THAILAND'S CHANGING STRATEGIC OUTLOOK: IMPLICATIONS FOR THAI-US SECURITY RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Directorate of
Intelligence
GG46725
EA~1J048~87
DEA*0044*87
OkA ~~tOCt~Iit'N D1^FiGER i211I
t;fG-EAST ASIAN ANAI.YS[S
RODM 4G32
HEADG~UARTERS (Sir'I1-OEA REI_A7EGi
Outlook: ImFlications for
Thai-US Security Relations
Thailand's Changing Strategic
~tcw~eae t
EA 87-100J8
November 1987
cry 2 4 8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Directorate of Secret
Outlook: Implications for
Thai-US Security Relations
Thailand's Changing Strategic
Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
This paper was prepared by ffice
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Reverse Blonk Secret
EA 87-10048
November l 987
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
25X1
L~J~ I
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Thailand's Changing Strategic
Outlook: Implications for
Thai-US Security Relations
Key Judgments After a period of nearly total dependence on the United States, we believe
Igformation available Bangkok now favors security cooperation with several partners, but with
as q/'21 October 1987 the United States anchoring defense policy. In our judgment Thai officials
was used in this report. ,
calculate this strategy is more attuned to their defense needs and such
political and economic realities as increased nationalism and limited
budgetary resources. This view underlies Bangkok's expanding cooperation
with China and efforts to cultivate other potential partners such as South
We believe two factors will sustain this trend over the next several years:
? Reductions in US security assistance-an important gauge of commit-
ment in Bangkok's eyes-highlight the limitations of US support and
reinforce Thai doubts about Washington's reliability.
? Changes in the views of the Army officer corps, which provides most of
Thailand's leaders. The majority of younger officers are more self-
confident, nationalistic, and independent-minded than their seniors, and,
as a result, we believe they will view cooperation with the United States
more objectively while being open to other options.
We believe Bangkok may become less responsive to US concerns or adopt
policies that contradict US objectives, as a result. For example, Bangkok's
increasing number of arms suppliers undermines the inter~nerah;l;ty of
Furthermore, because personalities play such a large role in decisionmak-
ing, we believe handshake agreements such as the one permitting the
United States to stage surveillance flights over the Indian Ocean from Thai
facilities at Utapao are vulnerable to leadership changes. If General
Chavalit succeeds Prime Minister Prem, as we ex ect the a reement will
remain viable, in our judgment
n ee , almost
remain an emotional issue, and thus we b li agree-
ment for use of Utapao could be jeopardized no matter
who is prime minister. Because of such sensitivities, we do not consider
25X6
Z~X6
25X6
25X6
25X66
25X6
iii Secret
EA 87-10048
November 1987
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Thailand as a possible alternative for US bases in the Philippines. We
believe Bangkok, at most, would permit only a small permanent contingent
to service transiting military aircraft.
Nevertheless, the United States will remain the major factor in Thai
national security policy. Both nations' interests remain largely parallel,
including the desire to limit Chinese, Soviet, and Vietnamese influence in
the region and to promote a strong Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. Thai efforts to develop and expand other security partnerships, in
our view, are intended to complement rather than replace US assistance
and guarantees.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4 5X1
Secret
Contents
Key Judgments
iii
Catalysts for Change
1
A New Breed of Officers
1
Limitations of US Support
1
Thailand Diversifies
3
United States Retains Central Role
5
Rough Times Ahead?
g
Appendix
Thailand: Equipment Modernization Programs
11
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Secret
Thai Foreign Policy: A Historical Perspective
The Thai have long prided themselves on their
skilful juggling of competing interests and their deft
handling of vastly more powerful friends and foes
through diplomacy. They have been guided through-
out by a combination of opportunism, pragmatism,
and an intense desire to preserve their independence;
they have not hesitated to sacrifice relations with one
nation to pursue what they believe are more attrac-
tive opportunities with another. For example, with
British colonialism in Southeast Asia on the rise in
the 1800s and posing an increasing threat to Thai
sovereignty, Bangkok made major commercial con-
cessions that satisfied London's search for expanded
trade and influence in the region. It thenlorged
similar arrangements with the United States, Bri-
tain's archrival, France, and several other nations
that helped Bangkok avoid what one author called
"such suilocatingly close bilateral relationships as
those between British India and Burma or France and
Vietnam. "Thailand thus struck a delicate balance
with Great Britain protecting Bangkok against the
designs of other powers who, in turn, provided lever-
age against the British.
