SOVIET ACQUISITION OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05C01629R000701490007-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Soviet Acquisition of
Western Technology
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Contents
Introduction
1
Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology: A National-Level Program
1
Soviet Mechanisms for Acquiring Western Technology
2
Soviet Acquisitions and Benefits
5
Outlook for the 1980s
11
Appendix
Projected Soviet Technological Needs and Acquisition Targets
13
Through the 1980s
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Soviet Acquisition of
Western Technology
Introduction
The United States and its Allies traditionally have
relied on the technological superiority of their weap-
ons to preserve a credible counterforce to the quanti-
tative superiority of the Warsaw Pact. But that
technical superiority is eroding as the Soviet Union
and its Allies introduce more and more sophisticated
weaponry-weapons that all too often are manufac-
tured with the direct help of Western technology.'
Stopping the Soviets' extensive acquisition of mili-
tary-related Western technology-in ways that are
both effective and appropriate in our open society-is
one of the most complex and urgent issues facing the
Free World today.
This report describes the Soviet program to acquire
US and Western technology, the acquisition mecha-
nisms used, the spectrum of Western acquisitions that
have contributed to Soviet military might, the project-
ed Soviet priority needs for Western technology, and
the problems of effectively stemming the transfer of
Western technology that could someday find applica-
tion in weapons used to threaten the West.
Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology:
A National-Level Program
Since at least the 1930s, the Soviet Union has devoted
vast amounts of its financial and manpower resources
to the acquisition of Western technology that would
enhance its military power and improve the efficiency
of its military manufacturing technology. Today this
Soviet effort is massive, well planned, and well man-
aged-a national-level program approved at the high-
est party and governmental levels.
This program accords top priority to the military and
military-related industry, and major attention is also
given to the civilian sectors of Soviet industry that
support military production.
The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have ob-
tained vast amounts of militarily significant Western
technology and equipment through legal and illegal
means. They have succeeded in acquiring the most
advanced Western technology by using, in part, their
scientific and technological agreements with the West
to facilitate access to the new technologies that are
emerging from the Free World's applied scientific
research efforts; by spending their scarce hard curren-
cy to illegally purchase controlled equipment, as well
as to legally purchase uncontrolled advanced Western
technologies having military-industrial applications;
and by tasking their intelligence services to acquire
illegally those US and Western technologies that are
classified and export controlled.
The Soviets have been very successful in acquiring
Western technology by blending acquisitions legally
and illegally acquired by different government organi-
zations. The Soviet intelligence services-the Soviet
Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Chief
Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff
(GRU)-have the primary responsibility for collecting
Western classified, export-controlled, and proprietary
technology, using both clandestine and overt collec-
tion methods. They in turn make extensive use of
many of the East European Intelligence Services (see
inset, p. 2); for their efforts in acquiring Western
technology, these countries are paid in part with
Soviet military equipment and weapons.
' While there are numerous interpretations of "technology" for
weapons, it is defined in this report as the application of scientific
knowledge, technical information, know-how, critical materials,
keystone manufacturing and test equipment, and end products
which are essential to the research and development as well as the
series manufacture of modern high-quality weapons and military
equipment. Western technology is defined as that technology
developed by the Free World.
Clandestine acquisition of the West's most advanced
military-related equipment and know-how by the
KGB and GRU is a major and growing problem.
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East European Intelligence Services Acquire
Technologies for the Soviet Union
In the late 1970s a former East European intelligence
officer revealed organizational and targeting details
related to Soviet-directed acquisitions of Western
technology by East European intelligence services,
particularly military-industrial manufacturing-
related technologies that were given the highest prior-
ity for collection by at least one East European
intelligence service. Many technologies were acquired
through dummy firms established in Western Europe
that were successful in securing some of the most
advanced technologies in the West, including com-
puter, microelectronic, nuclear, and chemical
technologies.
In microelectronics, for example, many US firms
were targeted through their affiliates in Western
Europe; scientists, technicians, and commercial rep-
resentatives also were successfully recruited to pro-
vide information during their trips to Europe. Al-
though most of the military and defense-industrial
information acquired by East European intelligence
services went to the Soviets, much of it was used by
the East Europeans themselves to benefit their mili-
tary and civilian industries. The computer, micro-
electronic, and photographic areas were priority tar-
gets. The East European countries benefited con-
siderably from microelectronic acquisitions, and
could not have achieved the present level of develop-
ment in their computer industry without illegal
acquisitions of Western technology.
These intelligence organizations have been so success-
ful at acquiring Western technology that the man-
power levels they allocate to this effort have increased
significantly since the 1970s to the point where there
are now several thousand technology collection offi-
cers at work. These personnel, under various covers
ranging from diplomats to journalists to trade offi-
cials, are assigned throughout the world.
Soviet foreign trade organizations, or enterprises,
although quasi-independent entities, are partially sub-
ordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and their
activities are closely coordinated by this Ministry.
They have major responsibilities for both legal and
illegal acquisitions and purchases; they work closely
with the KGB and GRU in arranging trade diver-
sions. East European trade companies assist them in
clandestine and illegal acquisition operations.
Official Soviet and East European science and tech-
nology (S&T) organizations also play a major role in
both open and clandestine acquisition of Western
technology. The Soviet State Committee for Science
and Technology (GKNT) is the key player in arrang-
ing government-to-government science and technol-
ogy agreements to facilitate access to and the acquisi-
tion of established as well as new technologies,
including those just emerging from Western universi-
ties, laboratories, and high-technology firms. It is the
GKNT that oversees the allocation of scarce Soviet
hard currency for the legal purchase by various Soviet
organizations of selected Western technology for So-
viet military purposes. If the GKNT is unable to
acquire the necessary technology by open or legal
means, it tasks Soviet intelligence to clandestinely
acquire the technology.
