TAKE 1 OF 6 -- MOISEYEV ADDRESSES FRENCH MILITARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00365R000100760001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 23, 1989
• Content Type: CABLE

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ****/
COUNTRY: USSR
SUBJ:
TAKE 1 OF 6 -- MOISEYEV ADDRESSES FRENCH MILITARY
REF:
1.
WA1710165389 -- ANSWERING DR/HVAUGHN
2.
PM0707133189 MOSCOW KRASNAYA ZVEZDA RUSSIAN 7 JUL --
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MOISEYEV ADDRESSES FRENCH MILITARY ACADEMY -
SOURCE: PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE IN FRENCH OCTOBER 1989 PP 57-71
TEXT:
//((TEXT OF SPEECH BY SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL MOISEYEV TO
FRENCH MILITARY ACADEMY ON 5 JULY 1989: "THE NEW POLITICAL
THINKING AND SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE" -- FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS ARE
EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION))
((TEXT)) DURING MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO FRANCE, SOVIET
CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL MOISEYEV DELIVERED A LECTURE ON 5 JULY AT
THE MILITARY ACADEMY TO THE CENTER FOR HIGHER MILITARY STUDIES AND
THE MILITARY ACADEMIES.
TWO IMPORTANT POINTS SHOULD BE NOTED FROM THIS LECTURE: THE
FIRST RELATES TO FRANCE'S DEFENSE POLICY AND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS,
THE OTHER RELATES TO THE PRESENTATION WHICH THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES
INTEND TO MAKE OF THEIR MILITARY EFFORT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR
DEFENSE DOCTRINE, AND THEIR PROPOSALS REGARDING THE BALANCE OF
FORCES AND DISARMAMENT.
ON THE FIRST POINT, GEN MOISEYEV'S REMARKS IN REPLY TO THE
QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM ARE UNDOUBTEDLY IMPORTANT. "I GAVE THIS
REPLY," THE SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF SAID, "IN MY CONVERSATION WITH MR
CHEVENEMENT. FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSIONS I HAVE HAD WITH GENERAL
SCHMITT, THIS REPLY HAS CHANGED. IT IS THAT YOU DO NOT REGARD
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WEAPONS, BUT SIMPLY AS A POLITICAL MEANS AT THE
DISPOSAL OF THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. YOUR DOCTRINE CORRESPONDS
TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR PEOPLE AND YOUR COUNTRY, AND TO THEIR
SECURITY INTERESTS. IT DOES NOT MAKE PROVISION FOR AN ARMED ATTACK
ON A STATE OR A COUNTRY, BUT IT DEFENDS THE INTERESTS OF YOUR STATE
AND YOUR COUNTRY.... IT IS POINTLESS TO SEEK AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT
BETWEEN US.... YOURS IS AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND A SOVEREIGN
COUNTRY. GENERAL DE GAULLE CAREFULLY DEFINED THE BROAD OUTLINES OF
FRENCH POLICY, YOU ARE FAITHFUL TO-THEM-AND, MOREOVER, THEY ARE IN
KEEPING WITH YOUR CURRENT INTERESTS."
WHATEVER REMARKS COULD BE MADE ON THE TERMINOLOGY USED -- IT IS
PRECISELY BECAUSE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE THE
CHARACTERISTICS WITH WHICH WE ARE ACQUAINTED THAT THEY CAN BE THE
INSTRUMENT OF FRENCH STRATEGY, WHICH IS ITSELF LINKED TO AN
INDEPENDENT POLICY -- THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE REMARKS IS OBVIOUS.
IT IS NOT THAT THEY ARE ENTIRELY NEW: QUITE THE REVERSE, IN THE
SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ADMITTED SEVERAL TIMES
THAT FRANCE'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENT STRATEGY BORE WITNESS
TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF FRENCH POLICY, AND THEY SAW THIS AS ITS
"POSITIVE ASPECT." BUT, SUBSEQUENTLY, AND APPARENTLY IN RESPONSE
TO FRANCE'S SUPPORT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE AMERICAN
"EUROMISSILES" IN EUROPE, MOSCOW SAW FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS ONE
ELEMENT OF THE NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES' NUCLEAR FORCES, AND THERE WAS
A DEMAND THAT THEY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, WITH A VIEW TO LIMITING
AND REDUCING THEM, IN DISCUSSIONS ON A U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON
NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE. BY ONCE AGAIN RECOGNIZING NOW THAT THE
FRENCH NUCLEAR ARSENAL IS IN KEEPING WITH FRANCE'S NATIONAL
INTEREST, THAT IT IS THE INDEPENDENT INSTRUMENT DEFENDING OUR
INTERESTS AND THAT SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD CONSIDER IT AS
SUCH, GEN MOISEYEV IS ADOPTING A NEW LANGUAGE WHICH MUST BE NOTED.