This approach often has required the Thai to do more
than enter into unpalatable diplomatic arrangements
or accept paiil/'ul economic concessions. They also
have ceded valuable territories on several occasions,
sacrificing various parts to preserve the smaller
whole. For instance, Thailand in this century relin-
quished control over parts of modern day Laos and
Cambodia to the French in return for their withdraw-
allrom southeastern Thailand. In similar fashion,
Bangkok won authority over British subjects in Thai-
land by granting London control of several of Thai-
land sMalay states. These concessions amounted to
over 175,000 square miles of territory, but they
preserved Thai independence.
During World War II, Bangkok responded to the
Japanese invasion of Thailand and a series of other
military successes by concluding a military alliance
with Tokyo. One noted historian speculates that Thai
ojficials concluded Japan would win the war and
decided their interests were best served by going with
the tide. As this tide shifted, however, Bangkok
reverted to the balancing act by maintaining good
relations with Tokyo on the surface while working
with the British and the Americans covertly. The
Thai move awaylrom Japan accelerated as allied
,forces prepared to go on the ojjensive and Bangkok
began mendinglences with nations it had declared
war on a few years earlier.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Thailand's Changing Strategic
Outlook: Implications for
Thai-US Security Relations
Catalysts for Change
The past decade has seen important changes in Thai-
land that will set the tone of Thai foreign policy and
Thai-US security relations over the next several years.
Bangkok's international stature has increased sub-
stantially by virtue of its role in spearheading opposi-
tion to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. This has
caught the eye of China and the Soviet Union, for
instance, and both have chosen Bangkok as the focal
point for their efforts to expand their influence in the
region, according to US diplomats. On the domestic
front, a generational change in leadership is under
way that, in our view, portends a period of political
uncertainty. Prime Minister Prem, Deputy Prime
Minister Siddhi, National Security Council Secretary
General Prasong, and National Intelligence Agency
Director Piya-who have shaped Thailand's moder-
ate, strongly pro-US foreign policy-are moving to-
ward the end of their respective careers.
A New Breed of Officers
Although the Army is among the most conservative
elements in Thailand, ints
out that many up-and-coming humor o cers have had
markedly different experiences from those of their
seniors and, as a result, have very different views
about foreign and national security policy. Many
entered the system as the Vietnam war was winding
down and US forces withdrew. Their experience with
the United States is much more limited than their
mentors', who rose through the ranks when bilateral
cooperation was at its height. At the same time, the
younger officers were closely involved in Thailand's
counterinsurgency effort against the Communist Par-
ty of Thailand (CPT). Although we believe factional
rivalries and the abrupt cutoff of Chinese support
were the CPT's undoing, these officers are convinced
it was a stunning victory for the Army.
Because of such factors, young Thai officers exude
confidence in their capabilities and are strongly na-
tionalistic and independent-minded, 25X1
Thai weapons procurement r+olicy, according to the
that they have pushed
and for domestic defense industries and more diverse
external sources of weapons. As they assume senior
leadership positions, we believe they will be somewhat
less cautious in dealing with China than their seniors.
Although many saw combat against CPT forces,
memories of the Chinese supply link apparently have
faded in the current era of close coo eration with
Beijing. that they do not 25X1
distrust ma tot a same degree as their seniors;
some do not believe Beijing is a security threat at all.
Limitations of US Support
Thai officials at all levels are increasingly critical of
perceived shortcomings in US aid. Bangkok has long
complained that US security assistance is inadequate
to meet Thailand's needs, particularly in light of its
self-styled frontline status and role as anchor of US
interests in the region. Thai officials frequently draw
comparisons with Vietnam, complaining that Hanoi
receives everything it needs from the Soviet Union
free of charge while Bangkok has to "pay for every
shell." This analogy highlights the significance Bang-
kok attaches to material aid in gauging commitment,
and thus this aspect of the relationship seems certain
to be among the most contentious (see appendix).
The 40-percent cut in US aid for FY 1987 renewed
Bangkok's doubts about Washin ton's ultimate reli-
ability, although
increased grant aid, the logistic memorandum of
understanding, and the war reserve stockpile buffered
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Key Elements of Thai-US Security Relations
Rusk-Thanat Communique. This 1962 agreement un-
derpinsthe relationship. The United States and Thai-
land agreed to interpret the Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty of 1954 also as a bilateral pact
"binding" the United States to assist Thailand in
time of need. The communique, however, leavesluzzy
the issue of a US commitment to use its forces to
defend Thailand.
