PRESS CLIPPINGS DECEMBER 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 181
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 6, 1978
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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#~1RT%CLB APP NEW YORK TThES
C 4 DECEM?ER 2978
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MINNESOTA DAILY
21 November 1978
CIA said to want students
to monitor Iranians
By ERIC RINGHAM
Copyright 1978
Minnesota Daily
Men identifying themselves as
representatives of the Central Intel-
-ligence Agency (CIA) allegedly at-
tempted this fall to recruit students
to spy on Iranians attending the
University.
The Daily received information
about the alleged recruitment effort
after locating a University student
and army veteran who claims he
was approached by the ageecy.?The
student agreed to discuss the sul-
sect last week if his name remained
confidential.
The source said two white,
middle-aged men claiming to be
CIA agents came to, his home in
September. Although they pre-
sented no identification verifying
their intelli-
gence agency, they knew details of
the student's career as an army offi.
cer.
Those details included his work
as a psychological operations offi-
cer and his security clearance for
top-secret information.
Asking if the student had heard
of SAVAK, the Iranian security
police force, the agents allegedly
said the CIA was helping SAVAK
agents in the United States identify
and observe Iranians opposed to
the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi.
The agents further said they
wanted to get "something con-
crete" on Iranian students to facili-
tate their deportation back to Iran,
according to the source.
"They said they wanted to find
out who was stirring up trouble,
who the 'terrorists' were," the stu-
dent said. "They referred to these
guys as'terrorists.' " .
The agents, the student said, ex-
plained that Iranians on U.S. cam-
puses are harming the shah's image
abroad. "Their goal was to discred-
it these Iranian) guys. That was
the main thing," the source said.
In a series of interviews the stu-
dent- said the men offered him
money and appealed to.his patriot-
ism as a U.S. citizen in their at-
tempts to get him to agree to their
proposal.
"This one guy gave fete this pitch
that my responsibilities didn't stop
when I got out of the army. They
offered to pay my tuition, but I'm
already getting that (through the
G.I. Bill), so I didn't give a shit,"
the source said. "Besides, I
wouldn't prostitute myself like
that."
The student said he refused to
observe Iranians and report on their,
activities. He said he agreed, how-
ever, to ask other veterans at the
University if they were interested in
working for the CIA.
Another veteran who did not
want to be identified confirmed to
the Daily that she had been in-
formed by the source of the oppor-
tunity to work for the CIA. "He
came to me and asked if I wanted to
make some more money, if I
wanted my school paid for," she
said.
The veteran, a CLA sophomore,
said- she wondered at the time.
"Who would get messed up in
something like that? Who'd need
the money that much?"
She said the cautious way in
which the student approached the
topic lent credibility to his story.
"If he was BSing, I don't think he
would have done that.
"I believe him. I know him pretty
well," she said.
It is not known whether any stu-
dents accepted the offer.
' The source said he believes his
service record-detailing his army
career in Southeast Asia, Germany
and several bases in the United
States-suggested to the agents that '
he might be willing to agree to their
proposal.
"I think r- j asychological opera-
tions ba.k0ruund was what
prompted t hr n to contact me," the
31-year-old veteran said. "It's the
same sort of thing I was doing in
Vietnam and several other places in
Southeast- Asia and Eruope," he
said. '
But another explanation the stu-
dent offered for why the CIA con-
tacted him is that he had once
volunteered information to thei
agency- -
After serving in Vietnam as an in-
fantry platoon leader, the veteran
was trained in psychological opera-
tions and returned to Southeast
Asia. He later was stationed in'
West Germany, again working in
psychological operations but also
serving as a drug and alcohol con-
trol officer at a U.S. base near
Stuttgart. Military records confirm
his assignments.
Ordered to stop the flow of Ills
gal drugs to U.S. military personnel
"at any cost," the officer repotted-
ly developed contacts with the West
German underground. Members of' '
the underground, including fugitive
radicals, finance their operations
partly through drug sales, accord-
ing to the former officer.
During this period, the officer re-
portedly met "seven or eight" per-
sons who said they were associated
with the Baader-Meinhof gang.
otherwise known as the Red'Army
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Faction. Andreas Baader, founder
of the faction. committed suicide in
prison in October 1977. Ulrike
`feinhof, a former West German
journalist and member of the
group, hanged herself in prison in
May of the previous year.
The officer's contacts in the fac-
tion, he said, suggested in 1976 that
they were considering hijacking A
airliner. They were vague as to the
time and place of the'.atftA- ac,
cording to the source.
-Ihs rollowing? spring, ,irtt:r the
Cal ?: ~r had left the army and re-
iuraed To his home in St. Paul. he
dec,J4fhat he should contact the
authanues and tell them about the
German terrorists. Looking in the
St. Paul telephone directory under
"U.S. Government offices." he lo-
sated a number for the CIA. He
dialed the number and requested a
meeting.
According to the student. a single
agent visited his house, listened to
his story and left. promising to get
back in touch.
The veteran did not hear from
the agent again. For eveal -
months, he said, he suspected he
was being followed, but he was not
contacted by representatives of the
intelligence agency..Thnat fall. four
terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jet
to Mogadishu. Somalia. .
Nearly a year went by before the
supposed agents allegedly contacted
him about spying on Iranian stu-
dents. Although the source and the
Daily have been unable to deter-
mine whether the men-were in fact
from the CIA, they seemed to have
had access to government files. ac-
cording to the student.
"These guys studied my file,"
the student said.
The student said his conversation
with the men ranged to other
groups allegedly being watched by
the CIA, including students from
Hong Kong and Taiwan and mem-
bers of the Young Socialist Alliance
and Vietnam Veterans Against the
War.
The [run, the student said, resem-
bled "anyone from 3M-_ -executive
types." They sgid they were con-
cerned about I "peace and order on
campus." and about possible com-
munist "insurgence" in Iran. ac-
cording to the student. And. the
student said, they seemed already
well informed about Iranians at the
University.
"As far as the masks go. you can
tell them (the Iranians) that they
don't need to wear them," the stu-
dent said. "They know every Irani-
an student on campus." Iranian
demonstrators often wear masks to
conceal their identities.
The source said he agreed to dis-
cuss the story with the Daily be-
cause "they (the CIA) spend
millions of dollars on intelligence.
activities and they don't know what
they're doing." He said he is neith-
er for nor against the cause of the
Iranian dissidents.
"I'd just like to see them (the
CIA) get their shit together." he
said.
That U.S. authorities sometimes
cooperate with the Iranian SAVAK
has been reported frequently in the
American press. Columnists Jack
Anderson and Les Whitten. for ex-
ample. have documented a relation-
ship between Mansur Rafizadeh.
the had SAVAK agent in the
United States, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The
New York FB1 office trades infor-
rgenoo WA .5AVAK .K+ma(w rou-
t) wly. dine "iher? b' notht' covert
about it," according to one FBI of-
ficial:
And the presence of SAVAK
agents in the United States also is
well known. A House subcommit-
tee chaired by Rep. Don Fraser (D.
Mn.) has heard testimony from
state- department officials that
"there certainly are representatives
(of SAVAK) in the United States."
Alfred Atherton, Jr., assistant
secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian affairs. told Frase is
subcommittee last year that "Irani-
an authorities are interested in
knowing about potential terrorists
who may be among students who
would return to Iran."
"There's not much question that
SAVAK has been making efforts to
keep track of Iranian students."
Fraser said during a telephone in-
terview last week. "But I'm slow to
accept that the CIA might be in-
volved in recruitment efforts," al-
though "I've made a lot of
assumptions in the past that turned
out to be wrong.
"Even if the CIA were doing it,
they certainly wouldn't confirm
it." Fraser said.
But to Iranian dissidents con-
tacted about the story. CIA cooper-
ation with SAVAK was a familiar
topic.
Preferring to remain anonymous,
the Iranians identified themselves
as members of the Iranian Student
Association. One said he was the re-
gional director of defense for the
student group, which is organized
on local, regional - and national
levels. The regional official said
that while his organization had not
heard of CIA actions against Irani-
ans at the University, "in other
cities it's an old story."
It is a common strategy, he sa;,.i.
to portray Iranian students as -bor.,
wrists" and then deport -them.
SAVAK, he said, works either
alone or with local authorities :a
provoking figtrsxarauti-shah dem-
onstrations. Protesters then are ar-
rested. he said.
"Whether these things are dons
by SAVAK or the local police, they
are controlled by the CIA," the dis-
sident said. The local Iranian Stu-
dent Association has escaped such
harassment so far: ,he said, "be-
cause it's a young chapter..1 don't
mean to say SAVAK is careless."
. Contacted by telephone Monday,
the CIA refused to comment on the
particulars of its relationship with
SAVAK. Dale Peterson, a public
relations officer. said he was unable
to gather facts that might relate to
the story without the name of the
Daily's source.
Asked whether the CIA. works
with SAVAK in conducting surveil-
lance against Iranians in the United
States, Peterson ? said no
"agreement" between the agencies
gives SAVAK the authority to oper-
ate in this country.
Asked if it were possible that the
CIA might have tried to recruit!
American students, Peterson re'
plied, "I can't answer that. You're
asking me to get into derail about
activities we may or may . not be
conducting against foreigners in the
United States."
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r'~1:TrCLL ;~'_Pvw MIAMI HERALD
? P46-~-% 26 NOVEMBER i 978
EDITORIALS
.U.S.. intelligence Community
Indicted, by Seres -of Failures
PERHAPS the most. disturbing report.
yet on the U.S. intelligence com-
munity is the news that President
Carter is'not satisfied with the quality of
its reporting and analysis.
Mr. Carter was 'caught off guard by
the rioting in Iran. His intelligence re-
ports said the shah had'such tight. con-
trol of.his nation's political system that
the opposition would be no more than a
troublesome irritation.
Apparently the CIA was giving more
'weight, tb.the shah's secret police than,
any of its. other'. sources, assuming ? that
the huge : CIA station; in Teheran has
other sources. But the. CIA wasn't alone.
The huge U.S. embassy staff was unable
to get: any contrary information back to
the State Department's Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research, and the even larger
Defense Attache's Office did not make a
convincing report to.the Pentagon: Or,
worse yet,' any other reports were dis-
-missed by the intelligence community
staff as ?the.report to Mr. Carter was
prepared. ..
This does not seem to'be air isolated
instance.
The intelligence community discount-
ed the possibility of war in the Middle
East in the fall of .1973. The Yom. Kippur
War followed. .' .
Military intelligence was unable -to
foresee the total collapse of the South
Vientamese army in 1975, and the CIA's
Saigon station chief had been hornswog-
gled into thinking a settlement would be
.negotiated- ,.,..
:'The bureaucratic politics involved in
, f intelligence estimates
the preparatioao
went on for, so . long that the White
-House was:,unable?to get timely, accu
rate information', on the Soviet, Backfire'
bomber in 1976. -
The CIA confessed in 1977 that its
economic analysis had been faulty and
that the Soviet Union was spending
about twice as much money on defense
as CIA analysts had ever predicted.
And the best information available in-
dicates that the. State Department failed
to keep the President up to date on Fidel
Castro's plans to release 3,600 political
prisoners.
Only the National Security Agency,
which collects information by means of
satellites and electronic eavesdropping,
seems to have come through these years
relatively untainted. I .
The failures we list here are not aber-
rant stunts like putting poison in Patrice
Lumumba's'.toothpaste or sneaking itch- .
irg power mi to Mr. Castro's skin-diving
suit. Nor are, they the significant and
systematic violations of Constitutional
rights, that Congress and, the White
House allowed the intelligence agencies_.
to commit through lack of control.
This Is a breakdown in the cardinal ,
function 'of U.S. intelligence - collect-
ing accurate information and getting' it
to. the President and other decision-mak-'
ers when they need it.
We can anticipate the argument that"
we'll get from the CIA: All the leaks, the
revelations of dissident ex-CIA .agents
have'. closed off Sources in allied spy
agencies. ?
Hogwash! `;.
The failures have gone on too long
and are too pervasive. The intelligence
agencies apparently were more interest-_
ed in being James 'Bond swashbucklers.
than in being successful reporters.
When President John F. Kennedy ded-
icated the then-new CIA office building
in Langley, Va., Or told agency employes
that history would trumpet their failures
and no-one will know of their successes.
Apparently Mr. Kennedy's statement is
being used by the spies to justify all their
failures, because the successes are few
and far between these days.
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BARRY G:,. WATE4
I,v;:OwY
'?ZCniLCt' Siafcz ,~~Crta.fc
D_--r 4, 1973
the Editor
-he tiarri Herald
529 14th Street, Northwest
Washing~mn, D. C. 2004-50
Iy~CJJ.f tt S.1w:-.-rte
-n Z7 wL.X-t-
COr MC oCL SC!E?:CE I\z-R ~~csOR'~"
5c C, CC. TLC ?+?wro'+` ??., S..-c
C,p.~ r W CJ.T.OMS
SLL.LC' COhMI7TCE ON 04T-7+E,cc
In your Sunday, Nove nber 26th issue there is an article to which
I take exception. It concerns fu ther abuses on the United States
intelligence conr;rzaty. First, please keep in Hind that every
abuse that befell this ca-riuuty cane as a direct result of
Presidential orders by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and ?:icon
with no evidence on : ord yet. Our intelligence colle o-n
s%-Stem is as good as you will find in the world, but how do
you expect Lntelligent, highly trained t ersc:'_^.el to stay on
the job after being repeatedly abused and slandered by the
Dress of this nation, including your own paper? Yes, we are
having a hard tire keeping mein with excellent ability on -hand,
and, yes, we do have a hard time finding people w_ho can tihdeer-
stand assessren-nt. But, if you and your brothers iinthe newspaper
profession want to help the intelligence cw-rrrity in this country,
for God's sake, get off their backs. Either sup- port then, or say
nothing about it until you }z=my mire about it than your continuing
writing evidences.
Sing y,
Ea _r y Col dw-4t
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nessmen now under arrest on corrup.
tion Charges.
"It's not civilized," the-politician
said, "l-ut if we; don't show the Dublin
we are- serious: in this ? way, ; we. will
have a revolution in the rest sense of
the word and we will all be shot."
Other leading opposition . demands
are that the shah prove his good will
by lifting.martial law, punishing, po-
lice officials accused-of excesses and
granting all> political prisoners a_gen.
eral -: amnesty.' rather. than. releasing
Position-leaden -
-------` - favor-s.:steFbY-step
heavals ; with. incalculable conse?
9ueace,.. They. are: especially worried
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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
Article appeared 7 December 1978
on page A-6
U.S.Jaking No Special Steps t&Protect,
Secrets .of Arms Now in.. Iran!
By Vernon A. Guidry Jr..
NasYi,Saa. Snr SWt Friar
The Defense Department -says no
extraordinary steps have been taken
to protect U.S. military secrets that
had been sold to Iran in the course of
its military buildup.-- .
"We will keep reviewing with them
their responsibilities -and precau-
tions," said a spokesman.
The Moslem holy days this -month'
are believed crucial for the embat-
tled shah of Iran. Uncertainty about
the'_ER re of his goveinmen- t has re-
vived concerns about what might
result if sophisticated American-
made weapons fell Into unfriendly or
unstable hands. "
The question of compromising U.S"
military secrets was most sharply
debated a year ago when Congress
reluctantly acquiesced to a $1.3 bil-
lion deal to sell a complicated air-
borne radar and computer system.
(called -AWACS) - designed to-help
control air battles.
THAT 'SYSTEM; plus brand-new
F-16 fighter planes and new Navy de.,
stroyers were not scheduled.. for.:
delivery until the 1980s so their tech-.
nology is not directly at risk.' ..-.4 ,
But the Iranians have a good deal~
of sophisticated American weaponry,
including 80 F-14s, the U.S. Navy's
first-line fleet defense fighter made
by the Grumman Corp: This fighter.
has highly secret black-box. electron-
ics aboard, Including a computer and
radar-system that can track multiple
targets at great distance and attack
them with the Phoenix missiles
carried on the fighter.
At the time of the AWACS contro-
versy, CIA Director Stansfield
Turner did not seem to have much
confidence about Iran's. security in
the best of-times.
IN A CLASSIFIED document
circulated on Captiol Hill Turner.
said. "The shah is a proponent of the
divide-and-rule principle. There is lit-.
tle cooperation among, the intelli-
gence and security services, and
jurisdictional rivalries are a way of
life." -
Turner went on to say that, while
U.S. observers believed security was
tight in Iran, "it would appear pru-
dent to recognize that the risk of
Soviet penetration exists along with a
consequence risk of compromise for
information and equipment pro-
vided." - .
One source familiar with condi-
tions in Iran said the unrest in the
cities has 'hot. penetrated:militam
bases where the armed forces- re-
main loyal to the shah. The F-14s and
associated equipment- area--main
tained on double-guarded-bases; said
a source.
Grumman :has?about 450 employ=
ees in Iran. who have with them
nearly 500 dependents. The company
has . not joined other firm& such. as
General Electric and-Westinghouse
in ordering their employees,'evacu-
ated from the country: r 3'
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MEMORANDUM FROM PRESIDENT
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DALLAS MORNING NEWS
28 NOVEMBER 1Q78
CIA and Iran:
Intelligence Test
TO THE secretary of state,
the assistant for national secur-
ity'and the director of central
intelligence, the President of
the United. States has passed
the word: The quality of politi-
c;l. intelligence we get from
abroad is unsatisfactory.
The President. in his
handwritten memorandum,
released late last week to the
media, was speaking generally.
But most of all he was "dissatis-
fied," to use his own word, with
recent reports on Iran. He had
been told everything was fine
in Iran; the shah, an invaluable
U.S. ally, was in no danger.
Then the riots and strikes
erupted. The Peacock Throne
began to totter.
Why didn't someone tell
me? Such was Carter's acrid
complaint.
Why indeed didn't someone
tell him? There may well be
more than one reason, but the
paramount reason is that in the
past few years, the eyes of our
intelligence agents have been
40pmed, their ear stopped up,
their tongues made fuzzy.
.Intelligence? Who needs
intelligence? Who needs spies,
with their penchant for secre-
cy, their disregard for the con-
stitutional niceties?
The questions may sound
absurd enough; and yet, in one
form or another, they have
flitted through the minds of
countless Americans over the
past few years. The Great CIA
Flap of 1975-76, initiated by the
media, pursued by the politi.
cians, served to persuade many
that the CIA (like the FBI) was
as much threat to American
Liberties as guardian thereof.
We were told of clandestine
operations, of mail openings, of
manipulation of journalists
and businessmen - enter-
prises that, ripped from
context, made the CIA sound
like some sinister capitalistic
counterpart of the Soviet KGB.
Amid these thunderings, the
morale of the CIA plummeted
like a failed parachute. The
men out in the field had
scarcely to be convinced the
American people had lost confi-
dence in them. They had only
to read the papers. .
What kind of work can be
expected of a demoralized
intelligence agency? Just about
the kind that has stirred the
President to anger and will
surely provoke him again
unless something is done to
persuade the CIA that we. the
people, still believe in its
mission.
That is no easy achievement
to arrange. The President's
own CIA director, Adm.
Turner, is likely as responsible
as anyone for the agency's
c'ndition, having heavy-hand-
edly tried. to clean house when
he took over. Would anything
be wrong with letting a profes-
sional spy, for a welcome
change, command our other
spies?
It is no frivolous point. After
all, whom did the White House
turn to for accurate reports on
Iran after the CIA had flunked
the intelligence test? To none
other than the much-abused
Richard Helms, a former CIA
chief who was ambassador to
Iran until recently. Spies, one
readily learns, have their uses,
however much they are out of
favor when TV cameras roll
and congressmen clear their
throats to speak.
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Analysis
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
11 December 1978
Why the CIA Is Under Fire Again
President Carter complains
he's being hampered by
Intelligence failures. Result
a probable comeback for the
old-fashioned spy.
Why was the Central Intelligence
Agency caught by surprise by the cri-
sis now rocking Iran?
And: Why has U.S. intelligence
failed to forewarn the White House-
of other critical political develop-
ments in recent months?
The President himself is demand-
ing answers to these questions-and
he is addressing his demand princi-
pally to an Annapolis classmate
whom he drafted to manage the na-
tion's troubled intelligence services.
Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency,
has received a handwritten "Dear
Stan" note in which Carter says
bluntly that "I am dissatisfied with
the quality of political intelligence."
The note also went to Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance and White House
National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski, who share responsibility
for alerting the President to potential
crises overseas. .
Carter's complaint was triggered
by the CIA's optimistic assessments
of the Iranian crisis. A mid-August
report by the agency concluded that
"Iran is not in a revolutionary or
even prerevolutionary situation." ` .
The President is disturbed by oth-
er recent episodes. In one, the CIA
failed to alert him to an imminent
pro-Communist coup in Afghanistan.
In another, the CIA gave no advance
warning of a large-scale Rhodesian
incursion into Zambia at a time when
Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith
was in Washington negotiating with
the Carter administration.
Poor morale. One fundamental ex-
planation cited for the intelligence
failures that resulted in Carter's de-
mand for an in-house inquiry: The
CIA is suffering from the demoraliz-
ing effects of four years of scandals,
investigations and reorganizations.
The demoralization is especially
acute among operatives engaged in
clandestine activities overseas. These
operatives have taken the brunt of
the criticism and, despite his denials,
they feel that Turner has downgrad-
ed "human intelligence" in favor of
ed evidence of a possible
revolutionary crisis brew-
ing there.
In the new controversy
over the CIA, Turner per-
sonally is in an especially
vulnerable position. He
conducted a bruising but
unsuccessful battle to se-
cure control over every
element of the American
intelligence community.
Also, he introduced a
sweeping reform, ostensi-
bly to insure maximum ef-
ficiency in the collection
CIA Diraetor Stanfield Turner, Carter's Annapolis and analysis of
d informa-
aamats, Is key figure in now controversy. lion by a half dozen agen-
technological spying, such as satellite
reconnaissance.
President Carter tended to lend
weight to this criticism at a Novem-
ber 30 news conference with the as-
sertion: "I have been concerned that
the trend that was established 15
years ago to get intelligence from
electronic means might have been
overemphasized."
Turner's preoccupation with run-
ning a "clean" espionage agency-a
pledge he gave to Congress-also is
blamed for inhibiting the initiative of
American spies. A former overseas
operative says that senior officers are
loath to risk dismissal by exercising
too much initiative or participating
in an unsuccessful operation.
-'-The CIA has worked in Iran under
exceptional handicaps. -
There was an understanding with
the Shah-a tacit one, if not explic-
it-that intelligence officers and dip-
lomats from the United States would
not contact dissident groups or en-
gage in any independent intelli-
gence-gathering operations.
Washington, as a result, was largely
dependent on information provided
by the Shah's personal intelligence
service, Savak, which itself miscalcu-
lated the scope and nature of the
violent upheaval that threatens sur-
vival of the monarchy.
Administration policymakers ex-
press dismay over the failure of CIA
analysts to question the erroneous in-
formation they were receiving from
Teheran, especially given the fact
that other intelligence organizations,
Israel's for example, and private busi-
ness analysts earlier this year report-
Gies. He assumed overall
responsibility for coordinating the
collection and analysis of foreign in-
telligence and also for managing the
budget for all intelligence activities.
When policymakers over the past
year complained of serious shortcom-
ings in the "product" that they were
getting from Turner's organization,
critics say that he rebuffed the com-
plaints with the argument that the
President was satisfied.
At his news conference, Carter
praised the work of the intelligence
community but indicated clear dis-
satisfaction with Turner's perfor-
mance in political intelligence.
Turner's apologists say the CIA is
simply being made a scapegoat by
frustrated policymakers. Scapegoat
or not, the fact is that the White
House repeatedly has complained of
CIA failures since the early 1960s.
Long list President Kennedy pri-
vately blamed the CIA for disastrous
miscalculations that led to the Bay of
Pigs fiasco. Former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger treated the agency's
assessments with contempt. And for-
mer President Nixon charged on
French television on November 28
that the CIA for 11 years underesti-
mated Russia's military buildup.
Whatever the outcome of this lat-
est inquest, a ranking Carter admin
istration official says that this is clear.
The U.S. must revitalize. the role Of
the old-fashioned spy, which has
been undermined by four years of
scandal, organizational turmoil and
preoccupation with technology.
This analysis was written by Asso-
ciate Editor Wendell S. Merick.
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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 December 1978
HQwUS,Soviets compete
in electronic espionage
states- compromised` American electronic svr- personal data on the Gurmman Tomcat F-14
veillance capacity in such_a_way as to interfere
tighter and the- Navy's LAMPS anti-submarine
. with - future verification oL: their country-', S .. , warfare program- The. latter is a system for
weapons systems under-a--new strategic. arms- - gathering undersea- intelligence electroaicauy
limitation treaty (SALT)?' from light helicopters
The, short answer to this, say senior US'De- In Miami op Nov. 10, 1977, an American
Tense. Department offici3ls;. is that both SALT I and a West German- were convicted of at.
the draft SALT IIagreement now under tempting to obtain for the USSR components of
Have Soviet.. spies operating.: m the Uniet
- who thought they were buying from. US Navy
v e s t i g a t i o n : in cooperation-with -US -Navy in-
? ees of the United Nations ? were convicted
' Br Jeri R. Cooky
-
The Christian Science Monitor Jersey, court: The Federal Bureau of 1n
' i WaaWgtee telligence, officials caught the two :. Russians,
d
photo spying` Their would playa central role m -'rope and the northwestern Pacific
SALT vetitldticjtt; .; ~ -,--L' >, Carter` administration: - 'analysts, -tasked
can .. be , med_;fa boths;'communications and 20 missiles, now deployed in both Eastern Eu-
on th4rUS. KR-11 ":sateWte:surveillance..system, , -, Two months before the Boyce conviction.
to a Soviet military attache in Greece.. two executives of another California defense
The Soviet_accordingj tQ' US agents, gave . electronics firm,, L 1. Industries, were con-
Mr: Kampiles $3,O a&"partial payment" for: 'victed of conspiring to export illegally other
the which described operation of the electronic equipment to the Soviets.
te
as:`part of ,th ;`national. chnical '- To prevent US surveillance, the Soviets have
`satellite
means"-of US irtalfgence collection. atel>ites 'encrypted the telemetry of their SS-18 and SS-
eyed in the US over the past-year:. and Defense Systems, was convicted in,Los.
?. Last' month;' former low-level Central In_.. Angeles on eight espionage counts for passing
telligence Agency' (CIA) ;staffer William P_ to the Soviets information on how-intelligence
Kampileswas convicted: in_ a Hammond, In- data are transmitted between US ground sta.
M}ng'. encrypting the signals sent -out -electronmc missile ingredients that emit - data
`by. their-own missile tests; Making it more dif- signals, called telemetry, would enable the So-
Scult for-US monitoring devices to gather vital viets to reinforce their own "national technical
data on them ? . '_~: "~ means,. of gathering data on US missile testa
Clues ti-Soviet priorities in their espionage ? In May, 1977, Christopher J. Boyce, a for-
-efforts are. found in the main spy cases uncov- mer employee.. of. TRW Corporation's Space
hasa:not ? stopped. the Soviets--from -Defense analysts think possession of the
i -0k :..
41 1
lwro=forn-er: Sowiet employ mem `5 for s 1'
a-_ A
. missing and unaccounted-for as o.L Now`-,L, Fu krofi future missile tests under a SALT II agre
t
of 350 copies of the manual ul question:were is-time-consuming and would'.delay verificatio
other` CLk' of dial said not just one. but. 17 out- . ably can be broken by the ?US, but- the proc
o o lic . =Dfr SStestffied : aG, the- Kama: agreement; "usually' reply. that SALT : I was
niles trial that US.'national. defense y ould: bet? - -never1 formally ratified. ` Electronic-'` ciphers
negotiation forbid such interference.. the US Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile.
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ARTXLE VFZf. THE BOSTON GLOBE
weighs plan to monitor
By, William'Beecher
Globe Washington Bureau''
WASHINGTON -The Carter Admin-
istration. is. seriously, considering tough
new provisions in the draft treaty to limit
strategic.. arms that-- would Se aimed at
preventing cheating .and. increasing
.chances-for its passage by the Senate.
_ Senior officials. say the United States
.. may seek to ban. the coding of any data
sent back. from missile tests to engineers
on the ground to tell how guidance and
other systems are working. By intercept-
ing and analyzing the data - or telemetry
- US analysts try to keep tabs on-im-
provements in Soviet weaponry.
The draft SALT-2 treaty contains re-
strictions on certain missile improve-
ments. Thus the monitoring of tests by
spy satellites and other intelligence-gath-
ering devices is considered' essential to
ensure the accord is adhered to, the
officials explain.
"Unless the Senate .is convinced we
can verify with confidence the terms of a
new treaty," one State Department offi-
cial said,,"the chances of ratification are
-Pot g*
principal impetus behind a ban on '
encoding telemetry; sources say, came
from Stansfield Turner, director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, who argued
that without it the United States could
not be confident the Russians were not
cheating. He' is known. to have cautioned the
White House that unless Moscow can be
persuaded to accept such a ban, he would
be duty bound to warn the Senate?during
ratification hearings of the immense
difficulties of verifying the treaty.
But when Secretary of State Cyrus
X,ance was in Moscow for SALT discus
sions in October, well-placed officials
(said. the Soviets rejected an even milder
:proposal to ban encoding. It would merely',
have called for a common written under-
standing on what test data could and
what could .not be scrambled.
It was after the Russians turned down
the part-way measure, sources say, that
Turner called fora total ban. He is being
supported by some officials in the De-
fense and State departments.
Sources say the telemetry issue is but
one - of i series o'f obitac1es that ? ve:
arisen recently to bedevil attempts to con'
elude the SALT . negotiations.'^:"
Officials have passed word to Moscow
that utilr~sM.the xussiaas.provide specific
3_.?~ti. ~a`~e~tl,n
are prepared:
y
o mscce; here is no'-point in scheduling
ipcther Vance-Gromylio round of talks.
