SOVIETS ADOPT COHORT SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00365R000100240001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 22, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
22 March 1984
SOVIETS ADOPT COHORT SYSTEM
Summary
Recent changes in conscription practices
represent a major effort to overcome the most
significant deficiency of Soviet ground forces--
poorly trained conscripts and small unit
commanders. Like the US army, the Soviets are
introducing a cohort manning system which, through
increased training and strengthened unit cohesion,
is intended to significantly improve their combat
performance. These changes should help the
Soviets to realize the combat potential offered by
the buildup of their conventional combat forces
over the past decade
The system requires combat units to be manned
by soldiers who are conscripted and discharged
together after serving in the same unit for 18
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L
months. After formation, units are isolated from
the disruptive semi-annual induction of new
recruits and progress from individual to complex
combined arms tactical training. We estimate that
the typical unit can receive about three extra
months of field training than in the past.
Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe all could
adopt the cohort system within the next two years
if they have not already done so. Although the
cohort program offers some important advantages,
it will entail higher training expenses. In
addition, the Soviets face major obstacles
implementing the system because of the increased
demands it places on junior officers for
initiative and responsibility. Moreover, their
junior NCOs--who must lead small cohort squads and
platoons-are often poorly trained for leadership
positions.
1. The authors gratefully acknowledge the
cooperation and assistance of the office of the US Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. The judgments
expressed in the paper, however, are not necessarily
those of the US Army.
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9
The New Program
the Soviets began adopting a cohesive manning policy in
the early 1980s. It requires small combat units to be manned
entirely by specialists and conscripts with the same discharge
date. The unit, whether a tank or rifle company or an artillery
battalion, then remains intact for at least 18 months.' There is
no evidence, however, that either combat support or service
support units use the program.
3. The cohesive unit program is now being extensively used
by both Soviet and East German ground forces units.
at least 6 of 19 Soviet divisions probably use
the program.
is had also adopted
German divisions would implement the program by the fall of
1983. Possibly East Germany--because of its small ground
forces--was chosen as the Warsaw Pact's testing ground for the
cohort concept. There is no indication yet that the system has
Units which have significant numbers of conscript NCOs and
specialists, who have had six months of training before
reporting to their unit of assignment, probably would stay
together 18 months. A few units composed almost entirely
of two year conscripts without specialist training may be
able to serve together for 24 months.
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SECRET
been adopted elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
4.
both the Soviets and East
Germans conduct separate training schedules for companies within
motorized rifle and tank battalions geared specifically to the
experience level of unit members. For example, tank companies
composed entirely of newly arrived soldiers in their first six
months of service concentrate on individual and elementary
company level tactics. Companies with more advanced soldiers--in
their final year of service--concentrate on crew and platoon
level training and advanced company level tactics. Their
training reportedly is also intensive and demanding compared to
tank companies with members in their first six months of
service. Companies with soldiers in their last six months of
service spend 60 percent more time in combined arms field
training and almost no time on elementary individual skills.
5. Forward Area Indicators: As Warsaw Pact units in East
Germany have adopted the program, traditional indicators of
routine force activity are becoming less valid.
reported a fifty percent increase in tank
and armored vehicle fire range training last year and a similar
increase in company and battalion level training exercises.
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GSFG is currently acquiring the training
materials and facilities to do even better.
additional training--emphasizing live fire training at lower
levels--is supported by other evidence including:
-- Advanced regimental field training, including
demonstrations for dignitaries and proficiency testing,
are now occurring during and after the troop rotation.
-- There has been a corresponding decrease in divisional
level field exercises. In the past, units generally
avoided complex training because of the turmoil
associated with troop rotation. The new system,
however, frees battalion sized units with experienced
troops to conduct advanced training any time during the
final service year of its members.
6. Changes in troop rotation practices--to include yearly
fluctuations in the numbers of new recruits sent to each of the
Groups of Forces, and an extension of the rotation period--may
also be related to the new manning policies. The exact
relationship of troop rotation changes to the new training
practices are not yet clear, however. Some divisions may receive
few new recruits for several cycles if most of their subunits are
composed of second or third term soldiers. However, they would
then receive large numbers of recruits when their sub units were
reconstituted.
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cohort system, which emphasizes all arms company and battalion
level training, is now used to some extent in at least 20 Soviet
divisions--both high and low strength--in the USSR. Unusual
company and battalion sized equipment sets
may be training equipment used by divisions adopting the
program. There is no evidence that the Soviets have used the
cohort system in Afghanistan--suggesting its scope is still
limited.
