RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05C01629R000300610013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 21, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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`HGI~ Ott AB
MEMORANDUM FOR - THE
,
ra' wear
:Departmt }of State
R1VSSELL 'SRVEMME
.`Gene'rarCaunse .
Central Lntelligence Agency
Special.: Assistant to;,.the President
and Legal Adviser-`
4. "
FROM: NICHOLAS ROSTOW
SUBJECT: Recognition of Foreign Governments
Attached for your information is an excerpt from an AEI study-
of the U.S. practice with respect-to recognition.
Attachment
As stated
STAT
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RECOGNIZING
FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS
THE PRAC11CE OF
THE UNITED STATES
LIHOMASGAllDWIW
wnxA FOREWORD BURAWHER
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Washington, D.C.
14912'
!APR 16 1979
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e possible by a communication
12969 requesting all United States
Lion practice of their host state by
V. I updated this material in 1975
es of these foreign states whether
ed since the Department of State
U.S. recognition practice for the
it views on desirable U.S. policy,
tion of the Department of State,
E the Harvard Law School has my
to a topic that has proven fasci-
I. John Norton Moore, my pro-
. School of Law, who introduced
iw' and who succeeded Professor
tl law at the Department of State,
r most of the typing of the many
one. She worked long and hard
tluable suggestions. She. did this
ecretary for the law firm at which
has my deep gratitude and respect.
awyers within the Legal Adviser's
and of Dr. Ronald Landau, a
I Office of the department. In the
s done extensive work on United
.atin America. I have drawn upon
us study, and I acknowledge my
t Wadlow, associate dean, College
lebraska, and Professor Charles L.
lemy, for permission to use their
errors can usually be found in a
re that this study is no exception.
:arefully as possible, and various
ment of State and without, have
s for their time, their suggestions,
tat remain are my own, for which
L. THOMAS GALLOWAY
Washington, D.C.
INTRODUCTION
The recognition of foreign governments is an often-practiced but little
understood area of foreign policy. Although the practice of recognizing
governments that come to power through extraconstitutional means
is over two centuries old and literally thousands of new governments
have been recognized, much remains unclear about both the practical
and the theoretical side of recognition.
Foreign policy decision makers have utilized recognition in
myriad ways, depending on the political circumstances of the time and
their perception of the national interest involved in a change of
government. Thus, for example, the United States has used recogni-
tion as a political tool to support antimonarchical governments (under
George Washington), to advance economic imperialism (under Theo-
dore Roosevelt), to promote constitutional government (under Wood-
row Wilson), and to halt the spread of communism (under Dwight
Eisenhower). The practice of other states is similarly diverse.
While the use of the recognition instrument in order to achieve
political objectives may be justifiable, the instrument is often em-
ployed without the development of an adequate analytical framework
to explain it. Consequently, there has been vacillation in policy and
confusion over such matters as when the question of recognition
arises, under what conditions (if any) It should be granted, and what
it means once granted. The confusion is reflected in policy statements
issued by foreign ministries and the State Department, in press ac-
counts, and in the reaction of the man on the street. Often the question
whether to recognize a new government creates strong emotion among
average citizens, as it did in the case of the Maoist government in
the People's Republic of China.
Practice over two centuries has not established whether recogni-
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meet is not always clear, and problems may arise in determining
whether a particular change of government raises the question of
recognition.
Unlawful changes of government occur in a variety of ways. In
perhaps the most extreme case, a revolution may occur in which the
social, economic, and political institutions of a state are radically
altered. In such a case, there can be no doubt that the change violates
the existing domestic law of the -state.
Far more common is the military coup d'etat. In the classic case,
the military, dissatisfied for one reason or another with the existing
government, may take power, killing, imprisoning, or exiling the head
of government and members of the cabinet or ruling body. The overt
seizure of power is often followed by the formation of a--military junta
to rule the country until elections are held, or for an indefinite period.
As with the case of revolution, when the military seizes. ,over overtly
by taking to the streets, there can be little question but that the change
of government violates the domestic law of the state, and therefore
raises & 'question of recognition of the new government.
In other cases, it may not be so Clear that a change of government
is extraconstitutional. For example, the military may bring pressure
and cause the resignation of the existing government without an
overt show of force. The military may then assume power, commonly
with the legislature's approval, which the legislature may or may not
have the constitutional authority to bestow.
A similarly questionable change of government occurs when the
president is replaced by the vice-president instead of a military junta,
but the change is brought about by duress. Here the. form of domestic
law may be preserved but not the substance. The vice-president who
assumes power may be merely a figurehead. In such. situations the
problems for an outside state in determining whether the question of
recognition is raised are patent.
In other cases, it may not even be clear that a change of govern-
ment has occurred, at least in a formal sense. For example, the mili-
tary may in fact assume power but leave the head of state and perhaps
the head of government in office as figureheads. In such cases outside
states are confronted with a difficult choice-whether to accept the
action at face value and conclude that no question of recognition
arises because no formal change of government has occurred, or to
look behind the form and run the risk that their judgments will be
attacked as intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state.
Political forces govern the practice of most states when confronted
with such situations. For example, in responding to military coups in
Latin America in recent years, the United States fairly consistently
has refused to make a close inquiry into changes of government,. fear-
ing charges of intervention and wishing to maintain relations with as
little disturbance as possible.
Neither the United States nor other states has developed guide-
lines to determine just when the question of recognition is raised.
Indeed, this is probably impossible given the differences in the do-
mestic laws of the various states and the great variance in factual
circumstances. The decision, therefore, is basically ad hoc with the
political interests of the recognizing state outweighing the technical
violation of the other state's domestic law.
States may avoid the recognition question entirely simply by de-
ciding that a change has been in accordance with domestic law. This
normally occurs when an outside state wishes merely to continue
relations with the new government or to maintain a low profile for
political reasons.
Criteria for the Grant of Recognition
The decision to recognize a foreign government that comes to power
through extraconstitutional mean's usually involves an interesting and
often subtle interplay between the principles of international law and
international politics. The interplay is no less interesting merely be-
cause political forces often overshadow legal principles.
Some scholars have argued that the decision to recognize a new
government is a wholly legal decision." Most policy makers have
taken the opposite view, contending that the decision to recognize is
political and within the discretion of the recognizing stater In prac-
tice, the majority of states blend both law and politics into their
decision.
The three major approaches to recognition that have developed
in the past two centuries reflect this interplay, and each has its own
set of criteria for determining whether to grant recognition. The
three are: (1) the traditional approach, (2) the Estrada Doctrine, and
(3) the Tobar or Betancourt Doctrine.
Traditional Approach. Under the traditional approach, a state con-
sidering recognition first seeks to determine:
(1) whether the government is in de facto control of the terri-
tory and in possession of the machinery of the state;
I Lauterpacht, Recognition in International L.aw, pp. 87-97.
T Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on S. Res. 203, pp. 8-17.
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(2) whether the government has the consent of the people, with-
out substantial resistance to its administration, that is,
whether there is public acquiescence in the authority of the
government; and
(3) whether the new government has indicated its willingness to
comply with its obligations under treaties and international
law.'
The first criterion is fundamental and by no means limited to the
traditional approach. States seldom recognize a new government, at
least openly, that is not in effective control of the territory and the
machinery of the state.' Such action would constitute "premature
recognition" and would be considered intervention in the domestic af-
fairs of the state.'? While the principle is uncontroverted, in practice,
when the political interests of the recognizing state favor the new gov-
ernment, the question of effective control may be finessed. The recog-
nition of the Yemen government by the United States in 1962, and the
grant of recognition by Hitler and Mussolini to the Franco regime in
Spain before Franco had gained control, are examples of such prema-
ture recognition.
The second criterion-the consent of the people-is more contro-
versial. In most instances such consent is assumed from popular
acquiescence in the assumption of power by the new government. A
State Department official, testifying before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee in 1969, explained the United States practice this
way:
CHAIRMAN. With the consent or the acquiescence, which do
you mean, or do you mean both?
MR. ALDRICH. Well, I think this is something that-can mean
different things to different people. We have had this am-
biguity since Jefferson referred to "the will of the nation
substantially declared."
CHAIRMAN. If it is so ambiguous and difficult, is
significant consideration then?
MR. ALDRICH. I think it has been in some cases.
CHAIRMAN. But is it under your present policy?
it really a
MR. ALDRICH. I think our present policy is more concerned
with the acquiescence rather than the declaration of the will
of the people. I think that what we have done in recent years
' Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 2, pp. 72-73.
? ' Green Hackworth, Digest of International Law, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: De-
partment of State, 1%2), pp. 174-192.
10 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, p. 94.
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shows a far greater concern with deciding whether the par-
ticular government involved has effective control and is not
sitting on top of 'an imminent revolution, but does in fact
govern with the acquiescence of the people. We have not
generally concerned ourselves with asking, would the people,
if given a free plebiscite, endorse that change of government.
CHAIRMAN. In other words, the present policy which, as you
say, is established policy, does not require that they be a
fully developed democracy in which the people have elected
their government?
MR. ALDRICH. I would say that the present policy would like
to see that happen but that there are a number of cases in
recent years in which we have not insisted on that before
recognizing a new government or engaging in diplomatic
relations."
The present approach of most states is to interpret the criterions"con-
sent of the people" to mean acquiescence of the people to the new
government.
Policy makers have found that in many coups d'etat the concept
of actual consent is meaningless. As one State Department official
stated:
Most coups occur in less developed countries which
have predominantly illiterate and politically dormant popu-
lations. The coup is usually quick, bloodless, and effective.
Moreover, such changes in government usually occur in one-
party states, and take the form of one elite replacing an-
other elite, political or military. In such circumstances the
popular will remains largely irrelevant. In the absence of a
popular revolution or a clear division of allegiance within the
country, the consent or. acquiescence of the population must
as a practical matter be taken for granted.12
The third criterion under the traditional approach, the willing-
ness to fulfill international obligations, finds its origins in United
States practice in the last half of the nineteenth century when the De-
partment of State used the standard to extract guarantees for U.S.
investments in unstable Caribbean and Latin American states." Today
it is largely a pro forma requirement; new regimes that seize power
usually announce as a matter of course that they will honor all inter-
national obligations.
11 Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on S. Res. 203, p. 10.
" U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Memorandum, June 1,
197
1.
is Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, pp. 109-114.
