NICARAGUA: CONTROLLING THE COUNTRYSIDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000100290001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Nicaragua:
Controlling the Countryside
An Intelligence Assessment
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Secrct
ALA 87-10043
September 1987
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Directorate of
Intelligence
,
Reverse Blank
Nicaragua:
Controlling the Countryside
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared b Office of
African and Latin American na ysis. t was
coordinated with the Directorate for Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle American?
Caribbean Division. ALA
Secret
ALA 87-10043
September 1987
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Scope Note
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Nicaragua:
Controlling the Countryside
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This paper examines the various facets of the Sandinistas' rural policy and
its impact on prospects for the insurgency over the next year. It was
completed before the Central American presidents, signed a peace plan that
includes provisions calling for a cease-fire by 7 November and a simulta-
neous cutoff of external support for anti-Sandinista forces. Although such
steps would dramatically affect the viability of the insurgency, we have
proceeded with publication of this study in the belief that its analysis will
be useful under a variety of circumstances. If the peace plan unravels,
either by a failure of any of the parties to implement its provisions by the 7
November deadline or by violations of its provisions after the deadline, for
example, we believe the Sandinistas will continue to pursue the approach
outlined in this paper. Even if the peace plan holds up, we believe Managua
would adhere to elements of its present strategy. In the weeks before a
cease-fire took effect, for example, counterinsurgency operations would
certainly continue and might even intensify as Managua tried to deal the
insurgents a decisive military blow. Population control mechanisms, includ-
ing both incentives and intimidation, would be a critical part of this
campaign and might become even more important as Managua worked to
consolidate its power in the countryside within the framework of a peace 25X1
accord.
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ALA 87-10043
September 1987
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 6 August 1987
was used in this report.
Nicaragua:
Controlling the Countryside
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The escalation of the insurgency in Nicaragua over the past year has been
accompanied by the intensification of the contest between Managua and
the rebels for the loyalty of the country's rural population. This paper
examines the programs and policies the Sandinista regime has been
pursuing in rural areas with an eye to gauging insurgent prospects for
winning control of the countryside, assuming US military assistance
continues. Its findings present a mixed picture:
? Over the short term, the regime's rural strategy will in all likelihood
remain relatively effective in helping to assure the neutrality?if not the
loyalty?of the great majority of the peasants and small-town inhabitants
in the areas of the insurgency. The incentives provided by government
socioeconomic programs?however inadequate?will continue to give a
significant portion of the rural population a stake in the revolution, while
government intimidation and suppression will discourage the disaffected
from joining the insurgents.
? At the same time, however, the Sandinistas themselves worry about their
ability to cope with a long-term, well-funded insurgency. Sustained
military pressure coupled with deepening economic problems will inevita-
bly reduce the regime's ability to deliver key social services to rural areas,
and, with time, the resentment over forced service in the militia and
increased political repression is certain to grow. Under such conditions,
antigovernment sentiment would be likely to fester in the countryside,
and the population would be more inclined toward active support of the
insurgents.
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We believe the Sandinistas, bolstered by extensive foreign assistance?both
Soviet Bloc and Western?made real gains between 1979 and 1983 in
delivering important social services to the rural areas, but they were unable
to sustain them after that time because of mounting pressures from the war
and wide-ranging economic mismanagement. Spurred by evidence of
growing popular dissatisfaction with the regime in the countryside, the
Sandinistas since late 1985 and early 1986 have carried on an aggressive
strategy to shore up their position. 25X1
Accelerated land reform has been the most visible?and, we believe, most
important?socioeconomic aspect of the new rural offensive. The regime
reportedly targeted close to 1 million acres for confiscation and redistribu-
tion last year. The well-publicized retitling of land to peasants and
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garret
cooperatives has illustrated the regime's commitment to "revolutionary
change"; demonstrated that loyalty to the regime is rewarded; and
improved government control over rural areas while denying the insurgents
food, shelter, and intelligence
The Sandinistas have also worked hard to deliver social services to the
countryside, diverting funds away from the cities and channeling them into
the more hotly contested areas for programs such as housing construction
and education. In our view, while the Sandinistas' efforts have not raised
the levels of social services to pre-1984 levels throughout Nicaragua, the
regime's system of resource allocation prevented precipitous nationwide
drops and actually bolstered its position in key strategic areas, especially
the northwest. The level of medical care in these areas has remained stable
relative to other areas that suffered from shortages in doctors and hospital
space. To further compensate for shortfalls, Managua has directed foreign
personnel and aid projects to these areas.
We believe the security and military buildup in rural Nicaragua will
remain key to the regime's control over the population and efforts to
undercut local support for the insurgents. The Sandinistas have created
new counterinsurgency units, built up local defense capabilities, and
constructed additional forward bases to improve troop mobility. In addi-
tion, they have increased the pace of the resettlement program?forcibly
concentrating rural inhabitants in large camps?which, though costing the
Sandinistas some political support from uprooted peasants, has further
denied the insurgents food, shelter, and intelligence. The regime also has
expanded the internal security apparatus and arrested thousands of alleged
insurgent supporters?especially in the antiregirne strongholds of Boaco
and Chontales?over the past 18 months. These detentions have generated
the impression of an all-pervasive security force
We believe that rural popular discontent, while deep seated and wide-
spread, is unlikely to pose a threat to the regime over the next year or so.
