CHINA'S YANG SHANGKUN: GROWING INFLUENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000300090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 6, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP04T00907R000300090001-1_5x1
Ler alai 1111C111y111C typKy
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
06 May 1987
China's Yang Shangkun: Growing Influence
Summary
We believe Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping sanctioned Yang
Shangkun's visit to the United States during a period of domestic political
tensions in part to boost the visibility and status of one of his most
powerful allies. Deng also probably wants to emphasize the importance
and continuity of the Sino-US relationship, not only in military areas but
across the board. We therefore expect Yang to be nonconfrontational in
most meetings, although he may raise standard Chinese complaints about
Taiwan, technology transfer, and trade for domestic political reasons. At
the same time, he may probe US willingness to sell air-to-air missiles to
China.
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This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis. 25X1
Information available as of 6 May 1987 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Political Assessments Branch,
China Division, 00 25X1
EA M 87-20089
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Yang's Role in Chinese Politics
Yang Shangkun, one of Deng Xiaoping's key supporters since returning from
Cultural Revolution exile in 1978, has been Deng's point man in the difficult and
politically sensitive process of reforming the People's Liberation Army (PLA).' Yang also
is one of a small group of revolutionary founding fathers on whom Deng leans for
advice in crises. The recent removal of Hu Yaobang as General Secretary of the
Chinese Communist Party--which Yang helped engineer--has boosted Yang's already
considerable influence, that since Hu's fall
Yang has assumed increased responsibilities, especially in domestic matters.
Both the timing of the visit (15-27 May) and the high-level reception the Chinese
have requested suggest that the underlying purpose of the trip is to enhance Yang's
credentials as an important political leader with broad responsibilities. We expect Yang
will be a key figure in this summer's wrangling over the agenda of the 13th Party
Congress scheduled for fall; we also expect Yang to assume greater authority at the
conclave. Chinese officials have hinted to US diplomats and
may be promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee; he may also replace Deng as
head of the party's Military Affairs Commission.2 Elevating Yang to the Standing
Committee would give Deng a reliable ally on China's most important policy body at a
time when Deng is under pressure from other party elders and new power arrangements
are taking shape.
Premier and Acting General Secretary Zhao Ziyang also stands to gain if Yang
makes the transition from military leader with behind-the-scenes influence to Standing
Committee status. Yang is one of the few military leaders to whom Zhao appears to
have ties. When Yang was number-two man in Guangdong Province, he relied heavily
on proteges of Zhao Ziyang?once party chief in Guangdong--to carry out reformist
policies Yang's support of the decision to oust Hu and
appoint Zhao was a key factor in the move, according to a variety of evidence, and he
has faithfully toed Zhao's line since January, while other leaders have demonstrated their
independence by slight but politically symbolic deviations. We believe Yang's support
for Zhao will be an important factor in the political infighting we expect during the next
few months.
Although Yang has become known under Deng as a military leader,
Before 1949, Yang held several military posts but he
concentrated on political work. Yang does not have combat or line officer
experience. After 1949, Yang held a succession of party jobs until the Cultural
Revolution. Since Deng's return to power, Yang has emerged as a leader on the
Military Affairs Commission, the party's top military policy making body. He has
focused on military politics and reform issues such as reducing the size of the PLA
and upgrading training.
According to the Chinese Constitution, the MAC chairman is automatically a Standing
Committee member.
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The Bilateral Angle--What Does China Want?
In our estimation, China has no new foreign or strategic policy goals for the visit.
We believe Beijing wants instead to demonstrate that, despite recent political upheavals
in China, the Sino-US relationship is still on track. Beijing probably also sees the trip as
an opportunity to introduce an increasingly powerful Chinese leader to the United States
and to a range of US policymakers. Yang has traveled little--to our knowledge, he has
visited only the Soviet Union, North Korea, and the Philippines--and the only top-level
US official he has met is the Secretary of Defense. Firsthand knowledge of the West,
and especially his meetings with important Western policymakers, will strengthen Yang's
leadership credentials and give him greater depth for his new, broader responsibilities.
Yang may carefully surface Chinese interest in US radar-guided missiles in
meetings with senior military officials. Air Force Commander Wang Hai stated during his
recent visit to Washington that Beijing's negotiations with Italy for the
57-kilometer-range Aspide missile have foundered. The Chinese, in our view, need such
a missile for the F-8-2 fighters being upgraded with US avionics to markedly improve
their air-to-air defense capability in the next decade. Yang may therefore probe to see
if the United States will sell Sparrow-class (AIM-7) missiles compatible with US
avionics.
Yang may also harbor some suspicions about US motives in pursuing a
relationship with China. Although he has generally promoted the growth of Sino-US
cooperation, on one occasion Yang complained that the
United States only wants to keep China and the Soviet Union apart, and has no real
interest in a stronger China. However, in keeping with his prudent style, he has not, to
our knowledge, tried to obstruct Deng's policy of increased cooperation with the United
States. In fact, both in public statements and in private talks with US officials, Yang has
pressed for freer military exchanges between the United States and China. In particular,
he has supported allowing US specialists in training and military education greater
access to Chinese facilities, reversing a longtime PLA stand.
