STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, MUTUAL AND ASSURED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00620R000200600093-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 93
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2009/06/17: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000200600093-2
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STRATEGIC RESTR AiN7 ,
MUTUAL AND ASS'L;R D
,Jj Alton 1:1-c
ccretary of State Cyrus Vance's first mis-
sion to Moscow produced mixed results-
and mixed emotions. Unrealistic public cx-
pectations of a breakthrough toward arms
control fed equally exaggerated disappoint-
ment when there was no immediate move-
ment toward. agreement.
Commentators volleyed speculations back
and forth. Brezhnev was too ill to cope with
such far.-reaching proposals as the Ameri-
cans presented. The Soviets were stonewall-
ing in order to test the new American pres-
ident. The president had contrived his pro-
posal not to produce agreement, but to shore
up his domestic support by "hanging tough"
on an initial position. The administration
was acting in the belief that the Soviets
needed an agreement more than the Ameri-
cans and would swallow even disagreeable
terms rather than trigger an intensified U.S.
arms effort. Carter's public maneuvers on
human rights provoked the Soviets into re-
taliating by a hardline stance on strategic
arms.
These and similar interpretations seem
too pat for the occasion. The Soviet Union
and the United States face serious strategic
issues which are quite sufficient in themselves
to explain the outcome in Moscow. Differ-
ences in the two countries' present force
structures, in their strategic requirements.
and in their technological potential are in-
trinsically difficult to harmonize. Surely the
basic reason for Moscow's decision not to
accept either of the suggested U.S. options
-a "comprehensive" plan for reducing
strategic forces to 2,000 delivery vehicles or
fewer and a "deferral" option for ratifying
the Vladivostok Agreement of 1974 (but
deferring action on the controversial cruise
missile)-is that the Soviet government did
not find the alternatives fair or advantageous.
From the American perspective the pro-
posals seemed eg1aitable-and--sensible The
comprehensive plan would have cut author-
ized forces by 17 per cent to 25 per cent and
would have bolstered strategic stability by
restraining tests and deployments of coun-
terforce missiles on both sides. The so-
called deferral plan would have confirmed
those aspects of the Vladivostok Agreement
on which the parties could concur, namely,
an overall ceiling of 2,400 strategic missiles
and bombers with a sublimit of 1,320
MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable
Re-entry Vehicles) launchers. Disputes over
the Soviet Backfire bomber and American
cruise missiles would be handled in later
discussions.
for the negotiations, but the comprehensive
plan was bound to cause difficulties for Mos-
cow, particularly given the abruptness wzicn
the president advertised and presented it
The difficulties were both strategic and po-
litical. Precisely because the Vladivostok
These were plausibll/points of departure
STAT
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 ceilings were .en hivh. rha? Snvu.t tlninn h,,l
been willing .Approved For Release 2009/06/17
..:,r.vard-based systems (FBS; ;iainly the
iar e nu nber of tactical aircraft based in
of delivering nuclear
:--.-.a Russia. To cut stra-
t. ie rte ,?'..:5 '? enhance the relative
t of these tactical weapons caeabie cf
r:ssions. From the Soviet scan;:-
point, lowering the ceilings was certain t-
revive the FBS issue. Soviet analysts were
also wary of the suggested constraints on
force modernization and of the idea that
they would reduce the number of heavy
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
from 308 to 150 in return for a U.S. com-
mitment not to proceed with the large MX
missile system. In terms of forces already de-
ployed, they saw themselves having to make
disproportionately larger cuts than the
United States to meet the proposed new
ceilings.
Politically, the Soviets' initial encounter
with the new administration came amid
mounting suspicions that the United States
might not be genuinely interested in detente.
Not only had the very word become taboo
in the Ford administration; a number of
agreements between the two nations had
been signed but never implemented. The
trade arrangements offered by President
Nixon in 1972 had died in the uproar over
the Jackson amendment. After arduous ne-
gotiation and signature of a Threshold Test
Ban on nuclear weapons and a Peaceful Nu-
clear Explosions accord, the United States
CIA-RDP05S00620R000200600093-2 d conception
of the ft? -ions and possibilities of nego-
tiations. I _.v we might fashion a more en-
compassing frameworks to regulate Soviet
a.^ C :_kr e tcl t I1?h.~c future stratCbis
IS t e suo ect of this essay.