Although increasing in number over the past year, open or violent
manifestations of antiregime sentiments probably will be sporadic and
isolated, and this is unlikely to change in coming months. The Nicaraguan
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populace is generally apathetic and easily intimidated. Therefore, no clear
leaders are likely to emerge, and the security forces will be more than a
match for demonstrators 25X1
We judge, however, that over the much longer term?perhaps two to four
years?the regime most likely would become increasingly vulnerable to
rural unrest as fewer in the countryside would have access to a shrinking
pool of resources. This would be especially true if the insurgents could
remain in the field permanently, to both protect local dissidents and offer a
clear alternative to Sandinista rule 25X1
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Contents
Scope Note
Page
iii
Key Judgments
V
Introduction
1
A Fast Start Sputters
1
Reinvigorating the Program
2
Focus on Land Reform 2
Expanding Social Services 5
Strengthening Rural Security
6
Shift to a Regional Strategy 7
Gauging Regime Effectiveness
7
Land Reform: Economic Losses, Political Gains 8
Social Services: Managing Gradual Declines 9
Military and Security Capabilities: Real Gains 9
Continuing Popular Resistance 11
Outlook
13
Key Programs
13
The Military and Security Buildup 14
Persistent Discontent 14
Implications for the United States
15
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Introduction
Nicaragua:
Controlling the Countryside
Although the Sandinistas consistently have devoted
resources to maintain tight control over Nicaragua's
major urban areas since coming to power in 1979,
their efforts in the countryside?home of nearly half
the country's 3.2 million people?have vacillated.
From 1979 to about mid-1983, the regime made real
gains in delivering social services to the countryside
and in building an effective security apparatus in
rural areas. Managua's rural policies?battered by
diminishing resources and the effects of political
repression?began to show signs of faltering in the
last months of 1983 and on through 1984. During
1985 the downward trend continued, but the re-
gime?increasingly concerned about the growing in-
surgent threat and its eroding popular base in contest-
ed areas?planned and gradually implemented a
major multifaceted effort to tighten its grip over the
peasantry, a program that is still under way.
record in the countryside and evaluates its likely
success over the next 12 to 18 months. The geographic
focus is on the contested areas, primarily the northern
and central portions of the country. Specifically, the
study discusses the regime's gains in the countryside,
the effectiveness of its various rural programs, and the
extent of rural unrest. It also assesses the prospects for
continued Sandinista control in coming months and
the implications of Managua's policies for the United
States.
A Fast Start Sputters
Between 1979 and the end of 1983 the Sandinistas
moved aggressively?and with considerable success?
to improve living standards in the countryside and
establish a firm base of support there. Rural Nicara-
guans?farmers, agricultural workers, and small-
town residents?had played a key role in the over-
throw of the Somoza regime and were central to the
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Rural Nicaragua on the Eve of Revolution
Under the rule of the Somoza family (1933-79), the
rural sector was dominated by a small elite. In 1972,
3.5 percent of the rural population controlled more
than 60 percent of rural income, according to aca-
demic studies. Rural laborers, who made up 51
percent of the population, earned only 7.5 percent of
rural-generated income.
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Land tenure was equally skewed, with much of the
prime land owned by the Somozas and their asso-
ciates. In 1963, according to Nicaraguan bank statis-
tics, 1.5 percent of farm families controlled 40 per-
cent of arable land while the bottom 79 percent
owned only 14 percent. Of these, nearly half owned
fewer than 17 acres, considered barely subsistence
level, and had to supplement their incomes with a
variety of jobs. Indeed, on the eve of the revolution, 25X1
less than 25 percent of the rural population had a
stable income, according to published statistics.
The Central Bank calculated in the mid-1970s that
over half the homes in the countryside were substan-
dard, and almost none had a potable water supply.
Government funding for home construction fell far
short of needs, according to the same source. Delivery
of health and educational services was also inade-
quate, according to several academic studies; both
infant mortality and illiteracy were widespread.
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Sandinistas' goal of reshaping society. Accordingly,
the new regime in Managua set out soon after taking
power to reorder the land tenure system, reduce
illiteracy, and improve health care and general living
conditions in the countryside. The programs generally
were successful and improved the lives of thousands of
rural Nicaraguans. In addition, the regime moved
swiftly to establish a strong military presence in the
countryside as a bulwark against counterrevolutionary
activity. We believe the Sandinistas' various programs
also were intended to break down what they viewed as
the capitalist orientation of the peasantry and make
them more receptive to state control over the econo-
my.
Managua's efforts in the countryside, however, began
to falter in late 1983. Difficulties persisted through
1984, with the result that, between late 1984 and mid-
1985, mount-
ing concerns in Managua about the regime's eroding
rural base. By that time economic deterioration and
the diversion of resources to the military buildup had
depleted funds needed for the Sandinistas' rural strat-
egy. Food production declined?in part because of
agrarian reform?and many peasants were unhappy
with the low prices the government purchasing mo-
nopoly paid for crops, according to US Embassy
reporting. The Embassy indicates that most peasants,
while enthusiastic about land redistribution, preferred
individual grants and resisted collectivization. More-
over, the heavy-
handed tactics of the security forces, military con-
scription, and the regime's Marxist indoctrination
efforts had alienated much of the countryside and
fueled the growing insurgency. In February 1985,
a high-
ranking Sandinista official told party cadres that
peasant defections to the insurgents were a "growing
problem" and that new policies would have to be
adopted to stem the flow. In addition to joining the
insurgents, thousands of rural Nicaraguans were mi-
grating to Managua, bloating the capital's population
by 40 percent over prerevolutionary levels?to some 1
million. Such growth strained urban services and
contributed to a severe agricultural labor shortage in
the countryside.
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Reinvigorating the Program
official statements
show that throughout 1985 the regime gradually
devoted increased attention and resources to the
countryside, and by early 1986 it was clear that
continued insurgent military activity, coupled with
the prospect of renewed US military aid to the
resistance, had led Managua to remake its rural
policy. The regime's goal,
was to undercut support for the insurgents,
discourage migration to Managua, and boost food
production.
