SIGNS OF STABILITY IN NORTH KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY: BELLWETHER OF POLITICAL CHANGE?

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000200280001-1
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Change?
Signs of Stability in
North Korean Workers' Party:
Bellwether of Political
A Research Paper
EA 87-10041
September 1987
C O P Y 2 1 2
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~`""`~+ Directorate of
7
n Intelligence
Signs of Stability in
North Korean Workers' Party:
Bellwether of Political
Change?
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared b~ ~ Office of
East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Northeast Asia Division. OEA
25X1
2oX1
Secret
EA 87-10041
September 1987
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Signs of Stability in
North Korean Workers' Party:
Bellwether of Political
Change?
Scope Note This paper marks an initial effort to exploit a small but significant increase
in information on North Korea's tightly closed society. 25X1
the media and academic coverage we have always 25X1
relied on heavily, has given us a somewhat firmer-if still tentative-basis
for judgments on political trends in North Korea. 25X1
important aspects of North Korea's political institutions may be 25X1
changing to firm the underpinnings of a leadership transition as the end of
President Kim 11-song's long rule approaches. The results of the Seventh
Congress of the Korean Workers' Party, which some believe will be 25X1
held soon, should provide a test of this hypothesis. 25X1
Secret
EA 87-10041
September 1987
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Contents
Scope Note
Summary
No Job Security
Comparison With Other Communist Parties
2
The Rationale: What Could Lie Behind the Pattern?
4
A Move Toward Greater Institutional Stability?
4
Testing the Hypothesis
7
Broader Policy Implications
8
The Political Role of the Military
13
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Signs of Stability in
North Korean Workers' Party:
Bellwether of Political
Change?
Summary President Kim 11-song's management of the Korean Workers' Party during
Information available his 40 years in power has reflected his control of all aspects of life in North
as of 2 September 1987 Korea. The party has functioned at his personal direction, and he has
was used in this report.
prevented it from developing an institutional identity. The KWP's weak-
ness has been strikingly evident in the transient nature of Central
Committee membership:
? Since 1946, 85 percent of Central Committee members have held seats
for only one or two terms, and never have members reelected from one
Central Committee made up a majority of the new one.
? Moreover, very few alternate Central Committee members rose to full
membership at succeeding congresses, and rarely have alternates served
more than once.
Kim's routine shuffling of Central Committee membership suggests he has
sought to protect his position by preventing others from building individual
power bases or developing the experience and knowledge to challenge his
policies. His management contrasts with many other Communist systems,
where leaders build a stable cast of loyal officials once they have
consolidated power. Moreover, unlike in North Korea where KWP instabil-
ity is the rule, high Central Committee turnover elsewhere often reflects
major changes in top leadership, massive social upheaval, or both.
The recent pattern of Central Committee membership and promotions,
however, suggests Kim may now view a strong, more institutionally
experienced party leadership as a key underpinning to the transfer of power
to his son, Kim Chong-il. Beginning with the Sixth KWP Congress in
1980, we have seen a significant decline in Central Committee turnover:
? Fifty-eight percent of the full Central Committee members and 25
percent of the alternates were reelected in 1980, the highest figures since
1948.
? Overall, incumbents made up 47 percent of the new Central Committee,
the highest proportion in KWP history.
? Fewer membership changes have occurred in the 12 Central Committee
plenums since 1980, and the number of alternate members elevated to
full membership has increased significantly.
The results of the next KWP congress-which could come as early as next
year-will test our hypothesis that Kim is permitting the Central Commit-
tee a greater measure of stability. Retention of half or more of the Sixth
Central Committee members, in our view, would establish a trend toward a
more institutionalized form of leadership.
vii Secret
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Even if Kim builds a large measure of continuity into the Central
Committee at the next party congress, whatever changes occur should offer
clues as to how policy is made and power relationships maintained in North
Korea. In particular, we will look at the standing of key military and
economic figures:
? Kim has kept the proportion of military members of the Central
Committee stable to ensure civilian control. Whether he will continue to
follow this pattern is a key question, as is the proportion of military
officers he selects for Politburo positions.
? Changes in the economic team could provide insight into Kim's satisfac-
tion with the party's approach to solving North Korea's serious economic
problems.
? A comparison of the rank order and numbers of senior military and
economic officials in the KWP should give us some indication of political-
economic relations and how both sides will fare in competing for scarce
resources.
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Signs of Stability in
North Korean Workers' Party:
Bellwether of Political
Change?