WITH REGARD TO HIS EXPLANATION OF SOVIET THEORIES ON THE USSR'S
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DEFENSE POLICY AND ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS, IT--IS OBVIOUSLY AN
IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF DISCUSSION AND STUDY AT A TIME WHEN THE VIENNA
AND GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE ON THESE SUBJECTS, AND WE
THOUGHT THAT OUR READERS WOULD APPRECIATE US PUTTING THESE THEORIES
TO THEM.
ALLOW ME TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE TO GEN SCHMITT, FRENCH ARMED
FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF, TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HIGHER
NATIONAL DEFENSE STUDIES INSTITUTE, THE CENTER FOR HIGHER MILITARY
STUDIES, AND THE HIGHER MILITARY ACADEMIES, FOR THE OPPORTUNITY
THEY HAVE GIVEN ME TO ADDRESS SUCH A HIGH-LEVEL AUDIENCE.
IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT I AM ADDRESSING YOU AS A SOLDIER. I
WILL DISCUSS POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROBLEMS; ABOVE ALL, I WILL TRY
TO EXPLAIN TO YOU THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET MILITARY
DOCTRINE WHICH, IN THE LIGHT OF THE "NEW POLITICAL THINKING," HAS
UNDERGONE A RADICAL REVIEW AIMED AT GIVING IT A STRICTLY DEFENSIVE
CHARACTER.
/****** BEGINNING OF TAKE 002 ******/
REF: PM2310145689 PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE FRENCH OCT///STRICTLY
DEFENSIVE CHARACTER.
TEXT:
((TEXT)) SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER, ARMY GENERAL D. YAZOV AND
FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER CHEVENEMENT MADE A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF
THE DOCTRINE QUESTION IN MOSCOW LAST APRIL. I WOULD LIKE TO
CONTINUE THIS DIALOGUE, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE
OCCURRED IN OUR COUNTRY DURING THIS PERIOD..,
THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF ANY STATE HAS TWO ASPECTS:
ONE IS THE POLITICAL ASPECT AND THE OTHER IS THE TECHNICAL
MILITARY ASPECT. HOWEVER, THE PRIORITY IS GIVEN TO THE POLITICAL
ASPECT. A SPECIFIC POLICY HAS A CORRESPONDING SPECIFIC MILITARY
DOCTRINE. ALL THE OTHER FACTORS -- Th ECONOMY, ARMS, EQUIPMENT --
ALSO INFLUENCE DOCTRINE, BUT THIS INFLUENCE IS SHOWN THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ASPECT TOO.
WHAT IS THE CONTENT OF THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF OUR DOCTRINE?
IT IS THE PLEDGE MADE BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER WARSAW
PACT MEMBER COUNTRIES NOT TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST A STATE
OR ALLIANCE IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES UNLESS WE ARE EXPOSED TO AN
AGGRESSION. WAR WILL NOT COME FROM THE SOVIET UNION, WE WILL NEVER
START IT. WE WILL NEVER, IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BE THE FIRST TO USE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
THE USSR DOES NOT HAVE ANY TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON ANYBODY AND
DOES NOT REGARD ANY STATE OR PEOPLE AS AN ENEMY. WE ARE PREPARED
TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES BASED ON THE MUTUAL
CONSIDERATION OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE.
THESE ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES. THEY DETERMINE
THE CONTENT OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND ALL OUR PRACTICAL
ACTIONS. SOME OF THE WEST'S REPRESENTATIVES ARE TRYING NOT TO
NOTICE THE INFLUENCE OF THESE GUIDELINES ON OUR DOCTRINE. FAILING
TO FULLY GAUGE THE PROFOUND NATURE OF THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN
PLACE IN THE SOVIET MILITARY ORGANIZATION, THEY CLAIM, IN THEIR
STEREOTYPED REMARKS, THAT OUR POLITICAL PLEDGES ARE ONLY WORDS.
WE ARE SOMETIMES TOLD: "IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE, YOU SEEM TO
TAKE DEFENSE AGAINST AN AGGRESSION AS THE OBJECTIVE, BUT YOU ARE
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TRYING TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL BY AN OFFENSIVE STRATEGY." THE
POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL MILITARY ASPECTS OF OUR DOCTRINE ARE
THEREFORE APPARENTLY INCONSISTENT.
THE REAL SITUATION IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. THE POLITICAL AND
TECHNICAL MILITARY ASPECTS OF MODERN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE ARE
CLOSELY LINKED: THE LATTER DEPENDS ON THE FORMER. THEY BOTH HAVE
ONE THRUST WHICH IS DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE
MAIN POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE WHICH WE HAVE ADOPTED:
PREVENTING WAR. REMOVING THE RISK OF A CONFLICT HAS NOW BECOME THE
SUPREME GOAL, THE HEART OF THE DOCTRINE, THE ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF
THE SOVIET STATE AND ITS ARMED FORCES. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT
THE MISSION AIMED AT PREVENTING WAR HAS BEEN TURNED INTO A
PRINCIPLE IN OUR DOCTRINE. OF COURSE, THE SOVIET UNION PREVIOUSLY
MADE PROVISION TO STRUGGLE AGAINST WAR, AMONG OTHER THINGS; BUT
THIS TASK HAS NOW COME TO THE FORE.