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Once the three basic criteria under the traditional approach are
met, the outside state normally must make a political judgment
whether recognition would be in its best interest. In making this
political decision, it usually will consider
the existence or non-existence of evidence of foreign inter-
vention in the establishment of the new regime; the political
orientation of the government and its leaders; evidence of
intention to observe democratic principles, particularly the
holding of elections; the attitude of the new government
toward private investment and economic improvement. Im-
portantly, also, the interest of peoples, as distinguished from
governments, is of concern. These, and other criteria, de-
pending upon the international situation at the time, have
been considered, with varying weight."
One might fairly characterize the traditional approach to recognition
as flexible and pragmatic. Each decision to recognize is somewhat
ad hoc, with the political interests of the recognizing state the major
consideration. In many cases the recognizing state may perceive little
national interest in a particular change of government, hence down-
playing recognition and resuming relations with as little disturbance
as possible. However, if the recognizing state perceives that a signifi-
cant national interest is involved, under the traditional approach it
may bargain with the new regime for free elections, a realization of
individual freedoms, economic -guarantees, and so forth. In the rare
case, a state may withhold recognition for a substantial period of time
because the new government refuses to comply with such conditions.
For example, the U.S. refusal to recognize the government of Albania
after World War II continues to the present.
The Estrada Doctrine. Under the Estrada Doctrine, the recognition of
governments that come to power through extraconstitutional means
is for all practical purposes eliminated from diplomatic practice. Only
new states are recognized; when a new government comes to power
either through constitutional means or otherwise, its relations with
outside states remain unchanged.
The doctrine of recognizing only states, and not governments,
was first articulated by the Mexican Foreign Minister Don Genaro
Estrada in 1930:
It is a well-known fact that some years ago Mexico
suffered, as few nations have, from the consequences of that
doctrine, which allows foreign governments to pass upon the
Digest of International Las, vol. 2, p. 73.
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the regime existing in another
country, with the result that situations arise in which the
legal qualifications or national status of governments or au-
thorities are apparently made subject to the opinion of
foreigners.
Ever since the Great War, the doctrine of so-called
recognition has been applied in particular to the nations of
this continent, although in well-known cases of change of
regime occurring in European countries the governments of
the nations have not made express declarations of recogni-
tion; consequently, the system has been changing into a
special practice applicable to the Latin American Republics.
After a very careful study of the subject, the Govern-
ment of Mexico has transmitted instructions to its ministers
or Charges d'Affaires in the countries affected by the recent
political crises, informing them that the Mexican govern-
ment is issuing no declarations in the sense of grants of
recognition, since that nation considers that such a course is
an insulting practice and one which, in addition to the fact
that it offends the sovereignty of other nations, implies that
judgment of some sort may be passed upon the internal
affairs of those nations by other governments, inasmuch as
the latter assume, in effect, an attitude of criticism, when
they decide, favorably, or unfavorably, as to the legal quali-
fications of foreign regimes."'
The Estrada Doctrine embraces the principle of unfettered na-
tional sovereignty and rejects interference with the domestic affairs of
one state by another through the granting or withholding of recogni-
tion. States..that have adopted the Estrada Doctrine often say they
recognize states, not governments; however, as a practical matter,
many states depart from the doctrine whenever they perceive a major
political advantage in using the recognition instrument.
A substantial number of states have adopted the Estrada Doc-
trine, either officially or in practice. In response to the Department of
rs The statement continues: "Therefore, the Government of Mexico confines itself
to the maintenance or withdrawal, as it may deem advisable, of its diplomatic
agents, and to the continued acceptance, also when it may deem advisable, of such
similar accredited diplomatic agents as the respective nations may have in
Mexico; and in so doing, it does not pronounce judgment, either precipitately or
a posteriori regarding the right of foreign nations to accept, maintain or replace
their governments or authorities. Naturally, in so far as concerns the usual
formulas for accrediting and receiving agents and for the exchange of signed
letters of Heads of Government and Chancellors, the Mexican Government will
continue to use the same formulas accepted up to the present time by inter
national law and diplomatic law" (Whiteman, Digest of International Lars, vol.
2, pp. 65-16).
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State's 1969 survey, thirty-one states indicated that they had aban-
doned traditional recognition policies and substituted the Estrada
Doctrine or some equivalent by which they accepted whatever gov-
ernment was in effective control without raising the issue of recogni-
tion. Among the states accepting the Estrada Doctrine were Mexico,
France, Finland, Turkey, Germany, Indonesia, and Peru."
The Tobar Doctrine. The Tobar or Betancourt Doctrine stands in di-
rect contrast to the Estrada Doctrine. It attempts to encourage demo-
cratic and constitutional government by refusing to recognize any
government that comes to power through extraconstitutional means
until a free election is held and new leaders elected. One writer has
noted: "If the Estrada Doctrine mode of approach assumed automatic
recognition of new governments, then it might be said that, for prac-
tical purposes, the Tobar Doctrine implied automatic nonrecogni-
tion."17 This doctrine is often criticized for its substantial interference
with the domestic political processes of sovereign states, and because
it bars revolutionary change as a method to overthrow even corrupt
and despotic governments.
The Tobar Doctrine was first developed by a foreign minister
of Ecuador, and was embodied in a treaty signed in .1907 by five
Central Americanrepublies A 1923 treaty went further and barred
recognition-even if the people constitutionally approved the change
-if the choice of headship or vice-headship fell upon a person con-
nected with the coup d'etat or revolution.
The Tobar Doctrine never has enjoyed widespread acceptance;
however, it did not vanish following the termination of the 1923
treaty. In 1963, the governments of Venezuela and Costa Rica at-
tempted to persuade the governments of the Americas to adopt the
Tobar Doctrine through a resolution submitted to a meeting of foreign
ministers.'" Although the attempt failed, some states adopted the
doctrine unilaterally, including Venezuela and Costa Rica, which ap-
plied the doctrine for several years.
Effect of Recognition. Just as there has been no agreement on the
proper approach to recognition, there is uncertainty and disagreement
over the effect of recognition once granted. In short, what does it
mean to "recognize" a new government?
Is See Appendix A.
lr Martin Needier, "United States Recognition Policy and the Peruvian Case,"
Inter-American Economic Affairs, vol. 16 (Spring 1963), pp. 61, 67.
,3!,Whlteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 2, pp. 85-46. Guatemala intro-
As Professor Stephen Schwebel has written, the simple ansv
is that recognition of foreign governments, for all its long history a
frequent use, has little substantive content. Governments deal wi
each other, sometimes extensively, without recognizing one anoth
They may negotiate and conclude treaties with governments they,
not recognize. They may sit in international or regional organizatio
with other governments they do not recognize. In fact, they m.
trade with governments they do not recognize." On the other har
one state may recognize the government of another and yet have i
diplomatic relations with that state, even interdicting trade, limith
travel, and maintaining all intercourse with that state through a thii
party."
The current relations between the United States and the People
Republit.of China on the one hand, and until recently Cuba on ti
other, illustrate the lack of substantive content in the recognition i
foreign governments. The United States recognizes the government ,
Fidel Castro, but until recently it interdicted trade and limited trave
maintaining no diplomatic ties with Cuba. In contrast, although th
United States does not recognize the government of the People's Re
public of China, a considerable relationship has developed between th
two states. Ambassadors have been exchanged and "liaison offices" es
tablished in each state. The President of the United States was is
ceived as a head of state by. the Chinese government. Cultural a
changes have occurred and trade is now lawful between the tw
states. Both sit on the Security Council of the United Nations. Thi
relationship was established not only while the United States dl,
not recognize the Maoist government but while it recognized another
that of Chiang Kai-chek, as the government of China.21
One-might logically inquire why states attach importance to
concept that has so little substantive content. The answer appears h
be that the importance attached to recognition derives in part fron
the weight of tradition and in part from the sense of legitimacy recog
nition confers. And because states granting or receiving recognitiot
perceive the act as important, they have made it a precondition fo:
other actions that do have inherent significance, such as the continu
ante of aid or the resumption of diplomatic relations.
The main importance of recognition over the years has been po-
litical. Recognition has served as a rough initial indicator of a state's
"Stephen M. Schwebel, "Is the 'Recognition' of Governments Obsolete?" Wash-
ington Post, February 23, IM p. Ais.
!0 Ibid.
u Ibid.
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attitude toward a new actor on the international political scene and
of the recognizing state's values and priorities in international affairs.
If a state feels strongly about constitutional government and
democratic rule it may refuse recognition until a new government
promises to hold elections. If a state wishes to contest vigorously the
spread of an ideology it may refuse to recognize governments of that
persuasion that come to power. Or if a state wishes to protect the
economic interests of its citizens in the foreign state it may condition
recognition on economic or investment guarantees from the new
government.
On the other hand, if a state desires to protect national sover-
eignty, or combat intervention in its internal affairs, it may adopt the
Estrada Doctrine and reject the political use of recognition entirely.
No one disputes that states repeatedly have used recognition to
advance their political interests in the course of the past two centuries.
The controversy concerns whether recognition has been effective in
advancing the interests of the recognizing state, and if so, whether it
is a legitimate political instrument.
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND,
1780-1960
Obscurity shrouds the precise origins of the concept of recogniti
of foreign governments. However, recognition finds its general I
ginnings in the political doctrines of the European monarchies and t
rise of the modern nation-state.
The doctrine of the divine right of kings was paramount in t
late Middle Ages in Europe and the sovereignty of the. king w
identified with the sovereignty of the state. The king was the "chos,
of God" and thus the only legitimate ruler. From this basic premi
sprang the concept of legitimacy which provided that any govemme
that came to power in a state depended for its legality not upon
facto control, but upon compliance with the established legal order
the state.'
Legitimacy was first invoked on behalf of monarchical gover
ments and reached its zenith in the period following the French Rev
lution when the European monarchies banded together and determin,
not to recognize a government created in open revolt. Diplomats at tl
Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 invoked the doctrine in their a
tempts to restore monarchical regimes to power. The Quadruple Al
ance formed during the Congress of Vienna likewise provided th
sovereignty could not be acquired by an act of conquest. Thus, tl
great powers hoped to defeat any revolutionary attempts to ups
the status quo.