Historical Institutional Weakness
Under President Kim I1-song, North Korea has been
one of the world's most stable and centralized dicta-
torships. Kim's influence on all walks of life is
pervasive, but it is particularly striking in his manage-
ment of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP),' over
which he maintains a firm grip
academic observers, and diplomatic sources agree that
Kim's personal power and prestige have dominated
the KWP throughout his 40 years in office. Examples
of his control abound:
? Kim has ignored party rules calling for a congress
every five years and,
has total discretion over the tim-
ing-and, we assume, the substance-of these
sessions.
? He has overruled party leaders on key initiatives,
particularly if he sees a threat to even a small
measure of his personal control.
Kim intervened last
year to block an initiative supported by a majority
of Central Committee members and economic ex-
perts to introduce Chinese-style economic reforms-
limited decentralization and toleration of some pri-
vate enterprise.
? Kim firmly controls the choice and terms of those
serving on the Central Committee and Politburo.P
North Korean officials rise or fall
"almost daily" in accordance with Kim II-song's
whims.
the party plays a role similar to that of most other ruling
Communist parties. It organizes and surveils public participation in
political and social life and recruits individuals into the bureau-
cracy. Party membership almost certainly is a prerequisite to career
advancement in all professions. Press reporting indicates that party
officials run government, social, and religious organizations, and
the media constantly exhort the public to defer to KWP leadership
No Job Security. Rapid turnover in the Central
Committee 2 is one of the clearest indications of the
degree to which Kim has controlled the party. The
Central Committee appears to have been a transient
body with very little stability in either full or alternate
membership. According to our analysis, based on data
from published sources 25X1
going back two decades, the turnover in membership
has been dramatic: 25X1
? Of the 317 people who have served as full Central
Committee members since 1946, 51 percent served
only once, 34 percent twice, 9 percent three times,
and 3 percent four times. Only Kim 11-song and the 25X1
late Premier Kim Il served on all six Central 25X1
Committees. In short, turnover has been exception-
ally high (see table 1).
? Judging from ~research by Western and 25X1
South Korean scholars, Kim 11-song also has tried to
ensure that controlling groups or factions did not 25X1
persist from one Central Committee to another.
Only in 1948 and 1980 did a majority of Central
Committee members retain their seats after a re-
election. A progressively smaller percentage of
members were reelected at the congresses held
between those dates. Members reelected from the
previous Central Committee have never made up a
controlling majority of a new one (see table 1 and
figure 1). For example, while 70 percent of the First 25X1
Central Committee elected in 1946 was reelected in 25X1
1948, the Committee's size was increased to the 25X1
point that these veterans made up only 45 percent of
the new body.
' We believe the KWP Central Committee is assigned a role similar
to its counterparts in other Communist systems-it provides the
stamp of decisionmaking authority, confers elite status on its
members, and serves as the leadership's tool to assign and promote
officials. The KWP "chooses" a ruling Politburo, administrative
Secretariat, and other departments and commissions, which-
according to research by Western and South Korean academic
observers-are more influential than government ministries
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Table I
Korean Workers' Party Central Committee Reelection
1946 First 1948 First
Congress Congress
Total
Number of full members
Number/percent of full
members reelected from
previous Committee
Number of alternate members
Number/percent of full
members who were alternate
members of previous
Committee
Number/percent of alternate
members reelected from
previous Committee
67
30/70%
1956 First
Congress
1961 First
Congress
1970 First
Congress
1980 First
Congress
116
135
172
248
71
85
117
145
29/43%
28/39%
31/36%
68/58%
45
50
55
103
5/25%
12/27%
15/30%
12/22%
Membership statistics also show that the Central
Committee lacks a regularized leadership promotion
system, pointing to another area of KWP institutional
weakness and instability. Historically, relatively few
alternate Central Committee members have been
promoted to full membership at succeeding congresses
(see table 1 and figure 1). Alternate members also
seem to come and go frequently. For instance, only 24
of the 273 alternate members elected to their positions
between 1948 and 1980 had served more than once.
Kim II-song most often appears to have recruited
Central Committee members from the party rank and
file and from local bureaucracies rather than from
among the alternate Central Committee membership.
Despite the rapid ascension of those chosen, he also
has demoted them just as suddenly.
Moreover, Kim has at times reappointed Central
Committee members after having demoted them at a
previous party congress (see table 2, page 4). Yi
Chong-ok, currently a Politburo member and one of
North Korea's three vice presidents, is an outstanding
example. Yi was on the Third and Fourth Central
Committees and was a member of every North Kore-
an cabinet between 1948 and 1970. He dropped out of
the leadership at the Fifth Party Congress in 1970-
because of economic policy failures, according to
Western and South Korean scholars-but reappeared
in a government role in 1973. He was elected to the
Sixth Central Committee in 1980.
