitation came to !
him and two other US clergymen was that President
Jimmy Carter's call for economic sanctions "was highly
reminiscent of Lyndon Johnson's bombing of North Viet-
nam."
He said: "Patriotism is a wonderful thing, but it must
be based on morality.' He said! "We must never cease
asking what is the virtue of unity if it is.unity in folly."
To his assembled parishioners at Riverside, the man
who has made a religion of politics and a politics of his;
religion said: "Let us gather around the Holy Child rath-J!,
er than rally around the flag."
Then the former (';A specialist on Russia flew off toy
Tehran to tend tote men and wom?n 2ccuscd by Iran of
working for the CIA.
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ARTICLE kPF7'_k-77,
O:i
THE WASHINGTON POST
1 January 1980
Two. Plots to Assassinate .'
Khomeini. Allegedly Foiled
By Ronald Koven
'Weshihfis? Pnft Poison wrrk..
PARIS, Dee. 31 Twice during the
past month, hired killers from Europe
were frustrated in.pians to assassinate
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, accord-
ing to a reliable Western source.
The source speculated that the as-
sassination plots were most probably
ordered by Iranian political exiles
who are centered in Paris, the focus
of the exile-communifys' efforts.to re-.
turn to power in_lran.
On bothroecasions, the source said,
a foreign intellienceservice, learned
of t e assassination plans, and' ar-
ranged to warn the Iranian govern-
ment through diplomatic channels.-
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r
:Ll'YinItZED
U: T
THE NEW YORK TIMES
1 January 1980
The Wrong Iran Lesson on American Intelligence
important to keep those two issues
clearly separated - for the sake of the
hostages as well as for future relations
To The Editor:
It might be hard to get consensus on
what is the most depressing aspect of
our difficulties in Iran, but surely Ray
S. Cline's Op-Ed piece of Dec. 20 must
be a prime candidate. Mr. Cline thinks
that the major lesson for us in that..
tragedy is that we must restore the old
C.I.A. methods and philosophy, but
with a better cover.
Could it be clearer. that that is ex-
actly what we do not need; that it was
precisely what Mr. Cline is calling for.
that got us into the mess-we're in?
The intelligence we need in such
places as Iran is information about the
injustices people are suffering, injus-
tices that, if not corrected, are certain
to lead to festering resentments
against the regime imposing them and
against the United States if it condones
them.
If there was a failure of intelligence
in China long ago, in Cuba, in Vietnam,
in Iran and in many other places, it
was plainly a failure to discern the in-
tensity of grievances that masses of
people were feeling, and the inevitable
attractiveness to them of extremist
solutions in the absence of any reason-
able alternative.
Although the radicals' seizure of the
American hostages cannot be tolerat-
ed, the outrages that pushed them to
that outrage cannot be ignored. It 13 1
I cannot know, of course, whether
there was a failure of our intelligence)
operations to obtain the kind of infor-
mation we needed. It is conceivable)
that, despite Mr. Cline's orientation,
those who were supposed to know such
things did know them, even reported
them, and were ignored. That would
represent an intelligence failure of an-
other sort: either the concealment of
vital information from the American
public or the stupidity of leaders the
public had ignorantly elected.
In any case, the lessons about intelli-
gence that we should be learning from
our recent international debacles are
two: (1) If we fail to appreciate the de-
gree to which our actions and inactions
cause people to resent us, we shall for-
ever be unpleasantly surprised; (2) if.
we appreciate how much we are re-
sented and choose to accept the resent-
ment, then we must also accept the
enormous costs of being totally ruth-
less - and in the long run probably
failing. Ask the Shah.
My best guess is that such reactions
as Mr. Cline's stem from the assump-;
tion that the major objective is to max-1
imize American power, and that all
means directed to that end are justi-
fied. That is a fatal mistake. Thei
major objective is to make sure that
American power is, and is always seen
to be, a means to the protection of free-i
dom and furtherance of justice. The)
two conceptions are worlds apart;':
they lead to radically different kinds;
of actions, including "intelligence"'
gathering, and they will have radi
cally different kinds of consequences.
Mr. Cline thinks that the best way to
prevent "Americans abroad [frrom
being] sitting ducks such as they were in Iran" is to develop better covert;
operations. I think that the best way to
prevent Americans from being seen as!
enemies of the people is for the United'
States not to support enemies of the
people. HARRY C. BREDEME!ER
Professor of Sociology;
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, N.J., Dec. 21,1979
To the Editor-.--
Ray S. Cline cannot really mean that
the C.I.A. replacement should be
called U.S.I.C. "You sick(?)" is' no I
name for an intelligence-gathering
group. Mr. Cline has no understanding I
of the power of a strong acronym. t
What he wants is Intelligence Gather-
ing Opera;ions ("I go!") or United
States Intelligence Receiver ("You j
Sir! ") Never, never "You sick."
DONALD M. KtRSCRENBAtM
- Brooklyn, Dec: 21,19179 .1
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ARTICLE !lu'P3iiri1
PAGB? _
ON
Jack Anderson
o Ice- Vea.,
While deploring the Iranian threat
to world peace and orderly diplo-
macy, the Soviet Union has been
moving quietly to exploit the situa-
tion to its own advantage.
By keeping a low profile and en-
gaging in its usual cynical double-
dealing, the Kremlin hopes to
emerge as the dominant power in a
weak, disunited Iran. To this end,
the Soviets proclaim their support
for the Iranian revolutionaries,
while simultaneously working to
undercut the new regime behind the
scenes.
The Russians obviously welcomed
the ouster of the pro-Westen shah
indeed, may have helped to foment
the revolution that ended his rule.
And the near-anarchy that has fol-
lowed in Iran has been tailor-made
for Soviet mischief-making.
But working both sides of the
street can be a tricky business, even
for such experienced dealers in du-
plicity as the Kremlin bosses. Intelli-
gence sources tell me that the
Soviets are probably no more in con-
tro of events in rant an we are.
Thus, the remain is clearly de-
lighted at the United States' discom-
fiture in the hostage situation, and
its ambassador has been spotted in-
side the captured embassy corn.-
pound, either as coach, cheerleader
or privileged guest perusing secret
documents.
In Moscow, meanwhile, Soviet For-
eign Minister Andrei Gromyko as-
sured Iranian Ambassador Moham-
THE WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1979
mad Mokri that the Soviets "would
not remain neutral" if the United
States should attempt "armed ag-
gression" against Iran.
But at the same time, the Soviets
are believed to he counseling re-
straint out of concern that the situa-
tion might get completely out of
hand. Soviet interests are best
served by keeping the fuse burning
without igniting the powderkeg.
Gromyko, therefore, encouraged
the Iranian ambassador to continue
detaining the hostages - for an-
other year if necessary - without
harming them or provoking the
United States to resort to military ac-
tion. -
The Soviets would like their oil-
rich neighbor to be continually beset
by turmoil, to remain militarily
weak; economically drained and
politically threatened.
Moving into the power vacuum in
southwest Iran, the Soviet-backed
Tudeh Pary has quietly organized
workers in the oil fields, which are
the backbone of the country's econ-
omy. The Sovietized workers are res-
isting attempts by Ayatollah Ruhol-
lah Khomeini. to solidify control of
the vital region.
Clearly, the Soviets are torn be-
tween support for the ayatollah's
revolution and a desire to under-
mine it. They are cautious, there-
fore, about encouraging autonomy
among the Azerbaijanis, Kurds and
other ethnic minorities.
An unpublished report, prepared
for the congressional Joint Eco-
nomic Committee. also makes this
point: "Soviet leaders probably fear
that the evangelism of the Iranian
revolution will cause ... [Soviet
Muslims to demand more autonomy
from the central government in
Moscow."
On the other hand, the unpub-
lished report notes, the Kremlin
might "seek to take advantage of the
discontent among the various Ira-
nian nationalities by attempting to
establish pro-Soviet states among
these people."
Interestingly, Iran's petroleum
reserves figure as importantly in
Kremlin strategic planning as they
do at the White House. ThTh al-
Intelligence Agency. in widely dis- I
puted findings, reported that before
1585 the Soviet union will he unable
to _11 i t its own domest' 5-and -
ural eas needs. Under a 1975 agreement with the
shah, the Russians were to build a
pipeline for export of Iranian nat-
ural gas to Western Europe through
the Soviet Union. The transit fee was
to be paid in natural gas - 13 billion
cubic meters a year. But since the
revolution, work on the pipeline has
stopped, and Khomeini is consider-
ing dropping the project altogether.
So for what cold comfort it play
bring U.S. leaders, their opponents
in the Kremlin are also faced
difficult decisions regarding the
present and future course of Iran
and its troublesome revolution.
,y on Iran laid lo Suviellos ~j
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. Ti'^.i.L' ~'1'1...~u+
oi'1 PAGE,
THE WASHINGTON POST
30 December 1979
Jack Anderson
'Incurable Fondness for Dictators'
The Iranian crisis won't disappear
when the fate of the hostages is finally
settled. Recriminations will start bub-
bling to the surface of the American
political landscape.
The question to be answered goes
deeper than our humiliation in Tehran,
serious as that has been. It goes to the
heart of U.S. foreign policy. what is to
blame for the hatred and ridicule that
have been heaped on this country in re-
cent years. and what can be done to re-
verse the situation? In a way. it's unfor-
tunate that this issue will be discussed in
the overblown rhetoric of an election
year, because it is one that. deserves
more dispassionate consideration.
The Iranian crisis is only the latest,
and most dramatic, evidence of the en-
mity the United States has aroused by
its support of repressive dictators in
the name of anti-communism. In Nica-
ragua, a Tehran-style backlash was pre-
vented only because the revolutionar-
ies who ousted the U.S.-backed Anasta-
sio Somoza were less fanatical than the
mullah in Iran. In Cambodia, revenge
for our support of the corrupt Lon Nol
was avoided because there were no
Americans left to terrorize. In.South
America and Africa, we continue to
prop up the regimes of generals who
beat their countrymen with one hand
and rob them with the other.
But it was too little and too late. The
revolutionaries who ousted the shah
remembered only the decades of U.S.
support for the tyrant, not Carter's
pressure on him to moderate his rule.
And to our client dictators, who have
been trading on their anticommunism
for billions in U.S. aid over the years,
Carter's abandonment of the shah was
seen as simple treachery to an old ally.
The Intelligence community's role in
America's current no-win predicament
erta my worth 1ookinQ LCO. Dld oils
lntelligence-ftathering agencies send
hones accurate information to Wash-11 ington, where it was distort at the to evels to co orm to - it1C - i-
c
ties ahead estabilshed? Or di~theex-
parts at the Centr Agency and the State Department cen-
sor their,own reports to tell the olicy-
makers what they wanted to ear.
For years I had. reported that the
shah was unpopular with the Iranian 7
masses and quite likely to be deposed
by popular revolution. is in orma-
tion was reported by U.S. intelligence,
which considered the shah an unstab e
me omaniac. But it was apparett y
i aored in or of more optimistic as-
sessments.
only two months before the shah's
collapse, Carter's national security ad-
viser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, telephoned !
the Iranian dictator and assured him
corrupt 40 years of family rule was
made possible by U.S. backing-was
losing out to a popular revolt, did the
United States give up-after an ate!
tempt to rob the rebels of victory by
back-door maneuvering.
Our apparently incurable fondness .
for dictators-who need only to spout a '
convincing anti-communist line and?as=
sure us of their stability-may get us in
more trouble before too long. In Argen-
tina and Chile, we continue to back
repressive military regimes to protect.
U.S. business interests. And in Zaire,
another enjoys American support,
President Mobutu Sese Seko, is repor'
tedly heading toward a Somoza-style
debacle. He has enriched himself while
his people starved and imprisoned any ;
who dared criticize his dictatorship. _
But he jovially wines and dines U.S. of-?,
ficials and businessmen.
Robert Remole, former head of the
U.S. embassy's political section in Kin-
shasa, told me Mobutu's days may he
numbered. Remole's summary of the-41
situation puts the U.S. predicament in a.
nutshell.
"Mobutu's an s.o.b.," he explained,:.
"but the powers-that-be say, as always,'
that he's our s.o.b. I'm sure he's not"
going to be around much longer.... the'
people of Zaire will blame the United-
States for supporting him."
Those who will not learn from his-.
tory are doomed to relive it. It's time ;
U.S. policymakers read a little of our'
recent history so we won't be doomed'
to repeat it endlessly.
oiY79,un-taFaaie.e~LCat~,LaG
,
s n
t
in U.S. policy toward these repressive j that the United States was behind him
regimes might spare us future Tehrans 100 percent. In a matter of weeks, the
-and Islamabads and Tripolis-when reality of the shah's collapsing situation
the inevitable revolutionaries throw ? finally sank in, and Carter withdrew
the rascals out. his pledge of support, after the shah
As a basically decent man who inher- had refused to liberalize his rule.
ited years of locked-iaconcrete alll- : in Cambodia, knee-jerk anticommu-'
an-
antes, Jimmy Carter has reaped the nism saddled the United States Lon
whirlwind sown by his p :other corrupt, unpopular
After two years of kowtowing to Shah NoL When this pathetic bumbler was
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, for example, thrown out by the savage Pot Pot re-
b
he was finally persuaded that the
shah's fate was sealed, and played a
crucial role in his final exit
a change
ot already too late
i
If i
y
gime, which was in turn overthrown
Vietnamese-backed communists, the
United States had no place to go. The re-
sult was the shameful U.S. vote in the
United Nations to recognize the govern
ment of Pot Pot, although he had butch-
ered half the population of Cambodia.
In Nicaragua, only when it became
obvious that Anastasio Somoza -whose
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//~~ (fir lFPI;ARUD
AIL i IL JP J t~~
T J fI
THE NEW YORK TIMES
30 December 1979
Carter r i learn'
Gets Its Act Together
By STEVEN R. WEISMAN
WASHINGTON - Carter Administration conduct
of foreign policy has sometimes tended to be disor-
derly, as In the case of former Ambassador Andrew :
Young's unauthorized meetings at the United Na-
tions with Palestine Liberation Organization offi-
dials. By contrast, in dealing with Iran, the Presl
dent's advisers have displayed an unusual degree of,
unity. There have been almost no signs of internal
discord, and secrecy has been tightly maintained an
sensitive actions such as unannounced messages to,
the Teheran authorities and undisclosed military
moves bolstering the announced buildup.
Mr. Carter tells White House visitors that he has
never seen his foreign policy machinery function so
smoothly. Despite differing approaches to world poll-,
tics, participants are unanimous in assigning pri-?
ority to the plight of the hostages, White House offs-I
dials say. But they also suggest that with Iran, the',
Administration's "crisis management" operation
has come into its own.
From the moment the United States Embassy was
seized in Teheran on Nov. 4, the President issued or-
ders to avoid the disarray - and appearance of dis-
array - that characterized Iran policy a year ago.
