REVISED DRAFT OF FBIS HISTORY TITLED THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION, 1946-1967

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 236
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 30, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: FBIS Historical Officer
SUBJECT Revised draft of IS history titled
"The Foreign Documents Division,
1946-1967"
1. The DDI Historical Officer has read and
approved the revised draft of the FBIS histor
y
"The ForPicsn nI?uments Division, 1946-1967" by
has done an excellent J~o of revising
is raft and the paper is now ready for further
processing.
2. The reviewer has a single suggestion -- that
the present Appendix A "Commentary" be renamed
'tConclusion" and- made-tie final chapter of the history.
Some minor changes, mostly editorial, have been made
directly on the manuscript and are noted for the
record in the attachment.
3. The Historical Staff will forward this
paper directly to the DDI Historical Board for re-
view prior to final typing of the manuscript in FBIS.
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CLASSIR 9 1:Y
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(Cols 596 IIR.?'~l ?.: J:' .n ?.?:[ rate as evt.i I
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THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
1946 - 1967
VOLUME III
by
Secret
CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by
CIA History
Staff and DDI
25X1 '
Secret
DDI FBIS 5
April 1974
Copy No. 2 of 2
PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
DO NOT DESTROY
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
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Access ControZZed by CIA History Staff and DDI
a
4
4
THE FOREIGN DOCUMENTS DIVISION
1946 - 1967.
VOLUME III
by
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u
Approved:
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1974
Copies:
#1 - CIA-HS
#2 - DDI
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Contents
1
Volume I
Page
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
I. Consolidation of Document Exploitation in the Post-
World war II Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Initial Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. The Washington Document Conference . . . . . . 4
C. The Washington Document Center (Advanced) . 12
D. Consolidation of Exploitation Activities . . . 16
II. The Washington Document Center Joins the Central
Intelligence Croup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A. Transfer of Document Exploitation to Civilian
Control 25
B. Problems of Administrative Integration . . . 30
C. Consolidation Completed . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1
III. New Approaches to Document Exploitation . . . . . 53
A. The Move Toward an Exploitation Function . . . 53
B. First Try fora Charter . . . . . . . . . . . 70
IV. The People and the Organization 80
A. Staff Develop rent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
B. Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
C. Organizational Development . . . . . . . . . . 106
D. The Question of Subordination . . . . . . . . 117
V. The Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A. Community Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B. The Search for Sources . . . . . . . . .. . . 134
C. Interdepartmental Rivalries . . . . . . . . . 146
D. Develo u nt of Procurement Procedures .. . . . 154
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Page
A. Phase-Out of Captured Document Processing 164
B. Transition to Processing of Current Materials. 177
C. Special Problems . . . . . . . . . ... . . 198
1. Source Curtailment and Security Classifica-
tion Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
2. Transliteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
3. Copyright Constraints . . . . . . . . 208
4. Dissemination and Reproduction . . . . . . 214
Volume II
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
1. Consumer Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
3. Liaison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
B. Intra- and Inter-Organizational Relations . . 235
1. The CIA Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
2. The 00 Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
3. The IAC.Agencies . . . . . . . . . . 258
4. The Allies . . . . . . . ... . . . . 269
5. The Non-Intelligence Sector . . . . . . . 273
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Page
B. Translation Coordination: The Central Foreign-
Language Document Exploitation File and the
Consolidation Translation Survey . . . .
. .
305
1. Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
3 05
2. Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
318
3. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
321
A. First Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
333
B. Second Effort . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
341
C. The New Ccennittees and Problems of
Coordination . . . . . . . .
. . . .
. .
.
350
.
D. Sequel: A Revised Charter . . . . .
..
.
355
X. Growth of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
363
A. Reorganization and Reorientation . . . .
. .
.
364
B. Overseeing FDD Operations . . . . . . .
. .
.
384
C. Procurement Problems . . . . . . . . . .
.
390
D. A New Reporting Policy . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
402
E. New Procedures and Problems in operations
.
412
F. Special Functions . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
423
1. Ancillary Activities . . . . . . . .
. .
.
424
2. Special Projects . . . . . . . . . .
. .
..
428
G. Reorganization of the Reporting Program
. .
.
436
Volume III
XI. Three FDD Staffs . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
449
A. Linguistic Support . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
450
B. Propaganda Analysis . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
458
C. Current Intelligence . . . . . . .
. .
471
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1
..Page
XII. Cold War Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
482
A. Emergency War Planning . . . . . . . . . . . .
483
1. Early Action and the War Planning
Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
483
2. FDD and the Armed Services Document
Intelligence Center . . . . . . . . '. . . .
493
B. Vietnam Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
511
1. Development of Vietnamese Language
Capability . . . . . . . . . . . .
512
2. Headquarters Tran n Service . . . . .
513
3. Personnel Support
. .
516
4. Intelligence Information Reporting
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
518
C. The Sputnik Flap: A Dissemination Problem . .
526
XIII. Expansion of Service: The US Joint Publications
Research Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
548
A. Establishment of the':Organization . . . . . .
548
B. Its Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
562
C. Its Relations With Consumers . .
584
XIV. Man Versus Machine: FDD and the Autanatic
Language Processing. Experiment . . . . . . . . . .
596
A. FDD and the Georgetown Project . . . . .
601
B. The Division Turns to Private Industry . . . .
618
C. MT Experimentation in Other languages . . .
637
D. FDD-Air Force Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . .
641
E. The Outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
647
1. Development of the System . . . . . . .
647,
2. Testing and Termination of the Project. . .
666
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Volume IV
Page
XV. End of the Line: Transfer and Merger . . . . . . . 676
A. The OCR Interlude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 677
1. The Transfer and Reasons for It . . . . . . 677
2. FDD Under OCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 683
B. Merger With FBIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 692
1. Formation and Work of the Study
Group . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . 692
2. The FDD Position Paper . . . . . . . . . 705
3. The F]Report and Aftermath . . . . . . 714
XV I . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 721
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1
Appendixes
Page
A. Organizational Charts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727
1. 17 December 1946 . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 728
2. 27 June 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
3. 29 July 1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 730
4. 24 August 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
5. 27 June 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 732
6. 7 May 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 733
7. 1 October 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734
8. 1 April 1957 735
9. 9 June 1960 736
10. 1 April 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
B. Foreign Documents Division Statistics, 1947-1967. 738
C. Executive Personnel . . . . . . . . . . 739
D. National Security Council Intelligence Directive.
No. 16: Foreign Language Publications . . . . 740
E. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 742
F. Chronological Table . . . .?. . . . . . . . . 754
G. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 771
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VOLUME III
:Three,FDD Staffs
11
We have noted in the preceding chapter a number of
examples of FDD functions which dealt with special situations
requiring the linguistic expertise which the division, of all
Agency components, was in the best position to furnish.
Although related to the handling of foreign languages -- in
spoken or published form -- these activities differed fran the
normal FDD routine of press exploitation and document transla-
tion. But as the can um-service agent for the intelligence
comcauzity in foreign-language matters, the division assumed
responsibility for the new problems, adjusted rapidly to the
challenge of these assignments, and incorporated then as part
of its regular on-going program.
The present chapter will describe in score detail three
staffs which performed functions of more than routine nature
and played an important role in FDD operations. One of these,
.the FDD Linguistic Support Staff, had strictly a service
function. Its work was in effect an extension of that.performed
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in the division area but with emphasis on speed and convenience
for the consumer's benefit. The other two,.the Propaganda
Analysis Staff and the Current Affairs Staff, represented
approaches to press exploitation in depth.. The Linguistic
Support staff proved highly successful and survived for the
duration of the division's life. The latter two ware largely
experimental and succumbed, for reasons which will be discussed
below, after several years.
A. Linguistic Support
The first of FDD's staffs to be treated in this chapter
functioned as a component under several naives but during most
of the period covered by this history was known as the Linguistic
Support Staff (ISS). Unlike the two staffs discussed below, it
outlived FDD and still exists at the. time of this writing,
though under a different name and subordination. It differed
also in the nature of its function. Unlike the Propaganda
Analysis Staff and the Current Intelligence Staff, both of
which were exploitative organizations dealing in large part
with substantive intelligence,, the LSS was strictly a service
organization. It was established, not to search out, process,
and supply the consumer with semi-finished intellligence, but
rather to . assist. theconsuWx offices inthe . solution of language
problems.
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office of the division chief was approved, and
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Since responsibility for language training in the
division eventually. became one of the functions of the ISS,
the evolvement of this task as a concurrent development with
the consultation aspect should also be mentioned at this
point. In June 1952 a language consultant attached to the
Section, where he had up to now served as chief, with
one of FDD's most versatile linguists, was assigned to the
position.'814/ This move was designed to formalize and to
raise the level of his position in FDD's Special Language
as his deputy. His duties in the new position included
assistance, to FDD linguists specifically and to the intelligence
ocamunity in general, in problems arising in the rarer languages
and in the FDD language-training program. later in the year,
on 4 December, another gifted FDD linguist,
was also attached as a member of the Special language Staff. 815
On 9 January 1953 _ was designated Coordinator of Language
Training for FDD. 816/
On 24 November 1952 FDD established on a trial basis a
Linguist Consultation Service (LCS) in M Building in the main
CIA compound at 2430 E Street, N.W., as a service for intelli-
gence components in that vicinity.. and
- 451 -
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two of the division' s better multi-linguist
officers, were assigned to staff it. The objective of the service
was to facilitate the processing of consumer requirements in the
M Building area by providing rapid scanning of the original
language material presented by the analysts and quick translation
of brief passages, thereby eliminating the usual lengthy trans-
mittal procedures and preventing the levy of requirements of no
value. The two officers were capable of covering 20 languages
and were therefore in a position .to satisfy the needs of almost
any requester desiring assistance. In those instances where
further help was needed, the document was referred to FDD.
After only one month the operation appeared to have proved
itself. The service was found to be valuable to ORR, OSI, OCI,
and OCD and was popular with their analysts. All of the consumer
Offices affected expressed satisfaction with the service and
urged its continuation on a permanent basis. 817/
There was a rapid increase in the use of the new facility.
Beginning with 18 requests during December 1952, the first full
month of its existence, 818/ LCS activity mounted as consumers
became accustomed to its usefulness. It increased to 330 and
353 transactions in January and February 1953, respectively,
and to 508 in March 819 .and by October 1953, less than a year
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after its canuencement, it had reached a peak of 758 items. 820/
During 1953 a total of 6,675 cases were handled for the offices
to which the service was available, 821/ an average of 556 a
month. The rise continued and by FY-1955 averaged 850 contacts
per mronth. Principal emphasis was on requests for assistance
with German and Russian language problems. During FY-1955, for
example, each language averaged 40 percent in the number of
requests, with Satellite Slavic at 15 percent, and 5 percent
for the balance. 822/ Though the bulk of interest remained with
German and Russian, the proportions varied from year to year.
In FY-1956 the respective figures were 50 percent for German,
30 percent for Russian, 4 percent for French and Italian, and
12 percent for the balance, 823/ but in FY-1957 German had
dropped to 33 percent and Russian to 22 percent while Polish
rose to 18 percent and French to 15 percent. 824/ The principal
customer during this period was ORR, with OCR and OSI following
in that order. The LCS maintained close cooperation at all
times with the CTS and its Index, with the result. that
numerous cases of duplication were prevented.
The LCS operation in M Building proved so successful
that early in 1954 extension of this FDD facility was requested
for OSI and for the DD/P complex in the CIA buildings occupied
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by these components, but for the. time being space limitations
prevented implementation of such an expansion. However, some
changes were made to improve the organization and to render it
more responsive to consumer needs.
In December 1954, to meet requests by other CIA components
that the LCS be expanded and to strengthen the FDD language
training program, the functions of the ICS and of the FDD
Language Training Officer were combined to form the Linguistic
Support Staff (LSS). Two positions,. a. GS-13 and a GS-12, were
initially authorized for the new staff.
formerly
Chief of the ICS, was appointed Chief and of
the Far East Branch was designated Acting Assistant Chief. As
the staff's services were expanded to other parts of the Agency,
FDD personnel were assigned to man these posts. With exception,
of that of the chief, it was contemplated to use these positions
for rotational purposes to enable the assignee to benefit not
only the component which he served but also himself and FDD by
gaining valuable linguistic experience. The program was to a
large degree successful in doing this. Initially, the rotation
period was a month, but the period was gradually lengthened as
p. 451.
* This represents a name change. Cf.l on
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it became obvious that, because of the special qualifications
required by the positions, the number of personnel suited to
fill them was limited.
In 1956 the space problem which until then had prevented
an expansion of ISS support activities beyond the M Building
area was eased and two additional linguist service stations
were soon established, the first on 9 January 1956 in Barton
Hall primarily to service OSI requirements and the second on
7 May 1956 Assigned
full-time to these posts were Scientific
Branch, and
Eastern Europe Branch, respectively.
Th judge by the subsequent reduction in needless transmittals
to FDD following activation of the two posts, their effectiveness
was almost immediately apparent. The number of contacts made by
the three stations during FY-1957 was sane 2,200 for M Building,
700 for Barton Hall, and 400 fo a total of 3,300. 825/
Fran mid-1957 on, though the three LSS stations continued
to furnish a needed service, there was a gradual drop--off in the
number of contacts with consumer Offices, possibly a reflection
of more effective program coverage in FIX) proper and through the
translation service provided by the newly established JPRS. In.
any event, the number of transactions at M Building for the
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respective. fiscal years fran 1958 through- 1961 were approxi-
mately 2, 00.0, 1, 600, . 1, 4Q0..., . and 1, 20.0. with. concurrent reductions
for the other posts. '826/ The need for retrenchment was apparent.
was the one least-used, FDD announced
as early as October 1958 its intention to close down this
station. The DD/P components admitted less than full use of
the facility but felt they would suffer if it was eliminated.
They therefore petitioned not only that it be retained but that
additional personnel be assigned to it. FDD agreed to a
limited trial period until 1 December 1958 when it would review
the matter. The trial period failed to show innn:ovement of
ISS use and on 17 December 1958 the facility
was closed down. 827/
The rather precipitous drop in Barton Hall contacts,
from 748 in FY-1959 to 373 in FY-1960 828 and the lack of
improve ant during the following year, led to placing ISS
service at this station on a part-time basis. 829/ The units
at Barton Hall and M Building continued to be maintained for
OSI and other DD/I elements until these moved to the new
Headquarters Building at Langley, Virginia, in 1960. In
August 1959 a manpower reduction pending in FDD resulted in
elimination of the last two ISS posts in the old CIA area in
Foggy Bottan effective 1 April 1960.. '210/
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Discontinuance of the. linguist service was, however, only
tan orary. On 23 September 1961 the division reconstituted its
linguist service at the Headquarters Building in Langley and
redesignated it as the Foreign Language Service Center (FLASC). 831
It was initially placed in charge of
four multi-linguists, a number increased to five in FY-1963.
Its functions remained much the same as they had been under the
ISS. Service was improved by the transmittal of requirements
and completed translations via a twice-a-day FDD courier. In
FY-1964 the FLASC staff was augmented by an additional three
persons with a resultant increase in production. 832/ It is
essentially in this form that the organization has continued
to function down to the time of this writing.
As mentioned above, asecondary function of the ISS was
to train FDD personnel in rare languages and specialized
vocabularies which would be beneficial to other Agency components.
The LSS also provided training directly or through other training
facilities in less rare languages. The purpose of this instruc-
tion for division personnel and recruit-trainees was to back up
the division needs and to provide a hedge against the constant
drain of FDD professionals for manning projects, of other CIA
Offices. FDD, through. LSS, undertook this training function,
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normally .the province of OM,, because of numerous instances
where FDD.required special language skills. at irregular and
unpredictable intervals and could not wait for courses in
.these skills to be fitted into GTR schedules.. The language
training provided by LSS was extensively used. During FY-1955,
for example, 93 FDD personnel -- airmst a third of the division's
total complement -- participated in scene kind of language
training.'833/ In January 1958, to provide further opportunity
for FDD officers to improve their language competence and as a
supplement to the LSS training, a language laboratory was
established in FDD. 834/ In June 1958, in connection with
the FDD reorganization at that time, the language training
function heretofore conducted by the LSS was transferred to
the,FDD administrative office. 835/
B. Propaganda Analysis
The concept of propaganda analysis based on research
of the press and radio media had originated during World War II
and was introduced into the Agency during its formative years.
After a variety of surveys and experiments, propaganda analysis
activity was finally. assigned to 00. As early as November 1946,
then FBIS Director, Who had beenasked by
..00 Chief Gen. Sibert to explore the feasibility of studies of
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all forms of foreign propaganda, reported.that in his opinion
coverage of press sources could.best.be handled by a.central
organ, whose functions would include long-range special reports
on public opinion or government propaganda as expressed in the
foreign press. 836/
The problems that accanpanied FDD's birth and early growth
left the division with little time available to consider sophisti-
cated types of press treatment such as propaganda analysis, and
for three years the idea lay dormant. Near the end of 1949 John
Bagnall informed the AD/O that division officers, on the basis
of experience gained in reporting factual information from the.
daily press, had developed a facility to "read between the
lines" which often enabled them to note items of intelligence
value that did not fit into the category of "factual" text.
Such data included: deliberate anissions of names, places, or
events; shifts in a newspaper's editorial policy; unusual
methods of presenting apparently insignificant information;
and similar indications. This information was likely to be
lost unless reported in some farm to the consumer. Bagnall
therefore requested. authorization to proceed with reportage
I of this nature 837/.and his request was supported by Theodore
11
Babbitt, the AD/EE, ' to whom Carey had forwarded Bagnall's
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memorandum. Babbitt expressed the opinion that the FDD
objectives set forth by Bagnall would be of considerable
value to his Office. In this connection, he suggested that
FDDacquaint itself with an interim report issued in February
1949 by the Rand Corporation entitled "The Intelligence Value
of Content Analysis." 838/
00 plans to handle caimunity needs for propaganda
analysis gathered impetus, particularly as interest in psycho-
logical warfare grew in the early stages of the Cold War. One
early result was the formation in November 1950 of an 00 task
force, chaired by FBIS's which, with OIC
assistance, explored the FDD/FBID propaganda analysis potential
during the next few years and beyond. To test this potential,
FDD was assigned preparation of one of its earliest world press
reaction series reports, a study on the dismissal of Gen. Douglas
MacArthur as commander of Allied Forces in Korea. Consumer
reaction to the experiment was generally favorable, though
sane concern was expressed by the Special Support Staff about,
.the press receipt time lag. However, the Staff went on to say
that,.despite the speed advantage of radio broadcasts, the
printed word still remained "the concrete evidence, the
considered expression,.the .record."U9/
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In its finalreport.to.the AD/0 in January-1952, the task
force statedthat.there was a real.need for additional analytical
and collative work on both radio and press propaganda of the
Soviet Orbit, that such work lay within the potential capacity
of the 00 divisions, and that it could appropriately be done
.by them. The task force recommended that the two media be
exploited separately by the two divisions but actively guided
and coordinated by a specialist on the 00 staff. It also
recommended the expansion of existing FBID operations and the,
initiation by FDD of systematic content analysis on a pilot
scale. It advocated assignment of 20 individuals to the
operations, two on the 00 staff and nine each for the
divisions. 840/ The OIC consultant, Allen Dines, expressed
general concurrence with the report and added a few comments,
none of which appreciably altered the thrust of the document. 841/
Despite FDD representation on the task force, Bagnall
found the results of its. deliberations somewhat disapppointing
and did not concur with its report. He found fault, for
example, with its failure to define clearly. the. term "content
analysis,".which.in the sense of the report.covered only that
type of ' ciantitative content . reported in. the FBID series
Trends and Highlights... This coverage, . he. felt, was.but
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one of many methods.. The fact.that FDD's technique of
exploitation was -quite another form of content analysis
made the task force recommendation that FDD."undertake
content analysis on a pilot scale" inappropriate. Bagnall
also vigorously opposed the recommendation for central
control by a specialist on the 00 staff. The FDD Chief's
position was based on various lines of reasoning, viz: the.
difference in the FDD and FBID operations made impossible
the application of similar methodology; the collation of
reports deriving fran the two separate media was the responsi-
bility of consumer Offices, not 00; and, the coordination of
FDD and FBID operations was the obligation of the two
division chiefs. 842/
Other comments of the task force report contrasted
with Bagnall's views. One example is that of Robert W. Kamer
of Cam; he concurred with the report's conclusion that some-
thing had to be done and that 00 was the organization to do
it. He also agreed with Bagnall's complaint about the lack
of definition of the term "content analysis", but his own
concept of it differed considerably from Bagnall's. Complaining
.that the intelligence. community did. not have a clear under-
.standing of content analysis or a specific. technique for
tapping its potential as an intelligence tool and noting
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that the monitoring services of FDD and FBID .were .only partially
and unsystematically applied. to this problem, he urged those
responsible to becane familiar with the Rand. Corporation
studies on the subject and to hire Rand specialists as con-
.sultants. 843/
.Regardless of the disagreements and the continuing lack
of a consensus definition of "propaganda analysis," the project
moved ahead. An informal study was undertaken to check out the
feasibility of a two-media approach. A test project on "Sino-
Soviet Relations," based primarily on an analysis of Soviet
and Chinese camnent on the 1951 and 1952 anniversaries of the
Sino-Soviet Treaty, was selected as the first effort, and the
Far East and USSR Branches of FDD started research on this
subject in limited collaboration with FBID. Despite some
overlap insofar as Soviet and Chinese sources were concerned, 844/
the result of this effort was a minor triumph. comments from
CIA canponents were generally favorable, although OIE/State
termed the FDD/FBID study "dangerous and misleading" because
of several alleged false assumptions on which.the analysis was
based. Even so, the State Department did not condemn the
quantitative .method of propaganda analysis out of hand but
admitted its. usefulness. as an aid in determining the general
character of Sino-Soviet relations. '845/
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The test run was . so. successful. that a program-for greater
development in.this field was initiated. Since .00 was not
staffed to put out studies of this nature on a continuing
basis, a first step was to provide personnel for a projected
propaganda analysis group in FDD. On 9 June 1952 John Bagnall
submitted a request for nine positions -- three each for the
USSR, Far East, and East European Branches. 846/ This figure
was revised downward in August to seven, including a GS-13 as
chief and coordinator and one GS-12 and one GS-11 for each of
the three branches involved, and on 22 September a T/O increase
was approved to provide the required slots. 847/ On 7 October
heretofore Chief of FDD's Eastern Europe Branch,
was officially designated Coordinator for Propaganda Analysis 848/
a USSR Branch unit chief, was selected to
assist him. Subsequently, two Chinese linguist/intelligence
officers were added to the staff.
At the outset, Loftus Becker, the DD/I, expressed some
reservations concerning the propriety of an intelligence collec-
tion component such as.00 and its two subordinate divisions,
FDD and FBID, engaging in what appeared to be an obvious research
function similar to that done by OCI or ORR.'849/ However, the
D D / I ? was a p p a r e n t l y .s n. over to -the propaganda analysis side,.
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for he was reported by Bagnall as agreeing. to. the proposition
that research and analysis were necessary techniques in the
exploitation of foreign documents.'850/
In any event, by September 1952 the project appeared
safely launched and ready to move on to new accomplishments.
In October a second study, a special propaganda analysis report..
of the Soviet "Hate America" sign based on a quantitative
survey of various themes and categories of anti-American propa-
ganda appearing in Pravda for the period 1 January 1946 - 21 July
1952 was completed for ONE. Owing to differences in approach,
methods of analysis, and dates of completion, the FDD and FBID
papers on this then were suhnitted separately.
Early in 1953, FDD requested 00 approval to work with
on a consul-
Approval was granted and on
researcher participated along with representatives of 00,
27 February 1953 a conference was held in which the
FBID, and FDD.
represented the division. This
meeting was basically only an 'initial exploratory discussion
in which the coordination of analysis of press and radio
propaganda was deliberated."851/
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To firm up the .establishment of.the propaganda analysis
function under FDD, on 30 May 1953.formally 25X1
requested authorization from the Deputy Director for Adninis-
. tration (DD/A) for establishment of a Propaganda Analysis Staff
within FDD carrying the seven-man T/O decided on earlier. He
further asked that the position of chief of the new staff be
reclassified from GS-13 to GS-14 and a deputy chief slot be
provided at a GS-13, together with a clerical position. 852
This request marked the high point in the hopes and
expectations within the division for a viable and independent
propaganda analysis staff. On 28 July the Chief. of the
Classification and Wage Division granted approval of the staff,
but withheld action on the personnel requests because of
pending budgetary problems. 853/ This hesitation proved a
harbinger of things to come, for the curtailment of FY-1954
funds required abandonment, on 19 August 1953, of the existing
propaganda analysis staff, except for the coordinator.
Nevertheless, propaganda analysis operations were
continued on an ad hoc basis in response to requirements from
ONE, OCI, and DD/P...The difficulties of depending on part-time.
exploitation to furnish information for interpretive propaganda
anal
ysis.werereadily conceded... The division's only recourse
was to draft experienced area branch personnel for temporary
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full-time assignment . tothe propaganda analysis effort to
handle.such requirements-This was done and.such TDY.assign-
ments were made in March 1954,
for example -- but experience demonstrated that, while the
operation was useful for descriptive propaganda analysis,
it was weak in the interpretive field because concentration
of application was lacking.
While the budget cuts all but eliminated the division's
Propaganda analysis effort and the operation from the FDD
standpoint appeared to be dying, it was not yet wholly defunct.
The staff coordinator continued to service requests for propa-
ganda analysis, with the help of experienced analysts. This
resulted in the production of several FDD research aids either
by the Propaganda Analysis Staff itself or by other members of
the division under its coordination. In all, three analytical
studies were prepared in support of national estimates in
response to specific requirements from ONE. A fourth was
issued for the use of the Clandestine Services. Two more
Propaganda studies in depth were completed and a third one
was in process when the operation, and FDD's.active participa-
tion, ceased at the end. of FY-1955. One of these studies,
issued on 8.September 1953 under the title Chinese and-Soviet
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1
Views on Mao as a Marxist Theorist and the Significance of the
Chinese Revolution for the Asian Revolutionary. Movement, net
with high praise fran all major consumers. Sherman Kent, the
AD/WE, characterized it as excellent and of great value to ONE,
a judgment which evoked from the comment: "A
little more of this and we may have to reconsider the Press
Propaganda Branch.- 854/
The issue of propaganda analysis, originally envisioned
as a cooperative venture between FDD and its sister division in
00, FBID, had by 1954 deteriorated into a dispute over control
of the operation. From the FDD standpoint, it was not a ques-
tion of sole possession of this function but rather the extent
to which its chief contribution, the exploitation of the elite
journals, would be used in the analysis of the mass media,
mainly radio intercept.
On 12 February 1954 00, FDD, and FBID representatives
held an inconclusive discussion of the general problem of
propaganda analysis. FBID took the position that integration
of press and radio material was necessary at the raw material
level and that integration of the finished product of the two
divisions would not work. FBID also contended that press
propaganda was supplementary and peripheral.to radio propaganda
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and that elite.journals could be exploited better and at.less
expense by FBID in the field than by FDD. 855/ Needless to say,
FDD did not share these viewpoints and regarded.the latter
contention, in particular, as constituting a direct denial of
the FDD cannon-service function.
After the meeting, the division chiefs outlined their
points of agreement and disagreement in a memorandurn to the
AD/O. In essence, they were in agreement that both radio and
documentary sources should be exploited as a unified propaganda
analysis operation but they differed on how to use the addi-
tional personnel requested to staff it. FBID recommended
calling in a consultant to resolve the impasse, while FDD
felt that this determination would be better left to the
parties directly involved. 856/ when Carey later analyzed
T
the memorandum, he noted that the personnel cuts in July 1953
had made the problem academic.
A meeting was eventually held on 18 November between
Carey, Bagnal1, and FBID Chief,
25X1
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The
strained relations between FDD and FBID were.still apparent
at this meeting, but it was possible to reach an agreement
.that without
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cost to CIA, would.undertake a. purely. theoretical. study of the
relationships between, political, and propaganda. analysis and
between analysis of press and radio broadcasts and of the
advantages and disadvantages of propaganda analysis by linguists/
analysts from original language texts or by analysts from
translations.
staff menbers, he canpleted a 72 page study
undertook this detailed exploration of
propaganda analysis and, after consulting with FDD and FBID
The report, in effect, resolved the question of the
future handling of this problem. It recomnended that a single
propaganda analysis operation be set up which would have
responsibility for overall scrutiny of all types of Communist
elite ca unications, irrespective of source or media, and for
both long-range and current intelligence analyses. This, it
predicted, would-result in better service to the city
than was then provided by separate analysis operations by FDD
and FBIDe
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Copies of.the 1 April study.w re distributed in
May to the DD/I,.the DDCI, and other interested parties. It.
was generally well received and it marked, for all practical
purposes, the end of FDD's venture into propaganda analysis.