It is the well-organized and well-coordinated use of all
these organizations that has made the Soviet program
to acquire Western technology so successful. As a
result, the Soviets have acquired militarily significant
technologies and critically important industrial West-
ern technologies that have benefited every major
Soviet industry engaged in the research, development,
and production of weapon systems.
Soviet Mechanisms for Acquiring Western Technology
Soviet acquisition mechanisms include: legal means
through open literature, through legal trade channels,
and through student scientific and technological ex-
changes and conferences; illegal means through trade
channels that evade US and Western (i.e. CoCom) z
export controls, including acquisitions by their intelli-
gence services through recruited agents and industrial
' The Coordinating Committee (CoCom) was established in 1949 to
serve as the forum for Western efforts to develop a system of
strategic export controls. It is composed of the United States, the
United Kingdom, Turkey, Portugal, Norway, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Japan, Italy, Greece, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Denmark, Canada, and Belgium.
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espionage. While a large volume of technology is
acquired by nonintelligence personnel, the overwhelm-
ing majority of what the United States considers to be
militarily significant technology acquired by and for
the Soviets was obtained by the Soviet intelligence
services and their surrogates among the East Europe-
an intelligence services. However, legal acquisitions
by other Soviet organizations are important since it is
often the combination of legally and illegally acquired
technologies that gives the Soviets the complete mili-
tary or industrial capability they need.
Because of the priority accorded to the military over
the civilian sectors of the Soviet economy, Western
dual-use technology-i.e., technology with both mili-
tary and civilian applications-almost always finds its
way first into military industries, and subsequently
into the civilian sectors of industries that support
military production. Thus, Soviet assurances that
legally purchased dual-use technology will be used
solely for civilian applications can seldom be accepted
at face value.
Legal acquisitions generally have their greatest im-
pact on the Soviets' broad industrial base, and thus
affect military technology on a relatively long-term
basis. The Soviet Kama Truck Plant, for example,
was built over some seven years with massive imports
of more than $1.5 billion worth of US and West
European automotive production equipment and tech-
nology. Large numbers of military-specification
trucks produced there in 1981 are now being used by
Soviet forces in Afghanistan and by Soviet military
units in Eastern Europe opposite NATO forces. Simi-
larly, large Soviet purchases of printed circuit board
technology and numerically controlled machine tools
from the West already have benefited military manu-
facturing sectors.
The Soviets give priority to those purchases that meet
the direct needs of the Soviet military-industrial
complex by paying for them in hard currency. Over
the past 10 years, the Soviets legally and illegally
purchased large quantities of Western high-technol-
ogy microelectronics equipment that has enabled
them to build their own military microelectronics
industry in a short time. This acquired capability in
microelectronics is the critical basis for the present
wide-ranging enhancements of Soviet military sys-
tems and for their continuing sophistication.
Acquisitions through illegal trade channels often have
both industrial and military applications, and thus are
important in the near term. Illegal acquisitions of
technology fall into two general categories, both of
which are extremely difficult to detect and monitor.
One is the diversion of controlled technology from
legitimate trade channels to proscribed destinations.
This is done through US and foreign firms that are
willing to engage in profitable impropriety; through
agents-in-place in US or foreign firms or foreign
subsidiaries of US firms; through Soviet- and East
European-owned firms locally chartered in the
West; and through foreign purchasing agents (includ-
ing arms dealers). For instance, to evade the US
embargo on microelectronic technology exports to the
Soviet Union, the Soviets and their surrogates have
set up dummy corporations in the West that purchase
sophisticated microelectronics manufacturing equip-
ment. This equipment is then shipped and reshipped,
sometimes with the knowledge of individuals in the
companies, to disguise its ultimate destination-the
Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Both the Soviet and
Warsaw Pact intelligence services are in the main-
stream of this illegal technology trade flow. The other
type of diversion is an in-place diversion, in which
legally acquired technology and equipment-in the
computer area, for example-are put to military end
uses not authorized in export license applications.
The acquisitions that most directly affect Soviet
military development have come from intelligence
collection and related illegal trade diversions. Soviet
Bloc intelligence services have concentrated their
effort in the United States, Western Europe, and
Japan. These services target defense contractors and
high-technology firms working on advanced technol-
ogy (both classified and unclassified), foreign firms
and subsidiaries of US firms abroad, and internation-
al organizations with access to advanced and/or
proprietary technology, including access to computer
data base networks throughout the world.
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Major Fields of Technology of Interest to
Soviet and East European Visitors to the United States
Architecture
Automatic Control
CAD (Computer-Aided Design)
Cybernetics/Artificial Intelligence
Data Bases
Image Processing Design
Image Processing/ Retrieval
Amorphous
CAD
Composites
Cryogenics
Deformation
CAD
Circuits
Defects
Devices
Communications, Navigation, Antennas
and Control Microwave/ Millimeter Waves
Radio Wave Propagation
Vehicular/Transportation Marine Systems
Laser and Optics Fiber Optics
Gas Lasers
Cryogenics
Fusion
Materials
MHD (Magnetohydrodynamics)
Genetic Engineering
Memories
N/C (Numerically Controlled) Units
Networks
Pattern Recognition
Programming
Robots
Software
Metallurgy
N/C Machine Tools
Powder Metals
Superconductors
Testing/NDT (Non-Destructive)
Design
Ion Implantation
Production Technology
SAW (Surface Acoustic Wave) Devices
Satellite Communications
Signal Processing
Telecommunications
Shipbuilding
Optics
Tunable Lasers
Reactors
Structural Designs
Superconductors
Both legal and illegal acquisitions of US and Western
technology and equipment are coordinated with infor-
mation obtained through the complex network of
international governmental scientific and technical
agreements and exchanges that the USSR maintains
with the advanced industrial nations. These include
know-how, equipment, and computer data base collec-
tion activities of Soviet scientists and engineers who
participate in academic, commercial, and official
S&T exchanges. Visiting Soviet and East European
technical and student delegations to the United States
generally consist of expert scientists, many of whom
are connected with classified work in their home
countries. Such was the case with the Soviet scientist
who managed to get assigned to fuel-air explosives
work. When he finished his US study programs, he
almost certainly returned to the USSR to work on
related weapons. Other Soviet and East European
scientists have come to the United States to work in
the aerohydrodynamic, cryogenic, optic, laser, com-
puter, magnetic bubble computer memory, nuclear,
microelectronic, and structural and electronic materi-
al areas. Given the military importance of these fields
to the Soviet Union, it appears likely that a high
percentage of these scientists will work on military-
related programs in these areas after they return
home.