A high turnover rate also is evident in subordinate
elements of the Central Committee. These subgroups,
staffed with Central Committee members, provide
administrative support to the party. For example, of
the 43 people serving during 1946-80 on the Central
Auditing Commission-which oversees KWP expen-
ditures-only three were elected more than once. As
another case in point, Kim retained less than 20
percent on average of the Inspection Committee's
membership during that period.
Comparison With Other Communist Parties. Kim
11-song's policy of routinely shuffling leading party
personnel contrasts with many other Communist sys-
tems, where leaders build a stable cast of loyal
officials once they have consolidated their power.
Members of Central Committees in many other par-
ties have been more likely than their North Korean
25X1
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Figure 1
Korean Workers' Party Central Committee:
Full Members
Full members reelected from previous
Central Committee
Full members who were alternates on
previous Central Committee
New full members
1948
2nd-
1956
3rd
1961
4th
1970
5th
1980
6th
The regularity with which other Communist leader-
ships promote alternate Central Committee members
to full membership status also demonstrates the insti-
tutional instability of the KWP. Not only do most
ruling parties select a greater percentage of new full
Committee members from alternate ranks, but they
also tend to reelect incumbent alternates. A compari-
son of Soviet and North Korean promotion rates is
noteworthy and appears in table 4, page 5. East
European parties also have had a more predictable
promotion system than the KWP. For example, 30 of
the 50 new full Central Committee members elected
in 1981 at the 12th Bulgarian Communist Party
Congress had been alternate members of the previous
Central Committee.
Several Asian ruling parties similarly appear to have
had a more institutionalized promotion system than
the KWP. At the 1986 Vietnamese Communist Party
Congress-which resulted in a major leadership
shakeup-24 out of 38 new full Central Committee
members had been alternates at the previous congress.
Six of the other 12 alternates retained their positions.
Mongolian Communist Party promotion rates are
lower than those of Vietnam, but still higher than in
North Korea. In Mongolia, 30 percent of new full
members elected in 1981 and 44 percent at the
congress in 1976 had been alternates.
Only the Chinese Communist Party appears to have
had a promotion rate as low as the KWP's. Only 12
percent of alternate members of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party's 11th Central Committee elected in 1977
became full members of the 12th Central Committee
in 1982. Fourteen percent stayed on as alternates. 25X1
Unlike North Korea, where there have been no
discernible leadership fights or shakeups for a genera-
tion, China in this period experienced considerable
internal tussling. We believe the low promotion rates
resulted in large part from major social distur-
bances-the rehabilitation of leaders who had been
purged during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu-
tion in the 1960s, the demotion of those who had
purged them, and the considerable factional
infighting in the party during this time. 25X1
counterparts to retain their seats from congress to
congress (see figure 2 and table 3, page 5). When
there have been instances of high turnover elsewhere
in the Communist world, they often have reflected
major changes in top leadership (Soviet Union and
Vietnam in 1986), massive social upheaval (Poland,
1980-81), or both (China after 1965). But the KWP
has a record of membership instability despite the
absence of social or leadership crises in North Korea
since the Korean war.
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Table 2
Patterns of Reelection of Full Central Committee Members
First Second
Congress Congress
1946 First Congress 43 30
1948 Second Congress 67
1956 Third Congress
1961 Fourth Congress
1970 Fifth Congress
1980 Sixth Congress
Third Fourth Fifth Sixth
Congress Congress Congress_ Congress
12(2)a (1)a 2 2(1)b
29 11 (1)? 3(1)d 2
71 28 10 6(1)e
a Kim Ch'ang-man and Yun Kong-hum were not reelected to the
Second, but to the Third Congress. Of the two, only Kim was
reelected to the Fourth Congress.
b Ho Chong-suk was elected to the First, Second, Third, and Sixth
Congresses, but was not reelected to the Fourth and Fifth
Congresses.
Yi Puk-myong was elected to the Second and Fourth Congresses,
but not to the Third.
d Pang Hak-se was elected to the Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth
Congresses, but not to the Fourth Congress.
e Yi Chong-ok was elected to the Third, Fourth, and Sixth
Congresses, but not to the Fifth Congress.
f Ch'oe Kwang, Yi Chao-yun and Yim Kye-ch'ol were elected to
the Fourth and Sixth Congresses, but not to the Fifth Congress.