Then, the Administration shifted fitfully from un-1
swerving support of the Shah to conciliation of "mod-I
erate" forces struggling to bring him down, followed
by a period of recrimination over the inadequacy of
American intelligence and foresight in Iran.
The primary vehicle for crisis management is the
Special Coordination Committee of the National Se-
curity Council - a working group of top aides'
presided over by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National)
Security Adviser. Their discussions in the window-
less, woodpaneled Situation Room in the White House
basement open with the domestic, legal, economic
and energy-related aspects of the crisis. Then, they
turn to security and diplomatic issues - secret
maneuvers and the channels of communication, how- f
ever tenuous, with the Iranian revolutionary Govern-
ment. Those present without a direct interest - the
President's domestic advisers - leave the room at!
this point, underlining the insistence on secrecy.
Mr. Carter set up the Special Coordination Com-,.
mittee early in 1977 as a subgroup of the National So-
curity Council. During the eight-week Iran crisis, the
parent N.S.C. - Mr. Carter, Vice President Mon-;
dale, Secretary of State Cyrus It Vance, Defense;
Secretary Harold Brown, Gen. David C. Jones, chair-i
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Adm. Stanfield;
Turner, director of Central IntelliQen met i
fewer than h dozen times. The S.C.C. meets al-
most every morning. briskly hurrying through a
fixed agenda. The members include security aides,
and Hamilton Jordan, White House chief of staff;
Jody Powell, the press secretary; Treasury Secs;
tary G. William Miller; Charles W. Duncan Jr., Sec-i
retary of Energy; White House counsel Lloyd Cutler;;
domestic affairs adviser Stuart E. Eizenstat. ands
Hedley W. Donovan. senior adviser to the President.
Mr. Brzezinski's staff types up the minutes fog
President Carter every day, allowing space for himt
to write notes in the margin and to ratify decisions by,
checking a box marked "agree" or "disagree." By
Mr. Brzezinski's order, S.C.C. members do not re-,
ceive copies of the minutes, even at the next day's
meeting when they are read aloud with the Presi-
dent's comments. They are kept in a fat gray loose-
leaf notebook on Mr. Brzezinski's desk.
"The President wanted more discipline, and het
wanted Brzezinski to exercise it on his behalf," said a i
senior official-"When he approved the compartaten.
talization of the meetings, he made it possible to en-
force that discipline. He was determined that this,
crisis be run by him directly, and he laid down the!
rules that everybody has accepted. 11 i
"When you think about it, it's absolutely amazing
that there have been so few leaks." another official
said. Last Nov. 20, for example, when the White'
House issued its strong warning against putting the
hostages on trial - implying a threat of military re;
taliation -- a private message in much stronger
terms was conveyed at the same time through diplo-l
matic channels. It warned the Iranians of "grave
consequences" if trials took place. "They understood
that doesn't mean economic consequences," an aide:
said. Existence of this note did not become known,
until recently, and officials say there are several)
other such communications, still secret. The United)
States is also understood to have taken several, un.!
disclosed military maneuvers beyond those an.
nounced "so that if we had to take military action,
we'd be in a position to do it," the aide added.
The White House precautions seem to have found al
counterpart American news organizations' restraint.1
Several have compiled lists of the hostages in Tehe-4
ran, but few have publicized them, at least in full.j
The State Department has refused to confirm names,
contending that "would not be in the best interests"'
of the hostages and their families.
Replying to suggestions that S.C.C. secrecy policy]
may deprive them of fresh viewpoints White Houses
orrrcials point to task forces under the committee's1
jurisdiction designed to explore alternatives, bring-I
ing to the President the thinking of outsiders, includ-i
ing academic experts and others with thoughts about
the psychology of the Iranian revolutionary leaders.
The liveliest debates, one participant said. haw'
not concerned particular tactics, but rather "basic;
assumptions." These, he said, go beyond the geopo-
litical ramifications of United States actions in the,
Middle East, to such questions as the rationality of
the Iranian authorities. "Our basic operating as-,
sumption all along Is that the Iranian leaders are ra-i
tional, that the holding of the hostages is not the most
important thing in the world to them _ that there is a i
cost beyond which they wouldn't go in order to keep)
the hostages," this official said. "But how can you bel
sure that assumption is correct?"
Secrecy has had its drawbacks, however, in mak-
ing the Administration's case to the American pub-)
lic. For one, American officials disagree with a pub-i
lic perception that virtually none of their efforts have!
produced tangible results. One top official said the'
President was convinced, from information providedi
by diplomatic intermediaries, that the Iranians tad',
in fact responded to American threats of military ac-i
Lion and, as a result. had deferred action on trials of
the hostages. Whatever evidence there may be fort
this assertion has been withheld, however.
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ARTICLE
P::+?s'
THE WASHINGTON POST
ON PAGEs
-
29 December 1979
A atollah Paperback Out - With H; elp From 0
't
CIA translated Khomeini's thoughts,
but Manor Books marketed them.
By Warren Brown
wxshinKton foal staff writer
Some enterprising Americans have
found a way to turn the ayatollah Ru-
hollah Khomeini's sayings into money.
They have published a Central In-
telligence Agency translation of Kho-
meini's theories and put them into a
slick paperback entitled: "Ayatollah
Khomeini's Mein Kampf: Islamic Gov-
ernment."
The asking price is $2.50.
The act of publication by Manor
House Books in New York City is le-
gal. Anyone could do it.
"It's done fairly frequently," said
Kathy Pherson, CIA public affairs of-
ficer, "It's no fancy deal."
It.works like this. The CIA, using
the services of its Joint Publications
Research Service in Arlington, fre-
quently translates foreign language
documents for agency analysts.
Just as frequently, especially if
they are adjudged to be of "public
interest," the typewritten translations
are turned over to the National Tech-
nical Information Service (NTIS) in
the Department of Commerce.
The NTIS documents are unclassi-
fied and can be had by anyone-for
a price, but not for profit, since the
government is not a profit-making or-
ganization.
However, private entrepreneurs can
reprint the documents fora profit.
Ironically, in the case of the Kho-
meini book, the sayings of the ayatol-
lah apparently are cheaper from tha
private publisher than from the fed
eral government
Pherson's "unofficial" cost estimate
of the NTIS copy of Khomeini's words
was $6.25, compared to the $2.50 asked
b AT or Books
an
y
Translations of other Khomeini
speeches and position statements also
are at NTIS, Pherson said. She said
the document published by Manor
originally was published by the CIA's
Joint Publications Research Service
on Jan. 19. There is no copyright on
U.S. government publications.
Manor officials were unavailable for
comment last night. However, the
first page of the paperback carries
this statement:
"Understanding the intentions and
tactics of an enemy is the first de.
fense against him. In that spirit we of-
fer this volume.-The Publishers."
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AR' I CTJ2 Al ?Fr's;F:?
or; PAGE_
WASHINGTON STAR
29 DECE -IBER 1979
By Lance Gay
WashingtoaStarStatf Writer
The clergymen who visted the
American hostages in Tehran say:
they could see no speedy way of re-
solving the crisis in Iran now that
the positions on both sides have
hardened.
But the three; the first Americans
allowed to visit the hostages since
they were captured eight weeks ago,
said yesterday-the hostages are safe,
in good condition and guarded by
"deeply convicted" young Iranians
who do not want to harm them.
"I don't-see an easy way out," said
Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton.
Roman Catholic auxiliary bishop of
Detroit.
The students, he said, continue-to
demand the return of the shah and
"they seem to be absolutely adamant
on it. They are not going to be re-
lenting easily. So it is going to con-
tinue to-require great- patience on.
our part, on the part of the hostages
and the part of the people here."
Gumbleton said he cannot suggest
any quick way out.
"I'm not able to imagine what
steps could be taken, that's not my
role," he said.
The Rev. William Sloan Coffin of
New York's Riverside Presbyterian
Church said he sees no way out of
the present crisis unless the United.
States offers some sort of small ges-.
!He said the administration could
rna e es ures such as promising not
to aepor ranian students. Lakin
out lull page-a s forte Ayarn'
u o a .omeini in newspapers s owing tae ranian si e o tile ats-
s
u e, or urnin over paper
concerning U.S. policy in Iran for
the last quarter of a century-
"I think the same arrogance, as
admitting the shah against the ad-
vice of our own embassy, is still
operating when we think we can get
our hostages out without paying any
price for it," Coffin said.
"The more we exert conventional
pressure, the more hardened the re-
sponse will be," said the Rev. M.
liam Howard, president of the Na-
tional Council of Churches-
The three clerics came here
yesterday to meet with Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance, State Department
officials and the families of the 43
hostages they saw in Iran. Shortly
after the meeting with Vance, Carter
reiterated U.S. policy warning that
Iran faces increasing pressure if the
hostages are not released..
In an two-hour meeting at the U.S.
Catholic Conference headquarters
here, the three clerics also met with
50 relatives of hostages and gave
them messages that had been scrib-
bled out or memorized.
Gumbleton said the clerics have
decided not to release the names of
the 43 hostages they met with "at the
-
request of the families."
The group carried back no diplo-
matic message from the students or
-the Iranian, authorities, Gumbleton
said. "We were not there to do the
work of the government. That was
-not our mission," he said.
The group conveyed "impres-
sions" of what they found on their
-two-day.trip. Gumbleton said the
main impression he got was that the
"students are in charge, they're the
ones who are running the com-
pound."
The other impression he got was
T'a"JOVAJr
"They agree that this is wrong, but
they say, 'You have to understand
the wrongs we have had to endure
for 26 years.' We talked to clergy who
were themselves in jail (under the-
shah) and they say. 'What about that.,
wrong)."' he said. -
Gumbleton told the-families of
hostages that "the foreign minister
in Tehran told us that the Ayatollah.
Khomeini has instructed the stu-
dents not to let anything happen to
any hostage."
The trio said they were instructed
before they saw the hostages not to
discuss current events with the
group, and Coffin said It was.
stressed to the clerics not to tell the,
hostages that the shah had left the
United States for Panama.
ture to express the gratitude of the -
United States for allowing the-
clergymen to visit the hostages...
Threatening Iran with economic
sanctions only serves to stiffen the
resistence of the captors, he main-
tained. -
"It may be hard to get out of, but it
was the easiest thing to get into. The
dumbest thing we did was to admit
the shah, particularly with those-
telegrams coming over from the -
embassy saying don't do it. But now
we're in it and I think some recipro-
cal gestures is the business of diplo-
macy," Coffin said.
that the captors were firm in their
I position on the return of the shah.
Gumbleton said he discussed the-
hostage-taking with Moslem reli-
gious leaders in Iran and, said they
indicated belief the so-called stu-
dents were wrong.
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TI JE 12 FiitED
THE WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1980
So-Viets Say C-1
Trained Afghan
. a .
Rebels in. Fakistan
By Kevin Klose
Wa.hinston Post Poreirn Service
MOSCOW, Jan. 1=The Soviet Un-
ion expanded its allegations of Ameri-
can subversion in Afghanistan -today
in a continuing effort to blunt world
criticism of the Soviet military inter-
vention there.
An authoritative article in the gov-
ernment newspaper Izvestia said,
The U.S. Central Inttlligence Aden
is direct y involved in-training Afghan
rebels in ca -
ining con acs with counterrevolu-
tionaries and reactionaries in Atgfiafi-
'
stan itself."
The paper claimed that CIA agents
under Coyer of -the anti r71' hnarrl
and the American 'Asian Fund' nne*-
ate in the area of the-Afghan-Pakistan
frontier."
Izvestia apparently meant the U.S.
.Drug Enforcement. Administration
(DEA). which has investigators in the
South Asia region as part of the fed-
eral government's worldwide narcot-
ics traffic suppression efforts. The
"Asia Fund" could not be specifically
identified but may be a Soviet refer-
ence to the Asia Foundation. a private
American assistance oganization..
The State Department refused to
comment on the Soviet charges, but
one official said a DEA agent is per-
manently assigned to the embassy in
Afghanistan. The agent. however, was
out of the country'on vacation at the
time of the Soviet incursion, accord-
ing to the official.
Under the authorship of Mikhail
Mikhailov, regarded here as an au-
thoritative voice, reflecting leadership
views, Izvestia expanded earlier offi-
cial accusations to include Britain and
Pakistan, along with China and Egypt,
in the alleged subversion effort under-
taken by Washington in Afghanistan.
"Pakistan's anti Afghan course had
the support of the U.S. and Britain."
the paper said, "and was decisively
the result of instigations on the part
of these countries, China, Egypt, and
some others."
Two days ago, the Communist Party
paper Pravda hinted strongly that
Pakistan was invovled directly in the
alleged subversion plot. By naming Is-
lamabad in today's account, the Sovi-
ets appear to have written off any
early easing. of their already strained
relations with the Pakistanis, who
have strongly backed China in a. se-
ries. of Soviet-Chinese confrontations
Islamabad, like Tehran and other.
Moslem capitals, has sharply de-
nounced the Soviet military incursion,
which Washington estimates at be-
tween 30,000 and 40,000 with another
12.000 or so ready to cross the border..:
Meanwhile, the official Soviet Tass
agency reported a telegram of thanks
to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev
from Babrak Karmal, who came to
power in Kabul Thursday in the So-viet-backed coup. . .-
Babrak, a staunchy pro-MIoscowi
communist who was pursed from Ka-
bul leadership last year by the man he{{
overthrew, Hafizullah Amin, told'
Brezhnev he is "convinced that with
the fraternal assistance and undimin-
ishing cooperation" of the Soviets,
"we shall win and overcome all diffi-
culties we inherited from the past."
Soviet media have avoided describ-
ing the insurgents opposed to Kabul's
Marxist government as Moslems in
an apparent attempt to improve re-
lations with other-Moslem countries.
In descrihing the angry rally by
Afghan exiles at the Soviet Embassy
in Tehran today, Tass simply called
them "hooligans who refused to dis-
close their names" and said they were
"hostile to the Afghan revolution."
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0-i
THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
31 December 1979
U.S. Reslales Pled V -,e P~- k mr:
Brzezinski Says U.S. Force
Possible to Counter Soviets
By Walter Taylor
Washington star staff writer
In an unusually blunt warning.
presidential adviser Zbigniew Brze-
zinski says that the United States
would be prepared to react with
military force if the Soviet Union
carries its Afghanistan incursion
into neighboring Pakistan.
Brzezinski, appearing yesterday
on ABC's "Issues and Answers," re-
ferred pointedly to a 1959 agreement
with Pakistan, which lies to the
south and east of Afghanistan and
.which reportedly has been aiding
rebel Afghan factions. He said he
had been authorized, presumably by
President Carter, to publicly reaf-
firm the agreement
"In case of aggression against
Pakistan," he said, reading from a
text of the document. "the United
States, in accordance with its consti-
tutional procedures, will take such
appropriate action, including the
use of armed force ... in order to as-
sist the government of Pakistan at'
its request."