From the beginning, Soviet candidates in various
academic and scientific exchange programs have
nearly always proposed research activities involving
technologies in areas that have direct military appli-
cations and in which the Soviets are technologically
deficient. Table 1 provides a list of the key high-
technology fields that Soviet and East European
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visitors come to the United States to study, research,
or discuss, many of which are on the US Militarily
Critical Technology List today. In each of the past
two years, more than a third of the 50 program
proposals offered under the Graduate Student/Young
Faculty Program of the International Research and
Exchanges Board (IREX) has been completely un-
acceptable in terms of prospective technology loss,
and many other programs needed to be modified or
have access constrained before the exchanges could be
allowed.
The Soviets correctly view the United States and
several other Western countries as a continuing
source of important and openly available scientific
and technical information, which they take every
opportunity to obtain access to. Some of the unclassi-
fied documents so acquired are previously classified
materials which had been downgraded to unclassified
through US procedures providing for automatic de-
classification after a stipulated period. When collect-
ed on a massive scale and centrally processed by the
Soviets, this information becomes significant because
it is collectively used by Soviet weapons designers and
weapons countermeasure experts.
The Soviets also regularly attend high-technology
trade shows, and attempt to visit commercial firms in
the West, particularly small and medium-sized firms
that are active in developing new technologies. These
apparent trade promotion efforts often mask Soviet
attempts to acquire emerging Western technological
know-how before its military uses have been identified
and government security controls have been applied.
Emerging technologies are particularly vulnerable to
foreign collection efforts of this type.
Soviet intelligence continues to place a high priority
on the collection of S&T information on genetic
engineering and futuristic weapons such as lasers and
particle beam weapons. The Soviets have been step-
ping up their efforts to acquire new and emerging
technologies such as very-high-speed integrated-cir-
cuit (VHSIC) and very-large-scale integration (VLSI)
technology from Western universities and commercial
laboratories for both military and commercial
applications.
Over the past few years there has been an increased
use of Soviet- and East European-owned firms locally
chartered in the United States and abroad to exploit
Western-controlled and military-related technology.
There are more than twenty Soviet- and East
European-owned firms in the United States, and near
the end of the 1970s there were more than 300 similar
firms in Western Europe. In addition to the United
States, heavy concentrations are in the United King-
dom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, the Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Canada, Belgium, and
Austria. These firms are avenues for Soviet acquisi-
tion of advanced Western technologies, as was shown
when the US engineer arrested in late 1981 was
charged with selling US secret documents to an East
European intelligence officer employed by a Polish-
owned firm chartered in Illinois (see inset, p. 6).
Furthermore, firms chartered in the United States
can legally purchase controlled US technology and
study it without actually violating US export controls
unless they attempt to export the equipment or related
technical data from the United States without a
license.
Soviet Acquisitions and Benefits
Today's recognition of the crucial role of Western
technology in the development and production of
Soviet weapon systems and related military equip-
ment is not unique. Soviet dependence on Western
technology was visible and clear-cut in the years
immediately after World War II, when the Soviets
stole Western nuclear secrets leading to their develop-
ment of a nuclear weapon capability, and copied a US
bomber in its entirety leading to production of their
TU-4. To achieve major improvements in their mili-
tary capability quickly, they exploited captured scien-
tists and industrial plants and resorted to a combina-
tion of espionage, stealing, and copying Western
systems.
Since that early period of near-complete reliance in
the 1950s, the Soviets' dependence on Western tech-
nology to develop their weapons has decreased. Nev-
ertheless, despite several decades of Soviet priorities
focused on science, technology, and weapon systems,
the Soviets, because of their inability to be innovative
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US Radar Expert Passes Over 20 Significant Classi-
fied Reports on Future US Weapon Systems to Intel-
ligence Agent
William H. Bell, a radar project engineer for a high-
technology US defense firm was recruited by an
intelligence officer who operated under cover as a vice
president of the Polish firm called Polamco. This
firm is a subsidiary of the Polish Government Corpo-
ration and is incorporated in Illinois and Delaware. It
began as an importer/exporter of machinery, parts
and tools and as a consultant to firms exporting these
products to Poland. The recruitment began as a
simple friendship between neighbors with mutual
sporting interests, grew quickly to include their fam-
ilies, then to proving Bell's credentials by showing a
classified document to the agent, and then to passing
microfilm copies of classified reports at meeting
places in the US, Switzerland, and Austria. Mr. Bell
was in financial straits and was easily influenced by
the cash proffered-a total of $110,000 over a three-
year period. In all, over 20 highly classified reports
on advanced future US weapon systems or their
components were passed to the Polish Intelligence
Service and probably eventually to the Soviet Intelli-
gence Service.
Among the classified reports, those of prime impor-
tance to the West included: the F-15 look-down-
shoot-down radar system, the quiet radar system for
the BI and Stealth bombers, an all-weather radar
system for tanks, an experimental radar system for
the US Navy, the Phoenix air-to-air missile, a ship-
borne surveillance radar, the Patriot surface-to-air
missile, a towed-array submarine sonar system, a
new air-to-air missile, the improved HAWK surface-
to-air missile, and a NATO air-defense system. The
information in these documents put in jeopardy exist-
ing weapons and advanced future weapon systems of
the United States and its Allies. The acquisition of
this information will save the Polish and Soviet
Governments hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D
efforts by permitting them to implement proven de-
signs developed by the United States and by fielding
operational counterpart systems in a much shorter
time period. Specifications on current and future US
weapon systems will enable them to develop defensive
countermeasure systems.
and effectively apply new technology to weapons
developments, still depend on Western technology and
equipment to develop and manufacture some of their
advanced weapon systems more quickly.
