THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL Vol. 13
tional consent, customary law of the sea. With or without
successful implementation of the treaty, radical changes from early
twentieth century law of the sea regimes have become general prin-
ciples of international law.
International law now recognizes a twelve-mile territorial sea,
exclusive economic zones, and internationally sanctioned develop-
ment of the deep sea bed. The law of the sea has slowly evolved
from Grotius' free use regime to a modified Seldonian regime.
Without the treaty, the continued appropriation of vast areas of the
sea by individual coastal nations could and arguably would occur if
it were not for the customary regime of international development
of the sea bed. It is clear that these unilateral extensions have been
greeted with majority support of the nations of the world, making
such extension the new customary norm.
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF INTER-
AMERICAN RELATIONS
HENRY WELLS*
Inter-American relations involve not only numerous bilateral
interactions between the individual countries of the Western Hemi-
sphere, but also interactions of most of the countries within the re-
gional arrangement known as the Inter-American System. The first
task of this Article is to explain what the Inter-American System is
and how it has evolved. The second is to describe the institutional
framework of the system as provided by two of its components: the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, commonly known
as the Rio Treaty, and the Organization of American States (OAS).
Then follows a discussion of recent attempts to change the charac-
ter of both the Rio Treaty and the OAS which, though unsuccessful
so far, may have jeopardized the future existence of the Inter-
American System. This Article concludes with some reflections on
the future of United States relations with the other nations within
the Hemisphere, particularly the Latin American countries.
1. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
The Inter-American System began to take shape on October 1,
1889. At the invitation of the United States government, represent-
atives of all but one.of the then-existing eighteen Latin American
nations assembled in Washington, D.C., to inaugurate the first In-
ternational Conference of American States.' The most significant
Professor of Political Science and Department Chairman, University of
Pennsylvania.
I. The Latin American nations represented at the First International Conference of
American States were the following: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Missing was the Dominican Republic. which did not send a
delegation to Washington "because the United States had not ratified a treaty of arbitration
and commercial reciprocity signed in 1884." In 1892 the Dominican Republic joined the
new International Union of American Republics (see below), and in 1901 it sent a delegation
to the Second Conference, held in Mexico City. Cuba and Panama joined upon becoming
independent States in 1902 and 1903, respectively. All twenty Latin American States were
represented at the Third Conference, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1906. See G. CONNELL-
SMITH. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 41,45 (1966). See also INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE
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accomplishment of the Conference was undoubtedly its establish-
ment of two institutions: the International Union of American Re-
publics whose purpose was to ensure "the prompt collection and
distribution of commercial information,"2 and the Commercial Bu-
reau of the American Republics (located by the Conference in
Washington, D.C.), which was to serve as the International Union's
agency for collecting and disseminating international trade infor-
mation under the supervision of the United States Secretary of
State.
Although these institutions have undergone significant changes
in name, structure and function since 1890, they both remain in
existence today. The International Union never became truly insti-
tutionalized, though periodic meetings of the International Confer-
ence of American States kept its name alive until 1948. The Ninth
Conference, which met that year in Bogota, tacitly abolished the
inchoate International Union when it established the Organization
of American States. Earlier conferences changed the Commercial
Bureau's name several times and steadily increased its functions.
The Second Conference, which met in 1901, designated the agency
as the International Bureau of the American Republics; the Fourth
Conference, meeting in 1910, changed its name to Pan American
Union. Since 1967, the agency has been known as the General Sec-
retariat of the OAS.
It would be a mistake to draw the conclusion from the forego-
ing that the Inter-American System is simply a set of institutions.
Though it does include institutions (of which the OAS and its Gen-
eral Secretariat are familiar examples), the System is much more
complex than that. Also included within it are important treaties,
agreements, conventions and other diplomatic instruments. Need-
less to say, the System also embraces the countries identified by its
institutions and instruments as member States.' Finally, the Sys-
OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM at xii (1966) [hereinaf-
ter cited as INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM].
2. International Conference of American Slater, 1889-1928 (Washington: Pan Ameri-
can Union, I931), quoted in C. FENW7CK, "HE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 36
(1963).
3. The Inter-American System now includes twenty-nine nations: the United States,
nineteen Latin American countries, eight small Caribbean States (all of them former British
Colonies, including Antigua/Barbuda which the OAS admitted to membership on Decem-
ber I I, 1981), and Suriname (the former Dutch Guiana). Not included are Canada, which
has always held itself rather self-consciously apart; Cuba, whose government the OAS ex-
pelled from the system in 1962; Guyana, part of whose territory is claimed by Venezuela; and
Belize, all of whose territory is claimed by Guatemala. According to the Act of Washington,
1983
tern includes numerous informal understandings and relationships,
some of which make the actual behavior of member States and
their representatives quite different from what one would expect
upon examining the charters of the System's institutions, or texts of
its treaties and resolutions.
The most significant of these informal understandings un-
doubtedly has been the widespread recognition of the System as
essentially a relationship between the United States and the rest of
the member States. The most striking aspect of the relationship is
its asymmetry. The power and wealth of the United States greatly
exceed the power and wealth of the other member States. Such
disparity has indeed given the Inter-American System its main rea-
son for existence: to provide mechanisms for reconciling the often
discordant interests of "the One and the Many," thus nurturing
their uneasy coexistence.
It would be difficult to measure the differences in power and
wealth between the United States and the other member States of
the Inter-American System. The disparity in wealth may be sug-
gested, however, by the quota system adopted by the OAS Council
in 1960 for determining the contribution to be made by member
States each fiscal year to the Regular Fund (that part of the budget
from which most OAS programs and services are financed). Based
on the principle of ability to pay, the quotas for fiscal year 1961
ranged from 66 percent of the Regular Fund contributed by the
United States to 0.3 percent contributed by each of the seven coun-
tries then judged least able to pay: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua,. Panama, and Paraguay. Presently, the United
States is still underwriting 66 percent of the Regular Fund, whereas
Grenada and the other minuscule new member States contribute
only 0.03 percent each."