"We want it to be understood,"
added Brzezinski, Carter's chief na-
tional security adviser, "that the
United States stands by its commit-
ments, and its friends should be sure
of that and any potential adversaries
should have no illusions about that."!
Brzezinski's remarks were thel
strongest public statement by a i
White House official to date follow-
ing Russsia's acknowledged partici-j
pation last week in a coup that saw
one pro-Soviet regime in Afghanis-
tan liquidated. and supplanted by
one even more closely identified.
with Moscow.
The president last week formally
protested the Soviet action and the
continuing movement of Russian
troops into Afghanistan, saying it
could have "serious consequences"
for relations between the two super-
powers.
In addition, Carter dispatched
Deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher to meet with U.S. allies:
to discuss possible joint countersteps
to the Soviet move. Christopher new
to London yesterday for consulta-
tions with Western European allies
and representatives from nations in
the Afghan region, notably Pakistan.
The protest and Christopher's trip
have not deterred the Soviets from',
continuing the deployment of com-
bat troops into Afghanistan, how-'
ever. Brzezinski acknowledged that
since Carter's protest, conveyed di-
rectly to Soviet President Leonid
Brezhnev via the Washington-Mos-
cow "hotline," the Soviets actually
have increased the concentration of
troops in Afghanistan.
gj,d there was "increasing evi-
dence" aooarent.1 from US. SPY
satellites that Russian troops e-
ed to the Afghan-Soviet b roe
had begun to cross t e rontier y
land and occupy key urban areas.
He cited movements by Soviet
armored columns into areas of the
northwest and additional northeast-
ern areas of Afghanistan yesterday.
"Several tens of thousands of
men" were involved in these maneu-
vers and the total number of Rus-
sian troops in Afghanistan now is
estimated at between 20,000 and 25,-
000, he said.
Brzezinski dodged questions about
possible direct response by the
United States to what he character-
ized as the Soviet's "naked use of
military force." For example, he
would neither rule out nor embrace
the suggestion that the United States
might provide military aid to guer-
rilla units battling the Kabul gov-
ernment.
But he stressed repeatedly that
the United States his "certain inter-
ests" in that part of the world "by
which it will stand" and said specifi-
cally than Carter had reaffirmed to
Pakistan the U.S. defense commit-
ment.
"It is an important commitment
and the United States will stand by
it," Brzezinski said.
The United States this year cut off
most economic and military aid to
Pakistan in a dispute over Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program. The at-
tack on and destruction of the U.S.
Embassy in Pakistan's capital
several weeks ago further strained
relations between the two nations.
Brzezinski implied, however, that
the aid cutoff decision could be
quickly reversed if Soviet military
activity spread south or east across
Pakistan's borders.
"The security of the independent
countries in the region is not a mat-
ter of indifference to us, not is it a
matter of indifference to the inter-
national community," he said.
"The only way to preserve peace is
for all concerned to understand that
there are certain explicit limits to
unilateral action and that these
limits must be respected."
Noting Afghanistan's border with
Iran to the west, Brzezinski also said
that Iran, locked in a dispute with
the United States over its detention
of American hostages in Tehran,
ought to be particularly alarmed
over the latest Soviet moves.
"Every sober-headed Iranian"
ought to ask himself, said Brze-
zinski, "what do the events in Kabul
portend for.Tehran? There have
been Soviet troops before in Tehran.
Tehran could be next."
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A3TICL 'aP2' xD
U.S. Affirms
Clo P~kis-tan
New Soviet Moves
Into Neighboring
Afghanistan Noted
C
By Don Oberdorfer
Washitttton Pest staff writer
The United States publicly and
pointedly reaffirmed its 20-year-
old commitment to the security of
Pakistan yesterday, as its next door
neighbor, Afghanistan, was re-
ported invaded by new, heavily
armed military units of the So-
viet Union.
Presidential national security af-
fairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski,
speaking on "Issues and Answers"
(ABC, IVJLA), read portions of the
1939 U.S.-Pakistan ao eement, as a
public message to Pakistan and the
world that "it is an important com-
mitment and the United States will
stand by it."
Brzezinski said he had been specifi-
cally authorized to reaffirm the U.S.
commitment, presumably by Presi-
dent Carter.
There is no indication that the con-
tinuing flow of Soviet forces Into Af-
ghanistan, described by Brzezinski as
"direct invasion" and "large-scale ag-
gression," is likely to move on- to
Pakistan in the short run. However, a
Soviet-dominated Afghanistan man-
ned with Soviet.combat forces would
be an ominous new fact of life for al-
ready unstable Pakistan to deal with,.
and would -present a long-range mili-
tary threat of major dimensions..
The 1959. commitment read. by
Brzezinski calls for the United States,-..
in case.. of- communist -aggression
against-Pakistan,-to take. appropriate:
action, including the ? use -o! armed-
force, as agreed by the two nations
and in accordance with-U.S_constitu-.
tional procedures."
Official sources said..the -commit-
rat nt has been. reaffirmed privately
on at least three previous occasions- in
thi& last year, as Pakistan worried
about conditions in Afghanistan and.
about repeated charges and warnings.
from Moscow concerning alleged Pak-
istani istani aid to Moslem insurgents bat-
tling pro-Soviet governments in c.f-?
ghanistan.... - : - ti
THE WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1979
After a telephone conversation Fri.
day between Carter and Gen. Moham-
med Zia ul Haq, Pakistan's president,
U.S. Ambassador Arthur 1-Pummel be-
gan intensive discussions with Pakis
tani officials about new measures to 'l
assist that country and assure its secu-
_
rity.
. These discussions, which are re-
ported here to be still in an early
stage, are complicated by the applica-
tion of U.S. nonproliferation laws bar-
ring economic and military assistance
to countries seeking to produce or ac-
quire nuclear weapons for the first
time. Early this year the United
States cut off aid to Pakistan, except
for food assistance, under these laws
because of Pakistan's secret drive to
build an atomic weapons capability.
Official sources said it is unlikely
that Pakistan will stop its nuclear de-
velopment. In this circumstance, di-
rect U.S. help will be limited by law
to food aid and cash sales of military
equipment and supplies.
Carter, in a White House luncheon
with reporters Saturday, made known
his resolve to speed up delivery to
Pakistan -of purchased weapons and
spare parts, estimated to be about
silo million worth of armored person-
nel carriers. tactical missiles, ammuni i
tion and spare parts. -
Pakistan has made no new- weapons
request to Washington since the open
Soviet moves in Afghanistan began a
week ago, according to officials, nor is
it clear. what role- the Pakistanis envi-
sion for the United States in view of
the.. still growing : Soviet presence
across th border.
Islamice fundamentalism and anti-
American sentiments in Pakistan have
been stirrred by, the'strident appeals
of Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini and
other figures in Iran,. another impor-
tant Pakistani neighbor. On Nov. 21, a
Pakistani mob attacked _ and burned
the U.S.. Embassy in Islamabad, lead-
ing to the. departure, of many Ameri-
cans.
New signs of'-Pakistan's sensitivity
to its Iranian neighhor were official
statements ver the weekend that
against Iran. where 50 Americans have
been held hostagerrinceirov::~l, and
that" it, takes exception.?'to : the U.S.
freeze of Iranian financial assets. This
suggests that despite- an enhanced So-
viet military threat.:. Pakistan may
choose to continue a lnw profile rela-
tionship with Washington while the
U.S.-Iranian conflict : ontinues.
Brzezinski, in his television inter.
view, said there is increasing evidence-
of large-scale Soviet troop movements
into Afghanistan at two points along
the border-,from Soviet Kushka into
the Afghan city of Herat and from So-
viet Termer toward the Afghan capi-
tal of liabul and the nearby airport at
Bagram. i?
The national security adviser said
the Soviet fore's in,-lude "armored'
formations, a lar_e number of. heavy
tanks. the most mourn Soviet tanks,
Soviet armored personnel carriers,
motorized infantry and so forth:' lie
said that Saturday's official estimate
of 20,000 to 23,000 S u v i e t combat
troops. plus about 5.030 other Soviet
military personnel, probably has been
exceeded. but officials did not release
a higher total yesterday.
Of greater potential significance
than t e continuing mu%emeti act s~
th glaa or er are mte sRenee re-
orts that large numbers of ad itLOn3
corn at units are being move wit n
,, lie Soviet Union in ways that sug?_est
the may be iea a to the border
area for assignment to the nauj
front.
The Soviet forces that have entered
Afghanistan so for may be adequatei
to secure key cities, airports and im
portant roads, according to U.S. offi-
cials. :Movement of additional units'
on a large scale to Afghanistan in days
to come would be taken here as a sign
that the Soviets intend all-out military
operations against rebellious Islamic
tribesmen.
Brzezinski declined to say wheiher
the United States is considering mill
tary aid to the rebel forces in Afghan-
istan. However, informed sources indi-
cated that this is among the subjects
to be discussed in London today by
Deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher with senior officials of
Britain: France, West Germany, Italy
and Canada in a meetng on possible
responses to the situation in Afghani-
stan.
Christopher, boarding a Concorde
flight to London, called the Soviet in-
tervention "a grave threat to interna-
tional stability." He added, "I think
the world community is so- outraged
that the Soviets will find in the long
run that it will be most, costl:.to,
them." .:Y.:.
Following)-the: surfd'on nzeetutg,
Christopher is -scheduled to go to
Brussels, where a special meeting of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza
tion council has been scheduled. Tues-
day to discus, hani.st*i_,
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C'.t 1:.CI ..:
THE NEW YORK TIMES
3 January 1980
WASHINGTON, Jan. 2 (AP) - Law-.I
yers for Philip Agee, a former officer of
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the!
State Department will meet with Federal1
District Judge Gerhard Gesell tomorrow
to discuss steps in Mr. Agee's fight to r&
gain his revoked passport. I
On Monday, Federal District Judge
Barrington D. Parker rejected a request
by Mr. Agee's lawyer, Melvin Wulf, to
issue a temporary restraining order bar-
ring Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
frorrtstripping Mr. Agee of his passport.
Mr. Vance. ordered Mr. Agee's passport
revoked after the former intelligence offi
cer, who lives in Hamburg, West Germa-
ny, spoke of involving himself in the Ira-
nian hostage situation.
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Ait?IOIL3 SPP~
C:f PAC-3
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
2 JANUARY 1980
A former CIA agent will get a new
hearing.
Philip Agee
~Y H
-?4
Philip Agee, who was turned down
'
in an initial legal bid to h i s ' '
U.S. passport, was granted the hear--
ing after a US. district judge agreed-
that the case presented "substantial
issues" that merited a further hear-
ing. Agee, who had written-books and
articles on the CIA since quitting the-
agency several years ago, was,
stripped of his passport Dec. 23 by
Secretary of State-Cyrus K. Vance.
The action was taken after-Agee, who
now lives in West Germany, had
spoken of involving himself in the
Iranian hostage situation.. .
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ARTICLE APP1&jct:D
ON PAGE -
THE WASHINGTON POST
1 January 1980
The U.S. District Court fot thr-Dts4
tract of Columbia denied a requestSo
an order temporarily- restraining.thi.
overturn a State Department order.r
unkind his n~ssri,,rl
his first court battle yesterday- t
Former CIA agent Philip Agee Ios,
Regain Passport
Agee Is Rebuffed.-
In Court Fiaht to >
department's action..
The department revoked.:-Agee
passport: Dec. 22 on grounds' ot,ntr>
tional security. Agee had sugge*sbed44t
the militants occupying the U.S.: E
bassy In Tehran that they reieas
their captives In exehange'`idr theM
complete Central Intelligence :Ageq
.fuel on operations in Iran.
The request for a temporarg' r
straining order was, filed with the f
eral court yesterday by Agee's.?Ne
York attorney; Melvin Wulf;- and'-
representative- of the American, Ci
Liberties Union, Charles Simmsr.
The petition asked that Secretary o fa
State Cyrus R. Vance- withdraw thi-O
order revoking Agee's passport. By
noon, the petition was denied.
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ARTICLr; APPEARED
0:v
THE NEW YORK TIMES
1 January 1980
Plea by Ex-c.I.A. Agent to Restore Passport Is Denied,
By ROBERT PEAR
Specbl W T New Yak rtmee
WASHINGTON, Dec. 31 - Attorneys
for Philip Agee, a former employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency, filed suit in
Federal District Court here today in an
effort to force the State Department to re-
store his passport, which was revoked.
nine days ago on national secprity
Judge J Barrington D. Parker said after
a court hearieg that the case raised
"very important and fundamental
issues" involving Mr. Agee's First-
Amendment rights, his right to travel and
the authority at the Secretary of State.
But he denied Mr. Agee's request for im-
mediate relief -a temporary restraining
order against the State Department -
saying that his attorneys had not shown
that their client would suffer immediate,
irreparable injury. Another judge will
probably hear further arguments later
this week on the request for an injunction.
Mr. Agee. who lives in Hamburg, West
Germany. has been an outspoken critic of
the Central Intelligence Agency and its
clandestine activities. He has written a
book and several" articles that, the Gov-
ernment says, disclosed classified infor-
mation, including the names of covert
C.I.A. agents.
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance took
the extraordinary step of revoking his
passport after finding that his activities
"are causing or are likely to cause seri-
ous damage to the national security or
the foreign policy of the United States."
NeverTested In Corot .
State Department lawyers said that the
1967 regulation used in the move had been
employed in only a few other cases and
had never been fully tested in court..
Mr. Agee's? lawyers asserted that his
passport had been revoked "without duei
Philip Ages
Lary of State to revoke a passport for na-
tional security or foreign policy reasonsi
was invalid because it went beyond any
l
Mr. Agee has proposed exchanging thel
intelligence agency's files on Iran for thei
hostages at the United States Embassy in j
Teheran. I
Glenn V. Whitaker, a Justice Depart
went lawyer defending the State Depart-I
merit's action, said Mr. Agee should not
be allowed to have his passport, espe
cially during the Iranian crisis, because{
"it is his stated intention to go about dis-i
rupting the intelligence activities of thel
United States."
Finds Hostile Feeling Intensified
,
In an affidavit submitted to the court
David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs. said that bir.
Agee's statements about C.I.A. activities
abroad intensified anti-American feel-
ings and increased the likelihood of at-
tacks such as those on the American Em-
~---_-- S. I.. i ~?'a
d Pakistan
an
that one factor in the decision to revoke
the passport was a newspaper article that
said Mr. Agee had been invited to Iran to
participate in a tribunal involving the i
hostages. Mr. Wulf said that the report
was false and that his client would not
participate in such a tribunal if invited.
The lawyers said that without a valid
passport, Mr. Agee, who has already
been expelled from several- countries in
Western Europe, was in "imminent dan-1
ger" of deportation from West Germany.
process of law in order to penalize and
suppress-his criticism of the United
States Government's policies and prac-
tices." to
The case was described by lawyers on
both sides as an important test of the
Government's power to cancel a pass-
port. Mr. Agee's principal attorney, Mel-
vin L Wulf, argued that a Federal regu-
lation specifically authorizing the Secre.