Today, Soviet military designers carefully choose the
Western designs, engineering approaches, and equip-
ment most appropriate to their deficiencies and needs.
These needs are still substantial and pervade almost
every area of weapons technology and related manu-
facturing equipment. Table 2 lists classes of Western
technology acquired by the Soviets and East Europe-
ans and illustrates the wide range of Soviet military
technology needs. In the following paragraphs of this
section, Soviet Bloc acquisitions have been grouped
according to their likely applications: strategic sys-
tems, aircraft systems, naval systems, and tactical
systems. Also cited are acquisitions in the microelec-
tronic and computer areas that have broad application
to military and industrial programs. In certain of
these areas, notably the development of microelec-
tronics, the Soviets would have been incapable of
achieving their present technical level without the
acquisition of Western technology. In other areas,
acquisitions have allowed the Soviets to reduce the
indigenous effort they would otherwise have had to
expend.
The Soviets' strategic weapons program has benefited
substantially from the acquisition of Western technol-
ogy. The striking similarities between the US Minute-
man silo and the Soviet SS- 13 silo very likely resulted
from acquisition of US documents and expedited
deployment of this, the first Soviet solid-propellant
ICBM. The Soviets' ballistic missile systems in par-
ticular have, over the past decade, demonstrated
qualitative improvements that probably would not
have been achieved without Western acquisitions of
ballistic missile guidance and control technology. The
most striking example of this is the marked improve-
ment in accuracy of the latest generation of Soviet
ICBMs-an improvement which, given the level of
relevant Soviet technologies a decade ago, appears
almost certainly to have been speeded by the acquisi-
tion of Western technology. Their improved accuracy
has been achieved through the exploitation and devel-
opment of good-quality guidance components-such
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Selected Soviet and East European Legal and Illegal Acquisitions
From the West Affecting Key Areas of Soviet Military Technology
Purchases and acquisitions of complete systems designs, concepts, hardware and software, including a
wide variety of Western general purpose computers and minicomputers, for military applications.
Microelectronics Complete industrial processes and semiconductor manufacturing equipment capable of meeting all
Soviet military requirements, if acquisitions were combined.
Signal Processing Acquisitions of-processing-equipment and know-how.
Communications
Lasers
Acquisitions of automated and precision manufacturing equipment for electronics, materials, and optical
and future laser weapons technology; acquisition of information on manufacturing technology related to
weapons, ammunition, and aircraft parts including turbine blades, computers, and electronic
components; acquisition of machine tools for cutting large gears for ship propulsion systems.
Acquisitions of low-power, low-noise, high-sensitivity receivers.
Acquisitions of optical, pulsed power source, and other laser-related components, including special
optical mirrors and mirror technology suitable for future laser weapons.
Guidance and Navigation Acquisitions of marine and other navigation receivers, advanced inertial-guidance components, including
miniature and laser gyros; acquisitions of missile guidance subsystems; acquisitions of precision
machinery for ball bearing production for missile and other applications; acquisition of missile test range
instrumentation systems and documentation and precision cinetheodolites for collecting data critical to
postflight ballistic missile analysis.
Structural Materials Purchases and acquisitions of Western titanium alloys, welding equipment, and furnaces for producing
titanium plate of large size applicable to submarine construction.
Propulsion Missile technology; some ground propulsion technology (diesels, turbines, and rotaries); purchases and
acquisitions of advanced jet engine fabrication technology and jet engine design information.
Acoustical Sensors Acquisitions of underwater navigation and direction-finding equipment.
Electro-optical Sensors Acquisition of information on satellite technology, laser rangefinders, and underwater low-light-level
television cameras and systems for remote operation.
Radars Acquisitions and exploitations of air defense radars and antenna designs for missile systems.
as gyroscopes and accelerometers. The quality of
these instruments, in turn, depends to a considerable
degree on the quality of the small, precision, high-
speed bearings used.
Through the 1950s and into the 1960s, the Soviet
precision bearing industry lagged significantly behind
that of the West. However, through legal trade
purchases in the 1970s, the Soviet Union acquired US
precision grinding machines for the production of
small, high-precision bearings. Similar grinding ma-
chines, having lower production-rate capabilities,
were available from several foreign countries. Only a
few of these machines, either US or foreign, would
have been sufficient to supply Soviet missile designers
with all the quality bearings they needed. These
purchases provided the Soviets with the capability to
manufacture precision bearings in large volume soon-
er than would have been likely through indigenous
development. The Soviets probably could have used
indigenous grinding machines and produced the re-
quired quality of bearings over a long period by
having an abnormally high rejection rate.
While some of the Soviet acquisition in the aircraft
area appears directed toward the development of
countermeasures against Western systems, the Soviets
appear to target data on Western aircraft primarily to
acquire the technology. Furthermore, while the Sovi-
ets have acquired a large amount of hardware and
data from planes downed or captured in Vietnam and
elsewhere, they continue to attempt to acquire the
most advanced technologies through both legal and
illegal transactions with the West. Assimilation of
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Western technology has been of great benefit to both
their military and commercial aircraft development
programs-to the extent that aircraft from certain
Soviet military design bureaus are to a significant
degree copies of aircraft of Western design. Soviet
military aircraft designers have "ordered" documents
on Western aircraft and gotten them within a few
months, including plans and drawings for the US
C-5A giant transport aircraft early in its development
cycle; these plans, although dated now, have contrib-
uted to current Soviet development of a new strategic
military cargo plane. Designers were in particular
need of data on US technological advances, but more
importantly, they needed information on aerospace
manufacturing techniques.