In August the establishment of an integrated Propaganda
Analysis Branch in FBID was approved and the FDD Propaganda
Analysis Coordinator was transferred to it soon afterwards.
With this action, except for occasional support action, formal
propaganda analysis operations in FDD ceased.
C. Current Intelligence
The events just discussed closed out the experimentation
in full-scale press analysis for FDD, but despite this disappoint-
ment some FDD officers retained the strong conviction that the
division had much to contribute to intelligence operations that
could be gained fran no specific and sharply defined source
material but rested largely on insights based on extended
experience with and exposure to the target press over long
periods of time. The subject has been touched on at sane
length in an earlier. chapter in connection with inter-canponent
disputes.over alleged FDD "analysis" when division officers
inserted bracketed camtientary in translated text in order to
clarify a point or to interpolate information not available
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from the translation.. This practice had arisen in a haphazard
fashion,.quite disconnected and disorganized.. As also noted
earlier, after the establishment of format -ground rules, opposi-
tion to FDD commentary had lessened in the course of time.
..The desire to make available to the intelligence
amity this type of "out-of-the-ordinary" knowledge was
accompanied by the wish to speed up dissemination of the FDD
product. The subject of delay and the reasons for it as well
as steps taken, with middling success, to improve the situation
have also been treated at various places in this history. The
problem was a continuing one. The wish to improve the timeli-
ness of FDD output and at the same time to establish a means
of dispensing FDD interpolative knowledge culminated in 1957
with the formation of the third staff with which this chapter
will deal. This was the Current Support Staff, which, through
the medium of its Survey of the Soviet Press (joined after a
period of time by a similar publication on Satellite affairs,
the Eastern Europe Press Survey), hoped to achieve the timely
dissemination of significant items of information. Because of
the nature of their purpose.these Current Support Staff publi-
cations dealt almost exclusively with political and sociological
information.,
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1
On.16 July 1956
one-year rotation (subsequently extended for a second year) in
the USSR Branch of FDD, primarily to improve his knowledge of
.the Russian language. Approaching the FDD operation with a
fresh viewpoint, in cooperation with and
other division personnel, investigated the possibility of going
beyond the mere extracting and translation of isolated bits and
pieces of information. They suggested producing instead a
report featuring coverage in depth and including cct entary
based on the researchers' own knowledge and experience with
the source material. The purpose of the new publication that.
resulted from this investigation was to record all developments
which appeared to be new or "out of the ordinary" that reflected
tensions in the Soviet system or pointed to the emergence of
problems which could ultimately engage the attention of Soviet
policy makers. The report would consist mainly of summaries,
excerpts, and condensed translations. Full translations would
be the exception. moreover, timeliness would be of the essence.
The proposed publication was to differ from other press
surveys of this.period, such as.the Current Digest of the
Soviet Press published by the American Association for.the
Advancement of Slavic Studies,. -the publications of the Moscow
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Embassy's Joint Press.Reading Service, . the Soviet-produced
Daily Review of the Soviet Press, by.the fact .that.it was to
be based primarily on provincial press and specialized journal
.sources. Coverage of the central press, such as Pravda and
'Izvestiya, was to be left mainly to other exploitation media.
As it developed, the new publication also featured a well-
received "Highlights" introduction and a supplement devoted
to special features such as full translation of important
articles or to a summary and interpretation of data uncovered
in the press. The report was issued as a weekly, and to
assure maxi.nun currency the staff worked on a tight schedule
to meet a fixed deadline each week. Arrangements were made
with the Reproduction Division to issue the publication within
24 hours of receipt fran FDD.
Advance copies of the new publication were issued to
consumers in April 1957 and though reactions to the initial
effort varied, the response was in general very favorable,
ranging from a canuent of "useful" from the State Department's,
Division of Research for the Soviet Union/Office of Intelligence
Research (DRS/OIR)''858/.to enthusiastic approval by OCI
oomponents.'859/ ORR and OSI,in view of the Survey's
emphasis on . political and sociological subject matter,.were
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noncommittal; 860/ but this attitude on the part of ORR
changed later.on.as greater.stress was placed upon treatment
of the political overtones inherent in Soviet.econcmic
activity. ONE termed the Survey a "valuable contribution"'
that was particularly useful in estimative intelligence and
expressed the opinion that its coverage was considerably more
relevant to the problems of Soviet politics than other govern-
ment and non-government surveys. Its concentration upon
regional reporting and internal party affairs filled two
notable gaps, in the opinion of ONE. 861/
With the new report well launched, some doubt arose
as to its future viability and whether the quality of the
publication could be maintained after left
the division to return to ONE. 862/ To provide for regular
Survey coverage, the political section of the USSR Branch
was reorganized and a Current Intelligence Staff directly
subordinate to the branch.chief was established on 19 July
was designated Chief. Other intelligence
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officers assigned to the staff at-this time were 25X1
'863/ Earlier, contributions 25X1
.to the report had.been made on a part-time basis by all n bens
of . the political. section; this was now changed to full-time
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activity bythestaffmembers...'I complement. the: "current"
coverage by. the. new. staff,.steps.were also taken.to organize
the section's."basic" coverage. Later in the.year a Political
Research Staff was formed to include the remaining personnel
of the USSR Branch political section. Its primary function
was to prepare reports on the basic structure and operation
of the Soviet government and CoarYnunist Party and on long-term
ideological trends.'864/ Following formation of the Current
Intelligence Staff, the position of.Survey coordinator was
established with the primary function of preparing the
"Highlights" section of the report and shepherding the
publication through its weekly preparation in time to meet
the deadline. Selected on the basis of their special
qualifications, the successive report coordinators were
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25X1
As the Survey was gradually developed and refined,
' there evolved a growing realization of the report's potential
' value to academic researchers working in the fields it covered.
Thus, in September 1957 when translations of a number of
Soviet literary documents. which dealt collectively with the
then-current revolt against "party tutelage" in the USSR
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were issued in a Survey supplement,. Benjamin Cain,.Acting
Chief of'FDD,.suggested to Carey that .the.issue~of.the report
containing these documents be sanitized and made available to
the Russian Institute at Columbia University. He.felt this
material would be of considerable value to the academic
caninanity and would pay dividends to intelligence by con-
tributing to a better informed study of processes current
in Soviet intellectual life. 865/ The Office of Security
interposed no objection to this proposal and Carey forwarded
the request to the DD/I, who approved it on 12 October. 866/
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1
Reception outside the Agency of the Survey of the
Soviet Press and, similarly, its counterpart for the Satellite
countries, the Eastern Europe Press Survey, was as gratifying,
if not more so, than it had been among CIA Offices. During
early 1958, after regular distribution of the publication by
CD had gotten under way, numerous ccanplimentary messages from
academic recipients were forwarded by ?.to FDD. Requests
to be included in the distribution were also received from
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individuals not on the original list and. sane of .these, where
warranted,.were honored.
Survey distribution did not end with the intelligence
and academic ccarmunities. The publication was sent on request
to interested parties elsewhere in the government, as a
coarmendation fran the Library of Congress received in
October 1958 indicated. 870/ The Christian Science Monitor-
also asked for and received copies, 871/ and distribution
was not limited even by national boundaries. Victor Zorza,
a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, was a regular.
recipient and in several ca nuanications expressed his
appreciation and ccmnented on its "excellence" and the
"sophisticated selection's of materials. 872/
A generally high regard for the type and quality of
reporting represented by the Soviet and Eastern Europe
surveys continued in the IAC camiunity. DRS/OIR/State,
which initially had.found.the Survey no more.than."useful,"
later changed its judgment and said the publication was "of
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more value than had originally been expected." 873/ In a
critique of the report a year after its first issuance, OCI,
one of the major users, ccmnended FDD for the useful and
worthwhile service offered by the Survey. The Acting Chief
of- OCIIs General Division wrote, "There is no better way
FDD can furnish regular political coverage and there is no
better vehicle for it than this weekly Survey." 874/
Early in. 1958, to meet the increased demands of IAC
manbers, distribution of the Survey was increased from 100
to 150 copies. 875/ This and subsequent increases, particu-
larly after distribution to colleges and universities
coamienced, resulted eventually in the same persistent time-
lag problem which affected other FDD issuances. In September
1963 of the DD/I Research Staff complained
about a delay of as much as a month in the reproduction of
the report. To overcane the problem FDD took over the
reproduction itself with the hope of cutting the time down .to
two or three days. 876/ Service thereby was much improved.
The Survey of the Soviet Press, in the form in which
it had been conceived and produced since 1957, was issued
until near the end of 1965. Although publication of the
report continued until late 1966, the original approach of-
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research in depth, involvingthe.use of. research files and
the inclusion of.ccmnentary with thetext, was gradually
abandoned and -the publication. near its end became simply
another vehicle for current reporting.. There were several
reasons for this, but the most important were, on the one
hand, a reduction in personnel trained to maintain the
former high quality level of the report, and, on the other,
a change in the philosophy of the division's mission, leading
to greater emphasis on current reporting of press information
to the detriment of press research as this had originally
been employed in the Survey operation. As a result of these
changes, the raison d'etre for the Current Intelligence Staff
no longer existed. The group was therefore disbanded and its
personnel assigned to regular section duties.
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Cold War Problems
Throughout most of its history the Foreign Documents
Division's operations, like those of other intelligence can-
ponents, were closely attuned to and greatly influenced by
the events of the cold war period. The division had to
adjust its functions to cope with each occurrence as it
surfaced. The procurement difficulties encountered in con-
nection with Soviet and, later on, Chinese Oinuunist publica-
tions in the 1950s and early 1960s represent a good example
of the type of problem which required solution. In scene
situations the problems faced had to be dealt with under
circumstances of more than normal urgency, as in periods when
the Cold War heated up close to the boiling point, during the
Korean and Vietnamese actions. At other.times the problems
were not war-related but were rather manifestations of national
rivalries inherent in the Cold War atmosphere* An example
or two of each form, as it affected EM actions, is discussed
in the pages following.
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A. Emergency War Planning
1. Early Action and the War Planning Exercises
One of the earliest issues faced by US intelligence
at the end of World War II was the question of preparation
for new military emergencies.. Paradoxical as this situation
at first glance appears to be with the war only recently won,
it was in fact consistent with the changed world conditions
created by the war. The fighting had ceased, but the political
issues still begged solution. In the immediate postwar
euphoria it. was difficult to maintain a stance of preparedness,
but rapidly growing US disillusionment with Soviet intransi-
gence after the war led to an early and more realistic
reconsideration of the US position. This change affected the
intelligence ccanrnuiity as well as all the other contributors
to national security. The establishment of CIG and the
development of the central intelligence concept was in fact a,
part of the reappraisal and represented a concrete manifesta-
tion of having learned from the mistakes of the past. As
part of the greater realism in international relations the
intelligence establishment accepted the fact that future wars
were a distinct likelihood'and that contingency plans for such
events were a necessity. It was in this light that EDD, as
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an Agency ocnponent, became involved in emergency war planning.
A first step in the division's preparation of contingency
plans for hostilities was taken in the spring of 1948, not
many months after the document exploitation components of
World War II had been consolidated to form FDB, when, in
accordance with a memorandum issued by the AD/O on 12 March
1948, a plan for wartime organization of the branch was
initiated. 877/ The development of the project for FDB, as
well as for the Agency as a whole, proved to be a long
drawn-out affair which in the course of its preparation was
subjected to periodic review and revision. At the end of
1948 FDB war plans were still in the process of being drawn
up, with a completion date of January 1949 contemplated. 878/
These were destined for incorporation in the overall war
emergency plan being prepared for the Agency under the aegis
of the CIA Emergency Planning oamnittee.
In 1951, as part of overall war planning, the subject
of the military reserve status of CIA personnel in the
event of'an emergency mobilization came up for discussion.
A list submitted in August 1950 revealed that FDD at that time
had a total of 55 reservists and a similar one, dated
29 May 1951, sled the number to be 51. 879/
A hard-line approach was adopted, that is, no deferments
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for CIA employees except in difficult-to-replace cases, and
then only for temporary periods. 880/ The effect of this
policy on FDD was minimal. Of 114 draft-eligible males in
CIA, only three FDD men were considered to have exceptional
linguistic skill and therefore difficult to replace. 881/
FDD took steps to protect these individuals frcan induction
and appealed to.the Personnel Director for assistance in
solving the problem. The available source material does not
reveal the eventual disposition of the three FDD officers
involved. In the overall, the division was not harmed to
any considerable degree by personnel losses to the armed
services.
As important as personnel in wartime was the availability
of sources with which to carry on the division's work. With
this in mind John Bagnall on 22 May 1951 met with a G-2 repre-
sentative to discuss the possibility of developing advanced
planning for procurement of Soviet publications in the event
of outbreak of war or of possible retaliatory measures by the
Soviets in limiting their publications as a result of trade con-
trols by the United States. Bagnall expressed the opinion that
at a minimum an advanced program should be developed with a policy
determination as to which agency(ies) should implement it. 882/
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On 17 July 1951, Bagnall, as chairman of the CEFD,
called a meeting of State and armed service representatives to
discuss further the problem of source procurement. This meet-
ing produced agreement that in the event of an outbreak of war
with the USSR or an intensification of the Cold War to a point
where normal diplomatic relations would cease, the regular
receipt of Soviet Bloc material through normal channels would
be likely to stop. The group therefore agreed to formulate a
contingency collection plan to cope with such an emergency.
This would be augmented by third-
country procurement where practicable. Each agency represented
was asked to prepare a priority list of titles which it wished
FDD to exploit centrally, with the aim of formulating a
coordinated priority list for guidance of emergency field
collection. 883/
One important aspect of emergency war planning in the
Agency was the establishment in the early 1950s of the Vital
Records Repository at the CIA Enexgency Relocation Center
.outside the Washington, D.C., area. It represented a central
collection of materials, mainly published,. with which the
CIA could continue to carry on its mission in the event of a
serious emergency and with the headquarters area presumed
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destroyed. Each Agency component required to deposit its
"vital" materials7 in the. repository- and periodically to review
and alter its inventory as cirmxmstances required.
The first consignment of FDD vital records was sent to
the center in January 1951 and a second was dispatched later
in the year. After the initial decisions had been made and
the list of items gradually shaken down, the division's
deposits remained relatively stable. The materials held in.
the repository for FDD at the beginning of 1955, for example,
included the following:
Materials pertaining to division
organization, including NSCID 16, personnel
assignment notices, statements of functions
and missions of the branches, etc.
Minutes of meetings of the CEFLP
FDD publication "List of Foreign-
Language Serial Publications Received
and Screened by FDD"
FDD Style Sheet
Armed Forces Document Intelligence
Center memoranda
Translation Service memoranda
Joint Intelligence Bureau memoranda
List of dictionaries used by FDD and
copies or microfilms of same.
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List of FDD personnel by languages
Copies of FDD Summaries, Translations,
the CTS and its supplement, Reference Aids,
Research Aids
External Contract Records 884/
Additions and deletions were periodically made. For
example, in December 1951, at CIA Library request, a list of
the Yrost important foreign-language periodicals was prepared
for the Repository. 885 In November 1960 each 00 division
chief was asked for a statement on line of succession of
cxmnand, five deep, for use in case of death or disaster. The
directive specified that no explanation of choice was neces-
sary. This list was also placed on file in the Vital Records
Repository. 886/
By 1955 war planning had progressed to a point where the
Agency considered it expedient to test the organization's
potential for coping with a simulated emergency. In preparation
for this exercise, scheduled for the summer of 1955, George Carey
on 22 April submitted to the DD/I a memorandum briefly delinea-
ting his concept of what the role of 00 would be in the event
of a global war. 887/ Attached to the AD/0's marorandum were
four enclosures, one for each 00 component, outlining their
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anticipated activity in the event of large-scale war.
The exercise Operation Alert 1955, involving the upper
echelons of the US government, took place during the period
15-17 June. It was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of
relocation planning, to determine the ability to conduct
essential wartime functions of the government at relocation
sites under conditions of sustained alert, and to test ability
to deal with problems under. attack conditions. 888
Operation Alert 1955 involved only top management person-
nel in the Agency, including FDD. Insofar as day-to-day opera-
tions were concerned there was no impairment, and desk-level
activities continued routinely. In his critique of the exercise
sent to the AD/O on 22 June, John.Bagnall stated that from
the FDD standpoint all phases of the operation had worked
satisfactorily. The only. deficiencies noted were the poor
lighting in the office area at the Relocation Center in
* See p. 493, below.
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the lack of magnifying glasses to read photostats
and poorly written materials, and the need for an index of
FDD Summary and CrS publications to be kept in the Vital
Records Repository. 889/
War planning on the higher levels continued in the
Agency. The part FDD was to play in the overall projections
for a crisis situation remained virtually unchanged from
what it had been since the beginning. As Robert Amory, the
DD/I, expressed it, 30 percent of all DD/I activity in an
emergency would be devoted to the collection function, and
within this, FDD participation boiled down essentially to
carrying out its current mission. The division would, however,
maintain a linguist pool for especially "hot" documents and
would work more closely with'ASDIC in captured document exploita-
tion. The latter activity could well involve theater linguist
teams, but these would be under military rather than CIA.
leadership. 890/
On 10 April. 1956 the Office of Defense Mobilization
(ODM) announced plans for Operation Alert 1956, an exercise
similar to that conducted the previous summer but somewhat
more extensive. This operation was to last from 20 to 26 July
and went a step beyond the earlier test by making the assumption
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that a massive. nuclear attack against the.United.States had
occurred.. Again, only senior management people 3n.the'.govern-
ment were involved and day-to-day operations progressed
without interruption.
FDD participants in Operation Alert 1956 were nine in
number and, to minimize the time absent from regular opera-
tions, the group was divided into two parts. John Bagnall,
an administrative assistant in the FDD chief's office,
were assigned to travel to the.CIA Relocation Site and to
participate in the exercise during the period 20-23 July.
They were relieved on 23 July for the balance of the operation
by
891/ The FDD part of the exercise was con-
ducted similarly to that of the year before. Some "alarm"
was created by the erroneous report of a simulated casualty
toll for FDD of 92 percent, but this was subsequently corrected
to read 92 "survivors" and thus represented a simulated casualty
figure of approximately two-thirds of the division coirple-
ment.o'892/..Operations were"thereafter conducted with.the
corrected figure in mind. Information on surviving procurement
centers and PPOs was obtained, and simulated operations were
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conducted in light of the reduced work force and facilities.
As in the earlier exercise, cooperation with ASDIC was stressed.
Following completion of Operation Alert 1956, critiques
of the exercise were requested and submitted. Bagnall repeated
his judgment of the previous year that fran FDD's viewpoint all
.phases of the operation had worked well. His criticisms and
reondations were minor. He criticized the failure of
certain requesters of translation service support to define
the type of information desired; he complained that microfilm
readers were not readily available; and he cited the inclusion
of non-essential and outdated materials in the Vital Records
Repository and the anission of certain reference books and
FDD reports. 893/
In his report on the operation George Carey referred to
FDD participation in the exercise and questioned the desira-
bility of having division representation at the relocation
center in view of the likelihood that all of FDD's source
material would be destroyed and that six months or Wore would
elapse before a flow of captured material fran strategic
areas would begin. Carey believed that best use of FDD
survivors could be made in conjunction with Contact Division
and FBID operations, at least prior to establishment of military
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control over document exploitation or the location of intact
and available unexploited repositories. In this way FDD
personnel could be held together pending activation of the
division. 894/
Operation Alert exercises continued to be held in the
next few years with FDD participation., As late as 1963, during
the period 7-11 October, CIA took part in Exercise KEY CHAIN,
a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) world-wide cemenand post exercise
which followed roughly the same format as the earlier alert
exercises. Designed to test eominanications and procedures,
it was held on premises and no relocation of FDD headquarters
was involved. 895/ was designated as FDD
contact, with
2. FDD and the Armed Services Documents Intelligence Center
The Armed Services Documents Intelligence Center has
been mentioned in passing several times in the pages above.
Given impetus by the Korean War then underway, plans for this
documents organization were formulated by the armed services
in the early 1950s to carry on a document exploitation func-
tion in the event of wartime emergency. At the same time plans
.were also devised for two matching units designed for personnel
and materiel exploitation, the Armed Services Personnel
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Interrogation Center (ASPIC) and the Joint Materiel Intelligence
Agency (JMIA). Since only ASDIC was of direct concern to
FDD operations, it alone will be treated in this history and
only to the extent that its development affected the division.
On 30 June 1950 a beginning in interagency coordination
for future wartime captured document exploitation was made
as a result of an informal discussion by John Bagnall with
representatives fran the intelligence organizations of the
three armed service branches. Bagnall posed three questions:
(1) What directions had been given or were planned
for respective theaters concerning handling of
captured documents and what directions had been
issued concerning the type of documents to be
forwarded to Washington?
I(2) What plans had the services envisaged for process-
ing of captured documents in Washington?
(3) 7b what degree did the services intend to rely
on FDD in the matter of captured documents?
The gist of the service representatives' replies was
that the matter had been only tentatively considered and all
agreed that a plan of implementation should be formulated.
The Army representative informed Bagnall that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff had recently issued a directive instructing
Army's Intelligence Division to establish an exploitation
activity on captured documents for the services but with no
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results so far. He cornplimented FDD on its support for the
services but added that planning in document exploitation
had been hindered to sane degree by failure of CIA to make
clear its plans for utilizing FDD in the event of an emer-
gency. 896/
In a 26 July 1950 merorandum to Chief, Coordination,
Operations and Policy Staff (COAPS), George Carey outlined
00's views on wartime document exploitation. Complaining that
a 2 May Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) report on the,
subject had failed to consider CIA interests and had ignored
the "cannon-concern" principle in captured document exploita-
tion at the national level, he pointed out that FDD was well
suited to serve as a nucleus for a national organization to
carry out this function. For a variety of reasons he
recommended that FDD participate in this project without
assuming sole responsibility for its operations and administra-
tion. 897/
When the matter came up in a JIC meeting two days latex,
the JIC representatives confirmed that they recognized CIA's
interest in captured document information, but since there
was as yet no NSCID on the subject, JIC had felt it necessary.
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to act on its awn to establish a procedure for dealing with.
any likely emergency. ' 898/
Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) plans were clearly
based on the concept that the armed services would have full
jurisdiction in any military theater and that CIA representa-
tion would be unnecessary. The exploitation center would be
under exclusive armed services control and requirements of
CIA and other civilian agencies would be dealt with on a
liaison basis only. Carey, on the other hand, recommended
formal action to ensure recognition of CIA interests by
the services, namely, that CIA should actively participate
in the fornuxlation of plans for these activities - personnel
interrogation and materiel, as well as documents. 899/
It was not until fall that CIA- IG collaboration was
formalized. It was then agreed that appropriate CIA and
JIG staff representatives would collaborate both in the
formulation of CIA requirements for intelligence which might
be derived from captured sources and also in the integration
of these requirements into the policy manuals which would
govern the operation of whatever centers were established.
JIG members were designated to collaborate with CIA representa-
tives concerning the three categories of captured source
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materials,' 900/ and several days later their CIA counter-
parts were also appointed. These included Benjamin Cain of
FDD for the document centers. 901/
Action on a Defense Department request for the DCI to
coordinate the JCS reconv endations to establish in the Zone
of Interior (ZI) the joint agencies for captured documents was
delayed on 8 February 1951 pending resolution of the related
question of CIA representation in the theaters of operation.
This delay was overcame when in March William H. Jackson,
Acting DCI,,urged that the project to set up the joint agencies
move ahead while the question of Agency representation in
the theaters of operation be handled as a separate matter.
On-the basis of IAC concurrence with his proposal, he recom-
mended that the Defense Department proceed with the establish-
ment of the organizations. 902/
After scene further delay the report of the ad hoc
ccumittee to the JIC on the "Joint Manual Establishing Policies
and Procedures Governing the Operation of Captured Documents
Centers" was endorsed by the JIC on 9 April 1951, 903/ and
the subsequent approval by the IAC was little more than a
formality. In view of the fact that all amendments requested
by FDD in previous drafts had been incorporated, Bagnall
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expressed the division's approval of the action. He believed
that CIA's interests were adequately covered by these amend-
ments, which gave the Agency an assistant directorship in
ASDIC, membership on the reading panel in such force as FDD
deemed necessary, and reproduction facilities for producing
copies of documents desired by FDD. 904/ Carey also approved,
citing the fact that 00 had accomplished all its major ob-
jectives except participation in the theaters of war, a question
which was still under consideration. 905/ The agreements
with the JCS were formalized in Special Regulation 380-350-2,
an Armed Services Joint Intelligence Directive on Captured
Enemy Documents issued on 6 July 1951. These regulations
contained essentially the same provisions noted in the Joint
Manual. On 10 July a Memorandum of Agreement with the State
Department and the AEC was issued formally providing for CIA
representation of these two agencies in ASDIC. 906/
With the basic directives, agreements, and manuals for
the joint intelligence exploitation of captured documents,
personnel, and materiel completed and approved, JMIA was
established and operating by 1 August. Progress on the other
two was less fit, although logistical and training prepara-
tions were underway to bring ASDIC and ASPIC into operation
at a later date. Carey requested FDD to think about releasing
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an individual to serve as an assistant director of ASDIC, 907/
but as it turned out this was somewhat premature. On 27 July-
CIA was informed that no date had yet been set for activation
of the centers, and since G-2 did not favor their activation
under present circumstances, JIC felt that no action on the
part of the Agency would be necessary for the next 12 months. 908/
Meanwhile, planning continued and the.Army requested from
Bagnall an estimate of the number of CIA personnel to be
assigned to ASDIC when it would be placed in operation. The
following tentative figures were given with the understanding
that these would be personnel assigned to ASDIC in the ZI:
one assistant director, one to three representatives on the
reading panel, and one to six personnel in the screening
operation. 909/
As an interim measure to satisfy current needs, Bagnall
brought up the matter of the disposition of current and future.
shipments of documents received in Washington from the Korean
War front and arrangements to process these materials. The
shipments received from Korea in 1951 had been sent to the
Federal Records Center in Alexandria, Virginia; they con-
and one shipment of. other documents
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r
t
captured between 29 October and 28 November 1950. G-2
proposed that rather than awaiting implementation of ASDIC, an
ad hoc joint panel should be established to arrive at ways
and means of exploiting these five consignments. Such a joint
panel would operate in conformance with the principles laid
down for ASDIC, including FDD representation of the State
Department and ABC on the ad hoc panel. 910/ With ASDIC
still only a paper organization, this procedure was followed.
At the end of 1953, with Korean hostilities already a
matter of history, ASDIC, unlike ASPIC and JMIA, still awaited
activation. Since none of the original service representatives
who had worked on ASDIC were any longer available, all having
been reassigned, the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
requested a new study on ASDIC. Completed on 15 December 1953,
it recammended authorizations for the ASPIC directorate to
serve as a standing camuttee to handle matters pertaining to
ASDIC until the latter's activation and to handle current
matters concerning document exploitation. It also reviewed
various earlier recommendations, for instance, that ASDIC
would be primarily a civilian organization in order to permit
use of physically handicapped individuals and those beyond
the age of military service, that it would be administered by
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11
military officers, and that it would be located at Fort
George G. Meade, Maryland. Since the last of these reccm-
mendations had been submitted in mid-May 1953, active planning
had come to a standstill. 911/
The reccMue ndation of the December study was implemented
the following spring. In a memorandum to the other two services
and CIA, the Army's Gen. Trudeau pointed out that ASPIC, under
the designation of the Army Security Center (ASC), already
existed and all three services and CIA were represented. He
stressed the logic of having this group continue the planning
for ASDIC until the latter should become operational and
recom mended formation of an interim standing ccennittee for
this purpose under Army chairmanship. 912/ Allen Dulles con-
curred on 30 March 1954 and appointed the Contact Division's
then Assistant Director of the ASC, as
the CIA m nber of the committee. 913/
With the planning for ASDIC proceeding at a snail's pace
felt it would not be activated until after the outbreak
of hostilities in any event 914/), FDD on 11 June contributed
a detailed five-page memorandum to the Director of the ASC
from John Bagnall, successor to~ as CIA representative on
the ASDIC Planning Ccarmittee. Drawing on experience gained
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in'the course of World War II document processing and in the
early development of FDD, Bagnall made a number of recamienda-
tions pertaining to document receipt and routing, ASDIC
organization (including suggestions for a, special document
corps and establishment of an Armed Forces Foreign Language
Institute), and operations. 915/
At a combined meeting of the ASC Directorate and the
Planning. Camrittee for ASDIC at Fort Meade on 7 October 1954,
G-2'solicited comments from the service representatives on
the idea of activating ASDIC inmBdiately on an austere basis.