The disparity in power between the United States and other
member States is even less amenable to measurement than the
wealth disparity. An indication of the manner in which many
adopted by the First Special Inter-American Conference on December 18, 1964, and to Arti-
cle 8 of the OAS Charter as amended in 1967, no State "whose territory became subject, in
whole or in part, prior to December 18, to litigation or claim between an extracon-
tinental country and one or more Member States of the Organization" is eligible to be con-
sidered for membership in the OAS's the dispute has been ended by some peaceful
procedure." Venezuela had laid claim 1o part of British Guiana and Guatemala to all of
British Honduras long before 1964. See M. MARGARET BALL, THE OAS IN TRANSITION 69-
72 (1969).
4. /d at 297-305. See also I I OAS CHRON., July 1976, at 8. See also 2 OAS DEY.
NEWSLETTER, Jan. 1979, at 2.
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Latin Americans perceive the disparity may, however, be inferred
from the terms they have sometimes used to describe the relation-
ship: the cat and the mice; the wolf and the lambs; the elephant and
the ants; the shark and the sardines.
Although the relationship has been asymmetrical in important
respects, United States interests have not always been different
from those of the other member States. On many issues, the posi-
tion taken by all or a large majority of member States has been the
same as that of the United States. Issues on which the United
States and some or all of the other member States have differed
have often been resolved in a spirit of cooperation and mutual con-
cession. The fact remains, however, that since 1889 some important
objectives sought by the United States, both in and through the In-
ter-American System, have been quite different from those sought
by other member States. This is not to say that their respective
goals have remained constant over time. As the following review of
their relations indicates, new situations have tended to alter policy
orientations in both the United States and the other countries.
Il. THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES-LATIN
AMERICAN RELATIONS
United States relations with Latin America have passed
through four major stages since 1889. The first stage began on Oc-
tober 1, 1889, when the first International Conference of American
States was convened. Lasting until 1933, this was a period in which
the United States was unabashedly domineering in its relations
with the Latin American States. The Latin Americans, needless to
say, were unhappy with their subordinate role from the beginning,
and became more so as the period advanced. The second stage,
which ran from 1933 to 1947, was an era of remarkably harmonious
Inter-American relations. This can be attributed mainly to the
Good Neighbor Policy of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and
the Roosevelt Administration's observance of the nonintervention
principle long championed by the Latin American States. The
third stage covered the postwar years between 1947 and 1967. This
period began with all of the nations within the Hemisphere reaf-
firming their commitment to nonintervention and working together
to create new regional institutions. The period ended, however,
with the United States and Latin American countries pursuing in-
creasingly divergent interests. The fourth stage, which began in
1967 and still continues, marks the rise of a spirit of independence,
1983 INSTITUTIONAL ri MEWORK
self-confidence and, at times, even solidarity on the part of the
Latin American States in dealings with the United States. Con-
versely, this period marks the decline of United States influence
within the Hemisphere.
This Article is primarily concerned with the ideas and institu-
tions that came to the fore during the third and fourth stages of the
United States-Latin American relations. The following discussion
focuses principally on those aspects of the first and second stages
that significantly influenced the subsequent development of the In-
ter-American System.
A. The First Stage. 1889-1933
In 1889, the major policy objective of the United States Gov-
ernment in its dealings with Latin America was the promotion of
United States business interests, particularly the export of manufac-
tured goods to Latin American countries. By 1903, however, the
promotion of United States security interests had become an even
more important objective of United States policy toward the Hemi-
sphere. The overriding policy objective of the Latin American
States was to restrain the United States from intervening in their
affairs and thereby dominating their political and economic life.
Throughout this period, Latin America sought unsuccessfully to get
the United States to recognize nonintervention as a binding princi-
ple of international behavior within the Hemisphere.
The differing objectives of the United States and Latin
America derived from underlying conflicts of interest. During this
period, the United States government claimed the right of diplo-
matic and even military intervention on behalf of United States cit-
izens who were doing business or living in Latin American
countries. In addition, the United States demanded greater protec-
tions and privileges for these individuals and their property than
the countries' governments provided for their own nationals. The
United States, like other powerful nations of that time, deemed it-
self entitled to make such demands on the grounds that interna-
tional law, as it was then interpreted, required all countries to
conform to certain international minimum standards in their treat-
ment of the nationals of other countries.
Most Latin American leaders rejected that argument and sup-
ported the Calvo Doctrine instead. The doctrine denied that sover-
eign States had any obligation to treat foreigners more favorably
than their own citizens or to apply to them any standard other than
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I 1953 INSTITUTIDNAL FRAMEWORK
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL Vol. 13
the host country's national law. At the first International Confer-
ence, all except one Latin American State voted in favor of a decla-
ration based on the Calvo Doctrine. The United States voted
against it and succeeded in preventing any such proposition from
being considered at the next five Conferences.'
One consequence of the Spanish-American War was that the
United States became generally recognized as a world power; an-
other result was that certain influential American leaders felt that
the United States should become an imperial power as well. A pro-
ponent of this latter view was Theodore Roosevelt, during whose
presidency the United States concluded treaties with Cuba and
Panama which established protectorates over those countries. The
Cuban protectorate lasted from 1903 until 1934 and the Panama-
nian from 1903 until 1936. Under the terms of those treaties, the
United States government intervened in both countries on numer-
ous occasions for a variety of purposes. It was President Roosevelt
who (as he later put it) "took the Isthmus" in 1903. The true story
of the United States acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone is prac-
tically unknown to present-day Americans. Many Americans are
amazed when they learn of the extent of diplomatic and military
shenanigans that the United States resorted to back in 1903 in order
to make certain that: (1) the Province of Panama rebelled success-
fully against the Republic of Colombia; (2) the new Republic of
Panama gained instant diplomatic recognition; and, (3) a French
citizen acting in the name of Panama two weeks after its recogni-
tion, without adequate authority to do so, entered into a treaty with
the United States which was highly favorable to United States in-
terests. The treaty provided for, among other things, the bisecting
of the new nation by a canal zone within which the United States
was authorized to act "in perpetuity ... [as] if it were the sovereign
of the territory."6 Many Latin Americans know of this story. To
them it is just one of many examples of imperialism by the United
States.
Other examples derived from the Roosevelt Corollary, the pol-
icy which President Roosevelt enunciated in a message to Congress
in December, 1904. The corollary asserted that the United States
5. See M. MARGARET BALL, Salpra note 3, at 48-50; G. CONNELL SMITH, supra note 1,
at 41-44. See also S. F. BE IS, THE LATIN AMERICAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 226-
241 (1967).
