LATIN AMERICA: THE NOVEMBER PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT STEPPINGSTONE TO LATIN UNITY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000100700001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 9, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
-nmgpon.ac20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
9 November 1987
LATIN AMERICA: THE NOVEMBER
PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT
Steppingstone to Latin Unity?
Summary
Recent moves by the so-called Group of Eight--the member
nations of the Contadora and Support groupsl--are raising the
specter that an exclusively Latin American body will form with the
potential to be a counterweight to US influence in the region.
Previous attempts to create such an organization have failed, but
this group's approach seems to hold more promise than earlier
efforts. The group's latest initiative, a summit in late November,
is the first such gathering in 20 years. The major focus is likely
to be on foreign debt and regional economic integration. Even if,
as we expect, no major substantive agreements are reached,
1 The eight nations include Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and
Venezuela from the Contadora Group and Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and
Uruguay from the Support Group. These countries account for 80
percent of Latin America's population and over 90 percent of GDP.
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This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Office of 25X1
African and Latin American Analysis, with contributions from other
analysts in the Office of African and Latin American Analysis, the
Office of Leadership Analysis, and the Office of Global Issues.
Information available as of 20 October 1987 was used in its
preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed
to the Chief, Middle American-Caribbean Division 25X1
Copy fL of T i
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decisions to set up a permanent staff and schedule regular summits
are possible and would represent significant advances. The Central
Mexico
American peace plan may be discussed, and if it is raised,
hopes to resurface the issue of Latin economic assistance to
Central America in general and Nicaragua in particular. At the
same time, the Group of Eight will face some obstacles to its
continued consolidation--including potential disagreements over
expanding its membership and rivalry between major countries. Over
the long term, however, continued consolidation of the Group of
Eight could help it become a platform for some Latin American
nations to criticize US policies and serve as a lightning rod to
focus discontent with Washington.
Efforts to promote Latin American unity have occurred with
some regularity, primarily reflecting the desire of Latin leaders
to develop a counterweight to US influence in the region. Although
various formal organizations have been created to promote this
objective, such as the Latin American Parliament and the Latin
American Economic System, none has generated the solidarity and
influence sought by some Latin leaders. The Group of Eight, while
still in its early stages, is the latest attempt at this type of
organization. This paper examines the group's formation and tions
objectives, prospects for further development, and the imp 25X1
of its emergence on the Latin scene for the United States.
Cautious Beginnincls
The Group of Eight is an outgrowth of the search for regional
peace in Central America. The Contadora Group organized itself in
1983 to mediate conflicts in Central America, and it was followed
two years later by the formation of a support group to gather
regional diplomatic support for the group's efforts. When foreign
ministers from the Contadora and support group nations planned
their December 1986 meeting, their primary aim was to revive the
stalled Central American peace process. Also placed on the agenda,
but receiving less pre-meeting attention, was a discussion of how
to expand the group's focus beyond the Central American issue,
according to press reports. Following two days of talks in Brazil,
the eight announced agreement on two proposals:
--The formation of a ministerial delegation--including the
secretaries general of the UN and OAS--to visit Central
America and renew peace efforts.
--The formalization of the Group of Eight, sometimes also
called the Rio Group to consider broader issues of common
regional interest. 25X1
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As formulated in Brazil, the Group of Eight's goals were
modest, but its members hinted at more ambitious plans for the
organization. The original declaration called for three meetings
per year on topics ranging from debt to regional security. After
the meeting, according to press reports, spokesmen for the group
noted that representatives of the eight governments had been
conferring regularly, and the announcements from Brazil had merely
formalized this practice. A statement by Argentine Foreign
Minister Dante Caputo suggested, however, that the Group of Eight
was less the extension of an existing informal process and more the
birth of a new arrangement:
We have tried to avoid inflated declarations in order to go
step by step toward real integration. In the past Latin
America has had a global approach, trying to do everything
in one sweep, but this has brought many difficulties. Now
our objectives are ambitious, but the instruments realistic.