Managua's strategy has been based on both incentives
and repression to encourage opposition to?or at least
neutrality toward?the insurgents. Many of the posi-
tive measures have been funded by diverting resources
away from the relatively secure urban areas,
Presi-
dent Ortega publicly backed this policy in March of
1986, admitting that his government had to reverse its
long neglect of the countryside and warning new
residents of Managua that they would have to return
to their homes in the countryside if they wanted
essential services. Learning from mistakes in the early
1980s, Managua also has tailored its policies to
account for the peculiarities of each region in Nicara-
gua, and has been willing to alter or abandon unwork-
able policies.
Focus on Land Reform
Accelerating land distribution has been the most
visible?and, we believe, the most important?aspect
of the new rural offensive. The Sandinistas were well
aware that peasants in northern and central combat
zones were dissatisfied with the pace of initial land
redistribution programs, according to US Embassy
reporting. As a result, the regime decided not only to
increase confiscations but also, in a major policy
reversal, to grant more individual titles and back
away from creating large cooperatives, which had
received almost all the land distributed in 1983 and
1984. According to US Embassy reporting, the re-
gime implemented its new policy during 1985, and by
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Figure 1. A rural school in the northwest. It is typical of dozens of
such facilities scattered throughout rural Nicaragua.
Figure 2. A rural hospital located outside Esteli. Such facilities
are stalled largely by foreigners and treat locals as well as combat
casualties.
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The Sandinistas' Fast Start in the Countryside
The Sandinistas launched their wide-ranging rural
programs as soon as they entered Managua in July
1979 and registered considerable progress during the
next four years. Their programs not only improved
the lives of many Nicaraguans but also reinforced the
regime's political standing in the countryside.
Land Reform
Agrarian reform began in 1979 with the transforma-
tion of Somoza 's land holdings into state-owned
farms and intensified after the 1981 Agrarian Reform
Law, which set criteria for the confiscation of private
holdings. Redistribution accelerated, almost exclu-
sively in the form of newly created cooperatives. By
the end of 1984 almost 900 cooperatives?mostly in
heavily contested regions in northern and central
Nicaragua?had been formed with some 60,000
members. According to US Embassy reports, 18
percent of Nicaragua's total territory?over 5 million
acres?had passed to public control at this juncture,
leaving private holders with about 30 percent of the
land as opposed to 48 percent in 1978. The Sandinis-
tas also formed state-controlled rural unions to
mobilize agricultural laborers in support of govern-
ment policies.
Education
With over half the rural population under 15 years of
age, the regime moved quickly and aggressively to
dominate and expand the rural educational system.
Relying heavily on foreign?mostly Cuban?help, the
regime in 1980 launched a massive literacy campaign
designed to reduce the 75-percent illiteracy rate in
rural areas in the eastern two-thirds of the country,
as well as to politicize the population. According to
regime statistics, the number of teachers in rural
Nicaragua in 1982 almost equaled the total in the
entire country the previous year. Total school enroll-
ment in northern and central Nicaragua climbed
some 35,000 to over 100,000, and about 200 new
school buildings were constructed in those areas.
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Organizing the Masses
Regime officials also developed a network of Sandi-
nista-run mass organizations to establish better con-
trol over the population, according to US Embassy
reporting. These groups, based on Cuban models,
helped extend the reach of the regime into remote
areas, mobilizing mass support for the Sandinistas
and assuming administrative functions?such as reg-
ulating access to health care and rationed foods?
where formal bureaucratic structures were weak.
Enthusiastic members of the Sandinista Youth
Movement and block-level Sandinista Defense Com-
mittees often collaborated with securit oj cials
according to US Embassy reporting
Health
According to the US Embassy, the Sandinistas have
tried to extend health care to all Nicaraguans,
putting the emphasis on prevention. The arrival of
Cuban and other foreign medical personnel, many of
whom were assigned to the countryside, increased the
number of doctors from about 650 in 1970 to more
than 2,000 by 1983. In addition, the government
expanded Somoza 's network of health centers from
172 in 1977 to nearly 450 in 1982, many of them
colocated with agricultural cooperatives and
churches to facilitate routine care. Rural hospitals
increased from 37 in 1977 to 46 in 1982. Regime
officials claim that the rate of mild and moderate
malnutrition among children under five years of age
was reduced to half the levels of 1977, that severe
malnutrition was virtually eliminated, and that a
large-scale vaccination program wiped out polio and
reduced the incidence of other childhood diseases.
The availability of prenatal care expanded signifi-
cantly, and state-subsidized pharmacies were opened
to offer medicines at reduced prices. The regime also
takes credit for extending the average lifespan by
some three years?from 56 to 59?as a result of
improved health care during its first six years in
power.
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Securing the Countryside
The regime quickly strengthened its military presence
in the rural areas. The militia, created in late 1979 to
serve as a supplement to local police, had evolved by
late 1980 into an important paramilitary force to
supplement the regular Army, according to US Em-
bassy and In September
1981 Managua claimed the militia had expanded to
120,000 combatants, who soon were conducting most
of the counterinsurgency operations. With the growth
of regular Army and specialized counterinsurgency
units, the militia in 1983 assumed a static defense
posture, defending hometowns and participating in
local operations, according to
nUS Embassy reports indicate that the recruit-
ment of such large numbers of rural Nicaraguans
made the militia an important vehicle for political
indoctrination. After 1980 the Interior Ministry's
Directorate General of State Security also began to
strengthen its presence in the countryside, ferreting
out dissidents and rebel sympathizers, according to
defector reporting.
The relocation of peasants into resettlement camps
reinforced the security and indoctrination campaign.
The program began in late 1981, when the regime?
seeking to deny rebels local support and to create
free-fire zones?forcibly transported some 8,000
Miskito Indians away from areas near the Honduran
border to camps in the interior. By forcing the Indians
into government cooperatives, the regime also dis-
rupted traditional social patterns and enhanced its
control over a fiercely independent population.