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ARTICLE AP ""
ON PAGE -
WASHINGTON SPAR
1 JAI VARY 1980
Ex-CIAAgent
In an affidavit filed with the court
yesterday, David Newsom, undersec-
retary of state for political affairs.
Loses Round in I said Agee's visiting countries to
identify officials engaged in CIA
t- the United
s
k
d
Passport-Fight
By Allan Frank
Wa%htngtunStar Staff Writer
Former CIA officer Philip Agee
has lost his immediate bid to regain)
his U.S. passport that was revoked,
last week by Secretary of State Cyrus;
Vance.
U.S. District Judge Barrington
Parker yesterday declined to issue a i
temporary restraining order that
would have prevented - for at least
10 days - the revocation of Agee's
passport, which had been valid until.
1983. N
Parker said that Agee's attorney,
Melvin Wulf, could not prove that
the former CIA agent, now living in
Hamburg. Germany. would suffer ir-
reparable harm if the restraining
order were not granted.
The judge added, however, that
the case presented "substantial
issues" concerning the First Amend-
ment and the right to free travel
that merit a further tearing tomor-
row before U.S. District Judge Ger.
hard Gesell.
Vance revoked Agee's passport on
Dec. 23 because he feared the agent
would further complicate the situa-
tion in Iran, possibly by identifying
agency operatives there. The State ,
Department said Agee's actions
"were causing or were likely to
cause serious damage to the national.;
security and foreign policy of the
United States."
.
angerou
. is
wor
States.
Newsom said, "It is clear to me
that if Sir. Agee continues to travel
at will ... to make public allega-
tions against United States officials
in foreign countries, such activities
'are likely to cause serious damage to
the--national security and foreign
policy of the United States.
"Among the adverse conse-
quences which could result from
such activities would be that United
Stales diplomatic facilities,?includ-
ing embassies and consulates would
be taken over by force," Newsom
continued, "and that United States
diplomats and other nationals would
be physically harmed."
Agee could become a man without
a country if the passport revocation
is upheld. Without a valid passport,.
he may. not be permitted to remain
in West.Germany, where his wife is a
dancer with the Hamburg Staatsoper ,
Ballet, or to travel to other coun-
tries.
Wulf, attorney for the American,
Civil Liberties Union, argued that
the lifting of Agee's passport uncon
stitutionally violated the former
agent's First Amendment right to
free speech and to travel freely as a
journalist..
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ARTICLE IfORTKERiI VIRGINIA SUN
ON PAGE_ 29 DEMMER 1979
`THERE IS A DISGUISED CIA AGENT AMONG YOU!'
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ARTICLE AFFUit1 ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
Or( PAGE 15t 28 DECFr' ..R 1979
Adieu TO Agee
Were we still operating in the days of
James Bond, the matter would've been set-
tled differently.
But, well, Mr. Bond was employed in
His Majesty's service and, well, he was fic-
tional anyway. He did, however, have a way
of handling matters in a rather permanent
manner. But, these days at least, our govern-
ment is more polite in how we handle
"defectors."
The State Department Sunday revoked
the passport of Philip Agee, a former CIA-
agent. in Latin America now living in
Germany. It was Agee, you will recall,. who
authored a book published . abroad which,
among other things, named some 900 CIA
agents serving in various nations under
The publication of the names placed the
agents still*active in peril - and perhaps re-
sulted in the killing of at least one agent -
to say nothing about crippling American
espionage activities.
Agee, while living in Germany, has been
"lending himself to anti-American propa-
ganda intelligence." The news that Agee had
been stripped of his passport - "his last pre-
tense of citizenship" was applauded by CIA
members, many of whom harbor strong ha-
tred for Agee. It was, indeed, an action long
overdue. Agee probably should rejoice that
the- "old days" are over - or something
other than his passport would have been re-
voked.
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SALT II
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OD`d P AGE-2
NATIONAL REVIEW
January 4, 1980
THE CIA & THE KGB
Taking nothing away from the Soviet Union, it is
herein claimed that most of America's wounds are sey-inf7icted,
largely by three categories of people: 1) "the dropouts"; 2)
"the philanthropoids"; and 3) "the intellectualoidr"
W y the Soviets Aren't orried
MILES COPELAND
THE WORLD of the President and his security plan-
ncrs bears little resemblance to the world of the
President and his SALT II negotiators, and of the bureau-
crats, politicians, and editorialists who continually fuss over
detente, the difficulties with NATO, "improving Soviet-Amer-
ican relations," and all the other spurious questions which
presuppose the possibility that the Soviets may abandon
their objectives. The former world is concerned with our
"foreign foreign policy," with the strategies guiding our
moves in the game that is played for keeps on the inter-
national gameboard; the latter is concerned with dur
"domestic foreign policy" which-fortunately or unfortu-
nately-dictates many of the moves which are passed off
as foreign foreign policy. In fact, most moves on the inter-
national gameboard are not genuine moves on that board
at all, but inert reflections of moves in the domestic games
of the various players.
Consider the picture of Soviet-American relations that
the general public gets from the sources available to it.
Our media, a goodly props*ion of our politicians, and a
majority of what we so loosely call "intellectuals" have,
first, adopted the language of the Soviets to describe the
various conflicts taking place around the world (e.g., call-
ing terrorists "freedom fighters" and "movements of na-
tional liberation," and lumping black African minorities
together as "the black majority"-what Pat Moynihan calls
"semantic infiltration").
Second, they have all but ignored what the Soviets them-
selves say about detente, the SALT II talks, and (in the
phrase used by some State Department people) "improv-
ing Soviet-American relations." After President Nixon re-
turned from Moscow to make what our jittery friends
abroad saw as a Chamberlain-like peace-in-our-time sort
of speech, the Soviets turned loose their entire propaganda
machinery to assure Eastern Europe and "peoples repub-
lics" everywhere that nothing that had been said in Mos-
cow was to be taken as indicating any intention of relaxing
one whit the. Soviet Union's "revolutionary determination."
Not one word of all this was mentioned on any of the
three major U.S. television networks, currently the prin-'
cipal source of news for the American peo ,k,,and the!
New York Times gave it only the briefest rr}fn[ion on the
back pages. .1' I
In that other world, however, those who plan our na-
tional security do ponder what the Soviets are thinking
and doing. When they retire to their garrets to plan strate-
gies for safeguarding our national security, they take with
them a view of the world that is more in line'with objec-
tive fact. Here are the conclusions, established at least to
the extent. of their being acceptable as "planning assump-
tions," to which this view has led them:
1. There is not the slightest chance that the Soviets will
abandon "Communism" as we know it, or the "struggle
against imperialism and capitalism" that it necessarily en-
tails. There is not one sentence, not one word, either in
literature the Soviet government disseminates to its own
people or in communications that Soviet officials circulate
among themselves, tomindicate a softening of intentions.
Nor is there any iiid cation that the obvious failures of the
Communist system-failure to develop the country's vast
mineral resources, to motivate the working population to
work at top efficiency, to remedy the appalling adminis-
trative chaos that causes machinery to wind up in one place
a3 spare parts wind up in another-will bring about its
collapse. On the contrary, the Soviet leaders blame their
troubles on the continuing presence in the world of "ex-
ploitative and corrupting capitalist systems" which distract
them from problems which would otherwise be soluble,
and they argue that what is needed is more Communism,
not less. Moreover, the argument advanced by some of
our academics that the Soviet Union's aging leaders must
inevitably be replaced by younger men of moderate dis-
position is confuted by the youngsters themselves-who
are, if anything, more fanatically opposed to accommoda-
tion than are their elders.
2. SALT or no SALT, the Soviets are developing their
military power not merely to achieve parity but to achieve
superiority-clear superiority, superiority the whole world
will recognize. They believe that SALT will assist them in
achieving this objective or they would not favor it. Nor are
the Soviets neglecting their conventional-warfare capabil-
ities in order to concentrate on nuclear superiority. Mil-
itary intelligence people now believe that the Soviets have
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so improved their conventional capabilities that they can
sweep through Western Europe any time they wish--or,
for that matter, through any one of those parts of the world
which, according to recent polls, our citizenry would not
be willing to go to war to defend.
In addition, the Soviets are pouring time and money
into proxy forces-the Cubans, the North Koreans, the
Palestinians, and others who are involved in military op-
erations against Western interests. Although it is not the
policy of post-Stalin Soviet strategists to wield out-and-
out control of proxy forces, the extent to which Moscow,'
now trains and supplies them enables it to conduct pre-
cisely the kind of warfare we are least able to resist.
Furthermore, proxies make higher "capability levels'-con-'
ventional Soviet forces, Soviet nuclear power-seem all the!
more intimidating. Successful intimidation is an essential
feature of any campaign designed, in part, to win over fence-1
straddlers of the Third World in whom a desire to wind up
on the winning side is a key motivation.
3. The Soviets do not envision a hot-war confrontation.
They will not attack us head-on-for example, by an as-
sault on NATO-but will go for our means of sustenance,
specifically the raw materials and energy supplies of Africa
and the Middle East. As numerous Soviet experts on the
United States have said repeatedly, they do not have to
smite us when it is so easy to choke us. They are proceed-
ing to do just that, through a carefully chosen, orderly suc-
cession of scenarios in which we seem to be backing the
Bad Guys of the Third World (and it is in the Third World
that the raw materials and energy supplies are located),
and the Soviets seem to be backing the Good Guys-and,
through their manipulation of our semantics, the Soviets
have seen to it that this seems to be the case even in the
eyes of our own people. Concretely, the Soviets are achiev-
ing their aims through the construction of an "Iron Chain"!
from Angola to Pakistan which will, in chronological j
order: 1) scare the Saudi royal family and the Gulf sheik-:
doms into adopting a so-called "positive neutrality"-a;
position which, experience to date has taught us, causes
an adherent to cooperate m t with whichever major
power it is most afraid of, or wlichever power seems to be
winning; 2) enable Western Europeans to see which side
their bread is buttered on, and to alter their policies ac-
cordingly; 3) induce attitudes in the American public of
which Andrew Young's remark that "The Cubans have
brought stability to Africa" would be truly representative.
This is the Soviets' World War 111. When these three
objectives have been reached they will have won it-in the
sense that they will have gained everything they might
conceivably go to war for, including the power to dictate
the economic terms on which we will be allowed to exist
on this earth. To put it another way, they will have gaine
as much for their purposes as Hitler would have gained
for his had Nazi Germany won World War I1, either
through actually fighting it or by default.
4. Present-day Soviet strategy, like Soviet strategy when'
Lenin was alive, is based less on Soviet strengths than oni
American weaknesses. Thus, it depends more on anti
American forces than on pro-Soviet forces-in fact, the
Soviets will happily give aid and encouragement to forces
that are anti-Soviet so long as they are sufficiently anti-
American as well.
This is by way of saying that, for all their emphasis one
military preparations (and our experts tell us that the mil-
itary forces are the only segment of the Soviet system that
operates efficiently), the Soviets' strategy is based funda-
mentally on subversion. To our intelligence community it
is perfectly obvious that the Soviets would prefer to anaes-1
thetize our powers of resistance by subversion, rather than I
enter upon the dangerous and costly business of bombing
us into submission-especially now that we have dis-
mantled our anti-subversive capacities, and have adopted
moral preoccupations which would hamper any attempts
our government might make to reconstruct them. (There
is, of course, a possibility that Iran will change all this.)
"It's very nice to have a winning philosophy," said top So-
viet ideologist Mikhail Suslov, "but victory is so much
easier if the enemy has a losing one."
With its professional penchant for cause-and-effect anal-
ysis, our intelligence community has understandably be-
gun to see the hand of the KGB in our national affairs. In
fact, an inter-agency intelligence task force has recently
worked out a detailed rationale to support the thesis that,
while the KGB is "not actually in control" of any signifi-
cant segment of our molders of public opinion, it may
s
very well be on its way to building a "network of influence
made up of individuals who are unaware of who is back i
inn them but who are effectively nudging our native effu-{
sioas into channels which benefit the Soviets. To use an
idiom of the intelligence 'community, the "current, ,.situa-
tion" in our country is precisely what it would be had the1
Soviets been able to create whatever climate of opinion
they wished for simply by waving a magic wand.
The notion is worth examining. The following items. 1
according to Soviet operational specialists, are standard
ingredients in the emasculation of a country and the break-!
ing down of its ability to resist the Kremlin's particular kind!
of onslaught. They are features of modern American society!
which have been described in Soviet strategy papers and
explicitly labeled as propitious from the Soviet point of' q
view:
-A public which so distrusts its government that it
views all official utterances with suspicion, and which
can be counted on to react negatively to appeals of the
government in the face of national emergencies even in
the rare cases when it sees no reason to doubt the gov-
ernment's veracity;
-A pervasive philosophy of "anti-social individuality,"'
as Suslov has called it (or "situational ethics," as we call,
it). by which an individual citizen finds it easy to ration-
alize his refusal to join in a common effort for the com-
mon good-such as, for example, a military draft;
..The replacement of democratic electoral processes by:
a channeling of popular enthusiasms through "special
interest" groupings which are capable of inordinate in-I
fluence in behalf of "single issues," whatever their com-!
plexion;
..Epidemic abhorrence of the military, of industry, and
of all institutions which smack of power and a capacity
for organized effort;
- Unilateral disarmament-or, at least, a public which)
is strongly resistant to military expenditures, either per
se or because of a preference for alternative expendi-
tures, real or imagined;
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I Aside from any specific faults persons in these cate-i
-Gt ncral acceptance of language by which our friends,;
our allies, and ourselves can only be designated by words
with unfavorable connotations while the Soviets and
their allies are designated by the opposite (cf. the "New-:,
speak" of George Orwell's 1984);
.In general, a popular tendency to see our enemies
abroad as "freedom fighters," "movements of national
liberation," etc.-or, at least, as reasonable people, fight-
ing for just rights, who could be won over to our side
by a bit of sympathy and understanding-and to regard
governments, groups, and leaders on our own side with
hostility and suspicion:
-Castration of our intelligence and security agencies,
and of all means whereby we might discover an alien
hand in these elements of the "current situation," ac-
companied by legal safeguards to protect those among
us who work against the national interest and by cam-
paigns to discredit those who oppose the safeguards;
a-As a consequence, a popular ignorance of-or, rather,
an insurmountable emotional opposition to factual in-I
formation about-the "current situations" in (for ex-i
ample) Iran, southern Africa, and Central America,
where proxy forces under various umbrellas stimulate
and direct popular uprisings and channel them toward
outcomes suiting Soviet purposes.
Our security agencies in response, spend their time
searching for "moles in our government and in quasi-
governmental organizations. Lists similar to the one I have
just given have been matched against names of persons,
organizations, and informal groups responsible for the
various items, and investigations have been made, and are
now continuing, in an effort to detect Soviet connections.