6. See D. MCCULLOGH, THE PATH BETWEEN SEAS 329-402 (1977). See also W.
LAFEBER, THE PANAMA CANAL 1946 (1978).
government had the right to exercise "an international police
power" in any Latin American country that was unable to "keep
order and pay its obligations."" The main purpose of the corollary
was to justify United States intervention in the debt-ridden Carib-
bean and Central American countries as a means of preventing
them from becoming subject to armed attack or other pressures
from European States seeking to collect debts owed to their nation-
als. It was feared in Washington that such interventions by Euro-
pean governments would lead to the use of the debtor-States as
bases from which Europe could challenge the United States control
of the Panama Canal and undermine United States dominance in
the Caribbean region. National security interests thus became an
increasingly important determinant of United States policy toward
Latin America.
Policy makers in the Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson Administra-
tions used the corollary to justify a wide variety of diplomatic and
military interventions in Caribbean and Central American coun-
tries. The interventions began in 1905 when the United States took
over the collection of customs duties in the Dominican Republic
and began to disburse the proceeds to the Dominican government
and its creditors in accordance with a fixed schedule. In 1911, the
United States extended the customs-receivership system to Nicara-
gua, and in 1915 to Haiti."
Other forms of intervention included the nonrecognition of
new governments that came into power by force (a policy begun by
President Wilson in 1913), the supervision of elections and the use
or threat of military invasion. The Taft Administration set a prece-
dent in 1910 by landing United States armed forces in Nicaragua
"to help protect life and property," and again in 1912 to help sup-
press a rebellion against a government that the United States sup-
ported. Except for a period of eleven months in 1925-1926, the
United States Marines and other military forces remained in Nica-
ragua from 1912 until 1933. The Wilson Administration inter-
vened militarily in Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.
The invasions of Mexico in 1913, 1914 and 1916 were brief, but the
7. THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LATIN-AMERICAN POLICY: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD
362 (James W. Gantenbein ed. 1950). See S. F. BEMIS, supra note 5, at 142-67. See also D.
MUNRO, INTERVENTION AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN THE CARIBBEAN, 1900-1921, at 65.111
(1964).
8. Between 1909 and 1912 the Taft Administration tried unsuccessfully to establish
customs receiverships in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras. See D. MUNRO,
supra note 7, at 217-68.
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military occupation of Haiti which began in 1916 lasted until 1934.
The occupation of the Dominican Republic, which also began in
1916, lasted until 1924. In that year, the country became subject to
the provisions of a treaty establishing a United States protectorate
which did not expire until 19419
The many instances of United States interference in the affairs
of Latin American nations between 1889 and 1933 explain why the
principle of nonintervention became the cardinal doctrine of all
Latin Americans in their dealings with the United States, and in-
deed with one another. By the end of the period it had become, in
the eyes of Latin Americans, "the cornerstone of the Inter-Ameri-
can System."" But the United States, against which it was mainly
directed, had yet to recognize the principle and act accordingly.
B. The Second Stage.- 1933-1947
The second period began in 1933 with the announcement of
the Good Neighbor Policy by Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The
President had been in office only nine months when his government
accepted, with minor reservations, the principle of nonintervention
as a binding policy in the conduct of the United States relations
with the rest of the Hemisphere. 'At the Seventh International Con-
ference of American States held in Montevideo in December, 1933,
the United States joined the Latin American countries in voting to
approve the Convention on Rights and Duties of States. Article 8
of the Convention read, "No state has the right to intervene in the
internal or external affairs of another." In signing the treaty, the
United States delegation appended a reservation retaining all rights
under "the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted."I'
It is not clear what the delegation had in mind by adding this reser-
vation; but it did not matter, for in December, 1936, at the Special
Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held in
Buenos Aires, the United States officially endorsed the principle of
nonintervention without any reservations.
This change in United States policy had a significant effect on
United States-Latin American relations. The period from 1933 to
approximately 1943 is still remembered with great euphoria by
9. The customs receiverships were not withdrawn from the Dominican Republic until
1940, from Haiti until 1941, and from Nicaragua until 1944. See S. F. BEMIS, JLpra note 5, at
174-84, 189-93, 210-13.
10. G. CONNELL.SMITH, nrpra note 1. at 9.
11. S. F. BEMIS,.svpra note 5. at 273-74.
many Latin Americans. This was an era of good relations, unlike
the long preceding period which was often been marked by mutual
suspicions and hostilities. The heyday of the Good Neighbor Pol-
icy, by contrast, was characterized by mutual help and support.
The United States seems to have made a special effort to avoid ac-
tions which Latin Americans might construe as coercive, humiliat-
ing or inconsiderate.
C The Third Stage: 1947-1967
The beginning of the third stage in United States-Latin Ameri-
can relations coincided with the onset of the Cold War, which in-
formed United States attitudes and policies throughout the period.
The two principal
and the OAS Charter of Inter-American 1948, owed their for-
mation Rio Treaty o
mation largely to the Cold War. United States policy makers came
to the conclusion that a mutual defense pact embracing the United
States and Latin American nations would provide needed protec-
tion against Soviet expansionism, and that a strong regional organi-
zation of the Western Hemisphere would serve as a countervailing
force against the Soviet bloc in the United Nations and other con-
texts. The Latin American threat; but /they welcomed the Rio
less worried about
Treaty and the OAS Charter as instruments for containing Ameri-
can power.
Both instruments unequivocally endorsed the principle of non-
intervention, and were in due course ratified by the original twenty-
one member States. Ratification was tantamount to a solemn com-
mitment on the part of each State not to intervene in the internal or
external affairs of any other State. During the 1950s, interventions
by one State in the affairs of another did occur, especially in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean. For the most part, however, such
interventions involved local rather than cold war issues; therefore,
they could be brought to an end fairly easily by timely application
of OAS peace keeping procedures.12 During the 1960s, however,
the Cold War became a more disturbing factor in Inter-American
12. A conspicuous exception was the United States-backed overthrow of the govern-
ment of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala in 1954. The machinery of both
the OAS and the United Nations proved to be ineffective in resolving this issue. See gener-
ally R. SCHNEIDER, COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA, 1944-1954 (1959); S. SCHLESINGER & S.