It was within this conservative historical context that the Amet
can Revolution occurred. Quite clearly, the United States, born c
revolution, could not invoke legitimacy to prevent popular changes c
U.S. Department of State, The Problem of Recognition in American Foreip
Policy, Research Project 174, Division of Historical Policy Research, Angu
1950, p. a.
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government in foreign states. In fact, the Declaration of Independence
had as one of its primal features the right of the people to overthrow
an unjust government.
Therefore, it came to the first secretary of state, Thomas Jeffer-
son, to develop and put into practice a revolutionary new theory of
recognition to counter the theory of legitimacy, one that gave effect
to the consent of the governed' Jefferson developed what came to be
known as the de facto theory of recognition, which holds that any
government in effective control of a state and representing the will
of the people should be accorded recognition. The European mon-
archies regarded Jefferson's idea as an open encouragement to revo-
lution.
The de facto theory flowed inexorably from Jefferson's general
political philosophy, the cornerstones of which were popular sover-
eignty and the right to revolution. Jefferson, a follower of the social
contract theory espoused by John Locke, believed that government
was based on the consent of the people and that the people retained a
right to abolish any unjust or unrepresentative government and es-
tablish one that would represent their will. The step from this belief
to the de facto theory of recognition is a short one. One historian has ?
commented:
Thomas Jefferson is rightly considered the author of
many of the cardinal principles of United States foreign
policy. No doctrine, however, bears more deeply the im-
print of his political thinking than does our recognition
policy. Indeed, so far removed were his doctrines from the
accepted canons of international law, and even from the
recent example of the recognition of the colonies by the
French government, that it is impossible to trace any rela-
tionship between the two. We are obliged to conclude, there-
fore, that the ideas developed by Jefferson relative to the
de facto principle of recognition were of his own invention
and in no way connected with previous international
precedents.'
Jefferson first applied the principle in , 1792, upon the fall of the
French monarchy, when he instructed the American ambassador in
France:
with our principles to acknowledge any Gov-
ernment to be rightful which is formed by the will of the
Goebel, Jr., The Recognition Policy of the United States (New York:
,Untversity,191h1 .
nation, substantially declared. The late government [set up
in France by the Revolution of 1789) was of this kind, and
was accordingly acknowledged by all the branches of ours;
so any alteration of it which shall be made by the will of the
nation, substantially declared, will doubtless be acknowl-
edged in like manner.4
In later instructions to the ambassador, Jefferson elaborated on the
theme:
We surely can not deny to any nation that right
whereon our own Government is founded-that every one
may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases,
and change these forms at its own will; and that it may trans-
act its business with foreign nations through whatever organ
it thinks proper, whether King, convention, assembly, com-
mittee, President, or anything else that it may choose. The
will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded."
Jefferson's ideas on recognition, enunciated in the above instruc-
tions, became the foundation of American recognition policy. Under
Jefferson's test, recognition was granted to a new government, what-
ever the origin of the government, on the basis of two criteria:
(1) The government to be recognized should be in actual control
of the entire governmental authority.
(2) The government to be recognized should represent the will
of the nation, substantially declared.'
During the early 'nineteenth century the United States became the
foremost champion of the de facto theory of recognition. In devel-
oping recognition- policy in this period the -foreign policy decision
makers stressed the acceptance of the government de facto and as-
sumed that the acquiescence of the people signified the will of the
people.' Thus, for practical purposes, U.S. recognition policy was
virtually automatic, turning solely on a question of fact-did the new
government have effective control?" If it did, recognition was granted.'
' Ibid., quoting Jefferson, Works (Washington edition) vol. 3, p. 500.
s Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign policy, p. 7.
' Ibid.
' Ibid., p. 9.
' Scholars have argued that the doctrine of nonintervention was a historical do-
velopment that subsequently justified the de facto theory of recognition but was
not, as some have said, the basis for the development of the de facto theory
itself. Goebel, Recognition Policy of the United States, p. 113.
' Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, p. 15.
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w
Whatever its democratic sympathies, the United States normally fol-
lowed the simple formula that the government de facto was equally
de jure1e
Role of Congress
Jefferson envisioned recognition as a function of the executive branch
of government, and this is largely how the practice of granting recog-
nition to new governments developed. Congress did however play a
limited role in recognition in the early nineteenth century.
In 1811, the House of Representatives passed a resolution claim-
ing the prerogative of empowering the President to accord recognition
by appropriating money to pay diplomatic agents to be assigned to
the new powers. Similarly, Henry Clay argued for the proposition that
Congress could grant recognition to new states or governments, rea-
soning that by passing a statute regulating universal intercourse,
recognition would be automatically conferred:
This House unquestionably has a right to recognize in the
exercise of the Constitutional power of Congress to regulate
foreign commerce.... Suppose for example we passed an
act to regulate trade between the United States and Buenos
Aires [sic]; the existence of the nation would therefore be
recognized as we could not regulate trade with a nation
which does not exist."
Clay made further attempts in 1818 and 1836 to gain at least con-
current control for Congress of the power to recognize states and gov-
ernments.. The, first attempt was through an amendment to an ap-
propriation bill to include the sum of $18,000 for one year's salary of
a minister to the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata and to pay the
cost of maintaining an embassy. Clay felt that passage of the amend-
ment would constitute recognition of the new state.
In 1836 Clay introduced a resolption stating that the inde-
1" Ibid. A report In 1836 by Senator Henry Clay of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee reflects this noninterventionist philosophy: "The policy which has hitherto
guided the Government of the United States in respect to new powers has been
to act on the fad of their existence, without regard to their origin, whether that
has been by the-subversion of pre-existing Government or by the violent or
voluntary separation of one from another part of a common nation" (Ibid., p. 16).
It Annab of Congress, 15th Congress, ist use. vol. 2, p.1499, quoted in Charles
L. Cochran, 'The Recognition of States and Governments by President John F.
,Kennedy: An Analysis" (Ph.D. dies? Tufts University, 1969), pp. 33-34. Clay
here was concerned with the recognition of new states, not with the recognition
of a government within a state. However, the legal rationale would seem to
apply to recognition of new governments.
pendence of Texas should be acknowledged by the United States
whenever satisfactory information was received that it had a govern-
ment capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of
an independent nation. This resolution passed the Senate and was
endorsed by President Jackson:
It will always be considered consistent with the spirit of the
Constitution, and most safe, that it, the spirit of recogni-
tion, should be exercised, when probably leading to war,
with a previous understanding with that body by whom war
can alone be declared, and by whom all the provisions for
sustaining its perils must be furnished.12
Modification of De Facto Principle
There was some modification of the de facto principle before the Civil
War. In 1848, a number of revolutions occurred in Europe that evoked
great sympathy in the United States and altered recognition policy by
placing an emphasis on Jefferson's second criterion, the will of the
nation, at the expense of the criterion of effective control.
In February 1848, Secretary of State James Buchanan sent an in-
struction to the U.S. minister in Paris that went beyond the de facto
principle and indicated that recognition policy be applied to favor
democratic government." The first part of the instruction to the
minister paralleled the usual doctrine.
'= John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1906), p. 99. Congress has on various other occasions
commented on Its role in the recognition of particular governments or states. In
1864 the Committee on1breign Affairs in the House of Representatives advanced
a resolution that stated: "Congress has a constitutional right.to an authoritative
voice in declaring and prescribing the foreign policy.of the United States as well
in the recognition of new Powers as In other matters." (H. Rep. 129, 38th Congress,
1st session, p. 156.) In 1897 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended
adoption by the Senate of a resolution which stated "that the independence of
Cuba be, and the same is hereby, acknowledged by the United States of America."
(Sen. Doc. 231, 56th Congress, 2nd session, p. 64.) These congressional actions
concerned the recognition of a new state. However, Congress also took action
on the issue of recognition of governments. In 1919 Senator Fall introduced a
resolution that sought the removal of recognition -from the Carranza regime In
Mexico; in 1922 a resolution was introduced to the effect that "the Senate of the
United States favors the recognition of the present Soviet Government in Russia."
(Ibid., 67th Congress, 2nd session, p. 6945.) Also with regard to the Soviet govern-
ment, a resolution was Introduced in the House "directing the President of the
United States to recognize the present government of Russia." (Ibid., 69th Con-
gress, 1st session, p. 8872.) This material was first collected in T. Cole, The
Recognition Policy of the United States since 1901 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University, 1928), pp. 12-13.
It Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, pp.
18.19.
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In its intercourse with foreign nations the Government of
the United States has, from its origin, always recognized de
facto governments. We recognize the right of all nations to
create and reform their political institutions according to
their own will and pleasure. We do not go behind the exist-
ing Government to involve ourselves in the question of
legitimacy. It is sufficient for us to know that a government
exists capable of maintaining itself, and then its recognition
on our part inevitably follows.
However, Secretary Buchanan then introduced a new factor: "Whilst
this is our own settled policy, it does not follow that we can ever be
indifferent spectators to the progress of liberty throughout the world,
and especially in France. 1114 Secretary Buchanan believed that the
United States should be the first to recognize the provisional govern-
ment because of the democratic nature of the new regime. President
Polk supported this idea in his message to Congress in 1848. He
stated that while the policy of the United States has "ever been that
of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, leaving
to each to establish the form of government of its own choice, all
U.S. sympathies were on the side of democracy and the new regime.""
However if a return to democratic government was not involved,
the normal procedure of recognizing any government in control of a
state was followed. For example, the traditional policy of recognizing
de facto governments was applied with vigor in 1856-1857 in the
successive coups in Mexico 76 During these years there were a number
of governmental changes in Mexico. Despite the rapidity of develop-
ments the. United States recognized each, not concerning itself with
the stability of the governments it recognized, much less with a com-
mitment to constitutional government. In May 1856, President Frank-
lin Pierce informed Congress that five successive governments had
assumed authority in Mexico in the course of a few months and had
been recognized successively by the United States."
---
ts Ibid., pp. 19-22. This principle was followed by President Taylor in recognizing
the new regime that resulted from the Hungarian revolution. The same response
was used in the revolution of 1848-1549 in Germany, where the Buchanan
corollary was used to fustify recognizing a de facto government more promptly
and enthusiastically than was usual.
to Ibid., p. 23.
rr Ibid. In 1656, in perhaps the most sweeping statement ever made by a U.S.