The Rationale: What Could Lie Behind the Pattern?
We do not know why Kim 11-song has routinely
shuffled Central Committee membership, but the
pattern, which buttresses the notion that his rule is
personal and pervasive, suggests several reasons:
? By keeping KWP officials off balance, Kim has
impeded the creation of individual power bases and
made his subordinates dependent on his personal
favor.
? Kim 11-song also has kept others in leadership
positions from building a network of grateful subor-
dinates by ensuring that government officials and
Central Committee members have owed their posi-
tions solely to his discretion or that of his son and
designated heir, Kim Chong-il.
? And, by keeping the KWP in flux, Kim has ensured
that he or his chosen minions can dominate all
aspects of policymaking without being threatened
by those who have the backing and knowledge to
challenge their views.
Kim's strategy has not been cost free. His failure to
allow development of functional expertise almost cer-
tainly has deprived him of a strong supporting cast for
managing the day-to-day affairs of state. Moreover,
we agree with those Western and South Korean
academic observers who believe Kim has left subordi-
nates unprepared to make even minor decisions with-
out his personal guidance, thereby worsening an
already ponderously inefficient bureaucracy. In addi-
tion, Kim's personnel policies and personal rule have
prevented the party, which should be the institutional
backbone of a Communist society, from developing
the kind of historical memory and institutional
expertise that would give it real strength.
A Move Toward Greater Institutional Stability?
The paucity of inside information on the North
Korean leadership, party apparatus, and policies
makes us cautious in forming judgments about politi-
cal trends in P'yongyang, but information on person-
nel shifts since 1980 suggests some changes may be
under way in Kim 11-song's approaches to Central
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Figure 2
Percent of Non-Korean Communist Party
Central Committee Membership Reelected
Bulgaria
1981
East
Germany
1981
Poland
1981
Romania
1981
Mongolia
1981
Vietnam
1986
Table 3
Full Central Committee Members
From Previous
Party Congress
Albania USSR China
North Korea
83 (1986) 45 (1986) 47 (198
2) 58 (1980)
80 (1981) 75 (1981) 44 (197
7) 36(1970)
46 (1976) 87 (1976) 37 (197
_
3) 39(1961)
95 (1971) 69 (1971)
_
43 (1956)
-
70(1948)
Table 4
Alternate Central Committee Member
Promotions
CPSU
Year
1981
1976
1971
Total
New Full
Membership
Year Total
New Full
Membership
1980
1970
1961
Committee membership. In particular, it appears he is
becoming somewhat more willing to give Central
Committee members a degree of tenure:
? Fifty-eight percent of full members of the Fifth
Central Committee were reelected at the Sixth
Central Committee in 1980, reversing the trend
toward progressively lower retention rates evident
since 1956 (see table 1).
? In addition, while the rate of promotion from alter-
nate to full membership remained low compared
with that of other Communist parties, 25 percent of
alternate members of the Fifth Central Committee
were reelected in 1980-another record.
? Overall, in 1980, incumbents made up 47 percent of
full Central Committee members-the highest pro-
portion in KWP history. Kim 11-song also doubled
the number of alternate members-an unprece-
dented development-perhaps to provide a greater
pool of candidates for promotion
In reviewing an October 1985 Central Committee list
we have noted few 25X1
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It is not clear whether the rate of turnover in the
North Korean Government-as opposed to the
KWP-is declining. In addition, the relative unim-
portance of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA-
the country's parliament) as a decisionmaking body
makes it difficult to assess the significance of person-
nel shifts. Retention rates have alternately increased
and declined in successive SPAs elected since 1962-
or since Kim II-song completed the purge of his
factional adversaries. Because Kim apparently uses
some SPA seats to reward war veterans and model
workers, the turnover pattern suggests he permits
some delegates so honored to "win" two successive
SPA elections, and then replaces them.
Turnover has been high on the primary SPA organs,
the Central People's Committee (CPC), and the
Standing Committee. The CPC-in existence only
since the Fifth SPA in 1972-appears to be the more
important of the two, because Kim Il-song and other
KWP Politburo members dominate its membership.
Changes in Politburo membership are reflected on the
CPC. The Standing Committee, consisting of lower
level Central Committee and SPA members, typically
changes one-half to two-thirds of its members at each
new SPA session.