(1982). For the broader context gee I. SLATER, THE OAS AND UNITED STATES GUATEMALA
POLICY (1967).
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relations, especially with respect to the policies and activities of
both Cuba and the United States.
A new element within Inter-American relations was Cuba's
rapid forging of close ties with the Soviet Union and other Commu-
nist regimes following the negotiation of the first Cuban-Soviet
trade agreement in February, 1960. Cuba's relations with the
United States rapidly worsened and were officially severed on Jan-
uary 3, 1961, during the last days of the Eisenhower Administra-
tion. The succeeding Kennedy Administration responded to this
diplomatic crisis in three ways. The first was to carry through the
plans formulated under President Eisenhower for organizing an in-
vasion of the island by armed Cuban exiles-a decision that not
only resulted in the Bay of Pigs disaster, but also represented a
flagrant violation of the United States commitment to noninterven-
tion under the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter. The second was
to arm and train Latin American military establishments for
counterinsurgency warfare in order to meet an expected wave of
Cuban-sponsored attempts at internal subversion. The third was to
sponsor economic and social development in Latin America
through the Alliance for Progress. Under this program, the United
States and Latin American countries were meant to cooperate by
bringing "a better life to all the peoples of the Continent" through
introducing "profound economic, social, and cultural changes."'
By 1967, the end of the third period, the Johnson Administra-
tion was merely paying lip service to the reform goals of the Alli-
ance. The Administration was using the Alliance as a vehicle for:
(1) promoting the interests of vocal sectors within the United States
business community; (2) helping the United States government re-
duce its balance of payments deficits; and, (3) shoring up the
finances of the Brazilian government and other authoritarian re-
gimes that the Administration regarded as specially deserving of
assistance because of their strong support for United States-spon-
sored cold war policies.
This shift in the United States government's economic assist-
ance policies in the mid-sixties and its military intervention in the
Dominican Republic in 1965" aroused a good deal of resentment
13. Declaration and Charier of F a del Er, as cited in INTER-AMERICAN SrsTEM,
supra note 1, at 44344 app. 18.
14. On April 28, 1965, President Joknson ordered the landing of United States Marines
and other forces (ultimately more than 20,000 troops) in the Dominican Republic, not only
to protect the evacuation of Americans eadangercd by the civil war then going on, but also to
prevent radical elements from winning that struggle and turning the country into "another
p0.,
in Latin America. Between November, 1965, and February, 1967
(when the member States of the OAS were meeting to amend the
OAS Charter), this resentment manifested itself in certain Latin
American policy initiatives with which the United States sharply
disagreed. As will be seen below, the key issues debated in the spe-
lead to
cial Inter-Americanter amendments of 1967 have not yet been resolved.
the Charter
The Fourth Stage: 1967 to the Present
The present period in the evolution of United States-Latin
American relations is one in which security concerns have re-
mained very high on the United States agenda. The United States
government seemed to regard the death of Che Guevara in 1967 as
symbolic of the failure of the Castro regime to foment revolution in
Latin America, and reason enough to concentrate its anti-commu-
nist energies on prosecuting the war in Vietnam. After the conclu-
sion of that conflict, the Nixon and Ford Administrations pursued a
policy of benign neglect (referred to by critics as malign neglect)
toward Latin America. The Carter Administration followed a simi-
lar course until 1978 when the rise of a strong anti-Somoza move-
ment in Nicaragua caused United States policy makers to focus
once again on the threat of communism in the Hemisphere. Since
1981, the Reagan Administration has shown a strong tendency to
return to Cold War policies and practices in its dealings with the
Hemisphere, especially in Central America and the Caribbean.
The Latin American governments, meanwhile, have continued
to assign top priority to problems of economic and social develop-
ment and to regard as exaggerated, if not irrelevant, the United
States government's fears concerning the spread of communism.
During the mid-seventies (as in the Charter revision period of 1965-
1967), many Latin American governments sought to commit the
United States by treaty to providing economic assistance to under-
Cuba" On May 6, 1965, after a long and bitter debate in a plenary session of the Tenth
Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the United States Ambassador to the OAS was able to push
through a motion establishing an Inter-American Peas Force. Since the Peace Force was to
consist almost entirely of the United States troops in Santo Domingo, that OAS action had
the effect of officially legitimizing the United States intervention and of appearing to multi-
lateralize the United States program for bringing an end to the civil war. It also had the
effect of revealing to many Latin Americans how completely the United States dominated
the OAS. See M. MARGARET BALL, =pro now 3, at 471-72. See also A. LOWENTHAL, THE
DOMINICAN INTERVENTION (1972); I. SLATER, INTERVENTION AND NEGOTIATION: THE
UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN REvoLUTioN (1970).
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developed member States. During the late seventies, the Latin
American States (including Cuba) established the Latin American
Economic System (SELA) as a vehicle for cooperating on economic
and social development projects and for defending themselves
against "economic aggression" by the United States, other devel-
oped countries, and multinational corporations. Efforts by Latin
American States to make further revisions in the OAS Charter and
amend the Rio Treaty in accordance with these ideas came to noth-
ing. As will be seen in more detail below, the Latin American ini-
tiatives failed because the United States made clear its refusal to be
bound by any such new provisions.
III. THE PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and
Peace, better known as the Chapultepec Conference, was held in
Mexico City in February and March, 1945. Two resolutions among
the many adopted at the Conference were of prime significance for
the institutionalization of the Inter-American System. One was
Resolution VIII, the so-called Act of Chapultepec, which contained
a provision that called for the drafting and adoption of a collective
security treaty-one that would create a hemispheric defense sys-
tem based on reciprocal assistance in the event of aggression
against an American State by any non-American State, or by an-
other American State. The other was Resolution IX, which called
for the reorganization and strengthening of the Inter-American
System and charged the Governing Board of the Pan American
Union with the task of preparing a draft charter for consideration
by the then-forthcoming Ninth International Conference of Ameri-
can States.