President on. adherence to a pure de facto recognition policy, Franklin Pierce said:
"it is the esablished policy of the United States to recognize all governments
without question of their source, or organization, or of the means by which the
governing pwaous attain their power. To us it I. Indifferent whether a successful
revolution has been aided by foreign Intervention or not; whether insurrection
The Recognition Practice from 1860 to 1913
With the outbreak of the Civil War, American recognition policy be-
came more complex as the United States began increasingly to look
to other considerations besides the factual existence of a new govern-
ment. Factors such as the extent to which the new government repre-
sented the will of the nation, the degree of stability which the govern-
ment possessed, and its willingness to fulfill international obligations,
began to play roles in the decision to recognize."
The first signs of a departure from the de facto policy came before
the Civil War in the policy of Secretary of State Webster. When
Louis Napoleon overthrew the French Republic and became virtual
dictator of France in 1851, the United States was faced with a case of
de facto control but with a return to conservative, monarchical gov-
ernment. The United States did not extend recognition to the new
regime immediately, but waited until a national plebiscite was held.
Secretary Webster summarized the U.S. position in a communication
to the American diplomatic representative in France:
Before this reaches you, the election will be over; and if, as
is probable, a decided majority of the people should be found
to support the President, the course of duty for you will
become plain. While we deeply regret the overthrow of pop-
ular institutions, yet our ancient ally has still our good
wishes for its prosperity and happiness, and we are bound
to leave to her the choice of means for the promotion of
those ends."
This action-by Secretary Webster marked a significant deviation
from past recognition practices, one that would appear in later policy.
Here the United States waited until elections were held before grant-
ing recognition, presumably relying on the second criterion of Jeffer-
son's recognition formula-"the will of the people, substantially
declared."
The change in policy heralded by Secretary Webster came to
fruition during the 1860s, as a result of the efforts of Secretary of
State William Seward, who served under President Lincoln. One of
has overthrown existing government and another has been esablished in Its
place, according to pre-existing forms, or in a manner adopted for the occasion
by those whom we may find in the actual possession of power. It is the more
imperatively necessary to apply this rule to the Spanish-American republics, In
consideration of the frequent and not seldom anomalous change or organization
or administration which they undergo, and the revolutionary nature of most of
the changes." Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. 1, p. 142.
"Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, p. 24.
It Ibid., p. 22.
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Seward's tasks was to prevent the recognition of the Confederacy by
the great powers of Europe, a task that had an impact on Seward's
views on general recognition policy. It was difficult for Seward to
follow an automatic, factual policy of recognition while at the same
time opposing the right of other nations to recognize the Confederate
government"
According to some historians, the principle that Seward devel-
oped was based on the fortuitous fact that the Confederate States of
America, because of wartime conditions, never convened a popularly
chosen Constituent Assembly nor held elections for a legislative body.
Seward seized on this historical accident, so it is argued, to develop
the principle that only a regularly organized state formally accepted
by the people under its jurisdiction merited recognition. In this in-
auspicious situation some find "the origin of the doctrine that 'free
elections' are requisite to a government's recognition by the United
States."21
A British jurist, Hersh Lauterpacht, more accurately pointed to
the real origin of this principle. While Seward did seize upon the
anomaly to justify nonrecognition of the Confederacy, statements by
Seward, and before him Secretary Webster, reflect a deep concern
for the instability pervading Latin America and a growing dissatis-
faction with the never-ending line of military dictatorships. The de
facto principle advanced by.Jefferson was aimed at elevating the will
of the people against the encroachments of monarchical legitimism.
As Lauterpacht notes, -however, when it became apparent that ad-
herence to de facto recognition resulted in substituting the tyranny
of ruthless and adventurous dictatorships for that of monarchies, the
United States adopted the principle of subsequent legitimation by the
people."
In 1862 Seward refused to recognize a new government in Vene-
zuela despite its de facto establishment. Seward indicated there was
a Revolutionary spirit pervading the republican states on
this continent, and that the United States therefore deemed
it a duty to discourage that spirit so far as it can be done by
standing entirely aloof from all-such domestic controversies
until, in each case, the state immediately concerned shall
me Ibid., p. 24. Technically, the recognition of the Confederacy would have been
recognition of a new state, not recognition of a now government of an already
existing state.
n Needier, "United States Recognition Policy and the Peruvian Case," p. 63.
n Hersh l.autepacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge, England: Uni-
versity Press, 1947), pp. 113-46.
unmistakably prove that the government which claims to
represent it is fully accepted and peacefully maintained by
the people thereof."
Seward went further in modifying the traditional de facto policy
in 1866 by instructing the American minister to Peru not to recognize
a revolutionary regime that had seized power: "Revolutions in repub-
lican states ought not to be accepted until the people have adopted
them by organic law with the solemnities which would seem sufficient
to guarantee their stability and permanency."24 Seward felt that the
de facto recognition policy stimulated unrest by making it too easy
for a self-seeking group of revolutionaries to obtain governmental
status .*t Therefore in such situations recognition should be withheld
until there was, evidence of a "formal acquiescence and acceptance of
the new regime *by the people."" The Seward argument bears a
marked similarity to that advanced by the monarchies of Jefferson's
time.
Later administrations did not adopt the Seward view whole-
heartedly. Nonetheless, the United States did apply Seward's criteria
to various coups in Latin America in the latter half of the nineteenth
century. In 1880, the Department of State instructed the American
minister to Peru to recognize a new regime in Peru if it was "sup-
ported by the character and intelligence of Peru and is really endeavor-
ing to restore constitutional government." In 1883, the United States
recognized a new regime in Peru only after the new president was
confirmed in office by a representative assembly. In 1885, after one
government had fallen from power, the Department of State an-
nounced that+ ;the new president would be recognized "when his
authority shall have been confirmed by the Peruvian people."27
Willingness to Honor International Obligations. Another criterion-
the fulfillment of international obligations-began to receive increas-
ing emphasis in American recognition policy following the Civil
Is Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, p. 25.
24 Ibid., p. 26.
fs Ibid., p. 24. Seward followed the same policy in 1368 in the coup d'etat in Peru.
Seward explained that the United States did not question the right of any nation
to change its constitution, even by force in rare instances, but he did insist that
the new government be sanctioned by the formal acquiescence and acceptance of
the people. U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence, vol. 2 (1368),
p. 864.
" Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, pp.
27-23.
n Ibid.
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War.= Technically, this was not a new criterion, since the principle
was accepted that the obligations of a state are not affected by changes
of government" However, in the years after the Civil War, the
United States would not assume that any government in actual con-
trol would acknowledge or fulfill its international obligations, that is,
would honor treaties and agreements entered into by the preceding
regime.
The reason for the increased U.S. interest in this factor, and its
application to recognition policy, lay in the growing economic interests
of the United States in foreign lands. In the second half of the nine-
teenth century the United States enjoyed a period of sustained eco-
nomic growth and expansion, and it became a major creditor nation.
Recognition policy was altered to serve this new interest.
Many of the states in which Americans invested substantially
suffered from chronic political instability and deep-seated poverty.
This combination resulted in frequent defaults on government bonds
and other instruments, making such investments risky. In an attempt
to protect American holdings, the United States relied on recognition
as a bargaining weapon and increasingly insisted on evidence that a
new government would pay its debts and respect foreign investment'0
In its zeal to protect legitimate interests, the United States repeatedly
overstepped the bounds of legitimate action and actually took direct
control of the finances of Haiti and the Dominican Republic in order
to ensure the sanctity of American investments. Recognition of new
governments was a handmaiden of the overall drive to protect U.S.
financial interests''
For example, General Guzman Blanco seized power in Venezuela
and was recognized promptly by Brazil, Great Britain, France, Ger-
many, Italy, and Spain. The United States withheld recognition, even
though Blanco was in unquestioned control of the country and its
governmental machinery. Secretary of State Evarts "thought it best to
defer intercourse" until the United States could assure itself that
r! A distinction must be drawn between the ability to honor International obliga-
tions and the willingness to honor them. While at various times the United States
has insisted on both, the major problem. arises over emphasis on willingness to
honor international obligations. The ability to honor international obligations is
merely one aspect of the requirement of effective control of the governmental
machinery.
n Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, p. 29.
?William Neumann, Recognition of Governments in the Americas (Washington,
D.C.: Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1947), p. 7. ,
s"President Hayes's annual message to Congress in 1877 is sometimes cited as the
first instance of reliance on this criterion d States tiitnllpi iccy.
However, as early as 1836, Henry Clay had refet. to the national. obligations as a criterion for the recognition of a state.
such a step will not only rest on the popular will of Vene-
zuela but will also be beneficial to the relations between the
United States and that country. Good faith in the observance
of international obligations is the first essential towards the
maintenance of such relations. At present there is no indica-
tion that any change for the better has taken place, either as
regards the payment of the indemnity installments, now for
several months in default, or the security of the rights of
citizens of the United States sojourning in Venezuela."=
[Emphasis added.]
Similarly, in 1877, the United States withheld recognition from
a new government in Mexico because of "occurrences on the Rio
Grande border" that raised questions about the willingness of the
new regime to honor. its international obligations."
These incidents ultimately subsided and formal recognition was
granted the next year (May 1878).
The emphasis on fulfillment of international obligations grew
more marked at the turn of the century during the presidencies of
Roosevelt and Taft. Roosevelt utilized recognition policy as "a means
of enforcing his demands-a means to see that American interests
were protected and advanced."" Taft, if anything, was more aggres-
sive than Roosevelt in protecting American financial interests. As one
historian commented: "If Roosevelt-had been painstaking in looking
after the rights of Americans in foreign states and especially in Latin
America, Taft was actually aggressive in attempting to aid American
financiers in those regions.""
The emphasis on international obligations was limited almost ex-
clusively to the Latin American area. As one historian commented in
regard to recognition of a new government, in Serbia in 1903:
The fact that: no special mention was made of international
obligations in the correspondence. leading up to the recog-
nition of the government headed by Karageorgevitch does
not signify by any means that this instance furnishes an ex-
ception to a rather well established rule. American financiers
had not found in Serbia the rich opportunity for investment
that they had found in Latin America, and American citizens
had not yet begun to travel or reside in this part of the
world in any numbers. De facto control only was necessary in
"Cole, The Recognition Policy of the United States since 1901, p. 32, citing;
Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. 1 (1906), p. so.
"Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, p. 30.
s* Cole, Recognition Policy of the United States since 1901, p. 43.
