HAITI: STRUGGLING TOWARD CIVILIAN RULE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000100220001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Haiti: Struggling Toward
Civilian Rule
Secret
ALA 87-10029
June 1987
Copy 18 9
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Civilian Rule
Haiti: Struggling Toward
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by -]Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with
contributions from
Office of Leadership Analysis; and
Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations.
Division, ALA
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 87-10029
June 1987
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Haiti: Strug H Toward
Civilian Rule
Key Judgments Looking ahead at the next few years, Haiti faces a difficult struggle to
Information available achieve stable civilian rule. Although Haiti's ruling council is likely to
as Qf 10 June 1987 adhere to its scheduled transfer of power to an elected civilian president in
was used in this report.
February 1988, it might delay the transition if public unrest recurs. The
greatest danger to political stability is likely to come after the transition. A
strong civilian leader has yet to emerge, and we doubt a new government
would encounter the euphoria that greeted the downfall of the Duvalier
regime and the installation of the council in February 1986. Without a
national consensus on the country's future political direction, the new
government could be toppled by even a short bout of unrest. Should Haiti's
experiment fail, Haitian or other Caribbean leaders could call for greater
US involvement-and possibly direct military intervention-to restore
order and stability.
The council has made some progress toward democracy, but US Embassy
officials indicate that most Haitians perceive it as unresponsive to popular
demands. Much of the current political calm probably reflects the popular
assumption that the council will soon relinquish power. At the same time,
in our view, the potential for serious civilian unrest persists largely because
of frustrated economic expectations. We believe public demonstrations will
increase as electioneering gains momentum in the next few months
None of the leading candidates for president is likely to win a clear
mandate in the election slated for November 1987. The political center,
however, could present a formidable force if leading moderates put aside
their differences and backed one candidate to head a united front.
Although personal rivalries have precluded significant collaboration, lead-
ing moderates may realize the need for unity as the election nears.
Alternatively, socialist-leaning nationalists could be surprisingly strong
contenders if they formed a populist coalition, especially if the moderates
fail to unify quickly. Such a coalition, however, probably would call for
sweeping reforms that would deepen the hostility between the people and
the elite.
Although we view the prospects for a successful transition as better than
even, the process might be delayed if the military-dominated council
believed that widespread unrest was threatening public order, that the
leading contenders or an elected successor were inadequate to the task of
Secret
ALA 87-10029
June 1987
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governing Haiti, or that the military's institutional interests would be
threatened. We also judge it possible-although highly unlikely-that
these same factors could induce the council to cancel democratization
altogether.
Regardless of who holds power, Haiti's authoritarian traditions and
unrealistic popular expectations for economic progress will greatly compli-
cate the government's ability to manage conflicting demands of key
interest groups. Key figures in business, the military, and the government
will resist dilution of their wealth and power. On the basis of US Embassy
reporting, we believe the Catholic Church will continue
to back popular demands for reforms that put it at loggerheads with
conservative interests.
We expect that, in this environment, the new government will have
difficulty encouraging disparate groups to cooperate in the national interest
without using intimidation and repression. Even a president favoring
democracy may have to quell dissidence, on the left and right, in order to
consolidate power. As a result, we see a return to civilian authoritarianism
as a distinct danger. Alternatively, should the government fail to consoli-
date power quickly and collapse as a result of popular unrest, a succession
of unstable civilian administrations is possible. Such turmoil would strong-
ly encourage the military to seize power again.
We believe that if a civilian is installed as president the Haitian Govern-
ment will seek substantial economic and military assistance from the
United States. Haiti's new leaders almost certainly would be aware that
past successful transitions from authoritarian to democratic governments
elsewhere in Latin America suggest that even a modest US commitment
helps reinforce the legitimacy of the new government and improves its
chances of success.
A stalled or aborted transition could quickly magnify Washington's
problems. At a minimum, we would expect a heightening of anti-US
sentiment. The ensuing political polarization could trigger violence that the
Haitian Government might well be unable to control. If the security
situation deteriorated markedly, we believe that Haitian refugees would
flock to the United States and that the lives and property of US citizens in
Haiti would be endangered.
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We judge that the return of authoritarian rule-military or civilian-
would present radical states with an opportunity to exploit Haiti's instabil-
ity and increase their influence in the region. Cuba, and to a lesser extent
the USSR and several foreign Communist parties, probably view Haiti as a
long-term target of opportunity and probably would continue to provide
various types of training and modest funding to Haitian Communists.
Libya most likely would continue paramilitary training of small Haitian
radical groups, encouraging them to initiate terrorist activity. In view of
Haiti's fragile security situation, even small groups backed by foreign
radicals could pose serious threats to stability.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Introduction
The Current Political Landscape
The Military
Business Elites and the Duvalierist Right 3
Socialist Nationalists and the Radical Left 5
Radical Foreign Influences
Unrealistic Popular Expectations 7
Looking Ahead: Transition Scenarios
Maintaining the Democratic Timetable 10
Dangers Beyond the Transition
Implications for the United States
A. Major Political Players and Presidential Contenders
B. Haiti: Daunting Economic Challenges
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3 Uoln niwn
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Civilian Rule
Haiti: Struggling Toward
Haiti's military-dominated ruling council is generally
adhering to the transition schedule it set for itself in
1986. The council held a referendum in March 1987
on the new liberal Constitution, which was approved
overwhelmingly. Local elections are scheduled for
August, and the presidential election is set for No-
vember. The transition to civilian rule is slated to take
place on 7 February 1988, the second anniversary of
the ouster of former President Jean-Claude Duvalier.
President Henri
Namphy is determined to stick to this timetable and
turn power over to a civilian president on schedule.