WHY HAS THIS HAPPENED? FIRST, BECAUSE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, WAR
CANNOT BE A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. IT WOULD LEAD
TO DISASTER. THIS POLICY OF PREVENTING WAR IS NOW SEEN NOT ONLY IN
OUR POLITICAL PLEDGES, BUT ALSO IN THE GENERAL THRUST OF OUR
MILITARY ORGANIZATION, OUR MILITARY PLANNING, THE TRAINING OF OUR
ARMED FORCES. UNLIKE THE NATO COUNTRIES, WE ARE NOT CONCEALING THE
POLITICAL GUIDELINES OR THE TECHNICAL MILITARY GUIDELINES OF OUR
DOCTRINE. IN ADDITION, WE ARE TRYING TO EXPLAIN THEM BOTH TO
PUBLIC OPINION AND TO EXPERTS. WE ARE PREPARED TO HOLD
CONSULTATIONS TO COMPARE THE SOVIET AND U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINES,
AND THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO MILITARY DOCTRINES WHICH WOULD MAKE IT
POSSIBLE TO DISPEL THE DISTRUST AND MUTUAL SUSPICION WHICH NOW
EXIST AND TO ACHIEVE BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.
THE NATURE OF THE TECHNICAL MILITARY ASPECT OF OUR MILITARY
DOCTRINE INCLUDES AT LEAST FOUR MAIN QUESTIONS: THE NATURE OF THE
THREAT, THE KIND OF AGGRESSION WHICH-WE--SHOULD PREPARE TO REPEL,
THE KIND OF ARMED FORCES NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE MEANS OF
TRAINING THE LATTER FOR THIS MISSION.
/****** BEGINNING OF TAKE 003 ******/
REF: PM2310145689 PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE FRENCH OCT///FOR THIS
MISSION.
TEXT:
((TEXT)) FIRST QUESTION: WHO IS OUR POTENTIAL ENEMY?
((SUBHEAD))
THE TWO SIDES -- THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES, THE WARSAW PACT
AND NATO -- DENY THAT THREATS OF WAR COME FROM THEM. AT THE SAME
TIME, THE AMERICAN AND NATO LEADERS ARE CONSTANTLY SAYING THAT THEY
REGARD THE SOVIET UNION AS THEIR ENEMY. WHEN I WAS IN THE PLANE
BRINGING ME TO FRANCE, I WAS LOOKING AT THE U.S. ARMY FIELD SERVICE
MANUAL WHICH, ON PAGE SEVEN, CLEARLY DESIGNATES THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER COUNTRIES AS THE UNITED STATES'
ENEMIES. FOREIGN SECRETARY G. HOWE, THINKS THAT THE "RUSSIAN BEAR"
THREATENS WESTERN EUROPE AND THAT IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY, IN HIS
VIEW, TO STRENGTHEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE WESTERN MASS MEDIA ARE
INCULCATING INTO THE PUBLIC THE IDEA OF THE THREATENING, FATAL
NATURE OF SOCIALISM, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE USSR IS ENEMY NUMBER
ONE AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH OUR COUNTRY CAN ONLY BE CONDUCTED FROM A
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POSITION OF STRENGTH. THE EMPHASIS PLACED ON-FORCE,-DETERRENCE,
AND NUCLEAR ARMS, IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION
WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY THE NATO LEADERS ON 30 MAY, IN OTHER WORDS, I
AM ANXIOUS TO STRESS, NOT DURING THE PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION AND
"COLD WAR," BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE "NEW POLITICAL THINKING."
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE? THERE IS CLEARLY ONE THING: TAKING
THIS INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR PRACTICAL ACTIONS. THE FACT IS THAT THE
WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THE 3 MILLION STRONG NATO FORCES FACE EACH
OTHER IN EUROPE. THOUSANDS OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE TARGETED ON
SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND, IN THE SAME WAY, AN ALMOST EQUAL QUANTITY OF
NUCLEAR WARHEADS CARRIED BY SOVIET MISSILES ARE TARGETED ON U.S.
OBJECTIVES. SUCH A MUTUAL THREAT PRODUCES A POTENTIAL RISK OF WAR
BREAKING OUT BY ACCIDENT AND IN AN UNPREMEDITATED WAY. THIS
INFLUENCES THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
IN GENERAL.
FOR INSTANCE, WE ARE NOW VERY WORRIED, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE
VERY WORRIED, BY THE HUNDREDS OF U.S. MILITARY BASES SURROUNDING
THE SOVIET UNION IN A HUGE CIRCLE; WE HAVE BEEN ENCIRCLED IN THIS
WAY FOR 40 YEARS. WE ARE WELL AWARE OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONAL
POTENTIAL OF THE U.S. AND NATO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, NAVAL AIR FORCE,
AND NAVAL FORCES, WHICH HAVE SUPERIORITY OVER SOVIET NAVAL FORCES
IN MANY SPHERES. THE SEABORNE CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH THE UNITED
STATES REFUSES TO LIMIT AND WHICH ARE DEPLOYED AROUND THE SOVIET
UNION, ARE A MAJOR THREAT.