"Ibid., pp. 44-43.
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Serbia. De facto control and especially the willingness to ful-
fill their international responsibilities (which were usually
specified by reference to American concessions) and claims
were both essential in Latin-American states"
Recognition Practice toward Coups d'etat In Central America. Prin-
ciples different from those applied to other states governed the grant
of recognition to states in Central America in the early part of the
twentieth century. The general instability in Latin America was espe-
cially pronounced in Central America and there was almost continual
warfare in the region in the early twentieth century." President
Roosevelt arranged a conference in 1907 to consider the problem, and
several conventions were agreed upon, including an annex on recog-
nition policy that was agreed to by Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador. The annex provided:
ARTICLE L. The government of the high contracting
parties shall not recognize any other government which may
come into power in any of the five Republics as a conse-
quence of coup d'etat, or of a revolution against the
recognized government, so long as the freely elected repre-
sentatives of tie people thereof, have not constitutionally
reorganized the country.
ARTICLE 2. No government of Central America shall
in case of civil war intervene in favor of or against the gov-
ernment of the country where the struggle is taking place.
ARTICLE 3. The Governments of Central America, in
the first place, are recommended to endeavor to bring about,
by the means at their command, a constitutional reform in
the sense of prohibiting the re-election of the President of a
republic, where such prohibition does not exist, secondly to
adopt all measures necessary to effect a complete guarantee
of the principle of alternation in power."
The United States was not a party to the treaty but agreed to follow
the policy enunciated in the annex in ?granting or withholding recogni-
tion to new governments in the five states of Central America." Thus
the criterion of explicit popular support or subsequent ratification by
election which had before been invoked in an ad hoc manner was
placed on a formal juridical footing In Central America.
" Ibid., pp. 83-83.
ar Raymond Leslie Buell, "The United States and Central American Stability,"
Foreign Policy Reports, vol. 7 (1931), p. 161.
"Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, pp.
28-29.
ss lid., p. 29.
14
The 1907 treaty was replaced in 1923 by a considerably more
drastic version. Under the treaty of 1907 the revolutionary forces
could retain power and legalize their position by means of elections.
This opportunity was foreclosed by the treaty of 1923 which forbade
the leader of the revolutionary forces from assuming control of the
government even if he won a free election following the coup and
commanded strong popular support.'0
Both the 1907 and the 1923 treaties had repeated application.
Coups occurred in all the Central American countries. Revolutions or
coups d'etat occurred in Nicaragua in 1909, 1912, and 1926. Honduras
experienced coups in 1911, 1919, 1924, and 1931. General Tinoco
assumed power in Costa Rica by extraconstitutional means in 1917.
Guatemalan'governments were overthrown three times in this period,
first in the Cabrera coup in 1920, next in the Herrara coup in 1921,
and finally in the Orellano coup in 1930. A coup occurred in El
Salvador in 1931."
In each coup, the United States ostensibly followed the treaty
in force at that time. However, the actual policy followed by the
United States government varied considerably depending on the
political forces involved. For example, President Taft and Secretary of
State Knox were strongly opposed to President Zelaya of Nicaragua
and favored the coup against him in 1909. To aid the anti-Zelaya
forces, President Taft refused to allow anyone associated with Zelaya
to stand for the presidential election. Similarly, President Wilson was
bitterly opposed to General Tinoco, who assumed power in Costa
Rica in 1917. Thus, despite the fact that Tinoco met the requirements
of the 1907 treaty, President Wilson refused to recognize Tinoco's
government.42.-
In Nicaragua, the United States recognized Adolfo Diaz as presi-
dent even though he was an uncle of one of the leaders of the coup
against the existing government, an action in violation of the treaty.
The United States repeated the violation in 1926 when it recognized
Moncado as president of Nicaragua following the overthrow of Diaz,
"Secretary of State Stimson outlined United States policy in a statement: "'It
[policy of not recognizing unconstitutional governments] Is quite different from
the general policy of this country and from the general policy of international
law toward the recognition of governments in the world at large.' The reason
for adopting a more stringent policy in regard to Central America was that the
five governments of that area had agreed to apply the restrictions themselves,
'with the object evidently of discouraging a revolution or coup d'etat within the
five Republics."' Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American For-
eign Policy, p. 57.
4' Raymond Leslie Buell, 'The United States and Central American Revolutions,"
Foreign Policy Reports, vol. 7 (1931), pp. 187, 201.
a Ibid., p. 202.
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even though Moncado had led the coup' The failure of the United
States to follow either the letter or the spirit of the 1907 and 1923
treaties led to criticism that U.S. policy was not to discourage revolu-
tion and coups, the aim of the treaties, but "to maintain in office in
1148
Central America presidents answerable to its influence.
The bloodless Tinoco overthrow of the Gonzalez regime in Costa
Rica provides a graphic illustration of the deep involvement
the internal affairs of a Central American country as a result of the
1907 treaty. On January 25, 1917, General Frederico Tinoco over-
threw President Alfredo Gonzalez, who claimed that conflict over
an oil concession to American businessmen was the principal
the coup. Tinoco nevertheless was initially popular with the people
and quickly placed his regime on a constitutional basis. He held elec-
tions on April 1, 1917, received an overwhelming majority, and was
proclaimed president by the Constitutional Assembly. President Wil-
son refused to recognize the Tinoco government even though it was
eligible under the 1907 treaty. Indeed, the United States hardened its
stand and informed Central American governments that recognition
of Tinoco would not be "evidence of a friendly feeling toward the
United Stites."" Despite this warning, all Central American govern-
ments, save Nicaragua, granted recognition as did most South Ameri-
can and European governments.'s Historians cite two reasons for the
U.S. nonrecognition: the doctrine of constitutionalism
In part as and a Wilson's
view that Tinoco had staged the coup. result of
the actions of American businessmen.
In August 1917 internal problems multiplied, and Tinoco stepped
down in favor of Juan Bautista Quiros. The United States refused to
recognize Quiros, and he stepped down after twenty days in favor
of Francisco Aguilar Barquero, whom the United States said should
be the president because he was the third designate elected in 1914
under the 1871 Constitution. This position was outlined by the secre-
tary of state:
The governmental power should be deposited in the
hands of Francisco Aguilar Barquero, successor to the execu-
tive power, under the Alfredo Gonzalez regime. Barquero
should hold free and open elections for president at earliest
possible date. Were this done, it would appear that the
necessary legal formalities had been complied with to con-
" [bid.. Stability," p. isl.
s. Baell. "The United States and Central American
VAdv pp. 180-183.
stitute a legitimate government worthy of recognition by the
Government of the United States."
The U.S. action was bitterly resented in Costa Rica. When Aguilar
was elected designate in 1914, his term was only four years; Costa
Ricans regarded as ridiculous the argument that he was the "legal"
president in 1919.
The Recognition Policy of Woodrow Wilson
President Wilson made significant changes in the traditional recogni-
tion doctrine by extending to all Latin America the constitutional
criterion that had previously been applied on a formal basis only to
the five republics of Central America.
On March 11, 1913, seven days after he assumed office, Presi-
dent Wilson set forth in a public statement the principles for recogni-
tion to be followed not only in the case at hand but also in future
actions. His statement was a strong endorsement of a policy designed
to strengthen constitutional democracy.
Cooperation is possible only when supported at every
turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon
law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I am
sure all thoughtful leaders of republican government every-
where hold, that just government rests always upon the con-
sent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom
without order based upon law and upon the public con-
science and approval. We shall look to make these principles
the basis oftnutual intercourse, respect, and helpfulness be-
tween our sister republics and ourselves. We shall lend our
influence of every kind to the realization of these principles
in fact and practice, knowing that disorder, personal in-
trigues, and defiance of constitutional rights weaken and
discredit government and injure none so much as the people
who are unfortunate enough to have their common life and
their common affairs so tainted and disturbed. We can have
no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of
government to advance their own personal interests or
ambitions."
Wilson's policy was a significant though not total break with
past recognition policy. The legitimist criteria of the Central America
Treaty of 1907 served as a limited precedent for it as did Secretary
' Ibid., p. 183.
41 Hackworth, Digest of International Law, vol. 1 (1940); p. 181.
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Seward's requirement of explicit popular support. Nonetheless, the
Wilson policy marked a strong shift In emphasis 45
The Wilson administration utilized recognition as a political
sanction to support constitutionalism, particularly in Latin America,
and to discourage the overthrow of existing governments. There is
an ironic parallel between Wilson's use of recognition to discourage
dictators and encourage democracy and the European monarchies' use
of recognition to discourage democracy and encourage the monarchical
form of government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries"
Wilson did not apply this policy often in non-Western Hemis-
phere changes of government 60 and even in Latin America he did not
invoke it consistently, not applying it to revolutionary governments
that seized power in Peru in 1914 and 1919. On the other hand, he
did apply it against new regimes in Mexico, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Haiti, and Cuba sr
Perhaps the primal illustration of the Wilson approach is found
in his dealings with General Huerta of Mexico who came to power in
1913. President Wilson stated in August 1913, in instructions to a
personal representative who was to negotiate with Mexican authori-
4" Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, p. 36.
One historian commenting on this parallel noted: "Recognition thus came to be
used as a means of ensuring democratic regimes, at least in middle America, upon
the assumption, presumably, that only such regimes were consonant with the
Pan American Ideal. The conception of recognition as a moral sanction repre-
sented a throwback to the legitimist principle of the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. Under that arrangement established governments operated their
own club with rules of their own choosing and required applicants for member-
ship to comply with those rules. Those rules were based upon the supposed
interests of monarchies and the rights of dynastic succession. That system had
been rejected by the young American nations as they took their places in the
international community. But in what Baty has called 'this illogical twentieth
century' it has been resurrected, not, as formerly, for the purpose of defending
monarchy, but rather as a means for promoting democratic or constitutional
legitimacy.. The actual existence of a regime in power in a state and its con-
tinuance in power were not deemed sufficient proof that its power rested upon
the consent of the governed." D. Dozier, "Recognition in Contemporary Inter-
American Relations," lournal of Inter-American Studies, vol. 8 (1966), pp. 322-323.
49 Ibid., Pp. 318, 328.
"The most.signif cant issue of recognition to arise in Europe during the Wilson
presidencywas that occasioned by the overthrow of the provisional government
of Russia (under Alexander Kers sky) by the Bolsheviks on November y, 1917.
