ARAB GULF STATE REACTIONS TO SOVIET POLICY SHIFTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05-00761R000100970001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 9, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washingoml1C10505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 March 1988
Arab Gulf State Reactions to Soviet Policy Shifts
Summary
Current trends in the Persian Gulf are enabling Moscow to
enhance its presence and legitimacy in the region and to
capitalize on declining Gulf state fears that it poses a threat
to regional stability. While Iraq and the conservative Arab Gulf
states have been frustrated by Moscow's efforts to delay
follow-up action on United Nations Security Council Resolution
598 as well as by its efforts to improve relations with Iran,
they have repressed their irritation and concentrated on trying
to gain Soviet assistance.
Should the Soviets support the proposed sanctions resolution
in the United Nations, the conservative Gulf states probably
would expand contacts. Should the Soviets also follow through on
their promises to withdraw from Afghanistan, thereby removing a
major obstacle to improved relations, the process would receive
further impetus. The Saudis--as well as Qatar and Bahrain--would
be somewhat more likely to reestablish diplomatic relations with
Moscow.
Improved relations with Moscow is unlikely to alter the
basic Gulf state orientation toward the West. Leaders of these
states will remain suspicious of communism and of Soviet
intentions, and their primary political, economic, and security
ties will remain with the West. In a post-war environment, when
it is no longer so dependent on the USSR for
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This memorandum was prepared by Issues and Applications 25X1
Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis coordinated with 25X1 ?.,,Y
SOVA/Near East South Asia Branch, Regional Policy Division. Comments and ?
queries may be directed to Chief Issues and Applications Division
NESA M 88-20029C
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arms, Iraq is likely to expand its ties to the West. If the
United States sustains its security support in the Gulf,
moreover, its credibility in the region will be enhanced.
* * * * * * * * *
Gulf States Face Soviet Policy Shifts
Over the past year, the Gulf states have had to respond to a
fluctuating Soviet policy in the region as Moscow has pursued somewhat
contradictory policy objectives. During the first half of 1987, the Soviet
emphasis was on supporting Iraq, courting the conservative Arab Gulf
states, and projecting an image of a responsible superpower seeking
constructive solutions to regional problems. Moscow voted for United
Nations Resolution 598, which was designed to put pressure on Iran, and it
endorsed Iraq's positions on ending the war and on interpreting 598. It
also agreed to lease oil tankers to Kuwait, thereby extending implied
Soviet securit?rotection to Kuwaiti shipping which was under Iranian
attack.
Although Soviet agreement to lease oil tankers to Kuwait gave Moscow
its desired inclusion in Gulf security matters, it was followed by the US
decisions to reflag Kuwaiti vessels and to increase its naval presence in
the region--decisions which undermined Moscow's primary goal of preventing
an increase in the US military presence in the region. It also led to an
Iranian attack on a Soviet freighter in May 1987. These events apparently
prompted a re-evaluation of policy in Moscow and a shift in tactics.
During the summer, Moscow began to focus less on the need to end the
Iran-Iraq war per se and more on the so-called tanker war--which posed
dangers for Soviet vessels and which had produced the US naval buildup and
enhanced US credibility as the security guarantor of the region. The
Soviets therefore embarked on a policy designed to protect their ships; to
end, or at least reduce, the US naval presence in the Gulf; and to prevent
the United States from successfully engineering a new initiative to end the
war (e.g., the sanctions resolution in the United Nations). There were
three primary facets to Moscow's new approach:
--An effort to delay action on the sanctions
resolution in the United Nations.*
--A proposal to create a UN naval force in the
*The Soviets began to emphasize the importance of the mediating role of UN
Secretary General Peres De Cuellar and to downplay the desirability of
follow-up UN action to 598. They also modified their interpretation of 598
to reflect a more pro-Iranian position. When voting for the resolution in
July 1987, the Soviets had endorsed Iraq's interpretation that a ceasefire
and withdrawal from occupied territory would occur first. In his speech to
the United Nations in September, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
suggested instead that, at the time of a ceasefire, a preparatory committee
Should be established to determine responsibility for the start of the
war--an Iranian demand.
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Gulf to replace the Western presence.
--A new move to improve ties with Iran in order
to gain protection for Soviet ships, promote a
common goal (the removal of the US navy from
the Gulf), and gain Iranian cooperation on
Afghanistan.*
In response to negative reaction from Iraq and the conservative Gulf
states, the Soviets modified this approach in late 1987 and early 1988.
