PERSPECTIVES ON AFGHANISTAN

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• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 15, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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CURRE
SPECIAL EDITION
15 September 1987 No. 1631
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Military Review
The Professional Journal of the US Army
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July 1987 Pgs. 52-72
Articles
Perspectives on Afghanistan:
2 The Forces in Conflict
by Captain Charles G. Wheeler,
US Marine Corps
6 The Evolution of Soviet Military
Doctrine
by First Lieutenant Kip McCormick,
US Army
PERSPECTIVES ON
=IMO&
STAT
For the past seven years or .so, Soviet military operations in Afghanistan have
received varying degrees of notice in the Western news media. Since the ini-
tial invasion, interest only peaks during Olympic boycotts, debates orer aid
and the alleged Soviet use of chemical weapons?routine operations without
dramatic results take a backseat to items of more immediate concern in the
United States. But the lighting continues. These articles look at the fmves in-
volved and the tactical doctrines employed by these forces in Afghanistan. It
appears that the lighting may continue for some time.
Herbert J. Coleman, Chief, 1 urrent ews Analysis & Research Service
(SAF /AA) 695-21t84
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The
Forces
in Conflict
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Afshmistm
Captain
Charles G. Wheeler,
US Marine Corps
SOVIET forces invaded Afghanistan at
Christmastime 1979 and have been
bogged down ever since. This is a result of
many factors, not the least of which is the fe-
rocious opposition by the numerous mujahi-
din groups fighting within Afghanistan. To
the extent that the world, and particularly
the American public, is aware of the war in
Afghanistan, it is probably most cognizant
of the courageous nature of the mujahidin.
Much of the US news coverage conveys
the image of brave but poorly armed Afghan
resistance members frustrating Soviet at-
tempts to conquer and pacify their country.
While this image is largely valid, it may also
be misleading if it causes people to believe
that the Soviets are experiencing "their
Vietnam" and will ultimately withdraw.
Given the composition of the forces fighting
in Afghanistan and the approximate stabili-
ty of other variables, the Soviets will proba-
bly achieve victory though not in the near
term. An analysis of the forces in Afghani-
stan will show why this outcome is likely.
The composition of Soviet forces in Af-
ghanistan has undergone an evolutionary
process. The Soviets initially used poorly
trained and equipped units to back up the
airborne units involved in the initial take-
over. However, by early 1980, these units
were replaced with more standard units.'
While it is difficult to get accurate numbers
of anything relative to the situation in Af-
2
ghanistan, various rough estimates are
available. It has been reported that approxi-
mately 118,000 Soviet troops are in Afghan-
istan. Most of these are in Soviet motorized
rifle divisions, but others include about
10,000 paratroops and 5,000 air assault
troops. Spetsnaz, or special purpose forces,
have been introduced to work mainly
among mujahidin forces to spread confu-
sion, terror and suspicion!
Soviet forces in Afghanistan make consid-
erable use of air power, particularly helicop-
ters, of which they probably have at least,
600. About 250 of these are the heavily ar-
mored Mi-24 Hind helicopters.' Various
types of fixed-wing fighters, bombers and
attack aircraft are also employed against
the mujahidin. About 950 of these are sta-
tioned in Afghanistan, and roughly as many
more, based in the Soviet Union, are availa-
ble to fly missions in Afghanistan.'
Soviet soldiers are reported to serve about
18 months in Afghanistan. Living condi-
tions are poor, with only about 20 percent of
the troops being housed in permanent
dwellings. Morale is low. Drug abuse and al-
cohol abuse appear to be rampant, and Sovi-
et soldiers are said to sell military equip-
ment to buy heroin and hashish.6
As for Soviet casualties in Afghanistan, a
wide range of figures are available. While
the Soviet government has publicly admit-
ted to very few soldiers killed there since the
beginning of the invasion, a likely figure is
roughly 10,000 dead with 30,000 casual-
ties.'
But what of the fighting ability of the So-
viet troops? They have generally shown a
lack of initiative and aggressiveness
throughout the war.' The massive firepow-
er inherent in their units and their willing-
ness to use this firepower indiscriminately
somewhat offsets what they lack in guerril-
la fighting skills. John Keegan provides
some insight into the crude and brutally ef-
fective way in which the Soviets employ
their inherent superiority in firepower:
Effectively, what the Russians did from
1982 onward was deem the whole of rural
Afghanistan a free-fire zone, with the aim of
driving the country people into the cities (a
million have been displaced in that direc-
tion) or out of the country altogether. But not
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amemnir.
even the cities were safe. One third of Qanda-
har was destroyed by artillery bombardment
as early as June of 1981. . . . In addition, over
the past two years the Soviets have instituted
a severe form of economic warfare against
the resistance which some observers think
poses the gravest threat to its ability to con-
tinue the war.. . . Their devilishly ingenious
tactics have included destroying crops out-
right by napalming the farmers' fields and
sowing anti-personnel mines to discourage
the farmer from reclaiming them, smashing
the primitive but vital irrigation systems.8
Since the beginning of the war, the Sovi-
ets have attempted to train and use Afghan
government troops in furthering Soviet
ends, but they have met with considerable
difficulty. Desertions are rampant, a not
surprising fact given the unpopularity of
the Soviet invasion. Also, considerable
numbers of the Afghan forces actually spy
for the mujahidin or otherwise assist
them.?