At that time the United States supported regionalism rather
reluctantly, but by 1947, it had become considerably more favora-
bly disposed toward both a regional defense pact and a regional
organization. This change of policy occurred mainly as a conse-
quence of the deterioration of United States-Soviet relations which
began during the San Francisco Conference of April through June,
1945.15 As noted above, the advent of the Cold War contributed
greatly to United States support for the drafting and adoption of
the Rio Treaty of 1947 and the OAS Charter of 1948.
IS. See M. ETZIONI, THE MAJORITY OF ONE 55-56, 107-09 (1970).
A. The Rio Treaty
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was for-
Mainte-
mulated by a special Inter-American Conference
h met in Petropolis,
nance of Continental Peace and Security
Brazil, during the last two weeks of August, 1947. The treaty was
signed at Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rio de Janeiro on
September 2, 1947. The United States and all Latin American
States except Ecuador and Nicaragua participated in the negotia-
tion and signing of the treaty. By December 3, 1947, two thirds of
the signatory States had ratified etffectd the treaty, which thereafter
ratified
them with full force and by the other signatories.
The Rio Treaty was the first collective security treaty to be
drafted in accordance with the inherent right of collective self-de-
fense as recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It
was also the first regional security treaty to be formulated since Ar-
ticle 52 of the United Nations charter came into effect, which per-
mitted "the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for
dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. the Rio
read wereas
rticl 31947
Treat Articles 3 and II . of
The first sentence of adopted in
especially sigmfice
follows:
The high Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any
State against an American state shall be considered as an attack
against all the American States, and consequently each one of
the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the
attack in the exercise of the inherent right of the individual or
collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations.17
Although states were authorized to take whatever immediate ac-
tion they deemed advisable in meeting an armed attack, the "Organ
of Consultation of the Inter-American System" was enjoined to
meet without delay and decide what "measures of a collective char-
acter" should be taken.
Article 6 extended the principle of collective security to States
that were victims of aggression other than armed attack. It reads as
follows:
16. !d at 65.7,1-77-
17. Inter-American Treaty of Reciproal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3, 62 Stat. 1681,
T.I.A.S. No. 1838.21 U.N.T.S. 77.
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If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sov-
ereignty or political independence of any American State should
be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by
an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other
fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the
Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree
upon the measures which must be taken in case of aggression or,
in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common
defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the
Continent.18
The significance of this article is that it required the Organ of Con-
sultation to meet and decide what actions were required whenever
any "fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America"
came to its attention.
Article 11 provided that the meetings of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs should carry out the consultations referred to above. In
1938, at Lima, the Eighth Conference decided that meetings of the
foreign ministers of the American republics (including the United
States Secretary of State) would be the best vehicle for consultation
among those States in case of war or other emergency. The Confer-
ence also conceived of the foreign ministers meeting together as a
convenient device for addressing any other issue that the govern-
ments of the System deemed important enough to justify top-level
consultation. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs was therefore established as a body that would convene in
times of crisis to decide what should be done. The first three Meet-
ings of Consultation were held during World War II, each for the
purpose of dealing with urgent war-related problems.19 Aware of
the usefulness of these meetings, the framers of the Rio Treaty of
1947 continued the arrangement, with the result that the Meeting of
Consultation of Foreign Ministers became the Organ of Consulta-
tion under the treaty.
B. The Organization o/Ameriean States
The Ninth Conference convened in Bogota on March 30,1948,
18. /d. at an. 6.
19. The First Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers was held in Panama City in
September 1939 to deal with anticipated problems stemming from the outbreak of war in
Europe. The Second was held in Havana in July 1940 to consider ways of keeping Germany
out of the French colonies in the Caribbean alter the fall of France, and other matters. The
Third was held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942 to take up the hemispheric consequences
and lasted flvrsten Among of State, who headed the
George C. Marshall,
United States delegation and remained at the Conference for four
weeks. In addition, all twenty Latin American States sent delega-
tions. When the conference adjourned on May 2, 1948, it had ap-
proved five treaties or agreements, and a Final Act consisting of
forty-six resolutions and recommendations2? From the standpoint
of the institutionalization of the Inter-American System, the Char-
ter of the Organization of American States was by far the most im-
portant of the treaties.
1. Purposes fou founders were ese"essential t forth as follows in Article O4 of
as perceived b by its
the Charter of 1948:
(a) To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;
(b) To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to insure the
pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member
States;
(c) To provide for common action on the part of those States in
the event of aggression;
(d) To seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic
problems that may arise among them; and
(e) To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social,
and cultural development 21
The first three of these clauses concerned "peace and secur-
ity": strengthening them, preventing their disruption, and restoring
them by collective action in the event of aggression. Even the
fourth clause implied a concern for peace and security in that it
recognized political, juridical, and economic problems among
member States (not within them) as matters for which the OAS
should seek solutions. Only the fifth clause focused on matters not
necessarily related to peace and security. This clause emphasized
the promotion of economic, social, and cultural development.
During the early stages of the Ninth Conference, two days of
violent rioting on the part of Bogota's numerous poor all but para-
lyzed the downtown section of the city where the conference was
20. See G. CONNELL?SMITH, supra note 1, at 196-97.
1948 2 U.S.T. 2394,
21. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 330,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361. 119 U.N.T.S. 3. The extensively revised version of the Charier adopted in
1967 retained intact wording of section 4 but renumbered it section 2. See Protocol of
Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States, Feb. 27, 1967, art. 11, 21
U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847.
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The third major institution provided for by the 1948 Charter,
the Council of the OAS, was of still greater importance. The Char-
ter placed the Council in Washington, D.C., where it was to serve
as a permanent agency. It consisted of one representative with the
rank of Ambassador from each member State, appointed by its
government. The Charter assigned to the Council a variety of im-
portant coordinating, supervisory, and budgetary functions. It also
called upon the Council to take cognizance of any matter referred
to it by the Inter-American Conference or by any Meeting of Con-
sultation of Foreign Ministers.
