THE IMPACT OF UNREST IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05-00761R000100940001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 24, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: The Impact of Unrest in the Israeli-Occupied
Territories
NESA M 88-20024
Distribution
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Central Intelligence Agency
1A'ashington. C.20503
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 February 1988
The Impact of Unrest in the Israeli-Occu7ied
Territories
Summary
The spontaneous, broad-based Palestinian uprising
underway in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 9 December
demonstrates that young Arabs in the occupied territories have
decided to take their fate into their own hands. Although the PLO
and some Islamic groups belatedly have attempted to assert a
leadership role, the uprising remains essentially a grassroots,
popular resistance lacking strong central leadership. Israel has
been surprised by the intensity and duration of the unrest and has
sought without success to suppress it. ?
There are no signs that the violence will abate soon. The
youthful Palestinian activists--bolstered by widespread
international sympathy and the belief that they can drive the
Israelis out--are determined to continue their uprising in the face of
Israeli repression. The Likud bloc opposes significant concessions
to the Arabs, and most Israelis are willing to commit large-scale
military force to the territories despite the adverse impact a
prolonged police role can have on the IDF's capabilities and
readiness.
Rather than winding down, the stage may be set for a
marked increase in violence. The growing involvement by
extremist Israeli settlers in clashes and increasing anti-Arab
feelings by frustrated Israeli troops could be matched by a resort
to arms by more militant Palestinians.
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Most Arab states are encouraged by the challenge to Israel's
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and welcome international
pressure on Israel and renewed US activism in the Arab-Israeli
peace process. Other Arab states, however, realize that the events
in the territories are beyond their control or the control of the
PLO, and worry about growing agitation among their own local or
Palestinian populations.
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Palestinian unrest in the West Bank and Gaza
since early December has reached an extent
unprecedented in Israel's twenty-year occupation
of the territories. The uncoordinated
disturbances have featured widespread daily
demonstrations, commercial strikes, stone
throwings, firebombings, and isolated attempts
to attack Israeli soldiers. The uprising erupted in
early December in Gaza: when rumors spread
that a traffic accident in which an Israeli driver
killed four Palestinians was a deliberate act of
revenge for the murder of an Israeli shopping in
Gaza the previous month. Palestinian violence
occured mostly in Gaza in December; since mid-
January most of the trouble has been in the
West Bank. Israeli Arab citizens also staged
several demonstrations in Israel proper against
the Israeli occupation as well as for left political
groups such as Peace Now and the Israeli
Communist Party.
Israel, slow to realize the magnitude of the
problem, has attempted to stifle the unrest
through harsh repressive measures. Since 9
December Israeli troops have killed at least 65
Palestinians, clainiing that Israeli lives were
endangered by mobs with stones, molotov
cocktails, knives, and sticks. No Israeli soldiers
or civilians have been killed in the disturbances.
In our view, the continuing outburst reflects
years of pent-up frustration by large numbers of
Palestinians in the territories, who since 1967
have been denied political self-expression and,
especially in Gaza, lived in conditions of poverty
and squalor. According to numerous reports,
the protests--which spread from refugee camp to
camp, from village to village?have been largely
spontaneous, lacking any central or even regional
leadership.
Since early January, Palestinian activists have
sought to coordinate the disturbances,
but these efforts have not
achieved broad coordination of what remain
mostly localized outbursts of unrest. The
distribution of inflammatory leaflets and
pamphlets attributed by the activists to a so-
called "United Leadership for the Uprising in the
Territories," have, been the product of local
committees within individual towns, villages, and
camps, in our assessment. Even within the
towns, villages, and refugee camps there appears
to be little coordination of activities among the
many neighborhood committees. Palestinian
radio broadcasts from outside the occupied
territories exacerbate tensions between
Palestinian factions rather than provide direction
to Palestinians inside the occupied territories.
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The absence of a well-organized leadership with
clear political demands will make it more
difficult for Israel to negotiate with the
Palestinians. The local Palestinians fueling the
unrest have expressed few political sentiments
beyond their desire to end Israeli occupation.
They have not articulated a political platform
nor raised interim demands with Israeli
authorities. Although some pro-PLO
intellectuals in Fast Jerusalem have called for
civil disobedience, such as a boycott of Israeli
products, they do not appear to be leading the
masses in the streets.
We have seen signs of friction between local
groups of Palestinian activists. There appear to
be growing sti4ains over the past few weeks
between rival PLO factions and between the
Palestinian nationalists and Muslim
fundamentalists. The fundamentalists--who have
been especially active in inciting unrest in the
more religiously conservative Gaza Strip--
initially had succeeded in submerging long-
standing rivalries with the secular Palestinian
nationalists. Fatah activists, for their part,
recently have become particularly upset by
efforts of the more radical Ahmad Jibril group--
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
General Command--to label pro-Arafat
Palestinians as Israeli collaborators in their "al-
Quds" radio broadcasts from southern Syria.
