THEORY OF THE OPERATION IN DEPTH AND TRENDS IN ITS DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00365R000200210001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 10, 1979
• Content Type: MISC

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THEORY OF THE OPERATION IN DEPTH AND TRENDS IN ITS DEVELOPMENT
Moscow VOYENNAYA MYSL' in Russian No 8, Aug 78 PB FFL mq_ ?I
signed to press 24 Jul 78 pp 14-26
[Article, title as above, by Col L. I. Voloshin,
Candidate of Military Sciences]
[Text] At all stages of organizational development of the Soviet Armed
Forces our party has devoted close attention to development of military
science as one of the most important factors in increasing their combat
might.
During the years of civil war, and especially during the period of peace-
time construction, life advanced a number of problems connected with es-
tablishment of an expedient system of army and navy organizational develop-
ment, reorganization of military leadership agencies, and elaboration of
new forms and modes of conduct of operations, which had to be rethought
and theoretically reelaborated.
Military science was faced with particularly complex tasks in the 1930's,
when the threat of another world war became sharply more acute, and there
occurred attempts by world reaction to unleash aggression by fascist Ger-
many and militarist Japan against the Soviet Union.
Decisive influence on the development of Soviet military science was
exerted by the character of the Civil War, which was distinguished by
decisive objectives and by employment of vigorous forms of struggle and
high mobility combat operations. An important role in the formation of
military-theoretical thought was played by scientific writings by M. V.
Frunze entitled "Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army" and "The
Front and Rear Areas in the War of the Future." These studies further
developed Lenin's theses on the character of a future war and theoretically
substantiated the major problems of readying the country for defense and
organizational development of the army and navy.
H. V. Frunze, while not denying the possibility of lightning attacks,
assumed that a war would most probably be of a protracted nature. A high
degree of troop mobility in the conduct of operations will be combined in
such a war with static forms of combat in certain sectors.
[Note: Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface.]
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The points stated by 11. V. Frunze exerted enormous influence on the
development of Soviet military science. They found reflection in official
documents: in the 1925 Field Service Regulations, in the manual entitled /
High Command and "and in the field manuals of the fnfantryan of er arms,.
ese documents pro`~-moted to a substantial degree the establishment of a
unity of views on many questions pertaining to preparation for and conduct
of the engagement and operation. At the end of the 1920's a general theory
of operations was elaborated, which included questions pertaining to
operational employment of all ground forces and air arms existing at that
time. Elaboration of the theory of the operation in depth constituted the
most important achievement of Soviet military-theoretical thought in the
period between wars.
Soviet military science, taking into_ account achievements in the d_ eveloop-
ment of armament and combat equipment of the armies of the principal
capita i.st countries as well as prospects o roweaponing of the Red Army, c/
provided in the form of a theory of the operation in depth a model for
solving the problem of swift and resolute development of an offensive to
operational depth.
This was a fundamentally new theory of conduct of the offensive operation,
which made it possible to discard methods of slow, gradual surmounting of
enemy defensive positions and to shift to more decisive and high-mobility
forms of combat.
The problem of swift and deep development of operations was resolved not
in an isolated fashion but in a close interlink with elaboration of such
vital problems as the organizational structure of troops, their technical /
war, operation, and engagement.
An important role in resolving these problems, which were important for
strengthening the nation's defense capability, was played by the prewar
five- ear pllaanss, successful accomplishment of which transformed our country
rom an economically backward land into an advanced, powerful industrial
nation, which made it possible immeasurably to increase its military might.
New branches of industry were established, branches with great output
capacity: an aviation industry, tank industry, and automotive industry.
By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan the Red Army already possessed a
solid material-technical foundation. The industry of the Soviet Union was
capable of producing all modern armaments, which were equal or even
superior in specifications and performance capabilities to those employed
by the armies of the capitalist nations. Rapid equipping of the army and
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navy with new types of weapons and combat equipment sharply increased the
firepower and maneuver capabilities of all military units. Under the in-
fluence of scientific and technolo camel advances there occurred improve-
went in the organizationaJ
on t e problems of war. 5ar-4'
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Soviet military science saw a future war as an armed struggle of enormous VQP` Op*
armies, in which the belligerents would pursue decisive objectives -- s av S-+-S
total defeat of the adversary. It was believed that war would assume a 1',, ,t~
broad spatial scale and would be characterized by great intensity. It 6A 10e~5
would be protracted, consisting of an entire system of strategic operations.b>
yr% 15,
The development of new arms and combat equipment and the establishment of A\jOt
well-trained mass armies substantially increased the capabilities of 5 4 -"1
defense. Combining powerful weaponry and natural defensive positions
fortification structures and obstacles, troops could establish a continuous ~11
defensive frontage and not only hold occupied positions and areas but also
inflict heavy casualties on the adversary. Under these conditions it was
necessary for the attacking force correctly to resolve problems of
penetrating the enemy's defense and pushing the advance deep.