*Iran had indicated its interest in improving relations as it sought to
prevent its isolation and head off joint US-Soviet action against it. In
the summer and fall of 1987, the level of bilateral contacts expanded
considerably. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov visited
Tehran three times, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani visited Moscow
twice, and numerous bilateral meetings were held at lower levels. The tone
of rhetoric improved on both sides and, for the first time since 1982,
there was some limited progress on substantive matters. Aeroflot resumed
Intermittent flights to Tehran in October, and a trade protocol was signed
to the effect that Iran would ship crude oil to the USSR in return for
light oil products as well as some machinery and renewed help in industria5xi
projects. (Iran has long sought a return of Soviet experts to its power
and steel plants). The strong Iranian reaction to Iraq's use of
Soviet-supplied SCUDs to bomb Tehran again put a negative cast on bilateral
relations, however.
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At the same time, Moscow continued its efforts to improve relations
with Iran and stall action on a sanctions resolution.
Gulf State Reactions
Iraq and the two Gulf states that have been most antagonistic to
Iran--Kuwait and Saudi Arabia--have also been most affected by Soviet
policy fluctuations and strongest in their reactions. The smaller states,
particularly Oman and the United Arab Emirates, have tried to keep their
own options open by sustaining contacts with Iran and have been less
concerned about Soviet ambivalence.
Iraq
Iraqi frustration with Moscow's ambivalence has been sublimated to its
greater need to continue receiving arms from the USSR, by far its most
important source of arms. This dependence has given Baghdad little room to
maneuver. The Iraqis, however, have expressed their irritation, both
publicly-and privately, to the Soviets. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz
publicly stated in ]rate Novpmhar that Moscow's position was an obstacle to
resolving the war.
At the same time, Iraq has tried to entice the Soviets into backing
its position by expressing support for Soviet policies in Afghanistan and
the Middle East.
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Iraqi officials and recent press ccanentary have welcomed 25X1
Noscov's "positive stand" an the search for a solution in Afghanistan.
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Kuwait
The Kuwaitis, who have the closest ties to Moscow of any of the Gulf
states, have expressed their criticism of Soviet policy more strongly in
public than the Iraqis. They may have been more willing to use their
limited leverage to influence Soviet decisionmaking because they are not
dependent on the USSR for arms. They too have tried to entice Moscow into
a more favorable position by supporting Soviet policy on Afghanistan.**
During visits to Moscow in the fall of 1987, the Kuwaiti Foreign and
Oil Ministers expressed unhappiness with Soviet policy and presumably
pressed for a modified approach. The sharpest public commentary appeared
in the newspaper Al-Rai Al-Amm which asserted in October that the Saudis
had been right to avoid ties with Moscow over the years and to focus
instead on relations with the United States.
Concern about improving Soviet-Iranian relations induced Kuwait to
intercede with the Soviets and to warn them against proceeding further.
There has
been little movement by Kuwait to expand economic and military ties with
Moscow during the past year.
** The Kuwaitis also have used this issue before and have lobbied in
Moscow's behalf. They tried unsuccessfully, for example, to water down the
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Conference summit, held in January 1987. In May, they proposed an
initiative to the United States which was designed to put pressure on
Pakistan on Moscow's behalf.
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The Kuwaitis have demonstrated their willingness to use support for
Soviet efforts on Afghanistan as an instrument to gain Moscow's
cooperation. Their agreement to receive the Afghan Foreign Minister in
February 1988 was a clear gesture to Soviet sensibilities. Their warm
reception in February of Soviet envoy Oleg Grinyevskiy and his message on
Afghanistan also suggested that Kuwait's current emphasis is on enticement
rather than pressure.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud's visit to the Soviet Union in January
1988 and the February visit to Riyadh by Vladimir Polyakov, the Head of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near East Department, suggest growing Saudi
recognition of Moscow's relevance to Gulf state interests and a trend
toward increased bilateral contacts. Polyakov, who carried a message from
Gorbachev to the King, was the first official Soviet visitor to Saudi
Arabia since diplomatic relations were broken 50 years ago. He met with
Crown Prince Abdallah and other Saudi officials to discuss the Iran-Iraq
war, Afghanistan, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
While Sa'ud was in Moscow as head of a Gulf Cooperation Council
delegation petitioning for Soviet support of Resolution 598 and a sanctions
resolution, Moscow clearly interpreted the visit as a harbinger of improved
relations with Riyadh.* It played up bilateral aspects of the visit,
emphasizing Sa'ud's meetings with Gromyko and Shevardnadze, calling for the
restoration of diplomatic ties, and stressing the coincidence of Soviet and
Saudi views on resolving conflicts in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.