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PLO Preempted
The PLO was caught by surprise by the unrest,
according to US Embassy reporting and
responded belatedly by trying to funnel
assistance to Palestinians in the territories and
claim credit for the disturbances. As late as
January, PLO Chairman Arafat apparently did
not believe he had a cle at was going
on in the territories.
We believe that the primary goal of the PLO at
this stage is to encourage West Bankers and
Gazans to prolong the violence so that the
Palestinian issue remains a priority item on the
international agenda. At the same time, we
believe the PLO leaders are alarmed by the
prospect that their irrelevance to the unrest will
undermine the PLO's claim to leadership of the
Palestinians.
In recent weeks,
Arafat has accelerated efforts to infiltrate money
and small arms into the territories and has
ordered Fatah activists to prolong the violence.
He also has received plans and may have ordered
PLO fighters in Lebanon to conduct anti-Israeli
operations to reaffirm his and the PLO's
revolutionary credentials and to increase pressure
on the Israeli army. In our view, the PLO's
effort to organize a dramatic "ship of return" to
carry exiled Palestinians back to Israel is the
organization's latest unsuccessful bid to claim
leadership of the protest movement.
Israeli Military and Political Reactions
Israel continues its two-track response of using
firm measures to contain the unrest while
considering proposals for Arab-Israeli
negotiations. Polls conducted since the violence
erupted in the territories show that over 60
percent of the Israeli public supports the strong
measures taken by the Unity Government to
handle the unrest. Before the disturbances broke
out, polls by the respected Public Opinion
Research of Israel (PORI) Organization
indicated 51 percent of Israelis were willing to
give up at least part of the West Bank and Gaza
in exchange for peace with Arab neighbors.
More recent surveys suggest that the violence
has had little impact on Israeli readiness for
territorial compromise.
Israeli leaders from the start defined the unrest in
the territories as a problem of law and order and
reacted by steadily increasing the number of
troops there and allowing liberal use of force.
By the end of December, the number of troOpS
had nearly tripled from the usual two thousand
in the Gaza Strip. Forces were at least doubled
in the West Bank, and in both places units
among the elite Golani and Givati brigades were
ormal border police and reservists.
Israel has employed a series of increasingly
forceful steps to contain the unrest, which so far
have not been effective except in Gaza, where
most Palestinians are residents of easily isolated
refugee camps. Tear gas, large-scale arrests,
curfews, selected deportation of agitators,
shootings, and beatings have been used by the
Israelis, but to no avail. In our opinion,
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Palestinians by the Israelis have aggravated
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By mid-February, when most violence had
shifted to the West Bank, Israel was able to draw
down its troop presence in Gaza to near normal
levels. In both the West Bank and Gaza, Israel
has begun to replace regular troops with
reservists in an attempt to minimize the impact
of the disturbances on the standing army.
The division in Israel's Unity Government
between the left-of-center Labor Party and the
hardline I,ikud bloc continues to thwart political
efforts that might assuage Palestinian
frustrations. Reacting defensively to the latest
US diplomatic efforts in the region, Prime
Minister Shamir has continued to oppose
international sponsorship of peace talks and
setting a timetable for negotiations on a final
settlement.
Shamir's Likud
bloc will support only strictly limited self-rule for
Arabs in the territories. I,ikud's concept of
autonomy would give Palestinians authority only
in matters like education, health, and 'municipal
services; Israel would control defense, settlement
activity, and land and water 'resources. Such a
limited version of autonomy would clearly be
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impossible for any Palestinian interlocutor to
accept.
Likud hardliners led by Ariel Sharon have
reinforced Shamir's inclination not to agree to
additional concessions. Sharon and Deputy
Prime Minister David Levi, both major party
rivals to Shamir, are threatening to challenge
him for party leadership now if he agrees to
more than limited autonomy.
Peres, leader of the Labor Party, has agreed to
autonomy as a first step and?unlike Shamir--is
willing to concede territory in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip to secure a peace treaty with
Jordan. Peres believes Arab-Israeli negotiations
on peace are necessary to stop the violence in
the occupied territories. Peres' earlier attempts
to withdraw from the coalition government in
protest against Shamir's belligerence failed when
he proved unable to muster enough Knesset
support to call for new elections.