The theory of sequential offensive operations of the 1920's, based on the
experience of World War I, was obsolete and failed to meet the demands s---
# of a future war and new troop capabilities. It was necessary to elaborate @~'P~t~ sr
a totally new theory of the offensive operation, to in new forms and
metho s of warfare which would make it ossiblee to penetrate a fortified
e ense and to develop the advance to depth at a rapid pace, with the
o jective of achieving strategic success
Soviet military science believed that in order to accomplish such complex
tasks it was necessary to provide the delivery of attacks of enormous
penetrating force to the entire depth of the operational formation of ~~
enemy's defense. This could be achieved only by means of troops which were CO
sitioned in depth and operating in close coordination with one -D je hQ,..
another, combining their own actions with artillery and airstrikes on
enemy targets deep in the defense, as well as the delivery of airborne
assault forces: This form of com at actions received the design
operation in depth. ofrosed -1b
oft
The origination and development of theory of the operation in depth are
connected with elaboration of theory of the engagement in depth,the prin-
cip es o w ich were expounded at the end of the 1920's in the writings of
Soviet military theorists M. N. Tukhachevskiy, V. K. Triandafillov, A. I.
Yegorov, G. S. Isserson, et al.
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band scope to an operation, as well as a high rate of advance.
The operation in depth also demanded deployment in depth of army and front
troops. The tactical order of battle of the battle group included a
penetration echelon, ppeenetration exploitation echelon (mobile troo s ,
an air group, and an airborne group. Assault armies, w1 e ippel with
combat hardware, transport vehicles and communications gear, were to be
employed on the main axis. Gaining of air supremacy, cutting off the com-
bat area from an inflow of enemy reserves, and prevention of flow of
supplies 'to the defending enemy troops were also considered important con-
ditions for achieving success in the operation in depth.
A special role in accomplishing these missions was assigned to aviation.
Attacking the withdrawing adversary, bridges and river crossing points,
defensive structures at intermediate positions, reserves advancing from
depth and in assembly areas, aircraft helped achieve a high rate of advance,
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The primary basis for elaboration of this theorywas development of Power-
ful and mobile weaponry and_+m-provement (taking into account they ractical
adoption of new weapons and combat equipment in line units) of the organi-
zational s ructure o combined units and operational formations, which ob-
tained the capability not onlyy to neutralize and penetrate the enemy's
defense to full tactical depth and to hit his immediate reserves, but also
to exploit tactical into operational success._
stage; operationa~oitation stag.e._
was publication in 1936 of the new Field Service Regulations, included
several stages: penetration of the tactical defense; tactical exploitatio
The operation in depth, the final step in elaboration of the theory of which
The principal feature of penetration in the operation in depth, in contrast
to linear forms of combat, specifying gradual pushing back of the adversary,
consisted in hitting the enemy in depth, in simultaneous neutralization,
annihilation, pinning down, encirclement and total defeat of the enemy's
main force. It would be performed by mutually coordinating infantry,
artillery, tank and aircraft, simultaneously hitting the enemy's battle-
field dispositions to full depth. With a sudden, deep and powerful attack
the troops would smash through the defense and would endeavor to pour
through the breach to operational depth. Coordinated action of troops
would be organized thereby and maintained for the benefit of the infantry.
Toward the end of subsequent exploitation of the advance and increase in
the maneuverability of combat actions, mobile troops would be engaged and
tactical airborne assaults mounted. For this purpose the support echelons
of armies an fronts woul contain motorized-mechanized or mounted-
mec anize combine units as so-called mobile rou s. Mobile groups were
W-considered one of the most important elements in the deployment of troops
,eya of the army and front and a decisive means resulting in considerable depth
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prevented the enemy from breaking contact from the pursuing combined units,
disorganized the enemy's ranks, and isolated the combat zone from an in-
flow of fresh manpower, which in the final analysis predetermined the
enemy's annihilation piecemeal.
Theory of the'offensive operation in depth advanced a new mode of combat
actions, the essence of which consisted in uniting the efforts of the
tactically non-interlinked penetration echelon, exploitation echelon,
assault, holding and other forces into a single attack mechanism ensuring
the enemy's defeat to the entire operat ona depth of his disposition.
