GUATEMALA: POTENTIAL FOR A COUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00990R000200080001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12 September 1988
GUATEMALA: Potential for a Coup
Summary
Officer discontent with both President Cerezo and
Minister of Defense Gramajo over their handling of the
counterinsurgency and alleged tolerance of corruption
is building. Gramajo probably is in greater danger of
being removed than Cerezo because key officers in the
High Command--whose support would be crucial to the
success of any plot--are concerned about the
international consequences of ousting a civilian
president. We believe Gramajo's removal would
marginally defuse tensions within the military and buy
time for the President. Nonetheless, doubts are likely
to persist among officers about Cerezo's commitment to
rooting out corruption and leftist policies in his
government, and the President's hold on power will
Civil-military tensions in Guatemala have escalated in three
key areas since the failed 11 May coup, and the risk of another
putsch is high. Officers are. expressing strong criticism of the
This typescript was prepared byl (Middle America-Cuba
Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Middle America-Cuba Division, ALA,
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government's conduct of national security issues, particularly
its handling of the counterinsurgency. In addition, there is
strong concern about civilian meddling in the military, and
growing numbers of officers believe that Minister of Defense
Gramajo is ineffective in dealing with the President. Finally,
President Cerezo's economic policies and slowness to weed out
corrupt government officials have fueled more discontent within
the officer corps.
Motives For Coup Plotting
We believe the critical force driving coup plotting among
officers is the perception that top civilian and military leaders
are undermining efforts to defeat the leftist insurgency.
many field officers blame
the Defense Minister an the President for the Guatemalan Army's
chronic shortages of weapons, uniforms, logistic support, and
transportation, which they believe have contributed to a
relatively high casualty rate--some 800 combat casualties since
last September--among units in the field. Many officers also are
disillusioned that Cerezo has not garnered substantial increases
in US military and economic aid since the return to civilian rule
Officers also have long harbored suspicions that the
President is trying to gain control of the Army and make it
subservient to civilians. Cerezo's efforts to strengthen the
National Police, for example, were viewed by the Army as an
attempt by the President to build his own politically controlled
military force, The military
has been concerned throughout Cerezo's term that the President is
trying to manipulate military politics.
Policy initiatives undertaken by Cerezo have aggravated the
situation. His previous diplomatic openings toward Cuba and the
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Soviet Union--such as allowing their press representatives to
establish offices in Guatemala--were perceived by officers as a
.backdoor attempt to give Communism a foothold in Guatemala.
Talks in late August between the Guatemalan National
Reconciliation Commission and Marxist guerrillas ended in failure
but probably reinforced perceptions within the officer corps that
the government is trying to reach an accommodation with the left.
Economic reforms implemented in August are perceived as making
life more expensive for the average citizen--but especially the
soldier in the field--and are further fueling discontent in the
military.
A clique of wealthy rightwing businessmen and retired
officers who have long resented Cerezo's ascendancy to power are
pursuing a campaign to foment unrest in the Army and to discredit
the President. These groups have enormous resources at their
disposal and, in our judgment, are trying hard to undermine
confidence in the current civilian administration. Businessmen,
for example, are buying space in the hews media to attack Cerezo
and his policies,
Threat to Grama to
Minister of Defense Gramajo--who is criticized for pursuing
political ambitions and ignoring his military obligations--
probably is in more immediate jeopardy than is the President-
attache, Gramajo himself believes ese o icers aye a means
to organize and launch a coup and views their discontent as ,a
Gramajo has tried to defuse tensions in the military by
reassuring the officer corps that he supports their concerns and
is a reliable advocate on thP;"half with the President,
We believe, however, that the
e ense Minister has largely lost his credibility with junior
officers and key officers in the High Command. Gramajo probably
could not regain their confidence without distancing himself from
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Replacing Gramajo, in our view, probably would placate
dissident officers only temporarily. Budgetary constraints would
hinder efforts by any new Minister to purchase items--such as
helicopters--that would improve the lot of troops in the field.
Failure to make substantial improvements in the military probably
would result in a resurgence in discontent. In addition, there
is no consensus within the Army regarding the best successor for
Gramajo. Both Chief of Staff Callejas and Honor Brigade
Commander Marroquin aspire to be the Defense Minister and their
joint participation in a move against Gramajo would be essential
to ensure a'smooth transition inimize the chance of-further
infighting.
Risks to Cerezo
The President lacks the clout to intervene in a decisive way
on the issue of Gramajo's tenure because he is himself
vulnerable. If Cerezo fights to keep Gramajo in place, rightwing
dissidents probably would be able to convince key senior officers
to back a coup. If he acquiesces in Gramajo's removal, he would
face an Army increasingly resistant to civilian direction.