Both Soviet and Saudi spokesmen subsequently confirmed that there is
no agreement to resume ties in the near future, but Soviet Foreign Ministry
spokesman Gerasimov stressed the mutual interest in maintaining contacts,
and Sa'ud indicated such
contacts were likely to increase.
Saudi perceptions of the Soviet Union continue to evolve. Sa'ud
commented in early 1988 that the Soviet Union had become less messianic
under Gorbachev
*Sa'ud was accompanied only by Saudi Foreign Ministry officials. The Saudi
Petroleum Minister, who visited Moscow in early 1987 on behalf of OPEC,
also was accompanied by other Saudi officials. During Sa'ud's previous
trip to Moscow, in 1984, he was a member of a large Arab League delegation.
Ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar was a member of Sa'ud's
retinue. In recent months, Bandar has met occasionally in Geneva with
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin, presumably to discuss bilateral
relations and matters of common interest.
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Riyadh's reluctance to expand ties with Communist countries also
appears to be waning.
the Saudi press reported that the USSR would purchase Saudi
wheat in 1988.
The Saudis, who are strong backers of both Pakistan and the Afghan
insurgents, have made Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan a necessary, but
not necessarily sufficient, precondition for the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations. For its part, Moscow would like to have Saudi
cooperation in its announced policy of withdrawal, particularly by ending
aid to the insurgents. Should Moscow proceed with its promises to withdraw
while supporting the Arab position on the Gulf, Riyadh probably would be
willin? to explore expanded ties, including reestablishing relations.
The United Arab Emirates
The Soviets also have been on the defensive in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), but the Soviet posture on a sanctions resolution is less
crucial to the UAE than it is to Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Embassy
reporting indicates that bilateral relations are minimal in any event, that
the UAE remains suspicious of Moscow, but that it will not slam the door on
the Soviets as long as there is doubt about US steadfastness in the Gulf.
The decisions of the UAE and Oman to establish diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union in the fall of 1985 have been the most dramatic
manifestations to date of shifting Gulf perceptions of the Soviet Union.
The UAE has moved more rapidly than has Oman to expand relations, however,
and has agreed to open air routes, allowed the Soviets to participate in a
trade show, received trade delegations, and purchased military equipment
(SA-7 surface-to-air missile systems).
The change in UAE attitudes toward the Soviet Union is reflected in
the comments of an official who had opposed the establishment of relations
with Moscow and who has been irritated by Soviet footdragging on a
sanctions resolution. In December he stated that the Soviets now have a
permanent foothold in the Gulf and that the United States and the Soviet
Union are pursuing similar games in the region.
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Oman
The Gulf war is not at the top of Oman's agenda in its relations with
Moscow. Oman's primary objective with Moscow has been to help control the
threat from South Yemen. A Senior Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs
official told US Embassy officials in January 1988 that good relations with
the USSR are an essential element in Oman's progress towards non-alignment
and a feature of its national policy toward South Yemen.*
Oman's approach to the Gulf war has been different than that of its
neighbors. It has tried to maintain a dialogue with Iran and to avoid
highly visible cooperation with the United States which might antagonize
Iran. It has even been supportive of several Soviet policies which have
irritated its Gulf brothers. In February, Sultan Qaboos spoke out publicly
against an arms embargo directed at Iran, saying it was not realistic; he
also indicated that he did not oppose a UN fleet in the Gulf.
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Oman has moved at a more deliberate pace to expand contacts with
Moscow than has the UAE. After stalling for two years, Mucat agreed to the
opening of embassies in late 1987, and the exchange of resident ambassadors
early this year. Omani officials have indicated in public interviews that
they believe Soviet attitudes are shifting and that Gorbachev is willing to
make changes within and outside the Soviet Union. One of these officials
indicated that the decision to establish relations was made when the Soviet
Union started to show a "positive and new position towards the region."
Bahrain and Qatar
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The Soviets undoubtedly believe that it is only a matter of time
before Qatar and Bahrain agree to diplomatic relations. Bahrain's Foreign
Minister told the US Ambassador in early March 1988 that it was unrealistic
to ignore the Soviet Union and that, if new developments came along in
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar would establish diplomatic
relations with Moscow.