Despite these promising signs, widespread popular
dissatisfaction with the council's overall performance
and its potential response to unrest remain serious
threats to the handing over of power on schedule to a
civilian administration. Popular discontent with Hai-
ti's dismal economic conditions and the lingering
political influence of Duvalierists have provoked spo-
radic antigovernment protests and violence since the
collapse of the Duvalier regime. According to US
Embassy officials, the current political calm rests on
the populace's assumption that the unpopular council
will be gone by early next year; meanwhile, a random
incident could still spark widespread mob violence.
Namphy's predilection to use increasing
force against potential demonstrators may signal a
reversion to authoritarian tactics.
The system is also under pressure from much more
fundamental sources. We believe Haiti's largely illit-
erate population and the country's history of dictator-
ships and political fragmentation seriously limit the
government's ability to construct a viable democracy
that can withstand the continuing maneuvering of
extremist elements on both the left and the right.
This assessment examines the makeup of the domestic
political landscape and the ability of radical foreign
actors to affect the process. It analyzes the hurdles
facing the development of democratic structures and
the pressures that a civilian government is likely to
confront. The paper also assesses possible political 25X1
outcomes over the next few years, considers the
potential for greater Cuban and other outside inter-
ference, and discusses the implications for US inter-
ests, including the possibility that a deteriorating
security situation could invite a more direct US role.
The Current Political Landscape
Haiti's political spectrum is dominated by the various
interest groups and power centers that vied for influ-
ence during the Duvalier era and by the newer ones
that have emerged in the more open political climate
allowed since the collapse of the old regime. Haiti's 25X1
political scene currently is dominated by political 25X1
moderates-all of whom opposed Duvalier in Haiti or
from exile-who have staked out popular, reformist 25X1
positions while remaining largely acceptable to such
crucial interest groups as the military and the busi-
ness community. The supporters of the old regime-
the so-called Duvalierists-with their political experi-
ence and strong motive of self-preservation, also con-
tinue to wield considerable, if low-profile, influence.
Socialist-leaning nationalists have been unable to
unite in an electorally workable political movement so 25X1
far, but we believe that their widely popular calls for 25X1
sweeping social reforms could, nonetheless, propel
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them to the political forefront in the months ahead. In
our view, the Catholic Church, as well as the far left
and its foreign backers, are secondary-but still im-
portant-players largely because of their demonstrat-
ed ability to foment unrest and their weak support or
outright rejection of the council's transition plan.
Moderate Contenders
The US Embassy in Port-au-Prince
indicate that none of the half dozen or so
leading moderates in a field of some 200 presidential
contenders has yet to emerge as a strong front-
runner.' Even the most prominent moderates lack
sophisticated political organizations or nationwide
support. Moreover, according to the US Embassy, the
keen ambition of leading moderates to become presi-
dent predisposes them to act as competitors rather
than as allies. They appear unwilling or unable to take
a firm first step toward forming a coalition movement,
which we believe is their best vehicle to elect a centrist
The Ruling Council's Mixed Record
The Namphy government has turned in an uneven
performance in several key areas since coming to
power:
Building Democracy. In addition to generally adher-
ing to the transition timetable it set for itself in June
1986, the council-according-to-the US Embassy, has
sought to encourage grassroots democracy in rural
areas through local administrative units called
casecs. The Embassy indicates that such initiatives
as the Constituent Assembly elections in October
1986 have lacked preparation and failed to engender
much popular enthusiasm; only 9 percent of Haiti's
eligible voters, for example, participated in these
elections. By contrast, the Embassy reports that the
constitutional referendum in March 1987, which at-
tracted roughly 44 percent of eligible voters, was
better prepared and conducted fairly and openly.
president
To preserve their credibility with the voters, the
moderates, in our view, perceive a need to distance
themselves from the ruling council
most leading moderates want
to work according to the ruling council's electoral
ground rules but have criticized the government's
handling of the transition process. Fearing that elec-
tions could be delayed or corrupted, leading moder-
ates in December 1986 called for the creation of an
independent electoral commission to oversee the
building of a political infrastructure and monitor
elections, according to US Embassy reports. Namphy
subsequently met with several moderate leaders and
reportedly reacted favorably to their proposal for the
electoral commission. Although the government an-
nounced the. establishment of a nine-member indepen-
dent commission in May
indicate that the politicians are increasingly skeptical
of the ruling council's democratic intentions because
Namnhv has failed to resume his dialogue with them.
De-Duvalierization. One of Namphy's first acts as
President was to disband the roughly 11,000-man
Duvalierist militia, known as the Ton Ton Macoutes,
which virtually eliminated the government's domestic
intelligence capabilities. A few of the most brutal
militia leaders have been charged with or convicted of
crimes. US Embassy and press reporting indicates
that other prominent Macoutes fled Haiti after Duva-
lier's fall, and the government has been unable or
unwilling to pursue their extraditions vigorously.
Although some prominent Duvalierists were purged
from the government bureaucracy, Embassy reporting
suggests many remain entrenched in their jobs.F__
books.
Human Rights. According to Embassy reporting, the
government has allowed complete freedom of speech
and a free press. Until recently, the council had
eliminated intimidation and arbitrary arrest as gov-
ernment policy, even though isolated incidents of
brutality beyond the council's control had occurred.
In February, however, the council proclaimed it had
the right to undertake `preventive detentions, " osten-
sibly to prevent disturbances on the anniversary of
Duvalier's overthrow, but the decree remains on the
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Haiti's new Constitution is designed to prevent the
emergence of another dictatorship and ensure human
rights, while limiting the political activity of Duva-
lierists, according to the US Embassy. The docu-
ment-drafted by the Constituent Assembly and ap-
proved by 99 percent of Haiti's voters-decentralizes
governmental structures, curtails the president's pow-
ers, and limits his tenure of office to two nonsucces-
sivefive year terms. Under the new system, the
president will govern in conjunction with a prime
minister chosen, under tight restrictions, by the presi-
dent. In addition, the president and prime minister
share power with a bicameral legislature consisting of
27 senators and no fewer than 70 deputies. According
to the Embassy, the Constitution does not clarify the
flow of power between the president and prime minis-
ter. The Embassy reports that some observers fear
that the Constitution is well intentioned but too
vague, and contains provisions that will make it
impossible for any administration to govern the coun-
try effectively.
