GORBACHEV'S NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00365R000100480001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Con,ven.t on.a.1? Arms Control A PreI... nar ...._Assessmen.t:1.
Summary
Mikhail Gorbachev began early in his term in office articulating
an interest in conventional arms control and has pressed the Nest on
the subject by issuing, along with his allies, the Warsaw Pact's
"Budapest Appeal" in mid-1986 and, in May this year, by endorsing the
"Jaruzelski Plan" and by prompting the Pact to issue a statement on
military doctrine at a meeting in Berlin. Gorbachev is probably
interested in conventional arms reduction in part for the propaganda
benefits his proposals my yield in the Rest, but also because movement
in this area of arms control could give him the biggest pay off in his
effort to reallocate substantial resources from the Soviet military to
the civilian economy. His proposals have expanded the scope of the
area covered in a potential arms control agreement from Central Europe
to the region between the Atlantic and the Urals_ The Pact doctrine,
if its language and explication by Gorbachev"s civilian spokesmen can
be taken at face value, means that the Soviets are willing eventually-
-if the Nest is as well--to restructure ground forces in Europe in a
manner that would:
-- require that each side retain a force "sufficient" to
repulse--but not pursue--an invading army;
-- disallow the possibility of a surprise attack by either
side;
-- necessitate the withdrawal of substantial quantities of
"offensive" equipment--tanks, bridging equipment,
helicopters, for example--from front lines;
-- and, ultimately, lead to the return of armies in Europe to
their national borders and the dissolution of the two major
military alliances.
The doctrine, however, has apparently received mixed reviews
within the Soviet Unions In the propaganda campaign that followed the
doctrines public assertion, civilian spokesmen issued robust
definitions of its pacific meaning and "historic" importance that
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emphasized Moscow's willingness to compromise and the economic
imperative for working a deal with the Nest. Some Soviet generals
however, have endorsed the doctrine with less enthusiasm arid have
attempted to define its provisions as nothing especially new and
allowing for the traditional "crushing rebuff" to be dealt to an
aggressor on his home soil- Unlike the civilians, including
Gorbachev, the military is also loath to admit that there are any
significant asymmetries in the NATO-Pact ground forces balance that
might require that the Red Army pull anything back to build NATO's
confidence. The ferment over doctrine and conventional arms control
issues within the Soviet system does not appear over.
Mikhail Gorbachev's quest to modernize the Soviet economy
according his own public testimony
Ithe central objective that
guides not only his domestic policy but also policy toward the West.
His quest for economic renaissance, especially in building up the
scientific and technological base that he believes must underlie the
USSR's economic viability, has led him to pursue a policy toward the
West that in the near-to-medium term--his spokesmen speak of 15 years
--requires a renewed detente. That policy, he appears to hope, will
at once bring the USSR two benefits. One is a fuller economic
relationship with the West that infuses the Soviet Union with Western
technology, capital, and managerial know-how. The other is a slow
down in the arms race that will allow the reallocation of resources
from the military to the civilian economy.
Central to both objectives are his arms control initiatives.
Although they have major public diplomacy objectives and play to a
longer term Soviet political agenda of bolstering the European left,
the campaign for arms control apparently represents a serious effort
to cut back the money Moscow spends on arms without at the same time
diminishing--and preferably enhancing--Soviet security. The most
vocal thrust of the arms control campaigns in the first two years of
Gorbachev's tenure has been in his push for limitations in space
"weapons," strategic systems, intermediate range systems, nuclear
testing, and chemical weapons. The USSR invests substantial sums in
all of these areas and its civilian economy would undoubtedly profit
from a reallocation of resources due to a lower rate of expenditure on
any of theme
I_m,portanc.e..... of... Con.ven tiiona.I......_Arms ....._Control..
The area, however, where major savings could be made in military
spending--and where the Soviets continue to have the greatest
advantage vis-a-vis the West--is in conventional arms control. Within
the Soviet Union, this is perhaps the most sensitive and politically
difficult area for the regime to formulate policy. The Soviet and
Warsaw Fact armies not only guard against a perceived threat from the
West, but the Red Army also serves as a de facto occupying force in
several Warsaw Pact countries that bolsters the satellite communist
regimes. Soviet ground forces, moreover, are by far the largest
component of the Soviet armed forces. They eat up the most resources
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and are thus the force that, if reduced, would free up the most money
for the civilian economy. Ground forces are also probably the sector
in the military that has the most entrenched and powerful political
clout in the party.
The ability of the Party and military to come to grips with
conventional arms control is probably complicated by other factors as
well. The propaganda value of the subject in the West is limited,
although this may be changing somewhat. Thus the use of a
conventional arms control initiative provides potentially fewer public
diplomacy or propaganda benefits than nuclear arms control; if the
proposals are made, their main value comes in reaching--or stalling--
an agreement with the West. Reaching an agreement on conventional
arms control can also be complicated by the need to coordinate
Moscow's position with Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members.
There are also, for a party leadership attempting to grapple with
conventional arms control, the problems of information and
credibility. Gorbachev does not appear to enjoy the luxury of leaders
in the West who have access to accurate descriptive and critical
information about their own military from civilian sources. His
information on arms control and net assessments of NATO-Warsaw Pact
balance comes, it can be assumed, largely from the military itself.
Academic institutes independent of the military offer some help, but
their credibility is limited, as is their own information, and their
views are probably dismissed by the Soviet generals. As a result.
Gorbachev is in a bind if he wants to gain the kind of economic
purchase from arms control that he appears to be after.
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Gorbachev's interest in a revised doctrine and conventional arms
control was hinted at publicly within the first year of his tenure,z
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