Corresponding forms of maneuver were also determined taking into account
the mobile character of offensive operations: the frontal assault, the
attack on converging axes; a combined attack (a number of splitting at-
tacks o various force along a broad frontage); wide envelopment; en-
circlement.
While giving priority to the attack, this theory also devoted certain !n
Defense was assessed as a mode of actions employed for the purpose of
economizing in manpower, gaining time, and altering the relative strength
in manpower and weapons in one's own favor. It played the role of an
instrument in operational support and preparation for the attack.
Such prominent Soviet military leaders as M. N. Tukhachevskiy, A. I.
Yegorov, I. P. Uborevich, I. E. Yakir and Ya. I. Alksnis devoted con-
roop maneuvers. It was reflected not only in the Field Service Regina-
siderable attention to further elaboration of this theory and comprehensive fs t
practical verification of its points in war games, field exercises, and
tions but also in numerous written studies, in the periodical press and
ni" speeches `by
Thus elaboration of the /fundamentals of theory of the operation in depth/,
which specifies simultaneous neutralization of the enemy's defense,
delivery of deep, devastating attacks on all elements of his tactical order
of battle (due to which conditions were created for swift advance to great
depth and tactical exploitation), was a qualitatively new stage in
development of Soviet art of warfare and a major achievement of this art.
For the first time there was noted atendency toward an increase in the- -
scope of future operations and an increase in troop mobility and maneuver-
ability.
On the whole theoretical elaboration of the major questions pertaining to
preparation and conduct of operations in the prewar period made it pos-
sible to arm our cadres with advanced military knowledge and to begin
purposeful preparation of the army and navy to repel aggression.
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The principal points of theory of the operation and engagement in depth
found practical application and further development in the operations of
the Great Patriotic War.
Development of the art of penetration took place under conditions of con=
tinuous improvement of the enemy's defense. His defense, beginning in
the summer of 1943 and running up to war's end, was characterized by a
high degree of stability and persistance on the part of the troops, vigor
and mobility of actions. Penetration of such a defense demanded a great
deal of skill on the part of Soviet commanders and troops. Of great sig-
nificance under these conditions was selection of the most effective
methods of penetrating the defense and forms of operational maneuver.
The.following would be mounted, depending on the operation plan: a frontal
assault aimed at deep penetration of the defense and at splitting up the
opposing force; frontal assault with subsequent envelopment of enemy forces
in order to encircle the adversary, either independently or in coordination
with adjacent units. Frontal assaults aimed at splitting up the enemy Bf
force and destroying it piecemeal. ~~ Sa` w Y%-Mvu,. t .'do
The defending force would be subjected to simultaneous heavy delivery of
artillery fire and airstrikes to the entire depth of his dispositions. The,
,adversary would be neutralized with the greatest density in the first
defensive zone. Following softening-up-by artillery and airstrikes,
rifle units and combined__.units,would shift to the attack. Infantry-sup-
tanks and self-propelled guns would advance in the battle formations
of the rifle subunits .
The advance ouldbe con.tinuousiy--supported by artillery
fire
and
air-_
at tactical and ona perational depth;-i m bilizing and
disorganizing
them.
Swift penetration of the defense would be achieved
as a result of
close
coordination of `ire and attack.
"The principal areas for improving the art of penetration of the defense
at this time were, first of all, a decrease in the number of breakthrough
sectors and their width: a front would most frequently penetrate the
enemy's defense in one or two, and less. frequently in three sectors.
Second, a decisive massing of men and weapons in breakthrough sectors by
weakening other sectors, which made it possible, with a slight overall
superiority, and sometime with equal forces, to establish the requisite
(two-threefold or more) superiority. Third, improvement in the art of
deploying battle groups with the aim of maximum utilization of their combat
capabilities."1
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More than 50% of rifle combined units were concentrated in breakthrough
sectors, up to 60-80% of artillery and mortars, and 80-100% of tanks and
aircraft. All this ensured establishment of the requisite superiority
over the adversary.
Mobile army and fronLgroups would be engaged for exploitation (tank
and com at actions would be shifted to operational depth. Achievement of
swiftness in penetration of the defense and a high rate of advance were
secured by mounting powerful attacks in narrow sectors of the front, with
subsequent widening of the breach toward the flanks and advancement to
d ept witout a alt.
The increased firepower, mobility and striking power of ground troops
predetermined successful penetration of a fortified defense at a com-
paratively rapid pace and to considerable depth.