8. The program apparently is confined to the combat arms of
the ground forces. There is no indication that either the Soviet
navy or air forces are experimenting with the cohort system,
although our evidence on training in those services is not as
current or complete as in the ground forces. Cohort training
would probably not be as necessary in combat air units because
most pilots are careerists and such units are highly stable.
While naval units might benefit from such a training and manning
program, the size of naval crews and the diversity of crew skills
could present serious adminstrative problems in selecting and
training cohort units.
Prospects
9. The cohort program will face major obstacles and will
involve significant costs. A vigorous field training program
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entails large fuel and ammunition expenditures and heavy wear and
tear on equipment. In the past, Soviet equipment usage norms
have been austere--and designed to conserve rather than to expend
unit equipment and fuel. For example, many tank crews fired only
about six full calibre rounds each cycle. The Soviets will have
to dramatically adjust their frugal peacetime equipment,
ammunition, and fuel useage norms to derive any real benefits
from added field training time. In turn, this will require added
costs for supplies, skilled maintenance specialists, and
additional repair installations to support the new training
program. GSFG is scheduled to
receive more training materials and will build additional
training facilities suggests the Soviets are willing to spend
more on their training establishment, at least in Eastern
Europe.
10. Like the US, the Soviets may still be experimenting
with the proper way to manage their system. They have
traditionally made the regiment their basic administrative unit
but fragmentary evidence suggests that the cohort system is now
administered at the battalion level. Each battalion apparently
has at least two of its three companies in the same cohort
cycle.
11. Eventually regiments may become the focus of the cohort
system perhaps with two of three battalions in each regiment on
the same cycle. This would more closely correspond to Soviet
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emphasis on combined arms operations at battalion and regimental
level. At the same time, the third battalion would provide the
regiment with a residual combat capability when the two
battalions on the same cycle were being reconstituted.
Furthermore, the Soviets could give some units six months of
training in the Soviet Union prior to deployment to Eastern
Europe. This would reduce the decline in readiness due to the
loss of units about to be disbanded. We have no evidence,
however, that the Soviets have considered this option.
12. The Soviets face a far, more complex problem in
countering old habits and attitudes antithetical to any new
manning or training policies. Despite talk of fostering command
initiative at regiment and below, Soviet readiness testing favors
stereotyped solutions to tactical problems. The Soviets have
developed elaborate "objective" norms for evaluating all aspects
of individual and unit proficiency.2 Tactical innovation and
initiative, however, assume creative deviation from the "school
solution." It is difficult to see how the rigidly normative
Soviet approach to evaluating military competence can create the
psychological conditions or proper incentives to foster
initiative at battalion and below. Nor is it clear that senior
Soviet officers--by Western standards used to detailed top-down
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control of battle formations--would abdicate their command
prerogatives or the strategic flexibility provided them by the
standardization and interchangeability of small units. Thus the
Soviets face a dilemma in striking a balance between providing
lower ranking commanders with--the skills to conduct all-arms,
low-level tactics and freeing them to fully exploit those skills
in tactical situations.
13. The cohort system is also likely to expose weaknesses
in the Soviet non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. Already
short of older professional NCOs, the Soviets rely heavily on
junior NCOs who only are promising conscripts sent to specialty
and leadership schools. They are approximately the same age as
the conscripts they lead when they assume their duties and often
have received only six months of intensive specialty training.
Evidence from the US cohort experience indicates that the cohort
peer group has high expectations of its immediate leaders in
return for the loyalty it is prepared to offer. The junior
Soviet NCO may not have either the stature or the expertise to be
a role model and the Soviets may find that they will require NCOs
with additional military experience and seasoning to lead cohort
squads and platoons. In turn, this will increase pressure to
recruit professional NCOs--already in short supply--or to change
laws governing junior NCO terms of service and training.
Alternatively, the Soviets could increase the already extensive
use of junior officers and warrant officers for jobs done in
western armies by NCOs.
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14. Given the size of the Soviet ground forces--and their
heavy dependence on reservists--it will be years before the new
training practices can work their desired effects. Not only do
new training manuals, techniques, and instructions need to be
widely promulgated in the active ground forces, but reservists--
who will compose 10 percent to 100 percent of Soviet divisions
after mobilization--need to acquire skills compatible with those
of active personnel along side of whom they will fight. This can
only be done, given the hundreds of thousands of reservists
needing training and the poor quality of reserve3 training, by
the gradual release to the reserves of conscripts who have gone
through the new training programs. For critical skills, such as
tank gunners, it will be more than a decade before enough
reservists trained in the all-arms battalion level field tactics
stressed in the new approach become available. A similar lag
will occur until enough reserve officers--who would command
companies and battalions--are available.