Soviet aircraft designers have been interested in US
military transports and wide-body jets and probably
have managed to accelerate the development pro-
grams for their IL-76 Candid and IL-86 transports.
The IL-86 looks much like the Boeing 747 and the
IL-76 resembles the C-141. Neither system is an
identical copy.
The I L-76 also is used by the Soviets as the platform
for their new AWACS (Airborne Warning And Con-
trol System), which is expected to be operational in
the mid-1980s. This system will provide the Soviets
with a major improvement in attacking low-flying
missiles and bombers. The Soviet AWACS is striking-
ly similar in many ways to the US AWACS, and is a
major improvement over their old AWACS.
The Soviets' acquisition effort in the naval systems
area reflects well the two major factors that motivate
their requirements: the acquisition of technology not
readily available to them-yet critical to their pro-
grams-and the acquisition of equipment which,
while producible in the Soviet Union, allows them to
divert resources to more pressing naval programs. The
Soviets appear to have concentrated their acquisitions
in areas related to aircraft carriers, deep sea diving
capabilities, sensor systems for antisubmarine warfare
and navigation, and ship maintenance facilities. In the
maintenance area, two huge floating drydocks pur-
chased from the West for civilian use by the Soviets
have been diverted to military use. Drydocks are
critical for both routine and fast repair of ships
damaged in warfare. In 1978, when the Soviets took
possession of one of the drydocks, they diverted it to
the Pacific Naval Fleet. The other was sent to the
Northern Fleet in 1981.
These drydocks are so large that they can carry
several naval ships. More importantly, they are the
only drydock facilities in either of the two major
Soviet fleet areas-Northern or Pacific-capable of
servicing the new Kiev-class V/STOL aircraft carri-
ers. Soviet advanced submarines carrying ballistic
missiles, Soviet Kiev aircraft carriers, and Soviet
destroyers were among the first ships repaired in these
drydocks. It is important to note that the drydocks
themselves are so large that no Soviet shipyard would
have been capable of accommodating their construc-
tion without major facility modifications, associated
capital expenditures, and interruptions in present
weapons programs. Their importance will be even
more pronounced when the Soviets construct the still-
larger carriers (for high-performance aircraft) project-
ed for the 1990s. The Soviets even have acquired
Western aircraft carrier catapult equipment and doc-
umentation for this larger carrier; catapult technol-
ogy, though relatively common in the West, is outside
the Soviet experience.
Within the past few years, the USSR also has con-
tracted for or purchased foreign-built oceanographic
survey ships equipped with some of the most modern
Western-manufactured equipment. In place of US
equipment that was embargoed, other Western equip-
ment has been installed on the ships. This moderniza-
tion of what is the world's largest oceanographic fleet
with Western technology will help support the devel-
opment of Soviet weapon system programs and anti-
submarine systems against the West.
Although the Soviets have a strong indigenous tech-
nology base that could support the development of
much of their tactical weapons systems, this does not
prevent them from maintaining an ambitious program
for acquiring and benefiting from Western technology
in this area. In some cases, their acquisitions satisfy
deficiencies in Soviet technology; smart weapons tech-
nology and electro-optical technology are examples of
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Microelectronic Equipment and Technology
Legally and Illegally Acquired by the Soviet Bloc
Process Technology for
Microelectronic Wafer
Preparation
Process Technology for
Producing Circuit Masks
Equipment for Device
Fabrication
Assembly and Test Equipment
The Soviets have acquired hundreds of specific pieces of equipment related to wafer preparation,
including expitaxial growth furnaces, crystal pullers, rinsers/dryers, slicers, and lapping and polishing
units.
Many acquisitions in this area include computer-aided design software, pattern generators and
compilers, digital plotters, photorepeaters, contact printers, mask comparators, electron-beam gener-
ators, and ion milling equipment.
Many hundreds of acquisitions in this area have provided the Soviets with mask aligners, diffusion fur-
naces, ion implanters, coaters, etchers, and photochemical process lines.
Hundreds of items of Western equipment, including scribers, bonders, probe testers, and final test
equipment have been acquired by the Soviets.
this. Signal and information-processing technology,
particularly for Soviet air defense systems, is another.
More often, however, technology is exploited to speed
up a developmental program or to improve upon
original Western designs in an expeditious manner.
The Soviets appear to have concentrated their tactical
systems acquisitions on Western tank, antitank, and
air defense-related technology and equipment in or-
der to derive concepts and know-how to benefit their
weapons programs and to design countermeasures to
the Western systems. The Soviet SA-7 heat-seeking,
shoulder-fired antiaircraft missile contains many fea-
tures of the US Redeye missile. Such acquisitions
have enabled the Soviets to obtain advanced tactical
weapon capabilities sooner than otherwise would have
been possible.
Western equipment and technology have played a
very important, if not crucial, role in the advancement
of Soviet microelectronic production capabilities. This
advancement comes as a result of over 10 years of
successful acquisitions-through illegal, including
clandestine, means-of hundreds of pieces of Western
microelectronic equipment worth hundreds of millions
of dollars to equip their military-related manufactur-
ing facilities. These acquisitions have permitted the
Soviets to systematically build a modern microelec-
tronics industry which will be the critical basis for
enhancing the sophistication of future Soviet military
systems for decades. The acquired equipment and
know-how, if combined, could meet 100 percent of the
Soviets' high-quality microelectronic needs for mili-
tary purposes, or 50 percent of all their microelec-
tronic needs.
Table 3 identifies the microelectronic production-
related equipment that has been acquired by the
Soviet Bloc. These acquisitions have been grouped
into areas related to the four steps required to produce
a microchip: wafer preparation, circuit-mask making,
device fabrication, and assembly and testing.