Since this was for purposes of making recc mendations to
JIC, of which CIA was not a member, the Agency's views were
not requested, but the A-2 representative asked for these
nonetheless because -- in his words -- "CIA had the only effec-
tive group of linguists." He was therefore concerned as to the,
extent of CIA participation. The gist of Bagnall's reply
was that it was the Agency understanding that ASDIC would be
activated only in the event of hostilities. Not knowing
what CIA personnel and commitments would be at that time,, he
felt constrained not to make a pledge now. In the event of war
he believed the CIA commitment would initially be limited,
and-that the Agency contingent would operate with a small
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nucleus until the flow of materials had increased to a point
where greater participatim was warranted. Bagnall questioned
the G-2 member on what documents ASDIC would process if
activated immdiately. He did not know. Bagnall recorr?nended
CIA take the position that it saw no reason for ASDIC activa-
tion, 916/ and in this the AD/O concurred.
The pressure on G-21s part to activate the documents
organization, even if on a limited scale, persisted. In
April 1955 Bagnall reported to Carey that he had heard rumors
of the imminent activation of ASDIC by the Army, despite the
absence of Air Force and Navy support. Carey discussed the
problem with James Reber of the DCI?s planning staff, but
Reber pointed out that CIA was in no position to counsel G-2
on the advisability of. activation since, paradoxically, the
Agency did not become an official advisor until ASDIC was
activated. 917/
On 26 May 1955 Bagnall attended an armed services meet-
ing called by JIC to consider the Army proposal to bring
ASDIC into being. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 had
requested activation "as soon as possible" for the following
reasons: for planning purposes; for training purposes;
to exploit, military. documents currently available; and
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to provide a nucleus for an orderly transition in case of
war. On. being asked to comment, Bagnall cited the incon-
sistencies in the G-2 position, particularly in connection
with the captured documents which G-2 said required exploita-
tion. These materials, he informed the group, had either
been or were now being processed by FDD on a regular basis
in conformance with earlier agreements. The result of the
meeting was to return the proposal for further consideration
by G-2 with the suggestion that an Army Document Intelligence
Center rather than a full ASDIC activation might be sufficient
for the present. 918/ Despite what had transpired at the
26 May meeting, the Army did not change its mind but wanted
this action as early as possible. 919/
Apparently JIC's opposition to the Army request served
to delay the activation issue and thus helped to prevent
a dilution of FDD control over document exploitation activities
within the IAC. For the nonce the issue rested. In 1956
Bagnall was designated as the CIA Assistant Director of ASDIC
and a number of FDD officers were earmarked for transfer to
the Center on D-day, 920/ but beyond this the project languished.
In 1959 the ASDIC issue was once more revived as a
subject of concern for the intelligence community when USIB
directed its cannittees, including the Committee on
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Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications to prepare
emergency planning papers by 1 Decenber 1959. On 11 March
1959 CIA was asked to present a paper to the Joint
Interrogation Planning Commission (JIPC), Security Center,
US Army Intelligence Center, on CIA's concept and planning
for participation in the ASDIC operation in event of an
emergency. Subsequently, a paper prepared by Bagnall and
concurred in by State and ADC was forwarded on 9 April to the
Army with to/I approval. 921/ The paper was essentially a
review of earlier directives and meroranda of agreement
whereby the CIA relationship with ASDIC had been established,
but in the final paragraph the FDD chief introduced a new
concept. The early proposals on staffing had foreseen the
major personnel load borne by the armed services with a
representative CIA contingent. In his 9 April marorandum to
JIPC, Bagnall suggested that, in view of the availability
in FDD of a highly trained staff of several hundred intelli-
gence officer-linguists and ancillary support personnel, a
substantial portion of the FDD staff-in-being be immediately
detailed to ASDIC in the event of activation so as to provide
its operational nucleus until such time as the armed services
were able to provide their quotas., This nucleus would be
charged with the management and conduct of professional
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activities in ASDIC, that is, the immediate organization of
the screening, exploitation, and professional train ng ac-.
tivities of the Center. '922/ What, in effect, the memorandum.
proposed was the conversion of FDD per se fran a peacetime
to a wartime status and a continuation of the division's
canon-concern function under emergency conditions.
The issue was broached once again later in the year
following a CCU meeting in September where the exploitation
of foreign-language publications and other foreign documents
was discussed. On 28 October Bagnall reported to the AD/O
the JIPC chairman's proposal that in an emergency ASDIC be
given responsibility for all document exploitation. As CIA
representative, Bagnall countered this idea with the statement
that it would make more sense to take an existing organization
like FDD and in an emergency charge it with responsibility
for. captured documents. The JIPC chairman indicated this
concept had already been rejected by the JCS on the.grounds
that FDD would be unable to shift its priorities so as to
give military documents first attention. Bagnall disputed this
contention and called attention to the fact that the. division
had in the past frequently shifted priorities to meet changing
Bagnall further reported that at 1 November his CM'LP
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would start drafting the paper requested earlier by USIB on
emergency planning for document exploitation activities. There
were essentially three approaches to this problem, viz:
(1) ASDIC established as the central document exploitation
activity with a core of FDD personnel; (2) FDD charged as the
central document exploitation activity augmented by assign-
ment of military linguists; and (3) ASDIC established to ex-
ploit captured documents and FDD continuing with overt
publications. The FDD chief saw specific merits in all three
approaches and in this connection proposed for the first time
combining ASDIC and ASPIC as a joint center in the interest
of conserving scarce linguistic talents. He concluded his
exposition with the reeamendation that the Agency adopt the
position that centralized exploitation for intelligence of all
types of foreign-language documents in an emergency was sound
and that CIA, which already had the function of providing
services of cannon concern, logically should undertake cen-
tralized exploitation. He expressed willingness, however, to
have the Agency support ASDIC in this function if the JCS
rejected his recommendation on military grounds. 923
Bagnall?s recommendations received the strong support of
J.W. Moreau, Chief of 00's P&C Staff. 29214Y At an 00 Staff
meeting on 4 Novenber Bagnall discussed his proposal for
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granting an existing organization like FDD responsibility
for all document exploitation in an emergency but cited the
objections from the military on this. He reported that a
counter plan had been received proposing the use of ASDIC
for captured documents and FDD for all other documents, with
a core of FDD personnel in ASDIC -- his point 3. Carey
expressed his preference for approach 2, but the meeting
participants agreed that if this were not obtainable, Bagnall
should hold out for proposal 3, with FDD assisting ASDIC to
the extent of providing a limited number of personnel subject
to recall by the DCI. 925/
The division of labor presented in the latter proposal
was substantially accepted as the basis for ASDIC-FDD coopera-
tion in any future emergency, and Bagnall spelled this out
in a 30 November 1959 memorandum to the Executive Secretary,
USIB. 926/
By May 1960 the suggestion of a combined ASDIC-ASPIC
organization, first advanced by John Bagnall in his 28 October
memorandum, had been discussed by the JIPC. As a result,
the ccmi ttee considered a plan for an organizational arrange-
ment which came to be known as the United States * Armed Services
Exploitation Centex (USASExC) as an alternative to plans for
separate ASDIC and ASPIC installations. Because these two
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organizations would be at the same location and engaged
in similar work, utilizing manpower whose training and talents
were sanewhat alike and often in short supply, the JIPC
reeoemended their union undera single headquarters. The
CIA would furnish one of four deputy directors, 927/ and
the initial staffing plan called for people from CIA. 928/
On 6 July the pros and cons of the new plan, which had
already been approved by the.three services, were discussed
by Carey, Bagnall, and
on the JIPC. The three agreed that
reply of CD as the CIA member, a change made
formal on 3 August, and it was further decided that CIA would
insist on the DCI having control of CIA assignees to USASExC
and its components, 929/ an escape clause designed to prevent
too rigid control by the military of CIA options in the
arrangement. Later in July Bagnall, with Carey's approval,
prepared a formal concurrence in the ASDIC/ASPIC plan, 930/
and the new organization was subsequently established on
paper for activation in the event of a crisis. Its purpose
was to serve as a headquarters for ASDIC and ASPIC, which would
conduct actual operations. The total CIA complement in
the combined organization was to be_individuals, including
professionals and FIclericals from FDD. '931/ The FDD
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complement of 83, or one-third of the division's surviving
members in the event of a surprise nuclear attack, was to
be phased into ASDIC according to the following schedule:
50 percent by M+30 days, 100 percent by M+60 days. In con-
trast, the armed services phase-in would be as follows:
5 percent by M+30 days, 10 percent by M+60 days, 50 percent
by Mf-90 days, 75 percent by M+120 days, and 100 percent by
M+180 days. 2L2/
With USASExC established, the first of several ASDIC/ASPIC
training seminars was conducted at Fort Holabird, Baltimore,
Maryland, during the period 11-22 June 1962. Four 00 officers
served as instructors in document exploitation, and
CIA monitor for the JIPC and
were designated as participants.
conducted the session pertaining to the omipositi,on
and functions of the CIA element in ASPIC. 933 The following
year, the JIPC, which prior to this time had had the responsi-
bility for planning the activation of ASDIC and ASPIC, was
deemed superfluous in light of the USASExC formation, and
therefore, effective 31 July 1963, this commission was dis-
solved. 934/ In order to maintain relations with USASExC,
contact officers for ASDIC and ASPIC, respectively. 935/
were designated as CIA
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Mn Operation Alert exercises of the 1950s and 1960s,
the US11.SExC training sessions in 1962 and later, and the
dissolution of the JIPC in 1963 in general marked the ccnple-
tion of war urgency planning so far as FDD was concerned.
The administrative detail involved and the time expended on
the forirnalation of plans was considerable. Their utility and
benefit to the Agency as a whole and to the division specifically
are difficult to assess and perhaps only in a real emergency
would the answer to the question of their practicality and use-
fulness be forthcaning. They did, however, represent planning
exercises which in the atmosphere and under the circumstances
of the Cold War were regarded as essential and therefore had
to be worked out and executed.
B. Vietnam Support*
The Foreign Documents Division became involved in
Indochina and Vietnam even prior to 1950 when, in the ab-
sence of any effective Vietnamese language capability, it
* in writing this section of the histo the author has relied
heavily on a paper prepared in 1964 by Asia
Branch, FDD, entitled "Role and Support of the O ice of Central
Reference in the Agency's Activities in Vietnam, 1950-1964,"
as part of the OCR contribution to the Agency project on Vietnam
under the program of the Historical Staff, O/DCI, established
by Unless otherwise indicated,
the ormation repo in the following pages represents
a paraphrasing and updating of the subject paper.
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translated or exploited French, Japanese, and other foreign-
language documents and publications dealing with the area to
meet operational and intelligence information requirements.
The evolution of FDD's subsequent support role necessitated
the creation of an effective language capability through re-
cruitment and training, the furnishing of extensive specific
translation service to CIA and to other USIB members, the
initiation and developuent of an ever-expanding intelligence
information reporting program (initially on all Indochina
but after 1955 almost exclusively on North Vietnam), and the
rotation of staff officers overseas
1. Development of Vietnamese Language Capability
Prior to 1950 FDD lacked the capability to handle
Vietnamese language requirements, but with the outbreak of
the Korean War and the worsening of the situation in Indochina
the division took steps to develop a limited proficiency.
The first effort consisted of self-study by two staff officers,
both Japanese linguists. Formal training began in 1952 with
the assignment of one of the officers to a six-month course
conducted by NSA. Following the Geneva Conference in July
1954 and establishment of the Communist regime in Hanoi, FDD
anticipated the growing intelligence interest in the area
and recruited and trained two additional staff officers,
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raising the total number of Vietnamese linguists available
in 1955 to four. In 1958 two more were added'Cand one lost
by transfer to OCI), partly to cope with the increasing
requirements for classified translation service and partly
in anticipation of implementing an agreement with DDP/FE to
begin rotating FDD personnel to the on a
regular and continuing basis. These anticipations were
fulfilled and subsequently necessitated the training of three
additional linguists in 1962 and 1963. Despite personnel
losses due to transfer, reassignment, or other causes, on
the eve of the increased US involvement in Vietnam follow-
ing the Zbnkin Bay incident in 1964, FDD had three staff
linguists on duty at headquarters, two
and a third on duty with the DD/P's Technical Services
Division (TSD) pending early transfer to Saigon. In emer-
gencies, the division was able to draw on the services of
one additional staff officer not then assigned to the Vietnamese
operations.
2. Headquarters Translation Service
Fran 1950 on, many, and at times all, staff officers
attached to FDD's Vietnam desk were assigned to servicing
specific requests fran Agency eamponents and USIB members for .
translation of classified documents on both North and South
Vietnam. FDD normally gave such requests priority over all
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other operations. Hundreds of requirements of this type
were serviced after 1950 but only a few of the more signifi-
cant items can be mentioned here.
in the early 1950s the division translated a major
six-volume military topographic study of Vietnam prepared
during world War II by the Saigon headquarters of Japan's
Southern Army. This project was of major interest to
ORR's Geography Division and to the Army Map Service (AMS).
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4. Intelligence Information 'Reporting Program
Almost since its inception in 1947 FDD had been
reporting all types of basic and current intelligence
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information on Vietnam and Indochina. Prior to 1955 the
division had to rely heavily on French and other non-
Vietnamese language publications and reports for information
on Indochina. Considerable basic data, for example, was
derived from World War II Japanese military studies of the
area. Zb the extent of its capacity, FDD did exploit
Vietnamese publications fran Hanoi and Saigon as well as
Viet Minh publications collected in the course of French
military operations or through clandestine and other means.
11 Than Dan, official daily organ of the Vietnamese Lao Dong
(Camauiist) Party was exploited by FDD as early as 1950.
This activity led to such exploitation products as a 1955
FDD report titled "A Survey of Viet Minh Anti-West Propaganda
in the Hanoi Press" and another titled "Survey of French
Comma ist Propaganda in Irdoc hina. " 939/
Following the Geneva conference in July 1954, which
confirmed CaYmunist authority north of the 17th parallel,
the division not only increased its Vietnamese T/O to cope
with the rising demands for specific translation service
but also decided to regularize and expand its reporting
program. Hence, in 1955 as part of the newly devised FDD
scheduled reporting program, it launched the Monthly Report
on Continental Southeast Asia, which was predominantly on
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Vietnam and was drawn largely from Vietnamese rather than
French-language sources. Between 1954 and 1956 Overseas
Chinese in Vietnam were reported on through FDD's quarterly,
report Overseas Chinese Activities in Southeast Asia, and
beginning in 1956 the division included North Vietnam in
its world-wide coverage reported in the FDD publication
East-West and Intra-Orbit Travel and Contacts.
Because after 1955, except for clandestine collection.
and FBIS-monitored broadcasts, the FDD program had become
ain st the only source of information on North Vietnam, the
division decided in 1955 to concentrate on that area, a
policy which was maintained from then on. This decision
was further justified by the fact that US facilities in
Saigon -- the American Embassy, the US Information Service
(USIS), Economic Cooperation Administration (EM), and
FBID -- were able adequately to fulfill collection requirements
for South Vietnam.
. In response to consumer interest, the monthly report on
Southeast Asia had by 1959 become almost exclusively a
report on North Vietnam and in recognition of this reality,
it was superseded by the Monthly Report on North Vietnam.
With increasing frequency this report included intensively
collated materials on such specific topics. as national
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and provincial rice production, export trade facilities and
organization, military unit identifications (for NSA), and
party organization and leadership (for OCI, BR, and O5I).
In 1960, again in response to consumer needs, FDD
replaced this report and during the next three years dis-
seminated the information collected on North Vietnam through
a variety of topical- or subject-oriented reports covering
the Asian Bloc or the international camtrnmnity. These in-
cluded the monthly reports on Comnanist revisionism and
dissidence and reviews of Oammmmist theoretical journals
discussed earlier in this history, as well as weekly Bloc
military reports, a weekly economic report on Coo mnist Asia,
a special weekly card-file type report of data on industrial
plants and service facilities in Canmunist Asia -- primarily
for ORR and IR but also for NSA and the Army -- and a semi-
monthly report on the external economic relations of Bloc
countries. In March 1962 FDD initiated the Review of the
Asian Bloc.Press, a weekly or, as source receipts permitted,
a semi-weekly report. In the interest of rapid dissemina-
tion, the information collected for this review was published
directly fran tapes dictated by the FDD officer. Fran mid-
1963 on, FDD resumed publishing all intelligence information on
North Vietnam under one cover, the Weekly Report on North Vietnam.
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The establishment of the USJPPS in 1957 greatly increased
FDD's capability to support the Vietnamese effort, largely
by permitting it to concentrate its internal capabilities
on classified materials, specialized reporting, and overseas
personnel rotation to support DD/P operations. The new
translating facility enabled FDD to draw upon Vietnamese
l; guistic talent throughout the United States and resulted
in a greatly increased volume of unclassified translation on
Vietnam which was disseminated not only to the intelligence
coiinunity but to academic institutions as well. By 1964
JPRS was publishing information on Vietnam (mostly North Vietnam)
at the rate of almost 4,500 pages per year and this rate was
subsequently increased with the buildup of US involvement.
The initiation of JPRS activity was accompanied by an
FDD attempt to center the Vietnamese press scrutiny function,
which since 1951 had been shared with FBID's Saigon Bureau,
exclusively in FDD. John Bagnall cited the undesirability
of fragmentary reporting with its high risk of duplication
and recommended that all reporting of press and periodicals
be done by a single ccaponent, an arrangement which would
be more comprehensive and orderly.'940/ An earlier letter,
in October 1957, from Chief, Saigon Bureau,
to the Acting Chief, FBID, prompted by an 00 effort to
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assign much of the Vietnamese press coverage to FDD had
stated, hovAaver, that separating monitoring from scrutiny
would be extremely difficult and that questions of procure-
meet involving Camuanist periodicals would mean long delays
if FDD had to await delivery in Washington. He suggested
that FDD be assigned to exploit journals. The FBID position
on press scrutiny was enhanced in January 1958 when the
DD/P, responding to a critique by the Inspector General that
it was not taking sufficient advantage of FBID's capabilities,
asked FBID to increase its exploitation of the North Vietnamese
press. 941/ Thus, the split responsibility for Vietnamese
press coverage continued and with it the uneasy FDD-FBID
cooperation on procurement and exploitation coordination. With
the establishment of JPRS in 1957, which increased FDD's capa-
bility to cope with a much larger translation work load, the
press scrutiny function at the Saigon Bureau was gradually
curtailed. Thereafter for the most part only press materials
requiring on-the-spot handling ware done there.
FDD reporting on Southeast Asia was buffeted again in
1964. In April 1964 Thanas Hughes, Chief of INP/State, addressed
a strongly worded mmrorandum to the DCI concerning deficiencies
in information on, North Vietnam which had become apparent
in the course of work on a recent National Intelligence Estimate.
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All aspects of the problem were covered but exploitation of
press material, which, with radio intercept, he characterized
as the major, and often the only, source of political and
econanic intelligence on the enemy, was strongly criticized
as erratic and slow. He attacked FDD activity in this
field and deplored the reduction in coverage by the FBIS
press scrutiny unit in Saigon and the transfer of this re-
sponsibility to FDD. He reccamnded that this change be
reversed, that the FBIS unit be expanded and more fully
used for current sources, and that only the remaining,.more
basic material, be left to FDD and JPRS. 942/
The FDD reaction to the Hughes blast was defensive but
the division accepted the valid criticises in the memorandum
in good grace and took steps to rectify the shortcomings
cited. However, recently appointed Chief of
FDD, indicated that scree of Hughes's ccnments were less than
accurate and in other instances they did not take into con-
sideration problems which were beyond FDD control, such as
procurement and staffing. However, in the interest of better
service to the co nmanity,~ advocated that Hughes's
reccmnendations be adopted, contingent, however, upon the
solution of the procurement and staffing problems in Saigon.
He further suggested that an arrangement be made for
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assigning FDD personnel to the Saigon Bureau similar to that
used in the period 1953-1961 in respect to the German Bureau."943/
The upshot of the Hughes memorandum and its reverbera-
tions in the Agency was a reappraisal of CIA collection and
reporting efforts on North Vietnam. In response to a request
from the Critical Collection Problems O:rmittee, a number of
meetings were held under the aegis of the Collection Guidance
Staff to carry out inter-Office planning directed at develop-
ing the most efficient procurement and processing of North
Vietnamese publications. As this affected FDD, it led to a
tightening up of the division's operations, with the result
that sources were received and reports issued on a much more
timely basis. 944/ Augmentation of the Saigon staff was not,
regarded as practical in that the three North Vietnamese
publications available in Saigon constituted less than six
percent of the overall total received in Washington, and in
1964 only one North Vietnamese newspaper Hoc Tap, was ex-
ploited in the field, yielding an average translation of four
to six of the eight to ten articles in the source. Of this
nber only two to four were included in the FBIS Daily Report
and the rest were sent for JPRS publication in Washington. 945/
During the period 1950 to 1964 FDD, in conjunction with,
JPRS after 1957, produced a total of approximately 16,700 pages
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of ad hoc exploitation on Vietnam and the rest of Indochina.
In the same period, FDD's production also included an
estimated 3,500 pages of scheduled serial reports and 3,700
pages of specific translation service. Since this was ac-
oomplished with a limited staff and the JPRS contribution did
not became effective until 1957, it would appear that the
division contribution to the Vietnam effort fran a quantitative
standpoint was highly significant. In terms of quality, even
the INR complaint of 1964 had no quarrel with FDD support. It-
simply wanted more current service. This fact, plus favorable
comment fran time to time from elsewhere in the USIB ccmnnanity, ,
leads to the conclusion that FDD contributed, if not a crucial,
at least a highly useful form of support to the overall CIA
effort on Vietnam.
C. The Sputnik Flap: A Dissemination Problem
In October 1957 the Russians surprised the world by
launching Sputnik I, the first artificial earth satellite. The
event was followed in the United States by a rash of public
criticism, directed largely at the intelligence comnnunity
for its failure to forecast this major technological break-
through. Some critics asserted that indications of the impend-
ing launch were to be found in the pages of Soviet technical
journals "gathering dust on the shelves of the Library of
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Congress .11
The Foreign Do=-ents Division was proaptly directed by
Allen Dulles to implement a procedure whereby its regularly
issued abstracts of Soviet open source S&T publications would
be made available to the public. Thus, in July 1958, after
more than a decade of classified bi-weekly issues, the FDD
Periodical Abstracts, appropriately modified, went to the
"newstand." For the next year and a half, retitled Scientific
Information Report (SIR) and bearing the seal of the Central
Intelligence Agency on its cover, it was sold to the public
by the Office of Technical Services, Department of Ccn erce.
.It was one of the few CIA publications ever to be openly
purchasable.
In the following pages are recounted the developments
which led to the "opening up" of the products of FDD operations
to the public and the problems attendant to the dissemination
of these reports for general use. Of interest also, in this
connection, was the issue of "overclassification" and the
alleged deprival of the scientific coma pity of so-called
"open" sources as a result of misdirected government zeal.
Even before the Sputnik crisis arose to disturb US
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scientific Complacency, the subject of intelligence support
for the scientific community had been broached. Early in
September 1957
recently returned from the USSR, had stressed to the DAD/NE,
William P. Bundy, the need for a US abstracting service for
Soviet and other foreign S&T literature. He had been greatly
impressed by the Soviet knowledge of US literature; conversely,
many of his questions had led the Soviets to comment that
all the answers were available in their literature. He ex-
pressed the thought that US industry might be willing to pro-
vide financial support for a central service. 946/
The Sputnik launch triggered a barrage of articles in
the US press stressing the general theme of US unpreparedness
in the face of the new and spectacular Soviet space achieve-
ment. Many of these, emphasizing the "disclosure" that the
facts relating to Soviet research on satellites were readily
available in open Russian sources, flatly stated that the
government had simply failed to search out this information
and pass it on to the scientific community. A New York Times
article on 25 Novenber 1957 was typical of such reports. 947/
It announced, for example, that thousands of Soviet scientific
reports were collecting dust on the shelves of the Library of
Clangress for lack of?a program to translate then. It went on
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to say that scene 1,200 Soviet scientific journals were being
published each. year, of which about 200 were of major impor-
tance, but only sane 30 were being translated under US govern-
ment sponsorship. As a result, American scientists were
ignorant about scientific progress in the USSR and much time
and money were wasted in duplicating work already performed.
The reason for this state of affairs, the article continued,
was the lack of personnel and irony for the government to do
the work. The Soviet Union, in contrast, had in 1952 estab-
lished the All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technical
Information in Moscow with a permanent staff of 2,300 trans-
lators, abstractors, and publishers, supplemented by a part-
time staff of 20,000 translators and abstractors. In the
United States, on the other hand, the Ccmnerce Department's
Office of Technical Services, the "only United States Government
counterpart of the Soviet institute," had a staff of only
35 persons for indexing and abstracting scientific reports.
The Times article made no mention of the USJPRS, then
six months old, although an earlier item on the same theme
in the Baltimore Sun had done so,'948/ and the new organization
had been referred to in a number of articles at the time of
its establishment. Security barriers, of course, prevented
the Times and others from knowing of the work of the
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intelligence cc mznity, through. FDD, in the field of scientific
translation.
The New York. Times was quite accurate in citing the lack
of money and manpower as the primary reason for insufficient
progress in foreign source exploitation. The advent of Sputnik
had no effect on FM's internal personnel complement. The T/o
remained fixed at
despite the furor over the Soviet aaxxn-
25X1
25X1
plishn nt and was in fact reduced ti~::::]at the beginning of
1959. However, the establishment of the JPRS more than com-
pensated for this. A similar situation pertained to the FDD
budget.
In its statement that 1,200 Soviet scientific journals
were published each year with only 30 of the major ones trans-
lated by the United States, the Times article was somewhat
misleading. The reader was left with the impression that all
1,200 journals were readily available, while in fact the
number of titles listed as available for purchase by the
Soviets themselves was considerably less than this. In 1957
only 325 S&T journals were included on the official list. 949/
Of the titles available at the end of 1957, approximately
half were subscribed to by FDD as worthy of S&T exploitation.
Fran the US standpoint the problem as outlined in the
New York Times was not as bleak as the article seared to
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indicate. It is true that more could have been accomplished
if additional people and money had been'made available to
FDD. To a considerable extent the initiation of the JPRS
operation helped, resolve this troublesome situation. The
primary problem was, however, not the failure of intelligence
organizations to produce Soviet scientific information but
rather the barrier between the intelligence community and the
public, an intentional one in view of the security aspects
involved. The intelligence establishment was producing all
or most of the information desired by US scientists. The
question, after Sputnik, was how to get it to them.
FDD took a first step in this direction during a meeting
on 28 October 1957 between John Bagnall and two officials
from the Comnerce Department's Office of Technical Services.
The meeting was primarily a get-acquainted and coordination
session, in the course of which was outlined the organization
Commerce proposed to establish as a translation clearing
house to republish available abstracts and translations and
also provide translations of additional articles recommended
by a scientific advisory board. had been
approved for this purpose in the FY-1959 budget and more
v uld be requested. Bagnall supplied figures on the volume
of available unclassified Soviet S&T literature but pointed
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out that CIA's. interest in seeing that information on Soviet
research. reached US scientists was indirect and that a meno-
randuum to this effect had been given to the National Science
Foundation. When asked for advice on good commercial trans-
lation agencies, Bagnall mentioned USJPRS, without disclosing
its sponsoring organization. 950/
The Sputnik flap gradually gained momentum and the
problem of disseminating the Agency's S&T output to the out-
side moved to higher levels. In November Bagnall worked with
OSI and OCR to draw up a memorandum for the DCI on what CIA
was producing frcan Russian scientific publications, and at
the end of the month he briefed the DCI and his deputies on
the overall picture of the exploitation of Soviet scientific
materials in the United States. In the course of the briefing
Bagnall revealed that of 65,000 to 70,000 S&T pages produced by
the government each year, the CIA had prepared 30,000 pages
of translation annually since 1951, the NSF and National
Institutes of Health (NIH) together produced approximately
20,000 pages, the Air Force turned out 10,000 to 15,000 pages,
and other government agencies, mainly AEC, accounted for
5,000 pages. In addition., commercial firms and academic
institutions had produced an estimated 5,000 pages.- He
pointed out that,. consistent with. Agency policy and good
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security practices, FDD used every device possible to make its
translations available to those who wanted them. About 90 per-
cent of CIA translations were furnished to industry and the
public through NSF, which distributed than with Agency
identification removed and also made them available through
the Special Libraries Association Translation Center (SLATC).