The tactical order of battle was continuously improved in order to main-
tain superiority over the enemy and to build up efforts in the course of
operations. In the first period of the war, for example, fronts frequent-
ly maintained a single-echelon operational formation, understrength
reserve, and an insufficient number of aircraft. Beginning in mid-1943
the fronts began establishing stronger forward and support echelons, power-
ful exploitation echelons (army and front mobile groups), and substantial
reserves of all arms.
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tical order of battle and consequently deep operation exploita-
ta
A d
c
eep
tion at a rapid pace was promoted by a continuous increase in the quantity
and im rovement in the quality of combat equipment being supplied to the
troops, and improvement in the modes of its employment.
I r-
In spite of the persisting difficulties, through the heroic efforts of the
entire people, guided by the Communist Party, by the middle of.1942 a
smoothly running and rapidly growing war economy had been established in
our country. Geared over to a war footing, the nation's economy was
supplying the battle front with everything needed for the war effort.
During the war years the Soviet Union produced twice as much weapons and
military equipment and of better quality than fascist Germany. Soviet in-
dustry produced (from 1 July 1941 through 1 September 1945) 134,100 air-
planes, 102,800 tanks and self-propelled guns, 825,200 artillery pieces
and mortars.2 And this in turn ensured an increased rate of advance and
depth of combat missions of units, combined units and formations.
In the first neriod of the war, for example, the depth of the army offen-
sive operation was only 50-90 km,_ while in subsequent periods it increased
to 100-150 km and more. At the same time tactical densities per kilometer
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iaer-
i
The air offensive also became further development of the points of theory
of the-operation in depth. From sporadic strikes by small groups of
aircraft there was a transition to continuous de th-dj ositioned actions
y large air forces working in
close coordination with ground troops.
Of course under present-day conditions the volume of tasks in offensive
operations has increased sharply, while the modes of their execution by
artillery and aircraft have become more complex? However, experience in
the organization and conduct of offensive artillery and air actions ob-
tained during the war years retains its significance in large measure, es-
pecially in combat operations without the employment of nuclear weapons.
Attainment of operation objectives was determined to a significant degree
by prompt buildup of efforts by our forces, particularly tank combined
units and formations. One of the most important problems in accomplishing
ti-
L Y~R T '~-~-
this tack was determ;
na
o
armies, which compris i the
principal
striking for
ce
It was believed that it was expedient to engage them after penetration of
the tactical defense zone. Experience showed, however, that combined-
arms armies of the front forward echelon could not in a number of cases
independently accomplish the task of penetration at a rapid pace. There-
fore, in order to deprive the enemy of the capability to bring up reserves,
to occupy deep fortified positions and thus to exert considerable influence
on the course of the front operation, the forward echelons of tank armies
would be engaged to_complete penetration of the tactical defense zone.
In operations beginning in th'e second half of 1944 (Belorussian, Iasi
Kishinev, Vistula-Oder) tank armies as a rule would be engaged following
penetration of the adversary's tactical defense zone.
This was dictated first and foremost by an increase in the striking. power
of combined-arms armies -- the forward echelon of the front. They would be
reinforced with a large quantity of artillery, infantry-support tanks,
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ttacking troops under continuous artillery_fire cover.
Ole-
of breakthrough sector increased: intantry -- up to 7.6 battalions; artil-
lery pieces and mortars -- 180 (not including rocket- artillery); tanks and
self-propelled guns -- more than 20.3
Artillery constituted the principal means of fire neutralization of the
enemy. Enhancement of its role was inseparably linked with the art of
massing forces on selected axes, while elaboration of the theory and
practice of the support fire plan for the attack proceeded from theory of
the operation in depth. Reliable neutralization, 9f the defense during the
period of deep artillery so_ ning up_.bomba rrt, continuous artillery
support of the assault ha nd close artil
P_ support of deep ad-
,,e5 vancing -troops, transformed the attack into a unified process of advance b
42
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independent tank and mechanized corps, which made it possible successfully
th
se
d
f
'
e
e
ense. n
s de
to penetrate the enemy
tank armies would be executed at operational dept which ensured favorable
for exploitation at a rape pace and achievement of the opera-
If we consider that in a number of operations tank armies were successfully
utilized in the forward echelon to~enetrate
independent
_axes we can state that during the Great Patriotic War the Soviet command
solved a totally new problem of operational art -- preparation for and
conduct of an offensive operation by a tank army.