Another area in which the Afghan puppet
government poses a greater threat to the
mujahidin is the KHAD, or secret police. Al-
though rife with factionalism, it is able, nev-
ertheless, to spread terror and suspicion.
The KHAD is patterned after the Soviet
KGB (Committee of State Security) and re-
ceives considerable guidance and training
from it.
The KHAD has from 15,000 to 20,000 per-
sonnel. It is suspected of such activity as ar-
rests and torture of civil servants, teachers
and others. It foments confusion and discon-
tent in refugee camps in Pakistan and infil-
trates resistance groups to aggravate exist-
ing divisions between them as well as to ob-
tain intelligence on their activities.'?
Another program that presents an omi-
nous potential threat to the mujahidin in
the future is the training young Afghans are
undergoing in the Soviet Union. They are
being trained to become officers or bureau-
crats for the puppet government." Thou-
sands of them are receiving training at the
university level.'2 Because this program
will not pay off for the Soviets in the very
near term, the training is a strong indica-
tion that the Soviets are in Afghanistan for
the long haul.
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The program also may lead to the in-
creased appearance of legitimacy of the Af-
ghan government as it becomes more effec-
tive with the return of these Afghans from
the Soviet Union. Such an appearance could
possibly lead to a decrease in foreign aid t
the mujahidin if their cause is seen to ho
weaker than when they were battling a
more visible Soviet presence.
As for the Afghan resistance, its members
have fought the Soviets to something of a
stalemate, largely through sheer contwe
and unwavering determination. These
qualities, however, are not likely to be de-
pleted soon, not as long as there are mujahi -
din to fight:
The Soviets can, with their economic icor-
fare, denude Afghanistan of its people, but
they can't stop most of the able-bodied mole
refugees from returning as Mujahidirz for o
time and making the occupation a misccl
with more and more foreign-supplied teeop-
ons. Nor can they expect the Afghan fightcr.c
to abandon the war as a lost cause?not uttit
their history of ferocious resistance to -
vaders, and not when recovery of their collo -
try has become their whole raison d'?e.''
The combat effectiveness of the various
rnujahidin groups varies, to a large extent,
according to their armament. It is difficult
to estimate the amount of outside aid the
rebels receive. However, some say the In uio
hidin have received up to .000 million in aid
from the United States since 1979, with
about $250 million more projected. Most of
this aid is in the form of Soviet block weap-
ons bought in the Middle East. Addition-
ally, other nations, particularly Saudi Ara-
bia and China, funnel roughly $100 million
a year to the mujahidin."
While many mujahidin carry Soviet
AK47 assault rifles, others carry obsolete
weapons, such as old shotguns, or even no
weapons at all until some become available,
often from Soviet or Afghan army deserters
or from battles.'5
Roughly 40 different mujahidin groups
exist within Afghanistan. These groups
have about 120,000 men though this num-
ber can rise to possibly 250,000 during re-
cruiting campaigns. These numbers, how-
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ever, are extremely difficult to estimate ac-
curately.'"
Afghanistan is composed of seven ethnic
groups (see accompanying map) speaking
23 different languages.'' In May 1985, seven
of the mujahidin groups formed an alliance,
the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan, based in
Peshawar, Pakistan. There is some reason
to believe that this alliance exists more for
appearances rather than for real unity.'"
When it comes to fighting the Soviets, "Old
rivalries and diverging interests among the
groups often impede cooperation on the bat-
tlefield."'"
A growing number of rebel leaders are
showing increased tactical and organiza-
tional skills," particularly the young and
relatively famous Ahmed Shah Massoud.2'
However, cooperation among rebel groups
still has a long way to go if thekare to maxi-
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mize their effectiveness against the Soviets.
Besides equipment and armament deficien-
cies and internal bickering, most of the mu -
jahidin groups lack junior leaders and non-
commissioned officers with sufficient tacti-
cal and technical expertise."2 This should
net be surprising since Afghans are rural,
village-oriented people and not soldiers (un-
til recently).
Insofar as mujahidin casualties are con-
cerned, they are estimated at between
50,000 and 100,000. There are possibly as
many civilian casualties.'" Clearly, in a
country which, until the war began, had a
population of about 15 million people and
has. about 170,000 men under arms at most
times, these figures represent. a significant
drain on the manpower available to the mu -
jahidin. This personnel picture is further
aggravated by the economic warfare being
6
4
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,? - s.E?tL FDITION -- 15 SEPTEMBER 1987,
. waged by the Soviets:
For this reason, resistance leaders some-
times see their manpower levels drop as the
farmer/fighters put down the rifle and pick
up the spade to help raise food for their fami-
lies."
The widespread and indiscriminate war-
fare being perpetrated by the Soviet Union
has resulted in the formation of a huge refu-
gee population. About one-third of the pre-
war population are refugees,25 with most liv-
ing in Pakistan. A sizable portion, more
than one million, are living in Iran:26 Natu-
rally, this situation is a serious handicap to
the mujahidin as it represents a significant
loss of potential aid. The guerrillas' struggle
En survive hampers their ability to fight.
It would also seem that displaced Afghans
face a significant shock to their culture as
they are uprooted from their familiar villag-
es and tribes to live in refugee camps. Per-
haps over time this situation will have a
negative impact on the desires of these refu-
gees to return to Afghanistan to fight for vil-
lages which no longer exist and tithes which
have been scattered.