All JPRS translations were unclassified and issued through
OTS and NSF. NSF- and NIH-sponsored translations were avail-
able on subscription and Air Force translations were dis-
seminated through OTS. Other government and non-government
translations were available to scientists through the SLATC. 951/
On 10 December 1957 Bagnall accanpanied Allen Dulles in
an appearance before the Killian Scientific Advisory Committee
to brief its members on CIA exploitation of Russian scientific
publications. At the meeting Dulles and Bagnall presented
figures on dissemination and exploitation based on the data
Bagnall had reported in November. Considerable interest was
created among the committee members by reference to FDD's
Scientific Information Report, a publication classified
"Confidential" in order to protect possible revelation of
national intelligence objectives. Th their request that
this report receive wider dissemination, Dulles responded
that this could probably be done by working through the
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NSF. The DCI revealed to the ca'rrnittee the work. of JPRS and
also the fact that FDD translations were openly available
through deposit with. the John Crerar Library in Chicago. Fol-
lowing further discussion on related matters, Dulles proposed
that the committee work out a plan to give expanded dissemina-
tion to CIA-produced unclassified literature and to set up
controls to avoid duplication. He further suggested that
Bagnall work with Dr. Burton W. Adkinson of the NSF on this
point. 952/
Bagnall met with Adkinson on 12 December. Their meeting
resulted in the formation of a working group chaired by
Adkinson and consisting, besides Bagnall, of members from,
the Air Force, Department of Cxce, AEC, and NSF. The
group was charged with developing a program for making the
results of Soviet scientific publication exploitation by
goverment offices more generally available to industry and
the scientific world. Designated the NSF Working Group on
Raassian Scientific Literature, it held its initial meeting
on 16 Decanter. 953/
Thus, some three months after the launching. of the
first Soviet satellite, considerable progress had been made
in implementing plans for di_ssani.nating that part of the
Agency S&T translations which heretofore had been withheld
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from public use for security. reasons. Criticism of govern-
ment classification policy in connection with this material
continued, however. On 20. January 1958 Dr. Lloyd V. Berliner,
President of Associated Universities, Inc., appeared before a
House Cazmiittee to appeal for Congressional support of a
program for S&T exploitation and dissemination. In the course
of his presentation Berkner stated that US access to Russian
scientific literature was poor and that the translation of
foreign language, particularly Russian, literature into English
was weak. He criticized the fact that a number of government
agencies (unnamed) were translating open foreign scientific
literature but were restricting circulation of such transla-
tions by security classification. This, he said, often
resulted in the processing of the same scientific article by
different agencies, and he cited one instance where a Russian
paper had been translated seven different times -- a wasteful
and ineffective procedure. He found it difficult to under-
stand the advantage to be gained by security classification
of open literature. 954/
The Berliner testimony proved disconcerting to the DCI
and other Agency officials, particularly in view of the wide
publicity given it by the press. George Carey took action
to counter the report. Fearing repercussions as a result of
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the accusations that the government was.over-classifying
Russian scientific literature, he called on Bagnall to report
on the number of translated S&T pages released to the public
in 1957 and the number withheld.. Bagnall reported 32,000
pages had been produced, a figure likely to run to 35,000 in
1958. Of the 1957 total, 8,000 were in the SIR. In addition,
roughly 2,000 pages per year were put out in the report.
Activities in the Arctic and Antarctic, classified "For
Official Use Only." Bagnall felt the two reports could be
downgraded to "Unclassified," but to do so would require
certain changes in format.-955/
At the DCI's insistence, measures were taken to identify
the alleged oft-translated "secret" source referred to by
Berkner. The item was subsequently disclosed to have been
a book on acoustics written by a Soviet author. Through a
Stung by the Berkner criticism, the Agency moved ahead
in the matter of downgrading the classification of FDD re-
search of its DEX file, FDD found the 195-page book to have
been translated by a Cleveland flight laboratory in 1950 and
listed as "Unclassified." Extensive inquiry among government
agencies resulted only in disclaimers of their having ever
translated the book.. .956/
ports. On 20. January 1958 Carey discussed with Robert Amory,
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the.W/I1 various steps which. might be taken. to arrange wider
circulation of the reports and requested Bagnall to prepare
a memorandum on this subject. The matter of downgrading
the CTS* was also discussed and Bagnall offered the solution
of issuing two versions of the publication, one unclassified
and the other a classified supplement. He solicited and
received the concurrence of the IAC members and the other
contributors to the CTS on this proposal, 957/
By 24 January the Agency had made the following arrange-
ments: classified and unclassified versions of the CTS were
to be issued and wider distribution of each version was to
be explored; the SIR was to be redesigned along lines of
scientific disciplines and away from its intelligence-oriented
format and would be issued unclassified; and 12 other FDD
reports would be issued unclassified and attributed to the
CIA, with the possibility that other reports might be issued
in this form in the future. Adkinson was enthusiastic about
these moves and requested Dr. Killian to request the Secretary
of Ccmmerce to provide funds for wider distribution of the
reports.'958/ Approval of these actions was granted by.
Amory on 31 January and distribution of the reports commenced
in February.
A question now arose regarding the handling of requests
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for copies. of reports. other.. than the. normal. IAC quota distrib-
uted by OCR. It was decided that Bagnall would investigate
the possibility of the Camaerce Department using its awn
cover on the reports with credit given to CIA in a preface.
In this way it was hoped that requests for copies would go
to OTS rather than to the Agency, a hope which was generally,
but not totally, realized. The Agency received letters from
time to time requesting information on how to receive released
translations. These were always referred to OTS. 959/
The attendant publicity resulting from the declassify-
ing of the FDD reports and subsequently from Ccamerce's request
to the House Appropriations Committee for funds to set up a
translation clearing house led once again to a flare-up of.
press comment, which had died down in the weeks following the
first impact of Sputnik i. 1n Associated Press (AP) release
appearing on 30 January 1958 under the title "U.S. to Release
Flood of Soviet Science Data" reported that the government
had decided to let down all bars and release for public use
50,000 Russian scientific documents a year, the bulk to be
made available by the CIA and the Air. Force. What was disturb-
ing about the article was the alleged.statement of a "source
close'to the Government" that CIA had expressed a desire to
get rid of the job of translating and abstracting Russian
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literature and turn it over. to some one else.-960/..As a
result,.Ccnmrrce requested clarification of. the CIA position
on the translation of Russian scientific works. Assurance
of continued CIA activity in this field and in support of
OTS was furnished by the DDCI, Gen. Cabell, who declared the
AP dispatch to be without foundation.' 961/
Despite all the effort expended, there was by the end
of February 1958 still no central point in government to
which industry and scientists could go to obtain unclassified
government translations of interest to then, and frequent
letters were received from requesters on how this could be
done. In the Agency's case the queries were usually referred
to OTS, but the latter was having its problems. In March
the House, Appropriations Canmittee turned down the Ca erce
Department's request to be made the distribution point for
unclassified translations. As a partial solution, JPRS made
arrangements with the Library of Congress, which agreed to act
as a repository and to make the JPRS translations available
to the public for a nominal fee. 962/ OCR had also received
many requests for FDD's unclassified material. Therefore,
Bagnall and Paul Borel, the AD/CR, developed a form letter
directing inquiries to the Crerar Library, from which photostats
of the material 'on deposit could be obtainedf.'963/.
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Meanwhile, a. related. problem, already foreseen, begged
for solution. This pertained to. the predictably large volume
of requests for copies of unclassified reports following the
press publicity. Bagnall reported on 20 March that after
only one issue of the declassified CTS considerable interest
was being shown in wider distribution. He feared this could
mushroan into proportions detrimental to CIA reproduction
facilities. The present distribution of the CTS to IAC agencies
was 384 copies and the total to the government was 444. With
declassification, the Agency received a variety of informal
requests which included, for example, 60 additional copies
for the Department of Agriculture for land grant colleges
and 125 extra copies for subcontractors of the AEC. Bagnall
could envision a distribution of thousands for this one re-
port. He requested a policy decision on whether unclassified
reports could be limited to 500 copies and whether encourage-
ment to recipients to use their own reproduction facilities
was in keeping with the DCI's interest. 964/
concluded that the best solution, in light
of the fact that it was not strictly.an FDD problem, was for
some other govermmLent agency, such as OTS or the Library of
Congress, to handle the reproduction and dissemination. He
felt that funds would probably be available from Congress for
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a central govermnent clearing house by. the beginning of FY-1959.
in the interim he' instructed Bagnall to. limit issuance to
500 copies. Since neither the CTS nor JPRS reports were copy-
righted, there was nothing to prevent recipients from reproduc-
ing than and making wide secondary distribution:' 965/
On. 6 June 1958 the AD/CR directed a marorandum to the
DCI for approval. It was designed to establish CIA policy on
dissemination of Agency translations and related reference
aids and included three points, as follows: CIA would make
available to the public the maxinaan amount of its own and
sponsored unclassified translations; attribution to CIA would
not be prohibited but would be avoided, particularly with
reference to external translations (e.g., JPRS); and CIA,
with some exceptions (e.g., dissemination by Contact Division),
would not distribute its materials directly to the public
but would cooperate with interested government agencies to
effect dissemination through their channels (e.g., the Library
of Congress, NSF, Catmerce Department). Again with minor
exceptions, CIA would not print or underwrite reproduction of
copies disseminated to the public o ' 966/- The proposed policy
was approved by the DCI the next day. On 2 July the AD/CR
followed up his policy proposal with a marorandum to the
AD/O outlining the manner in which the policy was to be
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implemented. In essence, it was a statement of OCR preroga-
tives. in the' dissemination function. '967/.
The Sputnik flap had by now progressed to still higher
levels, and with the flood gates open, so to speak, following
the-declassifying of FDD reports, pressures increased for
the release of information to an increasingly broad group
of requesters. This created problems, as we have seen, and
necessitated the use of larger amounts of government funds to
help ease the burden. As s-a result, FDD became involved at
the Congressional level.
With respect to the distribution of unclassified
scientific reports, in April the Commerce Department appeared
before the Camerce Subcamuttee of the House Appropriations
C mrnittee on behalf of FY-1959 funds for OTS, and, at the
Department's invitation, CIA representatives, including John
Bagnall, were present to answer questions pertaining to the
translation and dissemination. of foreign-language documents.
At the meeting, held on 28 April 1958, the CIA officers
were asked several questions which they answered without
difficulty. In the course of the session, the generally low
level of knowledgability by the Congressmen. on the subject
under discussion was quite apparent. Sane of the Subcommittee
members seated to-, have closed minds; those,'however, who.
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sought to ascertain the facts. appeared to be. in the majority.. 968/
CIA representatives, including FDD officers, made two
more visits to Capitol Hill in the spring and stnmaex'of 1958
to testify before Congressional caYmittees studying the general
problem. The upshot was favorable action by Congress on the
general question of disseminating IAC translations and specif-
ically on the Ca nerce request on. behalf of CTS, and on
1 July the new clearing house, with an assist from ATIC, FDD,
and JPRS, was ready to begin operations. FDD agreed to furnish
the mats of the S&T sections of the CTS and to continue to
do this for the next six months. Thereafter the division would
provide copies of DEX cards of unclassified S&T translations
produced. It was agreed that the OTS clearing house would
phase into indexing, reporting, and dissemination of S&T trans-
lations as rapidly as possible during the first six months of
FY-1958 and that FDD would cease these functions, except for
maintenance of DEX files, as soon as OTS was doing the job. 969/
However, after a trial period it was determined that FDD's
discontinuance of these functions had not proved feasible.
For a variety of reasons, such as incompleteness of the MS
files, unsatisfactory search results, incomplete source coverage,
inaccurate information, and inordinate delays, members of the
intelligence ooammity found the OTS service unsatisfactory
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and FDD continued to perform the CTS function. 970/
Meanwhile, considerable progress on the dissemination
of Soviet S&T intelligence to the public had been made and
a workable methodology devised. On 15 October 1958 OTS
announced plans for the publication of Technical TransZations,
a semimonthly report, the first issue of which was due for
release in January 1959. Continued cooperation of FDD in this
venture was requested 971/ and assurances given. that it would
be granted.
On .1 April 1959 George Carey, in what amounted to a
review of the year that had elapsed since FDD had first de-
classified its S&T reports in compliance with the ID/I order,
gave an accounting of what had been accomplished. His report
revealed that FDD was regularly issuing eight publications
without classification, control, or caveat.-
1. Scientific Information Report -- Published
by OTS. Dissemination had increased fran 175 to 223
copies per issue in the USIB camuunity. In addition,
OTS serviced 175 subscriptions.
2. Consolidated Translation Survey -- Dissemina-
tion to USIB agencies had increased from 316 to 529
copies. Expressions of interest had been received
fran a broad cross-section of science, industry, and
education.
3. International Geophysical Cooperation Program --
Soviet Bloc Activities -- Dissemination rose from 150
to 174 to government recipients and CYTS issued 190
copies by subscription. The report had been quoted
in scientific writings: for example, Missiles and
Rockets had used numerous articles from it; the
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US Medical Journal had quoted from it at least
twice; the Washington Evening Star had similarly
used it in its science columns.
I.
4. USSR Industrial EquiITLent (Transportation,
Construction, Power Machinery
5. Transportation, Communications, and
Electric Power in the USSR
6. Activities in the Arctic and Antarctic
7. USSR Materials and Materials Processing
Equipment
8. USSR Electronic and Precision Equipment 972/
Camierce Department had decided against reproduction and
dissemination to the public of the last five unclassified re-
ports on grounds that they were not "technical." However,
their goverrmient dissemination had increased sane 20 to 25
copies each since declassification.
Carey's statement of accomplishment was supplemented by a
CEFLP report furnished in August 1959 in compliance with a
request from USIB for information on the S&T exploitation and
dissemination problem. The report, issued 28 August, revealed
that in contrast to the 65 and 150 S&T journals available in
1947 and 1950, respectively, 440 were available and processed
by USIB agencies in 1959. Production from this material
had averaged 41,450 pages per year from 1950 through 1958;
however, the 1959 annual rate had risen sharply, to approximately
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.148,000. pages, with about.one-fourth,of this amount provided
by CIA. By 1 January 1959,.more than 330,000pages.of-trans-
lation from Soviet9S&Tpublications had been made,available
to the US. scientific.ccemnunity through the cooperation of
NSF, the Library of Congress, and (TS:'973/ The trend in
S&T production and dissemination by FDD/CIA and the rest of
the ccrmnuiity in the following years continued to rise.
At the beginning of this section of the chapter it was
indicated that the SIR, perhaps the main FDD contribution to
resolving the Sputnik flap, was declassified in 1958 and put
on the "newstand."" At the end of 1960, having served its
.purpose, it was once again classified and returned to the
..confines of the intelligence camunity. This action was
taken in order to restore the report's orientation to intel-
ligence needs. By this time the report had outlived its use-
fulness on the outside and the US scientific cammunity was
well served by other programs such as those sponsored by NSF
and NIH. Moreover, the number of subscriptions for the
report entered withOTS had declined drastically. Therefore,.
John Bagnall recannended on 5 October.that the unclassified
.version:of.the SIR be.terminated and four-series of classified
scientific information reports be established in its place.
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..The.OTS Director agreed to discontinuance; of the report pro-
vided it be.continued.to.the'end of 1960.to.ocxnplete existing
.subscriptions. 974/ Bagnall`s.request was-sent forward by
Carey and on 8 November 1960 the DD/I approved discontinuance
..of the report effective at the end of the year.
This change may be said to have marked the symbolic end
of the Sputnik flap as it related to FDD. The effects of the
..decisions made.and the changes implemented as a result of
..this significant. event remained, however. Conscious of the
value of its translations and exploitations to science,
industry, and education and at the same time mindful of the
recurrent derogations by outsiders that the government was
either "neglecting" foreign literature or was "over-classifying"
it, the division continued tQ make as much of its unclassified
product. available to legitimate users as was feasible. This
effort was considerably simplified by the development,
concurrently with the Sputnik affair, of FDD's field unit,
the United States Joint Publications Research Service.
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Expansion of Service:
The US Joint Publications Research Service
A. Establishment of the Organization
The US Joint Publications Research Service, FDD's
field component, was the division's third attempt to solve
the chronic translation problem which had plagued the
organization since early in its history. Unlike the two
translation units which had preceded it, the Translation
Division in the period 1948-1949
the new component
was from the start a successful undertaking and continues at
the time of this writing (1973) to contribute a valuable
service to the intelligence community. Like the earlier
projects, not to mention FDD itself, JPRS suffered pangs of
birth and growth, experienced the frustration of trial-and-
error, made mistakes, and underwent adjustments to accamradate
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to changing conditions before it had attained a mode of opera-
tion suited to the purpose for which it was established. As
it eventually evolved, it was a much larger operation by far
than either of the earlier two. Nonetheless, once the project
had been initiated its development was eased considerably by
the experience which FDD had gained from having worked on the
formulation of the Translation Division It was, in
effect, built on past mistakes.
The USJPRS was established to augment FDD facilities
in order to permit the expansion of documentary exploitation
and translation into areas of information hitherto untapped
by the division because of personnel limitations. It was
designed to serve as an extension of FDD to fulfill require-
ments for unclassified translation and thereby leave the
division free to concentrate on the exploitation function
and the translation of classified materials. This had, of
course, also been the reason the Translation Division
had been set up. However, in each of the
earlier instances, the experiment had proved less than
successful in coping with the work, in the case of the
Translation Division because of personnel ceiling limitations
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for security and managerial reasons.
Thus a new approach to the problem was sought in formulating
the JPRS operation.
JPRS was the product of necessity. The increasing
load of unclassified source material since the early period
was not matched by a conccinitant increase in FDD personnel
to do the work and, as mentioned several times before in
this history, it soon became evident that extraordinary
efforts would be required to complete it. Failure to do.so
would carpel the division to curtail its common-service
function. The Translation Division was established in
December 1947 to accomplish the task, but the fact that
the manpower to do it, 44 translators in all, was derived
from FDB itself placed an immediate limitation on the number
of people who could be assigned to the project and downed
the undertaking almost from the start. Primarily for this
reason, but also for others, the Translation Division was
abolished in mid-1949.
Project UT, initiated two years later, was a considerable
improvement over the earlier Translation Division concept in
that it recognized the potential presented by the large number
of individuals with multi-lingual competence concentrated
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in the Washington area who, while not clearable for. full-time
CIA employment, were fully adequate to handle the Agency's
heavy unclassified translation load. Many of the individuals
contacted ware particularly valuable because their professional
background enabled them to combine a technical competence with
their linguistic work. This provided a unique and very bene-
ficial service to the Agency. The theory was good and was
worked to some advantage for a period of six years, but
Project UT in the long run had to be termed a failure and.
was discontinued. The reason was twofold -- poor management
practices in the organization itself and the lack of proper
control by the Agency.
After the lessons of these experiences, the formation
and development of the USJPRS by the division was a logical
next step forward. The pressure of the growing volume of
foreign-language source material
underlined the
fact that a component organized along similar lines was badly
needed to help the division cope with the load. FDD, there-
fore, undertook the task of devising a successor organization,
A broader stage was selected. It was reasoned
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that if the division could be assisted by the contributions
of an area rich in linguistic talent such as Washington, D. C.,
the benefits to be derived from expanding to other centers in
the country, either by direct contact or through the mails,
would be many times greater. The USJPRS therefore represented
the culmination of a progression toward a large-scale transla-
tion program which, despite problems of growth and development,
removed the major obstacle -- translation volume -- from the
division's path in fulfilling its carrion-service function.
The organization which was devised to carry out the program
became FDD's first large-scale field activity.
The concept of contractual arrangements for unclassified
translation, which was to be the basis for the system, was not
new. At the urging of the State Department and of some CIA
Offices 975/ the arrangement had been employed as early as
1955 for projects of special nature -- for example, coverage
of such topics as "petroleum" and "rail transporation" for
ORR -- and as a result, the division had hired several semi-
cleared contract employees - never more than half a dozen -- on
an annual basis to perform this work. By mid-1958, after the
JPRS program was well established, this program was phased
out and some of the erstwhile FDD contract employees were
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picked up by JPRS. The previous system of contracting had
been very limited, while the new program was set up on a
much larger scale. How much larger is illustrated by the
fact, that in late 1964 the JPRS had under contract
individuals in the United States, not by any means all engaged
in translation at any one time, but nonetheless available if
the need should arise. 976/
Co rtnunity demands for increased translation service
and FDD carnplaints of inability to keep up with the load were
a common refrain almost from the beginning. With the approval
of NSCID 16 and the formation of SEFLP in 1953, discussions
of the problem were placed on a more formal and organized
basis. These exchanges finally culminated in a report drawn
up on 7 August 1956 by John $agnall, as chairman of SE LP,
to the parent of the subconmittee, the Advisory Committee
on Foreign Language Publications, in which he reviewed the
former?s work on Soviet Bloc publications in the past two and
a half years. Despite close cooperation and effort on the
part of the member agencies to help reduce the translation
load by redefining and "pinpointing" priority requirements,
Bagnall reported that current exploitation facilities were
insufficient to meet the needs of the ccmTunity for
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information frcm foreign-language sources in the wake of the
relaxation of Soviet controls over export of publications.
For example, in 1956, 510 titles were released caqared wit&
270 in 1953, and this increase in quantity was combined with
an improved quality of information in the Soviet publications.
Bagnall therefore requested ACLP backing for an expanded
exploitation program. 977/
The 7 August initiative was carried a step further the
following month when, on behalf of the subcamiittee, Bagnall
submitted another memorandum to the ACELP through the AD/O
expanding his views on the problem at hand and presenting a
variety of proposals to solve it. Briefly stated, the FDD
chief felt that the problem could be met in either of two
ways, by expansion of FDD facilities or by external contractual
arrangements. Going into detail, he offered sane six varia-
tions of these methods and put than in the form of proposals.
Two of them, involving the expansion of the FDD work. force,
were immediately dismissed in. view of current government
policy to allocate work to private enterprise where possible
and to avoid increases in. government employment. The remain-
ing four involved combinationsof contractual arrangements
between the division and translation corporations or private
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individuals. All were considered and in three instances
rejected as too expensive or too difficult to control.
Bagnall finally settled on the sixth proposal, which provided
for a combination of an FDD field office and individual con-
tracting, and recommended its review and adoption by the
Advisory Committee. Its cost, he felt, was reasonable --
-- and it was easiest to control, direct,,
and coordinate from FDD headquarters. 978/
The Bagnall study was sukmitted through channels and
Proposal 6 was approved by the DD/I and the Acting DCI in
late December. 979 The document was then sent in project
form to the Project Review Committee (PRC) on 30 January
1957. It proposed the establishment of domestic FM field
offices and through than contractual arrangements with well-
qualified private individuals for the exploitation of overt
published foreign-language source material. New York City
was selected as possessing the best potential for initiating
the operation. It was proposed that a small office staffed
by FM headquarters personnel be opened there, and that it
would recruit, subject to security clearance, linguistic
specialists. Quality control would be maintained by FED
headquarters officers and source material not available in
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New York would be provided by FDD. In the matter of a
security cover it was felt that inasmuch as the service
would be for the benefit of all IAC agencies, the require-
ments would be so diverse that the fact that part of the
work was performed for the Agency would involve no catvomise
in CIA security. The contract employees were to be witting
of the fact that they were employed by the US government,
but CIA connection with the enterprise would not be disclosed.
It was anticipated that operations at the new field office
could begin a month after approval of the project. 980/ The
PRC approved the project as submitted on 13 February 1957,
and it was signed by the DCI on 1 March. 981/
With the JPRS project now fully approved, FDD was
ready to launch its first full-scale venture in field opera-
tions. On 21 March 1957 Dagnall submitted a request -- approved
on 8 April -- to delete six positions, consisting of a chief, a
deputy chief, an administrative assistant, and three case
officers representing the Soviet, East European, and Com unist
Far East areas, from the FDD headquarters T/O in order to
establish the New York Field Office staff. 982/ Eight days
later recently returned from Saigon and now
designated chief of the new field operation,
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of the S&T Branch, designated deputy chief in New York,
of the East Europe Branch, and
an administrative assistant from the Reports Branch,
departed for New York to open the new field office.
of FDD's Far East Branch was also a mm-ber of the charter,
contingent but did not immediately accompany the group to
New York. On 9 August 1957
was assigned to
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the New York office to fill out the T/O there. Quarters for
the field office had been procured through the General
Services Administration, and on 1 April 1957 the USJPRS
opened for business in the Morgan Annex of the Post Office
Department at 31st Street and 9th Avenue. This location
proved temporary and later in the year the organization
moved further uptown to a building at 205 E. 42nd Street.
The fledgling field office was an operational success
almost from the start and, after an initial period of acclima-
tion, progress in establishing a "stable" of translators was
rapid. By the end of April JPRS had made 153 potential-
contract contacts,
Two contracts were approved before the end of
the month. 983/ By the end of June contracts had been signed
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with 42 linguists, and numerous reports were already completed
and in the process of publication. 984/ The latter was acocm-
plished with the assistance of PSD, which arranged for publica-
tion of the reports by the New York branch of the Government
Printing Office (GPO). The number of linguists under contract
by the end of July had risen to 61 and potential-contract
contacts by field representatives for this month alone
amounted to 435. 985/ Thus, the project mushroomed rapidly
into a sizable operation. In December 1957 a second clerical
position was authorized for the New York office to help with
the increasingly heavy workload.
Contacts with potential employees for JPRS were made
in a variety of ways. The most difficult problem at the
beginning was publicizing the operation. This was for
the most part accomplished by direct advertisement in the
daily press and in appropriate trade journals and newspapers.
Also effective were visits by field representatives from JPRS
and Contact Division to potential sources of linguistic
specialists such as educational institutions and research
centers in the New York area. As the operation expanded, the
hard sell became less necessary. In time, many potential
JPRS contract employees were recruited by w?rd-of-mouth,
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that is, by those already working for the organization.* The
quality of applicants varied widely, ranging from those poorly
versed in a foreign language and with little or no professional
experience to excellent multi-linguists with hard-to-find
specialties. Needless to say, the latter were at a premium.
Often a specialist with native fluency in one or more foreign
tongues would apply but had to be rejected because of his
poor cannand of the English language. All applicants were
carefully screened and only those who met the qualification
standards set by FDD were placed under contract. Hiring deter-
minations were made through interviews and a variety of
language tests. The tenure of the contractors with JPRS
varied considerably, some remaining for only a matter of
months, the majority staying for longer periods -- two, three,
or four years -- and a few continuing with the operation for
many years. Tenure was often determined by the employee's
* Problems in recruitment and clearance were sometimes
magnified by physical distance of the applicant from
Washington or New York. Perhaps the extreme instance of
this difficulty was the case of a Navy lieutenant whose
contract for JPRS work took six nnnths to approve. The.
reason: he was stationed in Antarctica.
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earning capacity. Some with high 9aalif i.cati ons considered
and used JPRS work as a full-time job, but the majority
.regarded it as part-tine employment.
With the success of the New York office assured and
the soundness of the entire contractual concept in the JPRS
form apparently proved, FDD and 00 began to give thought to
expanding the operation. The establishment of JPRS also
hastened the end of FDD's already rapidly fading Project UT.
On 3 May 1957 George Carey applied the coup-de-grace by
suggesting its discontinuance and the conversion of the
translation service into the Washington office of the USJPRS,
a move which he felt would entail no difficulty and would
result in a more efficient and economical operation. 986
Carey's suggestion was submitted in the form of a project
plan and was approved on 8 May 1957. A T/O similar to that
of the New York office was established, 987/ and on 16 August
1957 the Washington (later termed the District of Columbia [DC])
office of the USJPRS opened at 1636 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.,
with~ __] previously Chief of the FDD Eastern Europe
Branch, as head of the new eoaronent. He was assisted by a
contingent of four staff officers and an administrative
assistant, namely
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assignment, the USSR Branch's
Biographic Section in FDD, which he had headed, was dissolved
and its function transferred to the new District of Columbia
(DC) office.