Security Assistance. Thelocus of security assistance
over the past several years has been to help modern-
ize Thai conventional forces, thereby improving Bang-
kok's ability to meet external threats without direct
US intervention. For years, this largely involved
grant aid, but the Carter adminstration opted for the
Foreign Military Sales (FMSJ program, which ex-
tended concessionary loans to help finance purchases
of US equipment. Thailand s allotment of FMS
credits topped $90 million before the program revert-
ed to grant aid in 1987 totaling about $SO million.
Combined Military Exercises. These are an impor-
tant element of joint e,~orts to improve Thai conven-
tional capabilities and a major demonstration of
Washington's commitment to Thai security. From the
US perspective, they also represent important oppor-
tunities to train USlorces because of the environmen-
tal and tactical conditions. The exercise program has
expanded Irom three events in 1980 to over 20
annually, the largest of which is Cobra Gold. For the
,first time in 1987, the Cobra Gold scenario involved
defending against a simulated Vietnamese invasion
across the Cambodian border. Although US budget-
ary restrictions are a limitinglactor in the exercise
program, Thai officials are pressing to expand the
size and scope of these activities.
War Reserve Stockpile. The 1987 War Reserve
Stockpile Agreement provides ,for complementary
stores of US and Thai reserve materiel on Thai soil.
The United States agreed to provide munitions
matching Thai contributions up to $10 million annu-
allyfor five years. The supplies can be used by either
nation in an emergency, although the rules governing
withdrawals d~"er. The United States can use its
stocks at any time for any purpose upon "appropriate
notification" to the Thai Government, although
Bangkok cannot draw US stocks unless the US
President and the Thai Prime Minister agree that a
"nation-threatening" crisis exists. Bangkok's limited
control over US use of the stockpile clearly would be
a contentious point in Thailand if it became widely
known.
Access to Uta ao Airfield. Prime Minister Prem in
late
in the region, and for transiting US military aircr t.
Prem several times has allowed Washington to ex-
pand the operations-for example, by increasing the
number of surveillance,flights to eight annually-and
he is the only direct US contact in the Thai Govern-
ment on this highly sensitive agreement.
Logistics Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).
The MOU concluded in 1985,formalizes and regJ=
firms several separate arrangements under one um-
brella agreement. It covers issues pertaining to US
logistic support to Thailand, particularly the provi-
sion of supplies in an emergency.
Economic Support Funds. Although part of the US
security assistance package, this $S millionlund is
used for humanitarian projects in Thai border vil-
lages ti~`ected by Indochinese refugees.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Secret
US Security Assistance for Thailand (1982-88)
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
? Military Assistance Program (MAP)
Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
120
I10
100
90
80
70
b0
i0
~30
30
20
10
n -.
its reaction. Press commentaries often echo these
concerns. Indeed, the warnings against overreliance
on the United States and involvement in US issues
that do not directly affect Thailand become more
shrill whenever new elements of bilateral security
Thai security, they apparently heighten the fears of
many who believe Thailand is better off keeping the
United States at a comfortable distance (see inset).
cooperation, such as the sale of F-16 fighters, become
public.' Although these measures are obviously in- Thailand Diversifies
tended to demonstrate Washington's commitment to
'The Air Force's proposed purchase of US F-16 fighters became a
hotly debated public issue in Thailand in 1984. Military officers
were divided over the wisdom of the purchase in light of Thai
requirements and budget limitations while politicians and economic
policy makers argued that Thailand did not need and could not
afford the aircraft. Proponents finally won approval for the pur-
chase in 1985, but the total number of planes was reduced from 16
to 12, and the payment plan adopted will severely restrict Air Force
resources for years to come. The first delivery is scheduled for 1988.
Bangkok believes some distance from Washington is
appropriate, and we expect the Thai to seek a more
independent course over the next several years by
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Secret
developing greater balance in their defense relation-
ships. In our view, the Thai calculate that this
strategy:
? Is more attuned to domestic sensitivity regarding
sovereignty and independence.
? Reduces Thai exposure to broken commitments.
? Enhances Bangkok's flexibility in the conduct of
foreign policy.