But, according to evidence to date, Soviet successes in
this country-by which I mean developments in this coun-
try favoring the Soviets which result directly from KGB
operations-have occurred only in the field of intelligence
acquisition. True Soviet "subversion," as our security offi-
cials use this term, has yet to be proved. The KGB may be
subsidizing some of our own citizens' efforts, but it doesn't I
have to direct them-it's just sitting back and watching !
it happen.
Anthropologists under contra* to the CIA, looking hard
for ways to explain disaffection in various societies, have
bracketed three categories which they believe apply to our
own: 1) people who can't make the grade in an increasing-
ly competitive economic order, and who blame it on the
order rather than themselves, and who might be called,
for want of a better word, "the dropouts"; 2) those who
can, and do, compete successfully enough, but who for
some reason, usually unconscious and irrational, feel guilty
and uncomfortable with their success, and whom we might
call "phi/anthropoids," since they often give large amounts
of material aid and moral support to their "less fortu-
nate" co-belligerents; 3) the "verbalists" in our society-the
"intellectualoids"-who do not grow corn, manufacture
clothing, build houses, or cure diseases but are engaged in
professions which escape the disciplines of "results orien-
tation" (e.g., newspaper editorialists, college professors, etc.)
and who are therefore free to adopt any crackpot theory
that catches their fancy.
gories may find in the producers of our society, they sim
ply do not like them. This elementary fact alone is enough
to put them in opposition to those persons and institutions!
which provide most of our economic well-being and physical!
security-bankers, multinational corporations, small busi-
nessmen ("Babbitts"), and that hated, half-legendary in-~
stitution known as the "military-industrial complex."
Only a minuscule percentage of those who belong to'
one of the three categories and whose words and behavior
contribute to the "suicide package" described above might
conceivably he KGB agents. So far as I can be certain.
only the martyred Orlando Letelier, the Chilean who was
associated with the intellcctualoid Institute for Policy
Studies and who received a salary from the KGB-associ-
ated Cuban intelligence service while so doing, has been
definitely proved to have been an agent of a foreign gov-
ernment. There are others who are being subsidized by ei-
ther the KGB or some associate (Cuban. East German, or
North Korean). but not with their certain knowledge; for-
eign contributions to individuals and organizations en-
in activities which contribute to paralyzing . our
gaged
nation in the face of Soviet aggressions are almost all
channeled through intermediaries in such a way that the
recipients are unaware-or may plausibly claim unaware-
ss-of the source. I
Practically all of the recipients. moreover, believe their
motivations to be entirely patriotic. Even the Institute for
Policy Studies, the organization which members of our
intelligence community believe to be the rallying-ground
for destructive dissidence . in our country, has survived the
most painstaking investigations: with the exception of
Letelier. not one member or associate of that organization
can be proved to have taken direction or financial support
from a foreign power-not. anyhow, with evidence that
could stand up in court.
The dropouts, philanthropoids, and verbalists aren't the
society show. Moscow sees even more advantage in a
fourth contributor to the suicide package. I refer to the'
special interest group. The neo-Leninists now concocting:
Soviet strategies look to any segments of our society.I
whatever their aims and motivations, that contribute to
the centrifugal force which weakens our ability to take,
united action. Abortionists and anti-abortionists are equal
ty valuable, so long as they exert their energies cache
against the other and put their "single issues" above thej
general national interest. Ethnic minorities are even more
valuable-Greek-Americans for effectively opposing any de-
fense plan the Pentagon may devise which involves co
operation with the Turks; Jewish-Americans for effective-
'Iv opposing Arab-American relations or anything we might
do to accommodate the Palestinians; Arab-Americans for
effectively opposing any plan for the security of our Mid-1
dle Eastern oil supply which might involve cooperation with,
Israel.
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pended by this category of special interest groups. our
security planners are blocked from creating any workable
plan for protecting our overall national interests. There
is no recommendation, no plan. no project which the'
President of the United States can advance as being good
for the nation as a whole, whether in the field of eco
nomics, energy, or national defense, that will not have
against it some powerful group strongly motivated to kill
it. and entirely capable of doing so --and doing so not by
proving that it is damaging to its own well-being but by
proving that it is against the interests of the country as a
whole. A wealthy and highly concentrated 2 per cent of
our population can almost always have its way over a dif-
fuse. unorganized. and largely apathetic 98 per cent.
And this, it happens, is the key to the success of the 2
per cent which shapes up as a special interest group: the
skill of its spokesmen in arguing variations of "What's
good 'for General Motors is good for America" These 1
spokesmen are among the smartest, highest-paid, most
persuasive people in America. They are the elite of the
verbalists. Compared to them, those who argue honestly
for the general national interest are a lot of country-
schoolteacher amateurs.
Soviet defectors. although anxious to ingratiate them-
selves with their FBI and CIA interrogators by furnishing
them masses of juicy revelations, invariably insist that
"what you are doing to yourselves" is so effectively de-
structive that it robs KGB stations in New York and
Washington of arguments to use on their Moscow head-
quarters for bigger budgets. The sad truth is that the KGB
doesn't need agents and Fifth Column operations to
achieve its aims. Indigenous individuals, groups, and or-
ganizations-and even parts of our own government agen-
cies-are saving it the trouble. C1
Mr. Copeland is the author of The Game of Nations. His
next book. The Supergame, will be published in Mas' bt?
Simon & Schuster.
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or 1
THE WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1980
Warner Urges President
To Pull Back SALT II.
AOeodated Pens
Sen. John W. Warner- (R-Va.) called
on President Carter yesterday to pull
back the SALT II treaty from the
Senate.
"In view of the president's state-
ment that [Soviet Ptesident Leonid]
Brezhnev lied to him about Afghanis-
tan, is might well be that Brezhnev
lied during the SALT II negotiations,"
Warner said. -
Carter said in an ABC' News, inter-
view. Monday night that Brezhnev
gave. him a false account of Soviet .
actions in last week's overthrow of
the government of Afghanistan.
Warner- noted that he has previ-
ously urged delay of Senate debate
on the arms limitation treaty because
of Soviet troops in Cuba, the absence
of anX Russian assistance in freeing
American hostages in Iran "and now
this blatant invasion of Afghanistan."
"How can we possibly enter into a
contract with a nation which is be-
having so illegally all over the world
and against the interests of freedom?"
he asked.
"I call on the president to pull back
the treaty, to make a complete reas-
sessment of our foreign policy with
respect to the Soviet Union and to
shape a five-year defense program
which can meet these new and menac-
ing threats of the Soviet Union," War-
ner said.
He said the treaty should not be
considered- until after tt a presidential
election next November.
"Whoever is elected president
would have a strong mandate of the
people as to how to deal with the So-
viet Union and could negotiate a
strong and more balanced SALT II
agreement. if, in his judgment, it will
lead to improving freedom and global
stability," Warner said. .
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ARTICLE A??~"Lr"-~/
ON PAGE-
qay Key .1
THE WASHINGTON POST
31 December 1979
." ]Bus5nessDlafl
o Mobut
a ' o
By Leon Dash -
waahinscon Yost Yortlsn service
KINSHASA, Zaire-Maurice Tem-
plesman, an American friend and
business associate of President Mo-
butu Sese Seko, and reputedly a per-
son of influence in this country, had a
say in the recent appointment of the
new U.S. ambassador to Zaire, accord-
ing to one U.S. diplomat here.
In fact, the diplomat said, the local
American business community knew
about the appointment of Robert Oak-
ley even before the U.S. Embassy did.
In Washington, such views of Tem-
plesman's role are described as exag-
gerated if not utterly wrong. But in
Kinshasa, the New York diamond and
metals businessman is viewed as a
mover and shaker with important po-
litical ties to both Democratic and Re-
publican organizations back home.
It was Templesman. sources here
said, who put together the interna-
tional combine that owns 80 percent
of the world's richest copper and co-
balt lode, lying under 900 square
miles of savanna just outside Kolwezi,
in Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba Prov-
ince.
The rest of Zaire's mining opera-
tions in the area is owned by Geca-
mines, the government company,
which is forbidden to touch the rich
lode. The story of how the wealth
nearby came to be--owned by outsiders
provides a rare glimpse into the laby-
rinth of iliterlocking relations be-
tween Industry and government in de-
veloped nations, and a Third World
dictator.
Those who know Templesman say
that he "grew up in African metals"
as a salesman, middleman and inves-
tor. His father had established the
firm of Leon Templesman & Son long
before independence fever swept Af-
rica after World War II.
Maurice Templesman, according to
one diplomat, shrewdly anticipated
Africa's changing political tide in the
late 1950s and early 1960s and began
to "move in with the new regimes."
Today, his firm has branch offices
throughout West Africa, dealing pri-
marily in diamonds, but including
metals as well.
Templesman's involvement wit*
Mobutu dates back to the 19604. v'h.s
Mobutu was looking for markets for
Zaire's industrial diamonds. Accord-
ing to U.S. diplomatic sources, both
men share business interests in
Zaire's two main diamond mining con-
cerns, MIBA and Britmond.
U.S. Bureau of Mines figures show
Zaire as the world's principal pro-
ducer of industrial diamonds. More
important, however, are Zaire's re-
serves of the world's total industrial
diamond reserves estimated at 680
million carats, more that 500 million
are located in Zaire's south-central
Kasai province. Total yearly export
sales-in industrial and gem diamonds
from the two companies run into the
hundreds of millions of dollars.
Mobutu's rise from a salaried army
officer in 1963 to one of the world's
richest men is mainly the result of his
personal control of Zaire's diamond
exports, Western officials say.
The exact nature of Templesman's involvement
with Mobutu is not known. Templesman's office in
New York would not disclose even general informa-
tion about him_ But a diplomatic source who knows
both men describes their relationship as "very per-
sonal" and said-that both are reaping substantial
earnings from the gem diamond trade.
When Mobutu sought to put together a second
copper mining company in Shaba province to offset
Zaire's total reliance on Gecamires, he turned to
Templesman. According to business sources here,
Templesman brought together foreign investors
from the united States, France, South Africa and
Japan to form the Tenke Fugurume Mining Society,
in which. he and Mobutu also each have a personal
share.
The Tem lesman croup is re .resented in Kin.
shasa by Larry Devlin. a retie entr me r
gence Agency otticia w.io ser'~ ed as-the agency's
- ??ca?ie to Dower in a 965
ted
,..,..,..
U.J. suppor
erassi, who ormer y ea a the .a. mi to mis-
gion to .aL e.
"L rv can talk to Mobutu any time he wants to."
said a Western source who knows Devlin. Devlin,
w So operates out of a t it floor of ice in ins a-
sa s Texaco w ind was un3c-aua, a for comment.
after an initial investment of S250 mil fun or
roads and down payment on mining equipment,
Tenke Fugurume now needs an estimated $400 mil-
lion more to start assembling the plant.
The project has been stymied since 1976, when
the Benguela Railroad, which gives the mining re-
gion in southern Zaire access to s? ports in Angola,
was closed during the Angolan civil war. It remains
closed because of antigovernment guerrillas operat-
ing in the neighboring country.
One investor, Standard Oil of Indiana, recently
sold its 28 percent interest to a French government
mining company. Standard apparently was. frus-
trated by the continued disruption of the crucial
railroad.
Templesman is believed to have helped. Mobutu
with advice on political matters in W'sh Blair, for-
mer in Washington is
U.S. ambassador to Denmark and the Philip-
pines and one-time law partner of Adlai Stevenson.
Templesman has made campaign contributions to
both Republicans and Democrats. In 1973, he con-
tributed S5,000 to Richard Nixon's election cam-
paign. This year hee gave $1,000 each to the reelec-
tion campaigns of Sens. Frank Church (D-Idaho)
and George McGovern (D-S.D.).
In Zaire, Templesman's influence is considerable.
"Things get very personal here." said a senior diplo.
mat. "and to get along with the chief of state is all
that matters."
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ARTICLE App.:iZED THE WASHINGTON POST
nr PAGE .3._._ 30 December 1979
311obulds Slayin, r Poiver Is AltribufeJ
9
To His Pouncal -S Jki 11. and'Raw Fo-rce
By Leon Dash
Washieston Yost roreisn aerVtee
LUBUMBASHI, Zaire-A squat ce-
ment monument, topped with a choco-
late-brown arm gripping the replica
of an Olympic-style flaming torch,
dominates the main roadway leading
into this regional capital of Shaba
Province. Close by, a large faded
green billboard spells out in yellow
letters: "Mobutu Sese Seko-Our
Only Hope."
Variously known in the govern-
ment-run media as "The Guide," "Our
Savior" and "The Prophet," the char-
ismatic and imperious 49-year-old Mo-
butu has maintained himself in power
through ruthless suppression and the
shrewd use of what one Western dip-
lomat called "illusions, mirrors and
gimmickry."
An Army general in the turbulent
five years following independence in
1960, Joseph Mobutu, as he was then
known, came to- power in .a U.S.-
backed coup in November 1965; when
Zaire was still called the Congo.
Although he originally pledged to
run the country only five years, Mo-
butu Sesee Seko Kuru N gebendu Wa
Za Bangs, as he is now known, has
for the past 14 years presided over
this potentially rich Central__ African
country's brief ascendancy toward
prosperity and its subsequent rapid
degeneration into threadbare poverty.
Mobutu's enormous staying power
is attributed by political observers to
his skillful political manipulations
that fluctuate between occasional
cosmetic reforms and steady reliance
on raw power. -
He formed Zaire's only legal politi-
cal party, the Popular Movement for
the Revolution, appointed himself
head of the governments legislative,
judicial and executive branches, and
created a network of party informers
and an efficient secret police organi-
zation, known as the National Docu-
mentation Center.
Mobutu also molded all labor unions
into one, which was. incorporated in
his party. University students, large
numbers of whom were killed when
they demonstrated against Mobutu at
the outset of his rule, were eventually dependent on South Africa's rail-
brought into the party framework. ways to the ports of East London and
_ Although he permitted nationwide Durban. In turn, he muted all crib.-
elections in 1977 for a legislative cism of South Africa's racial policies.
council, there was never any doubt Mobutu also has. reached a com-
where the ultimate decision-making promise with the Roman Catholic
authority lies. Church after an open conflict over a
Yet under his rule, Zaire's debt to decree prohibiting. Western names.
Pope John Paul
Western governments and banks has II is scheduled to.
grown to $5 billion while domestic visit Zaire next year, a tribute to the
corruption has reached such propor? changed relationship.
tions that an estimated 40 percent of While growing increasingly resent
all government funds- winds up in the ful of the oil-rich Arab nations, whose
pockets of government officials. support he had wooed, Mobutu has.,
In the process, Mobutu has ad- m8?ded his relations with the United'
vaned from a salaried Army officer States. He visited President Carter
to become one of the world's richest in Washington last September.
His popularity at, home declined
men. sharply after Angola-based rebels in.