In sack a concep::on. :...:e major
clemcn:s deserve to be coaid._z:: the
role strategic forces i ; crisis
(2) the need for a common strategi oc-
trine, and (3) methods for assessing stra-
tegic intentions.
Strategic Forces in Crisis Management
1. In the 15 years since the Cuban missile
crisis, the Soviet Union and the United
States have managed to avoid direct and
acute confrontations, although the near-
misses in Southeast Asia during 1972 and
the Middle East during 1973 were too
close for comfort. In this interval, the de-
veloping dialogue in the Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks (SALT), the N?lutual Bal-
anced Force Reduction talks, and elsewhere
has proved a useful form of sensitivity train-
ing. Yet, paradoxically, this relative success
in managing or avoiding crises may have
lulled the two sides into understimating the
mounting risks associated with future crises.
There is reason to believe that the next ma-
jor crisis between Moscow and Washington
could be more dangerous than any yet ex-
perienced.
The reasons for this dire prognosis have
much to do with the transformation of the
strategic balance. It is a truism that neither
had declined to submit the agreements for side should base its strategic force planning
Senate ratification. When months of diplo
primarily on analysis of the worst case
macy produced a compromise formula to which might arise, but both nations need
implement the Vladivostok provisions, Pres to recognize that they are veering toward a
ident Ford had yielded to Pentagon objet- worst case" which cries for alert study and
tions and passed up the opportunity, as he
joint resolution.
later acknowledged with regret. Consider the context of a future crisis in
In this context and faced with a new the Middle East, Africa, or in some other
team on the American side, it was hardly arena where. the two sides' interests clash.
surprising that Brezhnev insisted on pin- The Soviet Union is bound to enter that
ping down the details of the Vladivostok engagement with vivid recollections of
Agreement before moving on to more am Khrushchev's demeaning backdown in the
bitious tasks. With the interim agreement 1962 missile crisis. Indeed, some analysts
on strategic offensive weapons running out explain much of Soviet behavior in the in-
in October 1977, there now appears no real tervening years as a determined effort to
option other than to concentrate on a rela- overcome the strategic disadvantages so often
tively modest agreement within the Vladi cited to explain President Kennedy's success
vostok framework. There remains room for in pressuring the Soviet government to re-
compromise. Although the Soviets did not move the missiles from Cuba.
accept the U.S. plan to exempt cruise mis- Having invested a decade and a half and
siles, an initial agreement could include only countless billions of roubles to achieve rough
air-launched cruise missiles and count any equivalence with U.S. strategic might, the
bombers carrying them as ~IIRV launchers Soviet Union may well enter that future
under the Vladivostok ceilings. Action on crisis with a felt need to demonstrate that
sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles its costly nuclear deployments are worth
could await the next phase of negotiations, their weight in political leverage. The tech-
as could questions concerning the Backfire nical and party bureaucracies which have
bomber. Under this arrangement, it would led the campaign for the massive Soviet
be important to suspend testing and deploy- build-up will be impelled to demonstrate
ment of the latter systems for perhaps three that all the sacrifices of these years arc jus-
years, while possible limitations are oval- tified. There will be tremendous pressures
uated. on the Soviet Ie adershi p not to back down.