Another involves the Backfire bomba.4;' . ,e Administration is concerned not
The Russians .insist it does not havi- itri- -only about the Russian"t'teclinique of ? ex-'
tegic range, but all elements of-the US in= pectilig new US. proposals. t_ each high-
telligence community argue tt'does 1660.- gaining session, often without
-
Americanfaegotiators have treed to substantive new Soviet positions, but also
persuade the-Soviets, among Other ' things.,,, aboutthe image being created in the Con-
to agree.;not to `increase the- production great that the Americans are making most
rate of the Backfire through 1985, the life :of the ' basic concessio> in the last stage'
of the=projected treaty:' `:_ `of negotiations.
The Soviets have said this--may be ?' Thus the United States is asking that
acceptable, but they refuse to divulge the new Soviet positions be passed along by
current production rate. When US negoti- ? Soviet. Ambassador Anatoly.Dobrynin in
ators said the American understanding is Washington before a new round of talks is
that, the rate is 2% a month, Foreign Min- scheduled, probably in Geneva.
ister Andrei Gromyko said the Russians '. The ..coding of missile telemetry be-
wouldn't aruge with that number, accord- (':came A pressing issue recently after the
ing to a senior Administration official. Russians encrypted several high-f requen-
But the Russians have been expanding cy radio channels during a test of the
the plant that builds the Backfire, and a SS18, 'the largest ICBM in their arsenal
recent US intelligence exercise concluded iSources-say this was the first time the:
that it could not ~e.determined whether RusRussians have done that on the SS18.
the rate is the same or has gone up, to, .. A key provision of the SALT-2 agree-
anywhere from -three to five a month, meet would prohibit major modernization
twice the previous understanding. ? of, existing missiles, such as providing
Failure of the Russians to provide in- new guidance systems. Another impor-
formation on their own programs is point- tant provision would restrict the number.,
ed to by some negotiators as an example -of warheads that could be placed on each
of the kind of loophole that created prob- ICBM. -
lems with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile But if tests of such improvements
(ABM) and Strategic Weapons accords. -.could be masked from US spy satellites,
For example, the ABM treaty banned, provisions would be.a sham, some Ameri-
certain tests except at existing test rang- --can officials argue.
es. There the United States enumerated
Some, in fact, would go even further
decing lined neoodiotions when the Russinas
ABM ' than barring telemetry encoding. They
declined to so. Later on, site- in after ABM also :would ban the use of low-frequency
tests at a nonennumerated site Soviet telemetry - which could only be read by
Asia were protested by the Americans, ground stations on the test range ea and
l Russians claimed the test range had would prohibit test data being recorded in
loon ng been in existance and it wasn't their a capsule on the missile and parachuted
fault the tinged States had failed to men-, down to the ground'to analyzed by Soviet
tiara it during negotiations. a" engineers - but not monitored by US in-'
Another obstacle to a new treaty, Ad- tell genre systems.
ministration officials say, is the lack of
movement in the Soviet bargaining posi- Sources say the United States does not
tion since Gromyko was in Washington in encrypt its missile test telemetry, but 1
September. does employ low frequency signals.
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TTCLE r WASHINGTON STAR
0 F'' 3 DECEMBER 1978
William F. Buckley Jr.
Skulciugger~ the satellite and SE1I,T
Early this year a junior clerk in
the CIA doing night duty at the
operations center in Langley, Va..
spotted a manual on a desk, stuck it
into his briefcase. and took?it:home.
On March 2; he sold this document to
a Russian: is Athens. for $3,000. Now
listen carefully:
Returning to the United Stites. the
young, man wrote to. a former col-
league -Ia ,CIA advising. h3m~: that the
Soviet Union had offered'moner.to in-
duce the. clerk to -transmit; secret
information. This bizarre communi-
cation alerted the.agency to one al-
most certain, and'-another probable,
piece of bad news. The first was that
the young., clerk had: already turned
something over 16-'the Athe Russians.
Why?c,Because even the KGB-has
traditions, and.one-of them, very well
established, is that cash is paid not
for prospective, butfor past services;
The KGB, in the words of Michael
Ledeen in :NewNork Magazine, does
not buy "on spec:.'.' But if the clerk:
William Kampiles is his name:-;-
whose-letter suggested that it might
? be useful tw-the .agency if he trans-,
mitted "disinformation". to the-Rus-
sians, i.e. information designed to
throwthe KGB off the track, took- a
step which would clearly lead to an
investigation of him as someone who
had almost certainly- already com-
mitted a crime, why did the KGB en-
courage him to make the offer?- In ef-
fect- to burn him. The. supposition is
thatE our announced
pp?tts of.-
policy of. supporting the Shalt. It tends
the strategictiarmds.! 11&ementiZ*nd-
particulariy; members , ot. the Jbit3L to legltimue; the opposition; and' Do
Chiefs of .staff bt ;tli8rr: aides.:have ; ggest that, the. .U.S. is hedging it;
: t spec
hed_td use this - -Mid -?3. deal as-a asst: `his the
tried. a' weapob-' against, j r. It`d : cral~yt?since a CIA- agent sat in oil the
treaty. with?the Soviet Union.. plot tinga a generals who overthrew
In other ords; the'administra t; Vgo. Dinb-D in Vfetnarrz:in.196a)
This especiailyy tttestrdCiive~ leak
tion's problem is 'not' with the- Soviet _ -1 s
_ ~- . .
Union sending z`IIGs to Cuba, but with cratic infighting
since it comes id-t)'
e'
,
.
,
the American people learning that it '.context of badly mistaken CIA esti
has done so. The administration would mates of strength of the Shah's opposi?
appear to have ' concluded, that the tion. Perhaps the. leak is intended to
MIGs ate not relevant _ to the 1982.:. , show that the CIA is shaping itself up; .I
pledge or to SALT.. The President indi- or'.perhaps it's- Intended .to? show that
sated in his press conference yester , the. President- is cracking the whip to
day that it is relying an Soviet ptom';r.,correct the deficiencyr.Either way, it's
ises not to. ship nuclear. weapons-:fdr'r.a.small,motive for. the..cost involved.
the planes. but It is mnost-doubtful thaf` r ? s WE Have' no way. to know: whether
we can verify whether this- has or: evil! ,Lthe `administrator fsrying about
be done. In. all . probability the memo the :CIA-Iran leak. the: wayMr-Reston
wee leaked byt someone-disturbed"at '-'described it worrying about; the MIG-
this, decision: ,Yet now that:- the, facts Cuba leak. We hope it is.: but . without
are out. the people and the Senate'calimuch. expectation. .=: -;:` -
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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
11 December 1978
Washington
U.S. jets that flew over Cuba to spy
on MiG-23s there came back with an
unexpected intelligence bonanza:
The American planes were able to
chart the Cuban air-defense system by
pinpointing location of radar units
tracking the high-flying planes.
How much does it cost the Kremlin
to support Cuba. About 9 million
dollars a day-more than 3 billion a
year--according to latest intelligence
estimates. That is twice the rate of
last spring.
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!R IC`:^ +;,; ;M NEWSWEEK
D'l ?nor 11 December 1978
Periscope
SPYING ON CUBA'S MIG-23s
An extraordinary U.S. intelligence effort backed up
President Carter's assurance last week that the new,
Soviet MiG-23 jet fighters now in Cuba pose no ;
nuclear threat to the U.S. Among other reconnaissance
tactics, the U.S. employed sensors that. can detect '
nuclear weapons--and that are so secret that no one
will say whether the sensors are land-based, airborne
or beamed from ships. But it is known that an SR-71
Blackbird spy plane made a rare flight over Cuba to
collect information on the MiG-23s, and that the
Blackbird carries some kind
of sensor in addition to its
cameras. U.S. Navy P-3 pa-
trol planes also flew near
Cuba to do some spying,
presumably by radar.
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MISCELLANEOUS
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Article appeared
on page- B-6
THE WASHINGTON POST
7 December 1978
Suit bvrVidow
Judge Dismisses
R. Richer 3a%dismissed. a. $33: million'
damage: suit.- brought against- former
secretarfof: state, Henry A. Kissinger
and the Centrals Intelligence Agency
by the!*': widovr a Kensington- man..
W6- was hires; as, a'.mercenary in the
-1976 wac;ia=dngola: t w
SheDS Gearhart and= her-four chit=
.dren.had-'claimed that: Kissinger;: the
?` CIA and'other_-U.S.. officials were're-
sponsible torthe Angola government's
execution- of Daniel F:. Gearhart; by
not- warning him of the dangerous sit-
uatioa Ia.' the', African -nation ? at the
time-he went there..r
But, Richey: ruled Tuesday that the
Gearharts had - failed W. "state with
sufficient specificity facts -upon. which
relief could, -be granted" and dis.
missed the suik;'
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NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PACAYUNE
25 November 1978
Secrets and Public Trials
There have. been several exam-
pus b recent Jeirs? of aecase I
criminals whose past connection
with security agencies have af-
forded them a free pass to break
the law. Rather than risk the re-
lease of national security informa-
tion In public courtrgoms, thg
government has dropped- or lower-
ed eriioinal.charges.
Now, the Justice Department,
CIA and other Gies have decided to file a test
against the tecbntgus of "gray-
mall" - the threatened disclosure
of national secrets by criminal de-
fendasts during their triaL Attar?
ney General Griffin 8e11 and
others now that dismissal of crimi-
nal charges Is too high jr price to
pay for the government to keep its
secrets.
The test case will be filed in con-
nection with the trial of Robert.
Berrelles, hn official of Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph,
who is accused of making false
statements to a Senate committee.
Mr. Berrelles's attorney has de-
manded, access to classified Info-
mation to pprepare his defense,
which. will; appare$iy. include
references to still-secret CIA
operations In Chile.
Under the Justice Department
proposal, a secret pre-trial hearing
would be held in which the defense
would be required to disclose what
secret infortnktion it plans to bring
out during the trial. If the judgp
rules the information is irrelevant
- and therefore inadmissible -
the defendant would be bared from
mentioning it .
Defense attorneys are normally
permitted to talk about their cases
in opening arguments, including
any information involving national
secrets which the defense plans to
introduce during trial. During the
trial, the judge would rule - in
public - whether the information
could be considered by the jury.
Under the Justice Department's
plan, the entire question would be
settled In secret before the trial.
The proposal raises significant
legal questions, including whether
a defendant's '.due process" rights
would be violated if he is forced-.to
disclose his case before trial. In
addition, a defendant has a right to
a "public trial" and it is question-
able whether this right would be
satisfied if there is'a secret pre-
trial hearing.
Justice Department. attorneys
suggest that much.more public
information would be 'available
under the plan because if a can is
dropped due to the risk secrets
might be made public, no Informa-
tion would come out.
It is a thorny problem, and there
is no clear-cut answer. The danger
Is that if secret proceedings are
permitted in national security
cases, the precedent might be ex-
tended to other cases where
prejudicial publicity Wat Issue.
'Pre-trial proceedings are often
critical junctures in the criminal
justice system. If the public and
the press are excluded from such
proceedings, matters of Important
public concern would be resolved
in secret, and without public over-
sight
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NEW SOLIDARITY
1 December 1978
I1:Dfeu4;cof the Cen'tra
fi.te
by Lyndon H. LaRouche. Jr.
NEW YORK, Nov. 26 (NSIPS) - Last
summer. CIA Director Admiral Stan-
field Turner launched a massive purge
of the so-called "clandestine services"
of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
Now, more than a year later, some very
foolish people pretend to be perplexed
by the CIA's alleged incompetence in
reading the situation in Iran.
The facts are as follows:
First, . Turner's purge of E. Henry
Knoche and hundreds of other senior
CIA specialists gutted the CIA's capa-
bilities, in the Middle East and many
other regions. This left the CIA analy-
tical sections dependent on what was
predominantly second-hand infor-
mation. fed into the. Agency through
predominantly British and.. Zionist
conduits.
Second. as-.4, result of leaks '.to
Congressmen, exposing', -Admiral
Turner and ' Zbigniew Brzezinski as
liars in their efforts to blame-Cuba for
the Shaba U affair, heavy clamps were
-imposed by' Brzezinski et al. on CIA
consultation with private channels of
relevance outside the Agency itself.
This was aggravated by the- conviction
of former CIA operative Snepp: which
-had. the effect of gagging the CIA's
discussions even in matters where no
secret information was transmitted.
Third, since ' approximately mid-
August. and increasingly since the
conclusion of the "Camp David
Summit." elements of the U.S. intelli-
gence establishment have been under
strict orders not to receive or take into
account any information which might
.suggest that the "Camp David" pack-
age was anything less than h new reli-
gious miracle. This gag-rule had the
effect of preventing the CIA (in particu-
lar) from receiving any of the kinds of
information which would have
informed them that the national esti-
mate subsuming the Iran situation was
a fatally flawed misconception from the
start. a
Purged and Gutted Agency.
,
These and related facts fully account
for the current problems of the CIA:. It .
is a purged and gutted'agency which
has operated under 'orders '.not to
contradict any national estimates.
authored in support of the policies of-
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry A. Kis-
singer.
There: are two additional matters to
be taken directly into account in this
connection. The first is the prevailing
illusions concerning the relative
weights of the CIA in the U.S. intelli-
gence community. The second is the
specific idiocies of national estimates
directly responsible for CIA misjudg-
ment in various matters, including the
Iran case. 0
On the first. The CIA purge of "clan-
destine services" under Mondale. Brze-
zinski, Schlesinger and Turner has
wiped out the CIA's general ability to
independently cross-check and correct
intelligence information and estimate&
generated by other elements grouped
under-the National Security Council. At.
present, the center of gravity of official
intelligence. operations is technically
located in the Pentagon, with the-
British,. and -Zionist-penetrated
. National . Security. Agency,_ Office of
Naval .Intelligence, and Air Force
Intelligence' the principal'- official
bastions of Brzezinski's operations.
The, increasing of the relative weight
of the NSA. ONI and Air Force Intelli-
gence:is consistent with Brzezinski's
technetronic policies, 'policies recom-
mended in Victor Marchetti's The CIA
and the- Cult of Intelligence; policies
supported by Philip Agee and Agee's
ally Morton Halperin. This places the
emphasis of U.S. intelligence gathering
on NSA telecommunications and mail-
taps and satellite and other, related
forms of information-gathering. For
qualitative, human political-intelli-
gence gathering the USA is now vir-
tually at the mercy of the combined
resources of British-Canadian and
Israeli-Zionist intelligence networks.
The importance of CIA "clandestine
services" is the means to know situa-
tions on the ground intimately, to be:
able to develop intelligence concerning
matters which no informant could pos- _
.siblvsunohr. in_advance: -how yat'ipmul
forces,,wilLr,think .and react--ut} gr
circumstances those forces do not yet
anticipate' as occurring. There is no
substitute for the experienced, quali-
fied senior clandestine operative in this
aspect of intelligence-gathering.
precisely the aspect of work in which
the CIA's reported Iran estimates
collapsed.
On the second point. although U.S.
cooperation with the. European Mone-
tary System has been formal U.S.
policy since the Bonn "summit." many
elements in the Administration and in
the leadership of the Republican and
Democratic Parties have been dedi-
cated to London's policy of intransigent
-opposition to the EMS. Exemplary is
the pushing of a 1979 depression in the
U,S, by Blumenthal and' Miller, among
others, and the disgusting antics of
Robert Strauss-and his- Clay machine-
. and Israeli intelligence sidekicks at the
GATT negotiations and in Japan.
EMS Is Policy Foundation
The, significance of this inconsistency
for CIA estimates is located in the fact
that the development of a new world
monetary system around the keystone
of the Jan. 1, 1979 institutionalization of
the. EMS is the foundation of all
strategic policy-making of the principal
governments of continental Europe, the
Middle East, southeast- Asia.. Japan.
Mexico and numerous- other nations.
The EMS-centered policy is also a war-
avoidance, pro-detente policy, and is in
direct opposition to the resurrection of
Henry A. Kissinger's policies in-the
Middle East, southern Africa and else-
where.
On all the closely related policy=
issues intersecting the EMS, the major-
ity of the U.S. domestic national press '
media, most emphatically the TV news
media. and the Washington Post, have
been consistently lying since May 1978.
Similarly, the leadership of the Repub-
lican National Committee has been
variously duped or outrightly lying --I
with the liars those most closely allied
with Henry A. Kissinger and with the
"free enterprise' campaign of the
Mont Pelerin Society and the Heritage
Foundation front-organization of
. British secret intelligence.
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the NSA, Air Force Intelligence, ONI
and National- War College- under
puppet-like control of British and
Israeli intelligence,: the overwhelming
weight of influence. on most of the
policy-making arms of government has
been composed of combinations of
outright lies and other forms of disin-
formation. There has been a ' gross
misestimate of all aspects of European..
Middle East and other developments on
all issues bearing on the EMS and new
world-~onetarysyst@m._,t i_
Disregarding These facts in, connec-
tion with the British effort to destabilize
the Shahanshah of Iran meant over-
looking the complex of counter-
measures taken against the British.
Bahai, British Freemasons, and other
accomplices of the attempted "destabi-
lization." These countermeasures were
taken on the basis of the strategic
correlation of economic, monetary and
political forces being developed around
the imminent institutionalization of the
new monetary system, and were
mightily aided by the mobilization of
Arab and European forces against the
.hideous. farce the "Camp David
summit" was rightly regarded to be in
those quarters. -
What do you critics of the CIA expect
that agency to do to, correct such
problems - perhaps shoot Brzezinski
and Kissinger?
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THE WASHINGTON POST
6 December 1978
Pentagon Official Due to Be Chief _
Of Senate Foreign Relations Staff
Sen. Frank Church (D.Idaho), who right-hand man, he can still have sub-'
is expected. to assume the chairman- stantial influence. Informed sources
ship of the senate Foreign Relations speculated that Bader could play an.
Committee in the, new Congress, has Important role in the Senate :debate i
selected William Bader, a Pentagon . on a new strategic arms limitation
official, to be the committee's staff treaty (SALT) with the Soviet Union.-I
director, informed'sources report. ,_ ... As chairman of the-committee, Church.
Bader, 47, is deputy director of the is expected . to be the SALT floor..
office o f -planning" for the- secretary tender.
of - defense. He- has been responsible._. Bader;with a doctorate from Prince-
ton, is former foreign service of-
for coordinating defense intelligence fiver and official of the Ford Founds
operations:`; ....d. on- the staf! of the tion. He worked for. Sen., Church on,.
Bader serve the staff of the select committee that-
Foreign- Relations--Committee.-, from.. investigated the Central Intelligence;,
1966 to 1969. His appointment is not, likely to be anounced until Church--:-;Agency-
has been formally__ Installed as chair
man in_ January. - / -
Bader would -succeed Norvm Jones,
who is reported to be taking* a job.in `
private industry." ?"
Staff members , on Foreign Rela ,
tions. report directly .to individual
senators who, in effect, named them.
to their positions, 30-the staff director
is leis powerful than on many other.
committees. But as= the chairman's
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'AI= WAwiINGTON STAR
3 DECa4B 1978
A veteran's view
What hinders. CIA.
'from doing its job'?
By Jack Maury
A wise veteran of White House
councils has said that the greatest
danger to'peace in our time could be
an ill-informed American president.
Small wonder, then, that the presi-
dent reportedly has expressed con-
cern over CIA performance with re-
gard to the potentially explosive
situation in Iran. But it is difficult to
see how any intelligence service
could function effectively in the face
of the coirycidence of circumstances
which have conspired over the past
several years to disrupt and demor-
alize the agency.
The roots of many of today's prob-
lems lie at the door of agency man-
agement. The peremptory dismissal
of hundreds of skilled and experi- i
enced officers have profoundly
affected morale, resulting in the
voluntary retirement of hundreds of
others.
CIA. and indeed our entire national
security apparatus. is victim.of the
theology, prevalent in parts of the
present administration, which holds
that' official secrecy, like military
strength. is, by definition, immoral
or sinister. The resulting restraints
and inhibitions have'seriously eroded
intelligence initiative. This unilateral'
disarmament in the-midst of intense
intelligence warfare with foreign
adversaries ? has had little effect in
reassuring the agency's domestic
critics, and even less in encouraging
reciprocal restraint on the part of the
KGB. It has, however, resulted in
considerable disenchantment among
friendly foreign intelligence services
whose valuable collaboration with us
in the past had been based on the be-
lief that CIA was ready and able to
taker the lead in providing the Free
World with protection against sur-
prise and subversion.
But perhaps as damaging to *he
long'-term effectiveness of our inte,ii-
gence services as any of the above
has been the irresponsible zeal of the-
American media in exposing the se-
crets, attacking the purposes and dis-
torting the facts regarding our intelli
gence activities.
This is. not to suggest that there is
anything unhealthy in the adversary
attitude of the media toward any gov-
ernment agency which operates
clandestinely. Nor is it surprising
that the media have not yet recov-
ered from. the euphoria - indeed the
arrogance - of their success in
vitally affecting, the conduct and out-
come of a major war and contribut
ing to the downfall of two presidents.
But just- as the press has been so
effective in dramatizing events in
Indochina and uncovering mischief
in the White House, so should its own
performance be subject to scrutiny.
The corruptive effects of power are
not limited. to government alone.
-Among recurring. seriously mis-
leading themes. appearing in the
news or editorial pages of influential-
publications have been the following:
-.CIA is a sort of "rogue elephant,"
operating beyond the control of presi-
dent or Congress. In fact, as both the
Church and Pike committees con-
cluded. CIA. in the words of the Pike
report. "has been highly responsive
to. the Instructions of the president
and assistant to the president for na-
tieital security affairs." And the
agency has always reported to Con-.
gress precisely in accordance with
procedures laid down by the Con-
gress itself.
? A front-page item appearing in the
New York Times in 1969 alleging that
there had been "at least one con-
firmed battle death in Laos -.when
an American CIA agent was killed by
gunfire.at'an advanced post." As a
subsequent embassy investigation
made clear, the "CIA agent" turned,
out to be a, five-day old premature
baby of the family of an employee of
Air America: the CIA-controlled con-
tract air carrier. The story was espe-
cially mischievous because of the
strict U.S. policy, in line with the
Geneva accords to which the U.S.
was a party. against any combat in-
volvement by U.S. personnel in Laos.
? Washington: Post item in. 1976 by a
member of the Post editoriaistaff de-
scribing the so-called Penkovskiy
Papers as "precisely the 'coarse.
fraud, a- mixture of provocative
invention and anti-Soviet. slander'
that' the Soviet authorities . - -
claimed it was at the time."
In fact, having been the CIA officer
in 'charge of the Penkovskiy opera-
tion.. I haveassuredthe Post. as.their
senior. . editors were assured when
they originally serialized the Papers.
that virtually every word in them at-
tributed to Penkovskiy was his own.
? Washington Star headline in 1976:
"CIA' Goal: Drug, Not Kill, Ander
son." In fact, the story said only that
the White House had consulted a
"former CIA physician" about drug-
ging Jack Anderson "to discredit
him.-"
? A number of. press stories alleging
CIA introduction of swine flu virus
into Cuba. Although flatly and ppub-
Ucly denied by the agency in both
press releases and assurances to con-:
gressional. committees, most of these
allegations have never, been re-
tracted.
Quite as damaging as some of the-
false and misleading stories have
been disclosures of sensitive opera-
tional information. It is difficult to '
see- how the public interest is
served by revelations which destroy
the fruits of important, dangerous
and expensive intelligence undertak-
ings, strain diplomatic relations or
embarrass individuals. organizations
or foreign governments who have
provided the agency with valuable
assistance. Who is served by publica-
tion of details of the efforts of the
Glomar Explorer-to salvage wreck-
age of a Soviet submarine? As Eric
Sevareid, commenting some time
ago on press stories of the intercep-
tion of foreign communications and
of submarine reconnaissance. in for.
eign waters, asks: "Were these two
stories information that people had a
right to know and benefitted by
knowing? Only a rather exotic cult of
editorial thinkers would say yes."
CONTIi,70ED.
. CIA was a witting accomplice in
the Watergate burglary. In fact, as
the Rockefeller Commission con-
cluded. CIA. had no reason to- know
that the assistance it lent Howard
Hunt (documentation.. camera.
recorder) would be used for im-
proper purposes. Moreover CIA
Director. Helms refused. to allow
agency operations in Mexico to. be
used as a pretext to obstruct post-
Watergate investigations-
- CIA has been involved in illegal
drug traffic. In fact, as John Inger-,
sell, director of the Bureau of Narcot-
ics and Dangerous Drugs, stated in-
response' to a congressional. inquiry.
CIA has been the bureau's "strongest
partner" in uncovering- foreign
sources of illegal narcotics.
.In addition. there have been
numerous false or misleading indi-
vidual news items. A few examples:
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The media have been ever ready to
make instant celebrities of those for-
mer . CIA employees. who, for
whatever motives, choose to violate
their solemn secrecy- commitments.
sabotage sensitive and important
operations and jeopardize the ca-
reers and personal safety of former
colleagues by "telling all." Typical
among these has been the recent idol
of the talk shows and book reviews,
John Stockwell. The mindless zeal
with which some, of the media have
accepted uncritically his unsubstanti-
ated allegations would befit the acco-
lades heaped upon the pronounce-
ments of Fidel Castro by Radio
Havana. Lost in the avalanche of
publicity is the fact that while still" in.
the agency he failed -to present his
complaints to the. inspector general.
or other senior officials, or to report
them to the appropriate oversight
committees of the Congress; and that
some of his allegations are outright
falsehoods, such as the especially
serious claim that "..: the CIA's re-
cent record includes the assassina-
tion of Patrice Lumumba; Ngo Dinh
Diem. the South Vietnamese Presi
dent; Rafael Trujillo Monila, the
Dominican Republic president; Gen.
Rene Schneider, the commander of
the Chilean Army..."-
(The "tell all" fraternity It not
limited to junior or middle-grade offi-
cers who were probably ideologically
or emotionally unfit for the demands
of the intelligence business in the
first place. It includes. at least in
some degree; a former director, Wil-
liam Colby, who defends his record of
going. beyond the traditional bounds
of security on the ground that only in
this way could the agency's reputa-
tion. be. cleared and. its critics reas-
sured.
(Among Colby's bitterest critics
have been some former members of
the high priesthood of secrecy, the
counter-intelligence clique. Perpetra-
tors and victims of the myth of the.
omnipotent KGB, their basic as.
sum ption is not only that all of our se-
curity agencies are penetrated (probe
ably true, at least to some degree).
but that most of what we take to be
reliable intelligence is being fed to us Over a dozen reporters - were.
by Soviet deception artists. It is present during the hearings. They
ironic that some of these self-pro- provided extensive coverage of the
claimed guardians. of the agency's testimony of media representatives,
security, conscience should, in an but no testimony critical of :he.
apparent effort to settle old scores media, or challenging allegations of
and cover past fiascos, now turn up CIA corruption of the media, or of
in the ranks of the, "kiss and tell" KGB penetration of the media.
brotherhood- along with the likes of This is a sorry record. It brings to
Messrs. Marchetti. Agee; Snepp; mind the words of Mr. Jefferson
Stockwell. See, for example,: Legend: when, in 1807, he wrote to his friends
The World of Lee Harvey Oswald, by , John Norwell of Kentucky: .
Edward Jay Epstein.) "Nothing can. now be believed-
There is also the problem of news which is seen in a newspaper. Truth
selection and' news suppression. 'A, itself becomes- suspicious by being?
casein point- is the coverage of hear-
ings into on CIA and the media, at. the But the purpose of recounting this,
beginning o8-this year :by a subcom- record here is not to- suggest a solu
mittee' of the House Select Commit- tion to the problem of irresponsible..
tee on.Intelligence. Although several journalism. Rather, it is to'identify a.
former CIA: officials testified there- source of disturbing disarray in ours
had been no significant cases where first line of defense and to warn those
news -disseminated to 'contaminated audi concerned' about the effectiveness of
ences by 'CIA had contaminated the CIA of the future nor to bemisled
stories destined for American- read- by. media-created myths' regarding
ers. I noted . that despite lengthy the CIA of the past..-These. myths
investigations.by other congressional have already generated public and.
committees and numerous cries of I political pressures -for cures worse-
alarm by editors and commentators. than me. disease, or legislative re-
strictions and public exposures had been identified. Typi-
cal headlines the. next day; however, g y s effec-
was this in The Washington Star, tiveness even more than it has been
"M.S. Media Took Stories Planted by, damaged already.
Clkas Genuine". But these is one measure which
There was' also my own testimony might do much to restore the effec.
that while there was little evidence of tiveness of all our intelligence serv-
CIA corrupting the American media, ices -- the- passage of legislation
there was good reason to believe that, providing meaningful protection for-
the KGB had been quite active in this sensitive intelligence sources and
regard:. I cited a top- secret manual methods. Out, basic espionage law is
entitled- "The- Practice of Recruiting , woefully inadequate. In order to con-
Americans" in the U.S.A. and Third vict under it- the government must--
prove that the disclosure of classified
Countries' published by the First
information was done with "intent
nection had 'either - contaminated
news disseminated in the U.S. or
Interfered-with the obligations of an
American journalist tar his publisher
or his public. Nor did anyone explain
how the American Dream would be
placed'in mortal jeopardy-by CIA re-
cruitment of a Tass.corresvondent..
US UUF.AWWV I' U Y& SLU. aaww~-va, records, export controls, patents, re-
neither he nor any media represents-. lief roils, and even insecticide form u-
tives cited- a case where a CIA con-- lass b tyntell' nc
1
c
e a
c
a
a,
Journalists "could lead to the death.,
Chief Directorate of the KGB and"
listing, in Oder of priority, 12 catego-
ries of recruitment targets. The first
was government employees with ac-
cess to classified information. The
second was members of the media. I
referred to evidence that Soviet. ef-
forts in this regard had. been quite
successful.