-` The rebels show no desire to capitulate to
the Soviets in spite of a tremendous disad-
vantage in firepower. The mujahidin's ag-
gressiveness and dedication have served
them well so far. However, over the long
term, the mujahidin face serious problems
that will probably result in their defeat if
unchecked. Some of the problems are a
dwindling manpower pool, the debilitating
efiects of prolonged economic warfare on
their ability to fight, a need for more and
better weapons, and the inability of rebel
groups to cooperate. The Soviets, on the oth-
er hand, have an almost unlimited ability to
rotate fresh troops into Afghanistan for an
indefinite period of time. The Soviets have
shown that they are ruthless enough to use
their firepower in barbaric but ultimately
effective ways. And, finally:
It is important to remember that the effects
of a terror campaign at cumulative. W title
the initial reaction may Nei the intensity of
the insurgency, over the long run terror saps
the most vital resource of any resistance --
hope. Mechanistic slaughter unrelated to
cause and effect, not just against combatants
but women and children, not for days but lar
years or even decades, can enervate even the
bravest and most committed Mujahidin. It is
a method of coercion that the Soviets have el -
evated to an art form.27
NOTES
1 James B. Curren and Phillip A. K arbor, "Afghanistan's Ordeal Puts a
Region at Risk," Armed Forces Journal International, March 1985, p79.
2 -That's a Russian in Disguise," The Economist, 26 October 1985, pp
46-48.
3 Albert A. Stahel and Paul Bucherer, Afghanistan: Five Years of Resist-
ance and Guerrilla Warfare, Freedom Policy Foundation, Washington, D.C.,
1984, p8.
4 Curren and Karber, op. Cir., p83
5 Stahel and Bucherer, op. cit., p It
6 Bob Horton, "Afghanistan:A Holy-War Stalemate," U.S. News & World
Report, 23 September 1985, p37
7 Stahel and Bucherer, op. cit.
8 John Keegan, The Ordeal of Alghanistan," The Atlantic Monthly, No-
vember 1985, p 103.
9 Hidden War. The Struggle for Afghanistan, Staff Report for Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Congress, Second Session, US Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, DC.. April 1984, p17.
10 "Afghanistan: Four Years of Occupation," Department of State Butte-
ttn, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., December 1983, p 77.
It Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Hayden, -Antquerrilla Wartare?Soviet
Style,- Pro' endings, November 1985, p 121.
12 Hidden War The Struggle for Afghanistan, op cif p 20.
13 Keegan, op cd., p 105
14 "U S.-Pakistan Tres Show Signs of Strain," U.S News &World Report,
9 Septerriter 1985, pp 51-52.
15 Stahel and Bucherer, op. c,t, p 17
16 Keeq.in. op oil. pp 101-2
17 Curren and Kerber, op cit. p91
18 Mark Whitaker and Frank Gibney Jr A New Soviet Offensive...
Newsweek. 9 September 1985. pp 40-44.
19 Horton, op. cit.
20 Hidden War. The Struggle for Afghanistan. op cit., op 22-23
21 The Return of a Charismatic Rebel, Newsweek, 23 Der. 1985. p34
22 Stahel and Bucherer, op cif p 20
23 Honon, op. cot
24 Cur' en and Karber, op. cit
25 /bid p 94.
26 Stahel and Bucherer, op, cit, p22
27 Curl en and Kerber, op. cif , p94
Captain Charles G. Wheeler, US Marine Corps.
is the repairable ntateriiil section officer Marine
Aircraft Group 29, Mantle Corps Air Station, Nell'
River, North Carolina. Ile receiver/ a B.S. from die
University of North Carolina and is a graduate of
the Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, Vir-
ginia.
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The
Evolution
of Soviet
Military
Doctrine
A A At 41 I I
AfSt MiSt
First Lieutenant
Kip McCormick,
US Army
AS A CONCENTRATION of motorized
rifle divisions crossed the Soviet-
Afghan border at Termez and moved south
toward the capital of Kabul, fixed-wing
combat aircraft of the civilian airline
Aeroflot were landing with troops and
equipment at the Kabul airport. It was De-
cember 1979 and, contrary to the beliefs of
Soviet military planners, the beginning of
a long stay in the hostile environment of
Afghanistan.
As the United States did in Korea and
Vietnam, the Soviets underestimated the
strength of their adversary and the unreli-
ability of the armed forces which they were
supporting. The Soviets perceived Afghani-
stan as another Hungary or Czechoslavakia
in which conventional armor-dominated
military doctrine could be used to settle un-
rest. They were not prepared for the type of
warfare necessary to defeat the resistance
in Afghanistan. Until the invasion of Af-
ghanistan, the Soviet military had centered
its military doctrine on past experiences of
World War II and planned its doctrinal ap-
plication to the flat plains of Europe.
Afghanistan posed a problem for Soviet
tactics. The Afghan military force was and
still remains unreliable?the number of de-
sertions continues to rise with evcry mili-
tary incursion. The Afghan terrain, with its
mountains and desert climate, also posed
problems?it was nothing like the Europe-
an plains. The Afghan terrain has made
past incursions by foreign powers costly and
is a shelter for members of the local resist-
ance. Another problem is that the fluor hi -
din, or "freedom fighters," use a type of
guerrilla warfare unlike the tactics em-
ployed in the conventional operations to
which the Soviets are accustomed.