The crucial goal now is,wrap up an agree- not to yI Id, not to accommodate. In short.
ment quickly in order to regain momentum there is likely to be maximum compulsion
the ocess "1 I' conside atio n or On i"losc0"' xtr
hues for early ratification of the threshold from the crisis. -s i ncli^atien could be
ban on nuclear weapons tests and the re- even stronger k.vit2 the suc,:ession of a new
la d pact on peaceful nuclear explosions. generation Soviet leaders more confident
i en if these outstanding agreements are .~l Soviet cower and less mindful of the
implemented, however. they will impart trauma of the Second World War.
only slight impetus to the ponderous process But look at the United States posture
of chapping a stable equilibrium between when facing such a contingency. Having
the two superpowers. To divine a path to- acknowledged Soviet achievement of stra-
ward genuine Approved For Release 2009/06/17: CIA-RDP05S00620R000200600093-2 t?idespread
 ILL,IL~ i11U111~'llltlln IJ \1'llll i\ll)ti, lfonal Systems whose deployment would not
co\v, l)ingtc Approved For Release 2009/06/17: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000200600093-2 1 nuclear
to cc Ill that %%-capons we eing 17 COllgI:C into position.
fit iU .n the .strate,e bai.i ce ijaV~ It IS, a, er extremel
given :mprobablc that
one Un_on jawonted political lever- nuc':car weapons
a. ....... ...... One of the n-,: promising ways to dim-
inih threats to the survivability of land-
based missiles would be for the Soviet Union
and the United States to limit the number
of missiles tests to a small annual quota:
the Carter administration has suggested six
tests a year, but the number should be ne-
gotiable. This could slow the trend toward
hard-target silo killers.
> The parties might usefully restrict such
tests to missile systems already deployed or
firmly scheduled for deployment in the very
near future, e.g., the Trident I missile and
the SS-16. New re-entry vehicles designed
for the greater accuracies needed to attack
missile silos, as well as maneuvering re-en-
try vehicles, could be prohibited.
> All tests of ballistic missiles should take
place over agreed ranges with prior notifica-
tion of the launch site, missile type. and im-
pact area.
> To avoid suspicion that space launches
may be used to cover clandestine tests. >L Ios-
cow and Washington should also undertake
to exchange information regarding planned
space lunches. including the time and loca-
tion of launches, booster configuration, pay-
load, mission profile, and orbital parameters.
> There should also be agreement that no
more than one test missile should be fired
within a 24 hour period. in order to reduce
apprehension about the occasional multiple
launches which the Soviet Union has made.
If tests are launched from operational sites,
as has occurred, the launcher's geographic co-
ordinates should be identified in advance.
> Furthermore, to ward off sneak attacks
on bomber bases and other priority targets,
neither side should test missiles in a " de-
oraed-trajectory" mom
L n dcrtakings of this nature would par-
alicl and expand upon the test restrictions
accepted by both governments in the A3M
treaty, which contains a host of qualitative
limitations on antiballistic missile tests. The,,
STAT
STAT
-r of inc i t' i l agree ,lit on A'leasures to
CIA-RDP05S00620R000200600093-2 )f Nuclear
War in wh _ach party promised to notify
the other c. pia nned missile launches "if
such launch cs wil! extend beyond its na-
tional , rrrcirV n r :r:nn of the other
OaCt'? . L ..~C` ,,;5 art . ` . 1cot. the Soviet
7 7 -.once of
ss::e ._5a '. hose irrin areas have been
in There should be no continuous track-
ing of SLBM boats, particularly by hunter-
killer submarines.
> The two sides might also wish to give
further study to the creation of possible
sanctuaries for such boats into which no an-
-tisubmarine warfare -(ASW) forces would
penetrate.
> A valuable quantitative control would
be an agreed ceiling on the number of hunt-
er-killer submarines capable of threatening
the missile-launching platforms. Lest some
breakthrough in detection and tracking ex-
pose SLB~i boats to destruction, the ratio of
hunter-killer submarines to strategic missile-
launching submarines should not exceed two
to one.
Admittedly, these suggestions would im-
pose some constraints on conventional ASW
capabilities, but their value as strategic indi-
cators should justify their acceptance.
The existing commitment of both sides
not to interfere with each others' "national
technical means of verification" invites ad-
ditional assurances on that front.
> Beyond general agreement not to inter-
fere with observation satellites, the govern-
ments should consider a flat prohibition on
development and testing of satellite kill-
ers." Again, this concern is re ecteL dL in the
recent U.S. proposals and in one of the
working groups created at i`v-loscow.