The provisional government had assumed power upon the abdication of the Tzar
of Russia, Nidrolas II, on Mardi 7, 1917. It was accorded U.S. recognition on
March 20. However, the United States withheld recognition of the new Bolshevik
government for sixteen years, until November 26, 1933. The reasons underlying
the refusal to recognize are well known, and centered on the Bolshevik unwilling-
ness to honor international obligations and the United States aversion to the
revolutionary nature of Communist ideology.
Hackwpdh, Digest of Internafional Lars, voL i, p. 183.
ties, the conditions he thought necessary for a satisfactory settlement
of the recognition question:
(1) An immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico,
a definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupu-
lously observed;
(2) Security guaranteed for an early and free election in
which all will agree to take part;
(3) The consent of General Huerta to bind himself not to be
a candidate for election as President of the Republic at
this election; and
(4) The agreement of all parties to abide by the results of
the election and cooperate in the most loyal way in
organizing and supporting the new administration.62
Huerta rejected the conditions. Wilson then maintained his policy of
nonrecognition for -two-and-one-half years, even after Huerta had
been elected by the Mexican people, until Carianza came to power in
1915 and was accorded recognition !i? Not surprisingly, the Wilsonian
recognition policy was criticized, especially by Latin Americans, as
placing one state, the United States, in the position of making itself
the arbiter over the internal affairs of another, thus violating the
principle of nonintervention.
President Wilson generally sought to use recognition as a po-
litical weapon to strengthen constitutional government. However, he
violated his own ideals on occasion, and attempted to exclude from
power certain political leaders the United States did not favor, even
after they had been elected. On other occasions he accorded recog
nition to governMents before elections were held if he perceived this
to be in the national interest of the United States.
The Recognition Policies of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover
The decade of the 1920s, and the presidencies of Harding, Coolidge,
and Hoover, saw a renewed emphasis on American economic interests.
When Harding took office, the question of the recognition of the
Obregon regime in Mexico was outstanding. American investors in
Mexican oil and mining were concerned with a provision of the Mexi-
"" Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, E-r cy, P. 38.
" The government of Carranza was recognized by the United States when it
agreed to honor all contracts and obligations of the government that had been
superseded, to protect foreign life and property, to make indemnity for injuries
caused by the revolution, to allow religious freedom, and to hold popular elec-
tions upon the restoration of peace. Whiteman, Digest of International Lase, vol.
2, p. 70.
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can constitution which separated sub-soil mineral rights from the title
to the surface.
Senator Albert Fall, the secretary of the interior under Harding,
set out the basic United States position: "So long as I have any-
thing to do with the Mexican question, no government of Mexico will
be recognized with my consent, which does not first enter into a
written agreement promising to protect American citizens and their
property rights in Mexico. 144 Secretary of State Hughes reiterated
this position. Nevertheless, President Obregon refused the offer to
negotiate, contending that he would accept recognition only on an
equal basis with the United States and on terms that did not compro-
mise Mexico's sovereignty. The United States rejected this view and
advanced the unique argument that recognition did not fall within
the scope of international law but was purely a domestic question.
The United States then withheld recognition for two and one-half
years, even though all Latin American states had recognized the
Obregon government .55
The constitutionalist views of President Wilson, while not totally
rejected by the Harding and Coolidge administrations, were relegated
to a position of less importance in U.S. recognition policy. The ad-
ministrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover normally accepted
the general acquiescence of the people as sufficient and did not re-
quire formal evidence of popular support for a government that
came to power through extraconstitutional means. The administration
,f President Hoover in fact explicitly abandoned constitutional le-
gitimism in a statement by Secretary of State Stimson in 1931.r'4
The Recognition Policy of Franklin Roosevelt
Latin America. President Franklin D. Roosevelt indicated from the
outset that he favored a return to the "traditional" policy of - recog-
nizing new governments primarily on the basis of their de facto
K Neu own, Recognition of Governments 'in the Americas, pp. 10-11.
ss Ibid., p. 11. The United States finally extended recognition following a com-
promise agreement that established a program of indemnification for expropriated
land and protected American oil interests in Mexico. of Mr. Wilson and
ss "The present administration has refused to follow the policy
has followed consistently the formal practice of this Government since the days
of Jefferson. As soon as It was reported to us, through our diplomatic repre-
li Peru Argentina Brazil, and
B
o
sentatives, that the new governments M , E the state, with the
Panama were in control of the administrative Machinery ut
apparent general acquiescence of their people, and that they are willing and
apparently able to discharge their international and conventional obligations,
were recognized by our government." Department of State, Problem of
the
y
Recognition is American Foreign Policy, p. 48.
existence. He retained but deemphasized the requirement that a new
government give evidence of its willingness to fulfill international
obligations. President Roosevelt and his secretary of state, Cordell
Hull, also stressed the need for consultation among American re-
publics before extending recognition to a new government in the
Western Hemispheres'
President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin Amer-
ica rested on the doctrine of nonintervention. As a corollary, no test
of recognition could pass judgment on the constitutionality of the
internal processes of foreign governments. In a direct repudiation of
the Wilsonian doctrine, President Roosevelt stated in 1933 that he
favored a policy of nonintervention and mutual consultation:
The maintenance of constitutional government in other
nations is not a sacred obligation devolving upon the United
States alone. The maintenance of law and orderly processes
of government in this hemisphere is the concern of each
individual nation within its own borders first of all. . . . If
and when the.failure of orderly processes affects the other
nations of the continent it becomes the joint concern of the
whole continent in which we are all neighbors."
Despite this general policy, recognition of new regimes in Latin
America did not become automatic. Indeed, in the thirteen years of
the Roosevelt presidency, recognition, of new governments was con-
sidered in fifteen instances and significantly delayed or withheld for
political purposes on five occasions."
64 Until the 1920s recognition was an unilateral act, completely within the dis-
cretion of the recognizing state. The 1920s saw the first halting movement by an
international body touronsider the issue, and in 1925, there was an attempt by an
inter-American judicial body to codify recognition practice. Following this, no
further inter-American steps were taken to codify recognition practice or pro-
vide for collective recognition action until the 1940s. The recognition issue in-
creasingly became integrated into the general fabric of the developing inter-
American system, and acquired procedures not present in recognition policy in
other areas of the world. ibid., p. 66.
w Ibid., pp. 67-68.
ss For example, recognition was withheld for two years in the United States
response to the Hernandez Martinez regime in El Salvador which took power in
December 1931. When Roosevelt assumed office, the 1923 treaty concerning recog-
nition of new Central American governments was still in effect. Consequently, when
General Hernandez Martinez assumed power, the United States took the posi-
tion that recognition could not be accorded because the assumption of power
violated the terms of the 1923 treaty. Martinez had assumed the presidency
through military coup d'etat, and the new regime had not been ratified through
free elections. Also, Martinez was disqualified from the presidency since he
had been minister of war within six months of the coup. In February 1932 the
United States rejected a plan to have Martinez deposit the power of the press-,
dency in the first vice-president for six months and reassume the presidency
thereafter.
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The overall United States attitude toward military coups in Latin
America and recognition of the new regimes is perhaps best captured
in a telegram from an embassy official concerning the U.S. position
on the assumption of power in Ecuador by General Enriquez in 1937:
A military dictatorship under one guise or another will
continue in power in Ecuador for some time to come with
possible occasional changes in the supreme chief. The ques-
tion, therefore, would seem to be the recognition of that
form of government which apparently is accepted by the
people of Ecuador because (Ist) they have no other choice
and (2nd) they seem resigned to the fact that constitutional
government cannot be had. Accordingly, we shall probably
continue to have to deal with this form of government ?0
Influence of World War II on Recognition Policy. With the outbreak
of World War II, the American states established the Inter-American
Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense for the purpose
of studying and coordinating measures for preventing subversive ac-
tivities that might be harmful to the security of the American re-
publics. The committee in 1943 adopted a Resolution on the Recogni-
tion of New Governments Instituted by Force which provided:
For the duration of the present world conflict they do not
proceed to the recognition of a new government instituted
by. force, before consulting among themselves for the pur-
pose of determining whether this government complies with
the inter-American undertakings of the defense of the Conti-
nent, nor before carrying out an exchange of information as
Finally, almost two years later, with Martinez still in power, Costa Rica and
El Salvador renounced the 1923 treaty and Costa Rica recognized the Martinez
regime. Shortly thereafter the other three Central American states extended
recognition through an agreement that the 1923 treaty would continue to bind
them, but would not bind either Costa Rica or El Salvador. The United States
accorded recognition one day after the Central American states. Department of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Historical Office, U.S. Policy toward Latin
America: Recognition and Non-recognition of Governments and Interruptions in
Diplomatic Relations, 1933-1974 (June'1975), pp. 1-3.
"" Ibid., p. 12. Between 1934 and 1937, the United States confronted six extra-
constitutional assumptions of power In Latin America: (1) Ecuador -October 1943
-Paez Government; (2) Paraguay-March 1936-Franco Government; (3) Bolivia
-May 1936-Toro Government; (4) Bolivia-July 1937-Busch Government;
5) Paraguay-August 1937-Palva Government; and (6) Ecuador-November
1937-Enrlquez Government. In each coup, Q w milititry either assumed power
itself or Installed a man to head the new government. In each case, the United
States granted formal recognition within a month, and contented itself with pro
forma statements that the new government would honor all international ob-
ligations.
to the circumstances which have determined the establish-
ment of the said government.b1
With the advent of the war, and the establishment of the inter-
American committee, the attitude of the new regime toward the war,
and specifically toward the Axis powers, became of prime importance
in the recognition decision 62
The influence of the war issue on the U.S. recognition decision
is illustrated in the assumption of power in Argentina by General
Edelmiro Farrell in February 1944. Upon taking control, the Farrell
government appointed a pro-Axis general as the head of press and
information, granted contracts to German firms for the construction
of barracks, and censored U.S. films. The United States reacted
strongly to these moves, stating that it had "reason to believe that
groups not 'in*sympathy with the declared Argentine policy of join-
ing the defense of the Hemisphere were active" in the assumption
of power by Farrell." The U.S. ambassador recommended a "minimum
action program" as a precondition to recognition to include "liquida-
tion of all Axis organizations and propaganda media, control of prin-
"h Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, p. 69.