We have no indications that Yang is coming with a special message, but we
believe whatever he says can be treated as authoritative. In our judgment Yang, unlike
Hu Yaobang, is unlikely to take positions that do not have the weight of leadership
consensus--at least of Deng and his supporters--behind them.
If Yang does choose to take a hard line in any of his meetings, it will most likely
be for domestic political purposes. With an eye on the congress and preparatory
meetings, Yang may believe he needs to make a bow to the concerns of some
traditionalist party elders who believe Beijing has been too soft on the United States.
He may also wish to demonstrate his "Chineseness" at a time when many are under
attack for worshiping the West. Therefore it is possible that Yang may criticize aspects
of US policy in public statements.
In our opinion, the most likely issue he will raise is Taiwan, although he may also
complain about US and COCOM controls on technology transfer and bilateral trade
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issues, as other Chinese leaders recently have. We believe Taiwan is a likely choice
because it is the safest and least controversial among the Chinese leadership, and
because Taiwan policy is one of Yang's responsibilities.
Yang's Prospects
It is a peculiarity of Chinese politics that the 79-year-old Yang may be about to
join the front ranks of Chinese leadership. Although Yang is an able and respected
leader, his principal political strengths, in our view, are his solid loyalty to Deng
Xiaoping and his firm adherence to "democratic centralism." Yang may oppose Deng's
plans on occasion, but once a decision has been made Yang supports it and works to
implement it. One consequence of this is that we know relatively little of Yang's policy
preferences. Like Zhao Ziyang, he is close-mouthed in private discussions and generally
sticks with the party line in public.
Although loyal to Deng, Yang is not without political ambitions. According to
press reports, Yang originally opposed Deng's attempts to move Hu Yaobang to the
MAC chairmanship. In our view, this was not only because Yang shared the military's
dislike for Hu, but also because he wants the job himself.
In any case, Chinese officials have stressed to US diplomats that Yang is now the
top day-to-day military leader. We believe that Yang will be one of the major players in
arranging the post-Deng succession. The MAC chairmanship and the Standing
Committee Seat would not only constitute recognition of his status, it would position
Yang as a contender for Deng's unofficial position as senior statesman were he to
outlive Deng.
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Subject: China's Yang Shangkun: Growing Influence
Distribution:
White House and National Security Council
1 - Don Gregg, Special Assistant to the Vice-President, NSC, Room 298,
White House
1 - Doug Paal, Director of Asian Affairs, NSC, Room 302, 0E0B
Department of State
1 - Stapleton Roy, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Room 6205
1 - Richard Williams, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs (EAP/C),
Room 4318
1 - Joan Plaisted, Deputy Director of Economic Affairs, Office of Chinese
Affairs (EAP/C), Room 4318
1 - John Danylyk, Chief, INR/EC Communist Economic Relations Division,
Room 8662
1 - G. Eugene Martin, (EAP/CH), Room 4318
1 - Richard Solomon, Director Policy Planning Staff, Room 7311
1 - Tom Fingar, Chief, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
1 - Chris Clarke, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
Department of Defense
1 -
Rear Admiral Baker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, ISA,
Room 4E817, Pentagon
Ed Ross, OSDISA 4740, Pentagon
DIA/DB-2B, Room C2837, DIAC
uon Matnis, DIA/JSI, Hoorn 1C945
Lieutenant Colonel Eden M. Woon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
China Plans and Policy, FESA J-5, Room 2E973, Pentagon
DIA/AT-3/China, Room 1120, Pompano
Plaza West
1 - Major Ron Tom, China Staff Officer, Hq Dept. of the Army, DAMO-SSA,
Room 38516, Pentagon.
1 - Chris Madison, Office of the Army, Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, DAMI-FII, Room 2A474, Pentagon
National Security Agency
Ft. Meade
Acting Chief, B441, Room 1W140, National Security Agency,
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Central Intelligence Agency
1 - DDI (7E44)
1 - D/DCl/DDCI Exec St (7D60)
1 - NIC Analytic Group
1 - NIO/EA (7E62)
1 - NIO/Econ (7E47)
1 - D/OEA (4F18)
2 - C/OEA/CH (4G32)
1 - ()EA Production Staff (4048)
1 - C/OEA/SDS (4032)
1 - C/OEA/CH/IS (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/EA (4G32)
4 - C/OEA/CH/PA (4032)
1 - C/OEA/CH/TT (4G32)
1 - PDB Staff (7G15)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7G50)
1 - CH/E. (5D38)
1 - EA/C' (500106)
1 - C/EA (5E18)
1 - C/PES (7015)
1 - C/DO/PPS (3001)
1 - D/OLL (7824)
1 - Senior Review Panel (5G00)
1 - FBIS/AG/CB (212 Key)
1 - D/LDA (1H18)
1 - C/LDA/CH (1H18)
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