On the use of journalists in the col-
lection of intelligence, Eugene Pat
tenon, president of the American
Society of Newspaper Editors.
warned that: CIA use of even foreign
ors reason to: believe" that it was "to
be used to the injury of the United
States or to the advantage of any for-
eign nation. Thus if even the most,
sensitive information, such as the
identity of agents or - the details of
intelligence - collection techniques,
art revealed publicly, conviction is
often impossible unless the defendant
is caught in flagrante- with a foreign
agent. It is ironic that we have laws
providing prison sentences for reve.
lation of information on such matters
as crop statistics, bank loans, Inter-
Sele
nal Revenue d
tive Service
t
,.
g
p
em oyees can,
with impunity, violate their sworn .
commitments, betray their organiza-
tion and destroy the careers and
jeopardize the lives of former col-
leagues by "telling all." They can de-
stroy the effectiveness of valuable
and costly. technical collection sys-
tems which have been years in the
making. And in doing all this they
can be assured of fame and for t::;:e.
If these instant celebrities crave
future adventure and reward they
can develop, and. some undoubtedly
have developed, mutually profitable
relationships with foreign intelli-
gence services. Their. appeal as tar-
CONTINUFa
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gets. for recruitment stems not only I ..-the identities of agents or the de-
:_ from. their knowledge of. our own ; tails of technical collection systems.
intelligence operations; with their It would have no-applications to other
ready access.::to the media, and lec. categories of classified material. And
ture halls, they are Ideally situated it would be binding only on those indi-
"agents of-influence:" In this ca- viduals who, by virtue of employ..
pacity they are uniquely qualified to ment with an intelligence agency, 41
serve what a former. Soviet intelli- voluntarily assumed the obligation to
gence officer has described as one of protect source. and method informa.
the .KGB's highest priority. objet- Lion.
fives.: to put out the eyes of our In considering such legislation; it
enemy by discrediting and disrupting may' be appropriate to recall' the
his intelligence service. comment. of Gen. Washington. who.
All this is not to~s uest anything just over 1200: years- ago. 'wrote-in a.
gletter to Col. Elias Dayton: "The
as drastic as the British Official. Se- ! . necessity for procuring good intelli..:
crets Act, or the espionage .laws of gence is apparent and need not- be
most other democratic countries.; All further-urged- - all that remains for
that is: proposed is a.bill which'would -m to add is that you keep the whole-.
whole-
cover Aatedybinform of >lically .matter- as. secret as :possible. For the Intelligence yr. the heads rector of.tha other- '=-Pon secrecy', success depends in_.
-,mostenterprises of the kind and for, cies as intelligence,: sonrces and` methodgi".~. ant"?f it, they are- generally. de-.
feated,howevpr-xeljplanned:",,
Jack Maury who recently retired as an
assistant secretary. of defense, served 18
Years in, the CIA, includinjeight years as:.'
chief of Soviet operation:: and five years
in charge of CU relations: witlJCongress_,,
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i 1 L' s As i'L'iBED
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
18 December 1978
Washington ~ho@p@m,
Groping for ways to deal with the
:Iran crisis, National Security Adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski is calling in
more Outside experts. Not only is for-
mer Under Secretary of State George
Ball sitting in on Iran policy talks, bur
also Richard Helms, former CIA di-
rector and ambassador to Iran, is be-
ing consulted.
Reports are-.flyiag that CIA chief
Stanfield Turner will be moved to
another job because of intelligence
foulups-possibly to replace Alexan-
der Haig as head of NATO. Turner 's
successor? John DeButts, retiring
head of American Telephone & Tele-
graph, is said to be a top candidate.
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THE WASHINGTON POST
10 December 1978
Article appeared
on page C-6
Fu
'i
our, intellig coliec e ts: amAW pro`vida for .the; cantlaning hiring
iurnan _Elemen in Intelligence Gs therlnr~
his lettaC* Thee?Paet- ["Americ a Spy, ;moet nniversaIIys sce d~: ' the
activitiw and that o-:aimswere to eni. ~a .;
accessrrto? motiveak' tc ;iateation:~~ . nttnue -to; provide the irreplaceably;
thoughts and plans. They will'alwaya be:~T . element of. human: intelligence is onr
vital twoio ofwcoantr~s saciaity:'. :ewlectim
th ., .t r w. enn4i l~rin
they:, dog age .ihumaaf.coDeatt~;~ that are 'sensible sad'
collection: permit ur twixtend our-m o6w& ionw A&ft-, .Gle them. ate
of this irecta aa! mncb ..todag-as `:is aa-3nezact.~deace and relies heavily.
the agency oa tha reporter "s-1
tened.
Can -you-still dial- into that govern
ment computer bank, John?" the law-
yer asked, explaining to the reporter.
"Godf How 1, wish I had been in the col-
lections business when he had that 1
:code and aecess:.I mean to tell you- thisl
guy could find out anything about any-:
body from that computer."
Ellsworth explains that he no longer
has direct computer access. "There;
were too many abuses;" he says. "The1
wrong kind of people- were: using it,
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A` I I i CLEF ,A.+UP
eN PAGE
BALTIMORE SUN
2S NOVE BER 1979
'viaence doesn:'t.con Urm'
? Washington (AP)-Carter administra? tive fallout during the pant three months," i
tioa? officials say they are increasingly the institute said..
doubtful that thert- was a nu- Officials . clear test in the South Atlantic September said there had been "absolute-
Iv nothing" besides. the initial- reports ,
22.:.;`{_ .from-New Zealand to- corroborate z.nu.
Theiofiidals, asking that they :not be-'--
a s -dear test. No seismographic or radicae-J
.
named; said it. is-unlikely that -;--
7 P ,five evidence has turned up;
scieatifie?panel convened by the adminis- .-:
tratioqwill be able-t6 conclusively explain'`, Noe have American intelliease a en-
whaVeauseda flasbe-detectad:by &recoo,.isles come uo-ai any MR& 71 Find that
'naissancrsatellitosthadate The flub,-very significant 11 a country. like South
wassii i -to?thatxtaated-Irdetooadw; Africa had set off z test,.dozens. of people:
o[ ' "a Cieerdevicei Would know about it;, or at least about a
?- -At e'time the flaair:was publicly die part of it. But there's been nothing, ' on
closed': Ia?. late- October,: offidals': said it::: official said.
closely resembled t lo"eld nuclear test worldwide
search; t no corroborating - evidence - has4
been found, to indicate a nudeatmplosion
occurred,-they said. iw~.
The latest- blow Ito the-nudear eiplo-
-sioa theory was delivered late last weekat
the New., Zealand Institute of Nuclear'
Sciences.' Scientists there had previously
announced the detection - of: radioactive
fallout. they:. 'believed might have. come':
from a late September blast in the South
.. f
Atl=
But on Friday, the institute said, "New
measurements ?... do not confirm our,
earlier results - The Institute said its final
conclusion was that the fallout does not
contain certain-isotopes that would have
been pres+eat in a September 22 blast -There l's no evidencetof fresh radioac-
nud ar-tes Vn AtLantIe,r
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SPIES -- THE 'JORLC OVEF
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ARTICL2 r.PPT FD
ON PACE
SOUTH AFRICA'S
YOUNG SPYMASTER
10 DECEMBER 1979
with no known experience in intelligence.
In one sense, Botha's choice of Lukas
Barnar , an outsider untaint y t
years uence- uying scan dad, is reminis-
cent o rP''resi ent Carter's appointment of
an outsider to polish up the tarnished image
o Me CIA. I he sin anties between Bar-
Hendrik van den Bergh was the archetypi-
cal spymaster. The grim, steel-spectacled
general founded South Africa's Bureau of
State Security (BOSS), and his unques-
tioned authority over security operations
made him one of the most powerful men in
the country. But van den Bergh, 64, was
forced to resign because of his part in South
Africa's information scandal, and it took
Prime Minister Pieter Bothanearly a year to
find a successor. The choice was surprisi
6-
is pe fted with biblicions to "the
s of God," and he strongly favors the
e of swaardmagsansie.-the sword-power
sanction. Barnard believes South Africa
should develop a nuclear weapon-and
make it known to the world as a deterrent.
Like Botha, Barnard be-
lieves that South Africa should
create "a self-sustaining com-
munity of states in sputhern Af-
rica-with white and black
governments-as a regional
bastion of power against the
Communists' path toward
world domination." As direc-
tor of the Department of Na-
tional Security, the new name
for BOSS, he will help plan an
activist foreign policy-includ-
ing possible military interven-
tion in Zimbabwe Rhodesia if
leftists seize power there.
Barnard grew up in the
cautions politicians that the fi-
nal solution cannot be a mili-
tary one. "A well-motivated
and progressive society is defi-
nitely the most effective
counter to terrorism," he ar-
gues. But his Old Testament
beliefs and his outspoken views
on nuclear weapons make him
the perfect executor of an in-
creasingly aggressive foreign
policy-as well as a handy
scapegoat in the event that
such a policy should backfire.
CHRYSS GALASSI with
PETER YOUNGHUSBA.W
in Cape Town
STAT
hard, thornbush country of Southwest Af-
rica, now known as Namibia. The son of an
educational administrator, he studied at the
University of the Orange Free State in
Bloemfontein, where he still resides as dean
of the faculty of political science. He en-
countered there the religious idea of a
"Christian state" that still dominates his
personal philosophy. "The government re-
ceives the sword from the hand of God to
guarantee interstate stability and provide
justice in a crooked and twisted genera-
tion," Barnard wrote in one of his essays.
HANDY SCAPEGOAT: Barnard is not all bul-
lets and bombast. While he bluntly advo-
cates a "mailed fist" approach to South
Africa's problems with terrorism, he also
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02f PAGE
NEW YORK TIMES
3 DEC 4B 1979
Head of Blunt Spy Ring
Named by London Paper i
LONDON. Dec. 2 (UPI)-Thespymas-
ter who controlled one of the most effec-
tive Soviet espionage rings in Britain
probably operated in the United States
too, The Observer said today.
The Sunday newspaper identified-the
spymaster as Ernst Henry, a German
Communist now living and working in
Moscow as an author. It said he ran a
British spy ring that betrayed top secrets
to the Soviet Union and was believed to
have followed one of his British agents to
Washington. l ;_ .,,,, ' ;
The article followed a sari es the news-
paper published last month an. Soviet es-
pionage_ Prime Minister ? Margaret
Thatcher subsequently disclosed that Sir
Anthony Blunt, who served for years as
art adviser to Buckingham Palace, had
been a Soviet spy. He was deprived of his
knighthood after Mrs. Thatcher's report
to Parliament..
Mr. Blunt was one of. many spies re-
cruited from high-level circles in Britain
before World War II who infiltrated the
British Foreign Office and the. secret
service. After his unmasking last month,
Mr. Blunt-said he never knew the name of
his spymaster, but The Observer said its
research disclosed that Mr. Henry was
the man to whom Blunt betrayed secrets.
"The man is a former member of the
Central Commitee of the German Com-
munist Party who came to Britain in the
mid-1930's," The Observer said. "Now
aged 72 or 73. he lives in Moscow under
the name of Semyon Nikolayevich Roe-
tovsky. but is better known as Ernst
Henry, the author of occasional articles
in Izvestia and the literary Gazette.'
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ARTICLE APPEAR ED
//~~
ON PAGE______
THE WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1979
R. Emmett Tyrrell fr.\
So Civil, fora S
py,
Why did he not shoot himself? Of
course, he is an eminent art historian.
and so there are aesthetic considera-
tions. Colors might clash, and then once
the trigger is pulled one has absolutely
no control over the- patterns those
colors might leave on carpet and wall.
Still, modern science has provided us
with an amplitude of civilized intro
meats for one's happy dispatch. There
are pills and potions, and there remains
the old heave-ho into the Thames, pock
ets filled with lead, "Dos Kapital"
strapped to the waist. , ^ . .
Apparently England's Mr. Anthony
Blunt will take no such course of a
tion. Blunt, knighted in 1958 and
stripped of his knighthood last month,
was on Nov. 15 exposed as the."fourth
.Maclean-Philb
man" in the Burg
spy ring. He had been a renowned
member of the English establishment,
the queen's own art curator, a Cam.
bridge graduate who for 40 years ear
joyed all the benefits and confidence of
English society. Now he admits to ha
ing made "an appalling mistake," to
wit: he became a Soviet spy. In the '31s
he was a Soviet "talent scout" at Cam-
bridge. During the war, he sedulously
carried classified documents from his
lofty position in Britain's counterintelli-
gence agency, MI5, to the progressives
over at the Soviet Embassy. And in 1951
he was back in contact with the Soviets,-
apparently assisting. his friend Guy
Burgess in absconding to Mother Rus-
sia. Now, does he feel any shame? After
dishonoring friends. in- the highesL
realms of English life and betraying his
country to one of the most barbarous
regimes of the century, is he.remorse?
ful?Notatall. ~..'
On Nov. 20 he held a -hews-confer.
ence" in the comfortable surroundings
of the board . room.' of ; the - London
Times..There, with four carefully s
lected Journalists and before repairing
to a lovely lunch of smoked trout, ve4
cheese, fruit salad and wine, Blunt
deigned to answer questions.. He also
brought a carefully worded apologia. it
all no trace of shame was detectable-
not even remorse. Rather, this honor.
ary fellow of Trinity College, Cam.
bridge, explained his years of treason
augustly and sanctimoniously, some'
what as though he were explaining at
life. devoted to the Society for the!
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals or to
the promotion of vegetarianism and all
the arcane uplift that goes with it.
."In the mid-1930s it seemed to m
and to many of my contemporaries that
the Communist Party and Russia co
stituted the only firm bulwark against
fascism," asserts Blunt, a man whose
life and work had revealed so little bi.
terest in politics that his closest friends)
doubted he had any politics whatever.
How did he come to such a carefully'
calculated political position? And his;
perception of. the Soviets as the staunch
bulwark against fascism-was it wob.
bled by the Hitler-Stalin pact, the purgei
trials or Orwell's reports on the Spanish
Civil War? Apparently not; he served
his Soviet-friends loyally throughout
the war.
tical con
l
f
"
-
i
po
Phis was a case o
science against loyalty to country. I,
chose conscience.... I could not de-;
nounce my friends," declares the high
minded Blunt. But, of course, in betray-
ing his country he betrayed any friend
living there who felt loyalty to its gov-
ernment and to its ideals. Who were his
friends? One was Burgess, his fellow
traitor. Blunt describes him as "one of
the- most 'remarkable, most brilliant
and.-making a distinction, one of the
most intelligent people I have ever
known.'London's Spectator puts it dif
ferently: "Burgess was a drunken rake,
'a homosexual with a voracious-appetite
fog the gutter."
Some will find Blunts words veryi
reassuring. No. one was killed duringi
the war as a result of his services to
the Soviets, he has said. Well, Blunt)
has been described as one of Eng.
land's greatest scholars; he ought to+
know. When it comes to indiscretions)
of the sort committed by Blunt on be-i
half of, progress and, enlightenment,
there is an. entire subculture of
lized people on both sides of the Atianl
tic willing to let bygones be bygones
The self-righteousness of Blunts;
apologia, his imperturbable hauteur-
those who know and love the Hiss saga
are familiar with the phenomenon. Nor
should we be surprised that-various of
his sleek and wellborn friends are tear-i
fully .extending their condolences i
Soon he will be back in their elegant;
dining rooms. There will. lamentably,:
be difficult moments. Does one men-
tion Mrs. Thatcher? Is Solzhenitsyn a
sore subject? Should one put.in a goodi
word for socialist realism?
. Yet there is something troubling l
about this case. Here is a man who de.
voted his whole life to the singularly:.
elevated subject of beauty. Neverthe-j
less, he betrayed his country and his i
culture, as Malcolm Muggeridge ob-
serves, "to help advance the power and'
influence of the most ruthless, PhilitI
tine and materialistic autocracy the
world has ever known." It is as though
a lover of antique furniture fell in love
with a termite. What is there in Blunt's
life that will explain his "appalling misl
take"? .. ,.
The writer is editor-in.chief of The I
American Spectator.
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ARTICLE LFPEl1M
ON PAGR_ ~~
Five hands
in'.- the game:
of betrayal..
By R.T. Crowley .
Mr. Crowley recently retired as a
senior official of the CIA
" after. the thirds man, the
fourth man, after the fourth man,
the fifth man, always beside you
WASHINGTON STAR
2 DECEMBER 1979
Eight years later, on January 23,
1963, Philby vanished from Beirut
where, a month earlier, he had
admitted (to Nicholas Eliot of M16)
his role as a Soviet agent.
On July 1, 1963, Edward Heath told
Commons: "... [we now know] as a
result of an admission by Mr. Philby
himself that he worked for the
Soviet authorities before 1946 and
that in 1951 he, in fact, warned Mac-
Lean through Burgess that the se-
curity services were about to take ac-
gton
..tion against him ...." ... - old Adrian Russell Philby., .. As a
A somewhat older Marcus Lipton result of the American-Israeli secret
asked:".,,.. does the statement mean intelligence connection. each of
that Mr. Philby was, in fact, the these three spies was identified,.
'third mad'... Maciean's identification leading to
~.>> Mr. Heath replied-"Yes.- sir." - Burgess', thence to Philby"s. . The
In the 12_ years between the Bur- subsequent manipulation, which in-
gess 7firSt man)-=MacLean (second cluded providing them-with inteul.
man) escape and Philby's final re= gence information, to mislead the
Soviets, makes the overall operation
treat to Moscow, it was generally, is-4
.. - ,
sumed that the "third man- had 11 a classic case 'Identification
warned the two other spies that they) occurred as the result of any nub-
or at least. MacLean had come under could have
suspicion of MIS..Although Philby's b of-11 chance #4 circumstances.
a on
in
n
t
Cyril Connolly. MI.
The events leading to the 1951'
flight to the Soviet Union by the-.
British Foreign Office officials, Bur-
gess and MacLean, makF an unlikely
tale. Its improbability makes it un-
suitable as fiction and almost unac-
ceptable as fact
The public's awareness of a still
deeper complexity began-four years
and four months later, on October
25, 1955. when Lt. CoLMarcus Lipton
rose in Commons and put a startling
question to Anthony Eden: " . . . Has
the prime minister made up his
mind to cover up, at all costs, the
dubious 'third man' activities of Mr.
Harold Philby?... "
Philby, an ascending star in M16,
had been the linkman between the
British Service, the FBI and the
embryonic CIA during his assign.
ment to Washington (1949-1951).
Lipton had to wait until November
7 for Harold Macmillan, then foreign
secretary, to reply for the govern-
ment: ". _ . I have no reason to con-
clude that Mr?..Philby has, at-any
time, betrayed. the. interests of this
country...:' ..; .,.:
Philby, meanwhile,. called.a press
conference at his. mother's London
flat and in a. most disingenuous-way.
suggested that..Lipton probably
would not chance the-consequences
of repeating the accusation without
the protection of Pgarhiamentary im-
munity. He went on, to confess -that
the last time he had spoken to a Com
munist,"... knowing he was a Com-_
monist..:.,"was in 1934.
Philby was seen as a good-tem-
pered martyr whose reputation had
been maliciously impaired. He suc-
ceeded in conveying the notion that
his sense of duty and obligation
under the Official Secrets Act denied
him the freedom to act in his own'
warning to Burgess was timely and
urgent, he could not have known
rom s remo a
from his t in Washin
post
Those in OSO, most notably
James Angleton were pleased to
have the Israeli relationship to
themselves. And over time, not only
during the Truman years, the rela-
tionship produced some remarkable
results and intelligence coups. One 1,
in particular is worth mentioning
briefly. It involves the identification':
and subsequent. manipulation of
three British intelligence officials
who were Soviet spies. Donald Mac-'
Lean ... Guy. Burgess. - . and Har.
,
ip
Uw" %.%
, con-
veys the unambiguous use of an
agent - perhaps still'
another num
bered man.
exactly when the security service - In this case it is "Basil"who
as the
,
would move. fifth man, played a critical role in'
L On Friday, May 25, 1951, (Mac- 194&49. "Basil" was uniquely quasi-
the following Monday. The interro.
gation was to be conducted by Wil.
liam James Skardon, who had gained
public recognition as "the man who
.
co
a
ora-
broke Klaus Fuchs." ' - - ' tion was in reporting to the Soviets
By mid-day on the 25th; Burgess the day-to-day progress of the US-UK
.learned from someone that time was : Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
running but. That evening he met, MacLean as a non-scientist looked to
at with Beacon MacLean- Shaw and had a Tatsfield light M meal ..Basil,'.' a distinguished physicist.
1
ac-
.
,Lean's home. where he was intro-
duced is Mrs. MacLean as "Roger
Styles," a Foreign Office colleague.~j
That night the two men boarded the
channel ship Falaise at Southhmpton
cans 38th birthday), Herbert. fied to influence and report on the
Morrison, then foreign secretary, activities of Donald MacLean. They
finally gave authorization to MI5 to shared a commonality of interests, interrogate MacLean at 11 a.m. on I friends and advantages. More impor-
tantly, they were active Soviet
agents committed to strengthening
the USSR by weakening the United,
States
The main area of
ll
b
'
for technical advice.
Soviets Slip Up
At the end of World War ff. both
the U.S. and British security ele-
and began the first evasion o>r their] ments became aware of the loss of
passage to Moscow: ] important, highly classified infor- `
Kl mation from the British Embassy in
.
Namedbyhraelis Washington. Intensive investiga-.
The-"someone" who had provided
the spies with such'an immediate re-
port* of the-precise terms of Morri-.
son's decision had gained the confi-
dence at a very high level in the
Foreign Office or the security sere
.ice. To the MIS officers who bore the
private outrage and public. scorn, it-
.was evident that there was still'
another numbered man.,
In the 1977 book The Armies of
Ignorance,, author W.R. Corso, in
describing intelligence successesn
based on. U.S.-Israeli cooperation
t wrote:-':'
tions were underway' when the
Soviet consulate in. New York pro-
vided a clue in the form of poor
'radio communications security. The
CONTIN.
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lapse led to the decrypting of mes-
sages to Moscow which named
"Homer" as the British Embassy spy.
Surveillance of "Basil" disclosed
his association with MacLean in noc-
turnal homosexual adventures.
"Basil" was then approached sepa
rately and persuaded to accept re-
cruitment by the U.S. rather than
exposure and arrest as a Soviet
agent. "Basil" acquiesced, identified
MacLean as "Homer" and for some
time following, acted as a link be-
tween MacLean and the Soviets in
New York and Washington
Two years following the publicap-
pearance of Burgess and MacLean in
Moscow, the "someone" who had
warned Burgess of the Morrison
decision to allow MIS.to interrogate
MacLean voluntarily' approached
the British security authorities and
confessed his role. In exchange for a
full disclosure of his work on be0alf
of the Soviets, he was not subjected
to prosecution. He, too, had worked
in the wartime MIS and, by reason of
his "old boy" status and social
prominence, retained close and con-,
tinuing contact with seniors in the
Foreign Office and the security serv-
ice. He is "Maurice," the fourth man.
In The Fourth Man - the new
book which caused the public un-
masking of art expert Anthony
Blunt as Maurice last month - au-
thor Anthony Boyle succeeds in
presenting an engaging version of
this bizarre story based on somenew
evidence. In the introduction, he ac-
knowledges the contributions by the
FBI and CIA in releasing documents
under the Freedom of Information
Act. Boyle also acknowledges the
"personal guidance of former mem-
bers of the American intelligence
community' which led [him] to the
independent discovery of Basil and
Maurice." Although these unnamed
Britons spied. for the Soviet Union,
both confessed:. "Basil when cor-
nered in Washington and Maurice
many years later in London."-Both
men were pardoned and received
the assurance of governmental
protection. To name them now, ac-
cording to Boyle, would give rise to
gray-mail proceedings based on
extra-legal considerations involving.
U.S. and UK national security.
Litvinov's Insight o` Y
Boyle attributes the: idea of at-
tempting to subverts middle- and
upper- class intellectuals to Maxim
Litvfnov, one-time*Soviet envoy to
London. who, among;Russians, had
an unusual understanding of Eng-
lish class structure and the peculiar
role of mutual trust which.bound,',
the establishment.. i.'. I .. .
Alexander Orlov, the dean of pre..
World War II intelligence defectors,
saw the plan develop differently-
". .. Chiefs of the NKVD hit upon
an idea which solved this most dif-
ficult problem (i.e? the penetration
of and promotion within the British
establishment) as if by magic. One of
the chiefs approached the problem
not only as an intelligence man but
as a sociologist as well. . .
"Accordingly, in the early 1930s,
the NKVD residenturas concen-
trated their energy on the recruit-
ment of young men of influential
families. The political climate of that
period was very favorable for such
an undertaking, and the idea of
joining a 'secret society' held. a
strong appeal for the young people
who dreamed of a better world and
of heroic deeds.:. .
"What they wanted wa a purpose
in life and it seemed tom that
;hey had found it. By t}a:tr mental
makeup and outlook the/, jteminded
one very much of the yoRussian
Decembrists of the past ntury.
They brought into the Soviet intelli-
gence the true fervor of new converts and the ideal-i
ism which their intelligence chiefs had lost long
ago....'
Burgess went to Eton, MacLean to Gresham's and
Philby to Westminister school, each in tarn consid-
ered a natural forcing house for sons of the ruling:
class. At Cambridge, new boys allied themselves
with one of the prevailing three major sects: The
Dandy/Aesthetes, the Rogue/Rebels or the Hearties.
Burgess, MacLean and Philby - a homosexual; a
bisexual and a heterosexual afflicted with satyria-
sis - seem an odd troika for recruitment by the
Soviets.
Disgusted With Russia
While still at university each openly professed
the conviction that communism was the only recipe.
for a stable and just world. Later, each aligned him-
self with the right wing and gave voice. in support
of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco. Each visited the
Soviet Union and all three came away with what
seems a sincere, though mild, disgust with the Rus-.
sian people, preferring to defer final judgment
until the "building of socialism in one country" had
progressed beyond the chaos they witnessed..
Throughout the Spanish civil war, the three
maintained right-wing postures - Burgess with the
BBC, Philby as a London Times correspondent with
the Franco forces and MacLean as a rising Foreign
Office diplomat. With the beginning of the Second
War, Burgess joined the Special Operations Execu-
tive and found a berth there for Philby. Later,
Philby moved to M16 where he was counter-intelli-
gence chief for the Iberian section.
Defector Betrayed .
In September 1945, Konstantine Volkov ap-
proached a British official in Istanbul and asked for
political asylum in Britain for himself and his wife.
He identified himself as an NKVD officer and
claimed to know the true names of three Soviet
agents operating within the British government,
two in the Foreign Office and one as head of a
counter-intelligence, organization in London: A re-
port of the meeting was promptly sent to Maj. Gen.
Stewart Menzies, chief of M16, by pouch since. Vol-
kov kov had also reported that the Soviets were inter-
cepting and successfully decrypting British.cypher
traffic. Menzies proposed the dispatch of David Rob-
erts of MI6 to Istanbul to handle negotiations with
Volkov. Roberts claimed an unconquerable aver-
sion to flying and Menzies then turned to Philby,
asking that he depart London for Istanbul by air.
Philby, on reading the Volkov file before leaving
London, called for an urgent clandestine meeting
with his Soviet controller in London and reported
Volkov's "treachery." By the time Philby arrived in
Turkey, Volkov had been seized, brutally beaten
and transported to the Soviet Union by a special
military aircraft on an unscheduled flight. Philby
in his KGB-sanctioned version of the event con-
cedes that Volkov's information would have de-
stroyed him had not the Soviets intervened.
Lurid Behavior
Burgess' outrageous behavior, his drunkenness
and total disregard of personal hygiene formed the
basis. for the Evelyn Waugh character "Basil Seal"
about whom Waugh wrote: "... He seldom de-
scended to the artifice of the toilet . - ." Burgess
was flattered by Waugh's attentions and took.
several autographed first editions with him to Mos-
cow. ~.. .,u?i.
CONTINtJ
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MacLean's uncontrollable rages and suicidal
drinking bouts continued to be indulged by an im-
plausibly forgiving Foreign Office. In 1963, when
they were joined in Moscow by Philby, the melan-
choly trio pretended fulfillment and gave..a brave
face to the West.
Philby's former wife Aileen, deserted in-England,
soon died. When Eleanor, his third wife, found Mos-
cow uncongenial, Philby turned his attentions to
Melinda MacLean.
Burgess. unable to form easy homosexual rela-
tionships in the workers' paradise, was morose
until the visiting Tom Driberg led him to an under-
ground public convenience in Moscow where he
met "questing male slays. ..", including Slava, the
electrician who later became his roommate. Bur-
gess died, pseudononymously. on an-iron bed in the
Moscow Botkin Hospital as Jim Andreyevich Eliot.
His brother Nigel, the'MacLeans, Philby and a
mournful Slava attended the memorial service.
Burgess had bequeathed to Philby his books and
clothes when he died. Among the books were the
signed first editions of Waugh; among the clothes, a
few Eton-made suits: MacLean's eventual loss of his
wife to Philby and the Burgess bequest were seen
by the social historian Martin Green as "cessions of
property which, perhaps, indicate the usual style of
transactions between Philby and,his more flamboy-
ant cohorts -each, in different ways, made submis-
sion to him.
Few Triumphs Left
Burgess is dead. MacLean is seldom seen. Philby's
last reported operational success was the theft of
MacLean's wife.