For example, the United States withheld recognition when Major Gualberto
Villarroel assumed power in Bolivia in December 1943. On the day of the coup,
the U.S. ambassador recommended that recognition not be granted until the
government deported certain Nazis and Japanese. Secretary Hull on December
22 told the press that the attitude of the Villarroel government toward the war
effort was of first importance and the United States was concerned whether out-
side influence unfriendly to the Allied cause played any part in the assumption of
power by Villarroel.
Secretaq. Hull went further on January,24 and accused .the Villarroel govern-
ment of finks to subversive elements hostile to the Allied cause. According to
Hull, the Bolivian coup was "but one act committed by a general subversive
movement having for its purpose steadily expanding activities on the continent."
Nineteen Latin American states refused to recognize the Villarroel government
on the same grounds. The "Axis taint" precluded recognition. In May, Villarroel
offered to trade the deportation of Axis nationals for United States recognition.
The United States refused the offer.
However, the Bolivian cabinet voted to detain and expel Axis nationals any-
way because It wished to identify itself with the Allied war effort. Based on
this and other actions friendly to the Allied cause, and after extensive contact
between American and Bolivian officials, the United States finally extended
recognition on June 23. Department of State, U.S. Policy toward Latin America,
pp. 14-18.
"= Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy,
p. 69.
"" On April 4, the Argentine charge d'affaires in Mexico City signed the final
act of the Inter-American Conference which called for freedom of the press and
protection of individual liberties. On April 9, the United States and twenty other
Western Hemisphere states agreed to resume relations. Department of State,
U.S. Policy toward Latin America, p. 24.
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cipal Nazi business firms, and internment of Axis diplomats."" 945
recognition continued for a year until Argentina on March 27, ,
declared war on the Axis states and pledged adherence to the acts of
the Mexico City conference!"
In contrast to the lengthy delay where Axis sympathy was sus-
pected, the United States promptly granted recognition to new regimes
in Ecuador in June 1944 and Guatemala in November 1944. The
United States did wait until elections were held in the case of Guate-
mala, but since elections were held only two weeks after the coup, the
delay was not substantial."
Other Parts of the World. Outside the Western Hemisphere, President
Roosevelt generally adhered to the principle of nonintervention " The
President refused to grant recognition in the Spanish Civil War until
all effective resistance to the national regime had ended. In the grant
of recognition to the Franco government, President Roosevelt followed
the traditional policy of recognizing a new government solely on the
basis of its de facto existence"
However, the question of recognition did not arise in areas out-
side Latin America often enough to result in the development of a
consistently applied policy. Africa, which was to become a fertile
ground for military coups in the 1960s, was still under colonial con-
'+
"6 Ibid.
"On June 7, 1943, following the resignation of President Arturo Rawson of
Argentina, General Pedro P. Ramirez assumed the presidency and command of
the armed forces. The United States accorded recognition four days later after
receiving assurances that the new regime would support the war effort. The
tenor of the United States position is reflected in a statement made to the Argen-
tine Foreign Ministry upon the grant of recognition: United States views]
with satisfaction the public declarations of the new Argentine Government
affirming a policy of friendship and loyal cooperation with the nations of America
in accordance with the agreements In force, and that this policy will be imply
mented by acts. This assurance is especially welcome in view of the fact that
these agreements were designed to protect the safety of all American nations
which now is gravely threatened by the lawless aggressors." Department of
State, U.S. Policy toward Latin America, p. 14.
*v The statement of Secretary Hull In a letter to Representative Tinkham on
May 16, 1936, was frequently referred to by o81cers of the Department of State
to explain the prerequisites to recognition of new governments: "It is the rule of
the United States 'to defer recognition another executive tive in Its place until
it shall appear that it is In possession of the of the state, adminis-
terbng government with the assent of the people thereof and without substantial
resistance to its authority, and that It Is in a position to fulfill all the Inter-
national obligations and responsibilities incumbent upon a sovereign state under
treaties and international law.'" Whiteman, Digest of international Law, vol 2,
V. 71.
a Department of State, Problem of Recognition in American Foreign Policy, p. 70.
34
trot. Liberia was an exception, and the United States accorded recog-
nition to the administration of President Edwin Barclay in June 1935.
Europe of course did not spawn many coups d'etat or revolutions dur-
ing this time, although the annexation of sovereign states by the Axis
powers did raise recognition problems, both at the time of conquest
and at the time of liberation and the formation of new governments.
The Near East and South Asia as well as the Far East were still largely
under colonial control, or were relatively stable during the Roosevelt
years.
The Recognition Policy of Harry Truman
Latin America. A move to codify inter-American recognition practice
was made in 1945.when Guatemala presented a draft resolution to
the Inter-American Conference in Mexico City. The resolution, which
did not enjoy U.S.- support, provided that American nations refrain
from granting recognition to antidemocratic regimes that might estab-
lish themselves in any state in the hemisphere. The Guatemalan reso-
lution was defeated. However, two resolutions on the issue were
adopted. The first stated that the right of maintaining, suspending, or
renewing diplomatic relations should not be exercised as a means of
obtaining unjustified advantages under international law. The second
resolution provided that the establishment or maintenance of diplo-
matic relations with a government did not imply any judgment upon
the domestic policies of that government."
In the Truman years, nineteen changes of government in Latin
America were achieved through extraconstitutional means. Almost
all the changes Were military-inspired, and in over half?(ten of nine-
teen) the United, States delayed recognition. This reflected a policy
decision made within the Department of State to proceed cautiously
in recognizing military governments."
Dean Acheson characterized the recognition policy toward
changes of government in Latin American in a 1949 speech to the
Pan American Society:
Our policy with respect to recognizing new governments in
Latin America is not inconsistent with our encouragement of
democracy. We maintain diplomatic relations with other
countries primarily because we are all on the same planet
and must do business with each other.... When a freely
elected government is overthrown and a new and perhaps
a Ibid., pp. a7-da.
TO Department of State, U.S. Policy toward Latin America, pp. 27-34.
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militaristic government takes over, we do not need to recog-
nize the new government automatically and immediately. We
can wait to see if it really controls its territory and intends to
live up to its international commitments. We can consul ,
with other governments, as we have often done. But if and
when we do recognize a government under these circum-
stances, our act of recognition need not be taken to imply
approval of it or its policy.71
This policy resulted in ultimate recognition of most military govern-
ments after a short delay to determine if the regime controlled the
territory of the state and was willing to honor its international obliga-
tions. Delay also resulted from the practice of consulting with other
American states. In practice, as George Kennan aptly noted, recog-
nition was accorded after an interval neither so short as to be unWgni-
fied nor so long as to make recognition a source of conflict between
the United States and the new governments."
In the majority of instances the United States accorded recogni-
tion within a month after it satisfied itself that the usual criteria had
been fulfilled. The following statement prepared for Secretary 'Ache-
son for use regarding the June 1951 military coup d'etat in Bolivia is
representative:
From appearances to date the Junta has met the criteria
which the U.S. has applied in other recent cases involving
the recognition of Latin American governments which have
come to power through irregular procedures. It has estab-
lished its authority over Bolivian territory, with the substan-
tial acquiescence of its people, it has declared its intent to
honor Bolivian international obligations, and its assumption
of power has not been due to any external infiuences.'s
In certain cases when the United States was displeased, especially
where a constitutional government was overthrown by the military,
as in Venezuela in November 1948, recognition was delayed for a
period of months. This was sometimes accompanied by United States
Interest in a promise to return to constitutional government .74
It Ibid., p. 43.
rs Ibid., p. 42.
p. 51.
is Ibid
.
T4 For example, recognition was delayed for several months In to the
January 11, 1946, assumption of power in Haiti, by the?mtlitary. 11w United
States acted cautiously because It did not wish to encourage the establishment
of military regimes that promised to observe democratic practices to gain recog-
nition but then ignored their promises after recognition was granted. Department
of State, U.S. Policy toward Latin America, pp. 45-46.
However, the United States was hesitant to utilize recognition
as a club to secure the promise of elections. For example, in the Feb-
ruary 1949 forced resignation of President Juan Natalicio Gonzalez of
Paraguay, the American charge recommended that recognition not be
granted and that relations be suspended until the new government
complied with its promise to hold elections. The Department of State
rejected this approach, doubting that the suspension of relations, and
presumably the withholding of recognition, would effectively en-
courage democratic processes or increase stability.'s
Other Parts of the World. Like the Roosevelt administration, the
Truman administration did not confront, at least in the traditional
sense, enough extraconstitutional changes of government outside
Latin America to develop a policy. The "minimal" recognition criteria
were applied in it 'routine fashion, as this response to a coup d'etat in
Syria in 1949 reflects;
The Legation has been instructed to inform the Min-
istry that the United States Government has noted with
satisfaction the public assurances which His Excellency the
Prime Minister, Colonel Husni Zaim, has made affirming the
intention of the new Syrian Government to discharge Syria's
obligations arising out of all treaties and international agree-
ments entered into by previous Syrian Governments, as well
as its attachment to democratic principles and its intention
to hold new elections at an early date.
The Legation avails itself of this opportunity to renew
to the Ministry the assurances of its highest consideration."
T` A similar hesitance is found in the response of Secretary Acheson to another
coup in Paraguay in 1949, where he felt that to withhold recognition until after
elections occurred: "might be interpreted as an endorsement of the quality of
these elections."
This interpretation, the secretary felt, would be particularly damaging since
it would lend support to the erroneous but widely held belief that recognition
implied approval of a new regime. To rebut this misconception, the secretary
stressed on numerous occasions, such as the takeover by Arnulfo Art" in
Panama In December 1949, that recognition did not constitute "approval of the
manner in which the present government came into power." Department of State,
U.S. Policy toward Latin America, pp. 46-47.
Ts Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 2, p. 455. Similarly, when another
government was formed in Syria on August 14, 1949, It was promptly recognized
on the same criteria: "The United States Government relies upon the assurances
given to it by the Syrian Government that Syria Intends to honor its international
obligations, and trusts that the friendly relations between our two nations will
be continued. The promulgation on September 11, 1949, of a new electoral law
reflecting the Syrian Government's intention to hold elections and form a con-
stitutional government has also been noted." (Ibid., p. 455.)