Experience in organization and conduct of such operations is of great
va ue or operational training
combined-arms
an their staffs underpresent-day conditions.--
As a result of rapid penetration of the enemy's defense, favorable con-
ditions were created for swift pursuit of the adversary, employment of
decisive forms of maneuver at operational depth with the objective of
wiping out. operational reserves, taking intermediate objectives without a
halt, crossing rivers, cutting off avenues of withdrawal and encircling
large enemy forces.
Encirclement and annihilation of large forces became the principal form
of conduct of Soviet offensive operations. Theory of the operation in
depth became enriched with the practical experience of encirclement and
annihilation of the enemy with the forces of one or several fronts. En-
circlement was accomplished both at tactical, close operational, and con-
siderable operational depth.
Soviet operational art was also enriched with the practical experience of
/organization and conduct of depth-sequential front and army offensive
operations./ In most cases completion of one offensive operation would
create the conditions for mounting a subsequent operation without a pause.
This was promoted to a substantial degree by firm and continuous troop con-
trol in the course of the entire operation. Precisely under conditions of
a rapidly changing situation and the sharply marked maneuver character of
troop combat actions, particularly mobile troops, prompt acquisition and
processing of data on situation changes by staffs of all echelons enabled
the front (army) command to reach a suitable decision and skillfully to
execute it.
A most important indicator of improvement in the art of preparing for and
mounting front and army offensive operations during the war years was a
steady increase in the scope of these operations.
In the third period of the war front operations were conducted to a depth
of 400-600 km, with an average daily rate of advance of up to 25-30 km and
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more, and army operations -- to 100-180 km. These figures significantly
exceeded the standard figures elaborated on the basis of theor
f
h
y o
t
e
operation in depth in the prewar years. An increase in the scale o opera
bons was a consequence of increase in the quantity of combat equipment
participating in operations, continuous increase in firepower, concentrated
employment of armored and mechanized troops, and continuous improvement in
the combat skill of troops and staffs as well as their ability to conduct
mobile actions.
Soviet operational art in the Great Patriotic War proved to be the most
advanced art of that time. It was superior to the art of preparing for and
mounting operations by the German-fascist command. Theory of the offensive
operation in depth, elaborated by Soviet military science in the prewar
years, found application in many operations of the Soviet Armed Forces.
One can state with full justification that the most important achievements
of Soviet art of warfare include elaboration and successful practical
execution of a new form of strategic offensive -- operations by front
groups, mounted for the purpose of achieving a specified strategic ob-
jective by the coordinated efforts of several fronts jointly with forma-
tions and combined units of other Armed Forces branches.
This was a totally new phenomenon in the art of warfare.
The Great Patriotic War made major adjustments in theory of the operation
in depth, leaving the general idea, but radically altering the content of
establishment of battle groups and the tactical order of battle, organiza-
tion of penetration of the enemy's defense, and offensive exploitation.
All weaponry continued rapidly developing in the postwar period and con-
tinued to be supplied to the combat units in requisite quantities.
Theory of the offensive engagement and operation were developing during
the initial postwar years taking into account acquired experience, on a
new technological foundation. It retained for the most part those same
characteristic features of the attack, ut improved modes of com at ap-
peared.
Soviet military theory held that the front (army) offensive operation can
begin under the following conditions: penetration of a fortified defense;
penetration of fortified areas; penetration of a hastily occupied defense;
encounter engagement.
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Offensive operations with penetration of a fortified defense were acknowl-
edged to be the most typical type of operation and the most complex kind
of offensive action. They consisted in forming breaches in the adversary's
defense by destroying men and equipment, as well as capturing fortifica-
tions to the entire tactical depth with simultaneous widening of penetra-
tion toward the flank and further deep development of penetration. Only
after penetration of the enemy's tactical defense and crushing of the
closest operational reserves did troops obtain sufficient freedom of ac-
tion for exploitation, splitting up and encircling enemy forces.
Independent of the conditions of initiation of the offensive operation,
, L_ . onrirr na the enemy and simultaneously an-
-
y
prep
artillery) for the period o
porting tanks and self-propelled guns (for the attack-echelon combined
units); 4-6 combat engineer companies.
ni.nilat.L ,--LLU. .,..-j - ------ -
enemy forces leads to annihilation and capture of the enemy and creates
conditions for swiftly seizing strategic or operational objectives and
positions.
Required for successful penetration was massive utilization on selected
axes of all types of combat equipment, and particularly artillery and tanks,
simultaneously hitting the enemy to the entire depth of his tactical order
of battle.