Soviet computer technology has long been limited by
fabrication and production technology problems and
by difficulties in software development. Since 1969
the USSR and East European countries have been
developing a family of general purpose computers
known as the Ryad series. These computers, which
make up virtually the total Soviet and East European
effort in large general purpose computers, have been
and will continue to be used in a wide variety of civil
and military applications. Western technology has
been important to development of the Ryad series by
providing proven design directions both at the system
and component levels. The architectural designs of the
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Ryad computers, for example, are patterned after
those of the highly successful mass produced IBM 360
and 370 series, computers that are used in a wide
range of applications and are highly serviceable in the
field.
With this approach, the Soviets and East Europeans
eliminated many of the risks involved in undertaking
the development and production of a new series of
general purpose computers, and saved considerable
amounts of manpower and time. Since the early 1970s
the Soviets and East Europeans have legally pur-
chased more than 3,000 minicomputers, some of
which are now being used in military-related organi-
zations. Furthermore, they are also developing mini-
computers that are direct copies of Western models.
Soviet and East European development of computer
systems has been aided by all available means-legal
and illegal, including clandestine-for acquiring the
needed technical know-how.
Thus, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have
derived significant military gains from their acquisi-
tions of Western technology, particularly in the stra-
tegic, aircraft, naval, tactical, microelectronics, and
computer areas. This multifaceted Soviet acquisitions
program has allowed the Soviets to:
? Save hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D costs,
and years in R&D development lead time (see inset).
? Modernize critical sectors of their military industry
and reduce engineering risks by following or copy-
ing proven Western designs, thereby limiting the
rise in their military production costs.
? Achieve greater weapons performance than if they
had to rely solely on their own technology.
? Incorporate countermeasures to Western weapons
early in the development, of their own weapon
programs.
These gains are evident in all areas of military
weapons systems. While difficult to quantify, it is
clear that the Western military expenditures needed
to overcome or defend against the military capabilities
derived by the acquisition of Western technology far
outweigh the West's earnings from the legal sales to
the Soviets of its equipment and technology.
Soviet Intelligence Officer Reveals
Technology Acquisition Saved Soviet Military
Hundreds of Millions of Rubles
A former Soviet intelligence officer revealed that
information on Western military-related technology
acquired by the Soviet intelligence services saved the
Soviet military industry hundreds of millions of
rubles. The acquisition of Western technology oper-
ationally was assigned the highest priority for collec-
tion by local residencies in key West European
countries because of the relatively easy access to
much US and Western technology in Europe and the
praise being received by the services for their acquisi-
tion efforts.
These acquisitions were directed by the military
manufacturing industries under the Council of Minis-
ters, and there was intense competition between the
intelligence services to acquire Western technology
needed for weapons development programs. Of par-
ticular need by Soviet weapons designers has been the
acquisition of knowledge on special materials, nota-
bly the weaving of carbon filaments in a three
dimensional configuration which the services were
tasked to acquire. The end products from this 3-D
carbon-carbon weaving technology are useful for ab-
lative heat shields for high velocity reentry vehicles
(the warhead part of ICBMs and SLBMs) and for
other portions of rocket motors for large missiles.
The Soviet acquisition of some of this technology is
likely to enable them to eventually gain a capability
for increased military options against the West-a
capability that otherwise would have taken them
several additional years to develop themselves. The
intelligence services also worked closely with scien-
tists from the Soviet military manufacturing indus-
tries and even planned joint operations against West-
ern Trade and Equipment Fairs in order to acquire
needed Western technology.
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Outlook for the 1980s
The Soviets' military R&D and weapon test-and-
evaluation efforts are continuing at a rapid pace.
Several hundred development projects for weapons
systems and major system elements are now under
way, and it is expected that through the 1980s the
number of new or modified advanced Soviet weapon
systems emerging from these projects into production
and deployment will remain at the high levels of the
last two decades-some 200 weapon systems per
decade.
Soviet military manufacturing capacity increased by a
significant 80 percent during the 1960s and 1970s,
and new plant expansion now under way at one-fourth
of their key weapons manufacturing facilities will add
considerably to their capabilities. These new facilities
will be ready to produce weapons in the next four to
10 years. Plant expansion is in the following areas:
ground warfare vehicles, including new tanks; avi-
ation, including facilities for a new B-1-type bomber
and a new long-range military transport aircraft
having strategic airlift capabilities; naval shipbuild-
ing, including submarines for ballistic missiles and
cruise missiles, as well as full-size aircraft carriers for
high-performance aircraft capable of competing with
the United States in global operations; and electronic
and microelectronic manufacturing facilities through-
out the USSR. The development and production of
new Soviet weapons at these facilities is sure to be
more complex and costly than during the 1970s.
All of this military development and plant expansion
activity, however, is taking place at a time when the
Soviet economy has reached its lowest level of growth
since World War II. Soviet annual GNP growth may
well be limited to an average of I to 2 percent by the
mid-1980s. Stagnation in industrial sectors that are
key to both the civilian and the military sectors will
make it increasingly difficult for the Soviets to satisfy
the needs of both. Thus, Soviet leaders will have to
make tough choices among defense, investment, and
consumption; the competition among rival claimants
for resources will become intense. Under these condi-
tions, it may be impossible for the Soviets to maintain
current growth in military production without hurting
the civilian economy.
Despite these economic difficulties, there are no signs
that the Soviets are shifting resources away from the
military sector or slowing down development of weap-
on systems that will be entering the production stage
by mid-decade. New generations of Warsaw Pact
weapons will require selected critical component and
modern manufacturing technologies. It is in these
areas that Soviet illegal acquisitions of Western tech-
nology, complemented by legal acquisitions, are most
likely to be concentrated over the next five to 10
years.
Among the more important technologies are micro-
electronics, computers, and signal processing. Micro-
electronics will play a very significant role in advances
in computers and signal processing, and all of these
technologies will be important in developing advanced
Soviet missile, aircraft, naval, and tactical weapon
systems, and associated detection systems. Additional
projected Soviet technological needs related to such
systems are presented in the appendix.