At the same time, member nations appeared to be concerned
about reactions from the United States. Press reports indicate
that spokesmen for the group stressed they were not attempting to
create an "OAS without the US." To back up these claims, the Group
of Eight declared that no permanent staff would be set up to
support the loosely structured organization. Furthermore, one
press report noted that membership would be opened, at some later
date, to other countries wishing to join. All members of the Group
of Eight are nominal civilian democracies. The Latin American
democracies so far excluded from the group--other than those in
Central America--are Ecuador, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic.
Increasing the Profile
Nonetheless, actions by the Group of Eight since December 1986
suggest it has been slowly laying the foundation for an
organization with a larger regional role. Movement
have highlighted this transition:
--After holding two additional meetings2 at the ministerial
level, the member nations have announced a Group of Eight
summit for 27 and 28 November 1987 in Mexico.
--The Group of Eight is already beginning to act as a bloc in
its relations with other international groups, like the EC.
2 The Group of Eight also met in Argentina during April and in
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The planned November summit will be the most noteworthy
advance for the Group of Eight in that it will increase both the
profile and prestige of t~e organization. The gathering will mark
the first time since 1967 that the leaders of Latin America's most
prominent nations have held such a meeting. Adding to the
momentousness of the meeting--at least from the participants'
perspective--will be the absence of the United States. According
to press reports, Peruvian Foreign Minister Wagner described the
summit as "our chance to break the tradition of only meeting when
called by the US." 25X1
3 The last similar meeting, which included the United States,
occurred in Uruguay and was called by President Lyndon Johnson.
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The Group of Eight's potential to become a focal point for
Latin issues is already attracting some attention from key
international players. Japanese press reports in September state
that Tokyo has met with representatives of the group and believes
it has a role to play in solving the Latin American debt problem
and forging regional peace. In addition, representatives from the
group met with the European Community (EC) in New York
Individual Agendas, Converging Motives
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According to press reports, the eight countries believe they 25X1
need to look beyond the Central American peace issue, which
initiall brow ht them together, and consider other regional
topics. 25X1
suggests a genera cons ensus a economic integration and debt are
two key concerns. Some countries also are interested in pursuing
regional cooperation in fighting narcotics, terrorism, and arms
smuggling. The Central America peace plan probably will not
the agenda, but may be discuss 25X1
Given the group's embryonic stage of development, agreement at
the November summit on specific substantive issues will probably
not be necessary. In our judgment, each member of the group wants
to be a major regional actor, to have the opportunity to validate
its Third World credentials and to assert publicly--to a greater or
lesser extent--its autonomy from Washington. For that reason, a
prime objective of the November summit probably will simply be the
further institutionalization of the group. An agreement to
continue such presidential summits and to establish a permanent
staff would be a major organizational success of the November
meeting. According to press reports, the Group of Eight already
intends t
t
ti
l
en
a
ve
y to hold another summit in Uruguay next year.
Devising strategies to make sure that the group has the
potential to meet individual goals may convince members that it is
in their interests to pursue the development of the organization as
a whole. In our judgment each country has at least one issue that
they would probably like to see addressed by the organization:
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--Peruvian President Garcia is trying to boost his prospects
for the chairmanship and host role of the 1989 Nonaligned
Summit.
--Brazil is seeking support for the Latin American seat in the
United Nations Security Council next year.
--Colombian President Barco is seeking the resolution of a
sticky border dispute with Venezuela.
--Argentine President Alfonsin probably hopes to gain
political mileage with the left and undercut domestidomec opposition attempts to seize the initiative on foreign
policy.
--Venezuela is seeking a more coordinated Latin position on
debt.
--Panama would like to gain political support to fend off
perceived US efforts to topple General Noriega and to
guarantee that the United States will fulfill its
obligations regarding the Panama Canal treaties.