The canrencement of operations at the office in Washing-
ton in many respects paralleled that of its New York counter-
part. fiver, as a beneficiary of JPRS/NY's experience, brief
though this was up to this point, the Washington group was
able to establish a routine rather quickly and to avoid many
of the mistakes and pitfalls encountered by their New York
colleagues. The first contract was signed on 27 August, an
event expedited through prior processing of the applicant's
papers in New York. Thereafter, with the use of recruitment
methods similar to JPRS/NY, the number of contract employees
moved steadily upward. Again, contacts with nearby educa-
tional, cultural, and research institutions were initiated
and maintained to assure a steady flaw of applicants. A
unique and important source of supply for the Washington
office was the Society of Federal Translators, an organization
of more than 100 members,
From the single applicant signed at
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the end of August, the number under contract by the end of
September had increased to nine, 988/ and this figure had
risen to 58 by 31 October 1957. 989/ As had been done earlier
with JPRS/NY, an imprest fund was established on 6 September
1957 for the DC office to serve as a funding source for
daily operations.
B. Its Operations
By the fall of 1957 the USJPRS, with two field offices,
was in full operation in carrying out its mission to augment
.FM's services. The full growth of the organization's
structural order had not yet been reached -- a third field
office would be opened in the future -- but JPRS was beginning
to settle into a routine of established operational procedures.
JPRS accepted material fran all parts of the
government. The bulk of items for translation was, however,
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submitted through JPRC by CIA ccaponents, and the greatest
volume was sent by FDD itself. This material consisted of
articles and extracts of articles selected on a daily basis
by FDD officers from the large volume of sources available
to them. These items were translated by JPRS contract
employees, were collected by staff officers at JPRS, and,
as the scheduled-reporting procedures gradually evolved,
were incorporated in the appropriate reports and periodically
published.
Quality control of the JPRS product was instituted
early. A high-grade product was assured in two steps:
initially, by measuring the qualifications of applicants
through the medium of a uniform language test for each
language in which they claimed canpetence and, thereafter,
by a continuing review on the part of FDD officers of trans-
lations performed by the contractors. The latter method
was later refined by requiring contractors to complete a
special translation approximately once a year in their
language and field of canpetence and basing their continued
employment by JPRS on the results of this exercise.
Although JPRS reached a plateau of stability relatively
soon, this status was not achieved easily and the new organi-
zation encountered many and varied problems, particularly in
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the initial period of operations. Some proved easy to work
out, others remained nagging irritants for extended periods
of time, and still others were never fully solved.
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Another potential complication was the matter of pay
rates, but this proved less serious than might have been
expected. It did, however, remain a source of some irritation
and surfaced periodically. Complaints were levied from time
to time by individual, usually professional, translators
against JPRS. The issue in these cases generally had to do
with the alleged low pay rates offered by JPRS which, it was
contended, deprived JPRS translators of "fair" rates of
compensation and represented unfair competition to those
employed by other translation organizations. Illustrative
of this is an excerpt from the newsletter of the Washington-
based Society of Federal Linguists, Inc., in rebuttal to an
article on JPRS appearing in the 11 August 1965 issue of the
WaZZ Street Journal. The excerpt read in part as follows:
"The alleged lack of good translators is caused not by any
shortage of translators, but by the sweat shop, practices of
JPRS. The pay scale is so low that most good translators
prefer not to work for this organization." 991/
It was true that JPRS pay rates were in general sane-
what lover then those offered by other agencies in government
and perhaps'. even sane ccmnercc ial firms. JPRS made every
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effort to keep costs at a minirmn as a matter of policy, in
large part to stay within its budgetary limits and at times
to conform to the necessity for budget cuts, but in general
the rates represented reasonable compensation. In 1963, for
example, the scale ranged from. a low of $7.00 to a high of
$25.00 per 1,000 foreign-language words, the rate depending
upon the difficulty of substantive text and the language
involved. '992/ With few exceptions the applicants appeared
satisfied with the basic JPRS pay rates of $7.00 to $9.00
per 1,000 foreign words. A number of them referred to the
State Department rate of $15.00 per 1,000 words or the Patent
Office's $10.00 per 1,000, but they seemed willing to work
at the lower JPRS rate, apparently preferring a comparatively
steady flow of work at a lower rate to sporadic jobs at a
higher one. 993/ The drawback of lower pay rates was no
deterrent to the flow of applications. In fact, in two
instances soon after the opening of the Washington office
employees at other government agencies elected to resign
their jobs to work for JPRS despite cautionary statements
that JPRS could not guarantee full-time or continuing employ-
ment nor provide the benefits inherent in Civil Service
status.-994/
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Fran the beginning, editing became the bane and bottle-
neck of the JPRS operation. In Washington at least, applicants
willing and canpetent to undertake editing were invariably
government-employed at an hourly rate. 995/ Government policy
at this early point in JPRS`s.existence forbade the employment
of such applicants at hourly rates. The sole criteria was to
be page count, that is, service payment not related to time.
Editing, however, could not be calculated on a page basis and
for. this reason created an apparent conflict. According to
the CIA General Counsel, there was no objection to the hiring
of government employees by FDD on contract as long as this
employment did not conflict with their regular job. He
suggested that payment related to a time basis could well
create a question of dual compensation for government
employees, 996/ but Bagnall assured him that FDD would use
such employees only for work not ccnipensated on the basis
of time. 997/
The "dual compensation" concept was not limited solely
to the method of paying government employees but in fact
created a serious roadblock to JPRS hiring practices in
general, especially so far as the DC office was concerned.
On 21 August 1957,,- while JPRS/DC was in the process of
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formation, OP disapproved for legal and administrative reasons
a request sulxnitted by John Bagnall earlier in the month to
permit the hiring of CIA, including FDD, employees for JPRS
translation work outside their normally assigned duties and
on their own time. 998/ This request was based on the fact
that the division would derive considerable benefit frown the
use in JPRS of highly qualified linguists in CIA, many of
than not directly involved in language work.
For the next four months the question of contracting FDD
employees for JPRS translation hung fire, but in mid-January
1958 Bagnall again revived the subject and on the basis of
his appeal the AD/O requested a review of OP's 21 August.
decision with a view to its retraction. Zb bolster his
request he pointed out that. piece work contracts with full-
time government employees was not a new practice and that
FDD officers were in fact not prevented fran doing translation
work for other government agencies. 999/ Finally, on 28 April,
conceding that the situation involving FDD and JPRS was an
unusual one and advising close and effective FDD control over
the arrangement, OP acceded to the FDD request and granted
permission for JPRS use of FDD employees. 1000/ Many of the
latter took advantage of this dispensation and the system
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worked well. The new JPRS, badly in need of ccarpetent trans-
lation manpower, received a windfall of highly qualified contract
workers, and FDD officers benefitted from an added source of
income. Moreover, the latter brought to this work not only a
high level of language competence but also an intimate. knowledge
(not publicized) of intelligence requirements. To the best of
the author's knowledge the arrangement was never abused.
The addition of the FDD linguists to the JPRS contract
roster, together with the normal increase in new contractors,
considerably enlarged the translation potential of JPRS. In
July 1958 former Deputy Chief of the USSR
Branch who had succeeded
as Chief, JPRS/DC,
following the latter's return to FDD headquarters, reported
on contract with the two JPRS offices,
a build-up which had created a budget squeeze. By the end of
FY-1958 this group of translators had built up a production
level of 12,000 English-language pages per month. 1001/ The
production increase was in part due to an expansion of service
within the ccannunity following establishment of the two offices.
Soon after this event several overtures had been received from
interested agencies outside CIA for use of JPRS translation
service, and it had been announced that the service would be
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available for departmental translation needs on a reimbursable
which JPRS had been established
basis at cost. As a result of this, arrangements were made
for the inter-agency transfer of funds for these services. 1002/
Among agencies using the service were NIH, AEC, the Bureau of
Mines, and the Bureau of Standards. The arrangement was
encouraged and exploited not only to provide the service for
Throughout its growth period and periodically thereafter,
the problem of funding was an endemic fact of life for the
organization. Requests for additional funds with the approach
of each new fiscal year were common phenomena, particularly as
the Agency sought ways and means to cut expenses during periodic
economy drives. With the recurrent threat of attrition of head-
quarters funds, special arrangements, such as fund transfers
from other sources, had to be made at times to enable JPRS to
continue full-scale production. When these failed, a cutback,
usually temporary, in JPRS operations had to be resorted to.
For the most part, however, the organization continued to
operate normally and to expand. Where possible, measures were
adopted within JPRS itself to cut costs. For example, in
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1
June 1958 OTS, in connection with the Sputnik crisis discussed
earlier, offered to reproduce all JPRS S&Treports. This
represented an annual saving of $15,000 to $20,000 over current
GPO charges. 1003/ This was carried a step further later in
the year when FDD acquired printing equipment fran OTS, at no
cost to CIA, and these facilities were operated at the New York
office at a cost of 50~ per page canpared with the GPO charge
of $2.20. In fact, as a result of this acquisition very little
JPRS printing was thereafter done at the GPO.?1004/ Another
example of economy in JPRS was the introduction during the.
latter months of 1959 of the use of a "Gestefax" reproduction
machine which resulted in considerable savings over GPO costs
in the reproduction of illustrations. In October 1959 alone
this saving mnounted to $1,300. 1005/ By measures such as
these JPR was able to cut expenses to a minimum and thereby
to offer its services to the xxmn pity at bargain rates, con-
siderably below those of other translation enterprises.
Despite such measures,. however, the threat to JPRS funding
did not cease and at almost every annual budget session the
organization appeared to be fair game for the budget cutters.
The success of the JPRS,.project up to this point was
reflected in the nomination in 1959 of for
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the Intelligence Medal of Merit for his outstanding performance
of duty since April 1957 in organizing and supervising the
New York field office, an assignment which had called for great
ingenuity, patience, and adaptability. In March 1960 the award
was presented by the DCI to the first FDD officer
to receive this honor. 1006/
With the success of the JPRS operation assured and the
New York and Washington offices providing a service of approxi-
mately 125,000 pages a year, FDD took a further step to provide
caYehensive coverage for the benefit of the cnity. At
the same time, in certain area and language combinations it
was becoming apparent that FDD was beginning to scrape the
bottan of the barrel for good people to supplement the New
York and Washington JPRS rosters. One of the general areas
concerned was that of oriental languages. Consequently, on
27 January.1960 George Carey submitted a proposal for a new
West Coast JPRS field office in the San Francisco area to
take advantage of the large number of educated Orientals
and major scientific research and development centers in the
area. He anticipated that this office could be established
without additional positions or funds for FDD and suggested
the deletion of three positions fran FDD and the establishment
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of the new-office-'s T/O on the: basis of these slots. '10.07 The
proposal was approved by the DD/T on 29 January and by the
Managenent Staff a week later, and on 20 June 19.60 the nevt
facility was opened in the Appraisers Building in San Francisco.
Selected as the first Chief of the West Coast office was
then Deputy Chief of FDD's USSR Branch,
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in the New York office as his deputy.
.remained in this position until August 1961 when he was
appointed Chief of JPRS/DC in place of
To carry the account of managerial changes in JPRS to
over by
position as Chief of the San Francisco office was then taken
a conclusion,
headed JPRS in Washington until late 1964 25X1
when he returned for assignment to FDD headquarters. As
before, he was succeeded in March 1965 by who 25X1
was in turn replaced in San Francisco by 25X1
Meanwhile, in October 1960 had taken 25X1
place as Chief, JPRS/NY, a position he held until 25X1
his retirement in 196
to assixne the post of
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was briefly replaced by
left JPRS in
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took over as JPRS chief in New York and held this position
until the unit was closed down in 1968.
Operations in San Francisco got under way promptly and
by the end of the first month the new unit already had tested
150 linguist applicants. 1008/ With establishment of all
JPRS field offices completed, the overall organization by
August 1960 had approximately under contract
for part-time service to translate unclassified materials. 1009/
This figure was eventually to increase by 1964 to a peak of
1010/ The growth of the organization was
further reflected by a general increase in annual production
figures. To illustrate, during FY-1958, its first full year
of operation, JPRS produced a total of some 38,000 English-
language pages.'1011/ This figure increased to 128,000 in
the following year, 1012/ dropped briefly to 109,000 the next
year, 1013/ but then, following establishment of the
San Francisco office, rose steadily until the organization
produced 268,000 pages in FY-1963. Scene 35 percent of this
FY-1963 volume was S&T material, as opposed to 70 percent in
the first year of operation. 1014/ The production rise
reflected an increasing awareness of the facility's existence
among government agencies, both inside and outside the
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I.
intelligence community, and growing demands for its services.
At the same time it offered FDD an open-ended method of
meeting its requirements for unclassified translation and
thereby provided relief fran much of the pressure which had
beset the division earlier.
Th facilitate the activities of JPRS and, in light of
budgetary pressures, to effect econanies where and when
possible, the effort to improve the organization's methods
and procedures continued. In.October 1960 the JPRS opera-
tional headquarters was shifted fran New York to Washington
to afford closer control by FDD. At the same time, to cut
costs the printing operation of JPRS/NY was gradually phased
into the DC office during November 1960, and the printing of
all JPRS reports became a function of JPRS/DC. In May 1961
arrangements were made to move the JPRS printing facility
fran the DC office at 1636 Connecticut Avenue in order to
centralize all JPRS'reproduction activity, including photo-
graphic work, in the old Providence Hospital at 225 D Street,
S. E. This move was essentially completed in January 1962
following receipt of all reproduction equipment fran New York.
The relocation ofthe. JPRS/DC reproduction facilities
at the Providence Hospital building proved.very temporary.
With the vacating of the old CIA buildings in Potanac Park
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following copletion of the Headquarters Building in Langley,
JPRS took the opportunity to consolidate all its activities
in the Washington area in one location by arranging to occupy
one of the vacated CIA structures . The AD/O
expressed concern over the fact that such a move might identify-
JPRS with CIA, as the building had long been known as a CIA
facility, but he was assured by John Bagnall that other non-
CIA agencies were moving into buildings vacated by CIA and
that security was therefore not a factor. 1015 The mom was
acccclished at the end of June 1962, but it was not to be
the last. In April 1964 JPRS.received notification that
was scheduled for imminent demolition. This
necessitated still another move, and space for the organization
was obtained in another temporary structure -- this one of
World War I vintage -- and at the end of June 1964 JPRS was
relocated in Temporary Building "E" on the Mall in Washington.
In March 1962 the other field offices completed moves to
new and better quarters, the San Francisco office from the
Appraisers Building to 214 Front Street and the New York office
from the third to. the ninth floor in the premises on 42nd
Street. In the fall of 1964 the San Francisco office was
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once again relocated, from the Front Street address to federal
property at 100 McAllister Street in San Francisco.
Other changes in operations and facilities were intro-
duced. As part of the overall FDD program of improved fiscal
control of its production, the JPRS translation and exploita-
tion programs were converted into funded projects. Designed
to bring about a closer regulation of expenditures, this
change went into effect at the start of FY-1962. In this
connection, a program of serialized reports was developed
under which items of similar informational content were
placed and issued under uniform titles. This arrangement
simplified production procedures and also served to categorize
translations for the benefit of consumers. By 1963 these
reports, all open to subscription by the public, numbered 67. 1016/
The funding process was in general applied to these subject
breakdowns and thereby served to simplify the organization?s
bookkeeping.
On 29 March 1963 approval was obtained to convert JPRS
publication facilities from a rather unsatisfactory mimeograph
method to an offset-printing operation. Action was therefore
taken to acquire . three.multilith presses and several related
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items of equipment, the introduction of. which resulted in an
improved JPRS product as well as in reduced costs for labor
and materials. By this time JPRS was completely self-sufficient
in all aspects of reproduction.
Althpugh the general there in JPRS operations and
administration was one of progress and improvement, the
organization continued to encounter problems. One of these,
involved a recurrence of the earlier debate concerning the
employment of FDD officers as JPRS contractors and was
triggered by a survey of FDD and JPRS conducted in the
. stunner of 1960 by a staff of the General Accounting Office
(GAO). The staff issued a final report on its review in
early 1961.
Briefly stated, the GAO report was highly critical
of the FDD-JPRS relationship and emphasized the need to
strengthen FDD's'administrative control of the JPRS operation.
The review alleged a failure on the division's part to
provide adequate safeguards in the expenditure of government
funds. Specifically, the report criticized the FDD employee-
contractor relationship, implying that as practiced it
resulted primarily in benefits to FDD contractors rather
than . to the, government. Moreover, FDD control of this
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relationship on an arms-length basis had not been effective,
so that translation material had been transmitted directly
to FDD employees under JPRS contract rather than through
JPRS desk officers. This practice was in conflict with the
understanding under which permission for JPRS employment of
FDD officers had been originally granted. In light of this#.
the GAO staff recommended that the case of JPRS employment
of FDD officers be reexamined and, if still justified, that
stronger controls be initiated. In addition, other recommenda-
tions, pertaining mainly to tighter fiscal and administrative
controls on the part of FDD over JPRS activities, were sub-
mitted by the staff. 1017/
John Bagnall on 24 February submitted a memorandum to
the AD/O in which he rejected out of hand the contentions
and recommendations of the GAO. staff. He regarded many of the
statements in the report as misleading. or, in numerous cases,
canpletely false. It was Bagnall's belief that implementation
of the GAO recommendations would require the addition of 22
positions to FDD headquarters and the JPRS field offices and
would result in unacceptable work delays due to the voluminous
paper work engendered and to disruptions of the smooth-running
relationships between JPRS and other government agencies. 1018/
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The Bagnall rebuttal of the C,AQ report received
sympathetic support at higher levels in 00 and the Office
of the DD/I, 1019 and it was forwarded through channels
with the result that on 7 April 1961 Lawrence K. White, the
DD/S, addressed himself to the problem. In a mezrorandum
to the GAO staff, Col. White expressed his agreement with
the staff recommendations calling for stronger fiscal
control but not with those aspects criticizing FDD-JPRS
operational procedures. 1020
The White memorandum did not immediately solve the
matter and a lengthy session between Bagnall and CIA's
Technical Accounting Staff followed. GAO expressed reluc-
tance to accept all the answers in Col. White's memorandum,
but by May, White's initiative and the FDD-00 counter-
attack had begun to weaken GAO resistance and the battle
was largely won. The GAO backed down and withdrew its
full report and ended the review with the bland statement
that in FDD the staff had found certain "administrative
deficiencies which have been corrected." 1021 FDD took
early action on those GAO recommendations supported by the
DD/S -- viz, formalization of JPRS employment of FDD officers,
the conversion of contract personnel working in the DC
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office to employee status (a status broadened in 1965 to
provide leave and insurance. benefits for JPRS non-staff
employees), and formalizing the accountability of contractors
through a signed voucher system 1022/ -- but by and large the
final outcome was the maintenance of the original FDD-JPRS
working relationship. The total result of the GAO review
was, with some exceptions, not a major change of the system
but rather a tightening up and elimination of loose ends..
Because of the peculiar nature of JPRS staffing,
that is, the use of. uncleared, unwitting contractors doing
what, at least from the FDD standpoint, was the production
of raw intelligence, one of the major JPRS problems pertained
to the procurement and. retention of personnel. This took a
variety of forms, some of which have been mentioned earlier
in this chapter. While no full clearance was required on
potential contractors, each applicant was subjected to a
name check to prevent potential embarrassment to the Agency.
On occasion contractors already employed by JPRS, sometimes
for as long as a year or two, were subjected to a subsequent
name check which resulted in disapproval of their contract
by OS. This in turn led to embarrassment in,JPRS in that a
logical excuse had to be furnished to the individual affected.
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This was often difficult to do. Not infrequently such releases
created operational difficulty for JPRS since sane of the con-
tractors lost in.this way possessed valuable linguistic and/or
substantive talents which were hard to replace. On this basis
JPRS would, where justified, appeal the contract cancellation
order. Sometimes the order would be rescinded; more often,
it was not.
A related personnel problem faced by JPRS was that of
dual government employment, already touched on earlier in
connection with contracting FDD employees. In September 1964
a similar instance arose in connection with employment of
military personnel. In this case an enlisted man at Fort
Detrick, Maryland, had requested employment with JPRS but,
on advice of the legal officer at the.fort, had been rejected.
Consulted in the case, the General Counsel?s Office/CIA held
that there was no legal bar to such dual employment for
civilians. but in the case of the armed services it was
presumed that military personnel were on duty 24 hours a
day, seven days a week. Outside employment such as that
offered by JPRS would.therefore be in conflict with their
regular duties. 1023/ In a.memorandum to the Chief, FM,
on 12 October, the JPRS chief, objected
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this ruling, if upheld, on JPRS operations. 1024/
vigorously to the interpretation of the legal advisor at Fort
Detrick that the JPRS contractual arrangement with active duty
military personnel was illegal and deplored the effect on
agreed with judgment on the case and its detrimental
effects on JPRS recruitment, but, in the interests of avoiding
the publicity for the Agency likely to ensue if the matter
were followed up, decided against making an issue of it.
The enlisted man in question was therefore informed of his
rejection based on the ruling of the legal advisor, and
there the matter rested. 1025/
In the overall, JPRS operations were eminently success-
ful. Despite the fact that some consumer dissatisfaction with
the levels of accuracy and selection of JPRS reports was
encountered in the early stages, mainly from consumers within
the Agency, most problems of quality were eventually resolved.
The service provided by the organization was particularly
appreciated by groups in the academic world who found the
material put out in great volume by JPRS a source hitherto
untapped in such measure. As a result, the organization was
the recipient of frequent praise in a variety of academic
journals and often received favourable mention at meetings
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of learned societies. JPRS was frequently and liberally cited
in articles of a research nature. Ca rtnendation fran CIA and
other IAC (USIB) agencies was less in evidence, the service
rendered by JPRS perhaps being taken too much for granted,
but even here the volume and availability of JPRS output was
much appreciated.
Its Relations With ' Consumers
As an overt organization, ostensibly created to serve
the translation needs of a variety of government agencies,
the JPRS,
came into daily
contact with a large number of individuals and institutions,
government and non-government alike, who were interested in
and sought access to the products of its operations. Fran
the start JPRS distributed its translations to outsiders.
In September 1957 JPRS/NY began publication of Abstracts in
Physics and Chemistry, which it made available to a number
of consumers, including government offices, educational insti-
tutions,
a total at that time
. of 22 external and 7 internal contacts. 1026/. The other JPRS
offices had similar contacts. For example, in September 1958
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alone the Washington office received inquiries from sources
1027/ Indeed, requests for JPRS
translations were received even from individuals behind the
Iron Curtain -- in at least two instances in 1965 from authors
whose books had been translated by JPRS. In each case canpli-
mentary copies were sent. 1028/ By the end of 1963 the organi-
zation was sending one or more JPRS reports to 60 non-government
subscribers, including individuals or organizations in
as well as the United States and the United
Nations. 1029/
JPRS sought
out and encouraged these contacts.
Early in its existence the JPRS was the subject of a
number of references in the US press. This type of publicity
was not actively encouraged but neither was it rejected, and
in the light of the,wide coverage in the period after.
Sputnik I on the alleged neglect by the US government of
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Soviet sources "gathering dust" in American depositories, it
was inevitable that. the new JPRSshould be mentioned. In
November 1957 the Baltimore Sun referred to support of USJPRS
in New York by government agencies to get translations of
foreign scientific literature, 1030/ and in January 1958 a
rather extensive article devoted entirely to the new organi-
zation appeared in the trade journal Products Engineering. 1031/
The effect of this.publicity was to create increased demands
for JPRS S&T translations and it also served to publicize the
role of JPRS/NY as a potential eloyer for would-be trans-
lators.
As the JPRS product became better known in the course
of time, it was not an infrequent phenomenon for members of
Congress to contact the organization for one reason or another.
These requests ran the gamut from positive to negative. Some
were simply petitions for assistance in the translation of
brief items. Still other Congressional contacts dealt with
inquiries by the legislators on behalf their constituents.
Occasionally, JPRS was asked for copies of its reports. One
such instance involved. requests in 1965 from Senators Robert
Kennedy and James Eastland for a translation completed earlier
.by JPRS of an important book on Soviet social science which
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I
of S&T translations produced by government agencies,
had been well received in. government circles and elsewhere,
even to the extent of rating reviews in the New York Times
and New York Herald Tribune. 1032/ The JPRS relations with
Congress were for the most part good and often resulted in
positive contributions to the work of that body.
JPRS exposure to the public view was considerably
increased when the organization was nominally absorbed in early
1958 by the Office of Technical Services (OTS) of the Depart-
ment of C rmerce. At that time, in the wake of the orbiting
of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union and the creation of OTS by
the US Department of Camuexce to facilitate the dissemination
Thus fran 1958 on, JPRS was fran a public standpoint a sub-
division of CTS. After OTS had readied its dissemination
facilities in 1959, S&T translations produced by JPRS were
cited in the OTS monthly listing and made available to all
government offices and to the general public.
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The overt nature of the JPRS operation and its affilia-
tion with the public dissemination activities of.OT'S had an
undesirable side effect, one which FDD and JPRS would have
preferred avoiding although under the circumstances it was
not possible to do so. As had been the case with the Project
UT earlier, the JPRS overt translation function placed it in
direct competition with the many commercial translation firms
in the country, and as a government-sponsored operation the
organization appeared to exercise a monopoly of the lucrative
government translation field. As one might expect, this
situation created considerable bad feeling among those
affected and led periodically to threats of law suits or
appeals to Congress. All of the various instances of this
nature cannot be covered here, but one or two examples can
be given to illustrate the difficulties involved.
In January 1961 the commercial translation firm of
Royer and Roger ccmplained about competition fran JPRS for
government business. John Bagnall discussed the problem
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Commerce Department was enjoined to appear before the staff
of the Joint Committee on Printing (JCP) of the Congress to
' commitments resulted from this meeting but, in reporting
' back to George Carey, Bagnall expressed the opinion that
JPRS could discourage business fran government agencies
' outside the intelligence ccm4nunity and merely give such
agencies a list of commerical companies who could do the
' work. Carey expressed concern over the possibility of com-
plaint fran the affected agencies if JPRS refused to accept
their work, but Bagnall felt it important to avoid serious
criticism of government competition with commercial firms. 112L3/
No binding decisions were made, however, and JPRS continued
' to accept work from all government agencies.
A similar instance of complaint by a commercial firm
went beyond mere discussion between the firm and JPRS and
' actually reached the Congress.onal level. In July 1963 the
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S E U R EI
waste" in the printing and distribution of JPRS reports.
then JPRS Chief, John Weber of OTS, and two
1
O inerce Department publications officials answered the
stmmans.They briefed the three JCP staff manbers present
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on the JPRS mission and the manner in which it was.conducted
and persuaded them of its validity. The outcome of.the
incident was a letter from Senator Carl Hayden, the chairman
of the JCP, denying the charges and allegations of the
company. '1034/
These examples illustrate a recurrent threat to the
JPRS operation
In instances of a similar nature where the com-
1
plainant approached JPRS -- or, if the FDD-JPRS connection was,
suspected, even FDD -- he was generally referred to the
Director of OTS as the proper official with whom to discuss
the matter.
Despite these and other problems the relationship of
JPRS with the public sector progressed satisfactorily and
in this respect the tie-in with OTS proved rewarding. The
original arrangement, which grew out of the furor created
by the Soviet scientific spectaculars of the late 1950s,
had been concerned exclusively with the dissemination for
public use of S&T translations. In the course of time,
however, the question arose regarding an even broader
dissemination policy, that is, the distribution of non-S&T
JPRS products.