The Soviets failed to realize that, in gti -
rilla warfare, there is no such thing as a de-
cisive battle?small units act independent-
ly with minor centralized control. So the
Soviet military has been forced to adapt
itself to the guerrilla tactics. This adapt a-
tion consists of three stages of Soviet Mili-
tary involvement in Afghanistan: a period
of conventional warfare, a period of small
unit offensive sweeps and a period of spec
operations. Although some aspects of mili-
tary doctrine in each period filter into emu -
ing stages, each stage has its own character-
istics that distinguish it from the others.
STAGE ONE:
Conventional Warfare
The first stage of involvement, roughly
dating from December 1979 to fall 1980, was
a period marked by conventional warfare
during which the Soviets intended to break
the mujahidin wherever they would stand
and fight. To confront the resistance, the So-
viets used force structures and military doc-
trine that did not match the situation in Af-
ghanistan. in hopes that a show of force
would break the in tijahiclin and quell the re-
bellion, the Soviets massed forces when con-
ducting military operations.
But confronting a guerrilla force with di -
vision-level operations quickly proved inef-
ficient. The Soviets learned that armored
personnel carriers and infantry fighting ye -
hides were not the best means of combat
transportation when pursuing an insur-
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gent. Because the road network in Afghani-
stan is limited and quickly destroyed by
tank treads, Soviet supply trucks were im-
mobilized. Hence, the Soviets moved toward
light forces, using combined arms rein-
forced battalions and reinforced regiments
as their main elements for pursuing the mu-
jahidin.2
The move toward lighter operations in-
corporated the use of the air force as the
prime source of mobility and maneuverabil-
ity of both personnel and weaponry. The So-
viets realized that, because of the complex
problems caused by the Afghan terrain, on-
ly a small number of combat vehicles could
be used effectively and could travel along
the narrow roads and mountain passes to a
position from which they would fire at the
enemy.'
The Soviets' eventual reliance on aviation
was also due to the successful inujahidin
tactics used when engaging Soviet convoys
in the mountains. When rebels would am-
bush Soviet convoys, they would disable the
first vehicle, blocking the route for the en-
tire column. They would then destroy the
last vehicle in the column, leaving the en-
tire convoy in the difficult position of de-
fending itself from a lower elevation than
the rebels.'
Another characteristic of this first stage
of involvement was the use of Central
Asians in the Soviet invasion force and as a
combat force. The invasion force consisted of
large numbers of Kazaks, Tajiks, Turkmen
and Uzbeks. When the Soviets invaded Af-
ghanistan, they wanted to play a limited
role in the conflict by providing air cover, oc-
cupying cities, and securing lines of coin-
munication and major road networks. This
limited role was easily affordable through
the use of Central Asians located on the So-
viet-Afghan border.
The Central Asians were located close to
the military objectives. Also, because of
Central Asia's isolation from European
Russia, coupled with the view held by the
Kremlin that Central Asians are second-
class citizens, domestic opinion of develox-
i,pments in Afghanistan would not play as
large a role in any decisionmaking. This
would make the legitimization of the war
easier. Logistics played a part in the deci-
sion to use the Central Asian invading force,
but the main reason the Central Asian con-
scripts were used was that the Soviets hoped
that the Afghan population would react fa-
vorably to co-ethnics from the Soviet Union
coming to the aid of their government.
The composition of the Afghan population
was extremely similar to the invading Cen-
tral Asian forces. Out of 20 million Afghans,
there were six million 1 'uslituns and a MI
jority of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen. The
Soviets felt the Central Asians won hi ap-
peal to the hearts and mindsofthe Afghans.
but this required members of the same
tribes to combat one another if the popula-
tion did not react favorably.
Thus, instead of throwing down their
weapons when they saw their Muslim
brothers of the Soviet Union defending the
Soviet-backed regime of Babrak Karmal,
the mujahidin !Ought even more di Ii -gent
Making the situation worse, the Soviet-
Central Asians began leaving pack iges of
weapons and ammunition for their co-et h -
nic Afghan tribesmen with whom they had a
common bond?Islam.' This Islamid lot ion -
alism motivated a large number of Afghans
and galvanized the opposition, thus stimu-
lating the resistance movement.
Robert L. Canfield summarizes the Soviet-
Muslim id Afghanistan when he writes:
Because oldie on of the Sm-o?i
Muslim peoples to assimilate the Soviet sy, -
tern and the possibilit V of their being itwi
by the restive populations south of their /wr
ders, the Soviets must remain in Afghan,
start until they hare quelled all oppositioo,
they cannot allow their Muslim subjects to!,
encouraged by mujahideen victories.'
Realizing that their in doctrine wa
unsuitable for Afghanistan, the Soviets in i
tiated a second stage of small-unit offensive
sweeps. This period extended from winter
1980 to spring 1983.' During this stage of in
the Soviets fully integrated t he
use of helicopters, heliborne assaults and
chemical weapons into these small-unit of-
fensive sweeps.
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STAGE TWO:
Small-Unit Offensive Sweeps
One of the most important characteristics
of this period was the increased dependence
of the Soviet occupying force on the com-
bined arms reinforced battalion WARM as
the core subunit of the Soviet force." A
CARD comprises an artillery battery, three
motorized rifle companies, a tank company
and a variety of specialized supporting
units. Included in supporting these units is
the Soviet air force. The CARB is given the
task of deep offensive sweeps into suspected
rebel-controlled areas, with the hopes of
eliminating guerrilla activity against Sovi-
et installations and forces.'"