We believe the Constitution could be politically divi-
sive as its implications become clearer and the re-
forms it mandates are implemented. Provisions bar-
ring Duvalierists from holding public office for 10
years if they have not been cleared of charges of
corruption or human rights violations could, in our
view, give the ruling council veto power over many
presidential candidates, since most leading contend-
ers have had at least some ties to the Duvaliers. In
addition, the Constitution calls for the creation of an
independent electoral commission and the separation
of Army and police functions, both of which are
unlikely to be popular with military leaders.F__1 25X1
Should difficulties arise as the Constitution is imple-
mented, such as in the separation of powers, the
legislature is empowered to amend the document in
order to rectify the problems. The procedure for
amending the Constitution,. however, is complex and
drawn out. Moreover, the Constitution cannot be
amended until 1993, after the first democratically
elected president leaves office. Still, we believe the
ultimate success or failure of Haitian democracy 25X1
depends less on the Constitution and more on the
willingness and ability of the new political leaders to
make it work.
The Military
Because the military is Haiti's strongest national
institution, it is the most important political player,
and one with a long history of involvement in political
affairs. Moreover, the military members of the ruling
council and other senior officers interpret the new
Constitution as mandating that the Army will remain
free of tight civilian control,
Despite the pivotal role of the armed forces, we
believe divisions in the officer corps, discontent in the
ranks, and civilian distrust of the ruling council may
impede the military's ability to influence political
events. For example
the council intends to press the military to vote as a
bloc for an as yet unspecified presidential candidate,
but we judge that such a move would fail. US
Embassy officials say some senior Army officers
tacitly support Duvalierists. Others in the military
support moderate candidates or leftist groups,
many in the military would refuse to
support the council's choice for president simply
because they are opposed to the leadership's telling
them how to vote. Moreover, we believe such a blatant
attempt by the military leadership to impose its choice
for president could provoke strong popular opposition
because many Haitians resent the continued promi-
nent political role of the military since Duvalier's
overthrow, according to the Embassy.
Business Elites and the Duvatierist. Right
Business elites account for only 1 percent of the
population, according to the Embassy, but they have
significant financial leverage to influence political
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In the post-Duvalier era the military has been called
on to provide internal stability. Even so, the deterio-
rating capabilities of key units could seriously under-
mine the military's effectiveness in maintaining order.
that the Leopards
Battalion-an elite counterinsurgencyforce-is at
less than one-third of its authorized strength of 598
and is essentially nonfunctional because the General
Staff has not authorized the unit to replenish its
ranks. that the govern-
ment totally depends on the Presidential Guard, the
Dessalines Battalion, and the Port-au-Prince Po-
lice-with a combined strength of approximately
3,000-to control civil disturbances in a capital city
with over I million residents. The government also
reportedly depends on regional units with an approxi-
mate total strength of 2,500 troops to maintain order
in the provinces, where an additional 5 million Hai-
tians live. Official Haitian figures put the armed
forces'strength at 9,998. owev-
er, estimates the actual strength at approximately
7,700. We believe the figure may be even lower
because of attrition and corrupt commanders padding
their payrolls
Factionalism and discontent within the military also
threaten to reduce the government's ability to control
the security situation.
oppose military reform
and jealously cling to perquisites enjoyed under the
old regime. in
January Namphy was sufficiently concerned about
the loyalty of the officer corps that he promoted
several trusted allies to shore up his support. A
sweeping shuffle of senior officers in March, accord-
ing to the Embassy, was engineered by Brig. Gen.
Williams Regala, the other military member of the
ruling council, to consolidate his position. Despite
these moves, several senior officers
believe that military morale and effective-
ness are at the lowest point in years and that open
dissent in the ranks may occur.
events. Those of mulatto and Arab descent-who
coexisted uneasily with the old regime-probably line
up politically with moderate candidates. The Embassy
indicates that some wealthy businessmen already are
attempting to identify and back the likely presidential
winner in an effort to preserve their economic inter-
ests. Embassy reporting suggests
the business community pays lipservice to reducing
official corruption and improving human rights but
privately views only limited social and political
change as in its best interests.
We believe the role of the Duvalierists is also impor-
tant to the prospects for the transition because many
supporters of the old regime remain wealthy and
influential members of Haitian society. US Embassy
and press reports indicate the ruling council has
weeded out some Duvalierists from the government
and brought several former militia leaders to trial for
crimes committed during the Duvalier era. Despite
these pressures and the public outcry that forced them
to announce the dissolution of their fledgling political
party last November, there are signs that the Duva-
lierists are secretly rebuilding their political network
to safeguard their perquisites and launch their own
drive for power
Adrien Raymond, who headed the ostensibly disband-
ed party, reportedly is instructing supporters to main-
tain a low political profile until the election draws
interests, the DuvalieristsJ
personal jealousies.
Still, they clearly have more money and po iti-
cal experience at their disposal than other groups on
the horizon.
The Church
Internal divisions have prevented the hierarchy of the
Roman Catholic Church in Haiti from playing a
potentially central role in assisting the transition.