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In January 1960.the Joint Committee on Contemporary
China (JCCC) and its parent organization, the Social Science
Research Council (SSRC), approached JPRS/NY concerning the
release of the JPRS report Communist China Digest to various
university libraries. Since the total requirement was for
only 30 to 40 copies, OTS expressed disinterest in undertaking
the distribution.,1035/ Meanwhile, SSRC approached NSF for
support in disseminating government reports -- particularly
JPRS reports in the.social sciences -- to the academic world,
and NSF agreed to underwrite the proposal. 1036/ The SSRC
insistence on including JPRS social science reports in the
program was underlined by an NSF survey which revealed that
83 percent of translations produced government-wide in the
social science field were issued by JPRS. 1037/
Preliminary plans were made for the release of social
science publications by JPRS to the SSRC, but in the mean-
time CTS, in view of the expanded distribution contemplated,
had reconsidered the question and had decided to handle
dissemination of the reports. Following further discussion
with NSF, this arrangement was approved.' 1038/ By April
plans were more clearly defined and the SSRC selected 56
institutions of higher learning to which the .reports were
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to be offered, two-thirds of the cost -to be subsidized by the
recipients themselves. 1039/ The program was further expanded
when agreement among JPRS, the SSRC, and OTS was reached in
December 1960 to extend coverage to social. science reports
on Slavic areas on the same basis as the Communist China
reports. 1040/ Scan delay was encountered before the
financial details were worked out, but on 1 July 1961 the
expanded program was under way. 1041/ It continued until
mid-1962 when NSF and the SSRC decided that commercial
firms could provide the reports at reasonable cost. The
firm selected to undertake the sale of the social science
reports,
as, however, unable to provide the hard xerox
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copies desired by the recipient institutions at the cost
paid under the earlier arrangement and therefore raised
their price to three times the original cost. The popularity
of the JPRS social science reports is. attested to by the
fact that despite the increased price, 32 of the original
subscribers agreed to purchase full runs of the reports, 1042/
an indication of their value to scholars. To assure the
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availability of this material to the academic ccmumity at a
reasonable rate,.the arrangement for ccatmercial sale was
abandoned and FDD held consultations with OTS resulting in an
agreement, to be effective 1 February 1963, whereby JPRS
would henceforth handle subscriptions and sale of all its
reports, both social science and S&T, thus enabling any
university or private scholar to purchase copies of then
at reasonable cost from JPRS. 1043/
The chapter just concluded has related only the high-
lights of JPRS development and made no attempt to treat the
subject in exhaustive detail. The reason is obvious. 'I a
large extent FDD's history after 1957 is also the history
of JPRS, since the latter was virtually an extension of the
division. In speaking, for example, of FDD production, one
must keep in mind that JPRS as well as internal FDD output
is meant; in fact, the quantity of JPRS production far
exceeded that of wank done internally. The reader is
therefore reminded that in other chapters of this volume
many of the facts set forth as pertaining to FDD should
be assumed to have reference to JPRS as well.
JPRS's success after 1957 as a solution to the.
problems connected with FDD's cormon-service function are
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11
readily evident from the foregoing account. Despite some
criticism of the operation by the intelligence community,
particularly in the early period, 1044/ it was in the long
term well received and soon justified its existence,
financially as well as operationally. Though established
primarily to serve the intelligence community, the JPRS,
as this chapter makes clear, was also a boon to the indus-
trial and academic communities, a fact attested to by
numerous citations. Its major contribution was that it
solved the problem of translation volume by attacking it
on a large-scale, reasonably well-regulated basis. The
processing of foreign-language documents on this scale had
not been done in the United States prior to 1957.
As of the time of this writing, the JPRS operation
still functions. It was somewhat curtailed in 1968 when,
as a result of budget cuts, the New York office was dis-
continued and its functions and assets transferred to
Washington. This move, however, had little effect on the
volume of translation produced by the organization.
Through JPRS, FDD had achieved excellent results
in solving its long-standing problem of translation volume,
but, not content to rest here, the division continued to
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i
seek still better ways to fulfill its mission. Productive
as the mass-translation effort of JPRS was, there was a
limit to the rate of speed at which a human being could
turn out translated copy. The division therefore turned
to experimentation with machine methods to determine
whether an even faster means of translation could be
developed. The progress of this experiment is the subject
of the next chapter.
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Man Versus Machine:
FDD and the Automatic Language Processing Experiment
In August 1963 an article in the Los Angeles Times opened
with the following passage:
Several weeks after Sputnik I stunned the world,
Congress discovered the Soviets had broadcast they
were going to launch an earth satellite in various
technical journals published months before. No one
had gotten around to translating them until after the
event. Now, six years later, the United States is
still trying to close this "intelligence gap" with
machine translation of voluminous Russian scientific
writing. The results have been mixed. 1045/
Though the accuracy of this statement was somewhat suspect,
it is indicative of the fact that machine translation (MT), or
automatic language processing (ALP), as it is also known, was
largely a child of the post-Sputnik trauma. As a matter of
fact, that event was by no means the motivation which triggered
the evolution of MT; it only provided impetus to the develop-
ment of automatic translation systems already under way and
broadened concern with the problem among research and
development (R&D) groups. Interest in machine translation had
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already been evident several years earlier -- in fact not long
after World War II -- when some of the "think factories"
established in that period began consideration of this develop-
ment among many others.
In approaching the subject of autcmatic language processing,
the reader is reminded that CIA's connection with MT goes well
beyond FDD's direct involvement. The interplay among Agency
components, the role of other government agencies, the NSF,
universities, and private research organizations in this
controversial field is of such complexity as to defy treatment
in summary form. What is set forth in this chapter therefore
represents the problem as seen wholly frccn the FDD point of
' view. A fuller treatment is beyond the scope of this history.
CIA was directly involved in MT fran 1956 to 1966 through
' two projects, the Georgetown University General Analysis
Translation Project (GAT) and the FDD project employing the,
IBM MT/Stenowriter system. Organizational and individual
responsibilities for the projects were shifted about and were
never canpletely centralized, a situation which may have
increased the level of objectivity with which the projects
were viewed. It unquestionably introduced elements of friction
within the CIA projects which paralleled the partisan strife
among Mr researchers elsewhere.
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with the effort were
Those higher echelon CIA officers most closely associated
Paul Borel, John Bagnall,
Deputy Assistant
Director for Central Reference (DAD/CR) (1957-1962), served
as project officer for GAT from 1956 to 1962. Borel, Assistant
Director for Central Reference (AD/CR) (1957-1963) and ADD/I
chairman of the Automatic Data Processing Conmittee (ADPC)
(1961-1963) and Assistant Director for Computer Services (AD/CS)
(1963-1965), was responsible for acquiring, budgeting for, and
status with the human translators in his charge.
(1963-1966), also served as chairman of the Committee on
Documentation of the United States Intelligence Board (ODDIB)
and thus had a dual responsibility. As head of OCR he had the
MT project as part of his operating budget; as CODIB chairman
he was responsible to USIB for coordinating all ccmnunity
programs in information processing. Bagnall, Chief, FDD
(1947-1963) and DAD/CR (1963-1965), was the official most
directly involved in carrying out CIA's translation program
and coordinating community translation efforts. In a sense,
it was to Bagnall that the Agency had to look for an ultimate
arbiter to decide when MT programs approached competitive
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1
operating the IBM language processor. ~ Chief, FDD
(1964-1967), had the primary task of testing and evaluating
the MT project based on the IBM system.
Zb put the level of Agency effort in proper context, fznnn
FY 1956 through FY 1965, the US government, through DOD, NSF,
and CIA, spent some $20 million on MT research, of which CIA
(not
including costs incurred internally for testing the GU output
or to conduct the IBM-based project).
1
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The CIA position during this period was that the develop-
ment of an MT capability was highly desirable and that the
Agency would support such a program. It recognized, however,
that an undertaking of this nature had implications which
transcended the interests of CIA and those of the intelligence
unity. It was therefore considered preferable that an
organization with broader responsibilities than CIA be prevailed
upon to take the initiative to push a comprehensive MT program.
CIA identified its own immediate need as a usable product, that
is, one which might well produce a translation far short of
perfect but nevertheless highly useful. In return for an
early Mr capability to formulate such a product, the Agency
was willing to leave the achievement of broader results to a
longer-range program.
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A. FDD and the Georgetown Project
The nature of the FDD operation dictated that, once the
decision was made that CIA would underwrite the Mr project,
the division's early participation in it was assured. As a
result FDD was closely associated with the project's Georgetown
phase almost fran its beginning until the end of the CIA
sponsorship in 1963. The GAT Project during all of this period
was under the direction of Dr. Dostert, director of the
Georgetown University Institute of Languages and Linguistics
(GUILL). Dostert's primary preoccupation for the project's
duration appeared to be, first, the search for a patron to
underwrite his undertaking and, second, having found one in
CIA, to shepherd it through to a successful conclusion by
the regular infusion of periodic subsidies. In a lengthy
27-page report in August 1952 Dostert had outlined in consider-
able detail the steps required to accomplish a feasible MP
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capability. As presented, the project was to be completed
in three phases, and Dostert estimated that the total cost .
expenditure of
the financial support for each phase to be
requested only as the preceding part was successfully completed.
Dostert was convinced that with this support Mr would be an
accomplished fact in about six years. 1047
Prof. Dostert's enthusiasm and considerable confidence in
his system and methodology were apparently infectious. CIA
officials, anxious to make an early start in the new venture
and convinced that the GAT system as elaborated by Dostert
showed more than ordinary promise, demonstrated a ready and
perhaps unwarranted willingness to make the initial investment
in the yet untried system. In retrospect it is difficult to
fault the decision because in the initial stages of MT develop-
ment the project appeared to offer an easy solution to a vexing
problem -- an ever-increasing translation volume -- and many
.of the difficulties which were to arise in the course of
development could not yet be foreseen.
Before a oamAtment to proceed was made, however, the
its of those likely to be affected by the decision,
including 00, were solicited by OIC. The AD/O requested the
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1
opinion of FDD as a potential major user of the new system,
and on 22 December 1952 John Bagnall forwarded an analysis to
Carey. His conclusions were for the most part negative. He?
questioned the advisability of supporting a concept which
could very possibly lead into a blind alley and even if
successful would be severely limited. It would only translate
one language and, within this, only five highly specialized
fields. It would, moreover, apply exclusively to scientific
translation and made no provision for other disciplines. Its
relationship to intelligence needs, he felt, was only incidental.
In view of these factors, it was Bagnall's opinion that in terms
of the project's potential contribution, the subsidies requested
were excessive. He therefore recoamiended to Carey that, if
official concurrence was not requested, 00 apply a "pocket veto"
to the project. If, on the other hand, an official position
was required, he reccmmended non-concurrence with a statement
to the effect that the feasibility and practicability of the
concept should be more fully demnstrated and the objectives
be much more inclined toward general intelligence usefulness
before CIA agreed to the contract. 1048 Carey submitted the
Bagnall analysis to Dr. Claude Hawley, coordinator of external
research in OIC, and posed the question whether. the exploratory
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phase could not be underwritten by the NSF, the Ford Foundation,
or scene non-government enterprise. 1049/
Despite the negative OO-FDD response to the OIC solicita-
tion, consideration of the Georgetown proposal as well as of
others continued. Among the latter was one submitted in may
1953
which requested Agency authorization to proceed with the first
stage of development of a translating machine. The cost of
the 12-nonth period of research was set at
ing study of the proposal, FDD again recemmended rejection to
the DAD/O on the basis of cost and of the quality and efficacy
of the final product likely to result frown the
project. 1050/
Meanwhile, Dr. Dostert continued his R&D program at Georgetown
and submitted periodic progress reports to CIA on the project.
In addition, he conducted a number of demonstrations for the
purpose of presenting certain preliminary and basic processes
involved in the MT field. One elaborate demonstration, based
on 250 words from selected Russian sentences, was conducted
on 7 January 1954 in New York City by GUIIL in collaboration
with members of the science and research staff of International
Business Machines (IBM), which was providing the machine support
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1
for the GAT Project. Bagnall attended this, in company with
ten other CIA officers. Dostert claimed his group had succeeded
"in a modest way," in producing a machine which would require
neither pre- nor post-editing. He stated that further research
would concentrate on developing a "core language" to be supple-
mented by specialized language and would be adapted to the IBM
701 Electronic Data Processing (EDP) Machine. Bagnall pointed
out in his subsequent report to the AD/O the small results to
date -- only 250 words -- after nine months of intensive work
but, on the other hand, he judged Dostert's estimate of three
years minimum to develop a machine for practical operation as
unduly pessimistic. 1051/
Dostert continued periodically to submit proposals to CIA
and held weekly seninars at GUILL at which he presented progress
reports on MT development at Georgetown. In March 1957
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1
FDD representative to these meetings and attended regularly,
sometimes in company with John Bagnall and other Agency officials.
The seminars permitted FDD to contribute its share of linguistic
expertise to the general fund, but the meetings were of benefit
mainly as a means of helping the division keep abreast of progress
in the MT field.
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be shared with NSF. In the.next four years the Agency
Concurrent with its interest in the GAT Project, FDD
continued its activity in other phases of MT research. In
June 1956, for example, the division prepared samples of
Russian articles and their English translations for transmittal
to the Rome (New York) Air Force Depot to be used in testing
a mechanical translator. 1052/ In April 1958 FDD submitted
its judgment on a Harvard automatic translation project,
suggesting that. for technical reasons it would not attain the
level of research on MT so far canpleted at Georgetown. Bagnall
believed MT development would benefit if the anticipated Harvard
research were coordinated with the work done by Georgetown and
the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, another firm engaged in NIT
R&D. 1053/
Meanwhile, CIA, which had been actively encouraging MT
research at Georgetown since'1952, finally made the decision
to provide financial assistance for this purpose, and in may
1956 the DCI granted to GUILL the first allotment of funds, to
1054/ During this time the GAT Project, using
general-purpose computers (the IBM 704 and IBM 705). evolved
various possible techniques for MT. 1055/
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Test demonstrations of the GAT Project were conducted
periodically and it was expected that by spring 1960 Georgetown
would have an operational Russian-to-English capability in
organic chemistry. Already in June 1959 Paul Borel had
expressed the view that it would soon be possible to move from
a research into a developmental phase in selected languages
and disciplines, further progress depending upon the availability
of money for the preparation of glossaries, a relatively expensive
operation. 1056/
This optimism notwithstanding, and though some progress had
been achieved and continuing research and experimentation appeared
justified, the GAT Project was having problems. What was worse,
these difficulties were catpounded by apparent dissension within
the Georgetown research team over which of two different
experimental approaches to concentrate on.
The dispute was not the only inkling of problems in the
project. In June Bagnall expressed the belief that the many
difficulties relating to CIA's support of MT research were
caning to light and that the cost factor was a major considera-
tion. Despite Dostert's sanguine prediction of a translation
capability in a year's time for Russian organic chemistry
materials, Bagnall was pessimistic. 1057/ As future events
would prove, his fears that this would entail excessive costs
were not exaggerated.
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Another factor was the limitation on materials which
could be processed. in late 1959 at the first meeting of the
new CIA Advisory Committee on mechanical Linguistics (ACtL) the
point was made that for the foreseeable future newspapers and
materials in the social sciences presented too many complexities
for MT. Moreover, in the scientific fields where MT was
considered feasible, it would still be uneconomical, in terms
of machine time, to translate any items of less than 3,000
words. Use of the machine was therefore questioned since most
items needed in intelligence work were under this figure. 1058/
Despite this gloomy picture the Agency was still determined
to move ahead with the project. As the reader will recall, this
was the post-Sputnik period and the pressure for output of S&T
materials in light of Soviet advances was great. The volume
of available Russian S&T literature had greatly increased in
recent years, and the annual available output was estimated to
be about 780 million words, of which about 53 million were now
being translated annually, most of it by the government or
under govern ent contract. Of this volume, CIA accounted for
over nine million words. 1059/ Combined with this was the
fact that by now the Agency was heavily committed to the GAT
Project and there was thus a natural reluctance to pull out.
The decision was therefore made to move ahead.
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A review of MT developments within CIA later in 1960 had
an apparent dampening affect, and as a result an earlier GAT
request for to carry on further MT research and
to key-punch 125 million words was considerably scaled down.
In June 1960 the ACML endorsed and the Project Review Committee
approved the allocation of _ to GU to determine the
operational feasibility of large-scale MT. 1060 FDD's part
in this phase of the project was to consist of providing it
with 2,500 pages of Russian economic text and the approved
translation of this material for purposes of lexical abstracting.
In addition, the division would select 6,000 pages of Russian
material in the other disciplines. The translations resulting
from this input were eventually to be post-edited by FDD and
made available for the intelligence cc uY unity and for public
sale. 1061/
By March 1961 FDD had completed Phase I of its contribution
to the GAT Project and had selected and prepared more than four
million Russian words with their parallel English text in not
five, but eight scientific disciplines. The division was now
ready to move to Phase II, which called for supplying six
million words in these disciplines. 1062 This task was
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in CIA funds. ?Bagnall, however, as a member of the Advisory
Caarmittee, proposed that prior to granting this approval a
report of the previous year's accomplishments be submitted to
the committee. FDD had been assigned the task of post-editing
the trials and keeping track of cost and time, human-versus-MT,
but so far the division had not even received the translation
results of the material which it had fed to the project, much
less post-edited the material. Moreover, Bagnall reported
that to the best of his knowledge no free run material had yet
been used, yet the plan for FY-1962 called for expansion into
seven new fields involving the translation of more than 30,000
pages. 1064/
May 1961 that GAT be continued for another year with
coanpleted early in may and was not only fulfilled but overful-
filled, that is, nine million Russian words against the initial
request for six milllion. 1063/
The solidifying of facts and figures and the greater
reliability of statistics on MT in the GAT Project, as the
undertaking moved along, further strengthened Bagnall's resolve
to urge the Agency to now more slowly before cQmnitting funds.
With the approach of the new fiscal year the
Acting Assistant Director of Central Reference, proposed in
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Members of the ACvIL were apparently impressed by the appeal
for greater caution, and the FDD Chief scored a point at the
7 June meeting of the ccnmi.ttee when it was agreed to insert
a paragraph in the GAT Project compact providing for FDD post-
editing of the Georgetown product and a report on the qualitative
analysis of the run plus a cost analysis of the entire operation*
consented also to change the recommendation providing
funds to indicate that the AD/CR would approve the program in
principle, subject to review by the ocmnittee in the first
quarter, and would release
to Georgetown (approxi-
mately one-fourth the total budgeted for FY-1962) pending this
review. 1065/
On 15 June Bagnall further elaborated on his misgivings
concerning the GAT system. In notes directed to Carey he
deplored the meagre yield from th which had so far
been spent on the project. With preliminary figures he
demonstrated that at this stage of development MT would cost
50 percent more than human translation, that is, $14.40, before
typing, versus $9.50 per 1,000 words. 1066/ At this point
Bagnall's skepticism appeared justified.
Even these preliminary figures did not appear excessive.
in retrospect. The first results of MT destined for post-
editing according to the procedures designed to evaluate the
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current status of the art were received from GU by FDD on
24 July. They consisted of 550 pages translated from two
Russian books on economics. The post-editing was completed
by FDD and JPRS at the end of August. This exercise plus
,more recent cost figures for MT received on the GAT Project
revealed a disparity of $21.50 versus $9.50 per 1,000 words
in favor of human translation. Moreover, the cost of post-
editing NIT work was in excess of performing this operation for
human translation, and the time spent in each instance was the
same despite earlier anticipation that the MT post-editing,
though costlier, would be faster than post-editing of human
translation. 1067
With the new figures in hand, the AC1HL net on 20 September
1961 under Bagnall's acting chairmanship to consider the
advisability of continuing support of the GAT Project. In
view of the unfavorable state of the MT product, the carmittee
agreed to recarumend to the PRC that support, in the amount of
funds be continued until 1 January 1962
providing that GU halt production and concentrate instead on
research to improve the quality of output. 1068 On 26 October
the PRC approved the recanmendation. 1069
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1
1
With the future of the GAT Project somewhat at loose ends,
discussion followed as to its disposition. In this connection
Paul Borel approached and informally suggested
to him that, in view of the fact that the FDD mission was
more closely related to the GAT undertaking than was OCR's, 00
assume responsibility for the project. demurred. in
discussing Borel's proposal with Bagnall later on, he expressed
the opinion that OCR was attempting to "unload" a highly contro-
versial project on 00. Bagnall suggested that the proper solution
was to turn it over to NSF, though he doubted that the Foundation,
which, he felt, had ccrm to regard the GAT Project with disfavor,
would be amenable to this shift in responsibility. 1070
On 1 November, at request, John Bagnall wrote
a tart memorandum on the subject of allocating responsibility
for GAT. He expressed disappointment in the original CIA
approach to the problem and stated that he found it difficult
to understand why the Agency had not assigned it to FDD in
the first place. He suggested that it may have been Dr. Dostert's
"unilateral, histrionic argumentation" against Agency language
specialists controlling the project that had swayed this
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decision.* Continuing, Bagnall deplored Agency sponsorship of
pure research, this being rather one of the functions of NSF,
and reiterated his advice to turn the project over to the latter.
On another tack he charged that the government was simultaneously
supporting both CIA's GAT Project and the Air Force-financed IBM
MT Project, which were in competition with each other. Citing
the large amounts of money being expended by the Air Force-IBM
combination on the one hand and the insufficiency of funds
available for FDD's regular functions on the other, he again
advised dropping the GAT Project and suggested concentrating
on the IBM operation. If this advice were not followed and if
GAT were transferred to FDD, he expressed his inclination to
turn it over to NSF or at least to implement a sharp reduction
in the funding of the project coemtensurate with its. results. 1072/
* An indication of Dostert's feelings about linguists involved
in MT came to the fore at a subsequent meeting, on 9 February 1962,
attended by GU, NSF, DOD, and CIA representatives. In the course
of the meeting he touched briefly on the "fallacy" of having
translators involved in evaluation since they "have an obsessive
fear" of bein replaced by a machine. In response to a query by
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comment that linguistic analysis of Mr was certainly required
for stylistic purposes. 1071/
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On 14 November 1961, as acting chairman of the A]'AL,
Bagnall essentially repeated to the DD/I the contents of his
1 November ne orandum to stating that the Air Force-IBM
MT system was superior to the GAT and reccmTetxb ng cessation of
CIA support for the latter at the end of 1961. However, he
advised continuance thereafter of evaluation of all MT research
and support of that which promised to be of value to the
Agency. 1073/
Meanwhile, the question of continued CIA assistance to
the GAT Project had generated considerable heat between the
supporters and detractors of the venture. At issue was'a
quarrel between 00 and OCR in which the latter challenged
John Bagnall's method of arriving at cost figures in his analysis
of the GAT Project. 1074/ Although OCR persisted for a time in
continuing the dispute, 1075/ 00 refused to be drawn further
into the quarrel and there the matter rested. Bagnall, however,
continued to issue figures on the GAT Project severely critical
of that system. On 31 January 1962 he reported to the ACS
that further computations on the basis of available facts had
made it obvious that MT under GAT could actually cost as much
as $28.29 per 1,000 words. Time computation for this number of
words, involving input, translation, and post-editing, amounted
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to 317 to 360 minutes for GAT compared with 192 for human
translation. 1076/ Bagnall was pushing the issue hard.
The question of OCR-versus-FDD funding of the GAT Project
remained open into February 1962. The 00-FDD position continued
to be that the MT project should not be under OCR. However, the
only two places in the Agency for its logical assignment appeared
to be FDD or the CIA Autcmatic Data Processing Staff (ADPS),
and,
was strongly opposed to having the division saddled
with the complications inherent in the project, especially at
this late date when its termination was pending. 1077/
l
The issue. pertaining to continued CIA sponsorship of the
GAT Project had by now reached the critical point. On 26 February
Bagnall reported to Carey his contention that, based on random
examples, the output of the Air Force-IBM system was not only
far better than the GAT but had actually reached an acceptable
stage. He therefore strongly urged CIA to commence negotiations
with the Air Force and IBM for use of their system and, to abandon
the Georgetown scheme. 1078/
On 14 March 1962, following discussions between 00 and ADPS,
Bagnall and ~ -1 the ADPS Chief, addressed a memorandum
to Paul Borel in which they offered the recam ndation -- among
others -- that the GAT project be phased out as of 30 June 1962,
that Chief, FDD be named responsible officer to monitor MT
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research on CIA's behalf and be designated CIA representative
on the interagency Committee on Machine Translation Research
(IQvIrR), and that FY-1963 funds be transferred from GAT to FDD
to be used in conducting the MT activities of the Agency. 1079/
The final decision to terminate the GAT Project was reached.
on 29 March at a meeting chaired by of the
DD/I's Office and at this session Prof. Dostert was informed
of the projected discontinuance of CIA support for GAT effective
1 July 1962. 1080/ Dostert threatened an appeal but this proved
little more than bluster and the project gradually drew to a
close.
In a letter of 29 May 1962 the DDCI informed the president
of Georgetown University of the CIA decision to discontinue
Agency support but agreed to the payment of legitimate liquidation
costs to assist in the phase-out program. In return the. Agency
requested a full report on the project's accomplishments from
inception to the date of termination. 1081/.
The originally proposed 90-day cut-off date proved to be
overly optimistic and negotiations concerning conclusion of
the project continued. Eventually, however, the final date,
was set at 31 March 1963 and after CIA had subscribed a closing
allotment, including payment for an-unauthorized deficit of
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incurred by GAT, plus soave further procrastination
on the part of GU, the project was discontinued. 1082
B. The Division Turns to Private Industry
Mechanical translation involved the development and
employment of machines for the performance of a function of
considerable usefulness to the government. While private
research establishments, including educational institutions,
were in a position to engage in and offer the results of
research in the theoretical aspects of language patterns and
relationships, they were seldom equipped with the engineering
' know-how or facilities to produce the hardware which permit-
ted them to transpose their theoretical computations to a
' practical operational level. It was therefore only a matter
' of time after the government decision to enter the MT field
that private computer firms and other producers of related
' hard- and software should be working in close collaboration
with government agencies interested in the products of their
manufacture.
In connection with the GAT Project, CIA and FDD had
not been directly associated with private industry. in this
case Georgetown University had handled its own contacts with
outside firms. But already in the course of its liaison with
GU, FDD was investigating the offerings of computer
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manufacturers and R&D organizations to. determine the
feasibility and practicability of their products.
Contacts with computer firms were made as early as the
end of 1955 when John. Bagnall was approached by a represent-
ative of Raw-Wooldridge Ccinpany, contractors for the Air
Force, who discussed'with him the methodology in handling
information fran foreign-language sources with a view toward
machine development. 1083/ Other firms followed with pre-
sentations of their own, in scone instances offering hard
.figures on costs and methods. In a few cases the preliminary
discussions showed promise of feasible methods but oftentimes
the cost proved prohibitive, far surpassing the cost of human
translation. Of the early contacts, none gave prcanise of
yielding a satisfactory solution to the problem- Thus, for
the moment, the Agency`s hopes rested with the GAT Project.
FDD ' s first direct exposure to MT development by
International Business Machines, the firm with which it was
to be closely associated in ALP/MT development during the
next few years, occurred in February 1960 when John Bagnall,
as chairman of C~E'LP, attended an IBM presentation on the
state of the art. IBM, which had been working on the prob-
lem for a considerable period in the past, had resumed MT
development under an Air Force contract in September 1959
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' and had attained an estimated speed of 100,000 words per
hour. The translations fran this operation required post-
editing. At the CEFLP meeting following the visit to IBM,
the cost differential between NIT and human translation was
examined. In Bagnall's view the cost would be similar if
all phases of the MT process, such as feed-in and post-
editing, were considered. 1084/
At the following month's meeting Bagnall distributed
examples of the IBM NB' for examination and informed the
committee of a study currently under way in FDD to determine
the best ooanbination of substantive and linguistic qualifi-
cations required by individuals to post-edit the NIT material.
I At this and at the previous meeting of the committee the
problem of developing a character recognition device (mechan-
ical reader) designed to do away with the laborious manual
' key-punching operation was also considered and the develop-
rrents to date of RCA and Baird Atomic,. Inc., were exauined. 1085/
This phase of MT was an important one from the standpoint of
speeding up the process and, as subsequent progress indicated,
' proved difficult to solve.
On the basis of the initial contacts, on 20 April 1960
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620
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to CIA for establishment of an automatic translation facility. 1086/
' In a reply ten days later Allen Dulles commented on the fact
that the CIA-supported GAT Project to date had proved suffi-
ciently encouraging to justify a large-scale operational feasi-
bility test and therefore expressed agreement with the proposal.
As a result a meeting was arranged for 5 May. 1087/
In connection with the negotiations now under way, in.
March an estimate of overall annual translation service re-
' quired by all USIB components had been coordinated by Bagnall
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On 25 May 1960, in company with other members of CODIB
and the CODIB Subcoarmttee on Mr, John Bagnall attended a
demonstration, one of many in which he and other FDD officers
were to participate in the next few years, at the IBM Research
Center at Mohansic, New York, and was impressed by the pro-
gress achieved through IBM's approach. His enthusiasm,
however, was not generally shared by other committee members.