5
the end of the year almost 249,000 acres of state-
owned property were distributed to families?a dra-
matic increase over the 35,000 acres originally pro-
jected by the government for the year.
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The agrarian reform decree of 1986 further acceler-
ated redistribution, ending proscriptions against seiz-
ing smaller holdings and stating that opponents of the
regime would lose their lands. Confiscations were
concentrated in combat zones. In Boaco Department, 25X1
for example, 16,000 acres of private lands?held
mostly by dissidents?were seized and redistributed in
1986. In all, the US Embassy estimates that the
regime targeted close to 1 million acres for confisca-
tion last year. 25X1
Expanding Social Services 25X1
Managua has boasted of increases in all important 25X1
social services in the countryside. Gains, however,
were actually uneven, and, in some instances, delivery
of key services declined to levels below those achieved
in the early years of the revolution, despite the
regime's efforts to reverse the trend. For example:
? Although the health system's share of the budget
has remained stable or shown slight increases, it has
suffered from personnel losses, shortages of medi-
cines and equipment, mismanagement, and the im-
pact of the war. Consequently, as of early 1986,
medical consultations had declined 11 percent from
the preceding year, and hospital bed space for
civilians had also dropped as facilities were convert-
ed to military use,
The health of rural children also apparently suf-
fered. Frustration with the system drove over 1,000
medical specialists, as well as hundreds of other
health professionals, out of Nicaragua during a two-
year period ending in early 1986, according to
regime studies
? Enrollment in primary school, which had peaked at
73 percent in 1983, dropped to 66 percent in 1986,
leaving nearly 200,000 children?most in the coun-
tryside?without even a basic education. Moreover,
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according to 1986 government statistics, only 105
new classrooms were constructed in rural Nicara-
gua during the preceding year, which did not even
compensate for those destroyed or abandoned as a
result of the war.
? The supply of housing continued to fall behind
demand in the countryside. By the end of 1986 the
regime publicly admitted to a deficit of over 32.000
units in rural areas.
Only the social welfare system in rural Nicaragua has
shown substantial gains during the past two years,
according to US Embassy analyses
Recipients?including soldiers and
their families, children orphaned by the war, and
displaced persons?have received social security and
income subsidies. Disbursements have been small,
even by Nicaraguan standards, but for many have
represented the only steady source of income, accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting.
Strengthening Rural Security
While the Sandinistas tried to develop new incentives
to rally rural Nicaraguans to the regime, Managua's
gnawing concerns about peasant unrest and the grow-
ing insurgency also led it to expand its military and
security apparatus in the countryside, starting with
the militia. Since early 1986, according to Sandinista
publications and expe-
rienced militia members in combat areas have been
joined by a variety of other troops?including regular
Army soldiers and conscripts?to form so-called
Light Hunter Battalions for patrolling or participat-
ing in larger operations under the command of the
Army. The regime has formed smaller units called
Permanent Territorial Companies for static defense
and joint actions with the Light Hunter Battalions,
In addition,
the Sandinistas have expanded the military infra-
structure?including roads and forward military
bases?to enhance troop mobility and establish a
presence in remote areas.
The Interior Ministry's Directorate General for State
Security (DGSE)?the main internal security ser-
vice?also has launched a massive buildup,
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Additional staff and
new departments have broadened the scope of DGSE
activities and extended its reach into rural areas.
In the face of mounting evidence of local support for
the insurgents, the Interior Ministry and the Army
have helped to extend the resettlement program from
its origins in the northeast into the combat zones
along the central and western portions of the border
with Honduras and?more recently?into south-cen-
tral Nicaragua. The regime planned to have some 135
camps established by the end of 1986, according to
Sandinista press reports. Many of the residents of
these camps receive military training and have formed
self-defense units, according to regime press report-
ing. Around Nueva Guinea in the south, over 4,000
peasants have been relocated from mountain villages
to camps farther north since mid-April, according to
Sandinista press reports
Managua also has strengthened its military presence
in the countryside by creating new agricultural coop-
eratives in strategic locales, primarily in northern
combat zones, and giving cooperative members mili-
tary training. A regime military publication in late
1985 reported that the agricultural cooperatives were
intentionally located in contested areas to serve as
links "in the system of territorial defense." Indeed,
the goal is to form a buffer?stretching from the
Honduran border to Boaco and Chontales Depart-
ments?that would help keep the insurgents out of the
densely populated Pacific coast region.
that all the land between two towns in Boaco was to
be confiscated as part of this program. Cooperative
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members have been divided into 16-man squads,
acting as work units by day and military units by
night to patrol or guard facilities, according to the
military publication. They are trained twice a month
by Army personnel. Many "internationalists"?for-
eign volunteers?working on the cooperatives also
receive training and have participated in combat
actions along with their hosts,
the press indicates that, because of the
increase in fighting this year, the Sandinistas intend
to confiscate more farms and turn them into coopera-
tives to help fortify the countryside.
Shift to a Regional Strategy
In addition to accelerating the pace of reform and
strengthening their rural security apparatus, the San-
dinistas since early 1986 have adjusted their tactics to
reflect local conditions in different regions. For
example:
In central Nicaragua, where antigovernment senti-
ments have been the most intense, the regime has
implemented severely repressive measures, such as
widespread arrests and land confiscation to discour-
age support for the rebels.
the area has been the scene of
most of the regime's human rights abuses over the
last 18 months, and defectors report a major securi-
ty buildup. Virtually all expropriated land, accord-
ing to a recent US Embassy analysis, has been
redistributed in the form of cooperatives?rather
than to individuals?to help deny insurgents a local
support base. Many of these cooperatives have been
strategically placed to serve as centers of military
activity. Aside from the cooperatives, we have no
indications of substantial government social invest-
ments in the region.