Once outwardly united in the forefront of opposition
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to Duvalier, the church-the only institution besides
the Army with a national organization-has become
increasingly divided between moderate clerics tacitly
supporting the ruling council and militant leftist
priests opposing it,
Reporting from
Embassy leads us to conclude that the radicals, at
least temporarily, have the initiative. US officials say
leftist clerics continue fomenting unrest in parishes
throughout the country, even though they have lost
some political momentum recently. For example, the
most outspoken radical priest, Jean-Bertrand Aris-
tide, is popular among youth, coordinates activities
with radical groups, and openly agitates-with some
success-for protests to topple the government. By
contrast, church moderates have been politically reti-
cent since Duvalier's overthrow. The Embassy says,
however, that the Haitian bishops' pastoral letter
issued in February was conciliatory toward the ruling
council and may represent an attempt by the hierar-
chy's moderates to undercut leftist clergy and regain
control of the church's political message. Neverthe-
less, even moderate clerics have been unwilling to tie
their reputations to the council or its initiatives be-
cause, the Embassy says, they doubt the government's
commitment to democracy and social justice.
Socialist Nationalists and the Radical Left
Socialist elements have begun organizing politically in
keeping with the government's ground rules but are
far from coalescing into a unified political movement
with a coherent strategy or ideology, according to the
Embassy. Many socialists belong to an umbrella
group called the Committee of the Congress of Demo-
cratic Movements or CONACOM, but the Embassy
reports that this group does not function as a single
political entity. Numerous other socialist parties have
operated intermittently alongside more radical groups
under the banner of the Liaison for Democratic
Forces, but this group is factionalized and increasing-
ly ineffective politically. Despite the organizational
shortcomings of the socialists, they share some com-
mon beliefs. Embassy officials, for example, describe
socialist elements as generally suspicious of the Unit-
ed States, the business community, and the military,
while advocating redistribution of wealth and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency for Haiti
The radical leftists continue to plan strategies aimed
at manipulating or derailing the transition to democ-
racy. the 25X1
have been secretly fomenting-antigovernment protests
through other groups, strengthening links to radical
Catholic priests, and developing a capability for
armed struggle should they decide to pursue that
course. The Communists reportedly also plan to run a
candidate for president in the coming election.
the Communists 25X1
Unified Party of Haitian Communists-which may
have as many as 3,000 members-has had some
success expanding its influence beyond Port-au-
Prince, partly by keeping a low profile during bouts of
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unrest in order to project a responsible image.~ 25X1
the leadership of the Democrat-
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is Unity Confederation-a group popularly known as
KID that has ties to Cuba and rejects the legitimacy
of the ruling council-believes that violence is the
best means to pursue revolutionary goals in Haiti, and
is seeking weapons. We lack credible evidence that
the left has the capability to carry out effective, 25X1
coordinated acts of subversion that could topple the
government any time soon, although the Embassy
reports that some radical groups may be partly re-
sponsible for a recent surge in violent robberies.
Leftist groups have had considerable success attract-
ing protestors to antigovernment demonstrations over
the past year, but have been unable to sustain the
momentum of protests beyond several days. More-
over, the Embassy reports that a conference in Janu-
ary of Haitian radical groups showed that the left
remains fragmented and reluctant to cooperate.
foreign leftist actors are attempting to expand their
influence in the region by supporting Haitian radical
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groups and encouraging them to develop a capability
for clandestine subversion in the posttransition period.
emergence of scores of presidential candidates and
parties. In addition, we believe widespread illiteracy
among voters and the government's inexperience with
electoral procedures could facilitate the manipulation
and corruption of elections by antidemocratic ele-
ments on the left and the right. Moreover, academic
studies have underscored the fact that most Haitians
traditionally have viewed governments in Port-au-
Prince as predatory regimes that secured power by
satisfying the interests of the elites while cowing the
general populace into submission. Haitian history
provides no precedents of a government successfully
balancing the interests of the elites and the poor
For example,
the USSR, Cuba, and the French Communist Party
are funneling considerable sums of money to Haitian
Communists.
Libya, which probably sees Haiti as a good opportuni-
ty to gain a foothold in the Caribbean, also has
become active.
Libyans are backing a small group of radical former
exiles and encouraging them to undertake acts of
and well-trained subversives could cause serious prob-
lems for the Namphy government, Qadhafi is backing
groups that to date have demonstrated little popular
appeal.
In our view, the council faces several immediate and
stiff challenges beyond its control in creating a viable
democracy. At a minimum, the volatile political and
social climate will greatly complicate the tasks of
managing a smooth transition to democratic rule and
building the national consensus needed to ensure the
survival of a fledgling democracy.
Undemocratic Traditions
Haiti's long history of strongman rule provides little
basis for the emergence of a workable party system.
In our judgment, the country's highly individualistic
political tradition is demonstrated most clearly by the
without resorting to intimidation or terror.
Unrealistic Popular Expectations
We believe that broad dissatisfaction with the pace of
social and economic progress will be a major hurdle
for the council-and any new government-to over-
come in the near term.' The lack of visible social and
economic improvements, in our view, is a principal 25X1
reason that seemingly insignificant issues can quickly
ignite widespread unrest. According to Embassy re-
porting, impoverished Haitians-the vast majority of 25X1
the population-have high expectations but doubt 25X1
that the democratic institutions the ruling council is
building will significantly improve their lot. In addi-
tion, we judge that frustration with the lack of
significant economic progress may well prompt fur-
ther outbreaks of labor unrest, which would discour-
age foreign investment in the coming months
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Whether the transition to civilian rule occurs on
schedule in February 1988 depends, in our opinion, on
three key factors:
? The level and endurance of violent protests.
? The strength of Namphy's commitment to relin-
quish power.
' For details on Haiti's recent economic performance and the
factors determining the country's economic prospects over the next
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After reviewing 25 transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule in the Western Hemisphere over the last
three decades, a study done on contract for the Central Intelligence Agency identified 10 factors that tend to
characterize successful transfers of power.a In Haiti's case, only one factor appears to apply fully, although
several others may be partially present during the transition process, as the following table indicates. These
findings reinforce our analysis that Haiti faces unusually strong obstacles in building a viable democracy. Al-
though Haiti is doing some things right, according to the study, chances appear slim that favorable
postturnover conditions-such as strong presidential leadership and relatively light pressures against the
government-will occur to help compensate for remaining weaknesses in the early stages of the transition pro-
cess.