The removal of General Gramajo by Cerezo might initially
defuse some of the unrest within the military and buy time for
the civilian government. At a minimum, it would be seen in the
Army as a signal of the President's commitment to address
concerns voiced by dissident officers. In particular, senior
officers apparently believe that by replacing Gramajo the
military would be able to exercise more authority over the
President and give more attention to the counterinsurgency
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The ouster of Gramajo, however, would carry risks which
could aggravate civil-military tensions and threaten Cerezo as
well. Although Cerezo has the constitutional right to replace
Gramajo, for example, he must ensure that the military high
command makes the actual decision in naming the new Defense
Minister or risk being accused of meddling in traditional
military affairs. Moreover, Gramajo takes pride in his record of
actively defending the civilian aovernme t during the past two
years, and is likely to feel 25X1
betrayed i there is an orchestrated effort by Cerezo to remove
him. In this circumstance, Gramajo may turn against Cerezo and
attempt to rally troops loyal to him to topple the government. 11C\14
Even if Cerezo manages to improve relations with the
military, the extreme right is likely to continue public attacks
against the President and his policies. We believe Cerezo will
remain vulnerable to such attacks because he is unlikely to make
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the changes in his lifestyle that would alter his public image l 25X6
Moreover, he is also unlikely to accede to 25X6
strong pressure to replace political allies, such as Foreign
Minister Cabrera and Minister For Specific Affairs Sarah
Mishaan ho are abhorred by both the military 25X6
and the rightwing. At the same time, he probably will have less
control over the ruling party and face worsening labor unrest
that the right could exploit if the recently imposed economic
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Outlook
A coalition of dissident officers and the political
rightwing is likely to make another attempt to oust President
Cerezo and Minister of Defense Gramajo before the end of the year
unless present civil-military tensions are defused. Even though
the extremists have been unable to rally broadbased support for
such a move so far, their schemes are likely to gain momentum if
the President fails to adjust some of his most irritating
policies and Gramajo remains in place. In our judgment, a coup
is likely if the following conditions exist:
-- Three of the four key military units based in Guatemala
City--the Mariscal Zavala Brigade, Air Force Tactical
Group, Honor Guard Brigade, and Presidential Guard--agree
to back a coup.
-- At least one person with political stature, such as Chief
of Staff Callejas or Honor Brigade Commander Marroquin,
agrees to support the ouster and help restructure a post-
Cerezo government.
-- The plotters believe they have an effective strategy to
We do not believe all the elements necessary for another
coup attempt are currently in place. In particular, the
leadership required for a coup attempt appears to be lacking.
Although senior officers like the Chief of Staff and the
Commander of the Honor Brigade are unhappy with the President,
(concerns about the fragile economy and the
possibility that a coup would dry up international aid.is a
potential restraint or those now fomenting unrest. However, the
momentum and cooperation necessary for a successful coup could
build suddenly and with little advance warning.
If the President were ousted in a coup, the military
probably would establish a caretaker government headed by a
civilian and announce its intent to hold new elections.
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In our judgment, growing
public discontent with the President does not imply strong public
backing for military rule. Consequently, most Guatemalans
probably would press the military to hold new elections, perhaps
as early as 1990.
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SUBJECT: Guatemala: Potential for a Coup
12 September 1988
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Central America, Chris Arcos,
State, Rm. 6263
Ms. Jackie Tillman, NSC, OEOB, Rm. 391
Mr. Joseph Sullivan, Director, Office of Central American
and Panamanian Affairs, Rm. 4915, State
Mr. Richard Wyrough, Deputy Director, Office of Central
American and Panamanian Affairs, Rm. 4915, State
Mr. Luigi Einaudi, Director, Office of Policy Planning
Coordination/ARA, Rm. 6913A, State
Mr. Robert Fouche, Director, Office of Analysis for Inter
-American Republics/INR, Rm. 7358, State
Mr. Harry Ponting, IAA, INR, Rm. 6510, State
Mr. David Smith, Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division/INR, Rm. 7637, State
Mr. Ashley C. Hewitt, Policy Planning Staff, Rm. 7417, State
Mr. Robert Witajewski, ARA/CEN, Rm. 4915, State
Mr. David Randolph, ARA/CEN, Rm. 4915, State
Col. James Seith, JCS-J5, 2D959, Pentagon
Mr. Richard Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter
-American Affairs, DoD. Rm. 4C800 Pentagon
Rm. 2A520, Pentagon
DIA/CAJIT/CJ4-C, NMIC, Pentagon
Mr. Dan Landers, USA, JS14B, Rm. MB932, Pentagon
SOUTHCOM, J5
SSCI
HPSCI
INTERNAL
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Executive Registry - 7E12
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D/CPAS - 7F16
PDB Staff - 7F30
SCIO/CPAS/DDI 7F27
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CENTRAL AMERICA BRANCH FILES
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