? In the northwest, in contrast, the regime apparently
has calculated that the population, while opposed to
government policies, is more divided over the insur-
gency. As a consequence, Managua has used a mix
of policies. While defectors report that the presence
of the security services has grown substantially over
the past year, the Sandinistas also appear to have
increased social investment in the area. For exam-
ple, the regime claims to have built 2,000 houses for
government sympathizers since late 1985. Managua
7
also increased land distribution to individual peas-
ants and in Jinotega launched a major schoolbuild-
ing program, according to US Embassy and
? The regime made its most substantial tactical shift
in northeastern Nicaragua, where policies of repres-
sion and resettlement in the early 1980s had failed
to quell unrest. In mid-1985 Interior Minister Borge
assumed direct control over the region, replacing his
deputy, Luis Carrion, who apparently had come to
symbolize the regime's hardline approach.
during 1986
Borge traveled frequently to the region to try to win
over the Indians, offering the Indians limited auton-
omy and other concessions to win their loyalty. The
Interior Minister also has ordered troops in the area
*ghts,
Press reports indicate that the
regime, wit stantial Cuban assistance, has ex-
panded social programs in the region, especially
health and education?indeed, the northeast is a
priority target for develonmen in 1987,
At the same time,
according to US Embassy reports, Borge's opera-
tives have sought to keep the Indians divided by
launching a major propaganda campaign aimed at
aggravating differences between rival groups. In
April of this year the regime put forward a plan for
limited regional autonomy intended to undercut
support for the insurgents.
Gauging Regime Effectiveness
The regime's rural strategy thus far has been relative-
ly effective in controlling the countryside and helping
to assure the neutrality?if not the loyalty?of the
great majority of Nicaraguans in the areas of the
insurgency, in our view. The incentives provided by
government programs?however inadequate?have
given thousands of Nicaraguans a stake in the revolu-
tion, while government intimidation and repression
have discouraged the apathetic from actively support-
ing the insurgents.
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Land Reform: Economic Losses, Political Gains
Despite the increased pace of land redistribution over
the past 18 months, the agrarian reform program has
failed to turn around flagging production. Indeed, in
our view, Sandinista land tenure policies, along with
low official prices and government control over distri-
bution, have been the principal cause of declining
production of basic grains and export crops. A recent
US Embassy assessment indicates that, while state-
run farms and cooperatives continue to receive priori-
ty deliveries of agricultural inputs, production has
been so low that Sandinista officials charged with
agrarian reform late last year urged the government
in an internal memorandum to abandon the "dogma
of immediate and massive collectivization." Accord-
ing to government statistics, for example, corn har-
vests in 1986 were half those in 1978, and similar
declines were recorded in critical export crops, includ-
ing cotton and coffee.
The agrarian reform program also has fallen short of
Sandinista claims in other areas over the past two
years, according to US Embassy
The regime, for example, has exaggerated its achieve-
ments in land distribution, inflating its figures by
including land controlled by state farms and titles
granted to longtime squatters. Moreover, actual con-
ditions on many of the agricultural cooperatives belie
regime statements that they are prospering. While
some have been successful, the regime often assigns
them the least desirable land and makes impractical
decisions affecting production. The regime also fre-
quently has had problems finding enough peasants to
populate the cooperatives and often lacks the re-
sources to capitalize new operations; several coopera-
yes in Boaco Department,
lost almost all their members because the
government failed to provide seeds and other materi-
als
The agrarian program also has alienated private-
sector producers, who account for about 50 percent of
all agricultural production. For example, in June 1986
the regime created a high-level?if short-lived?com-
mission to discuss agricultural policies with large
private landholders, according to US Embassy report-
ing. The meetings were unsuccessful, and by all
accounts the farmers remain adamantly opposed to
Secret
the Sandinistas and are reluctant to make any signifi-
cant capital investment. In mid-July of this year the
regime's chief agrarian reform official again met with
key landowners, reassuring them that their lands
would not be confiscated and offering incentives to
increase production.
Nonetheless, we agree with the US Embassy that on
balance the expanded land reform program has been
an important incentive for supporting the regime and
provided important mechanisms for controlling the
population. It has been by far the least expensive
program to implement, and the well-publicized confis-
cations and distributions illustrate the regime's con-
tinued commitment to revolutionary change. At the
same time, in our opinion, it has won grassroots
support for the regime by demonstrating that loyalty
to the regime is rewarded. Moreover, by concentrat-
ing peasants in agricultural and resettlement coopera-
tives, the government has improved control over rural
residents while denying the insurgents access to local
sources of food, shelter, and intelligence. Even inde-
pendent farmers have to come to the cooperatives for
seeds and equipment.
land reform and other programs in
southern Matagalpa Department had succeeded in
winning the loyalty?or at least the neutrality?of
many civilians, and a
that in some areas farther north recent Sandinista
social projects have bolstered local support for the
government.
the program has been especially
effective in south-central Zelaya, where relocation
programs have had a serious impact on insurgent
operations.
attests to the political gains
Managua nets from agrarian reform.
small and
medium-sized independent farmers benefit from gov-
ernment crop subsidies; moreover, they are able to sell
some of their produce, such as fruit, both on the open
market and through black-market outlets.
told Embassy officers that the members feel they have
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a stake in the survival of the regime, even though they
do not own the land and the farming is difficult. Some
members have expressed fear they would lose access
to the land in the event of an insurgent victory.
who works on one of the more
fertile cooperatives adds that, while problems persist,
he and the farm are making a profit because of
government subsidies and that they have benefited
significantly from the program.
Social Services: Managing Declining Resources
Although the delivery of social services has eroded
during the past two years
US Embassy analyses indicate that the levels of
key social services?such as access to doctors and
schools?still remain substantially higher than before
the revolution. The expanded welfare program in the
countryside also has been a political plus, according to
US Embassy reports, while the regime's frequent
public reaffirmations of its commitment to divert
funds from the cities to the rural areas has wen a
psychological boost to rural inhabitants.