Kim Philby is best remembered for his betrayals.
of British agents, Albanians, school chums, various
wives and other women, the British Establishment,
Volkov and the many service colleagues who have
their trust_
Today he is redundant to the needs of modern
Soviet intelligence, having little left to contribute
and no other place to go. He lives in surroundings
in which his urbanity and disarming stammer
count for little. As a matter of course he lives iso-
lated among people for whom he has always had
scant regard and less respect. His Russian superiors
know him for what he is, an aging, congenital de-
ceiver, recruited more than 40 years ago for pur-
poses which have been obscured by the passage of
time.
Among those victims of his treachery who are
still alive there is a small, vindictive wish that he
will live a very long life.
Unresolved Question
The Fourth Man seems to have had the advantage
of interpretive insights as provided by the parable speakers among the senior retired service officers
who had direct -knowledge of the events gained
while in positions of responsibility. Still unclear is
the proposition that the U.S. permitted Philby's con-
tinued participation in a joint US-UK operation in
Albania at a time when his Soviet connections were
suspicioned if not confirmed. -
Sir Dick White-one-time chief of MIS and later
chief of M16, was given the Augean task of restoring
the service. His political masters viewed the case as
a manufactory of further embarrassment and ad-
verse political reaction. The temporizing of Eden
and others, who would not confront the problem.
inhibited the investigation and contributed to the
massive damage. - -
Maurice lives comfortably in England, Basil near
Washington. Both have enjoyed distinguished pub-
lic careers which have brought them high honors.
It is conceivable that their secret careers, though
less well known, might have had greater import on
the world. Perhaps one day they will record the de-
tails of their. work as ideologically driven Soviet
agents and document this nearly extinct species.
-Followingpublication ofBoyle 'sThe Fourth Man,
(UK title: The Climate of Treason), Blunt was iden-
tified by Prime Minister Thatcher as Mavrica The
British press hasnamed Wilfred Mann asBasiL
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CHICAGO DAILY CALUMET
17 November 1979
012 vkEicn
tAttorney Hopeful
By Mark Klesling
(Staff Writer)
The deeision, * to ; uphold' the. con-
viction of accused spy. William Kam-
piles by the 7th Circuit Court of Ap-
peals Thursday has not halted action
on the part of Kampiles' attorney to
vindicate his client.
Although all nine points of the ap-
peal were rejected by the three-judge
panel, attorney Michael Monica in-
dicated yesterday that he will file a
petition for an appeal review before
the entire 7th Circuit, but will also file
a motion in federal court in Hammond
for a new trial.
Kampiles, convicted one year ago
today in Hammond before U.S. Judge
Phil McNagny, remains locked up at
the Metropolitan Correctional Center
in Chk go, where he has been since
his arrest Aug. 17, 1978. -
. "We may state all nine points
again," Monico stated. "We're going
to raise the same issues before the
whole (appeal) panel." .
The nine points dealt with the suf-
ficiency of government evidence, the
adequacy of the court's handling of
pre-trial publicity,. the district court's
treatment of the Kampiles'- con-
fession, Monico's allegation that
Kampiles was coerced into confessing
by FBI agents and the court's refusal
to grant the defense an - hour's con=
tinuance to call a witness in from.
Chicago.
The 29-page opinion of the appeals
court went into all nine points raised
by Monico, but the attorney indicated
yesterday he has, another plan of at-
tack for a retrial motion. , -?
According to Monico, he plans-to in-
troduce evidence linl$Ing two men con-
'victed of espionage in California in
early 1977 to the leaking of the same
information Kampiles was convicted
of selling in February, and March of
1978:
Monico cited the April 29, 1979
edition of The New -York Times as
providing sketchy.-information about
convicted spies Andrew Lee and
Christopher Boyce which alleged,
Monico said, "a year before Kampiles
sold the documents, the Soviets had
information about our photo satellite
system."
"Exactly what they (Lee and
Boyce) had, I don't know," Monico
admitted, "but the article said that
among the hundreds of documents
sold by Boyce and Lee were plans for
theKH-11."
It is the technical manual for the
KH-11 orbiting surveillance satellite f
that Kampiles was,.- convicted. of
selling on a vacation to Greece. He
received $3,000 from Soviet agent
Michael Zavali for the booklet, and
the ,information compromised the
U.S. space technology and jeopar
dized the Strategic Arms Limitation
,Treaty (SALT) II talks, according to
:the CIA. .-
As a-former CIA_-employee, Kam
piles had access to the KH-11 manual
everyday in his job, and was con
victed of taking the document before
leaving the agency in November, 1977.
He had only worked for the agency for
eight -,months, and was allegedly,
having some problems with his job.
However, Monica' is also disputing
the CIA contention that the sale of the
ddl urn nL actuality compromised any
U.Si t security -or', put the-- SALT
negotiations in ieopartly.."We have
statements " from Department' of
Defense people who were at the SAL
II talks that seem to contradict the
statements of the CIA on the effects of
the, alleged,- compromise, - Monica
said..: --
Monica- Madded the motion will'
filed for the new trial before McNagn
as well as the appeal review petition
in the 7th Circuit within the month.
Kampiles, 24, graduated from
Chicago's Washington High School,
114th and Avenue 0, in 1972 and from
Indiana University in 1975. He movedi
to an apartment at 7845 Hohman.Ave.,
Munster, in mid-1978. He was arrested;
at the apartment six weeks afteri
moving in with Perry Felecos, a Mun-i
ster'police officer and lifelong friend. '
Kampiles' mother, Nicoletta, still !
lives in Hegewisch at 13558 Burley i
Ave. 1.~
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SALT II
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~iLT1CLE AP:
L.
ON PAGE
White House As.
By George C. Wilson
w..else T.A aua wear
The White House is askiat defense
contractors to We President Carter
an assist is persuading the Senate to
approve the strategic arms limi
limitation
treaty (SALT M ' ' that
Several executives of firms
produce weapons for the government
told the Washington post they ha
been called over the last few weeks by
White House staff memo the Whit
?. Anne Wexler, head
House public liaison office, confirnud
that defense contractors are among
the businesses her- staff had called on
behalf. Of SALT' IL routine."
She termed the calls "very
She answered "abs Autelp not" when
asked if there-was any White House
implication that futubre defense con-
tracts would be linked to SALT U
suppo ade to
Wexler said the calla, b beinother g ng made
burl-
defense contractors ad,e to be
nesses are in- the "ate House brief-
followed-later by Whi
ings on the arms treaty.;,
Most executives . contacted about e
SALT II, Wexler said, told the White
House staffer who called, them that'
they would have to checl4 with their
.top. management. before .,giving the
firm's stand on the treaty:------ .: .
..One aerospace executive, said he
THE WASHINGTON POST
4 December 1979
Arms Firms to Lobby for SALT II
was called: by: Judy Mercado,: a White
House fellow working for one of the
asked if his firm, which is nation's top -defense ' contractom
would:get.behind:the treaty.:.
; "They want us to contact our con-
gressional delegation," he said. "I told
them I would have to check with my
:top management - and report- back.
They -do.: this kind of thing all the
time. T considered it routine." .
Mercado said she. called defense
rcontractors, as well -as others, on be-
half of SALT U. She replied, "I would
rather not, comment" when asked 1
what she had??requeated. defense con-
tractors to- do. - _ - .
"Ot course. the intent L to help us
with SALT:- Wexler said of the;phose
conversations with defense contractors.
Mercado was, "doing nothin_li-,im-
proper" in making those calls.... ,:.?~
Some defense executives, told :The
Post that the calls seemed to, be White
House pressure to support, the treaty.
"They really shouldn't- -leer'diet
way, Wexler replied when told about,
this interpretation. Some business Ot I
:ecutives will be. for: the treaty. some 1
will be against it, she said..
She putthe Carter admihistratioXs
.SALT II lobbying in the same ca
,gory as the earlier effort to make tIe
case to the business commuaity,fQr-I
;
the Panama Canal treaties..._,,_-..,,,,
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ARTICLE APPEAM
ON PAGE
NEW YORK TIMES
2 DECEMBER 1979
What Price SALT?-
Quite Considerable
Among the reasons Henry A. Ki"
ger is not very popular at the State De.
partment and the White House these
days is his lukewarm, at best, support
for SALT I1, even though he drafted
two-thirds of the . arms. limitation
treaty while be was Secretary of State.
Mr- Kissinger, . the charge goes,, is
playing politics to win the hearts and
minds of Republican Presidential can-
didates.. - .
Neverthelesi: last week Defense
'Secretary Harold Brown negotiated
personally with Mr. Kissinger and
Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat who,
is the Senate's reigning expert on mill.
tary affairs. over higher levels of
fense spending. Such is the Admininis..
tration's need to win wavering skep-
tics on SALT, that when Mr. Nunn told
Mr. Brown that Mr. Kissinger would
be present for their private talk, the
Defense Secretarydid not object -
More to the point, the Administra,
` Lion approved a rise. of nearly 5 per-
cent (President Carter had earlier an.
nounced 3) for the fiscal year begin.
ring Oct_ .1. 1960. Mat would mean a
Pentagon appropriations request near
SI60 billion; the current (1980) year's
request was $138.6 billion.
Even more spending may not push.
SALT through the Senate. A draft re..
port by the Armed Services Commit-
tee, disclosed: last week. recam?
mended "major changes" in the
treaty teat, Including eliminating Mos.
cow's "heavy" intercontinental mis.
sites and limiting its Backfire bomber
(not covered by the treaty). Examina-
tion of those: supporting the report
raises to seven: the antitreaty Demo.
crats now in the open.. That means at
least 15. Republicans are needed for
ratification, a prospect that, at the mo-
ment; is doubtfui."=`
BarbaraSlavia
and Milt Freudenhelm
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ARTICLE 'APPEARED
ON PAGE
THE WASHINGTON POST
2 December 1979
S enate*.SAL T Debate.-I
Not Seen Lilely
:? Begin This Year ?
By Robert G. Kaiser'
~. w..uinason rapt sett wear ` ~': '~. -
::Because of the- Iranian' crisis ands an overcrowded
CIngressional calendar, the Senate debate on. the
:;kLT II= treaty is unlikely to. begim this year
Jources predicted last week::.
,,:Pro- and anti-SALT maneuvering eontlnues- tn_
*ensely in the Senate, -but both sines now expect the
floor debate to begin in earnest no, sooner than. Jan-
aary. It may be,-difficult to get' a-final vote on the:
oceaty before'the~New Hampshire.primasy'on Feb.:
~8. some Senate sources say.':
Friends and, foes of the- treaty agree. that!=contfn-
ued slippage in the SALT timetable is likely to help
the treaty's opponents more than the Carter
istration. ;:...,??w 4 .." e::~ < z.K 7 +!'
The- Senate- majority leader, Robert. C.. Byrd '(D-
W.Va.), has expressed dismay at the-propsict that
SALT will be on the floor during the presidential
primaries, but that now appears to be inevitable
Byrd told reporters yesterday that in view-of Sen.
ate delays on the windfall profits tax bill and of the
need for a week or so for the Armed Services Com-
mittee to study -five-year protections for military
spending, it's only marginally likely that the treaty
would even be made the pending..Senate?-business
before the scheduled Dec. 21 adjournmentI And that
final vote wouldn't come until many weeks, perhaps
months, into the 1980 session.
Some opponents of. tl,e treaty scored.publie-rela-
ions points last week:'. with. a strategic leak of
draft report. that the-Sedate Armed Services Com-
mittee may consider soon that is sharply critical of
D,4LT IL l~..?;.?'=`
Aides to senators hostile to SALT 11 leaked the
document,..a 3I-page, report written.- by staffers
Nhich had no..officiak status; and -claimed that 11
members of the 17 member committee- would en-
'Zbrse it.
At leas one- of-the- alleged=1Lsupporters: Robert
. forgan_ (D-N.C),,said he ;would oppose-thepro.
aiosed report',it tt tomes -before the- committee; but
.4here appeared'to be-majority supportfora strong
3hti-treaty statement, if the committee decides to
'make anrstatement of this kind.. ; - 1
-- Treaties are outside the, jurisdiction of the Armed
Services Committee, and some senators, probably
Including Chairman John C. Stennis (D-IYliss.), may
appose it. committee finding on SALT IL _; , _.
Treaty supporters on the committee were angered!
by the leaks. Ones. Gary Hart (D-Colo.), called the
leaked draft report "a hoax." since it had no official
status, and had not even been circulated to the full;
committee.
Numerous aides and other Senate sources said!
',the report was the work of Richard Perle. the re-
sourceful defense policy aide to Sen Henry M. Jack-;
son (D-Wash.). Perle acknowledged helping write
the report, which he called a "collaborative effort"
of several _ Senate offices.
Behind the scenes last- week, the Carter adminis-
tration continued its efforts to pls.ate senators (and
'former -secretary of state- Henry: A.. Kissinger). who
have demanded Increased defense spending as the
price for theii-support of SALT IL
Defense Secretary- Harold Brown met during the
week with Sen. Sam. Nunn (D-Ga.) and Kissinger,-1
and with both, Byrd and Stennis to discuss additions
to the defense budget Administration officials have
'also met with more dovish senators who are unen-
4hustastic about increased defense spending to es
plaid their position. ;
%ccording wsources; the president is
likely' too approve- a 3.6 percent real increase, after]
.inflation, in the fiscal'1981 defense budget. This is a,
'much biSSer? increase than Carter planned before 1
Ee enseespending.-became an issue in the SALT de.'
ft-- the- subsequent. four years, these sources said,
the president will probably propose annual in-1
fireases of more than 4 percent per year in defense
spending If _appropriated,.`tnese increases could-i
zing the defense budget close to 5200 billion a year
1'-198& However, strong congressional opposition
a.auch increases is expected.
Munn declined to say last week what his incliner
tiens on SALT are, adding that he wanted to wait
;for, the- president's final decisions on the defense'
Jjedget, which may come this week.
Some SALT opponents in the Senate began pre.
'dieting that Nunn would end up supporting the;
treaty,-though. perhaps not with much enthusiasm'
Administration lobbyists regard: his support as cru-1
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ARTICLE APPEARED
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THE WASHINGTON POST
2 December 1979
es for NATO:
- I
New
A No-
liyArthurThw7JCox
T N TWO WEEKS the NATO alliance wM decide
whether to deploy 464 ground-launched cruise missiles
in Europe which have sufficient range to destroy targets
in the Soviet Union. This proposal is ill-conceived - not
because Soviet President Brezhnev and Foreign Minister
Gromykooppose it, but-because it may mark the and of
any further arms control agreements and a substantial
:increase in the possibility of accidental nuclear war.. The
;nuclear weapon package for NATO is directly tied to the
, SALT U treaty, but it abandons an essential principle of
..SALT even before the treaty is rectified by the Senate
Ground-launched cruise missiles cannot be monitored by
intelligence. If they are deployed, verification of a, SALT
-~ It has long beenvnderstood that neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union would risk arms control ag-
reements based on trust. During the seven.years of com-
plex negotiation of SALT II both aides made compro-
mises to enhance verification because they knew that no
treaty was possible without insurance against cheating;
Perhaps the most controversial issue of the negotiations,
from this standpoint, was the control of ground- and
sea-launched cruise missiles.
? The control of these weapons was '. so difficult; in fact?
that the SALT II treaty merely postpones a final dad-
:lion. The protocol to:-the
SALT II treaty provides
that "each party undertakes
not to deploy cruise missiles .
capable of a range in excess
of 600 kilometers [360 miles]
on sea-based launchers or on
l
360
e
-mi
.
portent because' weapons';' 't v ,,y s ~,: ~^
based' in Europe could not
reach the Soviet Union at that distance. The protocol,' on!
integral part of the treaty, remains in force until Dec31,
.198L :.., -
Attached to the SALTII treaty are the screed "Princi-
ples and Basic Guidelines far Subsequent Negotiations"
which Presidents Carter and Brezhnev signed in Vienna
on June 18. These guidelines call for resolution of the is-
sues included in the protocol in. the, context of "signifi-
.'cint and substantial reductions in the number of strate-
gic offensive arms, including restrictions on the develop
ment, testing and deployment of new types of strategic
offensive arms and on modernization of existing strategic
offensive arms." The intent of this language is clew
Both sides have agreed to cut existing forces, rather than
deploy additional weapons.
But the NATO proposal calls for t1i. deployment of
.108 Pershing. It ballistic; miasma, and:?464 ground
launched cruise missiles with a range of more than 1,000
miles each to be located in West Germany, Britain, Bel-~
gium and Italy. The NATO decision will also include al
yet unspecified, but directly linked, proposal to the
Soviets to negotiate a reduction of medium-range nuclear
^
The. justification for the new NATO weapons is that
the Soviets have been modernizing their medium-range
weapons- by deploying about 100 mobile SS20 ballistic j
missiles, each with three warheads and about 90 super-
sonic Backfire bombers. Neither of these weapons is con-I
trolled by SALT II, though Brezhnev in a letter to Carter;
has made a commitment to limit the deployment of thel
- Backfire to 30ayear with no refueling capacity.
Both sides have bad medico n-range systems since the
1950s. The United States has forward-based systems ce-
pable of reaching the Soviet Union, including bombers
located in. Britain and on aircraft carriers, as well as
Poseidon submarines, - carrying almost 500 warheads,
which are assigned to the NATO command. Both Britain
,. and France have their own independent nuclear forces,
capable of hitting Soviet cities. The medium-range nu-1
clear forces have been essentially balanced. for years.
f, However, since the Soviet weapons are more modern it is
_ 'claimed that they must be matched by NATO........ -
It might make sense to. plan the deployment of the
Pershing.Il, which is a ballistic missile with characteris-
.- tics somewhat similar to the SS20. It might make sense
also to build a new bomber as advanced as the Backfire.
But it makes no sense at all to plan to deploy. the ground
launched cruise missile.
These weapons are so small, about 18 feet long and two
feet wide, that they can be easily hidden, easily moved i
and easily launched from mobile launchers. Modern in. J
telligence- technology has. amazing capabilities,. but iti
cannot provide adequate information on the location. and I
numbers of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles.:
Adequate verification would be impossible. The deploy.4
meat of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles would
provoke an unrestrained arms race with no way to puti
the genie back in the bottle.
U.S. proponents of the cruise missile deployment deci-i
sion come from opposing camps, making for strange bed-
fellows. indeed. The opponents of arms control and the,'
SALT II testy see the decision as a possible means to
kill the SALT process.,They are not concerned about1
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verification, bemuse they oppose the treaty. They believe}
we should use our technological advantages to reassert
technology which we should exploit, they believe. Fur-
thermore, they note that the ground-launched cruise
missiles will have longer range than the Pershing Its and
can be produced a year or two faster. .
The conventional wisdom in the Carter administration,
however, is that a NATO decision to deploy the weapons
now will provide a bargaining chip which will advance
the cause of arms control in the next round of negotia-
tions. Theoretically it would appear that a. NATO com-
mitment to deploy the weapons'.would- strengthen the
hand of Western negotiators to press the Soviets for real
. But the history of the nuclear arms race, so far, demon-
strate. the opposite. Once the decision-to deploy the new
weapon is. made the bargain is lost,. because the Soviets
invariably counts with additional weapons of their own
Brezhnev and Gromyko;have stated that this would
their position.. Whether%that -proves to be-true or not, a
decision to deploy weapons inevitably generates so much
momentum. ::political,:, military, technological and:
The decision. to deploy multiple warheads (MIRV) on
~'. 'noloa: end. placed multiple
gotiated a ban on MIRV be,
cure, and'wa would havesaved billions=of dollars. The
real bargaining chip is the .decision itself, before it is
made: ,
In the case of .NATO decision in December it is true
that no action will be taken until the, parliaments of the
NATO governments have-approved the action,. and until
the weapons. have been produced,. tested and deployed,
which. map- take three or four years. The West German
might not be necessary` to , develop air-of-the . weapons,"
perhaps. only a few and' in.the ideal- case,-absolutely
Schmidt is willing to go along with a NATO decision b
sayx "If negotiations with Moscow` are successful
Soviet Union. its willingness to negotiate on,the deploy
Union relocated on German soil:"' itx
Germany would. receive the largest share of the new
weapons. It they are deployed, it would be the first time
government of Cliancellor.Helmut Schmidt is very semi-
none." Schmidt does not want to jeopardize the benefit
strategic superiority over Russia. Since, then many edito=l
future seaaity, because the United. States no longer has
created a furor.by questioning the. plausibility of NATO's
and Willy Brandt have
L:' It = r. ----but thaw was, no bar-
be a buildup of theater nuclear forces in Za%pe, ao that
invoking the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee does not
become Europe's only option in a conflict This argument
is wrong on all counts.
Unlike the indepedent French and British nuclear for-
cm the
and con~troolled by NATO the weapons will be United States. In fact,
the
West Germans have stated categorically that they will
not accept . the two-key system whereby a decision to I
send a nuclear weapon toward Russia would be shared by
the United States and Germany. Thus, a decision to
launch would be an -American decision, whether the
weapons used are based in, the United States or in
Europe..
NATO would not gain any greater assurance of proteo-
tion than it has today.The president of the Unted States
would still make the decision and U.S. cities would be
equally theatened by Soviet retaliation. Moreover, the
deployment of these weapons in Europe would guarantee
that the NATO member states would be early targets of
.Soviet rockets in the event of war. What would be the se-
curity benefit for Western Europe?
And why should the NATO governments be subj
to this emerging political turmoil, which may weaken the
alliance? Furthermore, why should the U.S. taxpayer. be,
subjected to the substantial cost of producing
-weapons if, after all, it is not intended that, they shouldIl
be deployed? The implications of the cruise missile d
ployment have not been thought through, nor have the~j
,been debated.: 4
The best course would be for NATO to adopt the posij
:tion recently taken by the Danish government. Denmark
has called for a six-month postponement of the NATO
'decision to ascertain whether the Soviets are willing td
negotiate mutual cuts, including the level of their SS20s
begin at once: If not,;NATO would move ahead-
-
Arthur Cox is a former State Department and CIA
;official who writes and- lectures on U.S.-Souiet.affairs
and arms-control issues.
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ARTICLE APP-.ZD
O1 IAGE 1
NEW YORK MAGAZINE
10 December 1979
oi.to learn to Start Worrying
end Care About SALT
I do have deep reservations about
some of the aspects of SALT If, but I
think you'll note that when I said deep
reservations I was focusing with great-
er priority on the concept of American
defense in the central strategic area
and the evolution of thought and the
trending toward first parity, and then
what we call in the trade "minimum
deterrence" or "assured destruction"
or "launch on warning concepts,"
which really place our posture in a
position where the Americans have
really no alternative but to indulge in
population destruction in a crisis with
the Soviet Union that's nuclear in
character, when you follow the scenario
through the doomsday application.
`General Alexander Haig (Retired)
Someone-usually an expert-is al-
most always saying something like that
about the SALT iI treaty, which is
Maybe we shouldn't dismiss
- doomsday scenarios. -
probably why no one listens and why
more than SO percent of the respon-
dents in a nationwide poll could not
even name the two countries who are
parties to the agreement (us and them).
But just because most of us don't know
anything about SALT doesn't mean it's
not important. It is.
The second Strategic Arms Limita.
lion Treaty (SALT II) is now before
the Senate for ratification. It's chances
are iffy-at best. As usual. many of
our representatives, the ones we elect
to supposedly exercise their judgment,
are looking to public opinion (the kind
measured by Gallup and company)
to clue them in on how to vote. What
follows then is a layman's guide to a
few of the arguments and issues sur-
rounding SALT, with special empha-
sis on the question of verification-
defined simply as our ability to de-
tect Soviet cheating once, the treaty is
in effect.
Q Wiwi SALT is not: SALT is not,
as its title would have us believe, an
arms-limitation treaty. That goal, a
true reduction in Soviet and American
arsenals, will come in SALT Ill-or
so say the treaty's proponents. SALT
11, say its supporters, and SALT I be-
fore it are merely part of a long proc-
ess, a feeling-out, a dialogue, a way to
develop the understanding and trust
which will permit true arms control
next time-which is what SALT I's
proponents originally, and incorrectly,
prophesied for SALT if. In any event,
as Senator Moynihan has written,,
"whatever else SALT I might have
done, it accomplished little by way of
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limiting strategic offensive arms." And,
says the Wall Street Journal, "it is by
now an uncontested fact that during
detente and under SALT I we have
witnessed a massive Soviet military
buildup.".
What about SALT II? Here's Wil-
liam Perry, undersecretary of defense
for research and engineering: "I antic-
ipate that [under SALT II] the Soviet
Union will continue to pursue the mod-
ernization of their ICBM program and
that we will respond to that, so that
both sides then will continue to have
significant increases in nuclear war-
heads. That is the bad news. The good
news [here it comes again] ... is that
SALT II also establishes a process and
goals. The most significant goal [em-
phasis mine] is the one to achieve a
real reduction in nuclear weapons."
And so on. -
[3 The death of MAD: To many
proponents of SALT. Dr. Perry has hit
the nail on the head: The process is
everything. No matter that both SALT
treaties ratify the arms race; at some
point all the talking and negotiating
will help us to trust each other, and
then, finally, real arms reduction can
begin. Behind this thinking lies MAD
--the doctrine of "mutual assured de-
struction," the rationale of deterrence.
As defined by Robert McNamara
some years ago, ? deterrence "means
the certainty of suicide to the agres.
sor. In other words, the Russians are
supposed to know that if they strike
the United States, enough of our nu-
clear force will survive so that we can
retaliate and-destroy- the Soviet Union.
So, the argument goes, let' the Rus-
sians foolishly spend millions of dollars
in order to overkill us a hundred times.
It doesn't matter-as long as we know
we can wipe them out once.
Sounds good. But wait. There are
some-and their number is growing-
who say that ? those sneaky Russians
are actually developing (have already
developed! says Moynihan) nuclear
superiority, the kind of superiority that
permits them to wage a nuclear war
they can not only survive but actually
win. A common scenario runs some-
thing like this: The Russians cheat on
the SALT agreement and develop the
capability to take out our land-based
Minuteman missile force. We would
still have our submarine-based nuclear
missiles and our strategic bombers-
enough, presumably, to wipe out the
Soviets-but before the president 'or-
ders- the retaliatory strike the Russian
high command offers us an option: We
can go ahead and launch against the
Soviet Union, in which case, the Rus-
sians tell us, they will simply launch
back and destroy the remainder of the
United States, not merely our Minute-
men. Or, say the Russians, we can stop
here. You Americans can -accept the
loss of your missiles-and the collateral
loss of, say, 5 million, but not 150 mil-
lion, people. And, best of all, you
Americans don't even have to~yturn
over your own country. How f"out
some, other countries? How / about
America getting out of Western Europe?
Would a president of the United States
yield to such a demand? Would he, as
they say in Haig's trade, go the route'
of "damage limitation"? Would he sell
out Europe to save the United States?
Well? -
There is another, perhaps more
realistic theory concerning the advan-
tage gained by nuclear - superiority,
short of its actual use. It is the notion
that the stronger side in the nuclear
equation can be more adventurous,
can "move in on" other nations with-
out fear of reprisal from the other nu-
clear superpower. This is the argument
.of Paul Nitze, a leading opponent of
SALT II and a former deputy secretary
of defense. Nitze maintains that we
have already seen this theory at work
-in our favor-during the Berlin and
of verification. "Will the Russians
Cuban missile crises. confrontations
with the Soviets which we "won" be- I cheat?" asks Glenn rhetorically. "They,
cause we held the bigger stick and, I will if they can. They always have."
presumably. were prepared to use it.
"To some of us who lived through
the Berlin crisis in 1961," says Nitze,
"[and] the Cuban crisis in 1962 ... [the
ideal that an adverse shift in the stra-
tegic nuclear balance will have no
political or diplomatic consequences
in fact is the clear history of the Rus-
sians and SALT I," says John Glenn.
the one U.S. senator to have become an
authority on the complicated question
John Glenn is conscientious and
straightforward. Despite having voted
against SALT II in the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, he wants very much
to vote for the treaty when it hits the;
Senate floor-which could be within!
a few weeks, or not for some time.
comes as a shock. In the Berlin crisis
our theater position was clearly un-
favorable; we relied entirely on our
strategic nuclear superiority to face
down Chairman ?Khrushchev's ultima-
tum. In Cuba, the Soviet Union faced
a position of both theater inferiority
and strategic inferiority; they withdrew
the missiles they were deploying."
Nitze goes farther: As the Soviets
gained nuclear strength, we could no
longer have our way. Thus, he says, "in
the 1973 Middle East crisis, the theater-
and the strategic nuclear balances were
more balanced, [so] both sides Com-
promised.
"The nuclear balance is only one ele-
ment in the overall power balance. But
in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum
upon which all other levers of influence
-military, economic or political-
rest."
To. the Nitze crowd the Russians
have invalidated MAD, thus forcing us
into a new ball game-where the other
guy is winning and the consequences
are dire. "Strategic [nuclear] superior-
ity," -says Moynihan, "is the ability to
make other people do what you want
them to do."
E3 Watch out: Assume that the So-
viets seek (may already possess) nu-
clear superiority and that MAD is no
longer a credible policy. Assume that
and you understand the need for us to
know exactly what the Russians are up
to. Assume further that the Soviets will
rush through every loophole in order
to legally-if only technically-violate
the spirit of the SALT treaties. "That
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There is, however, no chance that
Glenn will vote for SALT II if he
continues to believe, as he does to-
day, that we are incapable of verify-
ing Soviet compliance with the treaty's
provisions. "The administration:' says
Glenn, "has been very careful, very
precise. It speaks of being certain that
we have the means to 'adequately' veri-
fy Soviet compliance. That is to say.
we can detect large-scale Russian cheat-
ing 'in time' for us to take 'appropriate'!
countermeasures-either protest or mil- 1
itary buildup of our own. All of those
words are, of course, open to varying
interpretations, which is bad enough,
but the key point is that we can't verify
the treaty now, at the time when the
Senate is being asked to ratify it."