IDE Preparing for the Long-Haul
The Israeli military command, believing a
political settlement is not imminent, is preparing
for a long-term policing effort in the territories
while striving to minimize strains on manpower
and unit readiness. We assess that the Israeli
military has suffered minimal erosion in its
combat capabilities and readiness stemming from
its deployment of troops to the territories.
--Israeli commanders, however, are
frustrated by the seemingly
unending nature of the unrest
and fear the military will
become increasingly entangled in
a role for which it is ill-prepared
and which they believe
ultimately will detract from the
military's mission to protect
Israel against external threats,
according to US Embassy
reporting.
that recent
tactics undertaken in the
occupied territories offer merely
a short-term solution to the
unrest, which requires political
action.
Despite their reservations, Israeli commanders
are determined to do whatever is necessary to
restore order. Israeli Chief-of-Staff, Lieutenant
General Dan Shomron, has publicly conceded
that the military never prepared itself for such
widespread violence in the occupied territories
and has admitted deep frustration with the
military's inability to cope with the unrest.
Since the initial wave of disturbances, however,
the Israeli military has sought to minimize the
use of lethal force by encouraging the graduated
use of forceful riot control measures, ranging
from warnings through the use of tear gas,
rubber bullets and water cannons, and
eventually--when warranted--live ammunition.
The last action, according to the US Embassy,
also is graded to include firing warning shots in
the air, firing at the legs of rioters, and finally
lethal fire when troops believe they are in
physical danger.
The military has adopted other measures aimed
both at limiting the number of shooting fatalities
and at intimidating the population. Although
highly controversial, the mass beatings policy
was implemented by Defense Minister Rabin in
early January to punish rioters directly and
harshly in hopes of deterring other potential
rioters. Besides beatings, other forms of
collective punishment such as arrests, detentions,
curfews, and midnight raids on homes of
suspected agitators also have become standard
tactics.
The military has admitted that excesses
associated with the beatings have occurred but
insists these arc "deviations" and that
transgressors will be disciplined. The military's
concern .about excesses has led it to dispatch
army psychologists to the field to assess soldier
behavior. Growing involvement by extremist
Israeli settlers in clashes has added an explosive
new element, and several Israeli papers report a
growing trend of frustrated Israeli troops
developing anti-Arab feelings and spoiling for a
fight.
The military leadership is attempting to lessen
the adverse impact that prolonged occupation
duty could have on combat performance, troop
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morale, and ability to maintain security along
Israel's borders?particularly with Lebanon.
--Israel's ground forces commander
recently stated that reserve units
will continue to take over duties
in the occupied territories from
regular troops.
/that a limited
reserve mobilization is underway
both in northern Israel and on
the West Bank. The rotation
into the territories of reservists
inexperienced in police
functions, however, could cause
additional IDF overreactions, in
our opinion.
The View From Arab Capitals
We believe Arab leaders see the unrest as the
most serious challenge so far to Israel's
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
and the beginning of a new era in populist
Palestinian resistance. For most Arab states, the
extensive international criticism of Israel's
handling of the unrest, perceived strains in US-
Israeli relations, and renewed US activism in the
Arab-Israeli peace-seeking process have been
welcome developments.
Still, the Arabs are aware that events in the
territories are beyond their control and even that
of the PLO, and they appear uncertain about
how to exploit the unrest. In our view, Arab
leaders hope US pressure on Tel Aviv can ease
Israel's forceful security practices in the
territories and gain Likud acceptance of an
international conference. No key Arab leader
seems poised, at this point, to undertake a
dramatic new initiative or to deviate from
standard positions on a peace process as a result
of the violence.
--Jordan and Egypt almost certainly
are concerned that rising
expectations and militancy
among Palestinians living in the
territories make it more difficult
for PLO and other Palestinian
leaders to make concessions
required for movement.
--Amman and Cairo probably also
fear that Palestinian extremists
are uninterested in incremental
diplomatic advances and will
thwart progress by stepping up
the violence.
Arab regimes are more worried about growing
agitation among their own large Palestinian
populations, according to US Embassy
reporting. Jordan, in particular, fears the
violence is inflaming its Palestinian majority,
many of whom have family ties to Palestinians
living in the West Bank. Pro-Palestinian
demonstrations have taken place in several Arab
countries, and there have been violent clashes
with local security forces.
Moderate Arab leaders are concerned that the
violence is distracting attention from the Iranian
threat in the Persian Gulf, reducing chances that
international pressure on Tehran will force an
end to the war. They also fear that the
disturbances might complicate their security
cooperation with the United States. Syria,
however, has welcomed the distraction, as it has
helped relieve Arab pressure on it to move away
from its pro-Iranian tilt in the Iran-Iraq war.