? Provides a degree of leverage in dealing with the
United States.
? Improves the military's ability to modernize within
budeet constraints
for example, that
Thailand is moving toward a logistic partnership with
South Korea. A Thai Supreme Command delegation
visited Seoul in August 1987 to negotiate the pur-
chase of equipment, spare parts, and ammunition. We
are not aware of any final agreements, but the
an attractive supplier because it can provide hardware
compatible with US-made equipment more cheaply
and often more quickly than the United States. Senior
Thai officers also have developed extensive contacts
with several West European suppliers whose sales to
Thailand are increasing somewhat. In addition, mili-
tary exercises with Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) partners have increased markedly
during the 1980s, although defense cooperation within
the group is unlikely to grow much beyond the current
limited level (see appendix).
By far the most striking example of Thai diversifica-
tion efforts is the budding relationship with China.
Although parallel policies opposing Vietnam's occupa-
tion of Cambodia underpin the relationship, Beijing
now is a coguarantor of Thai security along with the
United States. From Bangkok's perspective, China
offers assistance that Washington either cannot or
will not provide, such as a bankroll for the Cambodian
resistance and a regional counterweight to Vietnam
and the Soviets. The Thai consider China's policy of
exerting limited military pressure along the Vietnam-
ese border, for example, as an important show of
support for Thailand and the resistance. They also are
looking toward Beijing as a major source of inexpen-
sive weaponry (see inset).
Chronology of Selected Developments in
Thai-Chinese Relations
1975 Formal diplomatic relations established.
1978 Thai Prime Minister, Chinese vice premier
exchange visits.
1982 Chinese naval delegation visits Thailand for
first time.
1984 Beijing unveils strategy of "a thousand
thorns" involving limited pressure on Viet-
namese border to show support for Thailand
and the Cambodian resistance.
General Arthit becomes just Thai Army
commander in chief to visit China.
1985 China provides ' giJ't " of jield and antiair-
crc+/'t artillery and counterbattery radar,
marking just receipt of major Chinese
weapon system by Thai military.
Chinese President Li Xiannian visits Thai-
land at King Bhumibol s invitation.
1986 Both nations decide to add naval attaches to
their diplomatic missions.
1987 Crown Prince Vajirilongkorn visits China.
Thai announce first major purchase of Chi-
nese hardware. Package includes tanks, ar-
mored personnel carriers, artillery, and other
equipment. Deliveries begin in September.
China stations two military advisers in
Bangkok to help Thai assimilate new
equipment.
Both nations agree in principle to open new
consulates.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Secret
The arms relationship has been one of the most
dynamic aspects of increasingly close military ties
over the last two years. China's aggressive marketing
strategy with its highly concessionary terms, together
with Thai financial constraints and a growing reser-
voir of experience dealing with Beijing, apparently
have helped the Thai overcome some of their trepida-
tions about acquiring Chinese equipment. So far in
1987, for example, the
Thai have contracted for tanks, armored personnel
carriers, antiaircraft artiller and other ui ment.
In addition,
the next step could include combined planning-
for example, for force modernization~r contingency
planning for emergency logistic support (see table 1).
a naval attache.z
Ito help the
Thai assimilate new hardware and Thailand has
expanded its diplomatic mission in Beijing to include
equipment it provides nearly free of charge.
We believe this relationship with China could well
produce Thai policies in conflict with those of the
United States. For instance, the transfer of US and
other NATO military technology may become a
contentious issue in the years ahead, in our view, as
this is one way Bangkok could compensate China for
three instances of illegal diversion
may already have occurred:
? a Thai Exo-
cet surface-to-surface missile reported lost at sea
may have been delivered to China.
may have acquired a West German Leop-
ar tan from Thailand even though Bonn prohibit-
ed the transfer.
through reverse engineering.
to transfer an Italian Aspide surface-to-air missile.