The._Carter administration has come
to take Tohn Glenn very seriou e
is briefed r often Defense
Di-
Secreta Harold Brown and
rector St s d Turner t emse Ives. He
is thorou familiar with our inte f-
ence ca abi ities--and he is worried.
"The loss of Iran was a great blow:'
says Glenn. "I don't care what anyone
says." Here enn is re erring to our
two supersecret Iran-based eavesdrop.
pininstallations some 700 miles from
the Soviets' main miss e-testing act tty
at T ratam near the Aral ea.
"At this point, the a ministration
confesses the significance of the Iran
loss," says Glenn, "but it keeps asking
us to be confident that we' can regain
that lost capacity by other means, and
quickly. But we haven't regained it yet,
and I'm waiting for them to prove to
me that we have. At first, the adminis-
tration asserted that wb could make up
for the Iranian loss by employing U-2
overflights. But the planes would have
to fly over Turkey, and our relations
with the Turks are pretty strained.
The Turks finally agreed to permit the
flights, but only if the Soviets didn't
object. Well, the Soviets have objected
-which, by the way, gives you some
indication of their real interest in seeing
that SALT II is followed In any event,
the U-2 argument is no longer credible,
so it's been dropped.
"The administration would also have
us believe that we can make up for a
lot of what we lost in Iran via our
reconnaissance satellites. But those sat-
ellites were compromised when the :
Russians got, their hands on the oper-
ating manuals. So now the Russians
know how the satellites work and can
take measures to negate their effective-
ness. But even if the satellites weren't
compromised, you just can't get the
same quality of information from 100
miles up that you can get from ground
stations in Iran. .
"I'm sure we can make up for the
Iranian loss in other ways. The ques-
tion is when? Harold Brown says we
can do it in a year, but we haven't yet.
It all gets back to what constitutes
'adequate' verification. I don't see
anything wrong with our delaying a
vote on the treaty until the adminis-
tration can prove that we once again
have the kind of intelligence capacity
we lost in Iran."
While there is disagreement over the
extent of the Iranian loss, a candid
appraisal of the problem and a de-
tailed evaluation of our overall intelli-
gence abilities are the subject of a
sensitive 177-page report under 24-
hour guard. on the top floor of the
Capitol in Washington. The report
may be read only by senators them-
selves and by a mere handful of senior
aides. It may be read during business
hours only, and no notes may be taken
from the room. It is, says Glenn, com-
prehensive, "sizzling" stuff. It took him
almost four full days to fully compre-
hend and digest. "Once again," says
Glenn, "the problem is the administra-
tion's assumption, this time contained
in the report's 'executive summary.'
The summary asserts that we will have
an adequate verification capability.
But, I say again, we don't now, and
I'm still waiting to see it proved. I
become oper3tional:" As Evans and
Novak point out, "a block of 200 new,
missiles could change overnight the i
strategic balance of power"-especially
if those particular missiles are of the
"heavy" variety and happen to carry a
large number of warheads.
Incredibly, as of the middle of No-
vember, only a very few senators, only
a handful, have bothered to take the'
time and trouble to read the report In
Its entirety. Such Is Glenn's acknowl-
edged expertise in this area (combined
with his general reputation for fair-
ness) that it is likely that some of his
colleagues will follow his- lead when
the treaty finally comes to the floor for
I a vote. And, although he is mum on
the subject, it seems reasonable to as-
sumo that Glenn would request a
closed Senate session in order to go
over the report for the benefit of those
colleagues who can't see their way
clear to reading it themselves. Still, it
would be far preferable for the sena-
tors to do their own homework, and,
given SALT's importance, those who
don't should probably be drummed
from office. This is no penny-ante game.
The stakes couldn't be higher--espe-
cially if you subscribe to the notion
that the Russians are anxious for nu-
clear superiority and a first-strike capa-
bility. _
SALT professes to be about peace,
and it may be, although there are those,
like Senator Moynihan, who argue that
'.'everything the SALT process was de-
signed to prevent has come about"
(including a further increase in the
defense budget-a Carteradministra.
'tion concession designed to win the
support of SALT opponents like Sena-
tor Sam Nunn). If Moynihan is correct
(and he makes a persuasive case in the
November 19 New Yorker) it is be-
cause, above all, SALT is about war.
And while weapons. have changed
dramatically over the centuries, war
itself has remained pretty much the
same. It is not a punch-pulling activity.
What Thomas Hobbes wrote In 1651
is true today: In war, "force and fraud
are the two cardinal virtues."
hope it will be, of course. But I'm still
waiting." According to columnists
Evans and Novak, one paragraph of
the report says, "If a covert deploy-
ment were attempted, the Soviets could
evade detection and identification of
the activity for as long as three years.
during which some 200 missiles might
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ARTICLE DEAREm
ON PAGE
uiptoma:
for intelligence work-
By John Maclean..
Chicago TNbuRe Prow Sanfu:?-=
tee of correspondence, a-high-level fed-'
eras group, dispatched its agent. to the
Continent with all appropriate secrecy."
Jones, the agent was to appear as. a
simple merchant. His intelligence re-
ports home-were to do be done,in invisi-'
ble ink between the lines of common
business letters...... . .
Jones' reports concerned the most vi-
tal interests of his country, the possibili-
ty of French military, political, and eco-
nomic aid for the American Revolution.
Was Jones, whose real name was Silas
Deane, America's first spy? .
Hardly. H. was America's first diplo-
mat, sent to France in -1778 under orders
from Benjamin Franklin, chairman of
the Correspondence. Committee-, which
has since been supplanted by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and State De-
partment..
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
6 December 1979
no difference between a CIA employe
engaged in legal intelligence gathering
and one involved, in convert activity.
The militants say that proof of CIA em- Much attention has been focused on the
ployment is enough evidence for them of CIA's masterminding of the scheme that
illegal espionage activity. returned to shah to power in 1953. Ker-
Espionage, however, long has meant mit Roosevelt, the CIA agent in charge
the clandestine gathering of information of the plot, said it took no more, than
and the practice of covert action, cr S10o000 in cash and six agents" to
"dirty tricks" as such activities became sweep the shah back onto the Peacock
known during the recent years of public . -Throne.
CIA scandal.
P BUT WHEN Iranian . revolutionaries
ESPIONAGE MAY be the world's sec ousted the shah earlier this year, the
and oldest profession. It may even tie- . State Department wound up paying $2
for first, considering the role often million ransom to the rebels to secure
played by women's wiles. the release of 22 CIA employes at an
Acts of espionage crop up in the Bible" electronic spy station near Iran's border
- such as Joshua's dispatch of spies ik with the-Soviet Union.
into Jericho before his assault across . As late as 1978, the CIA had mini-
the Jordan river. Classical authors such.,
as Xenophon and Caesar also give ex-
amples.
In modern "times the practice of build-
,ag intelligence organizations and sup-
plying 1iplotatie cover for spies has
created special problems. Organized es-
pionage first appeared in the 17th Centu-
ry under Cromwell in-England and Ri-
chelieu in France. Since then it has be
come standard practice for diplomats
proven to, be spies to be expelled from
host countries. but then; the U.S. intelligence agency
EVER SINCE the pattern of modern
diplomacy first appeared during the
Middle Ages, there has been a blurry,
gray area- where legitimate intelligence
nage. When Italian cities of centuries
--it was said that "an ambassador is
.spy acting under the. protection of the
-Today in. Iran, that statement has no
meaning. In the eyes of militants hold-
ing American hostages in Iran, there is
spies came from the Shah of Iran. Dur- hopeful signs, for the-American revoiu-
cial whose . job is to observe trends in - could not speak French, be had not been
the local press. That- distinction is get- told of efforts under way by Frenchmen
ting lost [in ithe Iranian crisisi." ".' .. on behalf of the U.S., and his clumsy
IRONICALLY, ONE of the clearest cover story fell apart. Charges of per--
statements about the role of diplomatic Wl sohe! the F Frreewenchere connection showed:
uEMBASSIES TEND to attract spies by-
cause they offer a safe haven. Two'SOvi-
ets employed at the United Nations were
convicted- last year of espionage and
were sentenced to 50 year terms. A third
Soviet citizen was implicated in the
scheme, but was released because be
was an attache at the Soviet mission to
the U.N., entiinr him to diplomatic im-
munity.
"AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE, EM-
BASSIES DO NORMALLY CARRY ON
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS," SAID
mized the significance of unrest within
Iran, an intelligence failure that prompt-
ed a major shakeup of the organization.
One major reason for the misjudgment
was the shah's insistence that nor CIA
agents talk with anyone who might be
considered the political opposition.
During the final three years of his
reign, he repeatedly warned U.S. offi-
cials thut he would expel any CIA
agents who engaged in activities he
thought improper. -- ,
had become so dependent on SAVAK to
provide its information that it had only
three agents in Iran who could speak
the local. language, Farsi.
THE CIA and foreign intelligence
agencies continue to. operate worldwide.
- John Barron,, author of a book pub-
lished in 1974- called "KGB: The Secret
Work of soviet Agen9s,'-' has said that so
many Soviet spies now operate here that
there are not enough U.S. counterintelli-
gene agents to watch them all.. '_
David Trask, the State Department's THE GATHERING of Intelligence wilt
chief, historian. "Most intelligence gath- ' always be a primary duty of envoys-
ering involves reading public docu- abroad. A lesson exists in the career of;
ments. Silas Deane, the first American envoy;s-
"There's a hell of a difference be-` in how to carry out this function..-
tween Mata Hari and an embassy offi- Deade foundered in his mission. He
intelligence agency, SAVAK, within the nourish the alliance. He.succeeded bi il-
tinted States. ; : I - liantly. Historians 'say-.his dispatches
He told the interviewer the purpose of ' -home read like highly skilled intelli.
SAVAK. activities here was "checking gence reports.
up on anybody who becomes affiliated Deane died an embittered and dis-
with circles, organizations hostile to my graced man. The good manners and
country, which is the role of any intelli striking apperaance that had contributed
gence organization." :. to his choice as envoy proved no substi-.
The role of the CIA in Iran,has ranged '%tute for preparation, seriousness, andl
frf' i overwhelming to ..incompetent ( skill.
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ON. PAGE-
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
6 December 1979
Honesty on Iran
As the crisis in Iran grinds on, one
of the tests of the American nation
will be its ability to be honest with it-
self: This may not be decisive in the
crisis itself, but will by and large de-
termine whether lessons are learned
for the future.
The thought is immediately
brought to mind by the UN Security
Council resolution, which is almost
universally proclaimed a "victory", for the United States. It is of course
true that the resolution passed by a 15
to 0 vote, and that it does urgently call
for the release of, the, hostages. While
the resolution, is not much likely to in-
fluence the Iranians, -these accom-
plishments are probably worth the
baggage that accompanies them.
But before bragging about a vic-
tory, we ought to look at the rest of the
resolution. For example, the clause
urging "the governments of Iran and
the United States. to exercise the ut-
most restraint in the prevailing situa-
tion." And the clause calling, on the
two. governments "to resolve peace-
fully the remaining issues between
them." And we also ought to note the
resolution's legislative history, includ-
ing what amounts to a U.S. govern-
ment invitation for the Iranians to
come to the UN for a propaganda field
day against the- shah and the U.S.
Taken in its totality the LTI resolu-
Within 48 hours Mr. Carter's ad
ministration was leaning all over the
shah to get him out of the country. As
soon as the Mexicans decided not to
readmit him, the administration'put
out public word that it still expected
him to stand by his "promise to
leave. The administration is being
pushed toward honoring the Presi-
dent's proclamation by the reality that
no good refuge exists for the shah. Bute
clearly there was a discrepancy be-
tween the President's words and hiss
policy before and after he uttered
them, and this is a disquieting portent.
For if the episode ends in anything
but total . disaster, the nation in gen-
eral and the administration in particu-
lar will be tempted to grasp straws
looking for a victory. All of us want
the hostages released, of course. And
all of us will breathe a sigh of relief
if that happens, regardless of what
further national humiliation this may
involve. But even if they were re-
leased tomorrow, we need to recog-
nize that the U.S. has suffered a mas-1
sive international setback, and that itsi
repetition cannot be tolerated.
We are already witnessing the
spread of the Iranian tactics; the as-
sault on the U.S. embassy in Pakist
probably did not involve governmen
connivance, but the assault on the-U.
tion tends to obscure the reality of the embassy in Libya almost certainly
Iran crisis That the Iranian regime- did. We risk being shoved around
has committed an act of aggression any dictator with enough galt to stor
against the United States. That Iran an embassy, especially if he has som
stands-in flagrant violation of histori- oil to sell. We need to think th row
cal convention, and international law. how we are going to stop the trend.;
That the United States has been re- - Military retaliation against
strained for humanitarian. and pruden- and for that matter Libya. should not
tial reasons, but would have every be ruled out. We need to insure that!
moral justification' for the use of force we have'the military forces to make,
against Iran. For our "victory" at the this option real. We need to redevelop
UN. we have paid the very consider a capability for covert action, and can
able price of.undermining our right to start now by straig tening out the con-
assert these principles unilaterally: aressional reporting
r uirerrents
Thoughts about honesty, are- also, ' that hobble the CIA. We need to pro-
stirred by the administration's actions vi a our own protection for embassies,
on the- shah: President Carter said at at the price of breaking relations - even his press conference last Wednesday when a host government like the Lib-
that when the shah should leave is. "a y, objects to Marines. In short, we
decision to be made by the shah and by need to abandon the supine- postures
his medical advisers, and that while ' that invite these provocations.
the shah had, stated his intention to -
leave whew. medical- treatment was .. > These are the lessons of the-Iranian
completed, "I.- have not encouraged crisis, regardless of how it is ultihim to leave. He was free to come . mately resolved. If we fail ? to- face
here for medical treatment and he will. them squarely, we will not have sal
leave on. his own: yolition. even so much as a lesson.
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ON PAGE
WASHINGTON POST
5 DECEMBER 1979
Rowland Evans grid Robert Novak
The Soviet `Forgery Offensive'
The- decision by Iranian militants to
show the world an alleged "secret" don
ument that they said had been put
loined from files in the occupied U_%-
Embassy adds an ominous new factor,
in the battle of American: intelligence
against Soviet forgeries aimed at div.
crediting the United States. _ _ ... '7-
Whether the militants have what
they claim, to have or whether the al-
leged CI assi ents for the two new
staff ers at a Embassy In Tehcan are bogus, the surfacing of-the docu-
ment compounds the problem of identi -
fyiug and exposing proliferating Soviet
:forgeries.. These. forgeries are- now
? known; to have drawn both President
Carter-and Vice President Walter Mon-
dale into their worldwide operations.
The Soviet ..-forgery., game-. was
analyzed early this year In a classified
government document called "the for-
gery 'offensive," which opened with
this flat assertion: the dangerous Soviet
game of lying about the United States
lit the struggle between the two super-
powers is undergoing "an appreciable
upsurge." ;
'The political purlwee of these for
genies, their technical sophistication-
and intelligence reporting all point to-
the Son s various East Euro-
pean allies and Cuba as being the re-
sponsible parties," the document said.
The study containing, that charge
against Moscow was followed ~ is late
summer by a second analysis? limited to
"official use only" and published by the
Defense Intelligence Agency-a major
branch of the U.S. Intelligence commu
g i. It proclaimed that Moscow has-
"continually employed forged docu-
ments to implement foreign policy, sup.
port political objectives and to lend
substance, credibility and authenticity
. to their propaganda claims."
The United States has new played
the forgeries game against Russia or
any other country. One reason could be
that in an open society forgeries would
almost surely be. exposed by those op?.
posing the practice-by politicians, for.
example, who in-the-past have taken
pride in o undercover oge-
tibns by the regardless of foreign.
policyobjecttves< i~. : d
The-Soviets have a c1ose l society and
no known scruples against dirty tricks
of any kind. But the efforts--described
as being "of suspected Soviet origin"-
to put false words in*the mouths of the
president and the vice president of the
United States touched a new low. The
falsification of- Jimmy Carter's spoken
word came in December 1977, in the
form of a bogus press release from
ordered to collect information "on ways
to bribe European officials and to devel-
op other covert means by which to dam-
age or eliminate foreign trade competi-
tion" with the United States. The timing
was calculated to cash in on the uproar
in the United States over bribery accu-
sations against U.S. corporations.
This .forgery, American intelligence
now believes, was an EmMenT t
forgery success" despite some sloppy
-(now . the. - International -Communic *. discrepancies, such as bad punctuation
tions Agency). It purported to be a ver- in the .covering letter that came with
batim report on a speech Carter gave in
the-American perspective series."
- Newspapers in Greece-and almost
certainly in other countries where the
forgery never surfaced-received the
phony Carter speech in the-mail Two
newspapers in Athens published It. In
his "speech," Carter flayed- the Greeks
fuzzy copies of the alleged airgram.
heating up, partly under the stress of
the Iran crisis, top intelligence officials
have ordered the anti-forgery watch
put on overtime duty. But for every
'forgery discovered, there probably are
half a.dozen that go undiscovered. The
for letting down NATO;, demanded far whole world is a forgery market and it
higher defense spending by Greece and is inconceivable that the United States
made demeaning remarks about this will not be damaged in the days of
major Mediterranean. ally. .. heated rivalry that lie ahead with an
The forgery involving Mondale came adversary who. plays by only one rule:
lust over a year ago when Xeroxed cop- the rule to win.
inotaainterviewheallegedlyrgavetoa
European newspaperman named 'Kart
Douglas" were mailed to Parisbased cor-
respondents of several newspapers
. In the "interview," the vice president
cast aspersions on Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister
Menachem. Begin. Mondale, according
to the bogus 'interview," called Sadat
not the master of his own house (imply-
ing the then-pending treaty with Israel
would not be adhered to) and claimed
that Begin was suffering from a- "ter-
minal illness." .
Botho these efforts were crude, and
neither one did American policy much,
if any, damage. But they illustrate this.
point-there is no limit to the Soviet ef?
-fort to "disinform" governments and -
peoples-of the world about the perfidy
of the United States by exploiting all
-techniques of forgery and black propa-
ganda. - Moreover, other attempts to
undermine the United States have had
conspicuous success.-<
In 1978, in an altered version of a-gen-
nine State Department document
known as "Airgram A895Q" dated Der-
$ Lg74r u& ,embassies in Europe were
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??`? - ~~ 5 DECEMBER 1979
FAGEe4-/a
014
Titles Often Used
Dipoina
1i grace 'Aides
-protect By Robert- G. Raiser, =x- ' \ -knowledgeable sources report that.tlie CIA western spies- with diplomatic status on
w.snnn.ton post atstt wrtt.r regards diplomatic cover as the best possi- their territory.
Though rarely proclaimed. publicly, the ble. protection for its operatives abroad, and Several official sources says it was sloppy,
use of diplomatic titles to protect intelligence has?long struggled in Washington to maxi- of '.the embassy in Tehran to keep on file
officers in foreign countries has long been mize the number of diplomatic slots alloca- copies. of a telegram referring directly to a
standard pfor the .United States teTh gency employes. CIA presence, in the embassy. One source
ad for t practice ari vie' Union, Israel. Britain. ,The` present ratio of ordinary diplomats close to the intelligence community also ex-
nnd cefo, Vest- Germany and probably every taCIA emplOYes:in foreign missions is not pressed' surprise that the CIA apparently'
cuun -chat. G intains an intelligence. sec. publicly known, but informed- sources said had. been eager to put new agents into the
a~, ~, ? f :.'i:. the ;division was the subject of a formal Tehran embass . last summer, given__the
vice.
19agreement between Secretary of State i
h
f
h
it
ti
O
t ty :o
t t
e s
on there: er
ua
t
U.S. officials- dismiss as' irrelevant arrow' sens Cyrus R. Vance and the president's national sources said the -agency was just doing its
tions by ` Iraaianc radicals that the American. security . affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brze- - .
Embassy In. Tehran. was a "nest of espion. job.
age." In the, viewsof these officials, no such.: znnski A - number of past, and present foreign
Several sources pointed out that intelli- service officers said is interviews that the
f
'
;
a: blatant violation o
accusations ustifys
aaccu i law-tha arbitrary nt detention of .genre work covers a myriad of activities, 'American personnel in embassies abroad in.
ations
_ ~._,_ he --i6- l 'including. much information-gathering that variably know who among them is working
An intelligence officer assigned to an em- reporting. "Every CIA employe is decidedly the- station chief, or senior CIA official
bassy and given formal. diplomatic, status not a James Bond," one source said. - the embassy, is common public knowledge.
enjoys. the full benefits of diplomatic im- "Espionage" can mean counting the num- Most embassy staffs also include military
munity;according, to.. traditional diplomatic ber of trucks that cross. a particular bridge attaches, one of whose undisguised functions
practice: ,` as. well as opening the prime minister's is to gather information on the military
The. stationing' of'-'-Central Intelligence - mail, one- source noted: establishment of their host country.
Agency employes with diplomatic, titles in If a host country is displeased by a diplo-
American embassies has been discussed mars - behavior, the remedy Is to expel the
openly for' years. In 1974 The Washington diplomat, a State Department official said.
Monthly published an- article called "How to Expulsion has been used by dozens of govern-
Spot a Spook" in- which Jahn Marks ex- ments?'around the world, most often in re-
plained how CIA employes with diplomatic cent -years against Soviet diplomats, but
cover could be- identified in. open State De- ,
partment directories. against Americans and others as well.
The directories Marks cited have not been T-In .1978 , the United States expelled a,
published since then. However, CIA agents Soviet diplomat at, the United Nations, Vla-
apparently continue to ,carry the most tell- dimir P. Zinyakin. after implicating him in a.
tale designation - Marks. described, an FSR spy operation that involved two other So-
(foreign service reserve officer) rank in. viet,citizens who, did not have diplomatic
stead of the standard FSO- ((foreign service-., status, . Those two, Rudolf F. Chernyayev
officer) tag carried by ordinary State. De-. ,and Viadik A. Enger,. were - tried. Ind sen-
partment-diplomat& - ' . 4 ~i-fenced to long-prison' terms before being
The cable -released by- Iranian students' swapped to the Soviet Union this year-for
Saturday in which the U.S. charge d'affaires- a group of dissidents.
in Tehran appeared to acknowledge the- . In 1971 the British government expelled
presence of two CIA men in the embassy, 105 Soviet nationals; most of them diplo-
included a reference to this telltale "R mats, after charging them with. improper
as?- the old 'and apparently insoluble proms espionage activity- The Soviets.-also have
blew of,.R.,de3ignation",for CIA employes.:, followed this pattern when. they have, caught
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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
l DECEMBER 1979
Spying shouldn't be left to politicians
ONE OF THE GREAT mysteries about. ? that they've made the same mistake all. If the Iranians mean we bad people In
us as a nation is .how we've always been the wrong public officials who ever lived charge of gathering information about a
so suspicious of everything our gov- made. They think they're doing what's _ lot of things going oil there, I suppose
ernment has done here at home and so best for the. country, but they don't dare they're right: Spying these days wouldn't
trusting about what it's done abroad tell us -because they don't. think we're, make much -of a movie. It's mostly a' We don't let our elected officials cross smart enough to understand. They think matter of gathering a lot of dull statistics
the street in Washington without comp- they have special information that makes _ about crops, production facilities, gross
laining about the way they dolt. On the them better able to. decide for us.. national product. and political move-
other hand, when it comes to fmenu. Spies aren't even looking for that
that what they' foreign e is MOST OF THIS "special information one all-important secret written on a lit-
affairs honest awend is assume m the best at the comes -to diplomats from our Central tie piece of paper anymore. There is no
United and and mankind nd ri1i e of general. the Intelligence Agency. I just wonder how such secret. Probably the closest we have
bad it would be if all CIA reports were.' to that is the number of the telephone on
' The strange thing about it. Is that the printed in the newspapers every week. Is the nightstand next to President Carter's
exact reverse. is true among the pow there any chance it wouldn't be bad at all. ~bed.--
They trust the democratic process- but good in the long run? V i
when it comes to letting us-decide what. -The Iranian terrorists have accused us 'THE BEST SPY. story I ever beard is?
they should do here, but when-it comes to of having, spies In our embassy in one I mayhave rewritten in my memory,
foreign affairs they seem to think that-. Tehran. Spy is a strange word. It means but it is closer to the truth about spying
what we don't know won't hurt us. one thing to us if it's applied to a devious, .. than most of the novels written about it.
I think we're all becoming a little. less- furtive Soviet. agent ferreting out' the During World War II, a German spy got
confident of our conduct in foreign affairs most important secrets of our defense; it. hold -of the top secret formula this coun-
because, for the first time, there's some means something else if it's about James try had for its most devastating nerve;
evidence that we've 'been sneaky in the Bond gathering information in a foreign gas. After the war, someone asked the
past. It ' isn't that our foreign policy country about their plans to destroy the. German spy how he ever got It He said
operatives have been dishonest. Its Just United States. that he found out the name of the'dom-
pany that manufactured it and simply
wrote to them and asked for the formula;
'which they sent him..-=._
I have a theory about what ought to.
happen to any. of the cloak-and-dagger.
'spies who. are caught:. I'm not for any.
'drastic. punishment.' Any. spy. caught in
the -act.ought to be put to- bed in his
embassy without his supper and not al..
lowed. to gar out and play with the other.
spies for two weeks:
If our diplomats don't want to lose thel
confidence. we've-always had in them,
they might consider doing away with all
-this- sneaky- maneuvering- They ought to
trust the democratic principle even i,
diplomacy. My' history :is weak; but I
remember Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen
points just well enough to have been able
to look them up just now. He referred to
"Open covenants of peace, openly ar=
'rived at, after which there shall be. no
private international--understandings of
any kind but, diplomacy shall proceed
"always frankly and in the public view.-
"'Right on. Woodrow!: '-
, ..
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ARTICLE APPrAR- D
CW PAGTHE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 December 1979
Chronology of hostage standoff
Nov. 4 Tehran: "Students" seize US Embassy;
hold some 100 hostages, including 63
Americans; demand Shah's return for
trial.
Nov. S Washington: US rejects demand.
Iran: US Consulates In Tabriz and
Shiraz seized by followers of Ayatollah
Khomeini. 1959 treaty with US and 1921
treaty with USSR cancelled: treaties,
gave the two powers right to intervene-
militarily.
Nov. 6 Iran: Prime Minister Bazargan resigns.
Ayatollah Khomeini orders Revolution-
ary Council to take over government.
"Students" warn they will kill hostages
if US uses force in rescue attempt.
Nov. 7 Iran: Ayatollah Khomeini refuses to ne-
gotiate with US. PLO envoys... -
Nov. 9 New York: UN Security Council -ex-
presses "profound concern" for hos-
tages; calls for immediate release..
Washington: US halts $300 million mili-
tary shipment to Iran.
Tehran: Abolhassan Bani-Sadr is named
acting foreign minister. - "
Nov.10 Washington: President Carter orders
deportation proceedings against
Iranians in US illegally. .._-,...._ . .
Nov.11 Beirut: Iranians break into US Em-
bassy, occupy for 90 minutes before be-
ing dispersed.
Tehran: Ayatollah Khomeini rejects
Vatican offer of mediation. . ?
Nov. 12 Washington: President Carter orders
suspension of oil imports from Iran.-
Tehran _ Oil embargo declared against
Nov. 13 New York: Iraq requests UN Securi
Council meeting and return of Shah
property in US.
Nov. 14 Tehran: Iran plans to withdraw funds
from US banks. ?%'
Washington: President- Carter Ord
Iranian assets in US frozen.
Nov. 15 Tehran: Government hints that women
and blacks will be freed soon; "stu:
dents" reject any compromise.
Nov.17 Tehran: Ayatollah Khomeini' ord
women and blacks freed; others to
tried in Islamic courts as spies.
Nov. 20 Washington: US suggests use of military
force to free 50 remaining . hostages;
President Carter orders second naval
i task force to Indian Ocean.
Mecca. Saudi Arabia: Takeover of
Grand Mosque by Muslim
fundamental- ist splinter group. , - :-n , ; : ;~,?;
Nov; 21 Tehran: Five non-Americans released:
other hostages will be executed if US
uses military force.
Washington: President Carter warns
Iran will be held "strictly accountable"
if hostages harmed.
Islamabad, Pakistan: Mob attacks US'
Embassy; two marines killed.
Nov. 22 Iran: Iranian Navy put on full alert.
Nov. 25 New -York: UN Secretary-General
Waldheim schedules urgent Security
Council meeting for Dec. 1.
Nov. 26 Washington: US orders partial evacua-}
tion from Muslim countries-
Bani-
Tehran: Acting Foreign Minister
- --"
Sadr requests delay for Security C
Nov. 27 Tehran: Ayatollah Khomeini attaci
plan for Security Council meeting: milil
~Mi
Nov. 28 Tehran: Mr. Bank-Sadr replaced by
Sadeq Ghotbzadeh as Foreign Minister. Washington: Speech by President C or; We -, will not yield to
blackmail."
Nov. 29 Washington: US asks International
Court of Justice to order release of
hostages. ? ? .
Mezico City:.Mexico says it will not re-
new Shah's visa_
Nov. 30 Tehran: Mr. Ghotbzadeh will not make
trip to UN.
Dec.1 New York: Security Council opens
debate. hold
Tehran: Militants announce they
two CIA spies. . '
Dec. 2 Tripoli. Libya: US Embassy attacked by
2,000 demonstrators.
bassy to guarded locations in cityMr.
Ghotbzadeh will send a representative to
UN for administrative duties only.. -
.1. New York: Shah flies to a military hospi-
tal in-, Texas; granted temporary
-sanctuary-" - -
Dec.3 _ New York: Security Council debate
continues. .
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ON, ,PAGE-_,.
THE WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1979
Rowland Evans ,.