Mobutu started out as a popular waded Shaba in 1978 and economic l
national figure whose government difficulties that followed the drop in
brought' stability following Zaire's copper prices. But he continued to
political turmoil of the early 1960s. run Zaire with an iron hand, elim-
His emphasis on cultural African na- inating all dissent. An unknown num.
tionalism, or Zairism "authenticity," her of political prisoners are tor-
also found popular acceptance. . tured.
First, he changed the name of the In an effort to preclude any coups,
country from the Democratic B,epub- 3Iobutu has sought to divide poten.
lie of the Congo to Zaire, then cre- tial opponents by setting ethnicI
ated Zaire's distinctive attire, the groups against each other. "He took!
so-called abacost. He justified his his lesson from the Belgians," Zaire's
one-man rule as consistent with pre- former colonial rulers, one Zairian
colonial Zairian traditions. said.
In the early 1970s, while still en- Mobutu's closest advisers are all
joying popularity at home, Mobutu from his. Equateur region while key!
military men come either from the i
also took an active role in Third
World affairs, criticizing South Africa president's province or from Upper
and leading the Africa-wide break of Zaire in the northeast But the gen-
diplomatic relations with Israel fol- erals report directly to him and in-
formants say that his soldiers are ''re-
lowifrg the 1973 Middle East war. cruited from all tribes except those"
In that period he startled- Washing- in the rebellious Shaba- region.
Ion by his Public charges that e "This is bow he maintains Shaba's-
CIA had tried to assassina~iiman security and his own," one source
to alehis government. Dip oma said.
,aw this as a p oy to gain re T By excluding the Shabans from the
in the Third World. "You aren't some- government, according to the sour-
bodv in the Thir Worl until the ces, Mobutu has made other ethnic
CIA tried to assassinate you,' one groups wary of the southern tribes.
European diplomat sal - "It is like juggling," one Zairian
By 1976 Zaire was in dire economic described Mobutu's policies. "It keeps
straits. As a result of. mismanage- everybody off balance."
ment, corruption and a drastic drop .Mobutu has done the same with
in the world price of copper, Zaire's Western countries that support his
main export and revenue source, Mo- government. "We're his major sup.
butu became increasingly dependent porters," a European diplomat said.
on Western banks and governments. "But he does the same thing to us he
The civil war in Angola closed the does to everyone, plays us off, one
Benguela railroad, leaving Mobutu against the other." .
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3TICL E THE WASHINGTON POST
or, PAGE 30 December 1979
People of Zaire Direct Supyresse'
at ]Wobnu,:Ii.
Want Grips Once-Rich African Nation
By Leon Dash
Washington Post POrokgn 3srvIC.
KINSHASA, Zaire = Ekofo Ma-
bamba spat with disgust as he
looked over. his crowded; dismal
neighborhood in ' the Livulu slum.
"None of us have enough food to
eat." he said. _
The words poured out in an
angry stream as he moved- from
the gray light of his front door into
the small living room lit with a
kerosene lamp. "We can say no-
thins about it, or we go to jail."
Once a week, on Wednesday morn
ings;. Catholic priests in the slum
dole out small quantities of protein- ,
rich soy beans.
"The priests only feed the chil-
dren they can see,. the weakest
Ekofo said. "There. are too many
to feed."
Ten thousand malnourished
children under 4 year of age are
brought yearly to Kinasa's Mania
Yemo Hospital. named after Presi-
dent Mobutu Sese Seko's mother.
For the last two years. well over
half of them have died there. Of-
ficials said the annual child mort-
ality rate in some rural areas of
this mineral-rich country of 27 mil-
lion people may be much higher
than 50 percent.
Ekofo (not his real name) is one
of nine Zairians interviewed who
asked that their names not be-used
for fear of arrest or reprisals,_ fears i
that help. explain- the absence of.
public outcry about conditions. As one
Western observer put it, "The-squeaky
wheel doesn't get the.oil here: he gets
thrown in jail."
Most of their suppressed anger is
directed at Zaire's military head of
state and authoritarian president for
the past 14 years who is reportedly
one of the world's richest men.
But beyond. Mobutu.. 49, Zairians
condemn the West, particularly the
United States, for.what they perceive
as vital support for a. corrupt and mis-
managed regime that has brought one
of Africa's potentially richest. coun-
tries to the brink of insolvency.
The perceived U.S. identification
with Mobutu appears to parallel in
many ways Iranians view o : mere-
en are
said to have been put in power by the
CIA. Despite obvious cultural, reu-
gious. and economic differences be- .
tween Zaire and Iran. they face simi?
lar development problems accompa-
nied by rising expectations.
The undertone.of Zairian interviews
also suggests a growing tendency in I
the developing world to scrutinize
U.S. support for various Third World;
dictators, a tendency that will con-
front Washington with new problems
in the post-Iran period..
EXCERPTED
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CIA ESTIMATES
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p;f PiGZ ___ 2 JANUARY 1980
Soviet Oil Outpu*t D edine
~
oss9b le, Some Experts Sad
United Press International
The world's largest oil producer,
the. Soviet Union, may be hard
pressed to hit its oil production goal
this year, an oil industry weekly
says.
Some experts think that Russian
production could peak at 12.2 mil-
lion barrels a day this year and then
fall, the Oil & Gas Journal reported.
Soviet oil production in 1979 was
estimated at 11.7 million barrels a
day.
While the pessimistic forecast
raises some fear among major con-
suming nations that Russia might
soon become a net oil importer, com-
peting with the West for tight sup-
plies; a Soviet government econo-
mist said the fear was unfounded.
"Skepticism voiced in the West
about.the U.S.S.R.'s?capability of ful-
filling its oil export commitments is
groundless," said the economist.
"Output growth will continue, and
the 1980 increase will be 420,000 bar-
rels a day." the economist said in the
article.
The production growth prospect
for western Siberia, Russia's oil field
area, have been "greatly extended,"
said another Soviet official.
-? "The drop in our oil output
growth rate should not be associated
with signs of oil hunger," said the
official. "The U.S.S.R.'s ability to con-
WASHINGTON STAR (GRE i LINE )
centrate its efforts and resources on
crucial problems is well known."
The pessimists note the 1980 out-
put target of 12.12 million barrels of
crude and condensate was scaled
down from .the original target of 12.4
million to 12:8 million barrels.
If Moscow hit its 1980 goal, it
would contradict a CIA forecast
which predicted no rise in Russian
production this year and a gradual
decline in the decade.
Soviet production was a record 11.-
868 million barrels of crude oil and
natural gas liquids in October, up
from 11.7 million barrels a month
earlier and 11.65 million barrels the
previous October, an indication the
target might be met.
However, the nation's perform-
ance on annual production goals in
the past four years offered little
cause for optimism. Production in
1976 was 10,000 barrels a day under
the goal, and the Oil & Gas Journal
said production shortfalls increased
in the following years to 500,000 bar-
rels in 1979.
The CIA forecasts that Soviet
pro~uc onii wistart declining in
the early 1980s and slide to 10 mil
lion barrels of crude and condensate
in 1985. The most recent CIA stud
predicts 1980 output wt
lion to 11.8 million barrels a day -
about the same as 1979.
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., rT!( T, PP;: R
THE NEW YORK TIMES
2 January 1980
Doubts Raised
On Soviet Oil
barrels daily in 1978; 80,000 bar-
rels daily in 1977; 170,000 barrels daily'
in 1978, and 500,000 barrels a day in;
1070
TULSA, Okla.. Jan. 1 (A?) - The
Soviet Union remains the world's larg-,
est oil Producer but will be hard-
pressed to reach its 1980 output goal of
more than 12 million barrels a day, ac-
co~ to a petroleum industry publi,
The OR and Gas journal noted yes.
terday that Moscow's revised 1980
"goal of 12.12 million barrels a day
compares with an estimated 11.7 mil-
lion barrels a day produced in 1979."
The "original Soviet 1980 target was.
12.4 to 12.3 million barrels a day, set !
just before the start of the current five-
' Year plan," the magazine said. .
But the magazine added that new
-$oviet analyses assert "that because of
:persistent and worsening problems in i,
exploration and development, Soviet
oil prpductim-in 1980 is likely to tall
short of its-goal-by 400,000 to 800,000+
'.barrels a day.'.'. +
-:Sovietoil vutppt far outstrips the No.
'2 producer, Saudi Arabia, with 9.5 mil-
?iion bkrrais.a day, and the third-ranked
United States, with 8.6 million.
The Central Intelligence Agingy last
r orecas a IMU Soviet oil out
?putof 11.8 million to 11.8 million 42-gal-
Ion barrels a day, indicating an insig.
.tl ificant gain or possibly a decline from
The Oil and Gas Journal said the
Russians fell short of revised goals by
The C.I.A. estimates that production,
Vill continue to ine in the early.
1980's and drop to a level of about 10!
millioy barrels a day in 1985:
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SUPPORT FOR CIA
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ARTICLE APP " "'
ON PACE 4
THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION
2 January 19780
"Jul Gulliver
The CIA
'h. al 11.0
We can't really have it both ways on how we
think American intelligence agencies, like the
Central Intelligence Agency. should function in
the world.
The national debate-
on the CIA and other agen-
cies was already going on
when -- those hoodlums
seized the American hos.
tages in Tehran. Congress
and President Carter were -
already is the process of
trying to lay down clear
guidelines for the CIA and
other intelligence opera-
lions. The seizure of hos-
tage. In Tehran will now play a part in that do-
What do we really want the CIA to do? -
The agency came under fire after Watergate
and other investigations held varied amounts of
dirty linen out for all to see. The CIA had been
involved In drug experiments on people who were
not told what was being done. in conspiracies to
overthrow constitutional governments, in assorted
141zarre plots to kill certain foreign leaders.
Some of these things were undoubtedly bad
things, things that most Americans would neither
approve nor condone.
And yet, in the wake of the Iranian crisis,
some quite respectable folk are deploring the no-
tion that we do not have a greater "covert" abil-
ity, even recalling with nostalgia the time when
the CIA literally helped install a friendly govern-
ment in Iran. In other words, the notion is being
pushed that the CIA (or some agency) have the
capability to fool around with the politics and
governments of other countries in ways very simi-
lar to those criticized in congressional investiga-
tions.
This theme, the role of the CIA (or some
other agency) in covert activities, may indeed
come to be the main national debate after the
Iranian crisis is resolved.
George Ba% formerly of our state depart-
ment, has been critical of this country's longtime
support of the now deposed shah of Iran. But Ball
also has suggested that the fierce criticism of the
CIA may well. have been a factor in leading the
Iranians to want to try the American hostages as
spies. "While emasculating the CIA, we wallowed
so masochistically in the disclosure of its wicked-
ness," said Bag "that we have created the im-
pression not only that the agency is guilty of
every misdeed but also that it is 20 feet tag with
almost magical capabilities for evil."
Some pundits and politicians are already
saying that there will be a great national wave of.
recriminations and blame after the current crisis`
in Iran is over. Who let the shah in? Why didn't'
our intelligence people know more? Who "lost
Iran? the questions would go. . ;
I don't believe that. American have re-=l
sponded with great maturity to the painful efforts,
to deal with. crazies who have taken some of our.
citizens hostage. It is my belief that the same ma-
turity will preclude any finger-pointing kind of,
search for somebody to blame when all this is
over.
But them-will be-and should be-a national
discussion of our intelligence agencies, of what we
want them to be, of we think about covert opera-
tions, even of Sen. Howard Baker's notion that
there should be a 50,000-member military strike
force, capable of being moved anywhere in the
world on short notice. Meanwhile, most CIA people probably do the
best they can in the most difficult kinds of jobs..
catching it on the chin when they presumably bad-
done too much and now catching it again when.
some say they did too little.
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BUSINESS WEEK
31 DECF20ER 1979
M 5,
The C!A: Trying to put `Humpty-Dumpty' together
When Senate Select Intelligence Committee staffers were
called together a few weeks ago for a meeting on a new
version of the proposed charter for the Central Intelligence
Agency, none of the committee Senators showed up. That
demonstrates the new mood in Washington toward intelli-
gence activities: Liberals up for reelection no longer consider
cIA-bashing a politically profitable sport.
Long gone are the white-hot indictments of U. S. intelli-
gence excesses that marked the Church committee's hearings
in 1975. And that committee's sharpest liberal critics of the
CIA-Senators Frank Church.(D-Idaho) and Charles H. Percy
(R-Ill.), along with the present committee chairman, Senator
Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), have quieted down.
In fact, one of Washington's most discussed questions-the
subject of a half-dozen seminars bringing together academics
and intelligence cadre over the past few. weeks-is: what is
wrong with U. S. intelligence and how can it be beefed up? A
White House strategist complains woefully. "You can't put
Humpty-Dumpty back together again so quickly." And he,
like many observers inside and outside government, is
concerned about a number of problems. The combination of
flagging morale, the loss of CIA veterans, and the discrediting
of American intelligence among both friend and foe have
probably cut into analytic capabilities. This problem-
worsened by an orchestrated campaign by the Soviet's KGB
secret police to discredit the CIA-has been exacerbated by
years of trying unsuccessfully to replace the personal, clan-
destine collection of information with technology.
Moreover, friendly foreign intelligence apparatuses are
becoming disinclined to work with U. S. intelligence because
of American legislative insistence on openness of files. Final-
ly, the demoralization 'of the service has been aggravated by
bad blood between White House Director of Central Intelli-
gence Admiral Stansfield Turner and the agencies for which
he now holds the purse strings. These include not only the CIA,
but all other U. S. intelligence services. And the hard feelings
have intensified since Turner was publicly criticized by Presi-
dent Carter for intelligence failures in connection with Iran.
War or paralysis. All this comes at a time when there is
growing consensus in the U. S. security bureaucracy-and
growing acceptance by the public-that America is on the
defensive around the world. The Iranian situation, for exam-
ple, has dramatized for the world the incapacity of the U. S. to
carryout clandestine activities. The aim, presumably, of the
inquiries of 1975 was to restrain excesses, such as plans to
assassinate Fidel Castro. But the effect has been to limit the
U. S. to the choice between all-out war and virtual paralysis.
The problem of U. S. credibility with both friend and foe is
complicated and may have been exaggerated by defenders of
the status quo ante in the intelligence community. But it is
true that the general atmosphere in the U. S. makes foreign
networks and individuals reluctant to work with Americans
now. U. S. law, for example, requires that requests for govern-
ment documents be honored under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act-even if the requests come from such Communist
sources as East Germany and Cuba. True, the law permits
authorities to hold material back to safeguard national securi-
ty. But because of constant pressure from civil rights activists
for liberal interpretation of the law and because of the huge
administrative load placed on all government departments,
the release of material becomes almost a matter of individual
judgment- sometimes by inexperienced personnel.