Characteristics of Key: ^Does not apply 0 Not likely to occur
Successful Transitions 10 Partially applies O Likely to apply partially
^ Fully applies ? Probably will apply fully
Pretransition
Short prior authori- ^ The Duvalier family ruled for 29 years before it was ousted in 1986.
tarian rule
Strong domestic pres- 13 The widespread protests that forced Duvalier's departure have not translated into
sure for democratic equal pressure for the overhaul of the political system. Public sentiment remains
transition more focused against the ruling council than for the adoption of democracy,
weakening the potential for a lasting transition.
Transition
Multistage transition ^ The study found that transitions that last more than a year and include
process constitutional conventions and two- or three-stage elections-thus allowing more
time for public acclimatization to the democratic process-have a greater chance
of success than those that effect a turnover in one step. Namphy's extended
timetable follows this pattern. He might further strengthen the transition process,
however, by adding another stage, such as a runoff election among the top
presidential contenders in the fall.
Consensus to respect ^ Haiti's most conspicuous shortcoming, according to the study, is the absence of an
new government agreement among major political actors to support and abide by the process of se-
lecting the new government. Research showed that formal or informal consensual
pacts were operative in the majority of cases where turnovers lasted at least five
years.
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Inclusion of major
parties in elections
Honest balloting
Posttransition
Leadership experience
and authority
Absence of longstand-
ing military antago-
nism toward new
ruling party
Relatively low pres-
sure against new gov-
ernment at six-month
point
US signalling through
increased aid
Q Constitutional provisions proscribe candidates with ties to the Duvalier adminis-
trations and the political parties law requires parties to collect 5,000 signatures to
register. At least a dozen parties among the scores now active are likely to meet
the requirement, however.
presidential elections is likely to be relatively free from fraud.
On the basis of Haiti's track record during the Constituent Assembly election and
the constitutional referendum, we believe that voting in the legislative and
Q None of Haiti's potential civilian rulers has had significant governing experience,
a situation that weakens transition prospects, according to research findings.
Moreover, the new president and prime minister will have to depend on fragile co-
alitions of self-interested political groups for their governing authority as the
democratic experiment gets under way. No candidate so far exhibits the
charismatic leadership style that might override a lack of other political
qualifications.
Q Although there is no new ruling party yet,
opinion of all current contenders and of politicians in general.
On the other hand, the restriction of political activity in Haiti over the
years has prevented the development of the deep-seated enmity between the
military and certain political groups that the study found to have handicapped
other, fledgling civilian governments.
Q The ruling council is allowing political activity to flourish during the transition
but has failed to initiate solid programs that might ease some of the difficulties
the new government will encounter. We expect social, political, and economic
tensions in the postturnover period to reach the same high levels that have
characterized many failed transitions elsewhere in the region.
Q Even a modest nod from Washington would benefit the new regime, according to
the study. Positive aid signals characterized 10 of the 14 transitions that lasted at
least five years, while most of the failed transitions steered reduced
disbursements.
a For the purposes of the study, a successful transfer was defined as
one that resulted in at least five years of democratic rule.
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? The perceived ability and willingness of a civilian
president-elect to implement policies within parame-
ters acceptable to the military.
Considering these factors, we believe that events in
Haiti could unfold in three different ways. Under the
most likely scenario, the ruling council would adhere
to the transition schedule. A second possibility is a
delay by Namphy in the transition, perhaps for
several months, if outbreaks of violence occur during
the election campaign, if the council perceives the
leading candidates or president-elect as too inept to
govern, or if the military believes that its institutional
interests are threatened. A third scenario, although
much less likely in our view, is a harsh government
crackdown on dissent and the imposition of authori-
tarian rule by the military.
Maintaining the Democratic Timetable
Largely on the basis of the ruling council's record of
adherence to the electoral timetable and the people's
clear expectation of political change, we believe the
council has a better-than-even chance of meeting the
schedule for the transition to civilian rule. Our as-
sumption, however, depends heavily on the council's
ability to avoid provoking widespread popular unrest
or cracking down harshly on the sporadic outbursts
that probably are inevitable as electioneering gains
momentum. Moreover, the new Constitution declares
that the council's mandate must end on 7 February
1988. US officials indicate that most Haitians want
the council to leave office on schedule, and we believe
the council is well aware of this sentiment.
The most viable successor government, in our view,
would be a coalition of centrist parties with similar
ideologies, because key elements of Haitian society
probably would support a moderate and no single
party is likely to receive a clear mandate. The political
center probably would present a formidable force in
the presidential election if the leading moderates put
aside their differences by backing one candidate to
lead a united front. The strongest coalition would
have the support of moderates in the church, the
military, and the business community and would draw
wide support from various social classes throughout
the country. We would also expect at least some
Duvalierists to quietly support a centrist coalition, if
only in an attempt to safeguard their interests.
Some leading moderates recognize that none of them
is likely to garner enough support nationwide for a
clear victory in November if they continue to act
independently, according to US officials. Such con-
tenders as Leslie Manigat, Marc Bazin, Louis Dejoie,
Hubert DeRonceray, and Gregoire Eugene, among
others, are aware of the similarity of their political
and economic views and of the costs of splitting the
centrist vote. ever-
al of these moderates explored various coalition op-
tions earlier this year, but so far they appear to be
unable to reach an accommodation. We believe that
direction from Namphy may be needed in order for
the moderates to put together and sustain a coalition.