The Administration Council, North Korea's cabinet,
serves a more practical role than the SPA in imple-
menting KWP policies. The SPA formally elects the
Congress. According to the list, 10 Central Commit-
tee plenums were held during 1980-85, adding 25 new
full members-six had been alternates in 1980-and
15 new alternates. Despite these changes and opportu-
nities for turnover, almost 90 percent of full members
and alternates retained their posts
The two most recent Central Committee plenums
(February and December 1986) provide further evi-
dence that the KWP may be developing a more
institutionalized promotion system. Although these
Administration Council, but in fact only ratifies Kim
II-songs appointments. Kim has changed the size as
well as the composition of cabinets considerably over
time, and has often merged ministries and commis-
sions only to separate them again soon. Therefore, it
is difficult to draw any conclusions concerning the
structural strength of government institutions. Kim
typically has reappointed one-fourth to one-third of a
cabinet. The highest retention rate was in 1967, when
20 members (61 percent) of the 1962 Administration
Council continued to serve.
One academic observer suggested in 1980 that the
increase since 1972 of the number of ministers reap-
pointed to the same posts suggested greater "stability
and continuity " than in the past. This scholar ignored
the decline in longevity of premiers and vice premiers
during the same period. Administrative Council ap-
pointments in SPA sessions since his analysis (in
1982 and 1986) suggest Kim continues to reappoint
only a small number of ministers to their posts. The
trend regarding premiers and vice premiers is unclear;
the premiership has changed twice since 1982, but
four vice premiers of the Seventh Adminstration
Council have retained their posts.
plenums added more new full and alternate members,
most members elected in 1980 still held their posi-
tions. In particular, 146 out of the 152 full Central
Committee members and all but one of the alternates
who were not promoted in October 1985 reportedly
retained their seats in December 1986. According to
North Korean media reports of plenum proceedings,
eight of the 13 full members elected in February 1986
had been alternate members-an extremely high per-
centage in North Korean terms. We are not certain
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that more alternates were promoted at the next
plenum in December. But the January 1987 lis
Politburo Membership Trends
25X1
25X1
of the
full Central Committee membership shows that five
more alternates made full Central Committee
membership
The North Koreans rarely publicize demotions, and
some Central Committee members may have been
dropped unceremoniously from the rolls. The most
recent list indicates that Politburo members demoted
since October 1985 have retained their Central Com-
mittee memberships. This would fit Kim I1-song's
historic pattern of shuffling Central Committee mem-
bers in and out of the top leadership. But at least six
of those dropped from the Politburo lost their parlia-
mentary seats last fall and may have lost their Central
Committee membership as well.
Testing the Hypothesis. Whether the pattern inside
the party since 1980 will hold should be evident after
the next party Congress.' If Kim II-song has in fact
decided to give the KWP greater institutional stabil-
ity, it could reflect a realization that his country's-
and his dynasty's-future depends on the party's
soundness. Kim is preparing to transfer power to his
son, Kim Chong-il, an unproven leader lacking his
father's legitimacy, revolutionary credentials, and
charisma. A strong, more experienced, and stable
party leadership could well represent a major under-
pinning for his son, and for the very success of the
transfer of power itself.
' Under the party's rules that stipulate congresses should be five
years apart, the Seventh Congress is already two years overdue.
Rumors are circulating in Western and Japanese press and diplo-
matic circles that Kim recently reversed a decision to call the
congress this year or next.
the success of efforts to implement the current Seven-Year
Economic Plan may be a factor in determining when the congress
The pattern of membership stability is less clear for
the Politburo than for the Central Committee. As in
other Communist states, the Politburo is North
Korea's senior policymaking body. All five members
elected to the Politburo in 1946 retained their posi-
tions in 1948, reflecting the balance among competing
25X1
25X1
increased that body's size to 19 full members, 25X 1
diluting the incumbents' irtffuence.
factions before Kim II-song consolidated his control,
according to South Korean and Western academic
analysts. Kim had achieved near total power by the
Third KWP Congress in 1956, when six of the seven
members of the 1948 Politburo lost their jobs. Only
three members of the 1956 Politburo remained in
place in 1961, and Kim dropped 73 percent of the
1961 Politburo before the end of the Fifth Party
Congress in 1970. These changes probably reflected
differences with hardline military leaders over reuni-
fication policy. Seven of the 11 Politburo members
kept their jobs between 1970 and 1980, but Kim
Promotion to the Politburo has been somewhat more
institutionalized than on the Central Committee;
most new members come from the ranks of those who
earned their spurs on the Central Committee. None-
theless, Kim has not regularly chosen full Politburo
members from those who have previously served as
Politburo alternates.