LOOK AT THE SITUATION FROM OUR VIEWPOINT. OUR TERRITORY IS
EXPOSED TO A TWOFOLD AGGRESSION -- THAT OF THE U.S. AND NATO
OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND THAT OF THE FORWARD-BASED U.S.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN ADDITION TO THAT, THERE IS "STAR WARS," THE
B-2 HEAVY BOMBER ("STEALTH BOMBER") -- THIS IS THE INSTRUMENT OF A
NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE -- THE REFUSAL--T6---3TOP?NUCLEAR TESTS, PLANS
FOR "COMPENSATION" AND THE MODERNIZATION OF VARIOUS NUCLEAR STRIKE
SCENARIOS.... CAN WE REALLY THINK THAT THIS ALL REPRESENTS
PEACEFUL ASPIRATIONS?
WE MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS AND BUILD OUR DEFENSE ACCORDINGLY.
BUT WHY SHOULD EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE NOT TRY TO UNDERSTAND
EACH OTHER IN THE MILITARY SPHERE? WHY COULD WE NOT GRADUALLY
ELIMINATE WHAT CONSTITUTES THE MUTUAL THREAT? THE MILITARY THREAT
IS THE MAIN SOURCE OF OUR MUTUAL DISTRUST. AS LONG AS IT REMAINS,
SUSPICION WILL PERSIST, ENGENDERING INSTABILITY AND NERVOUSNESS,
INCREASING THE DESIRE NOT TO LAG BEHIND, TO PRODUCE A COUNTERFORCE
OR, WORSE STILL, TO ACQUIRE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, IN THE ILLUSORY
HOPE OF INFLICTING DEFEAT ON THE ENEMY WHILE REMAINING SAFE AND
SOUND, BY SOME MIRACLE. THE ONLY WAY TO END THIS SITUATION IS A
JOINT EFFORT BY STATES TO PROMOTE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.
HOWEVER, JUDGING FROM THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION, NATO IS TAKING A
CAUTIOUS LINE IN THE DISARMAMENT SPHERE AND IS BRAVELY ACCUMULATING
ARMAMENTS.
SECOND QUESTION: WHAT AGGRESSION SHOULD WE PREPARE TO REPEL?
WE DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE HERE EITHER. THE UNITED STATES AND NATO
ARE PREPARING AS MUCH FOR NUCLEAR WAR AS FOR CONVENTIONAL WAR.
THEIR MILITARY DOCTRINE, DESPITE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON ITS
"DEFENSIVE" NATURE, HAS HITHERTO PRESUPPOSED THE USE OF NUCLEAR
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WEAPONS WITH THE AIM OF THREATENING,,FIGHTING-VA-WAR-,--AND
GUARANTEEING A VICTORY. ALL U.S. MILITARY PLANS ARE BASED ON,
PAGE:0006
CARRYING OUT MILITARY OPERATIONS ON FOREIGN TERRITORY AND ACCEPT.
PREVENTIVE STRIKES "IN CASE OF SUSPICION."
/****** BEGINNING OF TAKE 004 ******/
REF: PM2310145689 PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE FRENCH OCT///CASE OF
SUSPICION."
TEXT:
((TEXT)) THIS IS CONFIRMED BY THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF AIR AND
LAND OPERATIONS, A FORM OF BATTLE EXPLAINED IN THE U.S. ARMY FIELD
SERVICE MANUAL (FM-105). THIS DOCUMENT STIPULATES IN BLACK'AND
WHITE THAT THEU.S. TROOPS SHOULD'ACT IN AN OFFENSIVE WAY, AND DEAL
POWERFUL BLOWS FROM UNEXPECTED DIRECTIONS. AFTER INVADING FOREIGN
TERRITORY AND CONSOLIDATING VICTORY, THEY MUST ENERGETICALLY PURSUE'
OFFENSIVE ACTIONS,. PENETRATING DEEP INTO.THE ENEMY'S DEFENSES. THE
RATE OF THE OFFENSIVE MUST BE RAPID, TO DEPRIVE THE ENEMY OF THE
CHANCE OF RESORTING TO COUNTERMEASURES.
THESE ARE THE GUIDELINES ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS ALLIES ARE TRAINING AND EQUIPPING THEIR ARMED. FORCES. IN
ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES.-IS OPENLY STATING THAT IT CAN BE THE
FIRST TO RESORT TO NUCLEAR: WEAPONS.