And Robert Novak
A Soviet _
Eric Rouleau, a leading Western jour=
nalist on Iran. wrote in the lett4eaning
Paris daily, Le Monde, Nov 2& "Even
the denunciations of the 'oppressive
communist regimd of Afghanistan
have stopped, as well as the hostile slo-1
gans against the Tudeh (Iran's Comma
nisi Party) that the masses have beet it'
shouting out"
- The shift is directly traced to Sadegh
Ghotbzadeb, boss of Iranian radio and
-television ever since he accompanied
the. ayatollah from Paris to Tehran last
February. This is the same 'man who
now dominates civilian political power
in.Tehran, as acting foreign minister
under Khomeini.
The sudden pro-Moscow propaganda
switch ordered by. Ghotbzadeh coin-
cided.with the Soviet offer of "support"
against U.S. military intervention. de-
livered In Moscow by Foreign Minister
Andrei- Gromyko to Iranian Ambassa-
dor Mohammed Molar. -
Although Ghotbzadeh has been por-
trayed. on - some. American, television
screens as a moderate since his surprise
elevation to foreign minister. officials
here believe otherwise. He not only an-1 nounced Iran ? would not attend thel
emergency session of the U.N. SecurityI
Council, but to regarded as an author of
the boycott policy. -
Indeed, U.S. officials have long sus.
pected that of all the non-religious radl.
cals in the Iranian revolution, Ghotba-I
deh is the most dangerous to the
United States. He has known Marxist
links and Is closely associated with radi.
cal Arab liberation fronts-4ncluding
the far4eft Popular Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine, which helped In tak
ing over the U.S. Ember in TWmm
NOV. 4..
Thus, the ascendancy of Ghotbzadeh
dearly, gave --new.. leverage to the
Soviets in exploiting U.S. vulnerability
In the Iranian crisis The day before
Ghotbzadeh rated out his presence at
the Dec. I U.N. session, Soviet delegate
Oleg Troyanovsky showed the true
Soviet colors while Moscow confirmed
the illegal" of the embassy takeover,
he told council members, the Security
Council should let the Iranians speak
first atthemeeting ..,
'That would establish an immediate'
anti.American tone for the extraor-
dinary security council session. The ac-
cused. not the accuser, would have the
run of the courtroom at the outset of
the trial _
Nobody knows how far Moscow b
willing to risk playing out Its malevo
lent band. but an. example may have
been set by the Kremlin's refusal to
give Carter an escape hatch in the re-
cent Cuban crisis. The prospect of simi-
larly disdainful treatment in this far
more serious Iranian crisis helps ex.
plain the anxiety that permeates the
In Iran:::~=
That Moscow is playing a malevolent
hand in the country's Iran crisis became
indisputable when the CIA's top secret
National Intelligence Dar Informed
President Caterter that Moscow has pri-
vately promised to "support" Iran in the
event of U.S. military action.
The Russians intentionally left the
nature of that "support" ambiguous. As
pieced together by high-level opera.
tives in the Pentagon, the State Depart-
ment and the Intelligence community,
the Soviet objective is clear. induce Ay-
atollah Ruhollah Khomeini to. hold the
hostages long enough to entice Presi.
dent Carter into military reaction.
If and when that happens, Moscow''s
Intention may well be to offer Iran no
more than political and moral support.
But no official here is certain that
the Russians would be content (as one
prominent authority put it to us) "to
harvest the rich anti-American crop"
throughout the Moslem world that
would bloom with an American attack
on Iran. If not content, Moscow could
Indeed offer military help, using a
mechanized division manned by crack
Farsi,speaking Soviet soldiers long held
in readiness just north of the Iranian-
Soviet border.
This malevolent game, clearly the de-
sign of Soviet policy at the. highest
levels. may be understandable as one
superpower seeks to exploit the other's
vulnerabilitiee. But amid the shadowy
power politics swirling around Iran,
there seems more than simple explo
tion. This looks like calculation and de?
sign.
Some three weeks after the hostages
were seized, the - state.controlled Ira-
nian radio and - television suddenly
stopped its harsh. unremitting criticism
pf the Soviet Union. This propaganda
shift contradicted the historic reality
that the Russian giant to - Iran's north
has always been -viewed as a. natm
aggressor; never i friend.;' r" .L
administration today .
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ARTICLE APPEA ED
ON PAGE
THE WASHINGTON POST
3 December 1979
U nite ions,,
dNizts'
T IS TRULY regrettable. that Iran's acting foreign portent They signify a readiness to listen with com-
minister, Sadegh.. Ghotbzadeh, an authoritative plete seriousness to whatever the. Iranian regime
.confidant of Ayatollah Khomeini, was not present in wishes to say to the United States. This is, we believe,
the U.N. Security Council to hear Donald McHenry's a fair offer, and it would baffle Americans, and many'
presentation of the American can for the release of others, if the Iranians did not take it up.
the hostages. For it is of the essence that a direct and The latest moves in Iran are not good. For instance, i
honest dialogue be-substituted for the ragged ex. Abe students have produced a document purporting
change of statements and.. signals that is now the to show that among their 50 hostages are two CIA of-
'mode of, communication between the=United States titers.. This is, of course, completely irrelevant For.
and' Iran, and the.; UnitedNations would ' be a good even if the two are CIA men, they enjoy diplomatic'
.Place to launch it' If. Mr. Ghotbzadeh-:-were-there, immunity on the same basis that intelligence officers
moreover, hecould testforhimself the truth and sig? do in many embassies, including Iranian em
nificanee- of the- position Mr. , McHHenry-laid out to abroad. Moreover, they have not been accused of any
open the debater' suspect activity.
Mr. McHenry said; iirsE of elZ that "nolcountry can Yet it cannot be ignored -that to many Iranians
break and ignore the law while seeking its benefits." "CIA" evokes the full panoply of fears and resen
Unquestionabl' , Iran is breaking the law by holding meats left over from past American intervention irt,
the hostages:It,mortgages much of its Immediate fu- Iran. For some-not the cynical leaders-it may have
ture as a nation j it:does,not act in away that allows been those fears that led them to mistake the shah's)
it to claim the protection, of. the law as events move arrival in New York for medical treatment as part of
- ----- - -- ------ --------
At the same time; Mr: McHenry addressed the emo. Whether Iranians can understand the plain fact that
tional- core -of-Iran's conduct-"None of us is deaf to America is not trying to restore the shah to power in
the passionate voices that speak of injustice, that cry - Iran is a question. If Mr. Ghotbzadeh is among those
.out for understanding," he said. "There is not a single who -do not truly understand this, it is all the more
grievance alleged' orspoken-. is this situation that unfortunate that he did not come to the United N
could not be heard in an appropriate forum"-upon lions to hear the case authoritatively stated by Am-l
the release of the.hostages_These are words of great bassador McHenry.
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ARTICLE AP?EAP-n
l ?i P!1_CE =J
NEW YORK TIMES
2 DECEMBER 1979
IRAN SAYS HOSTAGES
INCLUDE C.I.A. AIDES;
U.S. CONCERN RISING
USE OF SCAPEGOATS IS FEARED'
A Cable Students Say They Found
Lists Two Agency Employees
Assigned to-the Embassy
WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 ""-'MilitantIra-r
nians holding the United States Embassy;
in Teheran said today that they had iden-
tified Central Intelligence Agency per
sonnel among the 50 Americans they are
holding, a development that heightened'
concern here over the safety of the hos-
tages. They are in their 28th day of, cap.
tivity. _ - .
The United States had no official coin-,
ment on the purported cablegram made
public by the Iranians that was said to,
have been sent -on 'Aug. 8- by L. Bruce
Laingen, the charge d'affaires. The mes-
sage spoke of "the great sensitivity 1o-;
tally to any hint of C.I.A. activity."
It has been 'assumed throughout the,
crisis that some of the embassy hostages
may be C.I.A. "employees carrying out
duties that are -often similar to those of
regular Foreign Service ?officers -to re-
port and analyze political; economic and,.
military; events:: Most. .nr*ions?attach'in-
teiligenceofficers to -thit'embassies~to-.
perform such function-
Concern They M y Be Scapegoats
There 'is. concern= that 'the Iranians,
conditioned to equate 'C :I:A ";with of-,+
forts to subvert Iran, may try to. make
scapegoats of those they charge with :
being intelligence officers. The agency
usually has analysts. attached to: United.
States embassies under a cover title < f
The documenfinentionecttwoembassy3.
offfcers3.Malcolms Kal*and-WWiamt
Daugherty: and said thattheyshoala be
lnvol ed hii,'S:R.F.,.coverage" and
should us* the'title$ of seoottd third t;
secretaty#ask. mpsage also'
said-,the 'em .shoUI 1t.. ....
S . R F~assigitnentst for tli~fdceseabl e' f it-
ture ?'.The Iraniana~a the. embassy said'+s
Mr. Daugherty;hadsledged work ;
Ingfor.theC.I.~ti};..'1a1r;?
Reference to Cover Designations Defense Intelligence Agency, and some
Pentagon officials have expressed con-
The state Department declined to ex- , tern about the. fate of the attaches in
plain the abberviation "S.R"F.," but for- Iran.
mer officials said it stands for "special
reporting facility" and refers to an office
in embassies that is usually staffed by
C.I.A. analysts who perform functions
similar to those of Foreign. Service offi-
cers..
It is common, a former official said, for
an embassy to pass on a recommendation
and. assert, that "S.R.F. concurred,".
meaning that the C.I.A. analysts agreed.
.The-purported Laingen cablegram also
,..expressed concern about the "old and ap.
~parently insoluble problem of 'R'_desig-
nation for S.R.F.. officers." This was'a
seeming-reference to the identification of
embassy personnel.`.
Those who enter the Foreign Service
through examination-- are listed as
"F.S.O. or, Foreign Service Officer.-
Those who enter the Foreign Service
someother way are listed as "F.S.R," or
Foreign Service Reserve. C.I.A. employ-
ees 'attached to embassies' are among
those in the "F.S.R." category. ` '
The two categories of Foreign Service
personnel used to be identified in a public
'document, The Biographic Register,
,issued by the Statement Department. Its
publication was halted three years ago to
,prevent vital information from becoming
public.
Officials said the United States had
sought to reduce the number of C.I.A.
analysts in Iran because of the volatility
oof the situation. The document produced
in Teheran today seemed to indicate that
the C.I.A. presence was minimal com-
pared with other posts.
Similarly, military attaches attschecb
to United States embassies report jo the
The cablegram also mentioned the
word "reftels," or reference telegrams,
meaning previous exchanges.
The State Department,, meanwhile,
showed irritation over conflicting signals
from Iran. Yesterday the new Foreign
Minister, Sadegh GhMbzadeh, said that
Mr. Laingen and two of his aides who
have been isolated at the Foreign Minis.
try since the embassy takeover were free
to leave but that their safety could not be
guaranteed if they did. The Iranians hold-
ing the embassy said the three could not
leave.
The State Department commented that
the Foreign Minister "may not have the
powers traditionally associated with the
Foreign Ministry."
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NEW YORK MAGAZINE
10 December 1979
"...The Carter administration sees Khomeini as a `cancer' which,
in the national interest, must be removed by any possible means...".
"What you must
comprehend is that
Ayatollah Khomeini
is going for broke."
The man speaking
was an experienced
Western European
diplomat based in
'Washington, con-
cerned, as are so
many in the' international community,
that Iran's religious leader has Sim-
ply become a clear danger to world
peace and the world economy. "You
must see the historical dimension of
what is occurring," he continued. "Kho-
meini is determined to push for the
fullest confrontation possible. He wants
to push President Carter into military
action-he is baiting him. He wants to
draw everybody, Islam and the infidel
West, into a bloody battle. He is a
fanatic, but he has coldly thought out
his moves. He is playing on anti-Ameri-
can and anti-Western sentiment in the
Arab world and everywhere in the
Third World. He thinks that time is
on- his side, that the Third World is
with him, and he's not afraid of a
bloodbath. This is Carter's terrible
dilemma."
The acceptance of this view has
only come recently to the Carter admin-
istration. Indeed, it -actually followed
Khomeini's threat to try the 49 hostages
held in Teheran, the attack on the
Great Mosque in Mecca, and the anti-
American rioting-inspired by the aya-
Tad Szule writes regularly on foreign
affairs for New York Magazine.
tollah-which ensued in Pakistan. But
even before these occurrences, the ad-
ministration had concluded that Kho-
meini was a "cancer," as one official
put it, to be removed before it spread.
It was at that point, around November
38, just two weeks after the embassy
seige e an, that the Carter a minis-
tration a an studying a mix of pos-
sible military action and CIA-managed
subversion to remove the a ato a from indeed,
elder U.S. government concluded possible. that re-
moving Khomeini was in the national
interest.
Although senior administration offi-
cials would not publicly discuss the
likelihood of direct application of
United States power, overt and covert,
toward the ouster of the ayatollah and
his regime-particularly while the hos-
tages were still in danger-top-priority
studies are 'now under way in the
National Security Council, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon,
and other government organs. Indeed,
it was only concern for the hostages
that prompted the president to veto
a secret plan to drop weapons and pos.
sibly American agents into the oil fields
of Khuzistan, where Iranian Arabs are
strongly opposed to the ayatollah.
The American hope in removing
the . ayatollah is that he can
be replaced by a more moderate leader-
ship, perhaps one including former
Prime Minister Mehdi Barzargan and
military commanders not tainted by
close relations with the former shah.
The U.S. government thinks that a
favorable climate for Khomeini's re-
moval might be created in time-despite
his popular support if Iran falls into
further internal chaos.
Yet the view that the ayatollah
"must go" does not stem from a desire
to punish him for the capture of the
embassy in Teheran-and the threat to
try the hostages still under detention
on espionage charges. The concern over
Khomeini's continuation in power goes
much deeper in terms of fundamental
American strategic considerations in
the Middle East: Iran under the aya
tollah's. sway is seen as a formidable
threat to the stability of the whole
region. What the seizure of the embassy
and its aftermath accomplished was to
convince the administration beyond any-
doubt that normal dealings with Kho-
meini were no longer possible and
that, therefore, drastic steps were justi-
fied to hasten his departure from power.
"The eighties will be the crucible of in-
tense crisis for the United States," a
respected diplomat said last week. "You
Americans are the target. And no mat-
ter what happens, the Middle East and
the world won't ever be the same again.
A historical line has been crossed, and
you lack power to draw new lines."
In recent private discussions, several
senior administration officials have rec-
ognized that the United States may
have been inexorably damaged by Kho.
meini's politics and posturing. Indeed,
the Iranian crisis has precipitated the
sudden unraveling of the basic Ameri-
can relationships in what has been called
r In
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the "arc of crisis," the immense Islamic
swath of the world extending from
North Africa to Pakistan and possibly
to Indonesia and the Philippines.
This process of unraveling, in turn,
now threatens to undermine and de-
stroy the policies and relations pains.
takingly built by the United States in
the Middle East and in the Third World
generally. It touches on the menace
of a partial or complete cutoff of oil to
the United States (notably if there is
administration committed a second er-
ror stemming from the original mis-
judgment. It thought that the situation
was negotiable through diplomatic
channels, and that, with patience, it
would be resolved. This led President
Carter to decide from the very outset
to rule out military action in Iran, a
decision which subsequent and inevi-
table events in Iran forced him to recon-
sider sixteen days later, when it finally
dawned on the administration-after
military intervention in Iran), on Arab- Khomeini threatened to try the embas.
Israeli peace prospects, and on contin-
ued American influence in Middle East
politics.
. While Khomeini's Iran was the flash
point of this crisis of "historical propor-
tions," senior administration analysts
now acknowledge that the explosion
might have occurred elsewhere sooner
or later. Ruthless and reckless. as the
old ayatollah's challenge to the estab?
lished world order has been, it never-
theless symbolizes the essential conflict
between the North and South, between
the affluent, industrialized West and
destitute Third World, between pro.
ducers and consumers of raw materials,
and between two sets of cultural' values
separated by a vast chasm. The explo-
sion was perhaps inevitable, though
America never really believed it. And,
in the case of Iran, it was enormously
aggravated by religious fanaticism so
dexterously exploited by the ayatollah
and by the oil weapon he wields..
It is now evident that the Carter ad-
ministration--and the West-misunder?
stood and underestimated the true
meaning of the student takeover of the
Teheran embassy, its origins, and its
consequences. This presumably explains
policy errors committed before and af-
ter the occupation of the American
compound. The first miscalculation was
clearly the decision to admit the shah
for medical treatment in the United
States, humanitarian as. the motives
may have been. To say this. is not sim-
sy hostages for espionage-that the con-
flict with the ayatollah transcended the
in-
fate of the shah. As a Washington
telligence expert remarked privately
that wee k ou must never rule out
anything, because you don't now what
as going to happen next."
Though there is general approval in
Washington of Carter's handling of the
crisis-his coolness and prudence-the
view was developing among many ad-
ministration officials and foreign diplo-
mats that the White House did not fully
understand the situation until quite late
in the crisis. Khomeini's rejection of
mediatory attempts by the Palestine
Liberation Organization, despite his
closeness to the PLO, and by Pope
John Paul II. a fellow religious leader,
should have convinced the administra-
tion that the ayatollah was-and would
remain-totally uncompromising. There
was no reason to believe that mildly
punitive actions such as the ban on im-
ports of Iranian oil and the freezing of
official Iranian assets in the United
States and in U.S. banks abroad, re-
quired as they evidently were to sat-
isfy American public opinion, would
sway Khomeini.
Overall, the growing conviction in
Washington is that Khomeini's attitude-
and the ongoing confrontation with
Iran have already wrought irreparable
damage to the United States in the Mid-
dle East, and that it will worsen pro-
ply hindsight: Classified messages be-- gressively:
tween the - State- Department and the _ Thus administration analysts- see the
embassy in Teheran, found and publi- Middle East already greatly destabilized.
cized by the Islamic students, show The attack on the mosque in Mecca has
that the administration was fully aware visibly shaken Saudi Arabia, creating
that the shah's entry into the United newfearsofmovesbyMuslimfundamen-
States might well trigger violent adverse talists and other radicals of the left or
actions by- the Iranians. But it is equally . the right. These fears in a country with
.clear that the administration had mini- a large foreign work force, including
mized the inherent dangers, and, above Palestinians and Pakistanis, may be af-
all, failed to place them in the histori. fecting the -Saudis' oil and foreign poi-
cal context of the runaway Iranian re- icies. Whereas the Saudis had raised
ligious revolution. their production by a million barrels a
Once the embassy was seized, the day, over 10 percent. to make up
for the post-revolutionary shortfall in
the Iranian output, Treasury Secretary
G. William Miller, visiting Saudi Ara-
bia late last month, was unable to ob-
tain assurances that the high produc-
tion level will be maintained.
The Saudis, according to some Wash-
ington officials, may not wish to appear
to their own population or fellow Mus-
lims, regardless of sect, to be excessive-
ly pro-American. A reduction by the
Saudis may be imitated by other Per-
sian Gulf and Arab producers, who are
inclined, in any event, toward conserva-
tion for political reasons. Most of them
disapprove of the ayatollah, but, given
rising internal pressures, they may be
wary of antagonizing him. Khomeini
has already urged them to withhold oil
from the United States, and, analysts
say, there are signs that the Middle
East understands the "historical dimen-
sions" he has unveiled. _ .
A reduction, let alone a suspension.
of Middle Eastern oil production would
have catastrophic consequences for the
United States, which imports one half
of its petroleum consumption, and for
Western Europe and Japan-particu-
larly with the onset of winter. It could
throw their economies into a tailspin.
Built into Middle Eastern oil strate-
gies are other political considerations
as well. These add to new dangers in
the stalemate in the negotiations be-
tween Egypt and Israel over the ulti-
mate fate of the West Bank and Gaza.
Saudi Arabia is opposed to the Egyp-
tian-Israeli peace treaty, and it has
been hinting it will use the "oil weap-
on" if Israel fails to make basic con-..
cessions to the Palestinians.
In the context of a generalized Mid-
dle Eastern turmoil resulting from the
Iranian crisis, the Palestinian deadlock
may force the Saudis' hand. Iraq, a
radical Arab state, has again been urg-
ing the application of this "oil weapon"._
against the United States if Israel re-
mains intransigent. Thus far the Iraqis-
have failed, but the situation could well
change overnight. To persuade Israel to
return oil fields in the Sinai to Egypt
under peace-treaty provisions, as the
Israelis did late in November, the
"
United States had committed
itself to
provide it with alternate petroleum at
tolerable prices. But. this could become
impossible, reopening the full question
of the peace treaty.
Likewise, Washington analysts, say,
the United States can no longer under-
estimate Khomeini's impact on Islamic
countries. Pakistan has apologized for
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ARTICLE A.P R
ON PAGE
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
10 DECEMBER 1979
reads
a miac
Support for the use of military power, a big increase
In defense spending, new backing for CIA covert
action and still more to come-the effects of the
Iranian crisis add up to a change of course for U.S.
Show of force. Much of the increase
in defense funds is earmarked to estab-
lish a stronger American presence in
the Persian Gulf region and to develop
a capability to intervene militarily in
crises in that area.
Pentagon sources say that a carrier
task force will be maintained in the In-
dian Ocean almost continually in the
future. And the American naval facility
on the island of Diego Garcia will be
upgraded to provide logistical backup
for the fleet.
In addition, more transport aircraft
will be ordered for a rapid-deployment
force that is being developed for quick
intervention in remote crisis spots.
Roving supply ships also will be built to !
provide logistical support for this force. I
keep permanently in deep freeze its
negotiations with Russia for an accord
to limit superpower naval strength in
the Indian Ocean. Pentagon officials !
point out that such an accord would
have prevented the U.S. from staging
the massive show of naval strength un-
der way in that region.
An armada of 19 American warships,
comprising three separate task forces,
is deployed in the Persian Gulf and the
Arabian Sea. It is the greatest demon-
stration of U.S. sea power in this region
in recent history. The armada is built
around two aircraft carriers, the Mid-
way and the Kitty Hawk.
For an administration that took of-
fice with a 'pledge to slash defense
spending and that has been preoccu-
pied with arms control, all of this rep-
resents a dramatic change of course.
Besides the military buildup, the cri-
sis in Iran has led to a radical change in
sentiment concerning the role of the
Central Intelligence Agency. Even cer-
tain liberal columnists such as Joseph
Kraft are advocating that the agency's
capability to carry out covert onera-
tions around the world be rebuilt. A
similar change has shown up in Con-
gress as well.
Says Representative Samuel Stratton
(D-N.Y.), chairman of the House
Armed Services Subcommittee on In-
vestigations: -We've got to re-establish
an effective CIA. Some people wonder
why we don't have the CIA ... take
back our embassy to free the hostages.
The sad fact is that the CIA no longer
has that capability."
Even more striking is the change in
attitude toward the use of American
military power. One knowledgeable of-
ficial says it is noteworthy that, in the
current crisis, no one has mentioned
the War Powers Act. The law was
passed after the Vietnam conflict to
limit the President's authority. to use
military forces.
"What this tells me," says the official,
"is that there is support for a more in-
terventionist policy-but within limits.
This does not mean a blank check for
the President. to go to war."
The ranking Republican member of
the House Armed Services Subcommit-
tee on Sea Power, Representative
Floyd Spence of South Carolina, put it
this way: "I'd say Iran has turned
around the anti-Vietnam syndrome. .
Now, here in the House, I hear mem-
bers talking hawkish."
The fallout from the Iranian crisis is
also having an impact on congressional
attitudes toward energy needs. Repre-
sentative Bob Eckhardt (D-Tex.) says
that he senses a new determination to
escape from dependence on foreign oil
producers. His assessment: "Events in
Iran are making people for.the first,
time look at energy realistically."
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AfTICLE APPEARED
ON , 1
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
2 December 1979
ells ru
our.
it..ByJOS5PHVOLZ
~?Washington (News Bureau):
State Department officials were Of
fled yesterday In the face of cn-
flicting comments from the new Jr`
Alan foreign minister, Sadeq Qot
tadeh, about the future.of the to
U.S. diplomat In Tehran. L. Bruc
Laingen,
Qotbzadeh said on Friday that Lain
gen, the U.S. charge d'affaires, and two
ether diplomats who have been staying
at the Foreign Ministry: were free to
leave. although providing security to the]
airport would be "rather difficult."
Ci But Yesterday, Qotbzadeh denied tha
he had ever said they could leave. Qotb.
tadeh's backdown appeared to come in
response to the increasingly militant'
tone of the Moslem students occupying
)he U.S. Embassy.
i::; State -Department officials. here said
that it Is just about impossible to know
who in Tehran speaks with any author
ity. At times the militants, who hold ;io
position In the government, appear to
have more Influence with the Iranian
strongman. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomei-
nl,'than cabinet officers. At other times
cabinet officers seem' to be An charge,
only to be summoned by the ayatollah
and chastised.
See a CIA presence
One key theme seems to be emerging,
though,-with. increasing force - the!
theory of the students that Central Intel-
ligence-Agency officers are. among the
hostages., Although the students . have
:called all 56 hostages spies, there is
some 'question as to whether they be-'
tieve that.
? But yesterday, for the ' first time, the
militants showed- newsmen in Tehran a
ecan't exit
document that they said wasan',August!
1979 cable from Laingen to Secretary of
State Vance discussing how. to' provide)
cover for CIA officers at the embassy. .
? State Department officials ? never
comment on allegations of U.S. espio.
nage activities and had no comment yes-
terday. It could not be learned here
whether the cable was legitimate-or a,
forgery.
But some of the terminology puzzled;
former intelligence officers who have!
read CIA .cables'>from abroad in past:
years. The Fable reportedly told Vance'
that "we should hold to the present total:
of four SRF officer assignments for thel
foreseeable future." It was not clear]
what SRF might mean. ' '
The cable named two Americans who)
were supposedly CIA 9fficers but were
serving under dip;omatic cover.. .>
A key reason for the turmoil over the
CIA now is *that the agency in the past
did play. an overwhelming role in Ira-
nian-Internal affairs. A CIA task force,
led by Kermit Roosevelt, engineered a 1
countercoup in the 1950s that returned'
the briefly deposed shah to power.
It seems clear from talks with offs-
clals here that the Cia is not currently
carrying out any espionage activities in,
But some of the more militant stu-i
dents are said to believe that somehow;
the shah will make one last return to'
power in Iran with the help of the CIA.
U.S.officials argue that anyone who'
really believes that is just incapable of,
listening to reason. Not only has the)
shah no support and bad health, the!
officials state, the Carter administration
would under no circumstances allow the
.CIA to participate in bringing him back;
to power. 4 . I
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ARTICLE
05 PAGE ('Z
THE BALTIMORE SUN
2 December 1979
Tehrad The- Iranians-` holding 50,
Americans hostage In the United Sta
Embassy here charged yesterday that Z of
their captives, William: Daugherty and
Malcolm Kalp, are employees of the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency.,:-..
The "students" who seized the U.S. Em-
bassy November 4 distributed a purported.
copy of a secret message sent in: August by
L. Bruce Laingee, the. American charge
d'affaires here, implying that the two men,
are CIA agents.
A spokesman for the, Iranian captors
alleged, "William Dougherty confesed he
is a CIA officer."
The Iranians did not,contend that any
of the other hostages, including Mr. Kalp,
have acknowledged spying or working for
the CIA. ..
The captors did not further identify t her
two Americans except to say, "They are
both with us."
The Iranians also released a booklet of
other U.S. Embassy communications dug
out of.tbe filet during nearly a month of
ransacking the embassy. They charge the-
documents show that "this was not an em-
bassy. This was a?den'of espionage:'Here
they (Americansr plotted against thr peo-
ple of Iran to loot their resources:": The communications presented by th
Iranians are quite routine documents, con-
taining the ?kindr"of reporting that nearly.
all"embassie , send' back to-their govern.
{ menu: Their presentation' as "evidence"'
demonstrates- what- could; at best,
called the captors' lack of sohistication.
The one purported, u.s cable released .
yesterday that Iran could use as particu-
lar evidence againt individual hostages is
the one naming Mr. Daugherty and Mr.
Kalp. Sent to the. State Department from.
Mr., Laingerr last summery and. labeled.
"Secret;.' it reads: "I concur: fh assign-
ments Malcolm Kalp and William. Daugh-
ertyas described Reftels. 3.. =Win. _
"With opportunity available to assn the
sense that we are starting from a clean -
slate in SRF coverage at this mission, but
with regard also for the great sensitivity
locally to any hint of CIA activity; it is of
the. highest importance that cover be the
best we can come up with. Hence there is
no question. as to. the need for second and
third secretary tides for these two off I.
cers. We [mush have it.
"I believe cover arrangements in
terms of assignments within embassy are
appropriate to present overall staffing '
pattern. We should however hold to the
present total of four SRF officer assign.
ments for the forseeable future, keeping
support staff as sparse as possible as well
until we see bow things go here:
"We are making effort to limit knowl-
edge within ELMB of all SRF assignments:
that effort applies particularly to Daugh-.
erty, pursuant to new program of which-
be is a product and about which I have
been informed.
"I suppose I need not (remind f they d
partment that the old and apparently! in-
soluble problem of designation for SRF of.
ficers will inevitably complicate and to
some degree weaken our coverage efforts
locally, no matter how much we worlra
It. Laingen." Asked what the initials-"SRF" refer to,
a spokesman for the hostage-holders said
"You can ask theCIA and tell us."--?"ss- '
What is -clear from the cable. If it is,
genuine, is that Mr. Laingen insisted?that
Mr. Daugherty and Mr. Kalp be give diplo-
matic status - witting the U.S: Embassy
here so that they would be protected b
diplomatic immunity if they got in trouble
In Iran because of the sensitive nature o
'their work.: = . _
The Iranian captors reiterated yesteri.
their threat to disregard traditional
respect for diplomatic immunity and
-4 try the American hostages for alleg
:spying-
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ARTICLE AFFM " .ED NEW YORK TIMES
all PAGE_, ? 2 DECEt? t 1979
It, Tr i r-_ Students Step Up Pressure .tor spy ra1s .91
ByJOHN x,i'N" trial.