It now seems unlikely that Congress will fulfill the original
intent of some legislators.of laying out a detailed charter to
govern U. S. intelligence action. However, if it does so it will
clearly have to consider not only the protection of individual
liberties, but also the reconstruction of American intelligence
in an increasingly hostile world. ^
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K
o PAGE
WASIII:iGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
2 JANUARY 1980
0 S ]KI 1 -0,
in a
a Enters Ind Decut1fl ,
in the area.
With its new-found treaty with Is-
rael, the Egyptian military strength
can be deployed to protect the deliv-
ery of oil from the gulf to Japan,
Western Europe and the United
States.
In particular. where the Egyptian
army would most logically be sent is
II Oman and the crucial Strait of
Hormuz. Western intelligence
sources sav t at t" the most an erous
porno con.uc tot Le entire area is
a : its borders stand Cuban
anthiopian troops backed up by
Soviet equipment and advisers.
The Soviet navy has major units,
including nuclear submarines,
posted in the former major British
naval base at Aden. Sultan Qaboos of
Oman has publicly declared that he
can cope with any South Yemen mili-
tary move against his country. But
he says he will need help if "foreign
forces" strike against Oman.
Western military sources say that
Egypt's military forces could be air-
lifted into Oman quickly and effi-
ciently. Although Sadat and Qaboos
Weizman, that when Egypt needs ;
help, 'especially against Kadafi.
Egypt will have it."
By Sadat's own reckoning, every .
move he has made these last 10
years, including his treaty with Is-
rael, is. not a passing fancy but a
permanent part of a new Middle
East.
Sadat believes without reserva-
tion that after he passes, the treaty
with Israel will remain. He believes
that his polices of the past decade,
from throwing out the Russians to
starting a new but limited war with
Israel in October 1973, then making
peace with Israel, are designed to
maintain Egypt's integrity as the
first nation of the Arab world. -
He does not feel weakened by .
ostracization from the rest of the
Arab world - far from it. "They
need Egypt more than Egypt needs
He is intensely proud that the
Egypt he began to lead at the begin-
ning of the 70s, now enters the '30s
.the dominant military and intellec-
tual power of the Arab world. That is
his strength and why he survives.
He is an Egyptian first.
do not admit that Egyptian troops.
are now in Oman, it is a widely held
belief of Western intelligence
sources that at least 200 Egyptian
officers are in Oman as the advance. j
party for the arrival of major Egyp-
tian military assistance.
It should also be noted that Oman
was the only Arab country to sup-
port unequivocably Sadat's peace
initiative with Israel. Two others
who went along did so discreetly.
The 'military intelligence sources:
say that Sadat has already received
assurances from Israel that if Egypt
has to make a major commitment of
troops to Oman, the Israelis will take
up positions in the western desert of
Egypt facing Libya as a deterrent to
any Libyan ambitions to move in.
Libya's Col. Mummar Kadafi has'
openly threatened to "destroy" Sadat ..
and would obviously contemplate
making a move, were Egyptian:
troops to leave their present frontier
facing Libya.
"Sadat would never leave those,
positions unmanned," says one of .
Sadat's generals. "He has firm assur-:
ances from Israel, especially from
(Israeli Defense Minister Ezer)
threaten war against Israel without
Egypt.
In the chaotic atmosphere of in-
security brought to the Middle East
by the rise of Khomeini to power
and Soviet interference
stands as the
tan, the Egyptian army
single most powerful Moslem army
By Dean Brelis
Time-Life News Service
At the start of the 1970s, Anwar
Sadat. who had just replaced Camel
Nasser as president of Egypt, was
given very little chance of lasting
more than a few months.
Now, a decade later, Sadat remains
president of Egypt and has accom-
plished what had been considered
impossible - peace with Israel.
Along the way, Sadat has just
about made himself the most unpop-
ular leader in the Arab world -
unpopular, that is, outside Egypt.
Within his own country of 40 mil-
lion, the path he has followed,
namely peace with Israel, has re-
ceived a favorable response from the
majority of Egyptians.
But in the rest of the Arab world,
whether it be conservative Saudi
Arabia or Kuwait, or radical Algeria,
Libya or Iraq, he is rated "the most
dangerous man in the Arab world."
The reason: Sadat has refused to
water down his peace initiative. He
also spurned an offer of SS billion
not to sign the Camp David accords
and after the shah fell willingly paid
host to the once-powerful monarch.
Sadat, at the same time, described
the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as
"a lunatic." As a result, contracts for
Sadat's life have been put out by
Marxist-oriented Palestinian groups.
But Sadat remains alive and well,
and as volatile and visionary as ever.
How does one explain the man's sur-
vival in what is essentially a hostile
Arab world?
To begin with, as Sadat himself
has declared, it is impossible for any
combination of Arab powers to
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~U ~... r
.?1I PAC,
THE WASHINGTON POST
2 January 1980
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak,
Unease in Oman
MUSCAT, Oman-This anticommu- Similar reports come from intelli-
nist, pro-Western redoubt on the Ara, even some Saudi services of otheals htin i aria
bian peninsula's southern shore is con- vinced of Soviet complicity in the No. ' as much. While U.S. officials reject the
vember assault against the Grand Omani report as evidence of a ten-
Mosque in Mecca, deepening belief dency here to find Russians under
here that the Russian bear is on the every bed, they concede the Mecca ter-
march in the Persian Gulf. rorists got arms from South Yemen.
Oman's leaders claim their ante erica Whatever the degree of Soviet com-
leaves no doubt the liemra attack was plicity, it was taken here as evidence of
hatched in communist South Yemen Moscow's arrogance. ,It stunned me,"
under Soviet auspices as an audacious ef- one Omani official told us. "I would
fort to overthrow the conservative royal think the Russians would want to en-
government of Saudi Arabia, the world's sure the reelection of a weak president
richest oil state. To Oman. this represents like Carter, or better still, Kennedy,
ultimate arrogance in the Kremlin and and not make any trouble. It shows just
blatant disrespect for the United States how arrogant they are."
in Its Iranian ordeaL Physical evidence of that arrogance
Oman's answer is to intensify its ap- ! is the growing Soviet naval presence
peal to the rich but nervous Persian here. According to Omani inteiliaencee.
Gulf hereditary monarchies and to eight to 12 Soviet nuclear submarines,
Western powers, particularly the are berthed in permanent pens in !
United States, for new aircraft and .. South Yemen alongside several surface
ships to patrol the strategically vital ' ? warships.
Straits of Hormuz against the expand-' Until recently, a Krivackclass Soviet
Ing Soviet presence. But beyond hard-,4 destroyer (bristling. with electronic lis-
ware, the Oman's want a tougher U.S. tening equipment) was on station in the
posture since the United States permit- Straits of Hormuz, through which pass-,
led the shah of Iran to fail and has suf. I es Persian Gulf oil destined for the
fered the humiliation in Tehran. Western world. Lt. Tom Hammon, Brit
While the Mecca assault stunned all e ish commander
le-firing fast patrol boatsmt Oman's
d td us it
after-Baghdad's blast. But Omani offs-;
vials claim many Arab states-includ
jug Iraq-privately expressed interest
in helping Oman police the straits.. "I
can assure you," one official here told
us, "we want no part of help from
Iraq:'
It does want help from the United
States; an, aid package of defensive
arms has been approved in the State
Department. The recent U.S. delegation
seeking emergency basing facilities re?
ceived a warm-reception here: -
Oman's position is a welcome for the ?j
U.S. naval presence "just over the line
of the horizon." Such force-out of
sight, but nearby-reassured this thin.
ly populated (around 500,000) nation.,
whose armed forces, though number-
ing only about 15,000, are excellent by
Mideast standards. Nevertheless, the
sultan's government remains uneasy as
It compares the Kremlin's arrogance
with Jimmy Carter's restraint in this
cauldron of world conflict.
our0.r~.wsawep 1.i Inc.
e
Islam. it especially disconcert
conservative sultanate of Oman, thanks was recently replaced by a Kotlin class
to reports from its iatg erica service destroyer. "It doesn't ms mebohy out 1 (which, like its arm services, is run "They've always got
by British officers). Those reports -,- there.
ject the official Saudi attribution of the With the Iranian navy departed fol-
attack to religious fanatics not con lowing the shah's fall, the only counter-
nected with any foreign power. weight is Oman's competent but tiny
Omani intelli a ce contends that the navy; Swhich tan troll the Qaboos, straits.
Oman s
ca a or the Mecca assault was trained ingly,
in the People's Democratic Republic of old pro-Western ruler, has asked fl-
Yemen (South Yemen), the Soviet out nancial help from the Gulf states and
post on the Arabian peninsula. Al- the West to buy patrol boats, mine!
though some arms were of British man- sweepers, helicopters and patrol
ufacture for the purpose of "deniabil- planes. ublic criticism
ity, they were supplied from South There was sharp p
Yemenrthermore, Omani intelli-from leftist, heavily armed Iraq, which
Bence contends that the attack on , decries Oman's breaking of Persian
Mecca, if successful, was to be followed Gulf solidarity to endorse the Camp
by uprisings at Medina and "other ; David accord. The-Gulf s jittery heredi-
Oman
places in Saudi Arabia." i tary states backed away from ;
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FORMER CIA EMPLOYEES
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:'... PPE A RED
0:+ I: rh THE NEW YORK TIMES
3 January 1980
U.S. Asks Judge to Bar Mr. Liech y's case "may be expected toI
disclose information detrimental to the
n~at:onal security, if not properly protect-'
i
CL A. Data Di'sclosurel
Jan. 2 (UPI) - The
Government asked a Federal district
judge today to prevent a dismissed offi-
cer of the Central Intelligence Agency
from disclosing classified information, 1
including details of alleged South Korean
payoffs to Congressmen.
The former officer,. C. Philip Liechty,
contends in a lawsuit against a former su-
pervisor that he was dismissed because
he kept prodding his superiors to turn
over to the Justice Department infor:na-
tion about South Korean payoffs to mem-
bers of Congress. Mr. Liechty said that he :
reported the information to high officials
of the agency in 1974 The Justice Depart-
ment did not begin a broad investigation
into Korean influence-buying in Congress:
until two years later.
In court papers filed in in Alexandria,
Va., the Justice Department argued that
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ARTICLE APP IRIED
ON FAGE-C. S_
THE WASHINGTON POST
3 January 18
IU.S. Acts to Enter Stilt,
For Security Reasons
The federal government asked yes-
terday to intervene in a civil suit in-
volving a former CIA agent and a cur-
rent CIA agent to rrevent the possi-
ble disclosure of unnamed national se-
curity secrets. '
Federal officials asked U.S. District
Judge Oren R. Lewis in Alexandria to
-let the government join CIA agent
Robert F. Bodroghy as a defendant in.
the $2 million sander and defamation I
of character suit brought against -Bo-
droghy by former agent C. Philip
Liechty.
The suit concerns remarks Bodro-
ghy allegedy made about Liechty dur-
ing a child custody fight Liechtp-ls
having with his estranged wife. In
that suit; Liechy gave a deposition
about purported national security'
matters which- Lewis placed under
seal at government request.
The judge told Justice Department
attorneys on Dec. 21 he would.-not
take similiar actions on alleged,;tna-
tional security.matters unless thegov-
ernment officially entered the- case.
Lewis scheduled a hearing ?on?'the
government's motion for Friday.
Liechty has said outside of court
that CLA officials "covered up" infor-
mation about attempts by Korean offi-
cials to bribe American congressmen
in the early 1970s. The CIA has de-
clined:comment. -
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A:,TICLE APPS'
ON PAGE__ .441
THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
3 January 1980
U.S. Seeks W'st3er Gag in CdA Agent's Spit
Lawyer Asks Disclosure
Of Surveillance Data
By Allan Frank
Washington Star Staff Writer
The U.S. government yesterday
asked a federal judge to prevent for-
mer CIA agent C. Philip Liechty, who
served in South Korea, from divulg-
ing any agency secrets in the course
of a private lawsuit.
At the same time, Sol Z. Rosen, Lie-
cthy's attorney, asked that the
government. be forced to disclose
any surveillance it has conducted of
him in connection with the case.
Papers filed with Senior U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Oren R. Lewis by the Jus-
tice Department and the CIA ask the
judge to forbid Liechty, who was a
covert operations officer, from di-1,
vulging any agency secrets.
Liechty has said he objected to
inadequate reporting by his CIA su-
periors in South Korea in the early,
1970s of their knowledge of illegal
payoffs by the Korean CIA to Ameri-
can congressmen. .
The Justice Department has asked
Lewis to allow the government to
enter a harassment and invasion of
privacy lawsuit filed by Liechty
against his former boss, Robert F.
Bodroghy.
The judge on Dec. 12 and Dec. 14
agreed to seal Liechty's answers to
wrMen,questions from Bodroghy
and to order Liechty not to disclose ;
information in the depositions.
At a Dec. 21 hearing, Lewis indi-
cated he would entertain a motion
from the government for a more-
widespread gag order in the case.
At that same hearing, Justice De-
partment attorney Stanley D. Wright
revealed that Rosen and Liechty'S
other attorney, Thomas Fortune Fay,
were being subjected to security
checks. Papers filed by Rosen yester-
day asked Lewis to order the govern-
ment to disclose whether it has con-
ducted any wiretaps of his office and
home telephones and whether other
surveillance of him has been con-
ducted for the security check.
Other papers filed by Fay and
Rosen recently included excerpts of
the questions that were asked of Bo-
droghy during the taking of deposi-
tions Dec. 27.
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MISCELLANEOUS
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G:t2YCLE ti i' L.RD THE WASHINGTON POST
PARADE MAGAZINE
ON 30 December 1979
wafter Scott's
Mika
Q. Stanfield Turner, director of the CIA. seems to
take a lot of flak from the pers. Isn't he bright?
a former Rhodes scholar?- Bill Clair, San Diego. Cal.
A. Admiral Turner is indeed bright. He was ranked
No. 25 among 820 graduates of the U.S. Naval
Academy, Class of '47. He and~~lamaiesJimmy
it
Carter both applied for Rhodes
was Turner who was awarded one.
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APTICL , Pi T's:I D
THE ARLINGTON JOURNAL & GLOBE
26 December 1979
Names in the News
s ooze
For CA I Services
The Director of Central Intelligence, I
Adm. Stansfield Turner, has awarded
the Distinguished Intelligence Medall
posthu.Z-ously to Frank A. Briglia of
Vienna in recognition of his outstand-i
ing service to the Central Intelligence!
Agency. Briglia, who was deputy'
director of the CIA's Office of Re-1,
search and Development, and his wife, ;
N. Belle Briglia, were killed in an auto-
mobile accident in August.
The medal; which is the agency's;
highest award for performance of out-
standing service, was accepted by the)
Briglias' four sons in a recent cere-,
mony at CIA headquarters in Langley
The citation accompanying the award
commends Briglia for adding "newt
analytic and collection capability to!
the intelligence community" through]
his "insight and persistence." Hiss
engineering and managerial contribu
tions to the-agency are described as!
"reflecting the highest credit on him!
and the United States government."