FOR INSTANCE, GENERAL LEYLAND, U.S. ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF
IN EUROPE, SAID DURING THE SENATE HEARINGS ON'14 JUNE: "THE
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE'S ARMED FORCES ARE ALWAYS PREPARED TO USE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, AND EVEN TO BE THE FIRST TO USE THEM, AT WHATEVER LEVEL,
FROM-THE START OF AN ARMED CONFLICT WITH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
ON THE EUROPEAN THEATER. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBT
ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES WILL
USE. THEIR WHOLE NUCLEAR ARSENAL." THIS STATEMENT WAS MADE AT A
TIME WHEN ADMIRAL CROWE, CHAIRMAN-OF-COMMITTEE OF U.S. ARMED
FORCES CHIEFS OF STAFF, WAS MAKING AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO OUR COUNTRY
AT MY INVITATION AND WAS TRYING TO CONVINCE US OF U.S. POLICY'S
PEACEFUL ASPIRATIONS.
IT IS BLATANTLY ILLOGICAL FOR THE UNITED STATES TO OFFICIALLY
ADMIT THAT NUCLEAR WAR WILL LEAD TO DISASTER AND AT THE SAME TIME
TO CONTINUE TO ADAPT NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BATTLEFIELD AND THEATER OF
WAR MISSIONS ON.A WORLD SCALE. WHILE STATING'THAT THERE CAN BE NO
VICTOR IN A NUCLEAR WAR, NOT ONLY IS IT REFUSING TO BAN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS OR SIMPLY, TO PLEDGE NOT TO BE FIRST TO USE THEM, BUT IT IS
.SEEKING TECHNICAL PROCEDURES AND A SERIES OF METHODS AIMED AT
MAKING. THE USE OF. THESE WEAPONS ACCEPTABLE FOR IT IN SPECIFIC
CIRCUMSTANCES.
. THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT FAIL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THAT. WHILE
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION U.S. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY, WE
ARE FORCED TO TRAIN OUR ARMED FORCES TO REPEL ANY AGGRESSION. BUT
WHY SHOULD NOT THE UNITED STATES, THE USSR, FRANCE, AND BRITAIN,
WHICH NOW FACE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES, MAKE A JOINT AND RECIPROCAL
PLEDGE NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS? THE WARSAW PACT
IS ALSO IN-FAVOR OF A JOINT PLEDGE NOT TO BE FIRST TO START'A
CONVENTIONAL WAR.
WE ARE ALSO PROPOSING PRACTICAL MEASURES TO AVERT THE DANGER OF
THE SUDDEN OUTBREAK OF A CONFLICT: A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE
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TWO ALLIANCES' ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE, AND THE-REMOVAL-OF THEIR
OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL; THE CREATION OF A NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR ALONG
THE LINE OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THE NATO
FORCES, AND AREAS IN EUROPE WHERE THERE WOULD BE LOW CONCENTRATIONS
OF WEAPONS; THE FORMATION OF A EUROPEAN CENTER FOR REDUCING THE
RISK OF WAR AND PREVENTING A SURPRISE ATTACK.
IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE REASONS WHY THE NATO COUNTRIES
WOULD NOT ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS, WHICH TAKE ACCOUNT OF EVERYBODY'S
INTERESTS AND DO NOT UNDERMINE ANYBODY'S SECURITY.
THIRD QUESTION: WHAT KIND OF ARMED FORCES SHOULD THE SOVIET
UNION HAVE?
THIS QUESTION IS DISCUSSED IN OUR DOCTRINE, ON THE BASIS OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF A REASONABLE AND ADEQUATE LEVEL OF DEFENSE. BY THIS
WE MEAN THAT A COUNTRY (OR A COALITION OF COUNTRIES) MUST HAVE THE
MINIMUM LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES WHOSE COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE
GUARANTEE A RELIABLE DEFENSE OF THE STATE AND ITS ALLIES, WHILE
RULING OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.
WITH REGARD TO OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS, THE PRINCIPLE OF
ADEQUATE DEFENSE, IN OUR VIEW, IMPLIES A BALANCE IN THESE WEAPONS
BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES. THEIR STRUCTURES MAY BE
DIFFERENT, BUT WHATEVER THE LEVEL OF REDUCTION, THEIR POTENTIAL
CAPABILITIES MUST BE EQUAL IN TERMS OF THE EFFICACY OF USE. ON THE
BASIS OF THESE POSITIONS, WE ARE CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
UNITED STATES ON A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND
.ARE PROPOSING THAT THEY TOO SHOULD ADOPT THIS POSITION.
WITH REGARD TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES, ADEQUATE DEFENSE IMPLIES A
COMBAT STRUCTURE WHICH ENABLES THE SIDES CONCERNED TO REPEL ANY
AGGRESSION, WITHOUT AUTHORIZING THEM TO EXERCISE A RECIPROCAL
THREAT, AND WITHOUT HAVING THE CAPABILITY OF CONDUCTING LARGE-SCALE
OFFENSIVE ACTIONS. THIS INVOLVES GIVING THE ARMED FORCES A
NONOFFENSIVE STRUCTURE, LIMITING THE ER-OF-OFFENSIVE WEAPON
SYSTEMS, MODIFYING THE WAY IN WHICH THE ARMED FORCES ARE GROUPED
AND THEIR DEPLOYMENT DISTRICTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR DEFENSIVE
MISSIONS, AND REDUCING MILITARY SPENDING AND THE VOLUME OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURED.