Sp.cdaT1.NSWYO&`nffM - However, the prospect of the Shah's
TEHERAN, Iran, Dec. 1- Pressure leaving the United States for some other
for "spy trials" of American hostages at country-a "worse crime" on the partof
the United States Embassy appeared to 1 the United States than the admission of
increase today as Iranians holding 50 hos- the former ruler, the students said today
tages at the United States, Embassy - put the situation into a new light.
released a document that they said Having insisted that the hostages were
proved that two of the captive diplomats "proven" to be spies by the papers found
were Central Intelligence Agency opera- at the embassy, could the Iranian au-
tives. . thorities release them without obtaining
The diplomats were identified in the the Shah in exchange?
document as Malcolm Kaip and William "We'll cross that bridge when we come
I Daugherty. It said they "must" be given to it," Mr. Ghotbzadeh said at his press
"cover" because of the "great sensitivity.- conference yesterday. But he also pre-
locally to any hint of C-I.A. activity." :.: i rented a hypothetical situation:
4 Suppose, Mr. Ghotbzadeh told the as-
The students, who have held the Amer t- sembled foreign reporters, you had
can Embassy since Nov. 4, said that Mr: caught a thief. Suppose, however, that
Daugherty had "confessed. to beings a the thief had given your stolen goods to
C.I.A. officer."" . someone else. You insisted on getting the
In another development, the Foreign mean, Mr. Ghotbzadeh asked, that you
1
i Minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh. denied should release the thief?
?~ .L- t?L-L
T-- .LAS
r...wad t
o
Is not
that he said as
day that L. Bruce Laingen, the American students said at their news conference
en- today, "thehostages will be tried and the
A
'
m
and two other
charge d
aftaires. trials will be conducted on Islamic princi-
can officials who have been in the For- pies." -
eign Ministry, since the takeover of the The students distributed copies. of a
embassy were free to leave the country. ' telex message, addressed to the United
it is of the highest importance that cover
be the best we can come up with. Hence
there is no question as to the need for sea
and and third secretary titles. for these
terms of assignments within embassy are t
appropriate to present overaW staffing
present total of tour S.R.F. officer assign.
supporting staff as sparse as possible as
well, until we see how things go here.:
"We are making effort to limitltriowl-
edge within emb of all S.R.F.. assiga-
"I suppose I need not mind the depart-
ment that the old and apparently insolu-
ble problem of R designation for S.R.F.
some degree weaken our cover efforts la
cally, no matter how much we work at
it."
Proof of Espionage Claimed
The students said the message proved
that those inside the embassy had carried
out espionage "and plotted against the
Iranian nation."
They also distributed a booklet in Per-
sian and English of the documents they
had previously released, several otwhich
appeared to show that the United States
had been considering admitting the Shah
at least as early as July, three months be-
fore he entered a New; York hospital for
medical treatment. ?
After the students said Mr. Laingen
would be tried along with the other hos-
UCAILJ lidos.. v ..-.. .? -
conference at the embassy that "Laingen lion through- "Roger channeE" and re- ;
ferred to designations called " S.R.F: as-
- .-.__
d ,ik
-..i? be
re--
i
e
tr
e
and
the
the rest."
t` Contents of Message
There has been a rising chorus from the ? s`
t the
th
-..
a
cents in recent days
Embassy on Taleghani Street was not an Kai and`. William Daugherty as de-
outpost of diplomacy but a"nest of spies" 1 ~; cppornunity available I., r
to us in the
but with regard also for the great sensi-
sian Gulf country. '` . ~'
,spies, although they would be forgiven:
,meini it the- deposed, Shah -Mohamm
tages, several reporters pointed out that
Mr. Ghotbzadeh had said yesterday that
Mr. Laingen was not a prisoner and that
the only problem in his leaving Iran was
guaranteeing his safety between the For-
eign Ministry and the airport.
"Mr. Ghotbzadeh did not say such a
thing." the student spokesman said.i "I
deny this:' , .
xemaras xecoraea on -rape i -
There was a loud bursa of derisive
laughter from the more than 200 foreign
I correspondents, most otwhom had heard
Mr. Gbotb=deb , make' thee- statement
three times during yesterday's news con-
ference. Some. of the correspondents i re..
corded his remarks on tape.:
Further questions on the-subject were
cut off. ; ; ??; . - , .:- . f,i' _ ?
Mr. Ghotbzadeh released a letter today
that he had sent to the United Nations
Secretary General, Kurt. ? Waldheim.
warning that "American -imperialism
and international Zionism have resorted
to a new plot to carry out their crimes on
an international scale ; y?,r;`?' ;iA LP
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ARTICLE APPEA "D
ON PAGE L
THE NATION
1 December 1979
? EJ
With the Ayatollahf Khomeini's announcemen
that the remainiag* hostages are "spies" and
"therefore" will beput on trial, it becomes clear
that only concern. for the hostages' safety is
holding back an explosion of frustration and!
hatred toward Iran. in this country. Violence
begets violence, and one hopes that whatever the
Ayatollah's next action or threat, the Carter Ad-,
ministration will heed the counsel -of restraint,
and begin a belated process of education ex-.
plaining to the Iranians why the United States
can't extradite Mohammed Reza Pahlevi under
our law and our moral and political values, and
why any attempt to bring him to justice must
take place in accordance with international law.!
Carter should also 'explain to the Americans the
motives behind 'the Iranians' tragic action. No
peace will be possible between Iran and the Unit-"
ed States until the Administration acknowl
edges our past complicity in the Pahlevi regime's
installation and,by extension, its record of tor-'
ture,, repression and economic plunder.
The more we learn about the decision to admit.
the Shah to this-covntry, the more his entry takes:
on the cast of another Henry Kissinger sideshow.,'
It now seems cleat that the Shah could have ob-
tained adequate medical treatment in any num
ber of other countries, and the Carter Adminis
tration has yet to explain why it submitted to the
Kissinger-David Rockefeller pressures. Those
pushing for the Shah's admission could not,:
perhaps, have anticipated the embassy takeover,
but they could 'not have been unaware that it
would destabilise-our relations with Iran and
thus strengthen the advocates of an intervention-
ist foreign policy. It would be a catastrophe if we
permitted the emotions aroused by this affair to
provoke a resurrection of the covert inteUigence~
activities that saddled the world with the Shah- in
the first place..
:} ?r
BES .+_INT
.A T I A - FO
F _R
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ARTICLE A-PPLIR-wD THE WASHINGTON POST
ON PAGFs~,~ 1 December 1979
sz* B ts
ania's- ,. _. 0-%,re *~ Gif
Remeraberino" 'theSu'btle Seduction of High U.S. Officials by Zahedi
. By Eugene r. Meyer
wasWnetoo Post Staff Wrtter
Shortly before his sudden departure
from Washington nine months ago.
Shah Mohammad Rea - Pahlavi's am--
bassador to the United States gave a
Persian rug to Henry A. Kissinger for
his Yew York City apartment.
The gift from Ardeshir Zahedi was
described almost casually by a Kis-
singer aide as, "kind of a - going-away
present" from one friend to.another.,
In this case, however, : It;. bespoke a-
friendship between a former secretary
of state and the emissary of the de..
posed ruler of Iran.
Zahedi had also given Kissinger and
his, wife a. gold goblet as a wedding.,
gift: Since Kissinger -was then im of-
fice, that gift : was turned . is to the
government, as were a silver tea set
and a silver cigar box from the shah
himself.
Friendships such as this, nurtured
during the years when Kissinger was'
one of the shah's chief proponents in
the U. S. government, would later
form part of the backdrop for the cri
sis that has engulfed Washington and _
Tehran since the ailing -shah was ad-
mitted to. the-United States- for medi-
cal treatment four weeks ago, It has
been alleged, at Kissinger's behest.
EXCERPT
At various other times; Zahedt gave
awAy the clips; cuff links, Persian-pill-
boxes, pistachios and gold coins, the l
last "to ladies he would meet offI.+
eially in his travels,'?'according to Del-
phine. BIachowicz;-Zahedi's?- personal
secretary from 1973 to 1979:
EXCERPT
r Blachowicz rec ed the 1973 Christ
mss gift list as "mostly my work. I sat
with the ambassador for several hours
while he personally went over every
name.".
The final list, she said, Included no
In the White House, practically every.
one in the Cabinet, lots of congres-
sional. figures and five in the Central .
Intelligence)- A ency." That year, she
said, "The Turquoise Bridge,"' a hand.
some book of Persian art, was dis?
patched to- Cabinet members. and-
White House staf . y
Also on the list; she said, were State
Department officials "who dealt-with
Iran" and. "a-number of military peo-
pie " . - .- --- .
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FLORIDA TIMES-UNION (JACKSON+NILLE )
25 NOVEMBER 1979
:Events in Iran underscore
need for an effective CIA
"The lesson from the
events in Iran is that America
needs a stronger Central Intel-
ligence Agency..;:
"Our intelligence oper-
ations have been operating al-
most as if America - has- one
arm tied behind its back, while
the rest,-of the world 'is
swinging-with both arms.,_
"Why aren't we anticipat-
ing these problems rather than
reacting to them?.
"Why must we be-faced
with no effective. options - be-
-tween being,-humiliated and
sending in the:Marines?".
These statements by
Pennsylvania Sen. John Heinz
.are hardly originaL.- just
about any man on the street
could make them today - yet
noteworthy for two reasons.
One is the timing: All this
has been said before - but
now people are ready to listen.
Back in 1975. veteran CIA
"street man" (spy), Mike Ac-
kerman. told--why he resigned
in a copyrighted article in:: the
Miami Herald' His decision
came aftera'se?Cret.meeting
"with a . Communist source
who-was, risking his life. to, see
me. - 4
"I realized s'I , could not
guarantee his seftrity. There
:was no way, I could promise
him that some irresponsible
member of Congress or (CIA)
ex-employee wouldn't leak his
information or that some re-
porter wouldn't blast it allover
the front page."
Former CIA Director Wil-
liam Colby. earlier this year
wrote (prophetically) in the
Washington Star: -
. - "It is often wise to use the
minimum necessary interven-
tion (CIA type operations)
rather than order carrier task
forces or Marine amphibious
groups to the alert-" .
Sen. Daniel Patrick Moy
nihan, at about the same time,
summed matters up bluntly:
"(Today) there is no intel-
ligence agency of any cone,
quence within the' United
States. government."
The second reason that
Sen.. Heinz' statement is im-
portant is that he puts the
blame where it should be -
upon the very body which can
do something about it:
"Unfortunately, the
blame for this sad state lies as
much with the Congress as
with the administration. In its
effort to correct abuses Con-
gress has reined in our intelli-
gence community. to the point
where. it is ? seriously handi-
capped irr its basic mission."
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ApPrARED
cr; ~~:1cL
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 December 1979
C1ss played in a lower key'
By Joseph C. Harsch
Perhaps it didn't mean anything, but on at least one day this
past week (Dec. 11) there were no. marching, shouting demon-
strators pertorming for television cameras outside the United
States Embassy in Tehran.
Was it because Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had other
things to worry. about besides the American hostages who had
been cooped up for over a month inside that embassy com-
pound?
Perhaps someone in the office for demonstrations in Tehran
forgot to schedule a contingent for that day. Perhaps it was
because a new consensus had
built up among the Ayatol-
lah's leadership group in Qom
that the hostages had lost
their usefulness. -
The essential fact out of it
is that the hostage crisis does
seem to be quieting down.
The new watchword among
the Iranian leadership is that
PATTER!
OF
DIPLOMACY
the Americans in the embassy are "guests," not hostages. It'
now is asserted repeatedly that none of them, not even those
alleged to be CIA agents, hence "spies," would be killed.
Sometimes crises end like that. They just seem to dissolve
in other preoccupations.
Ayatollah Khomeini does have other things on his slate right
now. The referendum on his new constitution has not been ac-
cepted by all provinces, or by all other ayatollahs, in Iran.
Azerbaijan province, in the north, on the Soviet frontier, is in a
state of rebellion. So, too, are- Kurdistan and Baluchistan, and
the area around the oil fields along the coast. There is as yet
no effective Khomeini dictatorship. Perhaps most important is
that for the moment anti-Americanism no longer seems to be
enough to maintain Ayatollah Khomeini's grip.
Presumably, if he could get any more use out of holding the,
hostages, out of abusing them, or out of general anti-American
propaganda - he would do whatever served his purposes of the,
moment. But if such tactics cease to serve his' purposes -
well, call them "guests" and begin to ignore the whole busi-
ness almost as though it had never happened.
The main beneficiary from the crisis continued over the past
week to be President Carter in Washington. Polls showed his
public approval rating at a new high. A majority of Democrats
had decided, according to the polls, that they now prefer Mr.
Carter over Sen. Edward Kennedy. Republicans were suggest-
ing that perhaps Mr.-Carter ought to begin moving away some
of those US warships now in Arabian waters. Sen. Howard
Baker, an important Republican presidential candidate, noted
that having them near Iran could lead to some dangerous in-
cident between the US and the Soviets.
In other words, Mr. Carter's rivals for the US presidency
have a stake now in the earliest possible deflation of the crisis.
A Khomeini outburst calling on Americans to vote against Mr.,
Carter was, of course, tqe best propaganda boost Mr. Carte
has had in a long time.
A Herbiock cartoon captured the mood. It showed all th
rivals looking in horror at a headline: "Khomeini says: Vot
against Carter." "There goes the ball game," say the rivals
Only deflation of the crisis could restore anything rase
the pre-crisis political status quo in the US.
The Western allies could share the hope of the rival Amer-
ican politicians for a deflation of the Iran crisis. It has brought
down on them heavy US diplomatic pressure to join in boycott-
ing Iran. They find the pressure unwelcome.
US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was treated with utmost
courtesy when he reached Brussels for the dual purpose of.
promoting "new nukes for NATO" (Pershing II and cruise;
missiles) and rounding up support for the Iran boycott. He;
would have had an easier time getting agreement on the "newt
nukes" had he not had to try for the other. On that other, bei
got more politeness than performance.
The Japanese were also unhappy about the pro-boycott pre*!
sure. The sharp American reaction to their purchases of Ira-;
elan oil reminded them of the affront they still feel when they,
learned from the newspapers that Richard Nixon was going to,
Peking. They continued to buy up all the Iranian oil they could!
find on the "spot" market. '?
Perhaps Moscow was a minor beneficiary. The continuations
of the crisis, even though in lower key, kept attention away,
from reports that the Soviets had moved a unit of their owns
troops into Afghanistan. Their-client regime in that country is
still having serious guerrilla trouble in spite of rising Soviet!
support.
Guerrilla sources put the number of Soviet people in Afgha-
nistan as high as 25,000 men. US sources think this estimate;
may be exaggerated, but agree that Moscow is doing a lot to
try to help the regime in Kabul. Guerrillas say the Sovi"
have sent in 100 big armored helicopter gunships. The Sovie
position in Afghanistan looks more and more like the US ex-
perience in Vietnam.
perhaps Moscow got a little advantage out of bad US rela
bons with Iran. It continued to pump out propaganda "w
ings" against any US military actions against Iran. It was
easy and safe move since the US has no intention of taking a
such action.
But Moscow has its own preoccupations. Its continued at-'
tempts to scare NATO away from those "new nukes" has;
failed. The Iranian crisis and Soviet efforts to exploit it have
almost certainly shelved SALT II. Conceivably that project,
might be revived next year; but it seems more likely than,
ever that the Carter White House will allow it to go over until,
after the next presidential election.
Moscow's effort to sweeten its relations with its Western,
neighbors by a token pull-out of an armored division from East
Germany seems to have come too late. It did not head off they
decision on the new nuclear weapons for NATO. It did not save i
SALT IL US-Soviet relations seem to be at their worst point!
since Henry Kissinger invented "detente." Little is left of that
And this deflation of detente comes at a time when the So-
viet economy is doing as poorly as is the US economy, in some
ways worse. Moscow has managed to conceal its inflation. But
it has not even tried to conceal its shortfall in grain produc-
tion. It is more dependent on the US for its food today than it
was a year ago, or a year before that. Soviet crop failures are
putting Moscow in the same position toward the US that the.
US tt in toward its foreign suppliers of oil.
The Economist magazine (London) says that in 1979 Moscow
turned in "its worst peacetime economic performance."
Neither the USA nor the USSR is yet a "pitiful. helpless gi
ant." But the economic foundation under the military power of,
both is sagging For Westerners there is at least some con-
solation from their troubles in that Moscow is in deepening
economic stagnation as well.
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UTMAREV THE WASHINGTON POST
ON PAl'E A J~r_ 14 December 1979
Stephen S. Rosenfeld
On Iran Prudent
Iran- means not only a crisis but a
prize in the policy-making wars.
Everyone-is trying to lay exclusive
claim to it to bolster the policy of his
choice. The people who have been ar-
uing for a military buildup and a
has strengthened his hand-the Amer-
ican hand-in dealing with Iran. He
has gone far to separate his own stand-
ing from the disaster that remains one
possible outcome of this affair.
Interestingly, few people are say-
ing that Carter is playing it too hard
or too soft in Iran, or even that he is
playing it hard or soft. He has made
those categories seem not really rele-
vant. He has gotten people to take his
performance on its own terms.
I think this goes beyond matters of
tactics-threats, feints and induce-
.ments, ship movements, economic
sanctions and diplomatic initiatives-
though these seem to have been han-
dled well enough: It also goes beyond
the impression Carter has' conveyed
of being serious, cool and in charge-
in this crisis, anyway.
I think it is that for the first time
Carter appears to be accepting the le-
gitimacy of all the purposes and all the
instruments of Amercan. foreign
tamed that prudish and unseemly 1
prejudice. I am not saying he neces-
sarily will or should use force in Iran
or elsewhere,. or that. he. has aban
doned prudence for the big.show. But
his manner suggest, to me anyway,
that he will do what he has to do. ,
The "students" in Tehran are glea-
f Xy P ucmn w_ ey r
as en e of.a resence. it this
turns out to be so, my guess is that
many Americans will be pleased at
the proof that Carter was not deny
ing himself intelligence resources in: i
s place where good intelligence has
been in notably short supply. They
will be pleased to know that he had
not let the ayatollah staff the- em-
bassy.
In sum, slinging our weight around
Is not the answer. Nor is taking a
crash course in cultural anthropology.
Using our considerable assets wisely
is the better way and, in this crisis at,
least, Carter has been following it
g
more strategic approach to world af-
fairs are saying with grim satisfac-
tion that Iran nails down thew case.
Those who believe the episode proves
that we should show more under-
standing for the sensitivities of oth-
ers are, though not so numerous, no
less insistent. The argument recalls
what somebody once said about
drinking: it intensifies, the mood
ou're already in.
y
Okay. Iran proves to everyone that
it's necessary to review old assump-
tions about how the United States
should deal with instability . in the
Third World. The debate is yet to be
properly focused, The show we're-
tough people, for instance, have not
explained how. adding more muscle
solves the problem of our being
muscle-bound in dealing with Iran.
The show-we'reeympathetic types
have not Indicated where to draw the
histori
g
line between sho
c
r
in
be
a
o
cultural empathy
mat But the argument goes on.
however, too narrow. An
It is
,
tant element is missing: the question
of political management. If this crisis
rove
s
d on_ r_
p
aa
ing so for, It is' that-skillful manage-
ment, in the broadest sense, tends 1) to
smooth out the differences' in sub-
stance and approach that and 9
to bestow political rewards-
Since Nor.-A, Jimmy Cartes Path
formance has earned the reapeet.of
most people, as measured in the polls
and- in the special Washington coin
in what people around town say qui-
etly to each other. Vulnerable earlier,
he has presented a shrinking target a
the eris$ has flowered- As a remit, he.
policy That is, for the first time his
policy is not inherently tendentious
and divisive The moralistic element,
which has made him-seem so interest-
ed in using foreign policy to, struggle
for the soul of Americans, has been
subdued. Such discussion as there has
been has centered on means, not ends.
We can all guess what Carter pri-
vately thinks of the shah, for instance.
But publicly he is not turning his back
--quite the contrary--on a figure
who for all his failings provided serv-
ices (keeping the Russians out, keep-
ing the oil flowing, performing politi-
cal odd jobs) that the United States.i
prized highly at the time and that it
sure would be glad- if, someone else
were providing now. And what he
does publicly is what counts.
In the past, Carter made no secret
of his view that it is unworthy to con- I
template the use of force. But in this
crisis, though he has V==
to, a final test, he
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I nE 1.nILJ I LrUI 41-LLJ ..I- 19VRL I VI.
ARTICLE APPZAf u
ON PAGE
US out on the limb with him
12 December 1979
Shah's search fora'home:t
captors demand. :-
for the Shah's return to Iran, as his Iranian
William Gallegos of Pueblo, Colorado, one of
50 US hostages, in. Tehran, expressed.?`hope"
? By Join IL Cooley " . Shah and all who befriend him. Ayatollah
Staff correspondent of -Kalkali has said one of these teams was re-
The Christian Science Monitor sponsible for the murder in France recently
of one of the Shah's nephews. - -
Washington The Shah's eldest son, Crown Prince Reza.
After working closely with United States and his wife, Empress Farah, who is with
presidents, Cabinet officers, and military him, seem to be as equally threatened as are
men since World War II. Shah. Muhammad bb sisters and other relatives and close {
Reza Pahlavi of Iran sits under US Air Force fends, scattered in hiding around the West-
protection in Texas, wondering whether that ern world.
is his final residence.
Sheltering the Shah and Prince Reza, who
In a controlled interview taped for Iranian has completed his US Air Force pilot training
and then US television Dec_ 10, Marine Cpi: -in this country, is likely to compound US difn J
But only a small minority of Americans
seem to echo thatview, and many doubt that
it is really what Corporal Gallegos himself be-
lieves.
The Carter administration is firm in its de-
termination never- to yield on this- principle,
and to guard the life of the Shah, a staunch
friend of the US since the 1950s.
Neither President Carter nor any other US
spokesman has so far been willing to address
in public the question of whether the Shah
should have permanent US asylum if he is un-
able to go elsewhere.
Since the US Defense Department took
over direct responsibility for the Shah's well-
being at his new residence in the Wilfred Hall
medical facility at Lackland Air Force Base,
Texas, only President Sadat of Egypt has
publicly offered a haven for the Shah.
-At early stages in his exile in Egypt, Mo-
rocco the Bahamas and Mexico before his
The Shah accepted President Sadat's hot- ' But Defense Department officials, at the time
pitality after he left Iran last Jan. 16, Some of the Huyser mission, described it privately
administration' analysts believe that if the as an effort to prevent a budding-"white"
Shah accepts it again, President Sadat's gov- coup by top pro-Shah Iranian Army officers
ernment, the cornerstone - of ` US Mideast against the transition government of Prime
peace efforts, would be in great danger from Minister Sbahpour Bakhtiar, and not at all to
extremist subversion: President. Sadat him- speed the Shah's departure.
self, these analysts say, would be even more-4- As former US Central Intelligence Agency
the target of possible assassins than he has. officer ermit velt describes in his new
been since his historic=Jerusalem trip in No- boo "Counter-Coup." the CIA: with Presil
vember.19?1:*: -Vi'e'-oft ' d0`' `'Y ~.-;,?;?",?r dent Elenhower's approval. helped restore
? -Ayatollah Ii;nbollah ms's associate, his throne after a wave of Irania:
Ayatollah Xhalkali, has announced that his = support for nationalist. Prime Minister Mu
"hit teams" would ruthlessly hunt down the , ossadeq in 1953.
culties in the third world. - especially since
neither the Shah nor his son have formally ab-
dicated or renounced the Iranian throne. -
In memoirs now being published in install-
ments in Europe, the Shah repeats charges
made to this reporter in an interview Sept. 18,
1978, and to others, that some American ele-
mentssought his downfall. - - -
_. Although in September, 1979, as the revolu-
tion began,- the Shah's suspicion fell on US oil
companies, his blame now falls on the US
military. He had worked with US military
_ men ever since 1943, when President Franklin
D. Roosevelt first sent to Iran a USmilitary,
mission to work with the Shah in building the
future Iranian gendarmerie and Army.
Gen. Robert Huyser, now commander of
the Military Airlift Command, headquartered
at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, went as top
US military emissary to assist US Ambassa-
dor William Sullivan during the final days last
January before the Shah's departure. -
General. Huyser's job,. the Shah now
charges in his memoirs, was to- "neutralize"
arrival in October in New York for medical Iran's- Army during his overthrow by mobs.
The Shah quotes an Iranian general as saying
treatment - the principal Western govern- General Huyser "threw the king out- of the
meats had all privately turned thumbs down country like a dead mouse."- -- . __ .. -
on permanent asylum for the Shah. - --
General- Huyser has declined ~ comment.
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RTICLE' APJEARD
I J?AGE f4-- L -
[ray to' Form
S pecdal Panel
g _
U.S. Role
By Brnce van Voorst-
And Raja Samghabadi- -~ ;'~'
TEHRAN, Iran Iran's foreign
minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, says
that the 50 Americans being held
hostage here will. not be. tried as al-
leged spies before an "international
grand jury" -'which he hopes will
meet within. 10 days - can hold
hearings and deliver its findings. -
"The trial is- not going to be con-
ducted before the grand jury is
formed and the results known,"
Ghotbzadeh said at a press confer-
ence yesterday. '
The foreign. minister indicated:
earlier that the hostages would
testify in the investigation. ..', "- , -
"We are going to investigate the
American foreign policy in the past
25 years in Iran. Ghotzbadeh told
ABC television. 11,_. . Those Ameri-
cans who have been here will testify
before the grand jury on what they
have done . some of them'are en-
gaged in espionage and we have the
documents." -
(In Washington, aides indicated
that President Carter does not in-
tend to "sit by as a spectator" itthe
American hostages are put on trial.
But press secretary Jody Powell re-
fused to say what Carter-contem-
plates if."show trials" are-held,in
Tehran.
. (State-Department officials said
yesterday that they cannot accoun
for the whereabouts of about 20 0
the 50,-Americans who have been
held l ,ostages since Nov. 4 and that i
is possible they are being .brain
washed in preparation for a trial..
(The officials...who asked not to
identified,: spoke:; in: reaction.to
Monday' night"televisioa intervie
with oneot the hostages.. Marine Cpl.
William Gallegos.otPueblorColo..
which he said he had not seen abou
THE WASHINGTON STAR
12 December 1979
(Officials said it was possible that
'the remaining 20 are being held else-
where in the embassy compound
under conditions similar to those de-
scribed by Gallegos...
(But they said it is also possible
that.the Iranians have singled out
those hostages they intend to put be- i
fore courts on espionage- charges
and are- somehow coercing them
into making confessions.)-.
Ghotbzadeh, in his comments yes-
terday, could-not say how long the
so-called grand jury session would
last. "That all depends," he said. "We
are trying to expedite that as fast as
possible:"..
_Ghotbzadeh- gave assurances the
proceeding would be open. "Obvi-
ously, that's the main purpose of the
grand jury," he said. .
He confirmed that independent
visits to the hostages are imminent.
"We hope to have, international
representatives visit the prisoners
within a very short time," he said.
"A visit is agreed upon and it will be
done in the very near future."
Later Ghotbzadehsaid that mem-
bers of the local diplomatic corps
would be included in the delegation,
as well as outside participants. He
was unclear whether members of
the press would also be included.
Ghotbzadeh expressed little inter
est in how the militant Moslem stu-
dents holding the hostages may
react to the notion of a grand jury.
"It is not a student affair." he said.
"It is-.a government affaiz.where we
intend to explore American foreign
policy in Iran for the past .2.5 years.:
This is what we are going to do.
Whether the students might give
their grievances and testimony will
be determined afterwards."
A-spokesman at the embassy said
an official student position would be
.releated later. ` ?.
c The foreign minister- dodged a:
question. whether the-United States
might be represented-on or at the
"grand. jury", sessions~to answer,
charges.
The grand jury is not a court,"
said Ghotbzadeh. "Generally the
jury- will be free;toaskanybody and
are fret to doso:"-r?.rxNV. -.'
Ghotbzadeh; who has repeatedly
promised to set a date for the trials
of the hostages, refused to do so yes-
terday.. Asked flatly whether he
-would provide a starting date,
-:
Ghotbzadeh said. "No-."
The foreign minister even hedged
somewhat on. whether there would
be trials. Pressed further on a- trial
date, he replied with some irritation:
f 'l
- l didn't even say-the trial would
gd after (the grand jury). All I said isl
that the trial would not start.before.
hand' .. . -. -. ? . ?- . ..:.-
Ghotbzadeh remained.,es hard-I
line as ever on the basic Iranian dew
.mand for the return of.the shah.;
How and- in what manner the
United States goes about this,."is
more or less their problem.". he said.
Asked whether, in light of Carter's
apparent determination not to
deliver the shah,. there were other
diplomatic possibilities, Ghotbzadeh
said: "I don't see any.'
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THOMASVILLE TIMES (N.C.)
27 November 1979
visa a ;hostage
Some -days following the
seizure of .the American Embas-
sy in Tehran, the State Depart-
ment got around to lodging a
relatively mild protest with the
Soviet Union for what it termed
"unacceptable" broadcasts . to
Overshadowed as it was by. the-: .
- ..
Iranian., crisis, the news about
this development. was more _ or--. , interference. in Iranian internal
less lost in the shuffle and didn't
attract much attention.- There-
fore, the Wall Street- Journal has.
service in employing its consid
erable resources - to =discover
what this was all about.