As the result of both tactical and strategic force
modernizations, Soviet and Warsaw Pact military
manufacturers are increasingly pressed by large-scale
production requirements and the related need to
control manufacturing and materials costs. Thus,
particularly critical for the 1980s are Soviet needs to
improve their manufacturing capability. To a large
extent, the level of manufacturing technology in Sovi-
et plants determines the Soviets' capability to move
new technology from R&D into military applications.
Manufacturing technologies play a significant role not
only in the development of advanced component tech-
nologies, such as microelectronics and computers, but
also in the actual production of modern military
systems.
Future Soviet and Warsaw Pact acquisition efforts-
including acquisitions by their intelligence services-
are likely to concentrate on the sources of such
component and manufacturing technologies,
including:
? Defense contractors in the United States, Western
Europe, and Japan who are the repositories of
military development and manufacturing
technologies.
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? General producers of military-related auxiliary
manufacturing equipment in the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan.
? Small and medium-size firms and research centers
that develop advanced component technology and
designs, including advanced civil technologies with
future military applications.
The combination of past Soviet acquisition practices
and projected Soviet military needs indicates that the
United States and its Allies are likely to experience
serious counterintelligence and related industrial se-
curity and export control problems over the next five
to 10 years.
The task of stopping Soviet Bloc intelligence oper-
ations aimed at Western military and industrial tech-
nologies already poses a formidable counterintelli-
gence problem, both in the United States and abroad.
But that task is likely to become even more difficult in
the future as several trends identified in the 1970s
continue into the 1980s:
? First, since the early 1970s, the Soviets and their
surrogates among the East Europeans have been
increasingly using their national intelligence ser-
vices to acquire Western civilian technologies-for
example, automobile, energy, chemicals, and even
consumer electronics.
? Second, since the mid-1970s, Soviet and East Euro-
pean intelligence services have been emphasizing
the collection of manufacturing-related technology,
in addition to weapons technology.
? Third, since the late 1970s, there has been increased
emphasis by these intelligence services on the acqui-
sition of new Western technologies emerging from
universities and research centers.
The combined effect of these trends is a heavy focus
by Soviet Bloc intelligence on the commercial sectors
in the West-sectors that are not normally protected
from hostile intelligence services. In addition, the
security provided by commercial firms is no match for
the human penetration operations of such foreign
intelligence services. But the most alarming aspect of
this commercial focus by Soviet Bloc intelligence
services is that as a result of these operations the
Soviets have gained, and continue to gain, access to
those advanced technologies that are likely to be used
by the West in its own future weapons systems.
The Soviet intelligence effort against Western defense
contractor firms poses a serious problem in itself.
With more than 11,000 such firms in the United
States and hundreds of subsidiaries abroad, US coun-
terintelligence efforts are stretched thin. Protection of
US firms abroad from hostile intelligence threats is
the responsibility of host governments, but they too
are feeling the burden of well-orchestrated Soviet
Bloc efforts. The Soviet intelligence threat and the
illegal trade problem appear to be severe in Japan. It
appears that Western industrial security-both de-
fense and commercial-will be severely tested by the
Soviet intelligence services and their surrogates
among the East European intelligence services during
the 1980s.
Western industrial nations also can expect increased
Soviet Bloc intelligence activities directed at the
acquisition of their key industrial technologies. West-
ern export controls are presently being updated and
broadened; the CoCom allies have recently agreed to
strengthen controls and to enhance their enforcement.
Moreover, serious hard currency shortages, along with
generally increased restrictions on Soviet S&T visitors
to the United States, will make the Soviets even more
dependent on intelligence and other illegal efforts to
acquire the goods and equipment they will need.
The massive, well-planned, and well-coordinated So-
viet program to acquire Western technology through
combined legal and illegal means poses a serious and
growing threat to the mutual security interests of the
United States and its Allies. In response, the West
will need to organize more effectively than it has in
the past to protect its military, industrial, commercial,
and scientific communities.
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Appendix
Projected Soviet Technological
Needs and Acquisition Targets
Through the 1980s
Given the dynamic nature of their collection program,
it is expected that the Soviets will continue their
attempts to acquire a broad range of Western technol-
ogies. Certain areas, however, represent priority col-
lection targets for them; these areas are critical to the
Soviets' enhancement of their weapons capability.
Over the past decade, the Soviets' most pronounced
improvements in strategic weaponry have been in the
development of a MIRV ballistic missile capability
and a significant improvement in the accuracy of their
ICBMs. The former capability was made possible
largely through the introduction of onboard digital
computers and the latter through the improvement in
the quality of the missile guidance systems and the
procedures used to calibrate them. Technology acqui-
sitions from the West contributed significantly to
these improved capabilities.
The Soviets probably will continue to make their
highest priority the acquisition of Western microelec-
tronics and computer technology for in-flight guid-
ance computers. This acquisition effort will be moti-
vated by a desire to overcome reliability problems and
also to provide the on-board processing capability
required for the development of new guidance options
with the potential for extremely high accuracies.
Western solid rocket propulsion technology also will
be a high-priority Soviet acquisition target in the
1980s. While the Soviets have vast experience with
the liquid-propellant systems which represent the bulk
of their ballistic missile force, they are shifting their
emphasis to solid propulsion systems, which have
practical advantages over liquid systems in a variety
of applications. At the same time, the Soviets have
had only limited success with the progress of their
solid-propulsion program. They probably will pursue
the acquisition of information on solid-propellant pro-
duction procedures, and propellant grain design, mo-
tor case, and rocket nozzle technologies.