With the CARB, the Soviets are perfect-
ing the art of combined arms warfare. The
significant characteristic of this warfare is
the use of the helicopter for fire support:
As the helicopters concentrate their fire on
specific point objectives, assault helicopters
land specially trained air assault (desanD
detachments on these objectives, support-
ing them with fire. These desant detach-
nzents capture choke-points and controlling
heights in the rear of the enemy. They then
facilitate the advance of the main forces of the
GARB, and sometimes conduct a multiple
pincer attack with them on main defensive or
significant objectives of the enemy."
During this stage, the Soviets used fixed-
wing aircraft such as MiG2 I and M iG23 to
attack with rockets and napalm, and then
the Al i -24 helicopter gunship delivered
rocket and machinegun fire, which was ,
quickly followed by troop insertion by Mi-5'
helicopters. These troops conducted search-
and-destroy missions and pushed the muja-
hidin back into their rocky defensive
strongholds in the mountains.''
The reason for driving the mujahidin
back into the Afghan mountains was to
starve them into submission. The Soviets
forced the niujahidin from the Afghan fer-
tile valleys and strategic roads by means of
aerial bombardments. The Soviets then es-
tablished a security zone by depopulating
the area. The intent was to force the peas-
ants either into the cities or out of Afghani-
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stan, allowing the Soviets to better control
the population."
Another characteristic of this second
stage was a tactic from World War II that is
still effectively being used today?the en-
veloping detachment. According to the Sovi-
et definition, the enveloping detachment
can vary in size from a platoon to a regi-
ment. It is administratively self-contained.
and its mission is "to envelope the enemy
with the aim of striking him in the flanks
and rear in order to seize his positions."
The Soviets specifically define the envelop-
ing detachment as an offensive formation
that lends itself to difficult terrain:
Depending on the trafficability of the, ter-
rain, the enveloping detachment is normally
composed of motorized ri Ile platoons, corn -
ponies, or battalion-size elements rein/reed
with portable antitank weapons, mortars,
artillery and other specialu nits such as engi -
neer troops.'s
The enveloping detachment is flexible to
adapt to the terrain. In Afghanistan, the en-
veloping operations are conducted by air
borne and air assault forces and by motor-
ized rifle troops. The mountainous terrain
restricts the use of tanks. Tanks are normal-
ly employed only in support of infantry pla-
toons and companies." Another problem
with using tanks in the mountains is the
limited gun tube elevation on Soviet tanks
which prohibits their use against high-
angle targets:7
Although the Soviet news media have
never openly admitted the Soviet use of
chemical warfare in Afghanistan, several
publications, Voennyi Vestnik (Military
'feral& in particular, have included an in-
creasing amount of articles on chemical
warfare doctrine in mountainous regions.'"
Chemical troops provide support for en \
veloping detachments by conducting recon- \
naissance, protecting the flanks of Soviet ?r
troops from ambush during an advance /
through mountain passes and dispensing /
chemical agents into inaccessible areas
such as caves and narrow creeks.'9
Thus, airborne and airmobile enveloping
detachments have proven themselves effec-
tive. By seizing bridges, mountain passes
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and key chokepoints, enveloping detach-
ments isolate the enemy until the main
forces arrive.
Although certain areas of Soviet doctrine
have proven effective, such as the envelop-
ing detachment, Soviet doctrine generally
has been plagued by hypercentralization.
Soviet field commanders suffer from a lack
of initiative, being oversupervised and us-
ing "cookbook warfare" in which Soviet bat-
tle plans are systematically applied to all
situations."'
But, in early 1981, this began to change.
Afghanistan has provided valuable experi-
ence for field commanders, junior officers
and pilots. Although the use of personal ini-
tiative runs contrary to the centralized com-
mand structure of the Soviet army, the Sovi-
,, ets realized the need for a more flexible mili-
tary command structure that would give
authority to officers from battalion level to
company level and sometimes platoon lev-
el.' The significance of this is that, 15 years
from now, the platoon leader in Afghanistan
will be a battalion commander with combat
experience unlike that of today's Soviet bat-
talion commanders.
Another characteristic of this stage of So-
viet military involvement is the use of
scorched-earth tactics. The primary pur-
pose of this policy is to control the major cit-
ies and secure the lines of communication
while forcing the rebels into the mountains,
thus eliminating centers of rebel resistance.
In late 1980, the Soviet military divided
Afghanistan into seven geographical zones.
They were placed under the direction of a
Soviet military officer and an Afghan politi-
cal commissar who were given the authority
to use unlimited force and adopt specific tac-
tics to keep their zones under control.22
The most common of these tactics incorpo-
rated the scorched-earth policy. The Soviets
presently apply this tactic by using napalm,
bombs and artillery fire, mining harvested
fields, destroying irrigation and buying food
from peasants at higher than market prices
to destroy the mujahidin's economic base.
The Soviets also retrieve all cattle in the
free-fire zone to remove the incentive for in-
habitants to return to their areas and to
eliminate a source of food for the resist-
ance.' It has been estimated that, since this
policy was initiated in 1982, agricultural
production has been cut 20 to 25 percent of
it S preinvasion levels and has heen a cause
of nationwide famine across AlOianistan..'
The scorched-earth policy Isis forced I he
population to migrat e to Iran or Pak ista
join the resistance in exile or move to the cit -
ies. It is estimated that Kabul is three times
its prewar size because of this tactic.''' Added
to the doctrine of scorched earth has been
the use of terror tactics which range from
the use of booby-trapped toys to the leveling
of villages suspected of aiding the resist-
ance."
