SOUTH KOREA: AN INCREASE IN ANTI-US SENTIMENT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00990R000400100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 3, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
VVash ington, D. C. 2050S
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
03 June 1988
South Korea: An Increase in Anti-US Sentiment?
Summary
Recent attacks on US facilities in South
Korea have been the work of a relatively small
number of radicals who are seeking to foment an
upsurge in anti-American sentiment. Nonetheless,
friction between Washington and Seoul over
economic, political, and security issues could
fuel a more broadly based popular reaction. The
more open political environment under President
Roh Tae Woo has emboldened critics of US-South
Korean relations, opening the way for a
freewheeling scrutiny of bilateral ties,
particularly sensitive trade and security topics.
/(;
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East
Asian Analysis. Information available as of 03 June 1988
was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch,
Northeast Asia Division, 0EA,
1
EA M-88-20083
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Changing Attitudes
Attacks by radical groups on US facilities represent an
obvious effort to tap latent anti-US sentiment:
o Assaults on the USIS building, the US Embassy, and the
Korea-America Bank in Seoul, as well as the USIS
building in Kwangju City figured prominently during
protests marking the May anniversary of the Kwangju
riots in 1980.
o Press coverage, editorial views, and other media
commentary have criticized the radicals' violence but
portrayed South Korean opinion as generally sympathetic
to their motives.
The media appear to reflect a steady shift in popular
sentiments. Independent opinion polling suggests the
generally positive view of the United States held by most
Koreans--while still prevalent--has been eroding in the
1980s. Generational change, growing nationalism, pride over
Korea's impressive economic performance, and a desire for a
more independent Korean position on a variety of issues all
have contributed to greater assertiveness and increased
frictions.
In our view, several spccific factors account for the
evolution of such attitudes:1
o The perception among most Koreans that Washington
sanctioned the government's suppression of the 1980
Kwangju riots has done the most to tarnish the US
image. Opposition leaders have played on this view by
claiming that Washington continued to look the other
way on human rights abuses during former President
Chun's administration.
o Despite his obvious break with Chun's repressive
policies, Roh is still widely viewed as a president who
leads an administration similar to his predecessor's
-military-backed government. Many Koreans are still
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skeptical that he can stand alone without the same
support apparatus--including a perceived US blessing--
that sustained Chun.
o Other US actions, particularly pressures for market
liberalization, have added to resentment among
mainstream Koreans. Press commentary, as well as
opinion polls, suggest many Koreans view US trade
initiatives as unfair. Government compromises during
bilateral negotiations, for example, have already
provided political ammunition to the moderate
opposition and radicals who cite concessions
capitulation to an overbearing US policy.
Outlook
as
While the more open political environment has allowed
existing anti-Americanism to come out of the closet, it has
also opened the way for this sentiment to gain popular
acceptance. The freer political atmosphere entails more
opportunity for critics of both the government and
Washington to assert themselves on sensitive issues, such as
trade and security policy:
o The US-South Korean defense relationship is certain to
remain high on the agenda. Radical criticism of US
operational control of the Combined Forces Command
(CFC) and the presence of US troops in South Korea have
prompted many moderate Koreans to openly question
important aspects of the security tie. Despite seeing
US ground troops as the cornerstone of deterrence
against attack from the North, many Koreans, including
many military officers, see as an embarrassment the
fact that a US General leads the CFC.
o Radical efforts to portray US troops as the primary
obstacle to reunification also have struck a responsive
chord among moderate opposition groups. For example,
many dissident newspapers have adopted the radicals'
anti-US program, broadening the calls for troop
withdrawals and the prohibition of nuclear weapons and
ships from Korea.
A crackdown on dissidents and radicals, in our view,
will-not put the genie back in the bottle. In the current
National Assembly session, the opposition is planning
investigations of the Kwangju incident and misdeeds of the
Chun administration--both issues with potentially sensitive
US angles.
Against this backdrop, Roh will face hurdles in
managing relations with Washington. For example, on
sensitive trade issues, negotiations with Seoul are likely
to be sticky as the government attempts to demonstrate it is
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,
not conceding unnecessarily to outside pressure. Economic
officials are already stating they will be less likely to
propose market liberalization because of the recent upsurge
in anti-US feeling,
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SOUTH KOREA: AN INCREASE IN ANTI-US SENTIMENT?