Socialist-leaning nationalists, in our view, could also
form a surprise coalition and garner widespread popu-
lar support, especially if elements in the center and
moderate right fail to unite on a timely basis. Al-
though we doubt that such a ticket would appeal to
the business community and senior military officers, a
socialist platform of "de-Duvalierization" and social
reform, particularly a national literacy drive and
better health care, would be likely to attract some
support within the church and could become a power-
ful populist movement.
A Delayed Transition
Despite Namphy's reassertions that the Army has no
political ambitions, we believe the military might
insist on delaying the transition if public order were
threatened by widespread unrest. Radical groups re-
jecting the legitimacy of the council and its initiatives
have vowed publicly to disrupt the process with
protests. Should an already unstable security situation
threaten to become unmanageable close to the presi-
dential election, military leaders, in our view, would
become convinced that they had a responsibility to
retain power temporarily until a peaceful transfer of
power could be assured.
We believe there is a lesser, but still possible, chance
that the military might refuse to yield power on
schedule if it perceived the leading candidates or
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president-elect as too inept to govern Haiti.
Namphy continues to
disdain politicians, and that he and Brig. Gen.
Williams Regala, the council's other military mem-
ber, are unimpressed by the leading candidates on the
horizon. In our view, the three-month period between
the November election and the scheduled transfer of
power could prove to be an unusually difficult phase
of the transition because the president-elect is likely to
come under intense criticism from defeated oppo-
nents, thus eroding confidence in the new government
even before it takes office.
The military, in our view, would also be prepared to
delay the transition to protect its institutional inter-
ests. Given the Army's experience during the Duvalier
era, when the regime regarded it with suspicion and
executed or exiled many senior officers, we doubt that
Namphy and other military leaders would allow
anyone whom they perceive to be a serious threat to
the military to assume power, no matter how demo-
cratically elected. he
military leadership wants prior guarantees on its
future role and benefits from serious presidential
contenders in exchange for military support. We
believe any civilian administration would have to
secure the active support and confidence of Army
leaders before assuming power.
an elected president, for exam-
ple, would have to reassure the Army that he would
not seek retribution against officers for any impropri-
eties they may have committed while serving the
Against this backdrop, some elements may try to coax 25X1
Namphy to stay in power beyond his mandate. Al- 25X1
though Embassy reporting indicates 25X1
Namphy lacks strong political ambitions, we believe
there is an outside chance that Duvalierists and other
conservatives-inside and outside the government-
might press him to remain President indefinitely in
order to preserve continuity and stability and that he
may view it as his duty to do so.
senior military officers have
plans to intervene and extend the ruling council's
mandate to 1990 in the event of civil disorder or if 25X1
there is no clear-cut winner in the presidential election
in November 1987. Considering the erosion in popular
support for the military since Duvalier's ouster and
the widely differing political views in the Army itself,
we believe such a move would provoke civilian unrest
and mutinies in the ArmyF___1 25X1
Even if Namphy remains committed in principle to an
eventual transition to democracy, Regala and other
key military officers are more 25X1
cynical about the need for democratic institutions and
close ties to the Duvalier regime regard the course set
by the ruling council as too tolerant.
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2bAl
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Duvalier regime.
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LOA-1
While certainly the least likely scenario,
nevertheless sug-
gests to us that the same factors that may induce
Namphy to delay the transition could spur him to
cancel democratization altogether. Namphy told US
officials in January that a recurrence of widespread
disorders would prevent a successful transition to
civilian rule.
Namphy subsequently told Cabinet officers that one
of his main goals is to maintain order and stability.
He reportedly also vowed that the Army would react
harshly to unrest-a response we believe could raise
the level of violence and derail the transition
The greatest danger to democratic rule in Haiti, in
our view, probably will come after the scheduled
transition. We believe the task of creating a stable
political environment and effective democratic institu-
tions ultimately depends on the ability of the govern-
ment to satisfy some of the popular expectations for 25X1
economic progress and a purging of Duvalierists,
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while avoiding economic sabotage and political back-
lash by rightist elements perceiving a threat from
sweeping reforms. We believe that, even if various
centrist or socialist parties were to form a workable
coalition and win the election in November, the
cohesion of the-new government would be fragile.
Even the leading moderate front-runners are unsure
how to manage political affairs,
uch inexperience and timidity cou-
pled with a historical tendency toward political frag-
mentation would almost certainly, in our view, make
holding a coalition government together a difficult
task.
The new Constitution is designed to prevent the
recurrence of a dictatorship, but we believe its restric-
tions on the power of the civilian presidency will also
compound the new government's difficulty in consoli-
dating its rule. According to the Embassy, the Consti-
tution mandates a division of power among the presi-
dent, prime minister, and legislature. Considering the
already limited popularity of leading presidential con-
tenders, we believe this formula could lead to paralyz-
ing factionalism in the new government as newly
elected officials maneuver to consolidate power at the
expense of the President
Aside from internal weaknesses, we judge that the
maneuverings of extremists-on the right and the
left-would pose a serious danger to the viability of
any moderate or socialist coalition. In our view, the
popularity and credibility of any centrist movement
would suffer if the support it attracted from even a
few Duvalierist elements became public knowledge.
Indeed, the public outcry expected from open support
by Duvalierists could well unglue such a coalition
altogether. Moreover, we believe a socialist coalition
would be vulnerable to manipulation by the Commu-
nist Party or other Marxist elements.
In this environment, a return to civilian strongman
rule is a distinct danger. The Embassy reports that
several leading moderate contenders appear to favor
the tradition of a strong executive. Even a government
initially committed to democracy might, in our view,
employ tough measures against political adversaries
in an attempt to survive and could gradually cross the
threshold into dictatorship, perhaps with the mili-
tary's blessing.