Article 40 of the 1948 Charter gave the Council an important
role in convening the Meeting of Consultation: any member State
could request that the Council call such a meeting, but the Council
did not have to do so unless an absolute majority of its members
approved the request. According to Article 43 and, by inclusion of
the Rio Treaty, Article 25, the Council itself or its chairman had to
call a Meeting of Consultation immediately in the case of: (1) an
armed attack on any American State; (2) an act of aggression other
than an armed attack; or, (3) "any other fact or situation that might
endanger the peace of America." Article 52 authorized the Council
to serve as the provisional Organ of Consultation during the period
between the calling of the Meeting of Consultation and the actual
convening of the foreign ministers in that capacity. Since the
Council determined when the Meeting of Consultation was to con-
vene, it sometimes set the date far enough in advance to allow itself
to serve several days as the provisional Organ of Consultation;
more often, however, it. called a Meeting of Consultation but post-
poned announcing a date and place so that it could act provision-
ally as the Organ of Consultation long enough to settle the dispute
in question 24
The fourth major institution that the 1948 Charter included in
the new organization was the Pan American Union, which had
been in existence under that name since 1910. Located in Washing-
ton, it had served as the headquarters and secretariat of the gradu-
taking place.22 If many delegates drew from those events the lesson
that extensive economic and social reforms were necessary to pre-
vent such upheavals throughout Latin America and thereby
counter the spread of communism, little evidence of that line of
thought could be found in the text of the Charter of 1948. It gave
little attention to methods of achieving economic, social, and cul-
tural development. Articles 26-31 set forth standards for such de-
velopment, but left them loosely defined. Moreover, the Charter
gave little authority to either of the new organizations it estab-
lished-the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in Arti-
cles 63-66, and the Inter-American Cultural Council in Articles 73-
77. In any event, the Charter made those organs subordinate to the
OAS Council in Article 57, a much more powerful and prestigious
body.
2. Major Institutions. As with the statement of purposes, the
main institutions that the 1948 Charter provided for were those re-
sponsible for ensuring collective security and the pacific settlement
of disputes. Article 33 designated the Inter-American Conference,
a new name for the old International Conference of American
States, as the "supreme organ" of the OAS. Unlike the Interna-
tional Conferences which had met at irregular intervals (only nine
times between 1889 and 1948), the new plenary body was to meet
every five years. In reality, however, it met only once-in 1954,
when what was referred to as the Tenth Conference took place in
Caracas.
The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
which was the second major institution set forth in the 1948 Char-
ter, was of greater importance. Article 39 declared that its purpose
was "to consider problems of an urgent nature and of common in-
terest to the American States, and to serve as the Organ of Consul-
tation." Between 1948 and 1967, it was convened three times as the
Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, and six times for the
purpose of considering urgent problems of common interest.23
22. The rioting began on April 9, 1948, in protest against the assassination of Jorge
Elidcer Gaitfin, charismatic leader of the populist wing of Colombia's Liberal Party. The
uprising (or bogorazo, as it came to be called) was a terrifying experience for the delegates,
for it was an explosion that occurred under their very noses. The National Palace, churches,
and more than 150 other public and private buildings were seriously damaged, pillaged, and
in some cases destroyed by fire; and several thousand people were killed. At the time, the
bogolazo was widely believed to have been Communist-inspired. See J. MARTZ, COLOMBIA:
A CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SURVEY 173-245 (1962).
23. See M. MARGARET BALL, saps note 3 at 133.70
24. Id at 198.201. See also A.V. THOMAS & AJ. THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES 106 (1963).
It must be emphasized that this interpretation by the Council of its powers is the
most important event that has taken place in the field of collective security of the
OAS. It often makes the Council the real political executive of the organization, for
in most cases presented to it and accepted by it the Council, upon convening provi-
sionally, has called a Meeting, but failed to fix a time and place of meeting. It has
then proceeded to settle the dispute and to cancel the Meeting.
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CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
ally evolving Inter-American System. Article 78 of the Charter
described the Pan American Union as "the central and permanent
organ of the Organization of American States," and Articles 82 and
83 enjoined it to perform a wide variety of functions, including the
use of its technical and information services to "promote economic,
social, juridical and cultural relations" among the member States
under the direction of the Council.
Direction of the Pan American Union was the principal duty
of the Secretary General of the Organization; he was also author-
ized to participate in the deliberations of the OAS Council, the
Meetings of Consultation, the Inter-American Conferences, and
other OAS organs, but not to vote. Articles 79-81 mandate that
once elected by the Council for a ten-year term, he could not be re-
elected or succeeded by a person of the same nationality.
The Assistant Secretary General served as advisor and assis-
tant to the Secretary General and also as secretary of the OAS
Council. He was also elected by the Council for a ten-year term,
but articles 85-86 of the Charter imposed no limitations on either
his own re-election or his successor's nationality. The post of Assis-
tant Secretary General was held by two successive United States
citizens between 1948 and 1968. Their election to the second high-
est post in the OAS Administration hierarchy continued a tradition
of United States dominance in the Inter-American bureaucracy
that had begun in 1890 when the Commercial Bureau of the Ameri-
can Republics was established in Washington with William E. Cur-
tis as D rector.25
3. The CharterAmendments of 1967. During the mid-1960s, as
noted above, the Latin American States were becoming increas-
ingly dissatisfied with the United States policies toward the Hemi-
sphere. They were especially critical of the level of economic
assistance that the United States government had been providing,
the United States violations of the nonintervention provisions of
the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter, and what they regarded as
the overly influential role of the United States in the security-ori-
25. Dr. William Manger served as Assistant Secretary General from July 1947 to May
1958. His successor was Dr. William Sanders, who served from May 1958 to May 1968.
Manger's predecessor as the top-ranking American citizen in the Pan American Union bu-
reaucracy was Dr. Leo S. Rowe, a former Professor of Political Science at the University of
Pennsylvania. who served as Director General of the Pan American Union from 1920 until
his death in 1946. See M. MARGARET BALL, supra note 3. at II. 175.276.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
ented OAS Council and in the Pan American Union, both of which
were based in Washington.
In November, 1964, the Council responded to such criticisms
by convoking a special Inter-American Conference for the purpose
of considering "various mericcsan of Sa fundamental importance
mss'
strengthening the Inter A Ystm
one in Rio de Janerio in initiative. the other
of Amendment
1967, resulted-from that
y of
adopted by the Buenos nThese changes were/' elnded
changes in the structure of the OAS
to accomplish two main purposes: ef tha e reduction
capacity of the OAS to pro-
mote Council, and a strengthening
mote economic, social, and cultural development. The emphasis by
Latin American States on those objectives in the mid-sixties was
reminiscent of the Shift in jocusthhe had taken io ~no~~r~a serial
United Nations, from security in
development in the 1960s-the "Development Decade."