/****** BEGINNING OF TAKE 005 ******/
REF: PM2310145689 PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE FRENCH OCT///MILITARY
EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURED.
TEXT:
((TEXT)) THESE ARE NOT JUST WORDS. WE ARE ALREADY IMPLEMENTING
SOME OF THE MEASURES WE CAN TAKE UNILATERALLY WITHOUT UNDERMINING
OUR DEFENSE. WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE SAME MEASURES FROM THE WEST,
THE USSR, IN CONSULTATION WITH ITS ALLIES, HAS TAKEN A SERIES OF
MAJOR INITIATIVES WHICH GIVE OUR DOCTRINE A PRACTICAL DEFENSIVE
CONTENT. IN 1989 AND 1990, OUR ARMED FORCES WILL BE REDUCED BY
500,000 MEN (12 PERCENT OF OUR FORCES). IN EUROPE, THE REDUCTION
OF SOVIET TROOPS DEPLOYED IN THE GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY,
POLAND, AND IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR, REPRESENTS A TOTAL OF
240,000 MEN, 10,000 TANKS, 8,500 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS, AND 820 FIGHTER
AIRCRAFT. HALF OF THE 10,000 TANKS WILL BE DESTROYED, THE OTHER
HALF WILL BE TURNED INTO TOWING VEHICLES FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY, OR INTO SIMULATORS. THE MILITARY BUDGET WILL
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BE REDUCED BY MORE THAN 14 PERCENT AND THE PRODUCTION OF ARMS AND
MILITARY EQUIPMENT WILL BE REDUCED BY ALMOST 20 PERCENT. YOU WILL
SEE THAT WE ARE CONVERTING 2,250 TANKS INTO TOWING VEHICLES FOR
FIGHTING MAJOR FIRES. THESE ARE CATEGORY T-55 AND T-62 TANKS.
THESE PLANS ARE NOW BEING IMPLEMENTED. ALMOST 30,000 MEN, MORE
THAN 3,000 TANKS, AND A LARGE NUMBER OF OTHER ARMAMENTS AND
EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE SOVIET FORCES STATIONED
ABROAD. THREE OF THE SIX ARMORED DIVISIONS DUE TO BE WITHDRAWN
ALREADY HAVE BEEN. THE REMAINING THREE WILL BE WITHDRAWN NEXT
YEAR. ALL THE DIVISIONS BEING WITHDRAWN ARE BEING DISSOLVED. AT
THE SAME TIME, WE ARE WITHDRAWING 500 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM FORCES
WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS (166 WARHEADS ON AIRCRAFT, 284
WARHEADS ON MISSILES, AND 50 ARTILLERY WARHEADS), AND WE ARE ALSO
WITHDRAWAL AIR ASSAULT UNITS, AND ASSAULT BRIDGING UNITS WITH THEIR
ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.
AT THE SAME TIME AS THIS LARGE-SCALE REDUCTION, WE ARE CHANGING
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE NUMBER OF MILITARY
DISTRICTS AND ARMIES HAS BEEN REDUCED AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE
REDUCED. THE NUMBER OF COMBINED FORCES DIVISIONS HAS BEEN REDUCED
BY ALMOST HALF. WHAT WE CALL OPERATIONAL MANEUVER GROUPS AND
"ARMORED GROUPS" HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. THE DIVISIONS WHICH FOR THE
TIME BEING REMAIN ON OUR ALLIES' TERRITORY ARE BEING REORGANIZED.
A LARGE NUMBER OF TANKS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THEIR STRUCTURE (40
PERCENT IN THE MOTORIZED FUSILIERS DIVISIONS AND 20 PERCENT IN THE
ARMORED DIVISIONS). THE DIVISIONS ARE BEING GIVEN A DEFENSIVE
STRUCTURE. IN ALL, THE SOVIET TROOPS' SURPRISE ATTACK POTENTIAL
HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY REDUCED.
SIMILARLY, OUR ALLIES ARE CONSIDERABLY REDUCING THEIR ARMED
FORCES, MODIFYING THEIR STRUCTURES, REDUCING THEIR MILITARY
SPENDING. IN ALL THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES-ARE REDUCING THEIR
FORCES IN EUROPE BY MORE THAN 320,000"MEN'; MORE-THAN 13,000 TANKS,
MORE THAN 1,000 PLANES, AND MORE THAN 10,000 ARTILLERY SYSTEMS.
DESPITE THESE RADICAL CHANGES IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE,
NOTHING HAS YET CHANGED IN THE NATO COUNTRIES' POLICY. INSTEAD OF
PRACTICAL MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO OUR INITIATIVES, WE ARE MERELY
HEARING PROPAGANDA. THE WEST CLEARLY HAS NOT YET DRAWN UP A
COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT WHICH IS SUITED TO THE PRESENT STAGE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS -- A CONCEPT WHICH INCLUDES ALL NUCLEAR AND
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL CHANGES
WHICH HAVE OCCURRED NOW THAT THE POLICY OF FORCE HAS BEEN
DISCREDITED, AND NOW THAT IT HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED THAT A DIFFERENT
APPROACH TO PROBLEMS IS NECESSARY AND RECOURSE TO MILITARY
SOLUTIONS LEADS TO AN IMPASSE. FOR THE TIME BEING, THE WEST DOES
NOT HAVE SUCH A CONCEPT.