It was believed that the quantitative indices of personnel and weapons em-
ployed in this last war for mounting large offensive operations had re-
tained their significance. It was demanded that forces established for
mounting attacks possess-adequate strength to smash any enemy resistance
and to ensure the crushing of approaching enemy reserves and successful ad-
vance of troops to the entire depth of the operation. Proceeding from this,
average tactical densities of personnel and weapons in a breakthrough
sector of 1 kilometer of frontae were determined as follows: infantry --
C2
3-4 battalions; 180-220 artillery pieces and mortars (excluding antitank
bombardment; 25-30 infantry-sup-
arator
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Decisiveness of objectives, participation in operations of large masses of
ground troops equipped with diversified combat equipment, large air forces,
airborne troops, and naval forces on coastal axes, a large spatial scale,
intensity and continuous nature of combat operations, as well as a high
degree of mobility were held to be characteristic features of the offensive
operation.
On the whole Soviet military-theoretical thought following the war cor-
rectly determined the character of the offensive in combat operations with-
out employment of nuclear weapons. The offensive was viewed as the
classic form of penetration of a fortified defense, when a strategic front
of both sides had already been established, when all or the bulk of armed
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As,
ar
ad-
his,
of
:es,
)nt
:d
forces were already deployed and could be utilized for mounting opera-
tions. This thesis was subsequently refined further, when nuclear weapons
were adopted.
Nuclear weapons were viewed as the principal means of destroy gthe enemy
(his nuclear weapons, troop deployments, air and naval forces, and other
important targets); completion of the crushing of enemy forces was assigned
to ground troops.
theory of the offensive operation.
Subsequently extensive equipping of the armed forces branches with nucl_._
weapons--led to a change in their role.
Principal attention in this period was focused on problems of preparing
for and conducting offensive operations under conditions of employment of
nuclear weapons. The general points of theory of the operation in depth,
pertaining to the character of offensive operations, their objectives and
spatial scale, modes of preparation, conduct and support, as well as
questions pertaining to utilization of personnel and weapons in the attack
received further development.
loyment of nuclear weapons and a substantial increase in troop mobili-
ty and fighting power
dynamic and ecisive caracter, increasing their spatial scale and
fronts, will be mounted on separate axes, with a substantial separation of
the most combat-efficient operational forces, particularly tank, from the
main forces.
shorfening-fheir duration. Views were expressed in the armies of
capitalist countries that the offensive, due to a lack of continuous
Massed nuclear strikes, maneuver of personnel and weapons parallel with
aid perpendicular to the front, and swift troop actions following nuclear
strikes are acquiring decisive significance. Offensive actions will be
distinguished by intensive combat effort to seize and hold the initiative,
by a diversity of employed methods of defeating the adversary, and will be
waged under conditions of considerable radioactive contamination, flooding
and physical destruction.
t the same time it was noted that in spite of the decisive role of nuclear
weapons in operations, success can-be-achieved only with unification of
the efforts of all grounsforces as, as well
uni s of other armed forces branches operating in coordination with them.
Solution of the problem of mounting deep strikes experienced new deve op-
ment. An increase in the depth of the enemy's defensive tactical order of
gave offensive operations an eve ore mob
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battle and the fact that major targets were located at a great-distance
from the line of contact dictated the necessity of increasing the depth of
attacks mounted by the advancing troops. Increased firepower and con-
siderable weapons range high mobility and striking power made it possible
to mount an offensive to great ept an at a rapid pace. It became pos-
sible simu taneously to it a enemy targets at operational depth with
nuclear weapons, with the results of these strikes exploited by ground
troops and airborne assault forces.
It was believed that the offensive operation should constitute an aggregate
of battles and engagements, coordinated in objective, place and time, con-
ducted on a specified territory by ground troops and air forces in co-
ordination with the troops of other armed forces branches. All troop ac-
tions should be carried out according to a unified plan and be directed
toward the earliest possible defeat of the opposing forces.
5-}k 1s&'. o
The offensive operation could include first and subsequent operations of
forward-echelon troops; advance and engagement of support-echelon troops;
combat actions by air forces,'units and combined units of the various
arms and special troops, as well as reserves. First and subsequent nuclear
strikes constituted a most important component part of this operation under
cond ons of employment of nuclear weapons.
The problem of the tactical order of battle in an offensive operation
underwent further development. It began including not only the forward
and support echelons but also groupings of. arms and branches, as well as
reserves of all types.
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1 _--f ? Oewo%
-CA
operational depth, there was to be a strong attack echelon, containing U,~g
tifie greater art of total man ower and weapons.