Moreover, we believe that, by concentrating its re-
sources in key geographic areas, the regime has
strengthened its position among peasants who might
be tempted to aid the insurgents, especially in the
northwest. Despite the drop in the overall rate of
medical consultations, for example, the number of
such consultations has remained stable in northern
combat zones, and dental exams even showed a slight
increase. Over one-third of all government-built hous-
ing is also scheduled to be located in the north and
given to loyal peasants. Patterns in the delivery of
other social services,
also point to the regime's determination to
maximize the political impact of its ever-shrinking
resource base in contested departments.
Secret
battalions, helicopter force, and signals intercept ca-
pabilities to seek out and attempt to engage the
insurgents in their rural operating areas. Counterin-
surgency units are also more experienced and aggres-
sive than the militia and reserve forces they supple-
ment, and their leadership seems improved.
the in-
creased use of armed MI-17 and MI-25 helicopters in
rural Nicaragua has had a negative psychological
impact on rebel troops while increasing government
troop mobility and helping to improve resupply opera-
tions. The Sandinistas also have constructed a large
number of artillery and air support bases in forward
rural areas to improve firepower and rapid response
capabilities. Newly created Nicaraguan units appar-
ently are performing well in small-unit operations
appropriate to a counterinsurgency campaign.
Military and Security Capabilities: Real Gains
The regime's improved counterinsurgency capabilities
thus far have prevented the insurgents from gaining a
permanent foothold in rural Nicaragua, giving the
regime breathing space to shore up support among the
peasants, in our view. During the past two years the
Sandinistas, in our judgment, have made steadily
more effective use of their 12 to 14 counterinsurgency
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The Interior Ministry and other security forces have
become increasingly effective in preventing the for-
mation of an internal front in support of the insur-
gents. Arrests increased twofold during the first half
of 1986 alone. In January of last year, according to
press reports, internal security officials arrested more 25X1
than 400 suspected rebel sympathizers in southern
and eastern Zelaya Department after insurgent units
were forced to return to Honduras for refitting,
leaving their local support networks unprotected. In
April the Sandinistas announced the arrest of some
1,500 suspects in Matagalpa. Moreover, the US Em-
bassy estimates that the security services were key in 25X1
the forcible relocation of as many as 250,000 Nicara-
guans away from insurgent operating areas in Jino- 25X1
tega, Madriz, Esteli, and Nueva Segovia Departments
during 1985 and 1986, and more campaigns are
planned. 25X1
Rebel commanders have attested to the effectiveness
asures.
rebel leaders believe the forced relocations
ave ro ed the insurgents of local sources of food,
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The Critical Role of Foreigners
Assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Bloc, as well as
other foreign governments and private groups, has
been vital in shoring up Sandinista rural policies. In
addition to food donations, foreign countries provide
technical assistance and equipment to cooperatives
and independent farmers and carry out large-scale
agricultural projects. Foreign medical personnel and
teachers also fill important voids in the countryside,
and foreigners have often financed the construction of
clinics and schools.
Cuban and Soviet Bloc Assistance
Cuba and the Soviet Bloc provide most of the techni-
cal and other assistance in the rural sector,
As early as 1980, Cuban teachers
participated in the literacy campaign and advised
Nicaraguan instructors. Havana also has sustained a
medical corps of at least several hundred doctors?
albeit mostly new and inexperienced?in Nicaragua,
as well as large supplies of medicines,
Many of these doctors serve in rural
health clinics and help account for the large increases
in medical personnel in Nicaragua registered in the
early 1980s.
over half the 123 foreign medical personnel
in the north were Cuban, and
Cubans are staffing a major military
ospita in Managua. In addition, Cubans provide
medical training for Nicaraguans. The Cubans also
have participated in the development of the Sandinis-
ta internal security apparatus, which has been key to
the regime's counterinsurgency strategy. Cuban ad-
visers often work with the Nicaraguans in planning
operations and interrogating prisoners,
The Soviets and the East Europeans also have helped
bolster Sandinista rural policies. Hungary built an
agricultural training facility in the northwest, and
Bulgaria is developing Nicaragua's tobacco industry,
according to US Embassy reporting. East Germany is
financing a dairy farming project in Matagalpa and
helping to rehabilitate several mines. In addition,
these countries, as well as Czechoslovakia, provide
training and equipment for the security service,
Moscow furnishes con-
siderably fewer personnel, while providing equipment,
such as tractors, and funding for large-scale agricul-
tural projects. The Soviets, for example, are financ-
ing a massive irrigation project and have built a
tractor maintenance school in Sebaco, according to
press and US Embassy reports. Moreover, we esti-
mate that, over the last two years, the USSR has
given Nicaragua some 80,000 tons of basic grains,
and the other Warsaw Pact countries have given close
to 90,000 tons.
points to continued heavy dependence on Mos-
cow and the Eastern Bloc for food imports in 1987.
Western Support
Western governments and private groups have provid-
ed substantial assistance to the countryside. Between
1979 and 1984 the European Community gave $81
million in aid, over half of which was food assistance,
according to US Embassy reports. In 1985, EC food
aid totaled nearly $21 million and $9 million was
provided for training and humanitarian programs.
The regime will be looking for more food donations
in 1987, according to US Embassy reporting. The
Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden provide the most
bilateral assistance, ranging from $10 million to $18
million each, according to US Embassy reporting.
The Swedes, who have been especially active, plan to
provide about $25 million in direct aid during 1987
and 1988, much of which will go to rural projects
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such as village stores, according to US Embassy
reporting.