The experience of Albania-another small, maverick
Communist state that was ruled for more than 40
years by its founding dictator, Enver Hoxha-offers
evidence that Central Committee stability can ease
the transfer of power. Eighty percent of Albanian
Workers' Party (AWP) full Central Committee mem-
bers kept their jobs at the AWP's 1981 and 1986
congresses, (see table 3). In our view, stability cush- 25X1
ioned the shock from the bloody split in 1981 between
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Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, his longtime second in
command, and helped smooth the way for Ramiz
Alia, Hoxha's political heir, who led the party appara-
tus by the time Hoxha died in 1985. Persistent flux in
the KWP could prevent North Korea from achieving
a similarly seamless transition if there is turmoil after
Kim 11-song passes the mantle or dies, bequeathing
power to Kim Chong-il
Retention of half or more of Sixth Central Committee
members, in our view, would establish a definite trend
toward more stability in the KWP, continuing the
relatively high retention rate (58 percent) of the Sixth
Congress. The next congress also will give some
indication whether the Central Committee's promo-
tion of alternate members is becoming more institu-
tionalized. The high rate of promotion from alternate
to full membership-50 percent or more-evident in
the Soviet and other ruling parties would be extraordi-
nary for the KWP, given its history. But even an
elevation of 30 percent or more would be significant,
especially in light of the unprecedented increase in the
absolute number of alternates between 1970 and
1980. Similarly, a decision to retain large numbers of
alternates in their present posts would provide evi-
dence of an attempt to develop structural stability.'
degree of stability on the Central Committee. In fact,
since 1980 military representation has remained
stable.
But there are signs of change on the Politburo, one
level up. If our information is generally accurate,
nearly all military members of the Sixth Central
Committee have retained their seats. But it is clear
from North Korean announcements that fewer mili-
tary leaders now serve on the Politburo than in 1980.
Only two of the eight military members serving as full
or alternate Politburo members after the Sixth Con-
gress still held their posts in 1986 (see table 5). One
officer, Ch'oe Hyon, died several years ago, and five
apparently were demoted. Further, Defense Minister
O Chin-u, 77, has been convalescing since September
1986 from a serious automobile accident, apparently
leaving Chief of Staff 0 Kuk-yol as the only senior
military leader actively shaping regime policy.
We lack the inside story on these developments and
can only suggest explanations:
? Kim may simply be replacing older military leaders
on the Central Commitee with younger officers who
do not yet have the stature for Politburo member-
ship. In fact, the North Korean media have an-
nounced the elevation of several younger officers.
We assume all of them owe their positions to Kim
Broader Policy Implications
Beyond testing our hypothesis about party continuity,
we expect the next party congress, whenever it is held,
to offer insights into North Korean politics and policy
directions. We will look at the complexion of the
Central Committee for clues as to how policy is made
and power relationships are maintained at the top. In
North Korea's case, as in other Communist systems,
we pay special attention to the role and status of the
military (see appendix), which has long been closely
controlled by Kim 11-song and could be a critical
factor in ensuring-or spiking-Kim Chong-il's suc-
cession. Kim appears to have allowed the military a
' A failure of the Seventh Congress to match the retention rate of
the Sixth would not necessarily mean Kim II-song's succession
plans are in jeopardy. It could suggest that Kim is unwilling to
relinquish control to KWP institutions. A return to a higher
turnover rate could also indicate Kim's disapproval of current
Chong-il, who,
has had significant influence over personnel
decisions since the mid-1970s. The promotions an-
nounced in February 1987 of Colonel-General Yi
Pong-won-a full Central Committee member-to
Deputy Chief of the Defense Ministry's Political
Bureau, and of Yi-Pyong-uk-an alternate Central
Committee member-to Colonel-General and Vice
Defense Minister are particularly noteworthy. Both
officers appear to be rising stars. The latter's new
responsibilities suggest that he may be a candidate
for early promotion to full Central Committee
membership.