STAGE THREE:
Special Operations
The third stage of the Soviet involvement
began in spring 1983 and continues today. It
is distinguished by the gradual move of So-
viet.forces from ground warfare to a reliance
on special operations, leaving the bulk of
the ground warfare to Afghan armed forces
arid Soviet mechanized infantry troops.
During this period, the Soviets have used
deep-raiding special forces accompanied by
helicopters and combat aircraft. This stage
shows the Soviets have applied lessons
learned in the early stages of the Afghan
conflict and have adopted special operations
as the primary means of suppressing the re-
sistance."
The Soviets have outlined these precondi-
tions for suppressing the mujahidin:
Deep intelligence penetration and manip-
ulation of the hostile population; deep raid
ing capabilities and the ability to conduct
surgical strikes against priority objectives;
and the ability to inflict massive collateral
damage to the civilian in fro structu re rapidly
in order to erode the popular support."
As mentioned, helicopters played a major
role in the first two stages of military in-
volvement. During stage three, their role
has broadened to provide not only transpor-
tation of troops and weapons but also to
serve as a major source of firepower. Per-
haps the greatest advantage of the helicop-
ter is that it allows deep-raiding forces to
land close to, if not on, the objective. The ac-
curacy of helicopter firepower has also been
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a great asset. The helicopter is used also for
resupply, reconnaissance, fire support, and
command and control.2'
The Soviets deploy large helicopter forces
when raiding rebel strongholds. These
forces need no logistic base on site and can
be deployed up to a week at a time. Accord-
ing to Yossef Bodansky, a Soviet military
analyst:
These forces are comprised of diversified
helicopter regiments, an air assault battal-
ion (including diversified BMDs and artil-
lery pieces) and a spetsnaz (Soviet special
forces) detachment.3?
The integration of the helicopter has thus
given pilots invaluable combat experience.
But this experience has not come easily. As
one Soviet officer described it:
Flying in the mountains and above the
desert, plus the real possibility of coming un-
der fire by anti-aircraft weapons which are
making their way from Pakistan to the ban-
dits operating on Afghan territory?this is
the real training school. No wonder they say
that after a month in Afghanistan helicopter
pilots can be awarded the top proficiency rat-
ing without testing their piloting ability."
As of 1984, the mujahidin have been cred-
ited with shooting down close to 300 Soviet
helicopters by using small-arms and anti-
tank weapons.32
One of the main characteristics of the
' shift from ground warfare to special opera-
tions was the attempt to use the Afghan ar-
my for the bulk of ground warfare. But the
Soviets encountered the same problems
they experienced at the beginning of their
occupation in Afghanistan. The most signif-
icant problem was the unreliable Afghan
army. This has forced the Soviets to use
their elite airborne units and Spetsnaz units
for deep raids and special operations while
using their mechanized infantry troops to
carry on ground warfare.
This has proven costly. For example, it
was estimated in 1981 that the Soviet Union
was spending approximately $10 million
per day in Afghanistan. This figure is pres-
ently $12 million per day and is increasing.33
The number of troops necessary to conduct
? special operations is less than the number
? needed to conduct ground warfare. The ne-
PINIM
cessity to use Soviet mechanized infantry
troops has, therefore, caused a need for in-
creased expenditures in Afghanistan.
The fact that the Soviets decreased the Af-
ghan army participation in joint military
operations in 1983 reveals the lack of trust
the Soviets have in the Afghan army. There
exists a highly paid civilian militia in Af-
ghanistan also, but it is just as unreliable?
"nearly 3000 militiamen defected to the re-
sistance in the fall of 1984, and resistance
leaders regard the militia as one of its prime
sources of weapons."'"
Although the mujahidin are loosely orga-
nized, they operate from platoon to regimen-
tal strength in the field. They usually oper-
ate in groups of 30 to 40 men and, according
to one Afghan army officer, prefer "to use
ambushes by bridges, or in defiles. They de-
stroy the bridge and block the road, and then
open fire from the commanding heights."
In every case, the mujahidin ambush and
then withdraw quickly. Although this pro-
hibits the resistance from establishing ef-
fective control over any area, it allows them
to continue harassment of the Soviet forces
with minimal casualties or captures for the
rnujahidin.
A problem experienced by the mujahidin
is that they are disunited and lack the cohe-
siveness of an effective military force. This
disunity has been manifested by centuries
of intertribal warfare. But disunity can
have its advantages. The rnujahidin are not
united around one leader, and this poses a
problem for the Soviet military. If they were
united around one leader, eliminating that
leader would weaken the resistance. But,
since the mujahidin are organized into sev-
eral different bands, eliminating one influ-
ential leader of a band would have little ef-
fect on the entire resistance.
This lack of unity also has many disad-
vantages, including the difficulty to conduct
negotiations with the Soviets, problems
with dispersing foreign military aid be-
tween resistance groups and the inability to
defeat the Soviets with a large cohesive mil-
itary force. Thus, the mujahidin are exist-
ing but they are not defeating the Soviets.
An important aspect of this third stage of
Soviet military involvement in Afghani-
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stan is the realization by the Soviet military
of the importance of mountain training. But
training is conducted without a concrete
plan. According to one Soviet officer:
Exercises are sometimes held in a formal-
istic fashion, with insufficient material sup-
port. Due importance is not always attached
to the psychological and physical condition-
ing of soldiers and sergeants, who conse-
quently display a lack of aggressiveness and
self-confidence in carrying out tasks.36
But, for the SOviets, no amount of moun-
tain warfare training will allow their forces
to defeat their worst enemy?the terrain.