--Mexican President de la Madrid is entering the last year of
his term and would like to leave some foreign policy
accomplishments as part of his legacy.
--Uruguay is seeking any mechanism that might promote trade.
For a few nations, most notably Mexico and Peru, estab-lishing
a Latin organization that might help balance, if not displace.
influence in the region is also a prim----vation.
So far, however
Mexic
,
o and Peru have carefully avoided
characterizing the
~aa=y re aware o so would embarrass most
that attempts to
th
a
b
a
o
er
mem
ers
and promote
that could jeopardize the association, as well as risk
US response.
aanelat~ve
least for now, most members appear co
f
m
ortable considering it
a united lobby for their common interests than one designed to
challenge Washington's regional i
nterests directly.
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Prospects
The Group of Eight will face numerous obstacles to continued
consolidation, in our opinion, despite its care not to antagonize
the United States and unanimity on some regional issues. The issue
of expanding the group's membership, for example, probably will
create friction from within as well as outside the organization.
(countries not now a part of the Group of Eight are
complaining about their exclusion and may find ways to work against
the organization. Internal strains also could develop if some
countries attempt to use the group to promote controversial
proposals, such as forming a regional debt cartel, without regard
for other members' positions.
In our view, the November summit is unlikely to produce major
substantive agreements, although such agreements are not yet
necessary for the continued organizational development of the Group
be enough time to work out substantive details on any of the_j vV 25X1
topics. As a result, the meeting is likely to concentrate on
general principles rather than specific initiatives. Nonethe-less,
the meeting of the Presidents almost certainly will result in a
good deal of publicity and rhetoric. If major disagreements are
avoided, decisions to form a permanent staff and schedule regular
summits are well within the summit's grasp, in our judgment.
Implications for the United States
With a successful November summit, the Group of Eight would be
one step closer to establishing a Latin American organization
capable of affecting the agenda in other regional and international
forums. Regardless of how it is now characterized, the Group of
Eight appears to have the potential as an organization over which
the United States lacks any direct control and which could
complicate US policy in the region. Additional steps towards
becoming a formal organization could allow the Group of Eight to
become a platform for some Latin American nations to criticize US
policies and serve as a lightning rod to focus discontent with
Washington. In particular, a permanent staff, an institutional
structure, and regularly scheduled summits would put it in a better
position than other more informal organizations like the Cartagena
Group--composed of Latin America's major debtors--to challenge the
US on economic issues, such as debt and trade.
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APPENDIX: GROUP OF EIGHT PRESIDENTS
Virgilio BARCO Vargas COLOMBIA
Age 66...political moderate with strong US ties... gives high
priority to programs to eliminate poverty, undercut support for
insurgents, narcotics traffickers... has called for regional
antipoverty effort... played key role in liberalizing Andean Pact
foreign investment rules but generally less active than
predecessor in regional economic groups... meticulous, hard
working... reputation as strong, behind-the-scenes
administrator... former senator, minister, diplomat... Ambassador
to US 1977-81...educated at MIT and Boston University.
Miguel DE LA MADRID Hurtado MEXICO
Age 52...President since December 1982... entering lameduck 13
months of office. . .by tradition will share some power with ruling
party presidential nominee Carlos Salinas, who is almost certain
to be elected... preoccupation with domestic economic issues has
limited foreign policy initiatives... has continued Mexico's
established policy of nonintervention and support for
revolutionary movements... strongly supported Mexico's efforts in
Contadora Group... career economic technocrat... Harvard graduate
Eric Arturo DEVALLE Henriquez
Age 50...President since September 1985... subservient to
Panamanian Defense Forces Commander Manuel Noriega--has publicly
defended him in the face of recent Panamanian and US
criticism... has considered resigning; is frustrated by current
stalemate between government and opposition forces and his
inability to act without the concurrence of Noriega
domestic position has crippled ability to take foreign policy
initiatives; has not pushed Panama's role in the Contadora
Group... rose to position from first vice presidency after Noriega
forced his predecessor to resign... studied agriculture at
Louisiana State University... wealthy businessman.