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We believe Arab leaders are becoming
increasingly concerned that the violence will
sharply escalate and develop into a regional
crisis. If the Palestinian death toll rose quickly
to dramatic new levels or if Israel began
deporting a large number of Palestinians into
neighboring states, we believe Syria, Jordan, and
Egypt would feel compelled to take tangible
action against Israel. They would almost
certainly try to calibrate their responses
according to their national interests, however,
and only secondarily to Palestinian and pan-
Arab interests.
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--Egypt probably would reduce its
trade and commercial relations
with Israel before downgrading
diplomatic tics. Cairo would
work with Jordan to orchestrate
international censure of , Israel;
Syria probably would opt to
increase its support for
Palestinian cross-border
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commando attacks from
Lebanon into Israel.
--The chances of political
miscalculations, dangerous
emotional reactions, military
missteps, and even military
attacks would increase if the
security situation in the
territories deteriorated
dramatically.
Outlook
We believe that the outlook for the occupied
territories for the next several months is grim,
with no sign that Palestinian violence will abate.
Public statements by some Palestinian youths
suggest they hope to wear Israel down, forcing
Israel out of the territories much as Shia
resistance in southern Lebanon in the early
1980s led to an Israeli "retreat."
In our judgment, the Israeli military is unlikely
to back away from its tough approach and is
preparing for an extended stay in the occupied
territories. Most Israelis believe that the rioting
will not soon abate and that the situation will
get worse before it gets better. Any escalation in
the violence inevitably will elicit a harsher
military response.
We believe that a protracted engagement of a
large Israeli force in the occupied territories
would severely strain the limited manpower
available both to contain the unrest and to
defend Israel's borders. Such a long-term
commitment also would force additional
activations of reservists, cause further disruptions
in regular training, and undermine troop morale.
Although Palestinians within the territories have
not yet resorted to using firearms in the
territories?largely for fear of forfeiting favorable
international media coverage--some extremists
are likely to do so eventually. Such a change of
tactics--making Israeli deaths nearly inevitable--
would mark an ominous turn toward an
increasingly lethal, armed civilian rebellion and
an even more forceful Israeli military crack-
down.
Islamic Fundamentalist Groups
Muslim fundamentalists have been among the
leaders of the protests, especially in Gaza,
The two most
active fundamentalist groups in Gaza are the
Mujama' and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
The Mujama' is led by Shaykh Ahmad Yasin.
It has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and is
popular with university students; it won about
80 percent of the vote in the student union
election in December at the Islamic University of
Gaza. The Mujama' emphasizes that the public
must be prepared spiritually to live by Islamic
law as a first step to removing the Israeli
occupation and imposing Islamic rule.
The more radical Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
which is not related to a similarly-named Shia
extremist group in Lebanon, appears to be a
loose coalition of cells sharing a common belief
in revolution against Israeli authority,
It has organized
demonstrations and apparently tried to kill
Israeli soldiers and civilians in Gaza.
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Sharon in Gaza: A Hardliner's Model for
Quashing Unrest
In recent weeks, some Israeli hawks have called
for the kind of severe measures used by Ariel
Sharon in 1971 following a prolonged period of
Palestinian violence in the Gaza Strip. General
Sharon--then in charge of the Southern
Command, including Gaza?instituted a
"pacification" plan to quell Palestinian
opposition to Israeli occupation.
After the Gaza Strip fell under Israeli control in
1967, Palestinian guerrillas attacked Israeli army
and government targets--effectively controlling
the Gaza Strip by night and hiding in refugee
camps and orange groves by day. Refugee camp
residents supplied the guerrillas with food and
clothing, and arms reached them from the Sinai
and Lebanon.
Within a year of implementing his draconian
suppression plan, Sharon had gained total
military control over the Gaza Strip--but at an
immense cost to the Palestinian population.
The Israeli army routinely fired into crowds of
demonstrators and arrested or deported
thousands of civilians. Hundreds of Palestinian
guerrillas were captured or killed. Collective
punishment became the norm as the army
imposed extended curfews on the camps and
deported whole families of suspected Palestinian
guerrillas to the Sinai. Bulldozers destroyed
wells and rows of refugee camp housing--leaving
thousands homeless--to "thin out" congested
residential areas and to make room for military
patrols.
Recently, according to Israeli press reports,
Israeli security forces on the West Bank have
begun nighttime raids into Arab villages to
apprehend suspected rioters. This tactic is
similar to Sharon's plan, albeit on a much
smaller scale. Just as Sharon intended in 1971,
the midnight raids are probably intended both to
discourage residents from disrupting traffic and
attacking Israeli vehicles with stones and to
intimidate more radical and committed
Palestinian young people into submission.
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