Strategic roads are few and far between, and
there are few other reliable, vehicular
routes, especially in the winter and during
spring thaws.
). During this third stage of military in-
volvement, the Soviets have intensified
their doctrine of economic warfare and
scorched-earth policies in Afghanistan.
Since the invasion, the Afghan population
has witnessed an increase in food prices by
as much as 145 percent. But the Soviets
welcome economic problems?they force the
peasantry away from areas known to be cen-
ters of guerrilla activity in the fertile val-
leys and into the cities where they can be
more easily controlled.
According to Alex Alexiev, a Rand Corpo-
ration scholar, economic warfare and fam-
ine are Soviet techniques for crushing re-
sistance movements. He notes the quelling
of the opposition movements to collectiviza-
tion in the Ukraine in the 1930s by an in-
duced famine that claimed six million lives.
For the Soviets, therefore, destroying the ec-
onomic base has proven an effective means
of destroying the resistance.'"
Within all stages of military involvement
in Afghanistan, Soviet forces have been
plagued with a problem typical of any force
in a police action--periods of life-threaten-
ing situations interspersed with periods of
extreme boredom. This has led to problems
in morale and drug abuse by Soviet soldiers.
A primary reason for morale problems in
Afghanistan is that Soviet troops have no
clear concept of whom or what they are
fighting for. According to one Soviet soldier
who defected to fight on the side of the muja-
hidin:
Everything was bad at our base. We had to
work all the time and did not even have a
chance to wash our clothes. The dining hall
was dirty and there was a bad smell. If a sol-
dier was hurt or wounded, he was given first
aid and was not sent to a hospital and put in
bed. Every week, someone tried to escape.
The Soviet troops can't find the mujahideen
so they kill civilians.. . . Our officers said we
must go into a village and kill all the people
and animals, sheep, horses, even dogs and
cats. But I thought it was the mujahideen
who were fighting against us?not dogs and
cats. No one wants to be in Afghanistan.. . .
If they were told that they could leave, they
would not wait for a truck or a plane, but
would walk 10,000 kilometers back to their
homes."
Soviet commanders have experienced dif-
ficulties explaining to their troops that they
are in Afghanistan as liberators. Soviet sol-
diers are told they will be fighting Ameri-
cans, Chinese and Pakistanis. In the Soviet
Union, newsreels shown on television re-
veal US tanks and planes in Afghanistan.
When the soldiers arrive in Afghanistan
and find no one but the local populatien,
they are confused. The Soviets have de-
creased attempts to justify the war to their
soldiers and have also decreased attempts to
win over the population. But., when a mili-
tary force is irivolved in a war arid has no
military, political or moral goals in which
the force believes and around which the
force can unite, problems evolve, and the ef-
fectiveness of the force quickly dwindles.
According to several Soviet defectors,
drug abuse is a major problem of Soviet sol-
diers in Afghanistan, one of the largest pro-
ducers of opium and hashish in the world.'"
The Soviet soldier's drug problem in Af-
ghanistan is similar to that of the US sol-
dier's in Vietnam. Soldiers are frightened,
far from home, under immense pressure and
bored. Some soldiers sell gasoline, ammuni-
tion and stolen guns to support their drug
habit. A Soviet Kalashnikov rifle brings the
equivalent of $1,100 on the Afghan black
market.'' In Afghanistan, that amount easi-
ly supports a drug habit.
Soviet soldiers get paid in rubles which al-
so creates a problem. To purchase hashish or
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SPECIAL EDITION -- 15 SEPTEMBER 1987
opium, soldiers must pay in afghanis, the
Afghan currency. A Soviet private makes
approximately five to eight rubles a month.
Soldiers consequently sell their boots, rifle
slings, sunglasses, flight jackets, transis-
tors, razors and food in the town market to
buy opium and hashish with afghanis.
Another characteristic found within all
stages of military involvement in Afghani-
stan has been the widespread violation of
human rights. Although the Soviets have
banned Western news media from covering
the war, reports of atrocities have leaked
across the border through the continuous
flow of refugees and from journalists who
make frequent unauthorized trips into Af-
ghanistan.
Several US Department of State Bulletins
have cited the use of chemical warfare in Af-
ghanistan. For example, a 1982 bulletin
said the Soviets were using the deadly tri-
chothecene mycotoxins or "yellow rain" in
Afghanistan. These chemicals can cause a
burning sensation in the mouth, vomiting
and diarrhea, and then they disturb the cen-
tral nervous system. The third stage of the
illness involves severe hemorrhages which
can result in death. Trichothecene mycotox-
ins thus produce a long and painful death.
The widespread use of toy bombs and anti-
personnel mines, making victims of the ci-
vilian population, women and children in
;particular, and refusing to accept Afghan
opposition members as prisoners of war but
as political prisoners are further examples
of the human rights problem in Afghani-
stan.
42
Although world opinion is on the side of
the Afghan population and the mujahidin,
the Soviets continue to ignore and disclaim
it. Human rights violations are, in a sense,
intertwined within the Soviet military doc-
trine?there are few human rights when the
end justifies the means. Thus, it is doubtful
that there will be drastic changes made to-
ward these violations until the Afghan re-
sistance is defeated.