27A CZ17,
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ARTICLS
05 PAGE
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WAS11I; GTO-' STAR
30 DECEIBER 1979
TheWorid
Manila Holds 16 on Plot Charges
MANILA, Philippines - Military authorities yes-
terday announced the arrest of 16 persons al-
legedly involved in a plot with American dissi-
dents to topple the government, murder top offi-
cials and set off bombs in Manila.
The military also declassified secret documents
in the supposed plot and said they had seized huge
quantities of explosives and documents on urban
terrorism marked "CIA."
Metropolitan Manila Commander Brig. Gen.
Prospero Olivas said he could not say if the initials
referred to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
The 16 included a Philippine-born U.S. citizen,
two Manila newspaper executives and 13 others.
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ARTICLE AP'::Aii.trD THE WASHINGTON POST
ON PAGE 91& 29 December 1979
Say, Defecting En'V.0Y
efl
11i
g
. rke for Cairo inte
? position "in the service of the
cial
ies:" referring to
nn
li
c
d Debusma
Did po
By Bern Cameav 1978
Reuter the accords signed in September bel and
States
The
,
by the United
-DAMASCUS, Syria. Dris zo-
Syrian government, surprised by the Egypt. The agreements paved the peway
ace
resignation o` its ambassador to the
for last 3larch's EbYPti'Israeli United Nations, accused him today ce pact, which is regarded as treason to
with EgYPtiaa intelligence the Arab cause-by Syria and most
collaborating
and misusing his official position- other Arab states.
Ambassador Hammoud Choufi an' Chouft's resignatiocoincided ath Party,
a New his resignation. last - at night at which a which congress of opened the last Syrian Saturday against
a New York news conference
of Pre
he accused the government re- a background of sectarian violence
dent Hafez Assail of corruption, and widespread economic discontent:
pression and the effounism. He said he At .least 120 people were reported
to have died over the past six months
could join the efforts to forge an op
aimed chiefly at
position front abroad. in violence aim members
Choufi, 52, was the highest opow cier of the minority Moslem Moslem Ala`h'ite sect,
to defect since Assad seized of which Assad is most prominent
nine years ago. He has been ambassador representative.
to Buenos Aires, Rome and Moscow, The government has blamed the
and chief of the United States section Moslem Brotherhood, an extr `mister-
panizatiQn pledged to fight
at the Foreign Ministry. was
The ministry said Choufi influence on Islam, for the violence.
The state-run press has accused Saudi
ordered home Dec. 7, after presenting and Jordan of training bro.
views at the United Nations to heed the Arabia activists. fi said
order an policy. He refused therhood and to heedd thhe
order. of Foreign Affairs ad- At his news conference, Chou
"The Ministry he believed the. only Lioni the a
vised Choufi of its decision to tran s far problems lay built
him to Damascus [ar.dl punish iable and formidable front,
his involvement and collaboration tian upon the involvement of all pani peg-
the intelligence service of the E,YP forces and sectors of the Syr
regime," a statement said:
Choufi, it added, misused his offi- ple."
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ARTICLE .1l'Pi::iitl:J
ON ?AGE
A 2a-
THE NEW YORK TIMES
2 January 1980
A Bad Bill
By William H. Schaap
WASHINGTON - The parliamen-
tary record is chillingly direct: This
bill, the lawmaker admitted, "could
subject a private citizen to criminal
prosecution for disclosing unclassified
information obtained from unclassi.
fled sourcces." The quotation, however,
is not from any Latin-Ame ican dicta.
torship. nor from Eastern Europe; it
is, unfortunately, from the Congres..
sional Record, and the speaker is the
chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee, Edward P. Boland.
In October, a bill known as the Intel-
ligencce Identities Protection Act, was
quietly introduced, and, if It passes, In.
vestigative journalists and Govern.
meat whistle.blowers are both in, for
big trouble.
The bill, proposed, authored and
promoted by the Central Intelligence
Agency, makes It a crime for anyone
who has had access to Information that
identifies undercover intelligence per-
sonnel to disclose such Information,
and also makes It a felony for anyone
else to do so with the "Intent to impair
or impede the foreign Intelligence no.
tivites of the United States." ?
The first provision would completely
stifle criticism and reform from
within the intelligence community;
the seoaM would eliminate scrutiny .
from the outside. Indeed, the bill
would represent the Insidious begin-
ning of an Official Secrets Act. It
would criminal fze the writings of
Philip Agee, John Stockwell, Frank
Snapp and others. even though they ex-
posed large scale violations at law,
gh
lying~Co thouthey laid bare
ss, even though they to-
tally belied the high aporal_tone of-
This law would also strike at the
heart of investigative journalism. For
example, It would have criminalized
the sciosure of regular C.I.A. pay-
ments to King Hussein of Jordan; It
would have prevented exposure of the
key role the C.I.A. and military intelli-
gence played In torture and murder In
Vietnam; it would have prohibited ex.
posoze of the backgrounds of the Intel-
agents involved In
Watergate.
That the bill is "limited" to informa-
tion that Identifies officers and agents
is of little significance. It is virtually
impossible to expose Illegal or im-
moral activity within government :
without disclosing who is responsible
for, or involved with, the illegalities.
The requirement that journalists'
activity, to be criminal, be carried out
with intent to impede intelligence as
tivities is another spsokeecreen. From
the C.IA's, and from a prosecution's,
viewpoint, any disclosures would be
considered an impediment to opera,-
ti; the motiv of the disclow
would be of little real significance.
What is more, the bill is rot even lim- .
Ited to the protection of legal active-
tiee.
This bill is unnecessary and unwise.
Even the Justice Department advised
against it, noting that existing espio-
nage lawradequately protect national
security.
Laws such as this must be strictly
limited to protecting what is in fact se. .
cret, and to what is in fact damaging to
the national security. Anything more
represents a serious infringement of
the FirstAmendment.
This Is the difference between the
laws and the Constitution of this cam-
try and those of countries that have Of-
ficial Secrets Acts. Such laws allow the
government to prohibit the disclosure
of information that the government
declares to be secret - regardless of
reality. Such laws shield immoral and
illegal conduct; they-are not aimed at
external: enemies, but at whistle-
blowers and reformers In government,
and at journaliists outside.
We must be aware of this attack on
our rights and our responsibilities.
William H. Schaap, a lawyer, is co.edt-
tar (with Ellen Ray and Louis oif) of
the CovertActfon Information Bulle-
tin.
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11; ?AGE,
TO THE POINT
14 DECEKLER 1979
SP AL REP OR "
UNITED STATES
Pilaying more and more
~nm?E hands
By Allan C Brownfeld
IN the US, many today hold the view that in the late Forties and Fifties
Americans overestimated the.aggresslve intentions and subversive be-
haviour of the Soviet Union and Its agents in the US. The view is wide-
spread, In addition, that no real threat to the national security exists at the
present time and, as a result, that it Is entirely proper to dismantle the
internal security apparatus which has been, many argue, a threat to civil
liberties.
In an important new book Self Destruct, Dis-
mantling America's Internal Security (Ar-
lington House, 1979), Robert Morris takes
sharp exception to these prevailing views. He
believes that the Soviet Union, from the end of
World War Two until today, has striven all too
successfully to weaken the US, with a view to
its ultimate destruction. He shows how the US,
for a variety of masons, has become a party to
the on-going process of its own destruction.
Robert Morris is well qualified to tell this
story. During World \Var Two he served as an
officer in Naval Intelligence and in 1950 be-
came chief counsel to the Senate Internal Se-
curity Subcommittee. It was largely the record
he compiled as chief counsel that inspired the
House of Delegates of the American Bar As-
sociation to commend the sub-committee for its
work over the years. He has also been a judge in
New York City, president of the University of
Dallas and president and founder of the Univer-
sity of Piano.
In his foreword, William Rusher, publisher
of National Review, writes: "Some people may
choose to scoff at Morris's deep concern as
dated or old-hat - but have they looked at the
world around them? Since Morris last retired as
chief counsel to the Internal Security Sub-
committee in 1958, the Soviet Union has:
"Drawn at least abreast of the US as a milit-
ary superpower.
'Established a spacious island base just
120 km off the coast of Florida.
"Come within inches of taking full control of
Indonesia and Chile.
"Drawn India into its orbit.
"Quarter-backed the communist conquest of
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
"Erupted with permanent naval forces and
bases into both the Mediterranean and the In-
dian Ocean.
"Deployed at least 30000 surrogate Cuban
troops on half-a-dozen fronts all over Africa-
and nonetheless persuaded bemused Republi-
can and Democratic administrations alike to
believe it is sincere about wanting 'detente'. If
what we have been witnessing is 'detente', no
wonder the Russians want it!"
Morris points out that, "Within the brief
time-interval of 20 years, the position of the US
has declined from that of the undisputed leader
of a confident world alliance of free peoples to
that of a beleaguered island in a rising sea of
totalitarian despotism ... When I left
Washington early in 1958, security agencies
were maintaining surveillance over subver-
sives. Today. the subversives are discrediting
security agents. Colonel Rudolph Abel, the
Soviet spy, was arrested and convicted then.
Today former FBI officials L Patrick Gray, W
Mark Felt and Edward S Miller are under in-
dictment for measures undertaken to track
down the terrorist Weathermen."
The decline of the US capacity b protect its
internal security is indeed dramatic. In 1958,
the US was protected internally by several
committees of the Congress, the Subversive
Activities Control Board, the Internal Security
Division of the Department of Justice, the
counter-intelligence departments of the army,
navy, air force and coast guard, counter-
intelligence departments of law enforcement
agencies, including police departments, and of
course the Fet and the CIA.
Now, in 1979, the House and Senate internal
security committees, the Subversive Activities
Control Board and the internal security division
of the Justice Department have all been
abolished. In addition, writes Morris, "L
counter-intelligence departments of the armed
forces and of law enforcement agencies have
been emasculated, and many o our leaders are
trying to strithe FBI of its intelligence:
gathering function and to weaken the role of the
A.
AlI of this has not come about because the
threat from the Soviet. Union has declined.
Moms shows the reader in great detail that it
has, in fact, increased. He points out, however.
"One of the first purposes of a conspiracy is to
convince its targets that no conspiracy exists.
The misinformation, camouflage and inces-
sant propaganda of the communist apparatus,
neatly complemented by the self-deception and
gullibility on our own part, have conditioned us
to accept with indifference the growth of a
meance to our very existence.
"And as this threat, now clear aqd unmistak-
able, becomes more proximate and more omin-
ous, a strange response is setting in. Instead of
shoring up our defences in the face of such a
threat, we are dismantling our ramparts and
treating as meddlesome extremists those who
would halt that dismantling."
It is Morris's view that the nation's internal
security requires the maintenance of an
intelligence-gathering organisation that can as-
sess the strength, the motivation and the inten-
tions of every real or potential enemy. The US,
he argues, must also maintain a counter-
F' 1. M S
. - - am, NEW &A It ti law
liortasie sae':riat se trirn~ s.aasy..rs:. f
intelligence force that will preserve it from
misinformation from tenG enemies, rom
their etration of the U s and from
the disloyalty or ineptness o
its operatives.
US intelligence has, in recent years: lamely
failed to understand what the Soviet Union was
doing ewor -an what was taking place
in strots a-spots as Iraa and Nicaragua.
Major-General George Keegan, former head of
US Air Force Intelligence, stated that "During
the past five years, I have watched at first-hand
the culmination of 25 years of consistent under-
estimates of the Soviet threat ..."
General Keegan's explanation for this at-
mosphere is that estimates of Soviet strength
have been deliberately understated and falsified
to conform to what the politicians want to hear.
This grim book should cause its readers
much concern. When before in history has a
country under concerted attack, dismantled its
means of defence? Robert Morris hopes that it
is not too late to restore the nation to sanity.
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9
ARTICLE AM MUD
on PAGB__,A_, ?....
THE WASHINGTON POST
1 January 1980
The lightning superbolt was described as "un-
likely,". because Its signature is nothing like what
was written in the sky the night of Sept. 22.
What the satellite saw was a double pulse of light
that is.the'Characteristic fingerprint of a nuclear ex-
plosion, in which a fireball briefly disappears when
the shock. wave makes it opaque from space, then
reappears when the wave dissipates.
The panel covened by the White House has also
concluded. that a? lightning strike quickly followed
by a meteor burning up in the atmosphere does not
?explain.the event of Sept. 22. Said one White House
source: "The statistical chance of that happening
got bad very quickly -once we started looking at it."
Despite the evidence that an atomic explosion
took place Sept. 22, the White House has not dis-
banded its panel of seven experts. The White House
will convene the panel at least once more after it
has researched even the remote possibility that the
Vela satellite may have mistaken a double glint ;of
`A-Blrxst' was 1?TT
Lightning dolt,
P~n~i Decides
By Thomas:O'Tonle
wasn-nvtoa past awt writer
A board of outside experts narned by the White
House- to decide whether an ato nie explosion took
place near South Africa Sept. 22 has ruled out al-
most every other explanation for the event.
In. a.,mrrting convened by the Rhite House Office
of Science Policy just before Christmas, the panel
of seven unidentified experts concluded there was
no reason to suspect that the .Veia satellite which -
spotted . the. Sept. 22 event. had malfunctioned, or
that, what the satellite saw was 'caused by an ener
moyts strike of lightning, as another theory- sag-.
gested. .
`'The signal the satellite saw, s4ilt looks in. every.
way'[ike' a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere,"
one White House source said. "The trouble is, -we
still have no absolutely no separate data that would
corroborate that it was an atomic explosion.".
The most.- solid such data .vo'eld be radioactive
fallout from the explosion, which took .place (if it
was-an explosion) . in the middle of the night Sept.
22 above- a wide expanse of the Scuth Atlantic and
Indian oceans. The nearest country to the source of
the explosion was South '.Afrie:q, which led to wide
speculation that the South .Africans had exploded:.
their first atomic bomb.
Late in. November, New Zealand thought it had
detected fallout in its rainwater. but -officials re-
tracted that statement shortly- thereafter, saying
they' coaid not be sure. One organization in New
Zealand- that measures radioactivity around the coon..
tryside said it had seen no evidence of fallout.
Some.* scientists suggested the Vela satellite had
made.a.mistake, either by malfunctioning or mistak
ing,.a ; `superbolt" of lightning= in the clouds above x?
the ocean for a nuclear explosion: The panel con-
ven.ed.by the.Whlte House was asked to look care-
Iully_.into each possibility. ? .. .
At the meeting, convened= by the White House be-
tore Christmas, the outside panel just about ruled
out these possibilities::
White House sourees:said the panel concluded the _
satellite was- is excellent working condition. Each
time the satellite was interrogated from the ground,
the sources said, it returned the' correct informa-
tion. What'r more, the satellite has never repeated
its Sept, 22, observation, suggesting it saw- a real
event in'the skies near South Attica that night, ?
sunlight off another satellite.
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9