The Soviets' ABM R&D effort has continued apace
since the 1960s. As a result, they have gained consid-
erable expertise in the development of large fixed-site
radars for early warning, tracking, and engagement,
and their interceptor technology has also improved
substantially over the years. Areas remain, however,
in which the Soviets will still seek and would benefit
from sophisticated Western ABM technology. These
include signal processing for detection, discrimina-
tion, target assignment, and sensor technology, par-
ticularly in the long-wave infrared portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum applicable toward improv-
ing their launch detection capability.
The Soviets will also give top priority to acquiring
information on the latest generation of US-inertial
components upon which the MX ICBM and the
Trident SLBM guidance systems are based. Despite
the past accuracy improvements of Soviet ICBMs,
these two US systems incorporate technologies be-
yond present Soviet technological capabilities. More-
over, their SLBM accuracies are significantly behind
those of US systems. In addition to information on
hardware, the Soviets are expected to seek calibration
software algorithms which, as the guidance instru-
ments themselves reach their practical performance
limit, would allow for continued improvement in
weapon system accuracy.
Priority Soviet targets in the aircraft area will include
Western materials technology, particularly composite
materials to allow weight-efficient designs. The Sovi-
ets would also benefit from the acquisition of certain
engine technologies, in particular those critical to the
development of high-bypass turbofans for large strate-
gic airlift type of aircraft. While, in general, Soviet
avionics technology appear adequate, the Soviets have
yet to demonstrate a capability to deploy reliable,
accurate airborne inertial navigation systems for long-
range navigation and weapons delivery. Thus, while
long used in the West, these systems are still prime
candidates for acquisition.
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Very high priority probably will be given to the
acquisition of computer-aided aircraft design technol-
ogy, an area in which the Soviets are clearly im-
pressed by US progress. In general, they also will
continue to benefit from the acquisition of efficient
aircraft production technology from the West to
reduce costs.
While the Soviets have a strong indigenous air defense
radar and missile technology, their general lag in
microelectronics and microprocessing will direct them
to attempt wherever possible in the West the acquisi-
tion of advanced signal-processing hardware and
software.
The Soviets will continue to emphasize the acquisition
of naval-related technologies applicable to improving
their antisubmarine warfare capabilities, an area in
which much Western technology is superior to theirs.
Thus, a significant effort to acquire acoustic sensor
technology can be expected, in particular that tech-
nology applicable to the development of large towed
acoustic arrays that would assist the localization of
Western submarines in open waters. They probably
will also target the acquisition of Western signal-
processing hardware and software required to fully
exploit the detection capabilities of these sensors.
Another critical problem area to which the Soviets
will direct acquisition is that of submarine quieting.
Here also the Soviets lag the West significantly. As a
result, not only are their submarines more vulnerable
to detection, but the self-generated noise reduces the
effectiveness of their own acoustic sensors.
An area in which the Soviets have historically lagged
behind the West is precision submarine navigation-
in particular, in the development of submarine inertial
navigation systems. The need for improvements here
will become more pressing as the Soviets develop long-
range cruise missiles for land attack which require
precise knowledge of launch location.
The Soviets also will continue to target technologies
related to the design and construction of large aircraft
carriers (for high-performance aircraft) to reduce the
likelihood of poor design choices that would arise in
what is for them an entirely new type of construction
program.
Much of the Soviet acquisition effort in the area of
tactical weapons is likely to be targeted against seeker
and sensor technology for tactical missiles and preci-
sion-guided munitions. The Soviets will apply consid-
erable effort in particular to acquiring advanced
Western electro-optical technology including that re-
lated to antitank weapons. As in other weapons areas,
the signal processing and microelectronics technol-
ogies supporting tactical weapon systems will also be
priority acquisition targets. Technical documentation
on entire weapon systems, if obtained, will be used to
develop countermeasures.
In the microelectronics area the USSR is now at the
stage of implementing its LSI (large-scale integration)
technology to high-volume production. Despite the
large acquisitions of Western technology and produc-
tion equipment over the past 10 years which have
brought them to the LSI level, additional acquisitions
from the West are needed for the more sophisticated
weapons projects of the future. Ever-increasing needs
for higher precision Western equipment will extend at
least through the 1980s.
In addition, the Soviets will require considerable
expansion of their microelectronic material base to
support continued expansion of integrated-circuit pro-
duction. In this regard, the USSR is seeking Western
help to build two or three poly-silicon plants that will
more than double current Soviet capacity for military
applications. Also, with increasing advances in the
technology, the USSR already will be seeking addi-
tional Western assistance in key complementary tech-
nologies such as packaging and printed circuit board
production.
The USSR is expected to focus its future acquisitions
efforts on the emerging technologies related to very-
high-speed integrated circuits (VHSIC) and very-
large-scale integration (VLSI). It is important to note
that, while VHSIC is thought of as a military devel-
opment program, and VLSI as a civilian technology,
there is little difference between the two as far as
Soviet production needs are concerned. The same
materials, production, and test equipment will be used
to produce both. In both of these technological areas,
the USSR has developed effective means for illegally
acquiring Western advanced products.
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Prime Soviet collection efforts in computer technology
through the 1980s are likely to include large-scale
scientific computers such as the US-built CRAY-1
Computer. Computers of this class offer significant
improvements over Soviet models in weapons-systems
design and simulation and in the processing of nu-
merical data for many military applications. Other
hardware targets will include: very dense random-
access memory chips; high-capacity disk drives and
packs; the so-called "superminicomputer" class of
machines; and the latest in general purpose computer
technology. All of the above targets offer opportuni-
ties for significant performance improvements and
represent technologies of substantial Soviet lag.
In computer software, the Soviets will continue to
attempt to collect IBM programs and programs of
other vendors written for these machines because of
past Soviet decisions related to copying IBM comput-
ers. The large and growing number of IBM-compati-
ble computers in the USSR means that collection
activity in this area can be expected to increase. The
compelling attraction of computer networks also
should spur great Soviet interest in acquiring net-
work-control software and other programs related to
networking.
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