The consensus appeared to be that it was desirable to caanpare
various systems in a large-scale feasibility test rather than
to zero in on one at this point. The CODIB would therefore take
no position at this time on funds for the IBM proposal. 1090
In 1961 CIA became involved in research related to an
operation which impinged at least indirectly on the ongoing
MT program and thereby affected also FDD operations. This
concerned investigation in the employment of carrputers as
an aid to intelligence operations and resulted in the estab-
lishment of the Autanatic Data Processing Staff. In the
course of its development and activity, and not long after
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it was set up, the ADPS engaged in the formulation of a
system which came to be designated as Project CHIVE, the name
given to a computing develognent program for the DD/I (a
similar program was under way for the DD/S). As defined by
the DD/I, the principal tasks of Project CHIVE were three in
number, as follows: to establish a computer center for the
DD/I; to implement selected computing and data processing
applications in direct support of DD/I intelligence officers;
and to conduct a study on a system's designed effort to
satisfy future DD/I needs, primarily in the areas of docmient
retrieval and automated information systems. 1091/
In terms of the new CHIVE system'.s effect on FDD, in
May 1961 John Bagnall foresaw the application of electronic
data processing as feasible in at least three fields of oper-
ations, that is, the CTS index, the cataloging and retrieval
of information for FDD special research reports, and machine
translation. Since EDP hardware was employed in MT systems,
it appeared likely that FDD would ultimately utilize the
Center's facilities for MT. 1092/ This appraisal of CHIVE
application in MT operations eventually proved to be true.
To relate the FDD function to the new project's devel-
opment,, a number of briefings of ADP Staff and IBM personnel
were conducted during June 1962, and in November
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were designated as the FDD repre-
sentatives to work with the evaluation group of Project
CHIVE in determining the feasibility of utilizing the IBM
Stenowriter System* in FDD to produce Russian-English MP as
well as to print out fran stenotype input human translations
from languages other than Russian. 1093/ Throughout the
life of CHIVE, FDD remained in close touch with the project
and contributed whatever it could toward what was hoped would
be its eventual success.
Meanwhile, CIA and FDD continued the search for a solu-
tion to the MT problem and in this connection made contact
with numerous firms and institutions engaged in trying to
solve it. A CIA paper issued in March 1962 listed some
eleven such organizations engaged in language-processing
research alone, 1094/ while-many others worked on the devel-
opment of peripheral equipment, such, for example, as the.
character recognition machine referred to earlier. By
November 1961 Sylvania had joined RCA and Baird Atomic in
.offering its version of this device for inspection. 1095/
* In the Stenowriter System trained stenotypists prepared
machine-shorthand tapes of dictated English translations of
foreign-language text. The stenotapes were converted to
magnetic tapes via a so-called Steno Mark Reader. The mag-
netic tape was then fed to a processor which, in conjunction
with a Steno dictionary, produced a printout of the English
text.
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Of the firms which offered their services in the NT
field at this time, many were technically and financially ill-
.prepared to enter it. Their claims were frequently extrava-
gant and were soon refuted when they were asked to produce
results. Their hope appeared to be to secure a government
subsidy, followed by extended experimentation but with no
realistic conception of the pitfalls likely to be encountered
in the Mr field. This was, of course,. not true of all. A
good many were legitimate companies, well-financed and pos-
sessing adequate or better technical facilities, which desired
to expand their activities outside already well-established
fields. CIA, anxious to take advantage of new and recent
advances in computer technology, in MT and in other phases,
gave all who desired it a hearing.
With the GAT Project encountering difficulties and
showing few signs of becoming a viable system, CIA-FDD sought
help elsewhere. Gradually the Agency's choice narrowed down
to the tentative selection of IBM, a well-established firm
experienced in computer technology, to carry on its Mr
experimentation. As mentioned earlier, IBM was already
engaged in this work for Georgetown University and the Air
Force. Nbreover, Bagnall, as part of the 00DIB group, had
visited the IBM Research Center, so that IBM activity was
not unknown to FDD.
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On 29 June 1962, accompanied by
of FDD, John Bagnall again visited New York and
received a further briefing at IBM. In his report to 00 he
described MP as the initial step to be accomplished; research
in this field was planned by IBM in three stages, namely, an
automated dictionary, syntactic analysis, and semantic
analysis. To date the first step had been completed with a
dictionary of 200,000 Russian words. The second step was mar
in process and could take two years or more to complete.
Bagnall also reported that the reader scanner manufactured by
Baird Atomic had failed to work and that IBM was seeking to
correct its faults and at the same time attempting to develop
a better one of its own. Moreover, IBM was fabricating a
Russian-language stenotype facility which would enable a
stenotypist to type the Russian phonetically, and the re-
sulting tape could then be fed into a machine for translation
into English. IBM was also working on Chinese translations
in connection with MT. In addition, the firm had developed a
stenowriter system which could transcribe steno tapes. IBM
did not volunteer cost figures for the various machines but
said the company was matching Air Force research funds dollar
for dollar. 1096/
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With the decision all but made to base the CIA Mr and
ADP program on IBM research, planning moved rapidly forward.
On 18 October 1962 IBM Corporation,
submitted to ADPS and FDD a formal proposal to install a
stenowriter in FDD at an approximate cost of
system would, apply the techniques of high-speed transcription
of stenotype to a system for converting translated dictation
into printed documents. It was capable of servicing 28
stenotypists working full time at 150 words per minute. An.
advantage of the system was that it was a general-purpose
language processor which could be used for other applications.
such as language translation. 1097 In the event that the
system was approved and installed, it was Bagnall's expecta-
tion that ten stenotypists would be needed for the FDD part
of its input. He expected to train FDD's present staff, if
possible, through IBM facilities. When the system had
attained its full capacity, he believed the division's output
would not consume the full time of the system and suggested
that Contact Division and FBID consider adaptation of their
reports to the stenowriter, 1098 an invitation which FBID
subsequently pursued when in May 1963 that organization
arranged to be included in the first phase of the environ-
mental study in order to determine its applicability to
the Daily Report. 1099
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With the IBM proposal in hand, CIA proceeded as rapidly
as possible to take same form of concrete action with regard
to the overture. On 14 November the group studying the pro-
posal again visited the IBM Research Center, where certain
questions were discussed and the firm demonstrated its present.
stenotype code-to-English translating capability. As-it.
turned out, the quality of the product was far below that
which IBM had claimed, in its proposition, to be able to
develop. Still, it was recognized that the potential of the
system was such that continued improvement could be antici-
pated. The Air Force and IBM had collaborated over a period
of several years in developing the AN/GSQ-16 lexical processor
and an MT capability, and FDD at this time judged this Russian-
to-English NIT, with a reasonable amount of post-editing, to
be capetitive with its human translation effort. The division
was thus in favor of negotiating the contract as it had been
proposed by IBM. In its initial planning FDD expected to
operate the AN/GSQ-16 in the MT mode about five hours and in
the stenowriter node about two hours per day. With this
operation it hoped to achieve a number of advantages, viz:
eliminate FDD's dependence on contractual help. for Russian-
to-Eiglishtranslation;speed up the translation function
and increase the volume; provide a standard terminology
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the translated product; and provide a saving of 18 per page
of edited Russian-to-English text. Thus, in terms of this
high-flown anticipation and based on the results of the 14
November visit and the ensuing discussions,
of the ADPS evaluation group, in his report of 4 December 1962
to the ADPS chief, rec mended that the Agency contract with
IBM to perform a study of the DD/I requirements for CHIVE, as
well as MP and stenowriter, appropriate to the capabilities
of the AN/GSQ-16 and, based on the results of this study, to
proceed with IBM to develop and apply the appropriate capabil-
ities of the machine for DD/I? applications. further
recommended that the AN/GSQ-16 be initially located in the
DD/I Computer Center but later on moved to FDD when a satis-
factory operational MC and stenowriter capability had been
proven. 1100/
Despite knowledge of pending, though relatively minor,
complexities before the system could become operational, FDD
and ADPS approached the new project with high hopes.. Bagnall
seemed to feel that the present IBM NT system was far enough
advanced so that it could be used with a minimum of post-
editing. It would take approximately 15 months to acquire
and install the machines and by that time the system was
likely to be further improved by IBM. It had now been
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determined that the cost figures of the IBM Stenowriter
System including the NIT capability would amount to
the rise over the originally quoted figure
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attributable to the need for standard IBM components required
to complete the basic system over and above the special hard-
and software cited earlier. With the MT added, Bagnall
anticipated that he could use the machine full time and
possibly even on a shift basis and thereby double or triple
the present FDD Russian output. He presumed the machine would
therefore be installed in the FDD area of the Matoenic Building
but was warned by
of possible opposition to this from
the building owner due to the need for special air-conditioning
and reinforcing of floors. 1101/ This prediction proved true
and partially for this reason but mainly because of ADPS
opposition to a dispersal of computer systems within the
Agency, all such systems were eventually centralized at
Headquarters and all FDD NIT experimentation involving machine
use was conducted off FDD premises.
By the end of 1962 CIA had completed all phases of the
study on the IBM proposal at the operating level and the re-
view had come out favorably. The next steps involved running
the proposal through the management cycle where the project
would be weighed, in terms of priority, with others.
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As this was going on, certain management changes oc-
curred at IBM which, from the Agency standpoint, required
some adjustment and a certain amount of delay. Immediately
pertinent was the resignation of the research director,
IBM's Vice President in Charge of Research and Engineering,
on 6 February 1963 visited the Agency with other IBM officials
to acquaint the people there with the nature of the change
and to assure them of his coanpany's continued support in the
pending project.
Not long after, on 10 April,
dispatched identical
letters to Bagnall and informing them that ITEK had
submitted to the Agency a proposal for automatic translation
equipment. The new offer was broad in scope and dealt with
what ITEK could supply in the way of equipment, the theory of
its approach to the problem, and its treatment of information
retrieval, steno transcription, and language translation. 1102
This development threatened a new delay in the attempt to,
get work started on the Automatic Language Processing System..
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thus in effect paying for the equipment in
Meanwhile, on the following day Bagnall and
submitted a joint request to the CIA Comptroller to allocate
the scan of ~ in FY-1963 to ADPS to procure MT/steno-
writer equipment from IBM for FDD use. The memorandum pre-
sented a general review of progress to date, enumerated the
likely benefits to be derived from the equipment, which would.
be installed by IBM within 15 months of the contract's
signature, and promised a tripling of FDD's current Russian
output or, at the current production level, a saving of
less than two years' time. 1103
The Budget Division's views on the FDD-ADPS bid were
expressed on 25 April in a cautious, somewhat critical memo-
the Comptroller. In it
chief, following a review of the system and a visit to the
IBM research laboratories, posed certain unanswered questions,
pertaining to such matters as: a more careful approach by
FDD and IBM to the serious personnel training and retention
problems; greater attention to workload priorities; possible
technological obsolescence, based on IBM's own statement that
it was working on improved models and on the possibilities of
better systems by other firms (for example, ITEK), thus
suggesting a lease system in preference to purchasing; and
the need for more tangible proof concerning the estimated
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speed-up rate of three-to-one over the present translation
process. Despite these questions, judged the project 25X1
sufficiently promising to warrant consideration of a limited
approach, that is, negotiation of a systems contract with IBM
permitting answers to some of the foregoing questions with
deferral of a final decision until applications and problems
had been more clearly defined. 1104/
The Comptroller's admonishment for a more careful assess-
ment resulted in further study of the problem by FDD and ADPS.
In the course of this, Bagnall on 2 July 1963 gave a presenta-
tion to the ADPS group on the current status of MT in which he
reviewed the three major NIT systems that had been under devel-
opment for years, the GAT, the Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge (THIN),
and the IBM (for the Air Fbrce) systems. The cost of the
three per 1,000 wards ran approximately $22, $16, and $10,
respectively. They differed primarily in the extent to which,
sophistication of a syntactic nature had been introduced,
ranging from the most ambitious in the GU system to the
least in the IBM arrangement, which was essentially a mechan-
ical dictionary. Bagnall favored the latter as the best and
most practical at this time. All systems required post-
editing; however, a translator employing the IBM method
could triple his output. To provide input for this system,
13 ?leowriters were needed. 1105/
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Prior to the 2 July conclave, in response to discussions
with members of the Comptroller's Office, ADPS had prepared
a single set of system specifications and on 10 June had sub-.
mitted copies to IBM and ITEK requesting return comment. Both
firms submitted revised proposals on 26 June and discussed
them with ADPS to iron out moot points. A comparative evalu-
ation and reccmnendation was then prepared jointly by ADPS
and FDD. This paper revealed the total fixed price of the
I
IBM system to be
including the cost of the flexo-
25X1
system, on the other hand, had a total fixed price of
writers. On a 12 month lease arrangement, the outlay would
be plus the initial cost of the flexowriters
and a steno mark sensor unit. Approximately 70 percent of the
rental would be available toward later purchase. The ITEK
with a lease arrangement of
the entire amount available toward a purchase option. The
ADPS-FDD reccnanendation in favor of IBM was based on the factor
of less capital risk for CIA plus greater IBM experience in the
NIT field. 1106/
On 9 July 1963, at the request of the CIA Executive
Director, the Automatic Data Processing O mnittee reviewed
the proposals. Certain hazards were considered, but in view
of the urgency for progress in the MT field these risks were
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accepted. The committee thus concurred in the ADPS-FDD
proposal and reccamended the following: that IBM be selected
as the contractor; that 13 flexowriters be procured with
FY-1963 funds; and that ADPS seek to negotiate a lease arrange-
meat with IBM (effective FY-1965) and initiate procurement of
a special-purpose steno mark sensor at a cost of
(effective FY-1964). 1107/
With final approval imminent, FDD, in preparation for
the receipt of the ALP system and in anticipation of the use
of the Air Fbrce's AN/GSQ-16, initiated orders for 13 flexo-
writers modified for Russian punch-tape input. However, the
project was not out of the woods yet. In the first place
the CIA Ctroller, John A. Bross, in reviewing the estimate,
expressed concern over two items, namely the lower cost figure
proposed by ITEK and the portent of the departure earlier of
an acknowledged MT authority, and soave of his
associates frown IBM to join ITEK. It was his feeling that
CIA should proceed very slowly with this program. 1108 His
misgivings appeared further bolstered when at the end of
August ITEK, anxious to secure the contract, sharply reduced
its bid fran
which placed its total estimate considerably below the IBM
bid. However, at this same time IBM had offered its steno
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recently appointed to the new CIA position of Assistant
Director for Computer Services, indicated his strong inclina-
tion toward adopting the IBM system, but by 4 September the
Comptroller had still not connlitted himself. 1109/
The log jam was finally broken on 10 September when
the attractiveness of that firm's offer.
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mark sensor unit on a lease. basis and also made the'~unit
subject to a 70-percent purchase option rate, which made
the IBM proposal still the more desirable financially.
Moreover, r= had never built computers and the vast
experience of IBM in this field added immeasurably to
the Budget officer, with the Comptroller's approval,
that the Budget Division favored the
IBM proposal, and on 13 September IBM was so advised. 1110/
Formal notification of this fact was issued on 29 November
1963, and IBM was informed that as soon as the fire had drawn
up the required formal standards and specifications for the.
project, CIA would issue a letter of intent to enter into an
agreement for lease of the ALP System for a mi.nini n of one
year. ~ -1 of OCS was designated the authorized
representative for the Agency. 1111/
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1
C. MT Experimentation in Other Languages
Greatest emphasis in the MT field during the early 1960s
had for obvious reasons been on the machine translation of
Russian-to-English text, but simultaneous effort of sanewhat
lower intensity had also been expended on the application of
MT methodology to other languages, in particular to Chinese.
Already in January 1960 John Bagnall reported that the
University of Washington was doing research in machine trans-
lation of Chinese scientific material to English and had
expressed the need for $50,000 a year for a pilot project
and twice this amount for a full-scale research undertak-
ing. 1112/ On 26 May 1960 of FDD's Asia Division,
had conferred with the staff of the RCA research installation
in Camden, New Jersey, regarding that firm's development of
Chinese MT. RCA proposed, with sufficient subsidy, to produce
acceptable MT within one year's time. 1113/ By 12 March 1962
FDD had also carried out an evaluation of a Chinese MT system
proposed by a California fim known as Pan Technical Systems,
Inc. 1114/ In mid-1962 IBM was working on. Chinese translations
for the purpose of developing a. mechanism whereby a typist could
be trained to input the Chinese ideographs by recognizing cer-
tain key features of the characters, an operation which could
be accanplished without language training. 1115/ The need. for
experimental work on MT in other languages was emphasized in .
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1
October 1962 by Bagnall in a briefing of the Air Force
Science Advisory Board's Ad Hoc Ccm-nittee on Machine Trans-
lation concerning CIA's current views on MT in which he recc r-
mended accelerated research in languages other than Russian
since the latter comprised only 7.5 percent of the estimated
volume of literature, requiring processing. 1U6/
Research and experimentation, primarily in Chinese MT,
paralleled on a lesser scale that carried on in Russ'
.an
during 1963 and involved the development of an experimental.
Chinese translation system. Later in the year the ccanpati-
bility of the Chinese Photoccnposer with the IBM Autanatic
Language Processor was examined, 1117 and on 31 January 1964
the first meeting was held between IBM and FDD regarding a
program to create a Chinese dictionary for MT. At this and
at a subsequent session on 27 February plans for a joint
effort on the problem were discussed, and IBM agreed to submit
about mid-March a cost estimate for a two-year schedule of
development of a "pin-yin"* translation system. 1118
A program was developed but, never implemented and the
February negotiations marked the'high point as far as CIA and
FDD experience with Chinese Mr was concerned. Its further
* Rix enized Chinese characters.
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development was likely to hinge on . the. success.of.the FDD
experimentation with.Russian.MT then pending.. On 14 May 1964
Joseph Becker, the AD/CS, informed IBM that: budgetary.re-
strictions for FY-1965 would limit.current CIA investment in
ALP to the funds allocated.to the ALP proposal on a Russian
1',TT capability then . being. negotiated with IBM. He indicated,
however that CIA interest in autocratic processing for Chinese
and other languages was a continuing one.-1119/
As a footnote to the foregoing, representatives of ITEK
Corporation in.July 1964 informed John Bagnall, then DAD/CR, of
.its current research in both Chinese and Russian MT. A year
later, on 13 August 1965, ITEK briefed CIA officers, including
several from FDD, on its progress in two years of theoretical
work in Chinese MT for the Air Force and announced the sched-
uling of a practical demonstration of the system in October.
The ITEK representatives were informed that CIA was interested
in following ITEK developments but that the Agency was not
funding any further research in MT at that time. 1120/
Meanwhile, FDD and the Agency considered MT applications
.in languages. other than.Russian and Chinese,.but this effort
proved relatively short-lived. In early 1963, encouraged by
..the apparent progress in ALP experimentation for Russian,
the Agency. adopted a. policy of broadening MT research. to
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languages such as Spanish, French, and those of Eastern .
Europe. By June 1964 FDD had laid the groundwork for the
development of dictionaries in anticipation of possible ALP
system adaptation. This included, in addition to the Chinese,
files in French and Spanish produced as by-products in the
course of normal operations including upwards of 30,000 and
1,500 carded entries, respectively. In addition, smaller
efforts had been expended in Portuguese, Polish, and other
languages. 1121/ The Agency policy to expand MT research
to other languages resulted in July 1964 in an FDD decision
to prepare a paper defining the need for MT in the Rcanance
languages and, on the basis of the conclusions reached,
making reccermendations on what course to follow. 1122/
The proposed FDD paper was some time in the formulation,
but finally in late fall
25X1
of the proposal addressed to John Bagnall, the DAD/CR. In it
he emphasized the urgent need for a system of machine-aid
for human translation of foreign-language documents because
of increased translation demands and recruitment difficulties
but recommended that such a machine-aid system be limited to
French and Spanish. 1123
This memorandum, prepared for Chief, FDDos signature,
was never signed. Instead, it was attached to a to-
Bagnall memorandum of 4 December 1964. By now, though the
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testing of the IBM ALP system was not yet ccpleted,
able sums of irony so far spent and the meager results attained
in the experiment. He explained to Bagnall his reluctance to .
sign because he felt further CIA investment in any disciplines
or languages was unjustified until the practicability and
feasibility of MT had been further tested. The years of
research and massive sums so far spent had still left the
future of the undertaking uncertain. Feasibility tests in
other languages, he felt, were consequently unwise. He there-
fore proposed instead for FDD to shift the investment of
available resources to human translation but to continue to
observe MT R&D programs in other languages sponsored by NSF
and private caiirercial firms. 1124 This action ended further
pursuit of an MT capability -in non-Russian languages so far
as FDD was concerned.
was beginning to have reservations about the consider-
D. FDD-Air Force Cooperation
FDD exposure to the MT operation in the late 1950s and
early 1960s during the period of its support of the GAT Project
and the initial IBM overtures, was limited largely to theory
and experimentation. At the same time, however, while the
division was only just in the process of getting its feet wet,
,its Air Force counterpart, the Foreign Technology Division,
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had moved ahead and in cooperation with IBM had established
an MT facility based on the AN/GSQ-16 machine with which it
was regularly producing Russian S&T translations.
Some collaboration with the Air Force in connection with
Mr had already been initiated in October 1961 when FDD was
provided with sane random MT text from the Air Force-IBM pro-
ject through George H. Pughe, Jr., of AID in the Library of
Congress. John Bagnall reported having found this material
so readable that post-editing was accomplished at approxi-
mately one third the cost of editing the GAT product. 1125/
This brief experiment and subsequent analysis in 1962
of the utilization of the AN/GSQ-16 machine in FDD operations
proved so promising that in July 1963 Bagnall entered into
general agreement for cooperative use of the Air Force's
prototype AN/GSQ-16 machine for Russian translation. The
machine was expected to arrive at Wright Patterson Air Force
Base near the end of August and to be in operation sometime
in October or November. In a letter to FID on 26 July,
Bagnall spelled out his ideas for a.modus operandi rela-
tive to FDD-FTD cooperation in its utilization. He estimated
that FDD would forward to FTD about 90,000 words a day for
translation, tape-punched for direct input. For this purpose
the division would use flexowriters compatible with the
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Air Force system and would aixmal the tape daily. Bagnall
indicated he was also investigating the possible use of a
leased wire for direct tape transmittal. It was agreed
that after the machine runs were returned from FTD, this out-
put would be post-edited through the facilities of JPRS. To
carry out this work, it was estimated that FDD would require
13 flexotypists. The machines required for their use were
already on order from IBM and were expected to arrive at FDD
sometime in November 1963. Since ETD had expressed a willing-
ness to train the flexowriter operators at Dayton, Ohio, the
division planned to send two or three of the operators there
for at least a week of instruction. On their return to
Washington this training. would then be passed on to other
trainees. 1126
Beginning 23 September 1963, Chief'
of the Support Branch's Publications Section in FDD, received
two weeks' training at Wright-Patterson AFB in the operation
of the Cyrillic keyboard flexowriters. Shipment of the
latter to FDD had begun in October, and on 26 November when
all had been received, the full-time training of the 13
flexotypists was initiated in the division. This number was
reduced by approximately one half in June 1964'and only the
best trainees were retained in the job.
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As projected in 1963 in cost ocxnparisons between human
and machine (the AN/GSQ-16) translation using the factors of
input, translation, and post-editing, FDD estimated a current
expenditure of $12.00 per 1,000 wards compared with $9.60
for human translation but anticipated that, with an increase
in MT utilization to three times the projected current pro-
duction, this figure for the AN/GSQ-16 would be cut back to
$8.40 per 1,000 words. 1127/ The total annual saving in the
use of the stenowriter mode, involving costs for salaries,
equipment, and supplies, was expected to be about $190,000
and for the MT mode about $167,000, a total of $357,000. 1128/
These enthusiastic projections reflected an ignorance of
intangibles which, when corrected later on, led to more
reasonable assessments.
Meanwhile, a continuing series of exchanges of person-
nel on a higher level took place between Washington and Dayton
to coordinate the operation. Finally, with arrangements
pertaining to security, training, and procedures ocalpleted,
FDD was ready to begin its first full-scale experiment in
processing NT text. The division expected to start forward-
ing the Russian punched tapes on a daily basis after
6 January 1964 and hoped to achieve the 90,000 words per day
rate very soon. In light of its other commitments FDD'
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1
headquarters was not in a position to meet the post-editing
goal of up to 45,000 words a day for FTD. Bagnall therefore
reported to the Air Force that FM had "contracted" with JPRS
in the C_rce Department to carry on this work and requested
ETD to send the tapes directly there. JPRS estimated a turn-
around time of four to five days per 100 pages once the project
got under way. 1129/
MT operations finally ciced on 17 January when the
first substantial shipnent of 45,000 words. was sent to
Wright-Patterson, and by March post-editing in JPRS was in
full swing with material from FTD being received almost daily.
During March 1964 JPRS post-edited a total of approximately
370,000 words. 1130/ In April the task of post-editing the
FTD Mr output was assigned to the New York and San Francisco
offices of JPRS in addition to D.C.
By May 1964 post-editing by the three offices had risen
to some 533,000 words for the month, but there was at this
time already a hint of problems related to the conversion of
translators to post-editors which the project had made
necessary. In May, however, this difficulty appeared to be
temporarily resolved due to a marked improvement in materials
received from ETD as the result of a new and improved vocab-
ulary disk having been obtained from IBM for use in the
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AN/GSQ-16 machine. The improvement in quality of the trans
lated output helped to lessen JPRS qualms about the need to
convert sufficient translators into post-editors to keep
pace with the flow of materials being received. The problems
still remained, Bagnall reported, but they looked somewhat
smaller. 1131/
Another difficulty came to light the following month
in the course of a liaison trip by FM and OCS officers to
Wright-Patterson, when dissatisfaction was expressed with JPRS
service and FM proposed discontinuing its use and doing all
post-editing in-house. Such a step would, however, have no effect
on FM processing of FDD input. 1132/ In fact, the threat to
discontinue JPRS support was never carried out.. Despite prob-
lems, the work continued and by mid-1964 FDD had tape-
punched more than three million Russian words of input, 1133/
resulting in the production of 1,735,000 words of Russian-
English Mr by FTD. This material was subsequently issued by
JPRS/OTS to the commmlunity in the form of 207 S&T reports. 1134/
The end of the FDD-FPD cooperative effort on NIT came
finally as a result of the culmination of FDD's negotiations
with IBM relative to the firm's ALP system development for
the division. This was brought about when, after :a period
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of experimentation, FDD contracted with. IBM for a one-year
test of the new ALP system, scheduled to begin in August 1965.
Since it would cc*nprise an Mr mode as well as other language-
processing capabilities, the system required modification of
the FDD flexowriter equipment, making FDD tapes incompatible
with the AN/GSQ-16. Consequently, FDD input to FTD equipment
would gradually decrease as individual machines were modified.
During the life of the agreement with the Air Force,
the operation had achieved scene success in terms of quantity.
Between 17 January 1964 and 28 February 1965 FDD had sent
approximately 9,561,000 words of Russian to FTD for MT pro-
cessing and had reimbursed JPRS for post-editing some
4,127, 000 words of Russian MI' submitted by F.
expressed appreciation for past FTD cooperation and stated
that in the next 30 days FDD proposed to send to Wright-
Patterson approximately another 300,000 words for processing.
There would be no further shipments after 15 April. 1135/
E. The Outcome
1. Development of the System
By the beginning of 1964 Agency (FDD)-IBM coordination
in establishing an ALP system had reached a critical point.:
The two sides had reached an understanding that IBM would
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1
proceed to develop such a system and estimated that it would
take about 15 months to accanplish this assignment, and the
Agency, through its Budget Division, had ccamitted itself to
underwriting the effort, but so far no contract had yet been
signed. This awaited further progress.
It became the task of FDD, in cooperation with ADPS
and the new Office of Computer Services (OCS), to monitor the
project fran here on in, to conduct tests to determine the
reliability and feasibility of the projected system, and
finally to pass judgment and submit recannendations in re-
spect to the Agency's commitment to the final product. The
immediate problem facing all parties concerned was to
establish the.ground rules under which coordinated activity
was to be carried out. This involved a number of factors,
such as, for example, mutual, agreement by CIA and IBM on
the standards and specifications for ALP, proper security
clearance for IBM employees who would be intimately associ-
ated with the application of the ALP system to active intel-
ligence requirements and methods, the orientation and
familiarization of IBM personnel on current procedures and
planned activities for ALP, the same for CIA personnel in
connection with IBM hardware and development procedures, the
determination of data characteristics developed by IBM in the.
past few years and their application to intelligence needs, and,
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finally, the determination of input and output formats
and coding.