Private groups of sympathizers?frequently called
internationalists?have formed proregime solidarity
groups that have donated food, medicine, and other
goods for distribution in the countryside. Western
medical personnel also serve in rural Nicaragua,
sometimes targeting specific regions. The Sandinistas
have admitted publicly that the internationalists are
critical to sustaining the rural health svstem.I
nearly half the medical personnel in the
northwest were Westerners, including doctors, nurses,
and technicians mostly from France Italy and Cana-
da. Various foreign groups,
also have furnished badly needed medical
supplies to clinics in that region. The Sandinistas
place these personnel in contested areas both to
service the locals and to treat wounded combatants,
Westerners have con-
structed hospitals, clinics, and schools, and partici-
pated in teaching brigades. Many donate their labor
during coffee harvests, although their inexperience
limits their value as laborers, according to US Em-
bassy reporting.
Many internationalists work closely with coopera-
tives, and some of the more committed foreigners
receive military training and serve in local militia
units. Last year,
several foreigners who were killed during rebel at-
tacks on farms were armed and uniformed. Others,
taken captive, had permits to carry weapons.
11
shelter, and intelligence in areas of the northwest.
More recently,
the
relocations in the far south have imposed real hard-
ships on rebel combatants operating in the area. In 25X1
addition, the Sandinis- 25X1
tas have established informant networks to report on
rebel movements. Such activities, according to
US Embassy reporting, have fostered Th
impression
impression of an all-pervasive security force and
discouraged local assistance to the insurgents in some
areas. Even in Boaco, according to
claims that the insurgents have
been "strategically defeated"?combined with declin-
ing insurgent activity and widespread arrests?caused
many regime opponents to lose heart during 1986.
The insurgents' expanded presence in Boaco since last
March probably has assuaged some of these senti-
ments, but locals probably are still concerned about
renrisals if the rebels again withdraw from the area.
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Continuing Popular Resistance
Despite the security gains the regime has made in the
countryside over the past two years, there are strong
indications of continuing discontent, manifested in
part in continuing support for the insurgents.
peasants are the major source
for recruits and that they frequently provide the
guerrillas with food, shelter, intelligence, and medical
assistance. Hundreds reportedly act as couriers, and
others temporarily fight with insurgent units operat-
ing in their areas. Precise amounts of material support
to the guerrillas from locals are uncertain, but rebel
forces operating in Boaco and Chontales Depart-
ments,
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rely almost exclusively on local food sources. Z
Rural Nicaraguans also have expressed their antipa-
thy toward the Sandinista regime with a growing
number of demonstrations and spontaneous attacks on
government officials and facilities during the past 18
months. For example,
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Figure 3. A rural health center located in the Pacific coast region.
It is located next to a parish church to facilitate access, and is
named for a hero of the revolution to underscore the regime's
commitment to health care
Figure 4. A rural household in the northwest. The family operates
a small food stand in the foreground.
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agricultural
workers joined their employer in Boaco in successfully
resisting government efforts to confiscate his land. In
mid-1986 there were two reported incidents of peas-
ant attacks on government granaries, according to the
US Embassy. The Embassy reports that locals also
have attacked?and sometimes killed?regime offi-
cials trying to enforce commercial regulations. In late
June of 1987, 1,000 residents of Boaco protested
against the high casualties and poor trainin receiv d
by youths conscripted into the Army
Resistance to Sandinista indoctrination efforts also
remains a problem in rural schools. A rural parochial
schoolteacher has told the Embassy that the school
had resisted government efforts to regulate religious
teaching and had removed proregime instructors.
Parents of children in public schools often provide
"counterindoctrination" lessons to their children at
home,
Resistance is so strong within the Indian
community on the Atlantic coast that some families
refuse to send their children to Sandinista schools.
Outlook
We believe the Sandinistas have been anticipating an
expanded level of fighting for some time and have
used the last two years?with varying degrees of
success?to shore up their position in the countryside.
Moreover, the regime recognizes it will continue to
remain vulnerable to rural discontent that could easily
be exploited by the insurgents if they are able to
continue to sustain large-scale operations inside Nica-
ragua. Given this threat, we expect the Sandinistas to
pursue their policies?especially land reform and the
military and security buildup?even more aggressive-
ly in coming months, underscoring their determina-
tion to win the peasants over, or at least to keep them
neutral
Key Programs
We expect that an expanded land distribution pro-
gram will be at the center of the regime's rural
strategy in coming months. To avoid further declines
in agricultural production, however, new grants will
13
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probably come at least partially from the regime's
vast holdings rather than from confiscations. Even so,
large-scale farmers and ranchers in key strategic
areas?such as Boaco and Chontales Departments,
where antigovernment feelings run high?will remain 25X1
vulnerable. Moreover, we believe that for strategic
reasons the Sandinistas may continue to back away
from concentrating on strictly individual grants, pre-
ferring to tie the parcels to more easily controlled
cooperatives that also serve as military posts. We also
expect the Sandinistas to pursue improved relations
with certain private-sector producers?perhaps
through additional concessions on marketing and pric-
ing?to try to avert further sharp drops in production
of food and export crops 25X1
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We believe the delivery of essential services will
continue to deteriorate, despite the regime's efforts to
keep key social programs afloat. Inasmuch as the
recently released economic plan for 1987 suggests
that the war will absorb even more than the current
60 percent of the national budget, malnutrition and?
public health standards probably will worsen, and
improvements in education are unlikely. Housing
starts will slip, and any construction probably will be
related to establishing new agricultural cooperatives.