Qatar shows even more signs of being receptive to Moscow. There have
been increasingly frequent visits by Soviet journalists to Qatar, and, over
the last year, Qatar has toned down its staunch, anti-Soviet rhetoric and
allowed more news about the Soviet Union to appear in its media. In
January 1988, according to embassy reporting, the Qataris indicated that
they preferred that the United States coordinate Gulf policy with the
Soviets, arguing that it would be best not to force Moscow to vote on an
arms embargo resolution which it had not participated in drafting and
indicating that Qatar would prefer to wait patiently a bit longer to allow
the five permanent members of the Security Council to agree on an approach.
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Prospects and Implications for the United States
The willingness of the Gulf states to accept the USSR as an important
regional actor almost certainly will grow. This shift in attitude is based
on a number of factors, including:
--The danger posed by Iran and a perception that
closer ties to Moscow adds a potentially useful
dimension to Gulf state security options.
--A decreasing perception of the Soviet threat,
fostered by the announced Soviet intention to
withdraw from Afghanistan and the fact that
Moscow has not exploited current tensions to
expand its own naval forces in the Gulf.
--A view that the new Soviet leadership is less
ideological and, therefore, less threatening
than its predecessors.
--A desire to lessen dependence on the United
States in order to deflect growing anti-US
sentiment in the region driven by the Islamic
revival.
--A recognition that, in an era of depressed oil
prices, "checkbook diplomacy" is no longer
sufficient and that Kuwait's successful
diplomatic maneuvering provides a useful model.
A Gulf state tendency to expand contacts with the USSR will be
reinforced if the Soviets:
--Follow through on promises to withdraw from
Afghanistan.
--Vote for a sanctions resolution in the United
Nations and generally support Arab positions in
the Gulf.
--Keep a low military profile in the Gulf.
--Support a moderate Arab position in the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
These policies would encourage those states which still do not have
diplomatic relations with Moscow to proceed toward establishing formal
ties. They also would foster increased political and economic ties between
the Soviet Union and all the conservative Gulf states. Over time, these
states also are likely to follow Kuwait and the UAE in purchasing arms from
Moscow.
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SUBJECT: Arab Gulf State Reactions to Soviet Policy Shifts
NESA M 88-20029C
DISTRIBUTION:
External
Copy 1 - Mr. Edward Djerejian/State
Copy 2 - Ms. Mary Ann Casey/State
Copy 3 - Mr. Michael Ussery/State
Copy 4 - Mr. Marion Creekmore/ State
Copy 5 - Mr. Philip Wilcox/State
Copy 6 - Mr. Gary Dietrich/State
Copy 7 - Ms. Janean L. Mann/State
Copy 8 - Mr. Richard Solomon/State
Copy 9 - Mr. David Dunford/State
Copy 10 - Mr. Aaron Miller/State
Copy 11 - Mr. Wayne Limberg/State
Copy 12 - Mr. Robert H. Baraz/State
Copy 13 -
Copy 14 -
Copy 15 -
Copy 16 -
Copy 17 -
Copy 18 -
Copy 19 -
Copy 20 -
Copy 21 -
Copy 22 -
Mr. John Craig/State
Ms. Wendy Chamberlin/State
Ms. April Glaspie/State
Mr. George Harris/State
Mr. Patrick N. Theros/State
Mr. Peter Burleigh/State
The Honorable Edward W. Gnehm, Jr./DoD
Lt. Col. Robert Kirkpatrick, USMC/DoD
Dr. Darnell Whitt/DoD
Ms. Sandra L. Charles/DoD
Copy 25 - Mr. Dennis Ross/NSC
Copy 26 - Mr. Tyrus W. Cobb/NSC
Internal
Copy 27 - DIR/DCl/DDCI Exec Staff
Copy 28 - DDI
Copy 29- ADDI
Copy 30,- NIO/NESA
Copy 31 - D/NESA
Copy 32 - DD/NESA
Copy 33 - NIC/Analytic Group 7E47
Copy 34 - C/NESA/PPS
Copy 35, 36 - NESA/PPS
Copy 37 - C/PES
Copy 38 - PDB Staff
Copy 39 - NID Staff
Copy 40,41,42,43,44,45 - CPAS/IMB/CB
Copy 46 - D/SOVA
Copy 47 - C/SOVA/NE/SA, Regional Policy Division
Copy 48 - C/SOVA/NIG
Copy 49 - C/SOVA/TWAD
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SUBJECT: Arab Gulf State Reactions to Soviet Policy Shifts
Copy 50 - EURA/IAD/RPI
Copy 51 - C/NESA/AI
Copy 52 - C/NESA/PG
Copy 53 - C/NESA/SO
Copy 54 - C/NESA/IA
Copy 55 - C/NESA/IA/I
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