Js+ ec~o~Part
The support echelon was designated for building up trooR,efforts and ex-
ploiting the offensive success of the forward echelon on the main axis;
sustained heavy casualties; mounting of strikes on new axes; crushing
enemy reserves and repulsing counterthrusts (counterattacks); for com-
pleting defeat of the enemy remaining on the flanks and to the rear of the
advancing troops, plus performance of a number of other missions.
Depending on the prevailing situation, the tactical order of battle could
lon o res e
b
h
i
a.v es, o
------_ --rr _
ot
s
multaneously.`
It was acknowledged that any mode of offensive operation should be based on
a combination of nuclear strikes with swift advance by the troops. In the
armies of the capitalist nations it was believed that decisive defeat of
the enemy can be achieved as a result of mounting nuclear strikes and
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ce
th of
sible
pos-
th
3
negate
con-
ac-
ed
of
lips;
.lear
under
%id
d on
the
f
buildup
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decisive attack by troops along the shortest axes, which would make it pos-
sible to split up the defending forces and to destroy them piecemeal.
The question of selection of main axis of advance, which under conditions
of nuclear war can run not only into the weak but also strong points in
the defense, also received fuller substantiation. The selected axis should
ensure advantageous conditions for engagement of friendly troops, effective
employment of weapons, swift breaking up of the enemy's defense and the
stability of his main forces, and prompt execution of assigned missions.
The following principles form the basis of planning, organization and con-
duct of the offensive operation: establishment of superiority over the
adversary on the main axis=:preemptive actions in mounting attacks and
deploying troops; securement of reliable delivery of effective fire o he
entire defending force; swift advance to depth and widening of the break-
through sector toward the flanks; continuous buildup of efforts on the
major axes; extensive maneuver f men and weapons; splitting up of the
enemy forces and their annihilation piecemeal.
It was believed that the lack of a continuous defense, developing opportu-
nities to open up breaches in the enemy's tactical order of battle, can
enable the attacking force at the very beginning of the operation to ad-
vance in march columns at a rapid pace. For swift advance to operational
depth it is essential to utilize primarily tan troops from the forward
Considerable attention was devoted to the matter of increasing the rate of
advance.
It was assumed that under conditions of nuclear war a number of operational-
tactical measures are essential in order to achieve a high rate of advance.
They included the following: delivery of decisive nuclear fire on the
adversary; prompt and effective utilization of the results of this
delivery of fire; selection of the most expedient forms of employing
troops and modes of their accomplishing operational-tactical missions;
achievement of superiority in troop mobility in the course of an operation;
skill
d
e
organization of all types of support.
Extensive employment of forward detachments, airborne assaults, stron
for increasing the rate of advance. A special role is assigned to the
element of surprise and beating the enemy in mounting attacks.
Questions pertaining to combatting antitank weapons and ensuring uninter-
rupted control obtained further development in theory of the offensive
operation. A new question was also reflected in it -- combat against air-
mobile troops.
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e
.x
t
'o
Lt
t
-s
2c
nt
The problem of combatting enemy antitank weapons was to be resolved as
follows: first of all it was necessary to learn how to hit antitank
weapons with fire from all types of weapons at the disposal of the ad-
vancing troops and to thwart control of antitank guided missiles. In ad-
dition it was necessary to increase the survivability of friendly tanks
and other armored targets both by improving the tactics of their employ-
ment and by introducing additional devices decreasing the vulnerability
of armored targets.
Following were considered the most expedient means of ensuring uninter-
rupted control: improvement in organization of troop control and the sys-
tem of control facilities and communications centers; improvement of work
methods of commanders and staffs; planning and execution of measures to
protect control facilities from mass destruction weapons; securement of
stable operation of radio electronic equipment under conditions of heavy
jamming; advance elaboration of measures to restore disrupted control.
Resolution of the problem of combatting enemy airmobile troops is one of
the most vital tasks of theory of the offensive operation. Combat against
airmobile troops should be waged at the tactical echelon, since air
defense weapons capable of engaging low-flying targets are concentrated
here. Antitank weapons and guns mounted on armored vehicles can be em-
ployed against airmobile troops. But short-range missile and conventional
artillery systems are considered to be the principal weapons for engaging
them.
Other questions pertaining to the offensive operation have also experienced
further development: destruction of the enemy's operational reserves and
repelling of his counterthrusts, troop actions in areas of contamination
and physical destruction, river-crossing operations, employing of tactical
and operational airborne assaults, etc.