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However, the Truman administration faced difficult recognition deci-
sions in two separate instances outside Latin America: (1) the assump-
tion of power by Mao Tse-tung in China, and (2) the liberation of
states in Central Europe from Axis control.
In perhaps the most celebrated instance on nonrecognition in
modern times, the United States withheld recognition from the new
government of the People's Republic of China, which was proclaimed
in Peking on September 21, 1949. The establishment of a government
headed by Mao Tse-tung followed the crossing of the Yangtze River
by Communist troops, and the evacuation of Nanking by the govern-
ment of the Republic of China. The government of the Republic of
China moved to Canton, then to Chungking, and finally to Taipei in
December 1949.
President Truman and the Department of State refused recogni-
tion to the new government and continued recognition of the Chiang
Kai-shek government on several grounds. First, the Mao government
was not in control of the entire land mass of China, and a rival gov-
ernment already recognized by the United States continued to func-
tion. Second, the new Communist government did not represent the
will of the Chinese people. Third, the Communist government was
not willing to honor all its international obligations. Fourth, as a
sovereign state the United States was free to withhold recognition
rather than accord recognition to a government that fomented revolu-
tion and hatred of the United States" Nonrecognition continued for
the duration of the Truman presidency.
Communist activity also presented President Truman with recog-
nition problems in another area of the world, the sovereign states that
had been conquered and occupied by the Axis powers during World
War II. In February 1945 at the Yalta conference, the United States,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union in a unanimous "Declaration on
Liberated Europe" agreed that the three governments would assist
the liberated states "to form interim governmental authorities broadly
representative of all democratic elements in the population and
pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections
of governments responsive to the will of the people."r" In certain
cases, such as Albania, major problems arose and recognition was not
accorded?' However, in other instances elections were held, a new
*t Ibid., pp. 90--110.
T2 Ibid., p. 406.
H Pursuant to the principles established at Yalta, the United States, thoough a
diplomatic note of November 12, 1945, responded to a request for recggni LIL_
mmah~
from the new Albanian government and indicated its wuingness to free
government of Albania provided that assurances were given elictlOm
i 1*
government was formed, and recognition was promptly accorded, as
occurred in Poland.80
The Recognition Policy of Dwight Eisenhower
Latin America. Recognition policy toward Latin America under Eisen-
hower was dominated by two considerations: (1) the new regime
should be in effective control of the state; and (2) the new regime
should be anti-Communist. If both factors were met, recognition was
promptly extended, even though in some instances an elected president
might be replaced by a right-wing military junta that repressed human
rights or violated civil liberties. While the United States still inquired
whether the new regime was willing to honor its international obli-
gations, this was, in most cases, merely pro forma. Elections were
seldom mentioned when the United States extended recognition, and
rarely was a promise to hold elections, legislative or presidential, ad-
vanced as a condition to recognition.
The Eisenhower administration faced nineteen instances in Latin
America where the question of recognition arose. In only two cases
was recognition delayed, and then for only six weeks. In most situa-
tions, a non-Communist bent plus effective control was enough ').0
gain recognition."r
A number of the military regimes that were accorded quick
recognition because of -their anti-Communist beliefs did promise to
hold free elections, apparently on their own initiative."= While the
would be held and. that the treaties and agreements in effect between the United
States and Albania on April 7,.1939, remained in effect. Assurances were given
with respect: to democratic elections but problems developed over certain bi-
lateral treaties; and the government of Albania refused to accede to the treaties
until certain '=corrections" had been made. (Wteman, Digest of International
Law, vol. 1, pp. 322-325.) These treaties were never "corrected" and to the
present, the United States does not recognize the government of Albania.
"0 Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 2, pp. 410-412.
"1 On January 1, 1959, following years of revolutionary activity by Fidel Castro,
President Batista fled Cuba. On the evening of January 1, Fidel Castro proclaimed
Manuel Urrutialleo to be provisional president. The United States extended
recognition on January 7 in a formal diplomatic note. Two years later, in January
1%1, President Eisenhower broke diplomatic and consular relations with the
government of Cuba. Nonetheless, recognition of the Fidel Castro regime con-
tinued. Ibid., pp. 268-270.
"s For example, the United States granted recognition to a military junta six
days after it overthrew the elected president of Honduras, Julio Lozano Diaz, on
October 21, 1956. The United States accorded recognition because the junta was
considered friendly to the United States and was anti-Communist, and in addition,
had announced its willingness to fulfill Its international obligations, and restore
constitutional rule through elections. Department of State, U.S. Policy toward
Latin America, pp. 58-39.
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I
United States was undoubtedly glad to receive such assurances (Haiti,
1956; Honduras, 1956; Venezuela, 1958), there is no evidence that it
demanded such promises as a condition to recognition.
Indeed, on several occasions the Department of State
refused to rely on a promise to return to constitutional gov-
emment as a condition to the grant of recognition. For ex-
ample, in the June, 1957 takeover by General Antono
Kebreau in Haiti, the American ambassador requested that
recognition be deferred until the intentions of the new
regime toward elections became clear. The Department of
State rejected this suggestion, arguing that conditioning the
grant of recognition on the holding of elections constituted
intervention in the domestic affairs of Haiti."
Other Parts of the World. Eisenhower, like Roosevelt and Truman
before him, did not confront many recognition decisions outside Latin
America. The significant cases included Vietnam (1953), Tunisia
(1957), Iraq (1958), Burma (1958), Pakistan (1958), Korea (1960),
Laos (1960), Turkey (1960), and the continuing problem of the re-
fusal to recognize the People's Republic of China.
The July 14, 1958, coup in Iraq is representative of the Eisen-
hower policy. Here the military overthrew the monarchy of Iraq and
almost immediately announced that ii would honor all its international
obligations, including those relating to petroleum. On July 30, Secre-
tary of State Dulles recommended to President Eisenhower that the
United States recognize the new government of Iraq.
I believe that we should shortly recognize the new gov-
ernment in Iraq. Although we deplore the brutality which
characterized its seizure of power, the new regime has
quickly restored order, is in full control of the country and
apparently faces no organized opposition. The Foreign
Minister and other officials have repeatedly said that Iraq
wishes to continue close friendly relations as well as eco-
nomic cooperation, particularly in oil matters, with the
United States and other Western powers. These assertions
have been accompanied by public assurances that the new
government would fulfill Iraq's international treaty ob-
ligations."
a ibid., pp. 656.
u Whiteman. Digest of International Law, vol. 2, pp. 450-451. The recommenda-
tion continued: "fine question of recognition of the Iraqi Republic has been dis-
cussed with representatives of the Muslim Baghdad act countries, Iran, Turkey
and Pakistan, who have Indicated their understanding of the advisability of our
recognizing the new Iraqi Government without undue delay so as to be In the
best position to protect United States interests In Iraq and to exert constructive
40
United States recognition policy throughout the 1950s was dis-
torted somewhat by the continued nonrecognition of the People's Re-
public of China. While in the normal case the United States followed
the de facto approach with anticommunism an additional criterion,
State Department officials often defended the nonrecognition policy
towards Communist China in sweeping, doctrinal terms, causing con-
fusion and misstating general policy. For example, Secretary Dulles
stated in an address in 1954:
Let me first recall that diplomatic recognition is a volun-
tary act. One country has no right to demand recognition
by another. Generally, it is useful that there should be
diplomatic intercourse between those who exercise de facto
governmental 4uthority, and it is well established that recog-
nition does not imply moral approval.
President Monroe, in his famous message to Congress,
denounced the expansionist and despotic system of Czarist
Russia and its allies. But he said that it would nevertheless
be our policy "to consider the government de facto as the
legitimate government for us." This has indeed been the
general United States policy, and I believe that it is a sound
policy
Howev
h
.
er, w
ere it does not serve our interests, we
are free to vary from it.
In relation to Communist-China, we are forced to take
account of the fact that the Chinese Communist regime has
been consistently and viciously hostile to the United, States.""
Summary
U.S. recognition policy from the time of Jefferson until 1960 was com-'
plex and changing. There was much confusion and disagreement over
the proper role of recognition from one administration to another, and
usually significant cnfusion and inconsistency within an administra-
influence upon the new reg s expected that the Baghdad
also will soon extend recognition. The Governments of Lebanon and Jordan nha
similarly expressed to us in private their appreciation of the considerations
which argue for early recognition by the United States. Other Arab states, such
as Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, have already extended
to consult with other friendly nations, such as the NATO powers, but your an-
thority is now sought for the United States to extend formal diplomatic recogni-
tion to the Republic of Iraq as soon as such action is
United States extended recognition on August 2, 1958 (ibideemed
d.). appropriate. " The
"Department of State, "The Threat of a Red Asia," gddress by Secretary of
State Dulles, Bulletin, vol. 30 (April 12,1959), pp. 539..540.:
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tion. U.S. policy varied from a de facto policy of almost automatic
recognition to the active use of recognition to achieve policy goals.
The changing nature of recognition policy and the inconsistent
application of the policy continued into the Kennedy administration,
to which we now turn.
2
U.S. RECOGNITION POLICY
UNDER JOHN F. KENNEDY,
1961-1963
President John F. Kennedy based his recognition policy toward Latin
America on two deeply held views-his antipathy toward military dic-
tatorships and his belief in the need for social, economic, and political
progress through the Alliance for Progress. Kennedy's basic foreign
policy, vividly reflected in his recognition policy toward Latin
America, broke sharply with U.S. foreign policy under Eisenhower.
In the 1950s the United States accepted.de facto military regimes ob-
taining power through coup.d'etat, and gave them military, economic,
and humanitarian assistance. If the new regime was friendly and
anti-Communist, it could count on a warm United States response.
One historian has observed that "the operative premise seemed to be
that dictators offered-the surest defense against the threat of commu-
nism."'
Kennedy rejected the complacent acceptance of military regimes
and strongly denounced militarism in Latin America. He believed
that democratic, constitutional government was a precondition to the
social and economic development Latin America so badly needed and
therefore he premised his most ambitious Latin American programs
on the development of strong, constitutional government.2 Conse-
quently, the Kennedy administration viewed military coups d'etat in
Latin America with considerable distaste and 'sought a return to
constitutional government in as short a period as possible. As one
writer commented:
E. Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents-Neomilitarism in Latin America (Praeger:
New York, 1964), p. 114.
* Ibid., p. 113.
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