Beijing apparently hopes to develop a similar system
China has asked the Thai
In any event, we believe several factors will limit the
growth of bilateral cooperation at least in the near
term. the Thai still view
China with suspicion, and many officials in Bangkok,
including Prime Minister Prem and Deputy Prime
Minister Siddhi, consider Beijing along-term threat
(see inset). In addition, while Thai officials apparently
believe they can manage anxieties within ASEAN,
particularly those of Indonesia and Malaysia, the
balancing act also will incorporate concerns over the
potential impact on relations with these skittish part-
ners who consider China their major long-term securi- 25X1
ty threat. some 25X1
officials in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta believe the 25X1
relationship has already become too close, although
they are not pressing the Thai to change course. ~
25X1
25X1
Despite Thailand's considerably broadened outlook, in
our judgment, the United States will remain the core
of Thai foreign policy and the ultimate guarantor of 25X1
national security. We believe Bangkok views Chinese
security assurances and Thai efforts to cultivate other
weapon suppliers as ways to overcome shortcomings in
the US relationship rather than as a move to supplant
it. Moreover, the Thai have strong motivations for
maintaining this central US role. They recognize, for
example, that US capabilities for rapid resupply and
direct intervention are unique. Previous rush deliver- 25X1
ies of US equipment in response to clashes between 25X1
Thai and Vietnamese forces along the Thai-Cambodi-
an border and large-scale deployments for combined 25X1
military exercises such as Cobra Gold have reinforced
this view.
In addition, Thailand's heavy reliance on diplomacy
to offset perceived security threats depends on having
the US counterweight for leverage. As Bangkok tries
to manage an increasingly complicated diplomatic
agenda with far more powerful nations such as China
and the Soviet Union, we believe the Thai foresee a
25X1
25X1
key role for the United States. For example, Bangkok 25X1
is certain to lean heavily on Washington to balance
cooperation with China. It also seeks to limit the
growth of Soviet influence and activities in Southeast
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Secret
Table 1
Thai Alternatives: A Comparison of Selected Weapons
Power/weight l6 horsepower/ton
One 105-mm main gun;
one 7.62-mm coaxial and
two 7.62-mm antiaircraft
machineguns
One 100-mm main gun;
one 7.62-mm coaxial,
one 7.62-mm bow, and
one 12.7-mm antiaircraft
machineguns
~~ Prices quoted for US-made equipment are for end items only. The
United States, however, generally offers the weapons as part of a
total package that includes spare parts, ancillary equipment, techni-
cal manuals, and other support. This is not always the case with
other suppliers.
b Maximum range increases to nearly 30 km with arocket-assisted
projectile. China is trying to develop a similar shell.
Asia exemplified by Moscow's presence at Cam Ranh
Bay and higher profile in the Gulf of Thailand. Prime
Minister Prem's repeated requests for appropriate US
responses, such as a more visible naval presence in the
Gulf of Thailand, underscore this concern.
Although a political solution to the Cambodia prob-
lem presumably would ease Thai concerns by remov-
ing amajor source of regional instability, we believe
Thailand also would look to the United States to help
deal with the uncertainties that a settlement would
generate. We believe bilateral relations with China
have sprouted roots deep enough to outlive the Cam-
bodia problem, but the ground rules for cooperation
would be changed markedly without this key common
policy interest. Thai fears probably would intensify
that Beijing may revert to the disruptive policy of the
1960s and 1970s, when it supported Thai Communist
insurgents. They also would worry more about the
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Secret
Chinese Tvpe 66 152-mm howitzer South Korean KH-!79 I55-mm howitzer
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Secret
General Chavalit: Playing All Sides
we rank
Army Commander Chavalit Yongc ayu t as the
front-runner to succeed Prime Minister Prem. Al-
though Chavalit is generally pro-United States, his
accession to the premiership would portend continued
diversification of Thai defense arrangements and a
more open approach to traditional adversaries, in our
and the Soviet Union the major powers in Southeast
Asia, and he argues that Thai policies should reflect
this. He also believes Thailand has much to gain
from both nations. For example, the Soviet Union
and Bloc countries offer attractive trade opportuni-
ties for Thailand, in Chavalit's view, and he advo-
cates dealing directly with Moscow to manage the
prospects for aSino-Soviet or Sino-Vietnamese rap-
prochement that may further reduce Chinese motiva-
tions to cooperate with Thailand and upset Bangkok's
efforts to manage relations with all three. Along with
seeking renewed assurances from the United States,
Bangkok probably would work to shore up aspects of
the China relationship unrelated to Cambodia-such
as fledgling economic ties-to ensure Beijing's inter-
est in continued cooperation.
security threat it poses. Chavalit says that in October
1987 he plans to become the first Thai Army Com-
mander in recent history to visit the Soviet Union. He
plans discussions on a wide range of topics, according
to press reporting, but says he will not raise sensitive
issues that would make his hosts uncomfortable.