WESTERN PROPAGANDA ABOUT "THE SOVIET THREAT" IS NOW NO LONGER
CREDIBLE. NATO SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER, EXPRESSED HIMSELF VERY
FRANKLY ON THIS POINT. THIS IS WHAT HE SAID: "IT IS PARTICULARLY
IMPORTANT FOR NATO TO DRAW UP A NEW WAY OF PERCEIVING THE THREAT,
BECAUSE VIRTUALLY NOBODY NOW BELIEVES IN THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR
WITH THE USSR. HOWEVER, FOR THE TIME BEING, THERE IS NO PARTICULAR
IDEA ABOUT THE CONTENT AND SPIRIT OF THIS NEW APPROACH." WE CANNOT
HELP MR WOERNER EITHER.
FOURTH QUESTION: THE MEANS OF TRAINING OUR FORCES TO REPEL
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AGGRESSION:
WE HAVE NEVER HAD ANY INTENTION OF BEING THE FIRST TO LAUNCH A
WAR. BUT, BASED ON WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE, WE HAVE UNTIL RECENTLY
PLANNED TO REPEL AN AGGRESSION BY BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
ACTIONS.
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE WESTERN COUNTRIES' CONCERN, WE
HAVE JUST REVIEWED OUR STRATEGY, AND WE ARE BUSY RESHAPING THE
THINKING OF OUR GENERALS AND OFFICERS. IN CASE OF AGGRESSION, THE
SOVIET ARMED FORCES' MAIN FORMS OF ACTION WILL CONSIST OF DEFENSIVE
OPERATIONS AT THE START OF A CONFLICT. IN TRAINING OUR ARMY,
DEFENSE IS NOW PLACED IN THE FOREFRONT. WE ARE CONSEQUENTLY
REVISING THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR OUR LAND, AIR, AND NAVAL
TROOPS, AND THE FUNDAMENTAL DOCUMENTS AND RULES OF COMBAT TO WHICH
OUR ARMED FORCES REFER. WE HAVE CONSIDERABLY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF
LARGE-SCALE MANEUVERS, WE ARE SHOWING MODERATION IN OUR DEFENSE
PROGRAMS, IN WHICH QUALITATIVE PARAMETERS NOW HAVE A MAJOR PLACE,
BOTH IN THE TECHNICAL SPHERE AND IN THE COMPOSITION OF OUR ARMED
FORCES.
/****** BEGINNING OF TAKE 006 ******/
REF: PM2310145689 PARIS DEFENSE NATIONALE FRENCH OCT///OUR
ARMED FORCES.
TEXT:
((TEXT)) HOWEVER, WE HAVE A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS OF CONCERN WHICH
THE UNITED STATES AND NATO SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION. DURING
THE "GLOBAL SHIELD" MANEUVERS, THE UNITED STATES HAS, SINCE 1979,
IMPLEMENTED AN AIR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM BY ITS STRATEGIC BOMBERS,
INVOLVING THE PARTICIPATION OF AROUND 30 PERCENT OF THE B-52 AND
B-1B BOMBERS. IN THIS SURVEILLANCE OPERATION, THE AIR ROUTES ARE
IDENTICAL TO THOSE IN THE REAL SITUATION. STARTING FROM U.S.
TERRITORY AND PASSING OVER THE NORTH ?, ALASKA, AND THE ATLANTIC
AND PACIFIC OCEANS, THEIR PLANES APPROACH TO WITHIN 1,300 OR 1,500
KM FROM THE SOVIET BORDERS, AND SOMETIMES LESS. SUCH EXERCISES ARE
DANGEROUS AND CANNOT ALWAYS BE CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED.
NATO'S ANNUAL MANEUVERS IN EUROPE OF THE "AUTUMN FORGE" TYPE
INVOLVE BETWEEN 300,000 AND 400,000 MEN; THEY HAVE TAKEN ON SUCH
PROPORTIONS THAT ONE WOULD THINK WE WERE ON THE THRESHOLD OF WAR.
WE HAVE TO WORK HARD TO ESTABLISH THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE
MANEUVERS AND A REAL DEPLOYMENT OF NATO'S ARMED FORCES IN CASE OF
WAR. WHY NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR CONCERNS, IN THE SAME WAY THAT WE
WOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THOSE OF THE WEST ON THE SUBJECT OF
OTHER ACTIVITIES BY THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES?
THERE IS ANOTHER QUESTION WHICH DEFINES THE NATURE OF OUR
DOCTRINE. I AM THINKING OF THE PLANS TO MODERNIZE NATO'S TACTICAL
.NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHAT IS THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM?