? Alternatively, although there is no evidence of
military discontent with Kim 11-song, he may be
removing those military figures who could com-
mand the political and military clout to challenge
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Table 5
Korean Workers' Party Politburo a
Kim II-song
Ho Tam
Kim I1-song
Kye Ung-tae
Kim II
Yun Ki-bok
Kim Chong-il
Chon Pyong-ho
O Chin-u
Ch'oe Kwang
O Chin-u
Hyon Mu-kwang
Kim Chong-il
Cho Se-ung
Pak Song-chol
Kim Pok-sin
Yi Chong-ok
Ch'oe Che-u
Yim Chun-chu
Ch'oe Kwang
Pak Song-chol
Kong Chin-tae
Yi Chong-ok
Kang Hui-won
Ch'oe Hyon
Chong Chun-ki
Yi Kun-mo
Chong Chun-ki
Yim Chun-chu
Kim Choi-man
So Choi
Cho Se-ung
So Choi
Chong Kyong-hui
Ho Tam
Hong Si-hak
O Paek-yong
Ch'oe Yong-nim
Yon Hyong-muk
Yi Son-sil
Kim Chung-nin
So Yun-sok
Kang Song-san
Kim Yong-nam
Yi Kun-mo
Kim Yong-nam
Chon Mun-sop
Hyon Mu-kwang
O Kuk-yol
Kim Hwan
Kim Kang-hwan
Hong Song-nam
Yon Hyong-muk
Yi Son-sil
So Yun-sok
O Kuk-yol
Kye Ung-tae
Kang Song-san
Paek Hak-nim
Kim Chong-il. Past purges of military leaders
demonstrate the elder Kim is not reluctant to
dismiss those who represent a potential challenge.
? And, it is possible that these personnel shifts may
reflect policy disputes driven by sharper competition
between the military and civilian sectors for re-
sources. We have seen some evidence that the
military may be giving way to civilian economic
demands. In 1986, the North Koreans publicly
claimed to have transferred 150,000 soldiers from
the "front lines" to economic construction projects,
and in July of this year P'yongyang announced it
would discharge 100,000 troops by the end of the
year, presumably to free up labor for civilian
economic activity.
In any case, whatever we can learn about the back-
ground of future Central Committee members could
provide some clues concerning the critical issue of
political-military relations. Whether Kim retains or
replaces military leaders who have been dropped from
the Politburo, whether he promotes younger officers
to the Politburo and other leadership organs, and
whether he changes the percentage of military Cen-
tral Committee members and continues to permit
military members greater job security than their
civilian counterparts are key questions. 25X1
Given the troubled state of the North Korean econo-
my, we believe economic policy management is anoth-
er critical area to watch, because a faltering economic
program could undermine elite and popular support
for Kim's dynastic succession scenario. The economy
clearly is struggling, and the leadership appears dis-
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II-song admitted to Japanese journalists that his
country's economic development is "slow." According
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It is uncertain what impact the country's economic
problems have had on Kim II-song's confidence in his
son, who according to
media coverage is deeply involved in economic eci-
sion making. On the one hand, some Western aca-
demic and media observers believe Kim II-song is
continuing to promote younger economic officials on
the basis of Kim Chong-il's recommendation. On the
other hand, the elder Kim is
disappointed with his son's stewardship
Kim II-song permitted Kim Chong-il to take charge
of the effort to meet the many unfulfilled goals of the
Second Seven-Year Plan (1977-84).
the result was growing shortages of
oo , energy, and building materials as the younger
Kim shifted resources to such grandiose projects as
the Nampo Lock Gates (a tideland reclamation pro-
ject also designed to improve sea and land transpor-
tation) and construction offacilities for Pyongyang's
bid to cohost the 1988 Seoul Olympics. By late 1986,
the elder Kim's
concern over economic deterioration had led him to
increase his personal supervision and delegate less
responsibility to Kim Chong-il.
to I I Western academic,
media, and diplomatic observers, the North has again
failed to meet most economic goals despite that fact
that its Second Seven-Year Plan (1978-84) was ex-
tended two years, to the end of 1986. Moreover, the
published goals of the Third Seven-Year Plan
(1987-93) represent some drawing down from ambi-
tious plans promulgated earlier in the decade
severe food shortages, awn
P'yongyang media have complained that the country's
"strained" railroad system is unable to transport
adequate supplies between mines, industries, and con-
sumers.
As a result, North Korean media commentary has
noted that both Kims want party officials either to
increase their functional competence or permit ex-
perts to work without interference. As early as 1985,
practical skills over "ideological purity" in identifying
officials for promotion.
We believe the consequences of economic problems
help explain the recent shuffling of the country's
management team. In addition to the demotion of
Vice Premier Kim Hwan:
? Kang Song-san, Premier since January 1984, was
reassigned to the party Secretariat last December,
although P'yongyang media continue to cite him as
a Politburo member.
? Yi Kun-mo, former chairman of a KWP Economic
Management Committee, is the new Premier. West-
ern press sources contend his appointment indicates
that the North has lost interest in Chinese-style
reforms. Hong Song-nam, the new First Vice Pre-
mier, also has an economic background. According
to North Korean media, both were promoted to full
Politburo membership in December.