All these factors were dealt with as expeditiously as
possible although hitches here and there required adjustments
and adaptations. The experience gained by the division since
its initial involvement with MT proved very valuable and its
continued interest and planning for more than a year in an-
ticipation of the steno/Mr system had prepared its personnel
for appropriate assignments. For example, in the preparation.
of Russian input data FDD personnel were already familiar with
the Data Preparation Procedure employed for the AN/GSQ-16.
Further, FDD now had a Cyrillic typist-instructor and 13
other clericals familiar with Cyrillic keyboard and flexo-
writer operation. Six of these'had reached a proficiency of
5,000 words per day and the'training of the remainder was:
continuing.
Despite these pluses, there were also many minuses.
Not the least of these was the need to convert the mentality
of the division staff, still largely wedded to the inviola-
bility of the human-translation concept, to one based on
machine-oriented translation -- in other words, to dispel
the normal fear of the individual of being replaced by the
machine. This, more than any other single aspect, made the
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undertaking difficult from the start.
Simultaneous with the development of the ALP system
and the preparations for its testing, efforts continued to
provide for the formal financing of the system and to conclude
arrangements for leasing it. These arrangements were initi-
ated on 9 March 1964 by Joseph Becker, AD/CS. in his memo-
randum Becker identified the ALP as a computer system capable
of performing two major types of operations, the stenowriter
mole, whereby the ALP would automatically transcribe data
from machine shorthand to English, and the machine translation
mole, in which the ALP would automatically translate from
]Russian to English. If the system served its intended purpose,
Becker anticipated that the Agency would extend the lease
arrangement or purchase the hardware. 1136/
The request for funds.was approved by the DDCI on
1 April 1964. 1137/ Becker then requested the Director of
Logistics to negotiate with IBM for acquisition of the ALP
system for the Agency. It was specified that the rental
period would begin about May 1965 after the system had been
developed and accepted. 1138/ The signing of the contract
with IBM was finally consummated on 18 June 1964 and it was
anticipated that a test of the Automatic Language Processor
system for use in producing FDD reports would be effected on
or about 20 August 1965.
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However, even before the contract had reached the point
of final signature a planning conference was arranged for the
period 29 April to 1.May 1964 in the course of which Agency
(OCS and FDD) and IBM personnel met to organize implementation
management and to exchange system functional and environmental
data. At this meeting it was decided that overall management
and direction of ALP system implementation for the Agency would
crane from OCS with assigned as Project Director.
FDD, as user of the system, would provide product standards,
manage data preparation operations, and evaluate the product.
Following introductory remarks and a review of the system to
date, the conference participants were formed into working
groups and for the balance of the conference discussed prob-
laps and exchanged information on the various aspects of the
project. 1139/ The meeting proved fruitful and set the tone
for a cooperative relationship between the Agency and IBM
for the long haul ahead.
This conference was only the first of many of a similar
nature conducted in the next few months. On 10 June a meeting
was held at which the post-editing of steno output was dis-
cussed because of the continued concern about the estimated
four-percent machine error, ccnVounded by human input errors.
The group considered four alternatives, via: to post edit;
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to educate the catuliunity. to. accept, temporarily during
development, a poorer product and not post-edit;. to duplicate
the present operation during the period of development; or to
post-edit on a selective basis, depending on the verity of
output in areas of information, and issue the rest unedited.
It was decided that semi-automated post-editing,* as pre-
sently conceived, would be a burden rather than a help and
would be impractical. 1140/ This left only resort to human
post-editing, but the problem of method was not yet resolved
at this point and discussion on the matter would continue.
Meetings held 14-15 July 1964 at FDD and on 17 July
at Kingston, New York, took up a variety of questions
related to the project. Sessions such as these between the CIA
ALP Staff and IBM representatives became from. this time on
until the end of the project a frequent and regular occurrence.-
An issue of some concern early in this period pertained
to the recruitment and training of a category of clerical
personnel in FDD whose participation in the undertaking was
vital to its success. These were the stenotypists who pre-
pared the input tapes needed to make the system function.
On 29 June, in a meimrandum to the AD/CR
* That is, use of a visual tape reader to. facilitate the
stenotype process.
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stated that the matter of setting up a stenotype training
program for FDD personnel was originally delayed pending
assurance of an IBM-CIA ALP contract. In retrospect this
delay appeared to to be a good thing in that the FDD 25X1
.plan, as conceived, was subject to potential disruption on the
part of the trainees for a variety of reasons such as the
possibility of resignation, transfer, leave, inability to
assimilate training, etc.
previously, ten would have been lost. Now, however,
ing of 15 selected clericals been started six to eight months
had suggested as an alternative the hiring of trained
stenotypists from the Washington based Stenotype Institute.
Feeling the
proposal to be more realistic and econoanical
than the earlier plan,
recommended accepting it. 114
Practical though the suggestion appeared to be, John
Vance, the AD/CR, showed reluctance to make a full caYmitment
to this arrangement and regarded statistics as overly
pessimistic. Vance therefore on 8 July recommended reliance
on both methods, training and recruitment, and ordered that
the in-house training effort continue. 1142 On 9 July
citing the target date of 15 August 1965 and the mini-
mum period of 13 months required to train a stenotypist,
urged speedy implementation of the training program and again
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proposed. use. of. the Stenotype.Instituteas a.source of.steno-
type operators:'1143/ On.14:Augustit wasresolved.to
establish imnediate.contact with theInstitute.to explore re-
cruiting and training possibilities. '1144/ At the same time,
.in-house training of stenotypists,ten in number, continued.
Work on other aspects of the ALP system meanwhile
progressed at afeverish rate. On 17 July a'meeting was held
between OCR, including FDD representatives, and OCS to review
..the status of the ALP project and to cane to some understandings
as to the objectives to be pursued.
developments to date, including information on the use of a
modified Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) system
for schedule control. In the course of the meeting Avram
..Pointed out that although acceptance criteria for the steno
mode as written in the contract called for a non-machine-
attributable error rate,of four percent, OCS, working with
IBM, had set as an objective a reduction of two percent by
the end of the . rental. year. 1145/
During the period.25-27 August.anotherseries.of.meet-
ings pertaining.to ALP was held at which information was
exchanged and a .number of decisions made. :1146/ In connection
with.Russian MT, IBM reported several- improvements in its,
program for Processing Russian in-the ALP system. It was
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agreed that FDD would furnish two Russian lexicographers on
subsequently selected) for training in Russian MT lexicography
at the IBM Research Center at Yorktown Heights, New York, and
that they would thereafter be employed full titre in this func-
tion at FDD in coordination with two IBM counterparts doing
similar work at the IBM Center. It was anticipated that the
combined effort of these men would result in the coding of
20,000 additional dictionary entries by March 1965. IBM
expressed some doubts that this could be done but were assured
by
that FDD would not require 20,000 new entries
and that those required could be coded in the time available.
CIA also arranged to supply two steno-to-English lexicog-
raphers on or about October under an arrangement similar to
that for the Russian lexicographers. These were furnished by
OCS. Their function was to code some 25,000 new entries into
the steno dictionary by March 1965.
It was stressed that for the steno system to work effec-
tively, it was necessary that each FDD report be put through
the system by the intelligence officer in the sequence and
format in which it was to be printed and as a single package
rather than in bits and pieces. That is, it was to be sent
forward for machine translation in "pre-packaged" form.
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This would.reg>;re.the preparation of. standardized. format
instructions. which would.bereproduced in.the.steno record
and cause the printer to.reproduce the report in the desired
format. The added burden on FDD linguists, it was agreed,
would be formidable. It was decided that a program of indoc-
trination and training for the linguists would have to be
Initiated to ensure effective introduction of the steno system.
The meeting resulted in several recoamiendations including
the early introduction. of an ALP dictation manual to be used
by FDD officers to instruct and guide the stenotypists. The
first of these was issued on 8 July 1964 and a revised version
on 12 April 1965. It was also resolved to ccnuence passing
system soon after 1 January 1965.
pre-packaged" reports through the FDD stenotype transcription
In the next few months further consultation on the ALP
system followed, designed to refine the system and to overcome
unresolved problems.. On 16 November OCS and FDD ALP personnel
met to consider the steno and MT costs under the ALP system.
At this meeting the.respective costs under two different
approaches basedon.actual FDD experience were-studied and OCS
and FDD figures . were. reconciled.. The costs, ofthe.respective
approaches had'amounted,to $9.80.and $9.91 per 1,000 English
.words. As a matter -of caTuarison
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presented figures for FY-1963 showing that the overall cost
of human translation from. all languages via contract amounted
to $9.77 per 1,000 words. 1147
With the approach of the new year the ALP Staff began to
formulate and refine the so-called Acceptance Test Standards
which were to serve as the basis on which would rest the final
decision as to the acceptance or rejection of the IBM ALP
system. In early December it was decided to use FDD personnel
to carry out the following functions: flexowriting 180,000
words of Russian input test; post-editing of the translated
equivalent of the 180,000 Russian words; stenotyping of
340,000 words of English text; and comparing the 340,000 words
of steno-mode printout with the original text. The staff
anticipated that this effort would require the services of a
large number of FDD personnel for about two days but felt that
the time would be well spent. 1148
The ALP Acceptance Test Criteria were established at a
meeting on 16 December 1964 between CIA and IBM representatives,
and on the basis of this document, it was proposed that IBM
develop the formal Acceptance Test Standards prior to 1 June
1965. The Test Criteria were subsequently issued on 18 March
1965 and the test itself was designed to be conducted for each
mode, steno and MT, in two phases, a quality/format test and a
quantity test. 1149/
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Other concerns relating to ALP, such, for example, as
the problem concerning the handling of proper names in MT,
were dealt with as 1964 drew to a close. Then on 19 January
1965 IBM reported that the construction and assembly of the
ALP hardware at Kingston and elsewhere, including the 1401,
Language Processing Unit (LPU), photostore, Steno Mark Reader
(SMR), tape drive, and their components, were proceeding on
schedule. By mid February, it was stated, the Research Lan
-.
guage Processor (RIP)-3, a more sophisticated computer than the
heretofore-employed Air Force Mark II and currently in use as
an exhibition model at the New York World's Fair, would be
programmed with the ALP program. This device would then be
used to debug the ALP programs. When the RLP-3 was returned
to the Fair, debugging and programming would be transferred
to the ALP, which, it was contemplated, would be sufficiently
assembled by that time. A cut-off date of 19 March 1965 was
set for dictionary entries and lexicographic contributions
from CIA. IBM and OCS were cooperating in coding the steno
dictionary, and this operation was on schedule. Moreover,
OCS was continuing its work on hcrograph resolution with
promising results, and discussion on the ALP System Acceptance
Test Criteria and the revised versions of the dictation and
flexowriter manuals continued and necessary changes were made.
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IBM announced that.the entire ALP system.would undergo system
..testing in Kingston. during May-June 1965. Inthis.connection
.the firm requested that FDD provide an unspecified amount of
steno record input.during the . testing. period. 1150
The ALP Staff and the two sponsoring Offices had
approached the new year with high hopes and enthusiasm relative.
to the promise held for the new ALP system, but it was from
about this time on that a feeling of uneasiness pervaded that
part of the community concerned with progress in the project,
and doubts were expressed and questions asked concerning one
or another aspect of the undertaking. One of these, of rela-
tively minor import, was the question, already raised earlier,
about the location of the equipment. FDD, as the primary user,
continued to question the decision to locate control of the
equipment in OCS. The last time the issue was revived was in
January 1965 when
posed the question why the SMR
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should not be located in FDD and thus eliminate the need for
special cassettes to transfer the material to Langley. The ALP
Staff answered.that there was.no obstacle.to this arrangement
provided space and environmental conditions in Key Building,
..to which FDD was to.move in April 1965, met IBM specifications.
However, it would create problems of coordination between Key and
Headquarters. Moreover -- and Here important -. OCS had been
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charged with hardware maintenance, and the SNR,.as.an.integral
part of the ALP system hardware, should . therefore be.located
within OCS.'1151/.This exchange appeared.to settle the problem
once and for all.
Considerably more significant and serious was the "static"
heard from those concerned with the MT post-editing function,
which at this time still pertained partially to the feed-back
from the Air Force MT operation but was phasing in now with the
ALP system activity. In early February 1965 a reading was
taken among the JPRS offices, upon whom the post-editing chore
mainly rested, to determine the status of their experience
with this activity. The reports received in answer to the
query were uniformly discouraging. In general, the contract
translators assigned to the job were unhappy about MT work and
preferred not to handle post-editing. In the beginning those
who undertook the work did so to please the staff officers at
JPRS. Their attitude had, however, changed. It was not only
the low rate of compensation that repelled them; they consid-
ered the work to be below.their professional standards for
translation. Without exception .every translator.. insisted. he
.could do the work faster by direct translation. In many cases
he had, in effect,. to. perform a"re-translation" of his project,
a result notonly:of machine error but. of human,error as well,,
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such. as purely typographical errors, omitted passages, .
misinterpretation of qm ilic letters on the 'part of typists
and flexotypists, etc. Basically', however, the problem was
economic. The post-editors, working at the rate of $3.00 per
1,000 words, were in same instances recompensed at less than
$1.00 per hour. For this reason many of the contractors
refused to do the work or, to assure a reasonable return, were
doing it so rapidly that the resulting product was below
standard. Some were even giving up their contracts and re-
fusing to work for JPRS. The consensus among the JP17S chiefs
was. that only by raising the post-editing rate -- to something
like $5.00 or $6.00 per 1,000 words -- or improving the
machines could the situation be improved. 1152/
in answer, to the complaints speaking for the
Joint Publications Research Committee, the JPRS control at
FDD headquarters, replied that the original post-editing con-
cept was not to get a "polished" translation but an intelligible
me. He held out hope for an improved ALP output over the
outdated AN/GSQ-16 machine and dictionary used by the Air
Force. He felt that to raise post-editing rates to five or
six dollars was poor business in face of the possibility that
the NEr product would be considerably inproved . by September
1965. 1153
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The second part of the JPRS chiefs' suggestion, improve-
meet of the machine, appeared then to be the only hope, but
by now cracks in the facade of confidence on this score were
beginning to appear. An ALP project status meeting, with
among those 25X1
in attendance, was held at Kingston on 28 May 1965. The feel-
ing of doubt is epitomized by the opening words in the report
on this meeting, viz: "Our meeting started on the high note
of viewing the new ALP equipment conpletely fabricated as it will
be delivered to CIA on or about 15 July. Unfortunately the
impressions made by this viewing of deluxe equipment were to
lose some of their luster in the later developments of the
day." 1154/
The SMR was in the final test stage and appeared to be
an excellent and easily operated piece of equipment. Unfor-
tunately, the CIA attendees were disappointed to find that the
steno dictionary for CIA use was not yet complete, and the
test performed by using an alternate dictionary gave a poor
impression of output. They were assured, however, that, with
the CIA dictionary, results would be satisfactory within the
four-percent error limit set by the specifications. The stem
disk and program were complete, but the core program could not
be completed for the meeting. IBM hoped to have this operable
by the end of the week.
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1
The LPU was in the unit test stage and no problems were
being encountered. The photostore, hovwever, was a week late
in testing, but a prototype was being used for system debug-
ging work. The programming for the Russian MT process-word tech-
nique was behind schedule by about three weeks and perhaps more.
An indication that there was real trouble here was the fact
that IBM was preparing a 1401 program for use of the bi-
directional system with the new Russian dictionary. IBM suggested
using this for a period of two months after the beginning of
the acceptance test following which the process-word system would
be effective. Use of the bi-directional system in ALP would
reduce the speed of throughput by about 50 percent.
The final unpleasant surprise of the day came when the
IBM programmer demonstrated that the 8,000-character core
storage of the 1401 was insufficient to accomodate the program
required to operate the ALP. The core was already at capacity.
at this time and more core storage -- at additional rental was required.
At a subsequent closed meeting the CIA ALP staff members
concluded that interim use of the bi-directicnal Russian Mr
system for two months would not be critical to the FDD opera-
tion and that some equipment trade-off would be possible to
compensate for the additional cost of the added core storage.
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They agreed that the problem, being more machine- than
language-related, was largely that of OCS rather than OCR
(FDD).
In light of the 28 May revelations, the likelihood of
IBM meeting the scheduled 15 July delivery date appeared
bleak indeed. On 15 June another ALP status meeting convened
to explore the situation. 1155 The same group, but with
replacing
1
represented the division. At,
this meeting the IBM group had little to report on successful
software progress. More discouraging, however, was the
intelligence that the updated steno disk had been run the week
before and shown a throughput of 40 words per second with a 7.5
percent error rate, two percent of which was attributable to
dictionary deficiencies. The outlook in regard to MT soft-
ware, I EM reported, was about the same with results termed
"sparse but not black."
The fact that throughput and quality problem existed
in the steno mode in addition to the MT problem aired earlier
at Kingston came as a new surprise to the CIA group. There
was no hesitation in declaring a 40 words-per-second through-
put with a 7.5-percent error rate to be unacceptable.
With the.develogreital phase of the ALP Project obviously
lagging and the pieces of the puzzle failing to fall into place,
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1
1
1
IBM begged for more time to bring the system in both modes up
to acceptance specifications.
After some discussion the CIA representatives reluctantly
agreed to a two month delay of delivery to 15 September 1965
with acceptance scheduled for 15 October on the grounds that
it would allow for benefits to CIA in providing additional
training time. However, they reserved committal on acceptance
of the delay pending referral to a higher echelon.
On 12 August, approximately a month before the scheduled
delivery of the ALP system hardware, the Agency ALP Staff and
IBM convened a final ALP status meeting. 1156/ The firm had
achieved sane success in meeting the specifications criteria,
but problems continued to plague the system. For example,
samples of steno-mode output derived from input provided by
IBM from samplings of FDD publications were displayed. These
samples were considered "correctable" and showed an error
rate ranging from 3.5 to 4.5 percent, at least an approxima-
tion of the maximum rate called for in the specifications.
On the other hand, input derived from classroom tapes of FDD
steno trainees resulted in unusable output, indicating that
the trainees had not yet achieved productive skill. Only one
was rated by IBM as having "acceptable" proficiency. By this
time, the machine and program error rate had been reduced to
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1
1.0 to 1.5 percent, dictionary deficiencies appeared to
account for 1.7 to 1.8 percent, and the remainder of the total
3.5 to 4.5 percent was attributed to human input.
IBM further reported that the S'NR product test had been
' canpleted, that the software was now in products testing,
and that by the end of August the process-word program would
' be identical in its development to the bi-directional. Fur-
ther, the date for shipping the equipment to Washington was
set for 13 September and acceptance testing would begin on
4 October. The ALP system was thus finally set to enter its
final phase.
2. 'Besting and Termination of the Project
The ALP system hardware was delivered to CIA as scheduled
on 15 September 1965 and its installation and checkout was
implemented during the period 15 September to 4 October 1965.
.During the period of the acceptance test which followed, all
ALP system hardware functioned satisfactorily.
The ALP system in Coto was tested for acceptance by the
Agency.during the period 4-15 October. The objective of the
tests was to ascertain whether the delivered ALP hardware
and software produced an output which met the speed and quality
criteria specified in the ALP contract as detailed in the ALP
Acceptance Test Procedures, which had been formulated and
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issued on 18 March 1965. This paper, following periodic
revision as required, was distributed in final form during
September 1965 and generally the test was conducted as stip-
ulated.
Three teams of personnel worked during the test period,
as follows: Russian MT -- two CIA (FDD) and two IBM;
steno-English -- two CIA (OCS) and two IBM; and hardware-
software (Computer Center) -- two CIA and five IBM (engineers
and programmers). From the standpoint of direct FDD partici-
pation in the test, represented
the division. During the period 5-12 October they, in cooper-
ation with the IBM representatives, reviewed in detail
approximately 20,000 words of the 66,000-word Russian text
comprising the acceptance test material for the ALP MT made.
The method of review consisted of a word-for-word
comparison of English translations of identical Russian text,
produced by the AN/GSQ-16 equipment in April. 1965 and ALP on
4 October 1965. Discrepancies between the two translations
were noted, tabulated, and characterized insofar as possible
as to type and cause. in company with their
IBM counterparts, conducted two tests. In the quantity test
for Russian MT they processed some 20,000 words at a rate of
28.4 words per second, or 8.4 words better than the accept-
ance threshold. The quality test yielded output "at least
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as good" as the k'I'D product. Similar tests with equally
encouraging results - giving the respective figures. of 60.4
and 5.4 words per second for quantity and an error rate of less
than the specified four-percent for quality -- were conducted
for steno-English transcription by the OCS people, so that in
his final report on the acceptance tests, ] as able to
state that the results produced by the ALP system in both the
Russian Mr and steno English modes were within all thresholds
set by contractual agreement. 1157
With the system judged acceptable, the stage was set for
the next phase, the year-long pilot project which was planned
to test the suitability of the ALP system for Russian Mr and
the steno-English mole within the context of FDD operations.
As we have seen, much work had preceded the performance of
the acceptance tests in October 1965. The first serious ALP
production work for FDD began in November 1965, and the ini-
tial effort was directed at the stenotype production of the
division's Latin America Report and at machine translation
of selected Russian textual material. In order vigorously to
test the utility of this pilot system for full-scale and
permanent operation after the test period, an effort was made
to collect appropriate operating statistics for both the
conventional and ALP systems during the period of pilot
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operation. In addition, scene reports were processed in
parallel through both systems in order to make a more direct
ccmparison.
The year which followed proved a difficult one for those
involved in or affected by the experiment, analyst and oon-
suner alike. A rigorous regime of record keeping was initi-
ated and all pertinent reports had to be carefully "pre-,
packaged" in conformance with closely controlled format
criteria. For this reason special caution had to be exercised
to avoid error, not only in translation itself but in the
method and order of preparation as well. This was made
necessary by the fact that fran the time the translator/
analyst released his material for stenotyping, the report
would not be subject to his review until after publication.
it is not difficult to perceive that under this rigid system
pressures grew and nerves frayed over the long pull. To
analyze the impact of the ALP system on FDD personnel, FDD
management solicited frank comments from its people. One
officer, doubtless expressing the feelings of the majority,
stated his belief that personal elements were slowly becoming
less and less important in the FDD intelligence production
cycle. He objected principally to the rigid format of the
system and to the plethora of instructions requiring prepa-
ration over and above the intelligence report itelf. 1158
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There appeared to be a general tendency among division per-
sonnel to regard the ALA' system as essentially a clerical
and reproduction function 1159/ and, despite management's
assurances to the contrary, this feeling persisted.
Nor were the feelings outside FDD pertaining to ALP any
better. There was no improvement in the post-editing problem
after October 1965 over what it had been earlier. In a ran-
dcan sample of 34 contractors whose opinions were solicited
on the efficiency. of Mr and post-editing during the period
1964-1966, two offered positive opinions, seven expressed no
opinion but.merely gave suggestions'for improvement, and 25
gave negative reactions, some mild, others vehement.*
The reaction to the ALP product by consumers of FDD
reports was no less discouraging. In a typical response,
user stated his view that, despite remarkable progress, Mr
was not yet sufficiently refined to permit its use. The Mr
product was post-edited but this appeared to serve primarily
* Sample comments of the many received were the following:
"Refer almost, constantly to original Russian text."
"As a professional translator want professional pay.
Slave wages."
"So many Engliski errors that it is canpletely unusable."
"Its only virtue, speed, is negated by post-editing
and therefore meaningless."'
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to "smooth out" awkward construction without necessarily
achieving the precise meaning of the text. With this
possibility of inaccuracy the reader could be led astray and
therefore felt obliged to rely on the original text if he read
Russian (thus negating the "speed" offered by MT) or, if not,
to accept the machine version. 1160 Other responses were
similar.
Even before the performance of the ALP acceptance tests,
in October 1965 CIA management had begun to have misgivings
about the feasibility of the ALP system as a solution to the
CIA translation problem. Within FDD itself
from time to time warned against overcomrtitment to Mr in light
of its still primitive state of development, and
doubtless expressing the thoughts of the other FDD branch
chiefs, had recajr nded the lowest priority in the division
budget for ALP funds. 1161/ To examine this facet further, it
is necessary briefly to retrace our steps to a point several
months earlier.
In April 1964, at the instigation of the Joint Automatic
Language Processing Group (JALPG),* a ccatanittee to study the
application of coanputers in the automatic processing of
* This Group, whose membership was made up of Burton Atkinson,
NSF, L. Robert Dailey, DOD, and Paul Borel, CIA, the CODIB
chairman, had been formed earlier in order to provide for a
coordinated federal program of research and development in the
NIP area.
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language data, including mechanical translation of foreign
languages, had been organized by the National Research Council
of the National Academy of Sciences. This committee, composed
of linguists, mathematicians, and computer specialists and
chaired by Dr. John R. Pierce of Bell Telephone Laboratories,
was designated the Automatic Language Processing Advisory
Committee (ALPAC) .
At an ALPAC meeting held 9-10 December 1964 a brief
statement was made by the chairman on the committee's attitude
relative to CIA's place in MT research. Its general tenor
was that CIA as a "mission oriented organization" should stay
completely out of this field because of the long odds against
chances of achieving success. John Bagnall, DAD/CR, declared
that, discouraging as this advice was, it confirmed his own
thinking on the then-proposed ALP system, that no further MT
research be bought but that the Agency simply purchase the
existing state of the art. The gist of this was included in
his recommendations in a report on the meeting to Paul Borel,
the Assistant Deputy Director/Intelligence (ADD/I). 1162
At the request of John Vance, the AD/CR,
as FDD Chief, subsequently reviewed the Bagnall recommendation
and agreed with its premise.
interest in NCI' and in machine-assisted translation (NAT)
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remained high but that investment in the systems should be
limited to time and to the expenditure of moderate sums to
sample commercial and other government agency operational
systems. 1163/
The Bagnall recamiendation and the c at on
MT had their effect. On 4 January 1965 Vance discussed them
with Paul Borel, and three days later the latter reiterated
the general CIA policy of not funding outside MT research on
an individual project basis. 1164
The general trend of OCR and FDD management's discour-
agement and declining interest in continuing FDD's involvement
in Mr was evident, but official corroboration of what was
assumed -- that the system embodied in the pilot project was
a failure -- was needed. This took the form of a detailed
.analytical study performed by a private research firm called
in mid-1966 to carry it out.
which was engaged by CIA
in effect, was requested
to perfan an autopsy on the body before the patient was
quite dead. The study was made by
and was issued in September 1966, just before the end of the .
pilot year devoted to the ALP system.
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The report gave a negative appraisal of the
system and doubtless provided the final element in the official
decision to discontinue it in FDD. stated that the
study of the present operating systems had shown that ALP
provided no improvement over the conventional (human transla-
tion) system in terms of cost, manpower requirements, or
translation response time. In fact, for the anticipated
annual work load of 20 million Russian words of translation
and 100,000 pages of transcription, the ALP system ccaipared
with the conventional method would cost an additional $206,650
a year, require an additional 16 people, and introduce an
average of ten days additional delay for finished transla-
tions. Even with contemplated improvements, the ALP system
would cost more than the conventional one.
pointed out that the ALP method as then conceived
was too large for current FDD needs, in fact four times too
large, and was therefore at a considerable economic disadvan-
tage. If other major applications were found, the costs could
be reduced but the relative staffing and response times would
not be affected. He concluded by suggesting the possibility
of developing a language-processing system using general
purpose computer equipment that would be a significant im-
provement over the system then in use. Exploration of this
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possZil.ity' would Hest be. done in. a research- environs-ent
without direct respon ih; i ty for any FDD production work. '11:65
The report was well received, and' it was agreed 25X1
by all concerned that it bore out what had been suspected all
along, namely, that the ALP system in its present form was
not the answer to problems related to FDD operations and that
it should be relegated back to the research community until
it faults and weaknesses had been eliminated.
With this in mind on 12 October 1966
issued a succinct memorandum to all members of FDD reporting,
in effect, the results of the _ study, thanking the
staff members for their cooperation in the experiment, and
announcing termination of the ALP project effective
14 October 1966. 1166/
This officially ended the long-term experimentation
in machine translation in FDD.
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CIA Internal Use Only
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