Chavalit accords the United States top billing over
China in Thailand s security scheme, distinguishing
them as ally and friend respectively, according to US
diplomats. He is a leading proponent of closer rela-
tions with China-a policy he is certain to pursue ~
worthy that, during his tenure as commander, the
Army has made itsfirst major purchase of Chinese
weapons and Beijing has stationed its.first military
advisers in Bangkok. Nonetheless, Chavalit intends
to maintain balance in Thai defense relationships,
and, by all accounts, he plans on continued close ties
to the United States. Under his direction, the Army
also has pressed for a jointly owned war reserve
stockpile in Thailand and for more combined exer-
cises with the United States as well as long-term
commitments of emergency logistic support.
Rough Times Ahead?
Nevertheless, we believe the changes under way in
Thailand will complicate Thai-US security relations.
This does not necessarily portend rising anti-US
sentiment, but Bangkok almost certainly will view
bilateral relations more objectively, and it certainly
intends to deal with the United States as a partner,
25X1
25X6
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Secret
not a patron. We believe the Thai will not necessarily
accept current levels of cooperation as a given and will
assess more critically the costs and benefits. More-
over, because the Thai have become more creative in
meeting their security needs, they will seek sharply
defined US commitments-for example, for emergen-
cy logistic support-in order to assess and fill per-
ceived gaps.
We also expect Bangkok to continue manipulating US
guarantees to come to Thailand's defense. This is
intended partly for public consumption and deterrence
value, but, more important, we believe it represents an
effort to maneuver Washington into explicit commit-
ments. Should direct US intervention be necessary-
which we believe is unlikely-the task will be compli-
cated by Bangkok's more diverse sources of weapons
that undermine the interoperability of Thai and US
forces. This procurement policy also works against
efforts to improve Thai self-sufficiency in national
defense by worsening severe logistics and mainte-
nance shortcomings.
Finally, because personalities are a critical factor in
Thai politics, handshake agreements that lack an
institutional foundation-such as the one permitting
US access to Utapao for surveillance flights over the
Indian Ocean-are vulnerable to leadership changes,
Although Army Commander Chavalit-
t et a c~front-runner to succeed Prem-is among
them and probably would maintain the agreement, we
are less certain that another prime minister would
Thai sensitivities to a highly visible US military
presence are unlikely to abate soon, in our view, and
thus Thailand is not a realistic alternative for US
military bases in the Philippines. US diplomats be-
lieve Bangkok, at best, would permit a small perma-
nent contingent to service transiting military flights
using Thai facilities. Even this would be subject to
close scrutiny by Thai officials, who are certain to
drive a hard bargain and require substantial financial
and other rewards. Moreover, we believe public reve-
lation of such an agreement could be explosive. US 25X1
diplomats expect that students and intellectuals would
spearhead the opposition. They would argue that the
reestablishment of a US military presence in Thailand
would infringe on national sovereignty, bolster the
Army's role in domestic politics, complicate regional
and international issues, and increase the chance that
Bangkok would become involved in conflicts where it 25X6
had no direct interests at stake. _~tiu~
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Appendix
Thailand:
Equipment Modernization Programs
Armor modern- The Army in September 1987 took delivery of
ization 30 Chinese Type 69 II tanks and it has bought
roughly 80 US-made M-48A5 tanks over the
last three years. Bangkok also is considering
the US-made Stingray light tank, and press
reports indicate the Thai Cabinet has ap-
proved the purchase of 100 Stingrays. The
Army's plan to modernize its fl
tanks remains shelved
the Thai also are buying several hundred
Chinese armored personnel carriers, but none
have been delivered so far.
F-16 fighter This remains the Air Force's only major
aircraft acquisition program. Twelve F-]bs
are to be delivered by 1989, and the military
has postponed plans to buy six more aircraft.
Air Force officials remain uninterested in
Chinese aircraft.
Air defense The Air Force in 1985 won approval for the
system first phase of this three-phase program to
construct a modern,integrated air defense
system. If Bangkok follows through on all
aspects of the program, construction will con-
tinue well into the next decade.
Fleet expansion The Navy is adding two new US-made cor-
vettes and two minesweepers made in West
Germany. The Chinese have offered frigates
and submarines to the Thai Navy, but no deal
has been struck so far.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/03 :CIA-RDP04T00907R000200340001-4