In future operations, the Soviets will con-
tinue to rely on special operations while
maintaining control of the cities, protecting
the lines of communication and driving the
insurgents away from their economic base
through scorched-earth tactics and eco-
nomic warfare. By using special operations
as a necessary strategic auxiliary to ort lio-
dox operations, the Soviets can obtain the
upper hand in Afghanistan.
Guerrilla tactics are not successful unless
they complement a main force, and this is
where the mujahidin are at a disadvantage.
They have no tightly organized army with
which to defeat the Soviet military. But Mao
Tse-tung, in his book On Guerrilla Warfare,
wrote that no military force can emerge vic-
torious if it is cruel to the inhabitants of the
conquered areas, if it underestimates rebel
strength and if it conducts operations with-
out planning and intelligence," all of which
the Soviets are guilty of.
The Soviets appear to be in Afghanistan
for some time to come. To cpmpletely defeat
the mujahidin, who consider the conflict a
jihad or holy war, the Soviets will have to oc-
cupy and control both the rural and urban
areas in Afghanistan. This will consume
much money and a larger occupying force.
The jihad is a powerful weapon?one which
the Soviets have yet to overcome?and this
is the reason that the Soviets wilt never
completely defeat the resistance. MR.
4101?11111=6.
12
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NOTES
I James Gerstenzang, "Afghanistan Helps Soviets Rewrite Their War
Textbooks. The Kansas City Star, 19 January 1986
2 Yossef Bodansky. Afghanistan The Soviet Air War,- Defense & For-
eign Affairs, September 1985, p12.
3 ibid p 14
4 Vara v Algamstane (The War in Alghanistan), Posey, Frankfurt, Fed
-
eta! Republic of Germany, 1980, p32
5 Ibid. p9,
6 Maior Joseph J Collins. The Soviet Military Experience in Afghani-
stan," Military Review, May 1985, p22
7 Robert L Canfield. 'Western Slakes in the Afghan War. Central Asian
Survey. 1985, Volume 4, Number 1.p 122
8 Bodansky, op Cit. p13
9 lbid , p 14.
10 Ord
11 Ibid.
12 Edgar 0 Ballance, Soviet Tactics in Afghanistan," Military Review,
August 1980, p 48.
13 !bid , p 50
14 Sovetskaya voennaya entsiklopedya (Soviet Military Encyclopedia),
Voyerazdat, Moscow, USSR, 1978, Volume 5, p 676.
15 Ibid., p506
16 I Sobran, "Strel ba a tankov v gorakh" ( Difficulties of Tanks in the
Mountains), Voyennyi Vestnik (Military Herald). May 1982, pp 79-80
17 Ibid., p62
18 For detailed accounts of mountain warfare and mountain training. see
Voyennyi VesfneM (Military Herald), Number 7 and Number 9, 1984, and Num-
ber 1, 1985
19 I Klyachin, Khimicheskoe obespechenie v gorakh" Chemical Secu-
rity in Mountains ). Voyennyi Vestnik (Military Herald). Number 9. 1964. p84
20 Collins, op cit, p 23
21 V Spitsyn, "Rota oboroniaetsia v gorakh" ('A Platoon Defends in the
Mountains'), Voennyi Vestnsk (Military Herald), Number 7, 1984. p 34.
22 Mainr John M Hutcheson. Scorched Faith Policy Soviets in Afghani-
stan.- Review, April 1982, p33
23 /bid p 34.
24 John Keegan, "The Ordeal of Afghanistan." Thu Atlantic Monthly. No-
vember 1985. p 103
25 Josoph J Collins, The Soviet-Afghan War 1 he Fast Four Years. *Pa-
rameters, !;urnmer 1964, p49
26 Collins,"The Soviet Military Experience in Afgnaostan,- Military Re
view, op cl.p20
27 Bon,insky, op cit.. p 12
28 Ibin . p 14
29 Koill,oynakskara Pravda, 4 February 1983, p4
30 Bodansky, op cl p 16
31 Collins. "The Soviet-Afghan War, The First Four Years.- Parameters,
op. cit p ',2.
32 /bid
33 David K. Willis, "Soviet Union Faces Rising Costs. Uncenaintios in
Holding T h ird? World Gains,- Christian Science Monitor, 18 February 1986, p
40.
34 Colltns, -The Soviet Military Experience in Afglaosian," Military Re-
view, op c , p 18.
35 !bid p23
36 Oaf . p25
37 IMO . p18
38 Keenan, op cif
39 Thai p Al2
40 Arthur Bonner, -Afghanistan's Other Frond A World of Drugs, 1 he
New York Times. 2 November 1985, p 1
41 /OKI
42 Feb, Frmacora, "Human Rights in Alglianistan, Surma,, July-August
1948S.
3Saitiel 13 Griffith, Mao Tse- Tung or; Guerrilla Warfare. Praeger Pub-
lishers, NY 1961, pp 104-5.
First Lieutenant K ip McCormick is with the
501st Military 1 ntelligilice Battalion, 1st Armored
Division, Katterbach, Federal Republic of Germa
fly. He received a master's degree in Soviet and East
European studies from the University of Kansas
and completed the Russian-language program at
Leningrad State University, USSR. His assign-
ments include serving as the tactical operations ol -
Jiver, G2, 35th Infantry Division (Mechanized),
Kansas Army National Guard, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
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