The chief beneficiary of the changes in the 1967 Charter was a
new institution, the General Assembly, which replaced the mori-
bund Inter-American CoheeAmended Charter not only the same as the "supreme OAS. It received from
the
general grant of authority that the 1948 Charter had conferred
upon the Conference, but also some important specific powers for-
merly exercised by the OAS Council. Articles 52-55 of the
Amended Charter included the power to adopt the budget and de-
termine the member States' quotas, to elect the Secretary General
and the Assistant Secretary General, coordinate the OAS agencies,
and to supervise the secretariat. The status of the Council,
renamed the Permanent Council, was further reduced by article 68
which identified it as one of three coequal "Councils of the Organi-
zation," each "directly responsible to the General Assembly." The
other two entities were the Council's formerly subordinate organs,
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (LIES) and the
Inter-American Cultural for nEducationttScle Science, reconstituted dCuas the
lture
Inter-American Council (CIECC).
It should be noted, however, that the shift of authority from
the Council to the General Assembly
the standpoint of American
OAS decision making, even from
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critics of the pre-1967 Council. The General Assembly certainly
did not live up to its billing as the "supreme organ" of the OAS.
Required by the Amended Charter to convene annually, it had
crowded agendas; but only rarely did it consider and decide issues
of genuine significance for the Americas or for the OAS itself.27
The General Assembly's annual sessions seldom lasted longer than
ten days. The Permanent Council, by contrast, continued to have
jurisdiction over political issues, including matters affecting hemi-
spheric peace and security, and on occasion continued to exercise
the right to act provisionally as Organ of Consultation under the
Rio Treaty. Its members still bore the rank of Ambassador from
their respective States, and the Permanent Council itself continued
to remain in session year round in Washington, D.C.
Especially disappointing to many Latin Americans was the
failure of the 1967 reforms to produce stimulation of economic and
social development. Making the CIES directly responsible to the
General Assembly did not produce that result-nor did the expan-
sion and upgrading of the Charter provisions, chapters 7 and 8,
concerning economic and social standards. In the eyes of an in-
creasing number of Latin Americans, the main deficiency of the
Amended Charter was that it did not include a provision that
would have made the furnishing of economic assistance to less-de-
veloped Latin American States juridically binding upon the United
States. The effort to impose such a commitment upon the United
States led to the next stage in the structural evolution of the Inter-
American System.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR RESTRUCTURING THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
Latin American dissatisfaction with United States-Latin
American economic relations increased rapidly in the late sixties
and early seventies. Manifestations of this trend included the Con-
sensus of Vina del Mar put forth in 1969, and the Special Commis-
sion for Consultation and Negotiation (CECON) established in
1970. The Consensus was a set of demands for change in United
27. The Times of qte Americas (Washington, D.C.) quoted Jeremiah O'Leary of the
Washington Slar as having described the Second General Assembly as the OAS's "spring
futility rite"; other accounts of assembly activities in the early seventies referred to them as
"wheel spinning" and "shadow boxing." For the O'Leary quotation, see TIMES AMERICAS,
May 3, 1972, at 4. Seeafso TIMES AMERICAS, Apr. 12,1972, at 4; LATIN AMERICA (London),
May 23, 1975, at 156.
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INSTtTUTIC
1983
States economic policy, which the Special Latin American Coordi-
'd t Nixon
nating Committee (CECLA)28 addressed to Presl en
CECON was organized by the Inter-American Economic and So-
cial Council to serve as a vehicle for dialogue between the United
States and other member States on controversial issues before final
decisions were made. Latin American sensibilities were outraged
in August of 1971, when the Unitid0 States
surcharge. bypassed The
CECON in announcing its general percent
the deficits they were running
them in n view w f the balance of payments policy
m
in their trade with the United States.
It was in this atmosphere of growing Latin American hostility
to United States economic policies that the Third General Assem-
bly voted in April, 1973, to establish a Special Committee (CEESI)
to study the Inter-American. System and to propose restructuring
measures. Composed of representatives appointed by the govern-
ments of the OAS member States (many of whom served as their
countries' ambassadors to the Permanent Council as well), CEESI
held many meetings over the next two years and compiled twenty-
seven large volumes of minutes, reports and resolutions.
The only significant change in the Inter-American System to
emerge from those labors was a series of amendments to the Rio
Treaty. Adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries meeting in
San Josh, Costa Rica on July 16-26, 1975, which the Fifth General
Assembly had convoked,29 the Protocol of Amendment revised and
renumbered many of the articles of the 1947 Treaty and added sev-
eral new ones. The only amendment that the United States govern-
ment found unacceptable was new article 11, which read as follows:
"The High Contracting Parties recognize that, for the maintenance
of peace and security in the Hemisphere, collective economic secur-
ity for the development of the Member States of the Organization
of American States must also be guaranteed through suitable mech-
28. CECLA, which consisted of all the Latin American foreign ministers except the
Cuban, had been organized in 1963 by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council for
first
the purpose of formulating a common policy position for Latin America prior to he du led
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 1),
to take place in Geneva the following year. CECLA met for the same purpose in 1967 prior
to UNCTAD 11 and in 1971 prior to UNCTAD 111. It also met to agree upon regional
positions to be expressed at meetings of other international bodies, including LIES, and on
other occasions. See M. MARGARET BALL, supra note 3, at 224. See also G. POPE ATKINS.
LATIN AMERICA IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 302-03 (1977).
29. Protocol of Ansendment to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio
Treaty), July 26, 1975, 14 I L.M. 1122.
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anisms to be established by a special treaty." The United States
approved the Protocol, but its representative appended the follow-
ing reservation in the act of signing it: "The United States, in sign-
ing this Protocol of Amendment to the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, accepts no obligation or commitment to ne-
gotiate, sign or ratify a treaty or convention on the subject of collec-
tive economic security."30
Since article 11 simply recognizes the need for a special treaty
concerning collective economic security, without specifying what
the term means or what "mechanisms" might be "suitable" for
guaranteeing it, and since the United States has formally dis-
avowed any intention of negotiating, signing, or ratifying such a
treaty, it would seem that article I I is unlikely to have any practical
consequence. Moreover, it is possible that the Protocol itself will
never take effect. The ratifications of two-thirds (fourteen) of the
twenty-one signatory countries are needed to bring it into force, but
as of mid-1982, only seven States had ratified it. The seventh coun-
try was the United States which ratified the Protocol on September
20, 1979, `with the reservation made at the time of signing.""