IN VIEW OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE VIENNA
NEGOTIATIONS AND TO CREATE A STABLE SITUATION AND REDUCE THE DANGER
OF WAR IN EUROPE, IT IS VITAL TO START SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS ON
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WITH A VIEW TO REDUCING AND COMPLETELY
LIQUIDATING THEM. THIS IS THE PROPOSAL WHICH THE WARSAW PACT
ORGANIZATIONS MADE TO THE NATO COUNTRIES. AND WHAT WAS THE REPLY?
IT WAS MADE DURING THE MEETING OF NATO COUNTRY LEADERS IN
BRUSSELS. IT LARGELY CORRESPONDS WITH U.S. INTENTIONS. THE NATO
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THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
AND THEIR REJECTION OF THE IDEA OF THE "TRIPLE ZERO" OPTION IN
EUROPE, THUS PERPETUATING THE NUCLEAR THREAT.
THE POSTPONEMENT UNTIL 1992 OF THE DECISION TO BRING INTO
SERVICE AND DEPLOY NEW MISSILES. BUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN AFTER THAT
DATE? IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO SEE, BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS
RECEIVED THE SUPPORT OF ITS ALLIES IN FINANCING ITS LANCE-2 MISSILE
PROGRAM.
THEIR DETERMINATION TO LINK THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS ON
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH REACHING AN AGREEMENT IN VIENNA ON
CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THIS METHOD OF LINKING THINGS IS, IN MY VIEW,
AN ERROR OF PRINCIPLE. THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO SURROUND
ITSELF WITH A "WALL OF CHINA," WITH REGARD TO NEGOTIATIONS ON
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I MUST SAY THAT MR GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO
BEIJING HAS SHOWN THAT THE WALL OF CHINA HAS NOW BECOME A MEETING
PLACE, A FAVORABLE GROUND FOR DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS.
THUS, TO REVEAL THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM, THE BRUSSELS MEETING
VIRTUALLY EXCLUDED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE GENERAL
DISARMAMENT PROCESS. THE NATO LEADERS REJECTED THE PROPOSAL BY THE
WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND GAVE THE UNITED STATES THE OPPORTUNITY TO
"QUIETLY" IMPLEMENT ITS MODERNIZATION PLANS.
THIS IS NOT A FLEXIBLE POSITION AND IT DOES NOT SOLVE THE
PROBLEMS. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN AVOIDED TO SOME EXTENT, THUS CLEARLY
RUNNING THE RISK OF HAMPERING THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, AND
HAMPERING EUROPE'S PROGRESS TOWARD A SECURE AND STABLE WORLD.
WHAT IS THE POINT OF MODERNIZATION IF WE CAN, DURING THESE 2 OR
3 YEARS, SECURE A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS?
WHY DOES THE UNITED STATES WANT TO DEPLOY THE LANCE 2 MISSILE IN
EUROPE, IF WE ARE DESTROYING OUR SS-23-MISSILES, WHICH HAVE A
SIMILAR RANGE? THIS IS CLEARLY A WAY-&----CIRCUMVENTING THE INF
AGREEMENT.
MODERNIZATION IS NOT IN HARMONY WITH THE POSITIVE CHANGES WHICH
HAVE OCCURRED IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE AND WILL NOT INCREASE
SECURITY IN EUROPE. THE LATTER IS SEEN SOLELY AS SECURITY "FOR
ONESELF" AND NOT AS COMPREHENSIVE AND EQUAL FOR ALL. IT IS
IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE WITH THIS POSITION, WHICH CONTAINS THE RISK OF
CONFRONTATION AND COULD PROMPT A RETALIATORY RESPONSE.
DISARMAMENT MUST BE APPLIED TO ALL TYPES OF WEAPON. NATO IS NOT
JUSTIFIED IN FEARING NEGOTIATIONS ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
IN INDEFINITELY POSTPONING THEM. NOR HAS IT ANY REASON TO REGARD
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS SOMETHING "SACROSANCT."
IN SHORT, THERE ARE MANY PROBLEMS ON WHICH WE MUST WORK TOGETHER
TO REMOVE OUR RESPECTIVE ANXIETIES. I MUST SAY THAT THE TALKS I
HAVE HAD ON THIS SUBJECT WITH ARMY GEN SCHMITT AND DEFENSE MINISTER
CHEVENEMENT HAVE PRODUCED AREAS OF AGREEMENT. OVER THE PAST 3
YEARS, EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE HAVE MADE CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS
IN ALL DIRECTIONS, NOTABLY IN DISARMAMENT. WE MUST SAFEGUARD THESE
ACHIEVEMENTS TO AVOID ANY REGRESSION WHICH WOULD TAKE US BACK TO
GLOOMIER TIMES. AND, IN THIS SPHERE, ALL THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES,
AND ESPECIALLY THE USSR AND FRANCE COULD CLEARLY MAKE A POSITIVE
CONTRIBUTION THROUGH THEIR JOINT EFFORTS.
ADMIN
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