15. We have no evidence on how the Soviets may plan to
handle the effect on overall unit readiness when subunits are
disbanded. Extension of the service terms of unit members in
periods of crisis is an obvious option. Likewise, the Soviets
will probably stagger the maturity levels of subunits--perhaps
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having the majority but not all companies in a battalion or the
majority of battalions in a regiment on the same cycle. The
minority of units on the "off cycles" would then provide high
residual combat capabilities when other units were disbanded.
Less demanding tactical missions could also be assigned to less
experienced units in an effort to match mission to maturing
capabilities.
Why Change?
16. Problems. Since the late 1970s, Soviet authorities had
become critical of the traditional training program because the
repetitive six month training cycle was seen as inferior to a
progressive, phased, multi-cycle schedule. They believed that
traditional training programs encouraged overly rigid adherence
to "school" solutions. Soviet authors emphasized that modern
combat requires high levels of initiative and decisiveness,
particularly by battalion commanders on the scene. These
authorities argued that because the demands on such officers to
make "spot" decisions has increased by a factor of two or three
field training methods which realistically simulate battalion-
level tactical situations for junior commanders were needed.
17. Soviet writings also have faulted weapons operators for
low skill levels due in part to overly simplistic field training
which did not challenge them to respond quickly as needed in
battle. Poor coordination between arms--particularly between
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artillery and supported infantry and armor troops--has been cited
as a problem requiring additional all-arms field training.
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18. Broad organizational changes and the fielding of
advanced weaponry in recent years brought with them renewed
emphasis for "hands on" small unit tactical field training. Most
Soviet ready divisions--including virtually all in Eastern
Europe--have adopted changes combining armor, artillery, and
infantry in balanced, all-arms maneuver regiments. Advanced
weapons now widely fielded include self-propelled artillery, a
new generation of battle tanks, and new mobile air defense
systems which must be integrated into battalion and regimental
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19. Finally, past practices required the discharge of about
one-quarter of a unit's personnel each six months, and their
replacement by untrained recruits thereby drastically reducing
unit readiness. Such turmoil merely amplified the affects of
inadequate field training time needed to master new tactics and
equipment. units did not recover
from the effects of the semi-annual troop rotation for about
three months and that most units did not conduct advanced field
training during the four-to-six weeks required to train and
absorb their new conscripts. Moreover, valuable field training
time was lost, as whole units stood down to absorb conscripts
received in the rotation.
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Solutions
20. Cohort manning reduces the turmoil associated with the
semi-annual rotation because there is.no longer a personnel
turnover each six months. Since the cohort units receive no new
recruits after their formation, the unit can follow an
uninterrupted, progressive training schedule. We estimate that
the typical small unit could spend three to four additional
months in the field or in training with simulators simply by
avoiding rotation standdowns. Furthermore, in Eastern Europe,
better use can be made of large training areas, since some units
will always be capable of conducting regimental exercises, even
during the rotation period.,
21. The new program should allow units to master additional
as well as more complex tactical maneuvers. More field training
time is available, but more importantly unit skill levels are not
depleted at every rotation by the discharge of experienced
troops. Unit cohesion should also be improved by the prolonged
service together of unit members. It is not clear, however, if
it will provide sufficient time--up to four extra months--to meet
vastly increased demands on lower level units
22. If the Soviets take advantage of the training benefits
provided by cohort manning, field commanders, particularly at
battalion, should benefit by having more time to actually plan,
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control, and coordinate combined arms tactics in field
settings. Furthermore, they will command more accomplished crews
in the final cycle of a unit's training. Such field training--
with the hands-on experience gained in the planning and direction
of logistics operations, fire allocation, tactical movement, and
terrain use--should be far more valuable to junior officers than
the staff exercises now conducted during rotational standdowns.
23. Despite problems with the implementation and
administration of the cohort system and the inevitable resistance
generated by new ways, the Soviet ground forces are adopting a
training program which offers an opportunity to develop soldiers
and commanders capable of better exploiting recent
given tactical situation.
organizational, doctrinal, and weapon changes. Nonetheless, even
assuming competent instruction, the 18 months most units will
remain together--the function of the draft term--is probably
inadequate to develop units with a large number of tactical
options or junior officers experienced in all-arms command.
However, the Soviets will probably provide their better units
with a small number of standard tactical options and can expect
that their best trained and led units will have competently
mastered these and be capable of choosing the best solution for a
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