. Extracts of Moscow's Persian--
were printed by the Journal, and ~;.
reprinted by other newspapers
throughout the country. , -
affairs,. counter-revolutionary
campaign being waged against
the United States throughout the
world, and 2 - a partial explana-
tion, although -certainly not an
excuse, for the irrational Iranian
hostility toward Americans,
The - Soviet propaganda : Is
spiced with enough half-truths to
lend plausibility- to,. trumped-up
charges of U.S. imperialism and
activities, and CIA espionage-
So much forte:
_ -The ~ Journal. makes a telling
point in analyzing the Carter
administration's -soft answer to
the Soviets despite their- serious
- _ aggravation of a dangerous cri-
sis involving.U.S. lives and na-
tional honor:.. The administra-
tion, having staked. its political
11
prestige on . ratification of the
SALT 11 treaty, does not wish to
A study of these transcripts raise public fears about Soviet
gives a better insight into.: I - duplicity lest this raise fresh
The Soviet Union's incendiary questions about the treaty. In
role in the Iranian crisis - an other words, - the ' Soviet Union
example. of the unceasing.: hate holds a hostage of its own.
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HUUJ I UN L.HKUNILLt
14 November 1979
-Ira
nians
leral-, hera isacree W1117
tak6ove- r of US& E b 'a s's''
11 .. 2~_-! Y1
BIf J
Several Iraniansw residing in Houston
say they disagree with the takeover of the
U.S. Embassy in4Fehran but msintaia
-tfsat the shah should be returned to Iran.
Interviewed Tuesday as they waited for
meetings with Immigration and Natural-
ization Service- officials, they. indicak
some sympathy with the goals cf Iraiiiaiia
demonstrating, throughout the- United
States but disagreed with the violent anti--
American actions. taken in their, native
country.
Magid Ahrabl, 26, said he thinks Ayatol-
lah Ruhollah-Khomeini is taking such-
strong actions to force the United States
to hand over the shah because the reli-
gious leader is pursuing a personal feud
with the ailing ruler.".-"', -' '..'
Ahrabi, who-said he is an Ehglish major
at Texas Southern University, said the
ayatollah is seeking revenge because the
shah ordered the deaths of two of his sons.
He said he left Iran when the revolution
was just beginning last year, but does not
want to return until he earns his' degree
here. Ahrabi also said he is concerned
about his safety in Houston because some
Houstonians are becoming increasingly..
anti-Iranian. '
Khosorow "Bob" Soltani, 26, who was in
the INS office with his American wife
Dagmar, 22, acknowledged that he was in
violation of his student visa because. he
was taking a semester off . to work - full- -
time as an electrician--- But Soltani said he was hoping the INS
will grant him a permanent residenttvisa ~
and allow him to stay in this country
because he was forced by-a tuition ?in-
crease to suspend his education.
"'I have a kid and a 'wife, and I. cannot
spend $1,000 for tuition," he said, noting
that- when- he enrolled-. at-TSU . im-1976, .
tuition for foreign students was only $350.
Both Soltani and Ahrabi say that some
Americans have made obscene gestures
at them. The two men said they are con-
cerned that Houstonians are venting their
anger indiscriminantly despite the fact
that some Iranians have not -participated
in the demonstrations here and do not
support the anti-American actionsrover-
seas...~
"Even- if you're not a demonstrator
-.,they (Americans) persecute you too,
which is not totally fair," Soltani said. .
"Two wrongs don't make a right." y ..__.~
Mrs. Soltani said her husband his never
participated, in demonstrations. She said
her friends have remained "very -suppor-
tive" despite - the recent increase in anti-
Iranian feelings. -
"When you come here on. a student visa,
you should study," Soltani said. "Most of
the demonstrators don't go to school. Per-
sonally,- I'm against the shah and what he
did to my country. He murdered many
people, and I think he should be sent
home. But not this way. I hope the hos-
tages will be safe. It's not good what
Khomeini did."
Mrs. Soltani said that if her husband-
were ordered deported, she would remain
in the-United States because in Iran she
would be persecuted for being an Ameri-
can and a Christian. She dismissed
Khomeini as "nothing but a mouth. I I
don't think-he's really religious ---' ? , _ -
Nick Fardi: -25,-a- TSU graduate and.
owner of Mehran's Deli and Restaurant,
-2405& Shepherd, described the situation
in Iran as "terrible" and said he will not
return to hip native country until the- reli-
gious fervor? and-. anti-Western hysteria.
dies down. '
He said his family in Iran has suffered
from the revolution: "They (Khomeini's
followers ) took away our home. They took
away our money."
Fardi said that unlike many of his coun-
.` trymen, he believes the shah is ailing in
New York: He said the eo le- in Iran
think the shan is well and. Blotting with
t Fe ( to regain control o is country. ;
pained why the ayatollah and
his followers refuse to accept news of the
shah's illness. "They1don't believe any-
body.' Because- they are not. straight'
(truthful), they. think no. one, is.'straight-.
They are corrupt."
Fardi said he -is not-religious and is
scornful of the Moslem holy men direct-
ing the revolution. in Iran.
"They (the religious leaders) are very
stupid. I know it because t was raised
among them. They are against technol-
ogy. They are against progress. They are
not open-minded." .
.. Fardi said he is sorry that 'Americans
are being held.captive in Tehran. "I
would do anything to help them," he said.-
"I would exchange myself for them."
Jholan.Jahanahmadi, 27, who identified'
?.himselfasa.TSU"student, said the Iranian
people seized.the U.S. Embassy because
they could not get justice through normal
means...
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5 DECEIGER 19T9
E-Syst~ms to sue Ira
By ROBERT DODGE pang has made In the last year to re-
Staff Writes cover the money it is owed.
"The company is being careful
E-Systems'Inc. said it will file suit -about the answers to questions due to
today in federal cour seeking ap- _ the effect- on legal proceedings." the
proximately $15.2 million in damages spokesman said:
and cancellation of $4.4 million in let- But according to a.Pentagon source
tern of credit from the Government of familar with the contract, the two
Iran and the Bank of Melli Iran. tanker-type jets were to be equipped
The Dallas electronics company said. with sophisticated electronic hard-
it would file the suit in U.S. District , ware for use in a "James Bond" like
Court in Dallas charging that Iran de- program called IBEX in which the la-
faulted on a 1977 contract in which test American technology was being
the company's. Greenville Division applied in Iran for deposed Shah Mo.
was to install communication and hammad Reza Pahlavi with the assis-
navigation equipment on two Boeing Lance of the Central Intelligence
707 jets owned by the Gulf Agency.
nation. P Under the $500 million program,
"We filed the lawsuit to protect the the Shah wanted to establish a border
company and its shareholders proper-
ty interests in these aircraft," John M.
Dixon, chairman and president, said
in a prepared statement. "We are ask-
ing the court to declare the contract in
default and to permit foreclosure of
liens existing on the aircraft. Once au-
thorized, the aircraft will be. sold at
auction."
In its one-page statement issued
Tuesday, E-Systems said the value of
the contract, orginally set at $28 mil-
lion, had escalated in value to about
$35 million by the time Iran defaulted _ ed he wanted the best electronic ears
in November 1978. The amounts to be
claimed by E-Systems, the comnpany,
said, represent sums due under the
contract and other unspecified. dam-
ages. t
An E-Systems spokesman,' who
asked to remain unnamed, declined to
explain why Iran defaulted on the
project, how the planes "would have
been used or what efforts *the com-
surveillance system for Iran. The pro-
ject called for 11 ground monitoring
posts, six airborne units and several
mobile ground units. Bids were sub-
mitted by four U.S. corporations in-
cluding ESystems, Rockwell. GTE
Sylvania and Mechanics Research Inc.
IBEX, which according to some
press accounts, involved the launder-
ing of millions of dollars through
Swiss bank accounts to pay for work
done by American corporations, was
and eyes on his borders.
Informed sources said the 707 jets
were flown to E-Systems' Greenville
facility. from the Boeing Co. in Seattle
in late 1977. While ESystems has de-
clined to say how the planes were to
be used by Iran, a company spokes-
man said Tuesday that the aircraft
were being outfitted with sophisticat-
ed navigation and communication sys-
tems. - .
No work is currently being done on
the planes other than that needed to
prevserve the aircraft, - the company'
said;
The IBEX program has been beset
with troubles since it began. A Jan. 2,
1977, story. by The Washington Post
detailed instances of corruption, pay-'.
ments to U.S. firms from Swiss bank
accounts and the Aug. 28, 1976.. mur-
der of three Rockwell International
employes connected with the project'
in Tehran.
The CIA has also declined - to an-
pro-
swer questions -regarding the
ystems was one of many United
States firms to have business with the
country before the fall of the Shah.
In most cases, firms selling military
hardware to Iran were protected
? against losses under the Foreign Mili-
tary Sales program which required
Iran to establish a trust fund and -
make pre-payments on projects. But
sources close to the Defense Depart-.
ment said the F Systems work was
not a part of the military sales pro-
gram and did not qualify for any of
the trust fund money..
The company declined to say how it
was paid or if the Bank of Melli -
the government owned bank of Iran
- had failed to honor letters of credit
that would have provided E-Systems
payment for its work. However. the
company did say loss of the payments
would not have any "material adverse
effect on its financial statements" be-
cause of a $1.5 million reserve fund
CONT IIIUM
7 jets;
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?reenville facility where Iran's Boeing 707 jets were being worked on by .E-.Systems
7 the company established in 1978 to
cover Iranian losses.
Sources close to E-Systems have in-
dicated there are a number of subcon-
tractors who also worked on. the pro-
gram and who are also waiting to be
paid. In its news release, E-Systems
said that its attorneys .had advised the company had 6rgin0y intended to
company "its liens on the aircraft are ' file its suit later in the week, but de-
superior to the claims of third parties cided it needed to do so earlier than
which may file lawsuits to attach the Pied, . '-We will have someone
aircraft in satisfaction of their claims . there (district court) as soon as is
against the Iranian Government" physicaUy possible," the spokesman
The E-Systems spokesman said the said.
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17 DECENM 19T9
A Matter of Principle
By Marvin Stone
The search for a place of refuge for the de-
posed Shah of Iran has started a controversy in
this country that regrettably is spilling over
into the presidential campaign.
Obviously, it would be convenient if a for-
eign sanctuary were found for this sick and be-
leaguered man, thus weakening Ayatollah Kho-
meini's pretext for holding 50 Americans in
the occupied U.S. Embassy in Teheran.
But this is not a question of convenience. It
is a question of principle-moral and political.
In simple decency, the United States has a re-
sponsibility to offer succor to a former head of
state who was *a loyal ally to this country for
more than 30 years and who now, in his dying
days, finds himself without a home.
To argue thus is not to say that we condone
without reservation the policies or the behavior
of the Shah during the long period that he
ruled Iran. He doubtless was guilty of a mea-
sure of tyranny and corruption. But seven
American Presidents did not find his "crimes"
so gross or intolerable as to jeopardize their
close relationship with the Iranian ruler.
Henry Kissinger put the point well: "I do
not doubt that wrongs were committed by the
Shah's government in his long rule; the ques-
tion is how appropriate it is to raise them, after
four decades of close association, in the period
of the Shah's travail."
In appraising Mohammed Reza Pahlevi's re-
gime, and our role in it, a little history is use-
ful. Persia-Iran has been a violent arena
through much of its existence. As late as the
1700s, political victors put whole towns to the
sword or worse. The country has always been a
place where one ruled by getting the other fel-
low first-because he was plotting to do the
same to you. That tradition persists to this day.
One can go further. Were the Shah's trans-
gressions any more 'abhorrent than those of
countless leaders still occupying power, and
some who are in exile? Indeed, who would ar-
gue that his excesses were worse than the Aya-
tollah's hundreds of senseless killings?
Diplomats have run into trouble in Persia
before. In 1218, the Persians beheaded a Mon-
golian ambassador-wlro was trying to make a
trade -agreement. In 1829, a - Teheran mob
looking for a fugitive royal eunuch and two
harem women invaded the Russian Legation
and hacked the ambassador to bits.
Historically, thus, it has been a problem to
find someone in Persia with whom to safely ne-
gotiate. The United States found such a person
in the Shah. And he was a friend.
In the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, with the Mid-
dle East in turmoil, he accepted the risks of ig-
noring the Arab oil embargo, fueled our Navy'
and even continued to supply fuel to Israel.
When the U.S. needed intelligence monitoring
stations to watch Russian missile tests, he of-
fered Iranian sites freely. American administra-
tions, Democratic and Republican alike, looked
to the Shah to contribute to stability in the vol-
atile and strategically vital Persian Gulf region.
Now he is a man without a country. He had
assumed that, once his medical treatment for
cancer in New York was completed, he could
return to his haven in Mexico. But the Mexican
government got weak knees.
Whether or not the Shah finds lasting sanctu-
ary outside the U.S., he should have the assur-
ance of a safe resting place in the United States
as long as he requires it. Honor demands no
less. And politically, if America succumbed to
the intimidation of the zealot who now rules
Iran, who would trust America again? -
For Senator Edward Kennedy to drag this is-
sue into the campaign raises anew questions
about his judgment-and his steadfastness as a
leader. He seemed to be implying that, if he
were President, he would contemplate a deal of
some sort-sending back the Shah. This is un-
principled, even as an electioneering ploy. It is
the kind of loose talk that can contribute noth-
ing to the resolution of the crisis and the re-
lease of the hostages.
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r
xof 1ntrveW
`with Hos#age 101arine
NEW YORK (AP) - Here are ex-
cerpts from the'text of the interview
yesterday with Marine Cpl William
Gallegos, one of the hostages at the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran, conducted
for NBC-TV News by its correspond-
ents George Lewis and Fred Francis
NBC: Cpl. Gallegos, do you have
something- to say- before-use start
questions?
Gallegos: I just want my family to
know I'm OK...: I want everybody's
family to know, most of all, were all
fine. We haven't been mistreated in
any way, yet, at all.... It was just
what do you do here. You know,
what's your name? How long have
you been here? And that's it. And
then we were taken and just kept in
our little cubicles.... I know every-
one here wants to go home. I don't
know what negotiations there are to-
wards.this, what's happening be-
tween the Iranian students and the
American government.
I know they keep telling us they
want the shah to return to Iran, and
we'll be released. Other stipulations
Q: Let me ask you about human
rights; your own.... What is your
daily routine like?
A:... Get up in the morning,
have breakfast, go take a shower,
come back, read a book, clean up my
area a little...:
Q Are you tied?
.. Not uncomfortably. We're tied
with cloths so that we can read
books and exercise...
Q: You said, 'we.' Are you kept
alone?
A. Oh no, sir. There are many,
many hostages.with us. I'd say at
least 30.
Q:. Are you permitted to converse
with each other? -
A: No, sir. The rule is, silence is
golden here.
Q: Why were you the one singled
out to do this interview?
A. I don't know.... I was reading
a book. Next thing I know is; they
come and say: "Come with me."
were that if the shah wasn't re- Q: What if you just said "no?"
turned, all the hostages would be put A.- I, I thought about saying no, but
on trial. I don't know what would I felt that many of the people don't
happen after that, but. I'm leaving it. know what's going on.... I want
up to my country, my people. i nave
faith in them. V
Q: Have yofi discussed ... this
type of political observation with
your captors.:..?
A. No, we haven't.... They ask us
why, you know, (why) our govern-
ment keeps him (the shah), and we
don't have the answers.
Q: How do you personally feel
about the issue of returning the-
shah?
A: Myself, as a Marine guard,. you
all know I'd give my life for any
American - any American; any.
president of the United States ...
And I just, I can't see it now.... In
some way, I don't see this as a good
cause.
ccedes to
Q: If President Carter accedes-
the demand -that the shah be re-
turned, isn't that inviting similar at-
tacks on other U.S. embassies else-
where in the world? .. .
A: Yes, sir;, it does implicate.
(imply) that in such a way. As. I
don't know, I don't know, like I said
before, I don't know the circum-
stances... .
Q: Are you a s ?
A: 0+o, sir. in not. I:n a United
States Marine security guard.
Q: What kind of interrogation
have they given you, if any, about
the spy issue?
A. Nothing else, sir. They .. .
made accusations, and as far as we
know, the students seem to think
they've found quite a few documents
that implicate us.
Q: How do you know that?
A. I don't, sir. I said 'the students
think.'
:. _ .
Q: _ .. Do you feel like
being brainwashed?
A: No, sir. Not at all... .
you're.]
Q: There are about 30, you say, in
this room.
A: Yes, sir. V
Q: Where are the others?
A: I have no idea, sir.
Q: Some of the political officers
who were at the embassy? - i
A:... I was with one of them, and '
after'that we were moved down to
this other place - mushroom - and
I haven't seen the other one. And
then they were taken away with
some other ones. And they move
them in and out. .
them to know that we're. okay.... I
want President Carter to know. . .
that we're relying on his decision to
let us go home.
Q: Will you accept his decision no
.. V
matter what?.
A. Yes, sir. V
Q:. What about the psychologi-
cal strain of being in that room?
How do you see your fellow hos-
tages? Are they holding up well, or
are any of them having problems?
A: The strain is tremendous on all
of us. We're holding up, though....
The hostages look at each other, they
look at the Marines, and the Marines
give them a smile of confidence.. Q: What has the worst part of all
this been for you personally?
A: The first two days; I would
imagine, were the worst part of this
.-.the takeover of the embassy -
were the worst part.... -
-Q*Did they accuse you of being a
spy, corporal?
A. Yes, sir. I was accused of being
ki
f
d
a
wor
ng
o
gent. was accuse
CIA
in a "spy den." I was accused of. of
many types of activities.
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ON PAGE ? f/ 11 D ER 1979
siacx annerson
Carte'r Wca&.AdNised Not to Admit Shah overnment
In the baclirooms of Washington. .shah a visa. He was privy to the many [g ? ] should take place after It
everyone seemed to know the shah was warnings and prognostications that the is in place some two-three weeks and .
bad news. The State Department, and shah's presence in the United States some few days before the shah would
Central Intelligence Agency advised would mean trouble. come here. In the meantime, we should '
against admitting him to the United Yet Newsom's only concern was how- begin to prepare the Iranians by telling, .
States. It would probably incite militant to minimize the impact of the shah's ar- them of the intense pressures for the
in Iran, they warned. to storm: -the rival. He would have preferred. for ex? ' shah to come here- pressures which
American Embaeey and seize American ample: to bring the shah into the coup- we are resisting despite our traditional '
hostages. try next year _ after the Iranian situa- open-door policy ..:
President- Carter was-aware of-:the- tion became more stable- If there is. no no prospect for Iran to-
warnings: In reeponseeo-mPik.that Henry Preeht,- who, heads the Iranian , settle down, there may be an argument
i
he admit the. shah. Carter reportedly , desk.?at the State Department. was in for going ahead and admitting the shalt
once asked his advisers ruefully: "When touch with developments in Iran daily. anyway to get that inevitable step be-
take our people m Tehran He knew the political. ingredients in hind us, but it will be. necessary first t
the Iranians o .
hostage, what will you advice me then?" Iran-were highly combustible and, with review how dangerous the situation is.
Nevertheless, he authorized,t a -shah's . the slightest spark, could-. explode in In either of these scenarios we should
entry, America's face aim for a positive change in our position
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance an- Yet on Aug. 2, he sent the American on the shah by January 1980-
derstood the danger. On July 21X he.sent embassy, a "secret/semdtive" planning . Instead the shah;, pleading medieat -
out an urgent, "eyes only' cable- to paper on how to: prepare "for the shah need, arrived in October. Sources close ?
Charge d'Affaires L Bruce Laingen.in to come to the United States." The plan . to the shah acknowledge that his. ail-
Tehran : - was to wait until Ayatollah Ruhollah meats, though real enough, could have
"We are considering." the cable said; Khomeini pushed through his new con- been treated elsewhere- The humanitar-
"how to respond to the shah's continu- stitution and established a new govern- ian appeal. in other words, was a ruse.
The compelling question is why? WVby
ads throaW various to
regarding establishing residence in n Then. the paper stated,-"we
United States ... I would like to form the new government that we wish admit the shah. contrary to the best- in.
have your personal and private evalua- to clear our decks of old issues on the terests of the United States? The usual
tion of the effect of such a move on the agenda. One of those old issues will be justification is that they could not turn,
safety of Americans. in Iran [especially ..'the status of the shah. We could inform their back on a loyal ally and that they
the official Americans in the corn the government that we have resisted could not give the ayatollah a veto over-
pound.]" intense pressures.to allow him to come who can enter the country.
Laingen warned that the shah's ar the U.S, because we'did not wish-to com? ? Poppycock. Their greater obligation
rival in America could ignite anti-Amer- plicate [the ayatollah's) problems or our was not seldbu to the nationat
ican actions, including probable repri-... efforts to construct a new relationship. interests. A day r passes that th the
sals against the embassy.. Yet Vance ad- "Now with the government firmly es. United States es doesn't n't ba undesirables
wised the president to admit the shah on . tabl shed- and accepted. -it seems ap- whose presence not r helpful.'
"humanitarian" grounds. proptiate to admit the shah to the US. The pressure to admit the shah came-,
The shah's ease was bandied at the The- new government may not like. it, primarily from David Rockefeller and
State Department by Undersecretary but it is best to get the issue out of the Henry Kissinger. Despite their disclaim-
AM tnev mmducted a relentless cam-. ? .
David Newsom. - He- probably under-
stood better than anyone else it. Wash-
ington the consequences of granting the
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ARTICLE "FEARM 11ZW i vrua -i ij'ie.o
ON PAGE- 11 DEER 1979
L jtebellious.Aierbaijani. Party
KHOMEINI REBUFFED
BY RIVAL AYgT06WH'
t, i-
Thm
TEHERAN; Iran, Dec 10-Ayatollah
Kazem Shariat?Madarl - today resisted
pressure from: Ayatollah Ruhollah Itboo-.
meini,. the revolutionary leader, _to-dis-:
solve the.. rebellious.. Moslem- People's,
Party. which has been active, in the-Azer
baijani minority- region of northwestern
Iran. . - _ .. ....
"Wecannotanoumce that the party is,.
annulled," the dissident Ayatollah said in
a statement. "Today it is the turn of the
Moslem People's Party..tomorrow it is
the turn of other parties. They want to
make all theerpsstiea step aside to have
Pee single party=and we will not accept
Critical Letters from Seminary
Ayatollah- Shariat-Madari was criti-
cized today in letters from the faculty and
students of Qum Theological Seminary.
In view of the interplay of religion, law
and politics In Iran, a rough analogy
would be an attack on the Chief Justice of
Supreme Court by the Harvard Law
School. -
The faculty of the seminary called on
Ayatollah Shariat-Madari to reject the
Moslem People's Party "so that this stain
on-the clergy and dear Islam can be re-
A letter from the theology students con-
teaded~ vertu was %larnio
an creanances alone
worked with the. ruling Revolutionary
Council had been-broken and that the
council wanted to discredit all other polit-
was broadcast over the radio and televi
sion, condemned those responsible for the
disturbances in Tabriz. "These people
are not Tabrizis, " the Ayatollah said::
try over? Those who come and say so are
lackeys of the embassy and Its af ili-
"A holy war against Islam?"Ayatollah
Khomeini said. "A holy war on behalf of
Carter? You wage a holy war so that Car-
ter can be successful and take your coca
"Tabrizis do not think of fighting Islam."'
In an apparent allusion to Ayatollah
Shariat-Madari, the revolutionary leader
,said people had been going into the vii-
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ARTICLE
0
?AGG _kkLL'D
OIt PE. ~`~frL
THE WASHINGTON POST
11 December 1979
ByStuart-Auerbach }--
Waahtnstoa last latdan auvtea-
- TABRIZ, Iran,. ,l_)ec..10 -. Repre-
sentatives of Iran.' ruUng Revolu-
tionary Council were rebuffed today
In their, effort to halt factional fight-
ing, bettuees, s" p"r ? oL .rival,ayr
tollahs.. .
In the.holy city of Qom, Ayatollah
Kazem Sharlatmadari; :. the spiritual
leader of this. region's -Turkish-speak
ing Azerbaijanis, forbade negotiations,
with the team-and issued a statement
supporting his partisans here. and ac-
cusing the central. government of
reneging . on -an- . agreement' reached
with him 'last week.. '" .
His 'rival,. revolutionary!- leader
Ayatollah' Ruhollah~'Khomeini, mean-
while put out his--statement blaming
the troubles in Tabriz on "American
spies" and_calling on. American voters
not to reelect President-Carter, whom
he branded a. "traitor;" ' "'' ='""- ``?
The,' Revolutionary Council peace
mission, headed bye Finance Minister
and former foreign minister - Abol-
Hassan.. BaniSadr, . was only able to
see a Khomeini representatives Aya-
tollah- Mohammed EnghjL_ Members
of Shariatmadari's- Moslem People's
Republican Party . dedined'_- tor. meet
with: the delegation. "
Although: tfief.oity L remained nse -
tonight, there was- no repetition =of
Sunday night's fighting :.between sup-
porters of Khomeini and Sharlatma-
dari,.who is regarded 'as the?country's
second moat popular-ayatollab and the :
most revered.veIigious-. figure- here in
.his native Azerbaijanr' -_,
Af the Moalem`People's ' Hepublicaa-
Party headquarters here,-,.Sadreza.
Moghimi. a party worker,, said, "Kho-
meini is saying these people who, want
freedom belong to- the. United-States.
Please take notice of me-Do I'belong
to the-United.StatesL",.",:,
There was -,, r.~i -tonight
great confusion'.?"to
at -the .party headquarters, an - old
building overlooking a roundabout
with a small pond in the center. -
Ci-owds were gathered-in`front of
the building when darkness fell, and
party workers had dragged, large
sewer pipes across part of the road to
slow-down traffic. The front gates
were chained and padlocked shut, and
armed guards sat behind sandbagged
barriers on the first floor balcony
with. automatic rifles trained on. the -
street. S.:
Inside, party workers were. rushing?
about and handing ? out weapons.
Moghimi told reporters he expected
an attack during the night from Kho-
meini supporters.
"Get out, get out," he said. "Maybe
they wiU= attack here.: I will see;; you
tomorrow-if we are alive.`
In Tehran, Rahmatollah Moghad
dam-Maraghei, a political leader allied
with Shariatmadari; was reported still
`in hiding after his office was raided
:'last week. Revolutionary
authorities-..said- the- students had found his- name
in files in the-U.S. Embassy.
The file purportedly. contained a re-,
'port of an interview he gave to US
political officers in the embassy, on'
the situation in Iran. One of" Moghad-.
dam-Maraghei's recommendations was
-thatthe-United States-press for,mee -
ings with "Khomeinf to try to ease the
strains between the two countries. He
also suggested that Americans not in
the government be r endouraged to
come here y !: ~4 . 4~ ..
Among. the two he suggested - as rep. resentativeirwere-Ramsey Crark the
former.-attorney.;-general `'who- met
Khomeiniilni and, Richard?.Cot-
tam, aaprofessor"atthe University of:
` Pittsburgh.Z considered here-L.'.-to-'.have. been?.geaerallj;. eadlyiid the;revolu
tionr One. local-, newsaaver.-- however,.
changed tta
e the former CIA ehief and TT R..
ambassador to Iran.e....; eatedlv accused
him of beingaa CIA anent a charge that he denied. Hej
-also said. a a } oug he and, other captives had bee
so- accused, he"had not been interrogated.. He said be di
not know whether the others had been.
After saying. "the students here have been really good
to us,"-'Gallegos disclosed that he and about 30 other
captives were being kept. in; "little cubicles." He de-
-scribed a room divided up by partitions four or five 'feet-
high.
Gallegos said each hostage was loosely bound and had
-:a-mattress, toilet articles; books:.to-read' and enough to
:;eat,. but were not allowed to'speak to each other or their
captors- The Marine, shown by an Iranian television crew.
throughout the. interview with a. large color- poster of
Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini In the background, added
that the cleanliness is-really great." -
He said the hostages were allowed to shower- every
"day. This contradicted the reports of'other recent visi-
tors to the embassy, jncluding Rep. George: Hansen (R-:
--Idaho), who said after seeing some-of the hostages that
they, badly needed baths and changes- of clothes.,:.-,.* The Marine said he -was allowed. to exercise. at Ieast,
three times. a. day for 15 minutes: at a. time..
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0
 Asked if he, would accept a, presidential decision to I
Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0
custody indefinitely, Gallegos said, "Yes, sir. I'd have
to
- Later, esked,.by.the NBC interviewers what- he would
lice to see i anon. the corporal. replied "We're not ready
to hold out her. forever. I don't know- how much longer
we- can-.take this.' And especially- If the shah's not re-
turned;: I Imagine it would get a little worse. I don't
-know:" X:
Gallegos, 21, appearing remarkably-composed for being
,:held hostage for .37 days, lost some of his composure
when he'was asked about the 20 hostages whose where-
" abouts-he did not know:
"Where are some of the-senior people at the embassy?"
Gallegos was asked. "Have you recognized any of them?"
"Senibt people as to who,. sir!'.. he answered, showing
~command and;-control". sites,.]
the -.Russian = said.. Kissinger-1
protested- that.. the sites were .
differ=:
"You'll see, they, are
eat," Dobrynin said. "Wait:
Eventually, the CIA report-
.. ed - the. Russians ; were fitting"
capsules into-. the silos which
-transmitting launch com-
- the command post.-The ad-
ministration accepted the ex-
_planation, although some offi-:
cials. continued to. worry that.
the. command. silos could be,
converted - : to launch- silos
-within weeks.. ,
he flame over- the so-a
,~ j . , and =other -smbigti ~~
sous acbVittes,led-tot
meant within.the: U.S. govern-
went of a new mechanism for;
monitoring - SALT.;. The- I
point of 'the-. "SALT -verifica
tion"' bureaucracy - is a'_ CIA
committee called " the.`; DCI's
=(Director of Central