DISTRIBUTION:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - WILLIAM CLARK, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 6205,
1 - HARRY DUNLOP, DIRECTOR, EAP/K, RM 5313,
1 - ROBERT SUETTINGER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR EAST ASIA AND
PACIFIC, RM 8840,
1 - WILLIAM PIEZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC
AFFAIRS, RM 6205,
1 - KENNETH C. QUINONES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EAP/RA, RM 4310,
1 - TED KLOTH, EAP/K, RM 5313,
1 - BILL NEWCOMB, INR/EC/CER, RM 8442,
1 - JOHN MERRILL, INR/EAP, RM 8840,
1 - JOSEPH A. MUSSOMELI, EAP/K, RM 5313,
1 - TONY INTEMANDI, EAP/K, RM 5313,
1 - WILLIAM WALLER, CHIEF/DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, RM 3829,
1 - PETER ITO, PM/ISP, RM 7424,
1 - JIM PRZYSTUP, POLICY PLANNING STAFF, RM 7330,
1 - DAVID JOHNSON, S/S/O, RM 7516,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1 - JAMES A. KELLY, SPECIAL ASST TO THE PRESIDENT & SR. DIR. FOR ASIAN
AFFAIRS, RM 493,
1 - STEVE DANZANSKY, SPECIAL ASST TO THE PRESIDENT & SR. DIR. FOR INT'L
ECONOMIC AFF, RM 363,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1 - DR. KARL JACKSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 4E817,
1 - RADM EDWARD BAKER, JR., DIRECTOR, EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION, INT'L
SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 4C839,
1 - WALLACE KNOWLES, OASD/ISA/EAPR, RM 4C840,
1 - LTC WILLIAM M. WISE, ASSISTANT FOR REGIONAL POLICY AND
CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS, ISA, RM 4C839,
1 - LTC JOE FLANTZ, HQDA (DAMI/F11/NORTHEAST ASIA), RM 2A474,
1 - CAPT. WALTER ANDERSON, DEPT. OF ARMY/CURRENT INTELLIGENCE/NE ASIA,
RM 28515,
1 - JAY SLOAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, EA/P, RM 2A520,
1 - COL. STEVEN DELP, DB-20, RM C2951,
1 - GUY ARRIGONI, DE-2, RM B6823,
1 - LTC. JERRY WILLIAMS, JSI-3C, RM 1C930,
1 - LTC. RICH FISCHER, OJCS/J-5/NE ASIA/KOREA DESK, RM 2D977,
1 - COL. JAMES MORGAN, JR., DIRECTOR FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, RM B7940,
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1 ? ROGER BIESEL, DB-2 D 1, RM C2230A,
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT
1 ? SCOTT GODDIN, OFFICE OF PACIFIC BASIN, RM 6854,
1 ? KIM FITZGERALD, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE LIAISON, RM 6854,
1 ? MEL SEARLES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC,
RM 3820,
OFFICE OF THE USTR
1 ? AMB MICHAEL B. SMITH, DEPUTY USTR, RM 201,
1 ? PETER ALLGEIER, ASSISTANT TRADE REPRESENTATIVE FOR ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC, RM 322,
1 ? SANDRA KRISTOFF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, RM 322,
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
1 ? RANDALL FORT, OFFICE OF SPECIAL ASST. TO THE SECRETARY FOR NAT'L
SECURITY, RM 4324,
1 ? WILLIAM BARREDA, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY, RM
4428,
1 ? PATSY HAAS, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING & PORTFOLIO
INVESTMENT, RM 5320,
OTHER
1 ? HENRY NATHAN, CHIEF, G911, RM 1A-187,
1 ? ALFRED PERSI, ASIA TEAM LEADER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY, RM
5546S,
1 ? GLEN HALM, OFFICE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, ILAB, RM S5006,
INTERNAL
1 ? Nb, EAST ASIA, RM 7E62,
1 ? NIO, ECONOMICS, RM 7E47,
1 ? DEPUTY CHIEF, PPS/DO, RM 3013,
1 ? CHIEF, EA RM 5D26,
1 ? CHIEF, OGI/FSIC/PI, RM 3G04,
1 ? CHIEF, OEA/NEA/KOREA, RM 4043,
1 ? CHIEF, OEA/NEA/JAPAN, RM 4G31,
1 ? CHIEF, OEA/NEA/STI, RM 4G43,
1 ? CHIEF, OEA/NEA/DIVISION, RM 4043,
1 ? CHIEF, ?EA/CHINA DIVISION, RM 4G20,
1 ? CHIEF, 0EA/SEA DIVISION, RM 4F24,
1 ? DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS, RM 4F18,
1 ? CHIEF, ?EA/PRODUCTION, RM 4048,
1 ? CHIEF, FBIS/NEAD/AB RM 1N07,
? 6 ?
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- DDI, RM 7E44,
- SENIOR REVIEW PANEL, RM 5G00,
- OCA REGISTRY, OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS RM 7624,
- PDB STAFF, RM 7F30,
- CHIEF, LDA/EAD/AB, RM 1H18,
6
- CONTROL BRANCH, OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND ANALYTIC
SUPPORT, RM 7G07,
1
- INTELL. SUPPORT STAFF, OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND ANALYTIC
SUPPORT, RM 7G50,
1
- INTELL. LIAISON STAFF, OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND ANALYTIC
SUPPORT, RM 7G50,
1
- CHIEF, PRODUCT EVALUATION STAFF, RM 2F42,
1
- NIC, ANALYTIC GROUP, RM 7E47,
1
- CHIEF, DDO/EA
DIVISION,
RM 5000,
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- CHIEF, DDO/EA/
3M 5C45,
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- CHIEF, DDO/EA,
RM 5C19,
1
- CHIEF, DDO/EA/_,
RM 5C19
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