? Yon Hyong-muk, who had been First Vice Premier
only since 1985, returned in December 1986 to his
previous post on the Secretariat. Yon also retained
his Politburo position. In contrast with Kang Song-
san, he has remained prominent on public occasions,
and appears to retain a voice in economic matters.
? An Sung-hak, alternate Politburo member since
1983, appears to have suffered a precipitate fall.
References in the North Korean press indicate that
in December 1985 he left the party Secretariat,
where he had specialized in light industry, to be-
come a vice premier and chairman of the Chemical
and Light Industry Committee. But two months
later he was abruptly removed from those jobs and
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from the Politburo and relegated to a provincial
government post. An was made subordinate to an
official only recently appointed to the Central
Committee, and has not been noted in public since
December 1986, raising doubts that he retains his
own seat. An Sung-hak may have fallen from Kim
ti-song's favor because of poor management of the
development of light industry-an important theme
of the new seven-year plan, according to North
Korean media commentary
We believe past economic failures have made the
success of the new plan a top priority as North Korea
moves toward its first-ever political transition. The
next party congress could provide clues as to which
economic officials retain Kim 11-song's confidence and
which functionaries will be rewarded for the successes
of particular economic sectors or showcase construc-
tion projects. In addition, the turnover rate of Central
Committee and Politburo members responsible for
economic activity will be an indication of whether
continuing economic difficulties are serious enough to
cause the elder Kim to discard the relative stability
evident on the Central Committee since 1980. North
Korea will remain one of the most difficult societies to
assess, but we believe analytical comparison of the
new Central Committee and Politburo with their
predecessors will yield a greater-if still tentative-
understanding of policy implications.
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Figure 3 Figure 4
North Korea: Functional Breakdown of Workers' North Korea: Retention of Full and Alternate
Party Central Committee Members Members of Korean Workers' Party Central
Committee by Function
Military Mass front/intellectual
Party/administrative Unknown
1948
2nd"
1956
3rd
1961
4th
1970
5th
1980
6th
Military Mass front/ intellectual
Party/administrative Unknown
1948-
564
1956-
61
1961-
70
1970-
80
a At least two military members of the Central
Committee in 1948 were killed in the Korean war.
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Appendix
The Political Role of the Military
The military's role is particularly important in North
Korea:
? It has the major responsibility for carrying out Kim
It-song's cardinal goal of Korean reunification.
? Its huge manpower and equipment requirements
absorb a large share of the country's resources.
? It provides a labor force for many priority construc-
tion projects and assists with agricultural and
industrial production
Over the years, Kim II-song's behavior has strongly
suggested that he pays close, continuing attention to
the political role of the military.
he, like other Communist rul-
ers, has subordinated his country's military establish-
ment to civilian party rule. In the 1960s, Kim purged
some military leaders-including at least six Central
Committee members-who, according to Western
and South Korean academic researchers, opposed his
decision to postpone plans to reunify Korea by force.
in 1970 Kim purged
at least two more generals who opposed Kim
Chong-il's succession. And, in 1982, Kim removed the
Defense Ministry from the cabinet, placing it directly
under KWP control, according to North Korean press
sources. At the same time, Kim has supervised the
growth of a powerful and expensive military establish-
ment. The Korean People's Army (KPA)-including
its ground, air, and naval arms-absorbs about 20 to
25 percent of North Korean GNP.
In managing the military's representation on the
Central Committee, Kim appears to have followed a
strategy that has limited its numbers but allowed
officers to serve longer than their civilian counter-
parts. As in other Communist societies, this co-opts
generals, making senior military officers members of
the political elite, while keeping them under the
watchful eye of the civilian leadership. Judging from
those Central Committee members whose functions
we can identify-figure 3 demonstrates that there are
many on whom we have no information-military
officers have never held more than 30 percent of
Central Committee seats. On the other hand, as
figure 4 shows, Kim II-song has been more inclined to
allow military than nonmilitary members to serve
more than once.
The apparent stability in military representation con-
trasts sharply with the experience of China. There, in
the late 1960s, after the Army moved to quell disorder
during the Cultural Revolution, military membership
on the Central Committee rose to 45 percent. It has
dropped precipitately since then, to 16 percent to-
day-a figure roughly in line with the ratio prevailing
in the 1950s, according to Western academic observ-
ers. Unlike contemporary Chinese leaders, Kim
11-song has never needed to use the North Korean
military to bail him out of a serious social crisis,
which almost certainly has helped him subordinate
the Army to his political control.
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