> They should specifically prohibit a close
approach by one country's satellite to that
of another without prior notification and
full description of the approaching satel-
lite's mission and capabilities.
> It becomes increasingly essential for the
two sides not to perform high-energy laser
or particle beam tests in outer space.
> Equally important. they should agree
not to s i,n in space large nuclear reactors
or other power sources capable of generating
threatening levels of laser output sir par-
tict:kr-beams. The purpose here is not only
to protect deployed satelli s, but to enforce
the agreed interpretation of the ABM treaty
to seek specific limitations on potential ABM
systems "based on other physical principles-
than those of interceptor missiles.
At the same time. actin, on lines set forth
in the 1959 A gears::c .:c: and :she 1967
ban on basing Weapccs of ,-:ass destruction
In outer S^acc. . , 1. attic: Scares and the
Soviet t:inn wood do weii to establish
:,lutual visitation :: j to facilities operat-
Ing in space- r-or many years tney have car-
ried out amicable mutual inspections of their
bases on the scuts float continent.
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 i,roposed rule Approved For Release 2009/06/17: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000200600093-2 tom tllOre
i r :)iltt Visits to .paCe statoar" mci older
;; ;nade ob,ts orbiting the rth. Here
-11C ;oi;,t space .r lion of 1975 is a helpful STAT
ca: or of :__....._4 and political feasibil-
_ s~.tab'.-
V., icl..
> There s'. ould be ex,,-''1c r a ......._..
ioint visits to sat____.es. _ estruc-
terna ins~ecdom ~~, e oermis-
,ibI
\Vhcre sat~llitcs are inaccesiblc to visits
:,} joint screws, e.g.. in zones of danger-
ous radiation, procedures should be drawl
for remote inspection on an agreed sched
ule by unmanned satellites equipped for op
tical, electromagnetic, and other radiation
measurements.
Arrangements of this character will in-
volve costs in information which could in-
crease the vulnerability of satellites to coun-
termeasures in time of conflict. Nevertheless,
since some of the gravest threats to stability
on earth may emerge from development in
space, it behooves us to operate there on the
principle of maximum disclosure. Ideally, as
confidence grows between the parties, a sim-
pier system of pre-launch inspection of all
space payloads would be preferable and much
less expensive.
Within this framework of interlocking as-
surances, the so-called Threshold Test Ban
on nuclear weapons, signed in 1974 but not
vet ratified, takes on a different aspect. Evi-
dently, a comprehensive prohibition on tests
holds more promise for promoting antipro-
liferation policies. Carter's suggestion of a
complete Soviet-American nuclear test mor-
atorium for a period of years and his will-
ingness to proceed in this direction whether
or not China and France adhere promptly
are sound initiatives to discourage further
spread of nuclear weapons. However, the
threshold ban and related protocol. together
with subsequent arrangements on peaceful
nuclear explosions, include quite significant
provisions for exchange of detailed informa-
tion regarding the geology and seismic char-
acteristics of specified test sites, as well as
calibration data or, the yield, time, depth,
and coordinates of particular tests. The peace-
ful nuclear explosions agreement contem-
plates actual foreign inspection of multiple
detonations whose total yield exceeds the
threshold of 150 kilotons. These are quite
extraordinary precedents, and pending sat-
STAT
isfactory arrangements for a comprehensive
ban, they justify acceptance of the accords,
especially sine:. American procrastination in
ratifying the pacts has provoke Soviet sus-
picion.
In shaping multiple indicators as a guide
to strategic intentions, one's attitude may
change regarding the usefulness of limits on
bases for certain deployed forces. Analysts
have been cautious in weighing such notions
as the possibility that the Soviet Backfire
bomber. which has been a source of great,
contention, might be denied an interconti-
nental potential by confining it to designated
zon:. Ai- '-furling. it is thou0ht, could still
make possible one-way strikes on the United
States with recovery of the planes in Cuba.