If, on the other hand, the civilian leadership failed to
consolidate its rule quickly by co-opting key power
centers in the Army, the church, and the business
community, we believe the new government could be
overthrown by even a short period of unrest. The fall
of the new government, in turn, might lead to a
succession of weak civilian governments. In a more
likely scenario, however, we believe a deteriorating
security situation would be a strong incentive for the
military leadership to again "assume its responsibili-
ties" and seize power.
Implications for the United States
We believe a politically stable and democratic Haiti
would be viewed by Haitian and other Caribbean
leaders as compelling evidence of the US commitment
to democracy and development in the region. The
transition's success would provide a concrete example
that Washington, by backing up stated good inten-
tions with actions tangibly benefiting a Caribbean
nation, did more than simply facilitate a dictator's
departure.
We expect leading presidential contenders and possi-
bly other Haitians to seek electoral assistance from
Washington in order to guarantee the legitimacy of
the election results.
Namphy and Regala oppose the nine-member elector-
al commission recently established by the Constituent
Assembly to oversee elections because it is not con-
trolled by the government. Should the council attempt
to frustrate the independent body's work, we would
expect some Haitians to ask the United States to
pressure the council to accept outside monitoring of
election balloting in order to minimize potential
fraud. On the basis of the country's inexperience in
conducting credible elections, we judge that Haitian
officials would request extensive outside guidance in
civic education and in the mechanics of carrying out
elections. A minority, however, would be certain to
charge that any direct assistance is an attempt by the
United States to manipulate political developments.
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We believe that, if a civilian president is installed, the
Haitian Government will almost certainly seek imme-
diate and substantial US, economic and military aid
to ensure political stability. We believe most of the
leading moderates who might win the presidency in a
fair vote to be strongly pro-US, and they would expect
the quick infusion of US assistance. A leftist coalition,
in our view, would pursue a policy of nonalignment
but still expect a large inflow of US assistance.
Successful transitions from authoritarian to demo-
cratic governments elsewhere in Latin America sug-
gest that even a modest US commitment in these
areas helps reinforce the legitimacy of the new gov-
ernment and improves its chances of success.
A stalled or aborted transition, in our view, could be
more problematic for the United States. At a mini-
mum, we would expect a heightening of anti-US
sentiment, potentially threatening to US nationals
and property. Moreover, we.believe ensuing political
polarization could trigger violent clashes between
leftist and rightist factions that the Haitian Govern-
ment might well be unable to control. Such a deterio-
rating security situation could create a flood of refu-
gees to the United States and raise the chances that
Haitian or other Caribbean leaders would seek a
wider US role-possibly direct military interven-
tion-to restore order and political stability.F___1 25X1
The reemergence of authoritarian rule in Haiti could
be expected to present Washington with a serious
dilemma in its relations with Port-au-Prince. We
believe Haitians and other Latin Americans would
increasingly question the US commitment to democ-
racy in the region if Washington failed to make a
meaningful gesture of disapproval of a dictatorial
Haitian regime. International human rights groups
probably would lobby hard for withholding US aid.
At the same time, however, pro-US moderates in 25X1
Haiti would see a major reduction in aid not only as a
serious blow to their political clout, but also as a move
that could strengthen leftist arguments that real
change in Haiti can occur only through revolutionary
tactics 25X1
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Appendix A
Major Political Players and
Presidential Contenders
Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy, President
A political novice and reluctant head of state ... recently more active, visible, and
confident ... widely regarded as an honest soldier ... governs with aid of small
circle of advisers ... moving toward more results-oriented governing, more formal
leadership style ... committed to seeing Haiti through the transition period ... has
denied having personal political ambitions, but unfavorably impressed with
potential successors, new Constitution ... 55.F___1 25X1
Brig. Gen. Williams Regala
Controversial ... also Minister of Interior and Defense, Assistant Chief of Staff of
armed forces ... probably most important decisionmaker in government ... re-
cently engineered military reshuffle to gain greater control over military ...
ambitions, raises public concerns about his political agenda ... 50.
The Right
Clovis Desinor
Old-guard Duvalierist, former heir apparent to Francois Duvalier ... frequently
mentioned as presidential contender ... may be political favorite of some senior
military officers, but has no political party or campaign platform ... 71
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Adrien Raymond
Career diplomat, Duvalierist politician ... led political party of regrouped Duva-
lierists until hostile popular reaction forced group to unilaterally disband last
November ... reportedly planning to reactivate Duvalierist network
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if opportunity arises ... 58.
2,25X1
Marc Bazin, Movement for the Installation of Democracy (MIDH)
Paris-educated lawyer, highly regarded international banker ... former World
Bank employee ... served briefly as Finance Minister under Jean-Claude
Duvalier ... respected by Haitian businessmen, popular with moderate church
elements ... greatest liability is local perception he is "Washington's candidate"
... 55.
Sylvio Claude, Haitian Christian Democratic Party (PDCN)
Protestant minister prominent in opposition to Duvalier regime ... repeatedly
arrested, imprisoned, beaten for political activity ... ideology nebulous, sometimes
contradictory ... believes God has chosen him to lead Haiti ..
ambitious ... 53.