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Age 63...President since February 1984... entering lameduck period
prior to December 1988 presidential elections... generally popular
despite public discontent with country's poor economic
performance... on defensive because of uncertain world market for
oil--country's main export--labor discontent, and pre-election
political measures. . .has adopted more expansionary economic
measures.. .has maintained Venezuela's generally pro-Western
stance but avoids domestic controversy by shunning open
identification with the US on some regional issues... moderate
within populist Democratic Action party.
Raul Ricardo ALFONSIN
Age 60...President since December 1983... in last two years of
term... personal popularity high despite September electoral
setback to his Radical Civic Union party... gives high priority to
consolidating democracy, rationalizing economy... likely to
continue moderate debt policies despite declining economy,
electoral losses... concerned about military mutinies, nagging
civilian-military tensions... enjoys role of international
statesman, prominent spokesman for nuclear disarmament... advocate
of Latin American integration... lawyer by training.
Jose SARNEY Costa BRAZIL
Age 57...President since 1985.
..publicly favors regional integration,
but probably will back more limited objectives; most likely will
discuss cooperation on external debt... former congressman,
governor... elected Vice President in 1985, assumed presidency on
Alan GARCIA Perez
Age 38 . . . President since July 1985 self-
confident populist politician . . . highly ambitious, sees
himself as Third World leader, actively pursuing chairmanship of
Nonaligned Movement . . . vocal supporter of regional
integration, cooperation, seeking expanded 1PadArahin role in
attention recently distracted from regional issues by growing
domestic economic, insurgency problems . . . engages in
inflammatory rhetoric on debt issue, US policy in Central
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Julio Maria SANGUINETTI URUGUAY
Age 51...President since March 1985... effective leader with
consensual governing style. . .has gained opposition party,
military cooperation... deeply interested in consolidation of
democracy, economic, social development... supports economic
integration initiatives with Argentina and Brazil. . .has promoted
Uruguay as regional leader... career politician,
journalist... former Minister of Education and Culture
(1972)... played key role in transition to democracy durin
twelve-year military career... lawyer by training.
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SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICA: THE NOVEMBER PRESIDENTIAL
SUMMIT Steppingstone to Latin Unity?
Distribution:
Copy 1 - Elliot Abrams (State)
2 - Ambassador Sorzano (NSC)
3 - Paul Taylor (State)
4 - Jack St. John (State)
5 - David Smith (State)
6 - Velia DePirro (State)
7 - Anne Hughes (Commerce)
8 - Thomas Welch (Commerce)
9 - Ciro DeFalco (Treasury)
10 - Bruce Jubba (Treasury)
11 - Jane Barden (Treasury)
12 - Kim Flower (NSC)
13 - Steven Farrar NSC
V'
15 - D/DCI-DDCI Executive Staff
16 - DDI
17 - O/DDI
18 - NIO/A/L, r
19 - NIO/LA
20 - NIC/AG
21 - PDB Staff
22 - C/DDO/MTF
23 - C/DDO/MTF
24 - C/DDI/PES
25 - DDI/CPAS/ILS
26 - D/ALA
27 - DD/ALA
28 - ALA/PS
29 - ALA/Research Director
30 - CPAS/IMC/CB
31 - D/OGI
32 - C/PIB/OGI
33 - C/PRB/OGI
34 - C/LDA/CA
35 - C/ALA/MCD
36-37 - DC/ALA/MCD
38 - C/ALA/MCD/CUBA
39 - C/ALA/MCD/CARIBBEAN
41 - C/ALA/MCD/NICARAGUA
42 - C/ALA/MCD/CENTRAL AMERICA
43-45 - C/ALA/MCD/MEXICO
46-50 - MCD Files
51 - MEXICO Files
ALA/MCD/Mexicc
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