In view of preparations for nuclear war by imperialism as well as by the
leaders in Peking, Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the position that
a potential future war wi a nuclear. Therefore all problems of the
offensive operation were examined applicable to nuclear war.
In the course of a war with employment of nuclear weapons, however, com-
bat operations on separate axes can be conducted only by conventional
weapons. In connection with this considerable attention was also focused
on offensive actions without the employment of nuclear weapons.
Resolved at this level were problems of selection of main axis of advance,
establishment of decisive superiority in personnel and weapons on selected
axes, particularly fire superiority, determination of the tactical order
of battle, modes of conduct of offensive operations, operations planning,
organization and maintenance of continuous interaction and control, etc.
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It was noted that the principal condition for a successful offensive with-
out the employment of nuclear weapons is the establishment of superiority
over the adversary in tanks, artillery and aircraft on the main axes of
advance.
Selection of main axis of advance should ensure successful penetration of
the tactical defense zone, swift advance of troops into areas where the
most important enemy installations are deployed (offensive nuclear weapons,
control facilities, airfields, etc), into the flank and rear of the. main
enemy force with the objective of destroying it.
It was emphasized that the tactical order of battle can include the same
elements as when attacking with the employment of nuclear weapons, but it
is essential to establish a stronger forward echelon, whereby support
echelons and reserves can be brought somewhat closer to the forward echelon,
which will ensure their faster engagement and will reduce the depth of the
tactical order of battle.
Various modes of conduct of offensive operations under these conditions
were also examined. They could include sequential massed artillery and
airstrikes to the entire depth of the enemy's defense in combination with
a swift troop advance. It was noted that it is essential to knock out
of action at the very outset of an operation the enemy's offensive nuclear
weapons and aircraft, to pin down his reserves, to disrupt control, and
in the course of the offensive continuously to build up attacks, primarily
by engaging support echelons and reserves.
technological revolution advances Armed
technical equipment, organizational stiucture o_ troops
Views on the character of conduct of military actions and organization of
operations radically changed with the adoption of nuclear missile weapons.
During troop training it was taken into consideration that the new weapons
had significantly expanded the framework of operations and had increased
the significance of morale-political and psychological qualities of person-
nel.
The principal mission of Ground Troops armed with operational-tactical and
tactical nuclear missile weapons was the destruction of offensive nuclear
weapons and other enemy targets, and the crushing of his remaining forces.
Full exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes for swift accomplish-
ment of assigned missions became a totally new element in their actions.
The principal role in achieving operation objectives was assigned to
operational-tactical missile and air forces, as well as tank, motorized in-
fantry and airborne troops.
t
c?; (
t1
r
be
c
a
t1
c
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r
i'
"Armeyskiye operatsii" [Army Operations], Voyenizda 1977 pp 10-54.
Training of personnel was organized on the basis that in present-day opera-
and linearity in troop act ons. Combat operations ma develo simultaneous-
tions an offensive will be characterized by an absence of continuous fronts
Y P
y over large areas pars e wit and perpendicular to the front.
Troops were trained to mount an offensive on a number of separate axes with
the objective of splitting up the opposing enemy force and destroying it
piecemeal. In all instances, however, the main efforts of the advancing
troops were concentrated on the principal axes, where massed nuclear mis-
sile strikes would be delivered. Zones of advance became considerably
broader than in the past, which made it possible extensively to maneuver
men and weapons.
Considerable attention was focused on mounting high-mobility combat
operations. This was based on the mass equipping of troops with tanks,
infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and other highly
mobile equipment. In the course of an operation considerable importance
would be attached to the employment of tactical and operational airborne
assaults, tactical aviation, air defense forces and weapons, special troops,
the conduct of protective measures against mass destruction weapons, etc.
In connection with a radical change in the nature of the engagement and
operation, sharp and rapid situation changes are inevitable, which has in-
creased the significance of the independence of units and combined units,
the initiative of commanders of all echelons, and has demanded daringly
bold troop actions, swift and deep penetrations, and extensive employment
of close and deep envelopments.
And although the term "operation (engagement) in depth" has not been
employed in official documents since the 1960's the general principles of
this theory ave not lost t eir significance and are continuing to be im-
proved on a contemporary material foundation of warfare.
A. M. Mayorov, "Penetrating a Defense: the Theory and Practice of
World Wars," VOYENNAYA MYSL', No 5, 1978, page 84.
2. See "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia],
17-e1 ..-.- .-1_.- 1 n7, II
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