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Hubert DeRonceray, Movement for National Development (MDN)
Internationally respected, Canadian-trained sociologist, educator ... former Duva-
lierist Cabinet officer, later persecuted for criticizing regime . 25X1
.55 25X11
tion, solid anti-Duvalier credentials owe much to current popularity ... 59. 125X1
Louis Dejoie, National Agricultural and Industrial Party (PAIN)
Wealthy, Puerto Rico-based mulatto industrialist ... son of Louis Dejoie, Sr.,
presidential candidate defeated by Francois Duvalier in 1957... name reco ni-
Thomas Desulme, National Labor Party (PNT)
Former Duvalierist senator, prosperous plastics manufacturer during exile in
Jamaica ... campaign theme is increased employment, but lacks coherent policies
... exaggerates private-sector support ... electorate may resent past political
connections ... about 74
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Gregoire Eugene, Haitian Social Christian Party (PSCH)
Constitutional lawyer, strong academic background ... good public speaker=
negotiations with Duva-
lier regime in 1985 for legal recognition of PSCH tarnished his image, damaged
his credibility ... 63
Leslie Manigat, National Democratic Group of Haiti (RDNP)
Internationally known, highly regarded educator ... has played moderate, con-
structive role in Haiti's political process since returning from exile in Venezuela
... has international Christian Democratic and socialist links ... former Duvalier-
ist official, who broke with regime in early 1960s over human rights abuses ...
presidential campaign may be handicapped by past Duvalierist connection ...
about 57.
Rene Theodore, United Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH)
General Secretary of pro-Soviet party since 1978 ... exiled for 22 years in the
USSR, France, and Cuba ... strongly supports new Constitution ... increasingly
popular and active, especially in northern Haiti,
47.
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Appendix B
Haiti: Daunting Economic
Challenges
President Namphy inherited overwhelming economic
problems from the ousted Duvalier regime that wors-
ened further in the immediate aftermath of the
dictator's departure. US Embassy and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) reports indicate that by early
1986 the Duvalier government had depleted foreign
reserves to less than three weeks' import coverage and
had run up sizable arrears on debt obligations to meet
day-to-day expenses. Unchecked public spending,
partly on make-work jobs and handouts to attempt to
quell anti-Duvalier protests, had increased the rate of
inflation to 20 percent and undermined the country's
already weak international creditworthiness. More-
over, business activity slackened in response to the
initial protests during late 1986 and early 1987 and
subsequent labor unrest among Haitians expecting
immediate economic improvements upon Duvalier's
departure. Foreign donors-skeptical of the new go-
vernment's ability to restart the economy-initially
restricted their contributions to emergency aid for
food and repair of riot damage, leaving Namphy to
cope with critical foreign exchange shortages.F_~
While the measures taken were appropriate for en-
couraging longer term recovery, in the short term the
economic downturn was merely slowed. Real GDP
declined by 1.5 percent in 1986, according to the
IMF, as a result of reduced government spending,
faltering business confidence, labor difficulties, and a
drop in tourism. Curtailed operations by many foreign
investors caused a 25-percent drop in employment in
the key light assembly sector-roughly 15,000 jobs,
according to US Embassy reporting. The govern-
ment's program, however, slowed the rate of inflation
to almost zero by the end of last year.
The decline in imports, resulting from the sluggish
economy, and the ruling council's clampdown on graft
and corruption helped to boost the country's foreign
reserves from $6 million to roughly $36 million by
yearend 1986, according to IMF reporting. The drop
in imports offset declines in sales by the light assem-
bly industry-which contributes almost 60 percent of
total export earnings-and a falloff in agricultural
exports other than coffee. The hike in foreign grants 25X1
in response to government economic reforms also
To attract additional foreign aid, Namphy in April
1986 authorized newly appointed Finance Minister
Delatour to take the measures needed to stabilize the
economy. The US Embassy reports that Delatour in
1986 slashed public spending by one-third. Delatour
pared expenditures on existing programs, closed the
country's two largest money-losing state enterprises-
the Darbonne Sugar Mill and the Edible Oil Fac-
tory-and streamlined many remaining public firms.
He also pushed through tighter monetary measures,
mainly increasing reserve requirements for commer-
cial banks and raising the ceilings on interest rates. In
addition, he abolished nearly all import quotas and
lowered tariffs and export taxes in an effort to
increase the competitiveness of local firms and boost
foreign exchange earnings.
increased reserves.
Near-Term Prospects
Increased aid flows, in our opinion, will provide some
economic breathing space during the electoral period.
Approval in December 1986 of a $21 million, three-
year IMF Structural Adjustment Facility has served
as a linchpin for as much as $200 million in pledges of
foreign aid-mainly from the United States and
France-for disbursement in 1987. We believe rising
imports of food and key inputs such as petroleum,
other raw materials, and intermediate goods for agri-
culture and manufacturing will push real economic
growth to 2 or 3 percent this year. We believe,
however, that the recent drop in world coffee prices
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Public-Sector Budget Deficit,
as a Share of GDP
Percent
1981 82 83 84 85 86a
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and lingering investor uncertainty abroad will keep
the economy from reaching the 4- to 5-percent rate
anticipated by IMF and Haitian officials.
The ability of the next administration to sustain
economic growth will depend largely on continued
adherence to the IMF program and the responsiveness
of foreign donors. In recent years, foreign aid has
accounted for about 30 percent of public-sector reve-
nues, 65 percent of public investment, and 40 percent
of imports. According to US Embassy reports, recent
economic reforms are due solely to Delatour-highly
unpopular with many Haitians-and could quickly
unravel as their full impact hits domestically. The
closure in April of two more publicly owned sugar
mills already has deepened public criticism of Dela-
tour. Even if the economy performs better than we
anticipate, expected layoffs of public employees prob-
ably would prevent a substantial reduction in the
current 50-percent rate of unemployment and under-
employment over the next few years. In this environ-
ment, there is a risk, in our view, that a new
president-trying to bolster his popularity-could see
firing Delatour as a way to further consolidate his
position. Such a move, however, probably would again
set economic policy adrift and increase the reluctance
of already cautious donors to provide aid.
We judge that the government's success in reviving
the economy also hinges on its ability to reassure
cautious foreign investors. The international business
community will pay special attention to the govern-
ment's responsiveness to continued labor demands for
higher wages. Foreign investors repeatedly have told
Namphy that any wage hikes would make Haitian
labor-the country's most abundant natural re-
source-uncompetitive with such neighboring coun-
tries as Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.F_
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