In December, 1975, the Permanent Council began considering
the CEESI proposals for amending the OAS Charter-a task
worked at intermittently until May 18, 1977. On that date, the
Council approved a draft Protocol of Amendments to the Charter
and transmitted it to the governments of the member States for
their consideration. A Special General Assembly was to have been
held as the next and final step in Lima on a date to be set by the
Permanent Council for the purpose of reviewing the proposed
amendments, considering the governments' comments on them,
and then adopting, amending, or rejecting the draft Protocol 32 As
it turned out, however, the Council never set a date and the Special
Assembly was never held.
This outcome was basically a consequence of the United States
government's unyielding opposition to several of the proposed
changes-especially to provisions calling for the establishment of
"collective economic security" or for the achievement of "integral
development." The inclusion of these terms and others like them in
the proposed new chapters on Nature and Purposes (I), Principles
(II), Collective Security (VI), Economic Standards (VII), and The
30. Id. at 1131.
31. See 191.L.M. 260 (1980).
32. 11 OAS CHRON., Jan. 1976, at 1-4; 12 OAS CHRON., May 1977. at 2.
1983 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Inter-American Economic and Social Council (XV), caused the
United States delegation either to vote no or abstain from voting on
every article in which
oved unanimou lye by the even though g American
them were PP
delegations.';
United States opposition to the provisions in question and to
many other proposed changes34 was enough to kill the entire effort
Latin Mexio is said to
that unless there aseunanimous
Latin in American
agreement on all of the reform proposals, none of them should be
approved. A possibly damaging confrontation between the United
States and the Latin American States was avoided and the Organi-
zation has continued to exist; but a kind of paralysis has overtaken
the Inter-American System as a whole.
V. CONCLUSION
What do these developments imply concerning the future of
the Inter-American System?35 Despite the current stalemate over
the question of proposed modification of the Rio Treaty and the
OAS Charter, it is unlikely that the System has outlived its useful-
ness. It began as an arrangement whereby both the United States
and the Latin American countries could peaceably coexist and even
prosper despite the enormous disparity of power and wealth that set
them apart; it continues to have that effect. For the Latin Ameri-
cans, the main purpose of the System has been to constrain or in-
hibit the Colossus of the North in its dealings with them. For the
United States, its main usefulness has been to legitimize United
States policies concerning the Hemisphere. Neither side has ever
fully or consistently achieved its purposes; but each has tended to
33. 11 OAS CHRON., Jan. 1976, at 1-2; 11 OAS CHRoN, Feb. 1976, at 1-2; 11 OAS
CHRON., Apr.-May, 1976, at 4; 11 OAS CHRON., Dec. 1976, at 1-2. In the voting on two
related matters before the Council in November 1976, the United States followed the same
policies. The first was a proposed Inter-American Convention on Cooperation for Integral
Development; here the United States abstained from voting on three controversial articles
but joined the other member States in approving the draft convention as a whole. On the
other matter, a draft Convention on Collective Economic Security, the United States was the
only member State to vote against the proposal: eighteen approved it and three abstained.
I I OAS CHRON., Nov. 1976 at 1; 11 OAS CHRON., Dec. 1976, at 4-6.
34. 11 OAS CHRON., Aug.-Sept. 1976, at 6-8.
35. For thoughtful discussions of the future of the later-American System see T.J.
Farer, The Changing Context of Inter-American Relations, pitied in T.J. FARER, THE FU-
TURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM at xv-xxiii (1979). See also R.J. Bloomfield. The
Inrer-American System: Does it have a future?Printed in T.J. FARER, THE FUTURE OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 3-19 (1979).
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246 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL vol. 13
1983
regard the possibility of accomplishing them as more likely within
the System than outside it or in its absence.
This is not to say that the present differences between them are
superficial. On the contrary, they represent different value orienta-
tions that are deep-seeded and have always been difficult to recon-
cile. The United States continues to be concerned principally with
political and strategic considerations, particularly the preservation
of United States strategic hegemony in the Caribbean and (as much
as possible) in the Hemisphere as a whole. The Latin American
countries, on the other hand, have continued to give top priority to
their economic and social development. In recent years they have
also been preoccupied with what they perceive to be the deleterious
effects of American policies on their own economies and societies-
especially the economic power exercised by the United States pri-
vate sector, including United States-based "transnational enter-
prises," as they like to call them.
The establishment of the Latin American Economic System
(SELA) in 1975, an organization consisting of all the Latin Ameri-
can States, including Cuba and also Guyana, and other States of
the English-speaking Caribbean, was a response to that concern.
From the beginning, SELA has tried to promote the economic de-
velopment of the region and formulate a regional position concern-
ing economic relations with the United States.' But SELA has had
little impact: large States like Brazil and Mexico have continued to
favor bilateral rather than regional approaches to economic rela-
tions with the United States and other developed countries,
whereas the small States of Central and South America and the
Caribbean have remained too dependent on United States aid,
trade, or tourism to risk identifying themselves with a well-orches-
trated regional protest against United States policies outside the
framework of the OAS.
It is indeed a unique strength of the OAS that only within its
institutions can the Latin American States achieve a degree of unity
among themselves and express a common policy vis-d-vis the
United States with some hope of having it taken seriously. That is
a basic reason why they are unlikely to abandon the Organization
or try to expel the United States. From the United States' stand-
36. The "Panama Declaration" adopted by SELA on December 1, 1981, represents the
latest attempt of that organization to formulate a regional position with respect to economic
relations with the United States. See Latin American Economic System; The Paaana Meet-
Ng. 28 COMERCIO EXTERIOR DE MEXICO (English ed.), Jan. 1982, at 16-19.
point, the OAS provides a corresponding advantage: only within
its institutions can the United States find regular opportunities to
make a case for its policies with some hope of gaining for them the
understanding and support of its Latin American and Caribbean
neighbors.
Approved For Release 2011/09/26: CIA-RDP05CO1629R000300610005-3