We also believe, however, that the Sandinistas will be
able to avoid any precipitous drop in the delivery of
services in the countryside. We anticipate that the
deterioration in rural services will continue to be
gradual and localized, thereby limiting its political
impact on the regime. Managua is likely to continue
shifting development funds away from urban areas
and to concentrate its efforts in critical regions. The
hotly contested northwest, for example, is almost
certain to receive a disproportionate share of services,
in our view. We believe the northeast will be another
high-priority target as the regime pursues its policy of
courting the Indians. Foreign assistance will remain
critical in further bolstering the regime's presence in
the rural areas, and the Sandinistas will almost
certainly continue to direct foreign medical personnel
and technicians to politically sensitive regions
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The Military and Security Buildup
We expect the Sandinistas to pursue their military
and security buildup in the countryside. On the basis
of current practices, we believe the regime will focus
on maintaining?if not increasing?active-duty force
strength in rural Nicaragua, providing further train-
ing to local militia forces, improving command and
control, and building additional forward bases and
roads to enhance mobility. We also expect the internal
security service to improve further in the coming year
as more rural informants are recruited.
Sandinista behavior to date suggests that forced reset-
tlements are likely to continue and that more agricul-
tural cooperatives will be established in combat zones.
Recent press reporting points to new efforts on this
score in southern Zelaya Department, and additional
relocation sites probably will be created in the north-
west as well. In the northeast, however, the program
generally has been completed and, unless fighting
increases substantially, further massive relocations
are unlikely in view of the Sandinistas' desires to
reach an accommodation with the Indians.
Persistent Discontent
Although we believe that the combined effects of
economic distress, conscription and forced service in
the militia, ideological indoctrination, and political
repression are almost certain to generate more discon-
tent, we expect that more open or violent manifesta-
tions of unrest are likely to remain sporadic and
isolated over the next year or so. Incidents so far
appear spontaneous; they lack clear leadership and
have been easily suppressed by the security forces. In
addition, rural Nicaraguans?like their urban coun-
terparts?have been traditionally apathetic and slow
to risk opposing Managua. Moreover, because of the
Sandinistas' emphasis on indoctrinating rural children
in the schools, many of the Nicaraguan youth?who
might fuel more generalized discontent?probably
will not be inclined to oppose the regime. Therefore,
although we believe that many Nicaraguans will
continue to demonstrate their opposition by joining or
aiding the insurgents, the great majority in the coun-
tryside probably will try to sit out the conflict.
We judge that over the much longer term?perhaps
two to four years?the regime's vulnerability to rural
unrest may increase substantially, if the strength and
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Indicators of an Eroding Sandinista Position
In our judgment, a number of possible developments
favorable to the insurgents during the next 12 to 18
months could hasten the erosion of the regime's rural
base. On the military side, we believe Sandinista
control over the countryside would decline rapidly
? Transportation problems strained the regime's abil-
ity to fight a multifront war.
? Spot shortages of fuel and ammunition resulted
from poor planning or breakdowns in foreign mili-
tary assistance.
? Desertions and low morale within the Army in-
creased substantially.
? An elite unit suffered a major defeat in the field.
? The internal security apparatus failed to detect
major rebel support networks.
In terms of social programs, the regime would have
more difficulty maintaining popular support in the
countryside if:
? Increased urban unrest forced the regime to shift
resources to the cities.
? External economic assistance?especially food and
medical aid?declined sharply, forcing deep cuts in
social services.
? Managua proved unable to cope with a major crop
failure or epidemic.
operating areas of the insurgency continue to grow
and the government becomes increasingly unable to
provide key social services. Such vulnerability almost
certainly would be greater in some rural areas than in
others. The insurgents probably could make their
greatest gains in exploiting regime vulnerabilities in
central Nicaragua, where the population has been
strongly antigovernment and has provided sustained
support for local rebel units. The traditional indepen-
dent stance of the Indians in the northeast and their
consistent opposition to Sandinista policies probably
will continue to make that area fertile ground for
antigovernment activity despite the regime's efforts to
bolster its position there with economic and political
incentives. The government's vulnerability in the
northwest is less certain, given the relative effective-
ness of social programs and agrarian reform
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Implications for the United States
In our view, the Sandinistas' rural policies have made
the countryside less than a hospitable environment for
the insurgents. The Sandinistas are more deeply
entrenched in the rural areas than ever, and the
rebels, even with US military assistance, face a
difficult task in challenging the regime's military and
security apparatus. The Sandinistas' expanded securi-
ty network, for example, will complicate insurgent
operational planning, and the large-scale peasant relo-
cation program will increase the need for external
supply, straining the rebels' already fragile aerial
resupply system. Moreover, the insurgents probably
will encounter a more intimidated population and will
find it difficult to convince rural Nicaraguans to
assume the risks involved in opposing the regime.
We believe the Sandinistas' perception that their rural
strategy is working will reinforce Managua's inten-
tions to resist a dialogue with the armed opposition.
many
regime leaders are confident that, by shifting re-
sources, resettling rural inhabitants, and negotiating
autonomy for the Atlantic coast, they have undercut
local support for the insurgency.
Secret
when a new administration takes office in 1989, and
their strategy seems intended to hold off massive
popular defections?at least in key geographic ar-
eas?until the insurgency subsides and the regime can
devote more resources to ernnnmir and social pro-
grams
the Sandinistas
are mucn less connoent of their ability to manage a
long-term and well-funded insurgency, and we agree
with the regime's apparent belief that it would be
much more vulnerable to the social tensions almost
certain to accompany a prolonged conflict. A pro-
longed insurgency?perhaps two to four years?would
undercut the Sandinistas' short-term calculations and
force them to deal with mounting unrest with a
shrinking resource base benefiting ever-smaller num-
bers of rural Nicaraguans. As a result, the delivery 0f25X1
social services?even with substantial external sup-
port?probably would decline sharply. More wide-
spread and frequent antigovernment demonstrations
would most likely occur and the population probably
would be more inclined to support the insurgents. 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
the Sandinis-
tas calculate that Washington's policies will change
Reverse Blank 15
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25X1
25X1
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Declassified n Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP04T00907R000100290001-1
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP04T00907R000100290001-1