Yet, if the Soviets genuinely wish to dem-
onstrate that the Backfire is strictly a thta.~;
ueao n, a combination of limits on tauter
aircraft capabilities and clear ind cations twat
the plane would be based ;.veil out or range
:1crtlleriy D '-S. nllgbt
Stmllar '. there are to be Mobile land-
based all. the :.Lo sides should re-
s --- >s and w :Zi:old them from
other
missile is tro_J:~i :n:. , perna:s ...a- -
a
able. A\ ashin,ton should) uress ~,ios=r. -j
spell out Its full plans for the system, and
should determine whether the Soviets pi
compensating reductions in older intermedi-
ate range ballistic missile forces in Europe.
Most importantly, the United States should
urge that ,'vlosco,~w confine each missile to an
agreed block of territory, possibly 25 to 50
square miles in size and with no fully en-
closed revetments. Limited mobility within
such sectors would afford ample survivabil-
ity but could facie litate the accounting neces-
sary for arms control. In addition, to prevent
conversion of this missile to intercontinental
capabilities. its canister dimensions should be
fixed and there should be neither testing nor
retrofitting of an additional stage on such
rockets. Such schemes are in several respects
inadequate as limits on capabilities but, in
conjunction with other measures, they could
be useful indicators. Any movement of the
designated systems into forbidden zones
would then provide strategic warning of
hostile intentions.
The most important factor in weighing
a "multiple-indicators" approach may well
lie in an emerging shift in Soviet psychol-
ogy. As strategic parity has materialized, the
major argument for Moscow's resistance to
greater disclosure of its capabilities-the per-
sistent fear of exposing its weakness-has
surely declined. Thus. one contrasts the tra- _
ditrtilal Sviet attacks on Western inspection
proposals with more recent hints of a will-
ingness to offer necessary assurances for faith-
ful compliance with arms control agree-
ments. Confidence-building measures seem to
have become more negotiable, whether one
speaks of prior announcements of military
maneuvers in Central Europe. arrangements
to avoid incidents among naval forces in the
open seas, hookups of the two nations'
manned spacecraft and visits to key space fa-
cilities, exchange of meteorological. geolog-
ical, and seismic data relevant to military
assessments, or even the prospective on-site
inspection of certain nuclear explosions. No
one should understimate the psychological
advances to which these agreements testify.
A concerted effort to fathom strategic inten-
tions may now be both prudent and prac-
tical.
,ortunately. the current American pres-
ident seems instinctively to perceive this fact.
He has already alluded to hs interest in a
number of the proposals mentioned here-
limits on missiic tests, antisatellite technol-
o,y, the comprehensive nuclear test ban, and
other ideas. Obviously, some of these con-
cepts are more significant- than others, some
are
But their coiiec:ive ou:wei-hs their
individual fat::: es. _ e ae :er e o: a
si_ Abe :`:ac:.an :-_se s_;;csti.;-s would
_.,.,rd umj:eccde-._ed rnsights into the ke-
iy strategic behavior of cormr:g decades.
STAT
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 Approved For Release 2009/06/17: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000200600093-2
It may b,: that Ca:._ =
quainta nce with nuclear teclinola. w;l1
si:aat;on.
ct.._. -a: zr t :.. _.._ r e ea: age has
such ._....i!i. rity , : r... arc. Carter
seems less intimidated by such issues and per-
haps less vulnerable to distorted presenta-
tions of the technical intelligence on which
national security decisions rest so heavily.
He clearly displays a special sensitivity to. the
dangers of the nuclear age and 'a firm dedica-
tion to meeting them responsibly. These
qualities may enable the first president of
America's third century to move boldly
where others have trod but timidly.
Jack London once wrote of "the men-
acing truce that marks the meeting of wild
beasts that prey." The United States and
the Soviet Union have been locked in such
a truce for a full generation. It is a fate un-
fit for human beings. The task for the next
generation is to transform that truce into a
more affirmative and more secure relation-
ship. To banish fear is too much to expect.
but to govern strategic capabilities and to
mold compatible i ,cr.tions arc well within
our reach.
The goal is to impose mutual assured re-
straint upon mutual assured destruction. The
irony may be that, as another student has
put it, we must have both, or we shall have
neither.
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